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General Introduction 
I 
This is a book about the history of colonial law in German New Guinea. When I started work I thought that I had chosen an unexciting but straightforward task which could be completed 
within a few months and would produce a neat monograph that filled a minor gap in the literature 
of the history of the Pacific Islands. I was wrong because it turned out that neither the 
conventional, normative approach to law nor the conventional, narrative approach to history were 
suitable for dealing with colonial law as a historical phenomenon. I therefore had to choose 
between abandoning the project and expanding it to include a critical examination of these general 
approaches, in the hope that this would enable me to develop more suitable alternatives which I 
could then apply to my particular topic. Since it was by then also clear that this topic raised more 
interesting issues than I had expected I opted for the second choice. 
My persistence produced a necessarily awkward book. This awkwardness is already reflected 
in the shape of this introduction. Instead of setting the scene with a lively thumbnail sketch of the 
history of German New Guinea, it firstly tries to demonstrate that it is impossible to draw such a 
sketch which meets the normal academic standards of critical rationality. Secondly, it tries to 
demonstrate that the history of colonial law in German New Guinea should be seen as a 
manifestation of two interrelated global processes, namely the narrative phantomisation of the 
history of modem governments and the transformation of the legal ideal of "the Rule of Law" into 
a bureaucratic governmental technology. 
Thirdly, this introduction tries to demonstrate that this transformation produces historical 
records of the structures and exercises of governmental powers which can be utilised for a more 
realistic but also more cumbersome approach to the history of colonial law in German New 
Guinea which historians refuse to adopt because they regard it as detrimental to their professional 
self-interest, just as lawyers refuse, for the same reason, to adopt a more realistic approach to law 
as a historical phenomenon. 
In short, this is a book for people who are prepared to consider that "the Past" is no more 
mysterious but also no less complex than "the Present" and that it is no more justified to sacrifice 
normal academic standards for the sake of greater readability in the study of history than in the 
study of any other subject. 
II 
German New Guinea was the least prominent among the German colonies and the German 
colonial empire was born later and died earlier than any of its modem western counterparts. Why 
then rescue the colonial law which applied in this remote comer of the globe for three decades or 
so from the proverbial scrap-heap of history? Why indeed, as there appears to be a general 
consensus that all forms of colonial law are historically irrelevant because none of them 
accomplished its task of protecting the indigenous inhabitants of colonies from being oppressed 
and exploited? All a history of colonial law in German New Guinea can do under these 
circumstances, so it appears, is to illustrate this failure in detail by examining the relevant 
historical records, in particular the decisions of the colonial courts in cases involving "natives"' 
as plaintiffs or victims, and there are many other colonies which offer a more attractive target for 
such an exercise than German New Guinea with its comparatively short and undramatic life. 
1 Since the term "native" was an official term of central importance in the exercise of German colonial rule, replacing 
it with less offensive alternatives would distort history. 
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This blanket dismissal of colonial law, however, is due to a misunderstanding of its historical 
role or, rather, to an acceptance of an idealised perception of law promoted by lawyers which 
portrays law as an instrument for the protection of the rights of individuals from arbitrary and 
unjust actions, especially by the executive arm of government. 
Compared with this image, the performance of colonial law in German New Guinea left a great 
deal to be desired, but to dismiss it for this reason as historically irrelevant misses the point 
because a protection of individual rights was not its primary historical function. Like all forms of 
modern western law, colonial and metropolitan, the colonial law of German New Guinea was, first 
and foremost, an instrument of government. It was used to organise and operate a system of 
government in which law served as an administrative technology concerned with efficiency rather 
than justice and with the exercise of the powers of government rather than with the protection of 
the rights of citizens. 
As soon as this historical, as opposed to jurisprudential, perception of law is accepted, colonial 
law moves into the centre of the stage of colonial history, since the creation of colonial states was 
the most important historical result of modern western colonialism and since colonial law, seen 
as constitutional and administrative rather than as civil and criminal law, played a crucial part in 
their creation. 
Moreover, the same factors which seem to make German New Guinea historically unattractive 
turn it into a promising case study of the role of law in the exercise of colonial rule. Firstly, 
German colonial law came into existence at the height of modern western colonialism and ceased 
to operate before it went into decline, so that it represents the type of modern western colonial law 
in a purer and more concentrated form than the law of other colonial powers. Secondly, German 
New Guinea had a large economic potential, whereas its indigenous population was politically too 
fragmented to constitute a serious military threat, so that modern western colonial rule was in a 
better position to show its true, administrative and economic, colours than in other German 
colonies which either lacked this economic potential, like German Samoa, or whose history was 
dominated by military events, like that of German Southwest Africa. 
But this is not all; the historical dismissal of colonial law has helped to distort the perspective 
from which colonial rule is viewed by focusing attention on highly visible but secondary features. 
By identifying colonial rule with white rule over territories with coloured indigenous populations, 
it suggests that foreign, racist domination was its essential characteristic. Yet the history of 
colonial law, and its fate after the colonies gained political independence, indicate that colonial 
rule is not the rule of a master race but of a master state which colonises whatever populations 
happen to occupy its territory and which treats the economic development of this territory as its 
central task as well as its legitimation. That this colonial state, in the typical historical setting, was 
a foreign imposition and that the bulk of the population under its rule consisted of members of 
allegedly inferior races is, seen in retrospect, no more than an added bonus, since the treatment 
of coloured people as colonial subjects was regarded as natural by those who would have had the 
power to stop it, whereas a sudden transformation of white, metropolitan citizens into colonial 
subjects would have met with fierce opposition. It can only be brought about gradually, and it is 
happening all around us. Instead of living in an age of decolonisation we are all being colonised 
by developmentalist, territorial states which use people, irrespective of their race, as an economic 
resource and law as their central administrative technology. Far from being historically irrelevant, 
colonial law, the Rule of Law as a bureaucratic form of government, is on its way to achieving a 
global triumph. 
m 
When I had reached this point I too was triumphant. Instead of writing a history of the colonial 
law of German New Guinea, which was of direct interest only to a handful of academic 
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specialists, I could write a history of the global colonisation of humankind which would be read 
by millions upon millions of its victims who had hitherto been kept in the dark about what was 
going on. But my triumph evaporated when I began to consider how the historians fitted into this 
great conspiracy. 
While it made sense for lawyers to dismiss colonial law as an aberration and to assure 
everybody that the Rule of Law stood for the taming of a tyrannical executive by an independent 
judiciary, firmly committed to the protection of the rights of individuals, it was odd that the 
historians should have fallen for this professional propaganda instead of gleefully unmasking it. 
What did historians gain by adopting the lawyers' ahistorical, jurisprudential perception of law? 
It happened to serve their professional self-interest as well, albeit in an indirect and negative 
manner. It suits historians to treat law as a normative order which stands outside history and is 
therefore none of their business, because law as a historical phenomenon does not fit into the 
perception of history they have adopted: the image of history as narrative or, to be more precise, 
as a particular form of factual rather than fictional narrative. 
Seen from a professional historical perspective the problem with colonial law is not that it 
failed to protect the rights of indigenous people but that its history is not narratable, because it is 
concerned with structures rather than events, with the shape of the stage on which historical actors 
perform rather than with their actions. The alleged failure of colonial law merely provides 
historians with an alibi for declaring colonial law to be historically irrelevant, instead of having 
to admit that their approach to history disables them from dealing with law as a historical 
phenomenon. 
As is to be expected, law as a historical phenomenon causes similar problems for lawyers, 
since it does not fit either into their professional perception of law as a particular, namely 
judicially enforceable, normative order. Law as an instrument for the organisation of government 
is no more normative than it is narratable. It creates institutional and procedural structures instead 
of prescribing them; they henceforth actually exist, although as sociopolitical rather than physical 
facts (see Sack, 1990). Lawyers deal with the problem of non-normative forms of law not by 
dismissing them as legally irrelevant but by treating them as if they were normative law, by 
translating them into a normative language, by creating a phantom world of quasi-normativity 
where the distinction between norms and facts does not apply (see Sack, 1994). This allows them 
to maintain the illusion of the unity of law as a normative order but blinds them to the fact that 
these non-normative forms of law can replace normative law and that a fully organised body 
politic has neither the need nor the room for law as a judicially enforceable normative order. 
Historians pursue the same strategy in relation to non-narratable history: they treat it as if it 
was narratable and have developed a form of quasi-narrative which allows them to deal with it. 
But their task is more awkward because they have to present their narrative history as being 
descriptive rather than prescriptive. Historians have an inescapable professional commitment to 
factuality. They have to insist that their accounts are factual, rather than fictional, because it is this 
claim which legitimates the writing of history as a professional enterprise, just as the lawyers have 
to insist that they deal with norms, rather than facts, in order to legitimate the administration of 
justice as a distinct professional enterprise-and a professional commitment to justice is indeed 
the legal counterpart to the historians' professional commitment to factuality. 
But the world of the ought in which lawyers have established their professional home is 
different from the world of the is-or, rather, the has been-in which historians operate. Lawyers 
cannot only openly construct law as a normative order, they also can, and do, formulate rules of 
evidence and standards of proof which determine what does and what does not count legally as 
a fact, although these rules and standards too are the product of normative decisions claimed to 
promote justice. By contrast, historians have to purport that they are merely reconstructing history. 
Yet it is plain that the history which is taking place in the Here and Now does not take the form 
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of a narrative, so that narrative history always translates history into something which it is not. 
Narrative history is always phantom history, even if it is factually accurate. Such factually accurate 
stories, however, are also only stories about history. To maintain that history is narrative and that 
factually accurate narratives are history is therefore-in fact-a normative act. 
Historians go still further by maintaining that only narrative history is history, just as lawyers 
claim that only normative law is law. This is where the problems really start, because there is 
much in the field of history which is not narratable, just as there is much in the field of law which 
is not normative. Since historians are not satisfied to tell factually accurate stories about the past 
which represent isolated fragments of history, but claim that the entire history of humankind can 
be told as a master narrative, they have to translate the non-narratable parts of history into a 
narrative language, just as lawyers have to translate the non-normative parts of law into a 
normative language, as long as they insist that law in its entirety is a normative system. But 
whereas lawyers can shrug off this counter-factual normativisation of law, the counter-factual 
narrativisation of history clashes directly with the historians' professional commitment to 
factuality. 
Historians deal with this dilemma by turning the field of history into a mysterious phantom 
world where the distinction between fact and fiction, and indeed any other normal standards of 
critical rationality, do not apply. But instead of openly denying the validity of these standards for 
the field of history and of adopting different standards of their own, historians tum them too into 
phantoms which are applied in a phantom fashion, although all these phantoms are treated as real. 
However, this narrative phantomisation of history does not protect narrative history any better 
from the effects of the global colonisation of humankind than the normative phantomisation of law 
protects normative law. A fully bureaucratised body politic also has no need or room for narrative 
history. Its entire history has been reduced to sets of statistical data which speak to us in 
impersonal numerical patterns. But until this happens, and perhaps beyond, historians can continue 
to market their familiar narrative products, and they become narratively even more attractive, 
precisely because they have less and less in common with the actual history they purport to 
describe. 
IV 
So much for the great conspiracy. It does not exist, although its story can be told in the form of 
a phantom narrative, featuring a few evil men plotting behind the scene and, of course, some 
knights in shining armour who are fighting them with superhuman courage and who will 
ultimately vanquish the villains so that we can all live happily ever after. In the real world the 
global colonisation of humankind takes the form of a myriad of small structural changes. They 
usually follow the path of least resistance and w ill eventually crush those who have helped them 
along as much as those who opposed them. This does not mean that these structural changes are 
inevitable or that they are not the result of human actions, but it does mean that a narrative 
approach to history is no more able to describe them accurately than a normative approach to law 
is able to prevent them from actually occurring. 
Unfortunately these considerations did not just take me back to square one. They also 
suggested that I would get into deep trouble if I persisted with my modest case study of the 
colonial law of German New Guinea, because law as a historical phenomenon is meant to fall 
through the gap between normative law and narrative history. Neither the normative approach to 
law nor the narrative approach to history were invented during a recent weekend of brain-storming 
as being professionally desirable; rather, both approaches have deep cultural roots and serve 
general ideological as well as specific professional needs. 
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If I was going to persist, I therefore not only had to develop an alternative approach to history, 
but this approach was unlikely to meet the western cultural expectations of what history is 
supposed to look like. Moreover, it had to compete with the narrative phantom histories of 
colonial rule in Gennan New Guinea which did-and phantoms are real as phantoms, even if they 
are not what they claim to be. My first task was therefore to show that these narrative phantom 
histories, although they looked like proper history, were in fact seriously distorted over­
simplifications. 
When I considered what I perceived as phantom history, and why I found it unacceptable as 
an academic enterprise, things started to fall into place: it all had to do with the historical record 
understood as the sum total of information about the past available in the Here and Now. Just as 
the normative approach to law grew out of the age-old technique of guiding human behaviour by 
means of commands, the narrative approach to history grew out of the age-old technique of 
transmitting information about the past in the form of stories. History became to be perceived as 
a body of stories which were treated as true, in the sense of being in accordance with the facts and 
which, apart from physical remains, were themselves initially the only historical record of what 
had happened. But this changed when the recording of written information became an increasingly 
important part of the conduct of human affairs and when governments, in particular, began to 
engage in a systematic recording of information relating to their activities. 
How did the essentially pre-modem, narrative approach to history cope with the rising flood 
of recorded information, much of which no longer consisted of stories but of naked facts and 
figures, relating to repetitive actions which, taken individually, lacked any narrative potential? And 
this was not the only challenge, the scope of history also expanded. History was no longer 
concerned with the history of particular groups of people but with that of the universe which was 
beginning to be explored by a growing number of increasingly specialised academic professions 
whose findings all affected the view of what was historically admissible. 
Narrative historians responded to these challenges by turning history also into a distinct 
academic discipline. But while they insisted that the growing historical record could no longer be 
mastered without specialised expertise, they also pretended that otherwise nothing had changed 
and that academic history could still be told in the form of a traditional creation myth which was 
both factual and ideologically meaningful. To claim that islands were the backbones of culture 
heroes became historically unacceptable, but the idea remained that history consisted of stories 
about the unique deeds of somewhat smaller heroes and villains, so that historians were still 
capable of delivering their familiar and satisfying narrative fare. 
In order to be able to do so, historians had to make more and more general statements 
supported by a smaller and smaller selection of facts, based on a less and less thorough 
examination of the relevant historical record. As a result history, although now seen as an 
academic discipline, became increasingly less capable of applying the normal standards of critical 
rationality which are, of course, different from the artistic standards by which the quality of a 
narrative as narrative is judged. Yet, narrative historians could not openly abandon their 
commitment to factuality because any form of history is pointless as history if it is treated as 
fiction. 
In this regard indeed nothing has changed. What has changed is that for history as an academic 
enterprise factuality is no longer a matter of belief. A statement purporting to be a statement of 
fact is academically acceptable only if it is logically possible, if it can be proved, or at least not 
be disproved, and if it is also not inconsistent with other purported statements of facts which meet 
these requirements. 
To be sure, this definition of academic factuality raises difficult questions which can be turned 
into an argument that these standards are, in principle, inappropriate in the field of history, since 
it is concerned with a mysterious past rather than an observable present. But this argument 
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becomes largely irrelevant once we accept that academic historiography can only deal with the 
historical record as it exists in the present. It is the historical record that determines what 
historiographers can and cannot be expected to do. If there is no historical record relating to a 
piece of history narrative historians can do with it what they like, provided they can convince their 
audience that the figments of their imagination are factual, whereas academic historiographers can 
do nothing because they have no material to work with. Conversely, a person brave enough to 
attempt writing a factual history of the universe-or of the global colonisation of humankind-has 
to consider the entire historical record available for this topic at the time of writing. Although it 
is a physical impossibility to do so, these limitations have no effect on the factuality of the account 
produced. Nor can such a person hide behind the authority of the sources used. On the contrary, 
the adoption of existing phantoms is a more serious defect than their creation, because it 
demonstrates that the process of continuing quality control, which is essential for every academic 
enterprise, has broken down. 
On the other hand, while the eminence of its creator does not make a historical phantom 
academically acceptable, no historiographer can be expected to offer more than what emerges 
from a critical analysis of the available historical record. A commitment to factuality requires 
historiographers not to be objectively factual but to get as close to factuality as the historical 
record allows them to go. Factuality is a historiographical ideal rather than an actual state of 
affairs, just as justice is a jurisprudential ideal. While this takes the mystery out of academic 
historiography, it makes the task of the historiographer more onerous because it turns factuality 
into an insoluble problem. Factuality is no longer something which can be taken for granted but 
a goal historiographers have to strive for continuously, although it will forever remain beyond 
their reach. 
The commitment to factuality forces historiographers to take the historical record seriously. 
Instead of serving as a quarry from which narratively attractive information can be mined 
selectively, it has to be studied systematically as a whole the structure of which can tell us more 
about history than its component parts. This is the price that has to be paid for turning 
historiography into a genuine academic enterprise: instead of being the master of history the 
historiographer becomes the servant of the historical record. No wonder that narrative historians, 
as well as their readers, are reluctant to pay this price, and that they come up with all kinds of 
excuses which appear to justify the continuation of the accustomed narrative freedom-and 
narrative freedom is worth fighting for: it enables historians to write the history of virtually 
anything as if it were written for the first time, apparently independently of all the accounts other 
historians have already devoted to the same topic. 
This does not mean that these narratives are independent of each other, it merely means that 
a critical analysis of previous efforts is not a visible part of narrative history. The critical analysis 
of the sources becomes a hidden academic prelude to wnich references are made in footnotes 
which indicate that this laborious task has been carried out but that there is no reason to expose 
the reader to its boring performance. 
As far as the finished product is concerned all sources become part of a quarry of information, 
and narrative historians have to mine it only as deeply and broadly as their narrative requires. They 
can rely exclusively on one or two secondary sources for part of their narrative. Indeed, they have 
no choice, apart from remaining silent, if the primary sources are, for one reason or other, 
inaccessible to them, or if their topic is so big that they cannot possibly cope with all the relevant 
sources themselves. The beauty of narrative history is that those writing it do not have to tell their 
readers whether and how they have checked the reliability of their sources, so that phantom history 
can spread undetected through the historical record, lingering on indefinitely. 
Taking the historical record seriously puts historians in a different position. But it takes a little 
case study to demonstrate that it is so, and that means starting to face up to facts and more facts 
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instead of continuing the line of general assertions presented so far. But this also takes us to the 
crux of the matter: history as an academic enterprise is about facts and more facts and not about 
the selection of small samples of facts--0r the production of phantoms-in support of politically 
more correct, or ideologically more pleasing, or intellectually more exciting interpretations of 
history. 
v 
Let us compare the position of a historian writing a history of colonial rule in German New 
Guinea with that of a historian who wants to write a history of the Melanesians and Micronesians 
who lived in this colony while it was under German rule.2 
German New Guinea is a reasonably well defined historical stage in terms of geographical 
space as well as astronomical time. It came into existence officially on 17 May 1885 when the 
German emperor granted the Neu Guinea Kompagnie a charter to govern the northeastern quarter 
of New Guinea, called "Kaiser Wilhelmsland", the New Britain Archipelago, renamed the 
"Bismarck Archipelago", and all other islands within the geographical area defined in this 
document. 
German New Guinea grew and shrank in a series of steps. In 1886 the northern section of the 
Solomon Islands was added. In 1899 the "Island Territory" in Micronesia, comprising the 
Carolines, including Palau, and the Marianas, excluding Guam, which had been acquired from 
Spain, was placed under the governor of German New Guinea. On the other hand, Germany ceded 
during the same year the southern part of the northern Solomons to Britain as part of an agreement 
which was primarily concerned with Samoa. In 1906 the Marshall Islands, also in Micronesia, 
which had been a separate German colony since 1885, and included Nauru as from 1888, were 
incorporated into the Island Territory. As from 1910, it formed part of a single budgetary entity 
together with the "Old Protectorate" in Melanesia. German colonial rule in this combined territory 
came officially to an end on 17 September 1914, when the acting German governor signed the 
terms of the capitulation to the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force. 
Not only the beginning and the end of German colonial rule, and its territorial fluctuations, 
were marked by legal documents, its exercise during the approximately 30 years in between 
produced a voluminous legal or quasi-legal record in the form of legislation and administrative 
instructions, judicial and administrative decisions, budgets and accounts, registers and licences, 
which form a solid basis for writing a factual history of German colonial rule. 
By contrast the Melanesians and Micronesians living in German New Guinea did not form a 
single historical entity, neither at the beginning nor at the end of German colonial rule. Instead of 
being able to write one history, our historian would therefore have to write a large number of 
histories, one for each of the largest traditional entities to which these Melanesians and 
Micronesians belonged. Almost no information relating to the events making up these histories 
was recorded in writing by Melanesians or Micronesians at the time they occurred, because 
writing was not part of traditional Melanesian or Micronesian cultures. Nor does much 
information relating to events during the period of German colonial rule still exist in the form of 
the memories of Melanesian or Micronesian participants or observers, because these eye-witnesses 
are by now almost all dead. What has been preserved of their memories now exists mainly in the 
form of oral traditions which, naturally, have been influenced by what has happened since. As 
most of these oral traditions remain unrecorded, our historian thus would have to begin his task 
2 What follows is a hypothetical exercise, not a review of the efforts of any historian who actually followed this path. As 
we shall see, such historians do exist but they do not appear to be concerned about the preliminary questions which in my 
view need to be addressed before examining the historical record. 
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by going into the field to record at least a representative sample of these oral traditions, whatever 
this may mean. 
He can, of course, also utilise the written historical records of German colonial rule. They do 
contain a great deal of information about events in which Melanesians and Micronesians 
participated, but this information relates mainly to their involvement in the colonisation process, 
be it as policemen or criminals, as plantation labourers, or patients in colonial hospitals. True, it 
is possible and legitimate to read this information against its grain, as it were, and write a history 
of German colonial rule, which shows Melanesians and Micronesians as historical actors rather 
than as objects of the colonisation process, but this still identifies their history with this process. 
It does not, and cannot, show how Melanesians and Micronesians conducted their own affairs 
during the period of German colonial rule which often had little or no impact on what was 
happening at the local level. Hence, a historian who seriously wants to write a history of the 
Melanesians and Micronesians under German colonial rule has no choice but to rely primarily on 
their oral traditions. 
Let us examine the case of "the Tolai" in the northeastern part of the Gazelle Peninsula of New 
Britain, which became the main centre of German colonial rule, to find out what kind of 
information their oral traditions have to offer. 
Even the name "Tolai" is a product of colonial history which had not yet come into use at the 
end of German colonial rule. This lack of a traditional tribal name is not surprising because the 
people in question had no traditional tribal organisation. They therefore also had no traditional 
tribal history. The vunatarai (clans), the central units of traditional Tolai sociopolitical 
organisation, functioned and are still functioning as changing networks of interpersonal 
relationships rather than as corporate bodies. The impressive Tolai genealogies, compiled some 
30 years ago in connection with an attempt by the Australian colonial government to demarcate 
and register customary land, are as much a creation of colonial history as the name "Tolai". Tolai 
traditionally did not have "family trees" which allocated individuals a place in a grid of biological 
descent. Consequently Tolai also have no clan histories tracing the descent of all current members 
of a vunatarai back to a founding ancestor or, rather, an ancestress, since Tolai social organisation 
is matrilineal. Instead each Tolai has a smaller or larger fund of stories about the past which relate 
to particular, unconnected events. Like modern western narrative history, these stories are treated 
as factual. However, Tolai regard it as natural that different people have different stories relating 
to the same subject matter, and that even stories told by the same person can contradict each other. 
All these stories stand side by side as self-contained bodies of information in a field of history 
where nothing is impossible. 
There are different kinds of stories; for example those which tell how certain features of 
traditional Tolai culture came into being. A good illustration is the story of how the two culture 
heroes established the two blood-lines that form the backbone of traditional Tolai social 
organisation by turning two differently coloured coconuts into two women whose children must 
continue cooperating with each other to "mother" and "father" human beings rather than animals 
(for details, see Sack, 1989). But there are no stories dealing with the subsequent history of these 
two bloodlines. Instead there is another layer of stories. They tell how different waves of Tolai 
arrived in the Gazelle Peninsula (for details see Sack, 1987). Whereas "culture" stories do not 
relate to particular groups of people, "migration" stories do. They not only relate specifically to 
one of the waves of migrants but narrow down the history of this wave. They are told from the 
perspective of the vunatarai to which the narrator belongs and show how his line of people (taral) 
came into being by establishing its madapai (heartland) in a particular area as its base (vuna). 
While culture and migration stories are public in the sense that they are readily told to 
outsiders, the history of the various vunatarai is not. Nor is it taught to all its living members. The 
reason is not that the Tolai regard their history as unimportant but, on the contrary, that they treat 
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historical knowledge as a source of sociopolitical power. This applies most strongly to vunatarai 
history which has the primary function of establishing and maintaining claims to land. Vunatarai 
history is not concerned with heroic deeds or tragedies but with ordinary activities, linking people 
directly with land or indirectly by linking them with other people who established such direct links 
by making gardens, building houses, planting trees or collecting vines. 
Vunatarai history is part of competitive politics. Disputes over land are argued in terms of 
competing stories about the use of the land in the past and the relationships between past users and 
current claimants. It is essential under these circumstances to treat all these stories as 
factual-since it is pointless to argue about fiction-but also essential to accept none of them as 
being permanently true, so as to allow for future adjustments as the political power of different 
sets of stories grows or shrinks. 
Put differently, Tolai do not have their kind of oral traditions because they were traditionally 
incapable of producing written records but because their society cannot operate in the traditional 
mode if it has to deal with written records of its operation. Instead of increasing the efficiency of 
its operation the production of written records would be dysfunctional. 
By contrast, the culture stories have a stabilising ideological role. They describe how central 
features of Tolai culture and society came into being, instead of explaining why they came into 
being, let alone justifying their existence by presenting them as good or, at least, as being better 
than alternatives. The culture heroes are neither creators nor law-givers. On the contrary, the two 
bloodlines come into being by accident, not by design. Yet they are the only permanent feature of 
traditional Tolai society and the very basis of human existence. They are not something ordinary 
human beings can change or could have brought about. 
This is different as far as the existence of vunatarai is concerned. It is not attributed to the 
culture heroes or to other superhuman forces. Vunatarai came into being as a consequence of 
people turning nature into human living space. Seen from the Tolai perspective, vunatarai are not 
subdivisions of the two bloodlines but clusters of people which formed because the existence of 
these two bloodlines ruled out the nuclear family as a basis for a permanent social body, since not 
the children of an original male settler but their spouses and, in the next generation, the children 
of his "daughters-in-law" belong to his bloodline. 
A strange world, seen from a modem western perspective, but one which makes sense in its 
own terms. Much of traditional Tolai sociopolitical organisation follows from the existence of the 
two bloodlines and a few simple facts of life. Thus it was natural for wives to move to their 
husbands' place, rather than vice versa, since it was males who cleared the bush for gardens and 
who built houses, just as it was natural for boys to move to their mothers' brothers as adults 
because they and not their fathers were using land identified with the boys' bloodline. It was also 
natural for their mothers ' brothers to help young men to obtain wives because it was these women 
who made the gardens to feed them when they were old. But it was equally natural for fathers to 
help their sons to obtain wives if they continued to live with them, because their daughters-in-law 
could then look after them when they were old and because their children belonged to the same 
bloodline as their paternal grandfathers. Hence it was in practice primarily a matter not of descent 
but of the availability of land and other natural resources which determined whether Tolai lived 
as adults with their fathers' or their mothers' bloodline. Vunatarai are resource management units 
rather than descent groups. And they each have a territorial core: the madapai. There are no 
vunatarai without a madapai, and no madapai without a vunatarai. Nor are there vunatarai 
without a lualua (leader), who is primarily responsible for managing the resources controlled by 
his line, and also no lualua without followers who share in the use of these resources. 
In this manner changing networks of actual and potential interpersonal relations developed 
between and within the two bloodlines. In principle the structure was simple. A Tolai knew that 
every other Tolai belonged either to the bloodline of his or her mother, and therefore his or her 
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own, or to that of his or her father. This meant that he or she had been fathered by that entire 
bloodline and that his or her own bloodline had, in turn, fathered the children of the other 
bloodline, whereas both bloodlines mothered their own children. Superimposed on this bloodline 
grid were two equally simple generational and sex grids. Every Tolai had a parent-child 
relationship with every other Tolai in the generation above and below and a sibling relationship 
with members of the same generation in his or her own bloodline and a cousin relationship with 
those in the other bloodline. All three relationships differed with the sex of the people involved. 
In the case of the parent/child relationship the sex of the child was of secondary importance: each 
Tolai had male and female "mothers" as well as male and female "fathers", but the social roles of 
these four categories of people varied depending on the sex of the child. In the case of the 
intragenerational sibling and cousin relationships the Tolai distinguished primarily between inter­
sex and intra-sex relationships: between brother/brother and sister/sister relationships, on the one 
hand, and brother/sister relationships, on the other, and between the relationships among cousins 
belonging to the same and the opposite sex. 
What complicated matters was the superimposition of an additional grid of "affinal" 
relationships because marriages, in contrast to the mothering and fathering of children, were a 
personal affair: it was not the bloodlines which married each other but particular individuals. In 
order to appreciate the situation we must remember that not only had all spouses already a 
"cousin-of-the-opposite-sex" relationship with each other but that they also already had defined 
kin-relationships with all their in-laws: Tolai married the children of their female fathers and 
became the children-in-law of their male mothers; their brothers and sisters-in-law were already 
their cousins and they themselves were the male fathers of their wives' sisters' children and the 
female mothers of their husbands' brothers' children and so on. 
In practice this system could only work if a distinction was made between nominal and actual 
relationships, between the different social roles a person was capable of playing and those which 
a person actually performed. Although it was more than just talk if a Tolai said that he or she had 
fathered a person belonging to the other bloodline or mothered a person of their own bloodline, 
it was of little consequence. It was of more consequence if a Tolai could say that his or her 
vunatarai had fathered a member of another vunatarai because no member of any other vunatarai 
could say this. On the other hand it was unlikely that one vunatarai could say that it had fathered 
all the children of another vunatarai because this was only possible if all the female members of 
the latter who had offspring had married male members of the former, whereas vunatarai usually 
intermarried with more than one other vunatarai. Different members of the same vunatarai were 
therefore "patrilineall y" linked with different other vunatarai. It also meant, in the ordinary course 
of events, that this link was not so much established by the marriage of the member's parents but 
by the fact that this person had grown up on land belonging to this vunatarai and had eaten its 
fruits. 
Conversely, a man who paid the brideprice for a wife for his son who belonged to a distant 
vunatarai so that she would look after him, would hardly be seen as a male mother of this woman, 
as well as her "father-in-law", although this was what he was in bloodline terms. He had never 
performed the role of a male mother in relation to that woman, and, rather than receiving a 
brideprice for her, which was usually part of the role of a male mother, he had paid for her, which 
was usually part of the role of the male mother of the groom. The situation was different if the 
young woman was a member of his own vunatarai, in particular if her father-in-law had grown 
up with the woman's mother as brother and sister in the same locality. 
Depending on the particular circumstances of a case the scenarios could differ greatly, but the 
social texture produced by these overlapping grids of social relationships was so finely grained 
that the course of action was nonetheless largely predictable. It was usually clear how a Tolai 
would behave in certain situations. There were many different types of situations because there 
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were many variables, but there was rarely a question of what a typical response of Tolai 
performing various social roles was going to be once the facts were known. It was generally well 
understood what the performance of different social roles involved and what consequences certain 
acts or omissions were going to have. 
This mixture of a tightly grained social organisation and its flexible operation had a strong 
impact on Tolai oral traditions. Instead of describing this organisation and its operation 
systematically they stereotype and fragment history. History is seen from the perspective of the 
narrator as an individual and ideally condensed into the three generation span of the society the 
narrator experienced as a child. While his or her own life represents the present, the generation 
of his or her parents represents the immediate past, whereas what was the present for the 
generation of the narrator's  grandparents takes human history for the narrator back to its very 
beginning, and what happened before that is a timeless, primordial state of affairs. 
Within this framework history consists of a pool of stories describing particular remarkable 
events. Looking more closely, however, it becomes apparent that these events are remarkable not 
because they are unique but because they are typical. They are not concerned with what particular 
individuals did in the past but with what a particular type of person can typically do and how he 
or she typically does it to make it work. They are stories about what sorts of things culture heroes 
do, about what Tolai sorcerers are capable of, about how Tolai ideally establish claims to land, 
about what happens if Tolai brothers do not behave towards each other as brothers and so on. 
Tolai oral traditions show by way of example how the system operates and thereby reinforce 
its structure. In doing so they gradually translate what actually happened into what is ideally 
supposed to have happened. The founding ancestors of all Tolai vunatarai turn into the original 
settlers of the land their vunatarai currently claims. All Tolai have originated in New Ireland and 
have matanoi somewhere along the beach in the Gazelle Peninsula where their ancestors first 
landed. All Tolai heroes actually died the way Tolai heroes are supposed to die, no matter whether 
that happened in pre-colonial days or whether they were shot dead by colonial police: they all first 
demonstrate the s11periority of their protective magic and then announce that now, as the sun is 
setting, their time to die has come. 
Tolai have no difficulty in incorporating new ideals into their repertoire and in adjusting their 
timeframe accordingly. It has become an accepted part of Tolai oral tradition that the Tolai chased 
the Baining out of the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula because that is what they were told again 
and again by Europeans. It also has become desirable for many Tolai to link their oral traditions 
with the Bible and to claim, for example, that their ancestors fled Sodom before settling in New 
Ireland. The advent of the first Christian missionaries is now not only often identified with the end 
of the primordial darkness, but missionaries and other leading colonial figures are cast in the role 
of modem culture heroes: it was the long-serving German governor Hahl who introduced coconut 
palms into the Gazelle Peninsula, or a particular Catholic missionary who invented the Tolai 
language and gave it to the people who had previously grunted like pigs and fornicated with their 
mothers and sisters. 
Conversely, it is said that it was only after the arrival of the Europeans that Tolai began to use 
killing magic: "before" they only fought openly with spears and slings and clubs like true men. 
It is also said, however, that colonial influences undermined the strength and purity of Tolai 
magic. Instead of using the power of their magic, sorcerers now have to use physical means: razor 
blades, pulverised glass or rat poison. Generally, it is concrete details such as these that give Tolai 
oral traditions their weight. That the two differently coloured kinds of nuts still exist and can be 
pointed out to the audience adds strength to the story of how the culture heroes "created" the two 
bloodlines. The story becomes stronger still if the place where this transformation took place is 
identified and is known to the audience-namely on a conspicuous group of small islands in 
Blanche Bay-whereas it does not matter that the culture stories are set in the Gazelle Peninsula 
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whereas the migration stories tell us that the Tolai came from New Ireland. It is also irrelevant if 
it is pointed out that the transformation of coconuts into women is scientifically impossible, since 
it is precisely these kinds of things culture heroes were supposed to do. Instead, seen from the 
traditional Tolai perspective, it is absurd to believe, as modern western scientists do, that the 
ancestors of monkeys gradually turned themselves into human beings. By contrast, it is plain that 
human beings will again turn into animals if brothers no longer behave like brothers in relation 
to each other and if Tolai magic can no longer do what Tolai magic is supposed to do. 
To be sure, much of Tolai oral tradition is phantom history, but it is honest phantom history 
because it does not purport to be an academic enterprise. It is not concerned with a critical analysis 
of the historical record but is a way of recording history which has to work in the Here and Now, 
ideologically and politically. And it still does work, by reaffirming the general structures of 
traditional Tolai society and culture, and by giving them at the same time the flexibility necessary 
to operate, under changing circumstances. 
It is essential for anyone who is seriously interested in the colonial, as well as the pre- and 
post-colonial history of the Tolai, or in the history of any of the other traditional groups making 
up the indigenous population of German New Guinea, to understand these structures and that 
requires a detailed study of the kind indicated in the preceding pages. Since it is likely that there 
are significant variations between these structures, an attempt to write a general history of the 
Melanesians and Micronesians under German colonial rule must produce phantom history 
containing generalisations that will be contradicted by the vast ethnographic literature which no 
historiographer can hope to absorb, let alone critically analyse. On the other hand, it is unlikely 
that the oral traditions of any of these groups will differ so fundamentally from those of the Tolai 
that they would form an adequate basis for reconstructing a factual history of this particular group. 
In short, our imaginary historian either has to abandon his project or seek refuge in the 
Wonderland of narrative history. He has chosen a task which simply cannot be accomplished in 
an academically acceptable manner. 
Yet the time spent on this case study has not been wasted because the manner in which the 
Tolai traditionally deal with their history is most instructive when considering approaches to 
writing a factual history of German colonial rule. 
VI 
While Tolai oral traditions can often not be accepted as factual, they do show how traditional 
Tolai society actually operates . Indeed, they themselves are an important part of this operation. 
In the traditional Tolai context its phantomisation enhances the political and ideological power of 
history. By contrast the professional phantomisation of history in the modern western context is 
part of a process purporting to neutralise history politically and ideologically. It presents the study 
of history as a form of a serious entertainment which makes illuminating sense of the past but has 
no practical consequences because it also maintains that history is unpredictable. It treats the study 
of history as a precious luxury which broadens the mind but has no direct impact on how modern 
western societies and governments actually work. It can get away with this stance because modern 
western governments also can afford to treat history as a luxury, and indeed profit from doing so. 
They no longer have to rely on oral traditions in order to be able to operate, because the Rule of 
Law, and the written records it produces, have taken their place. But these records also create new 
opportunities for writing factual history because many of them contain frozen history: statutes, 
administrative instructions, budgets and registers are, as long as they exist as written documents, 
as real as they were on the day they were written. The question is whether these mountains of 
information can be defrosted without phantomising them in the process-and Tolai oral traditions 
show a way in which this may be achieved. 
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They too had to  deal with a situation where the bulk of history consisted of the performance 
of repetitive actions by a multitude of human actors, although the actors were not government 
officials and although the performance of their actions was not recorded in writing. Yet the Tolai 
a hundred years ago had the same basic needs and emotions as subjects of modem western states. 
They needed food and shelter, they loved and hated, nurtured, protected and maltreated each other. 
And while they had little government, they too had to manage the natural resources available to 
them and to control the use of the various powers possessed by human beings. 
Instead of trying to record the vast multitude of human actions the operation of society 
produced, Tolai oral traditions focus on the social and cultural framework within which they take 
place. But rather than describing these structures systematically, they illustrate them narratively 
by presenting phantom accounts of how particular features of this structure came into being as a 
result of what individual human or superhuman actors did in the past. Yet even these origin stories 
are typical in the sense that they show how results of this kind come about in the traditional Tolai 
context-and typification is generally a central feature of Tolai oral traditions. The stories of 
which they consist are essentially not stories about what particular individuals did in particular 
instances but stories about how various sociopolitical roles are performed effectively. It therefore 
does not matter whether or not they describe what actually happened. They are not concerned with 
unique actions but with types of behaviour, and they typify actors rather than actions. 
But we must also take into account that Tolai do not perceive the traditional structure of their 
society and culture as a normative order. The two bloodlines do not exist because the culture 
heroes decided it was a good thing to have them but because they came about in the way 
described, and the story is certainly factual to the extent that these two bloodlines exist as social 
facts rather than as normative commands. Tolai do not have the right or the duty to belong to one 
of these bloodlines, they actually do belong to one of them as a matter of fact: they have no choice. 
Tolai traditional culture is generally non-normative. There are no rules determining to which 
vunatarai a person ought to belong; where a person ought to live; how a mother ought to behave 
in relation to her children, or how a lualua ought to behave in relation to the members of his 
vunatarai. All these are questions to which history rather than norms provide the answer. A person 
is a member of a vunatarai as long as he or she behaves as a member of this vunatarai and as long 
as its other members treat this person as a member-and there are stories which tell how members 
of the same vunatarai behave in relation to each other, and other stories which tell what has 
happened when people behaved differently. 
The telling of such stories plays a crucial role in the treatment of many kinds of disputes, for 
example marital disputes. There are no customary rules defining the rights and duties of spouses, 
instead a marital dispute which has become public is dealt with by the telling of stories not only 
about how these particular spouses behaved towards each other in the past but, just as importantly, 
about the behaviour of other spouses. It is the public airing of these stories for the benefit of 
everybody present that is the main purpose of the exercise. As far as the disputing spouses are 
concerned, the issue is whether they will again behave like husband and wife towards each other 
or whether their spousal relationship will come to an end. This does not and cannot depend on 
how the behaviour which led to the dispute is judged but on a number of factors that have nothing 
to do with the dispute and involve many other people, for example all those who have received 
a share of the bride price. The behaviour of all of them, however, has been and continues to be 
shaped by stories they have heard about role behaviour, and their own behaviour too will consist 
of the performance or non-performance of specific social roles. 
Although the tasks of academic historiography and Tolai oral traditions are different, and 
although they are located in a different cultural context, a historian grappling with the history of 
colonial rule in German New Guinea may be well advised to adopt the two key features of Tolai 
oral traditions, instead of trying to condense what a multitude of colonial officials did in different 
14 PHANTOM HISTORY 
parts of German New Guinea over a period of 30 years or so into a single narrative, since such an 
attempt is bound to produce phantom history. At least an approach which first describes the 
structure of the government of this colony and then illustrates its operation with a series of typical 
examples of the exercise of governmental powers would seem to be a more realistic way of 
dealing with the historical record. 
On the other hand, the historical records which German colonial rule produced are very 
different from Tolai oral traditions, reflecting the different ways in which traditional Tolai society 
and the German colonial government were structured and operated: the former as a socially 
organised network of people without a governmental structure and the latter as a territorial 
government without an organised social base; the former in the absence of any written records and 
the latter as a chain of usually written commands, the execution of which required the production 
of further written records which formed the basis of further commands. Yet these differences may 
allow historians of German colonial rule to pursue the path followed by Tolai oral traditions 
further than the Tolai were able to go. While their oral traditions have no choice but to take the 
form of a collection of anecdotes, the historical record of German rule may permit a systematic 
approach. 
Such an approach is possible, and indeed necessary, if a government operates in accordance 
with the Rule of Law, because it then functions as a system of normative and quasi-normative law. 
Its organisation as well as the exercise of governmental powers will be regulated by legislation, 
and there will also be legislation which prescribes how the exercise of these powers is to be 
controlled and what action is to be taken if they are not exercised in accordance with these rules. 
That is to say, under the Rule of Law the exercise of governmental powers becomes fully 
routinised. All governmental actions are repetitive acts so that it no longer matters historically how 
they are performed in particular instances. This means, in turn, that a narrative approach to the 
history of such a government as an operation becomes inappropriate. Instead a systematic, 
quantitative approach is called for. Seen as an operation, the Rule of Law becomes a question of 
numbers : how much, how many and how often-and its history consists of the changes in these 
sets of figures. It therefore can, and can only, be adequately represented by a series of statistical 
tables. 
Nonetheless it is useful to look at the history of the Tolai during the period of German colonial 
rule because this shows that such tables would also contain the meat of this history which Tolai 
oral traditions are unable to record. If such records had been produced, they would tell us, for 
example, how many vunatarai there were in 1884 and how this figure changed until 1914; how 
many vunatarai split, merged or died out during this period; how the number of members of each 
vunatarai fluctuated; whom each of its members married and where each of its members resided 
in the course of his or her life; how its landholdings increased or decreased and how and by whom 
they were utilised at various times; how many lualua it had and how many of them died in office, 
retired or were deposed. 
It is plain that no factual history of the Tolai during the period of German colonial rule can be 
written without this kind of information. But it is also plain that Tolai society would have been 
unable to function in the traditional mode if this information had been recorded and if this written 
record had shaped the actual behaviour of Tolai in relation to each other. By contrast, this kind 
of information is the lifeblood of modern territorial governments. While quantitative information 
about the day to day operation of traditional Tolai society was not essential for the operation of 
the German colonial government, it was helpful rather than harmful, and it could hardly operate 
effectively if it did not have the same kind of information about the involvement of the Tolai, and 
its other native subjects, in the colonial sphere. This applies not only to actions which Tolai 
performed as instruments of the colonial government, for example as policemen, or in fulfilment 
of their public duties as colonial subjects, for example as taxpayers, but also to the private sector. 
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The colonial government needed information about the Tolai as  producers of cash crops and 
consumers of imported goods in order to function effectively. It was concerned with the 
interactions between the missions and the Tolai as much as with their interactions with the traders, 
planters and other employers. 
The more information they have, the more efficient territorial governments can become, until 
the entire life of all their subjects has been translated into a regulated complex of repetitive actions 
which can all be quantified and managed as quantities whose unique features become historically 
and administratively immaterial because they are part of a single entity that can only be described 
systematically as a structured operation. 
So far so good, but this systematic, structural and quantitative approach to history can only 
work after the Rule of Law has become fully established. Until then governments do not function 
as routine operations producing a full written record of quantified or quantifiable information of 
what they are doing. As far as German New Guinea is concerned the situation was, at least at the 
beginning of colonial rule, quite different. The German authorities were in a position similar to 
that of the culture heroes of Tolai oral tradition: they had to start from scratch, because there was 
neither a traditional structure of territorial government which they could have taken over nor had 
a system of colonial government been worked out in Germany and tested in other colonies which 
could have been exported ready-made to German New Guinea. But the German authorities did not 
approach their task like Tolai culture heroes. They did not create the foundations of a social 
organisation which could evolve organically but put a legislative framework for the exercise of 
governmental powers into place which had to be implemented and developed by enacting more 
legislation. It was natural for the German authorities to follow a road which would eventually lead 
to a total Rule of Law because there was no acceptable, alternative modem western ideal. Yet 
there were also strong practical reasons for hastening slowly along this path. 
Consequently the Rule of Law was, even at the end of German colonial rule, not fully 
established, in territorial as well as in substantive terms. In large parts of the colony German 
colonial rule did not operate at all and even close to the main colonial centres the continued 
operation of the traditional sociopolitical organisation, side by side with the colonial government, 
was generally tolerated, if not encouraged. Moreover, where German colonial rule asserted itself 
it often did so as an exercise of administrative discretion rather than in the form of legislation and 
subsequent law enforcement. 
Historians of colonial rule in German New Guinea can therefore not begin their task by 
describing it systematically as a single operative legal system. They can only give an account of 
the gradual and incomplete establishment of the Rule of Law as a historical process. And their task 
is further complicated by additional factors. 
Firstly, while essentially territorial, the colonial government was designed as a dual system 
which distinguished between "natives" and "non-natives" as two different legal classes of colonial 
subjects, although it was neither possible nor intended to keep these two classes physically apart, 
so that the two systems overlapped in practice and a third system, dealing with cases falling into 
this mixed category, had to be put into place. 
Secondly, as regards non-natives, the colonial authorities were not given discretion to develop 
a form of colonial law which reflected local conditions. Instead, their legislative discretion was, 
from the start, limited to the field of administrative law and the entire German/Prussian civil, 
criminal and procedural law was introduced, although a growing number of modifications were 
made or permitted. 
Thirdly, the colonial legislation itself was not uniform and was subject to frequent changes. 
Some colonial laws applied to all German colonies, others only to some German colonies, others 
only to German New Guinea, and still others only to a smaller or larger part of the colony. Hence 
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the same subject matter could be regulated at different times and in different ways in different 
parts of German New Guinea, or in some never be dealt with legislatively at all. 
Fourthly, the exercise of administrative discretion was not only limited by legislation but also 
in other ways: administratively, by issuing instructions to government officials, and financially, 
by providing the government with annual budgets within which they had to operate. 
Finally, the Rule of Law was also not fully implemented organisationally. There was, primarily 
for financial reasons, no formal separation of the legislative, executive and j udicial arms of 
government, and for the same reason there was a general shortage of manpower which continued 
to hamper a regular administration until the end of German colonial rule. 
It hardly needs saying that a quantitative approach to the history of the exercise of colonial 
rule, as opposed to its organisation, faces even greater difficulties under these circumstances. The 
written records produced are incomplete, not always reliable, and the kind of information recorded 
often differed over the years, or from one administrative district to another, quite apart from a 
disappointingly low and uneven survival rate. 
Besides, there is again an additional problem: a quantitative approach to history can only come 
into its own if it deals with big numbers. Only then can peculiarities cancel each other out and 
meaningful statistical patterns and trends emerge, whereas German New Guinea remained 
throughout its history such a small historical stage that even comparatively minor events could 
cause a storm in the statistical tea-cup. 
By the same token the volume of governmental activity was far too large for each official 
action to be treated as a unique historical event. More importantly, it is pointless to describe 
repetitive actions as unique events, since this adds nothing of significance to the definition of the 
type of action in question. Irrespective of the number of repetitions, the performance of repetitive 
actions is essentially a quantitative phenomenon. Where the exercise of governmental powers has 
become routinised, a particular instance is historically interesting only if it does not conform to 
the type of action it is meant to represent. But even these exceptional cases are no longer unique 
events. They represent a negative type of behaviour: the irregular behaviour which has typical, 
structured consequences of its own. It may be illegal or invalid or constitute a breach of discipline, 
but it becomes, as such, again a quantitative phenomenon. 
What about the non-routinised exercises of governmental powers? Seen as an exercise of a 
governmental power they too are not unique events, for even discretionary powers are exercised 
within a general structural framework, which may provide for powers which are never exercised 
but which, when they are exercised for the first time, already represent a type of action rather than 
a unique event. On the other hand, even the most routinised exercises of governmental powers are 
parts of unique historical episodes, seen as a cluster of interlinked human actions and reactions, 
so that it is worth considering where such a perspective will take us. 
Let us take a dramatic example: a "punitive expedition", the use of military force against the 
indigenous inhabitants of German New Guinea. Seen as an exercise of governmental powers it 
is a typical act because the German authorities treated the use of military force against their 
colonial subjects as a legitimate form of exercising their powers which was employed on 
numerous occasions. Although the exercise of this power was not defined by legislation it did not 
take place in a legal vacuum. A punitive expedition could only be legitimately carried out by a 
competent official in accordance with his orders. Moreover, the existence of a native penal 
ordinance which provided for the judicial punishment of native crimes ruled out a punitive 
expedition as a discretionary alternative for their punishment, although this did not mean that the 
use of direct force was illegal if criminal acts had created a continuing danger to public order. 
However, the principle of proportionality in the use of coercive administrative powers applied, so 
that punitive expeditions could legitimately only be carried out in serious cases. In addition, and 
quite apart from any disciplinary action against them, officials were liable to be prosecuted under 
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the German criminal code for killing or wounding people during a punitive expedition, unless their 
behaviour was legally justified. 
All these legal considerations are relevant if historians want to give a satisfactory account of 
punitive expeditions as unique historical episodes. They must establish what orders were given 
before a particular expedition, whether members of the government forces subsequently received 
disciplinary or criminal punishments, what happened to native prisoners, if any were taken, and, 
in particular, what impact the expedition had on the subsequent relations between the colonial 
government and the natives involved. Was it followed by peaceful visits, by the establishment of 
a police post, by the appointment of "government chiefs"? Did the natives in question 
subsequently refuse to trade or let themselves be recruited? 
Furthermore, a punitive expedition is not only an episode in the history of German colonial 
rule but also in the histories of the groups of natives involved, as well as in the life histories of all 
individual participants. Seen from each of these different perspectives, different facts are and are 
not significant. Thus it makes no difference to the life history of a native woman killed during 
such an expedition if her killing was regarded as illegal and if the policeman who killed her was 
subsequently punished, whereas this is crucial for the life history of the policeman in question. 
Conversely, it makes little difference to the history of German colonial rule, and none to the life 
history of the policeman in question, if the woman killed was the last female member of her 
matrilineal group capable of bearing children, so that the shot may have also killed her entire 
group. In other words, there are no historical episodes as such, they only exist as episodes in the 
histories of something else and they exist as episodes in a number of different histories which take 
a different form in each case. 
To be sure, historians can isolate a cluster of human actions and describe what happened in 
a defined physical space during a defined segment of astronomical time. But even if all the 
relevant information were available, such an exercise would be futile, because it would still be too 
voluminous to be manageable, unless the section of the time-space continuum identified was 
absurdly small. 
This does not only mean that historians have to be selective, it also means that they are not free 
in the selection of the information presented. Historians have to write the history of something and 
the something they select determines the type of history they have to write because all these 
somethings belong to one type or another. A historian who wants to write a life history is not free 
to decide what is and what is not relevant for the life history of a human being, although a 
historian is free to decide not to write a life history but, say, the history of X as a governor or as 
a father. But whatever topic a historian chooses, it has an inherent typical structure, which has to 
be discovered and the implications of which in this particular case have to be pursued. 
This applies to all possible topics, provided the writing of history is treated as a rational 
enterprise, and determines first of all whether a topic is suitable. Thus it is clear, for example, that 
events are part of a number of histories, but have no history of their own. The same applies to a 
chronological sequence of events: to describe a sequence of events does not amount to the history 
of anything. Nor can historians escape from these inherent structures by choosing not to write the 
history of any concrete something, such as a history of the life of an individual human being or 
the history of a group of people or an institution, but by selecting instead something abstract, like 
a category of human actions, as their topic. 
VII 
Let us take the case of another imaginary historian who decides that he neither wants to write a 
history of colonial rule in German New Guinea, nor a history of the Melanesians and 
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Micronesians during the period of this rule, but a history of Melanesian and Micronesian 
responses to this rule. 
If such a historian approached his topic as a genuine academic task, he would have to begin 
by developing a typology of the possible responses of indigenous populations to the imposition 
of every possible form of colonial rule. He would then have to identify the range of responses 
which occurred in German New Guinea, before examining the factors which determined why one 
rather than another of these responses was adopted in different parts of the colony at different 
times. All of this would still be part of a preliminary typological exercise because he would now 
have to investigate the actual chronological sequence of these responses in all parts of German 
New Guinea. 
Moreover, such a history could hardly be written without also taking account of the history 
of the responses of the colonial authorities to the responses of Melanesians and Micronesians. In 
short, our historian would be jumping from the frying pan into the fire. Even if he managed to pass 
through the flames unscathed, the result had to remain inconclusive because the number of 
variables would be too large and the information he could extract from the historical record would 
be insufficient for the systematic treatment the topic required.3 
This example demonstrates again that some kind of typification is necessary in order to deal 
with the multitude of human actions. A normative approach tries to achieve this by a typification 
of these actions. It defines what constitutes a theft or a breach of contract and prescribes the legal 
consequences for every human action which falls into this category. By contrast, Tolai oral 
traditions have opted for a typification of sociopolitical roles. The question therefore arises as to 
whether this approach can help us to come to grips with the discretionary exercise of governmental 
powers in German New Guinea for which precise normative structures did not exist. 
Did German colonial officials also perform typified roles and did they regularly act in 
accordance with their role? For if they did our problem would be solved, because an account of 
how a particular governor, district officer, police sergeant, government doctor or surveyor acted 
in a particular situation would then be representative of how all other German officials of this type 
acted in all situations of this kind. We would only have to look at one punitive expedition, for 
example, and we would have seen them all. Moreover, we would also be free to construct a 
composite picture by combining the incomplete information the historical record offered us for 
various punitive expeditions. Indeed, we would become independent of the historical record. We 
would know in advance how a German colonial official would have acted in any possible situation 
because his actions would be predictable, at least to the same extent as a Tolai can know how a 
Tolai playing a particular social role will typically behave in a given situation. We could even 
disregard the entire normative or quasi-normative framework of government because it would then 
either merely confirm that a German colonial official had actually acted in a typical fashion or 
because it would be historically irrelevant because German colonial officials typically disregarded 
this framework. 
Alas, what works in the traditional Tolai context does not work for a history of German 
colonial rule, and it does not work because such a typified role approach could not have worked 
as a technique for operating the colonial government of German New Guinea. A territorial state 
government and the political management of a kinship society are different enterprises, j ust as 
academic historiography and oral traditions are different enterprises. 
One important consequence of the former differences is that the various sociopolitical roles 
in the traditional Tolai context do not have to be defined normatively. There are no detailed duty 
statements which define what actors performing these roles are supposed to do in all imaginable 
situations. Nor could such duty statements be devised because the number of relevant variables 
is too large. Yet the net of reciprocal sociopolitical relationships is sufficiently tight to make 
3 It hardly needs saying that this imaginary historian too has historical counterparts. 
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traditional Tolai behaviour nonetheless predictable, because the environmental constraints are also 
tight and the traditional means of power Tolai can employ are limited. 
Compared with a Tolai lualua the means of power available to a governor of German New 
Guinea, although small compared with that of, say, the German metropolitan government, were 
enormous. Accordingly his range of options was much larger, and so was his range of tasks, which 
reached far beyond the management of natural and human resources for subsistence purposes. 
Moreover, instead of being tied into a complex horizontal network of reciprocal interpersonal 
relationships, the governor was, in his official capacity, part of an administrative hierarchy, a link 
in a chain of commands, subject to orders by his superiors and entitled to give orders to his 
subordinates. 
A normative or quasi-normative framework was the natural way of operating such an 
arrangement. But it was necessary or, at least, desirable to retain some flexibility and to give the 
governor discretionary powers in the exercise of which he could not be guided by specific rules. 
All that could be done was to formulate a general political program and to charge the governor 
with its implementation "to the best of his abilities as a conscientious official", of course within 
the general legislative and budgetary framework and in accordance with any specific instructions 
from his superiors. 
Since the same applied, mutatis mutandis, to all other German officials, the history of colonial 
rule in German New Guinea was far less predictable than the history of the operation of traditional 
Tolai society. Despite the normative and quasi-normative restrictions to which they were 
subjected, German officials were freer in the exercise of their residual discretion than even the 
most powerful Tolai in the traditional context. Whereas the latter was able to kill a few people 
with impunity, the range of actions he could himself perform was quite limited. Beyond that he 
had to rely on the cooperation of his followers, instead of being able to set an institutionalised 
machinery of government in motion which issued and enforced orders rather than working through 
the personal manipulation of reciprocal obligations. 
Although traditional Tolai society operated in a more personal manner than German colonial 
rule, the personality of an individual performing a traditioniiI role therefore mattered historically 
less than that of particular German officials. While it is possible and useful to establish what, for 
example, a typical Tolai lualua would do in a particular situation, it is pointless to speculate what 
a typical German governor would do. There were no typical German governors or, for that matter, 
district officers or police sergeants, because such a role typification was not part of how the 
system worked. This does not mean that German colonial officials were more differentiated as 
individuals than Tolai lualua or that they had no shared characteristics which distinguished them 
as a group from, say, British colonial officials. But where their official actions were not governed 
by the Rule of Law, their freedom of action was less limited because the various social restraints 
which operated in the traditional Tolai context did not operate for them. 
German colonial officials also had to perform a much wider range of tasks, often in rapidly 
changing circumstances. The role of a Tolai lualua hardly changed during 20 years of pre-colonial 
history, whereas a German colonial official found himself in a significantly different position in 
the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula in 1914 as compared with 1 894 or even 1904. German colonial 
officials were also transferred from one part of German New Guinea to another, or from one 
German colony to another, and the system had to cope with such transfers while their traditional 
Tolai counterparts could and did only operate in the traditional Tolai context. 4 It is for this reason 
that a typification of roles approach makes sense as far as Tolai oral traditions are concerned. Still, 
even in this context, this approach produces phantom history. If applied to the history of German 
colonial rule it would lead to even greater distortions. 
4 It would have been absurd to post a Tolai lualua in this capacity to the Island Territory or a Marshallese chief to the 
Gazelle Peninsula. 
20 PHANTOM lllSTORY 
vm 
Looking back it appears that while the position of a historian of the German colonial rule may 
differ fundamentally, in terms of the historical record available to him, from that of a historian of 
the Melanesians and Micronesians during the period of this rule, his chances of performing his 
task successfully are hardly better. All he can offer, if he takes the historical record seriously, is 
an account of the gradual creation of an incomplete normative and quasi-normative framework of 
government, supplemented by a sample of illustrations which show the colonial government in 
action but which cannot claim that any of the actions described were typical or even that they 
actually took place as described, because the description can do no more than reflect a critical 
reading of a few potentially relevant and still available sources. 
This is such meagre fare that it becomes palatable only after it has been shown that the rich 
cuisine offered by narrative historians indeed presents mere phantom history. While it is not the 
task of this introduction to prove that this is so, it is necessary to indicate at least by way of 
example that there are good reasons for settling for less attractive but more realistic approaches 
to history-and what better illustration is there than the narrative introduction to a history of New 
Guinea under the Germans which does what I have claimed to be impossible by offering a 
thumbnail sketch of this history and foreshadowing the main results of its subsequent detailed 
treatment.5 
This book is about the German past of the independent state of Papua New Guinea, the thirty years before 
World War I when the Germans ruled the north-east of the great island of New Guinea, the island chain 
to its north known as the Bismarck Archipelago and some of the Solomon Islands. For good reasons it 
is not a history of all of 'German New Guinea' , a territory which has no modern equivalent and which 
changed its borders on a number of occasions. 
As first acquired in 1 884, Germany' s  Melanesian territory or, to give it its official title, 'The 
Protectorate of the New Guinea Company' ,  consisted of north-east mainland New Guinea and the 
Bismarck Archipelago. The Protectorate included New Britain, New Ireland, New Hanover and Manus 
but not Bougainville, Buka and atoll groups in the Solomons such as the Mortlocks and Tasmans. 
Between 1 886 and 1 889 this original territory expanded to embrace the Shortland Islands, Bougainville, 
Buka, Choiseul, Santa Isabel and the northern Solomons atolls as far east as Ontong Java. It now 
incorporated more of the Solomons than the future tenitory of Australian New Guinea was to do. Then 
in 1899 and 1 900 a further reshuffle occurred as Germany, Britain, Spain and the United States jostled 
for the islands of the Western Pacific. First, the German possession, now officially the Imperial Colony 
of German New Guinea, gained a huge new area of the Pacific north of the equator by Germany's  
purchase of  the Mariana and Caroline Islands from Spain. All these Micronesian islands, with the 
exception of Guam which went to the United States, were incorporated into German New Guinea as its 
'Island Territory' .  Second, German New Guinea lost the Solomon Islands ofChoiseul, Santa Isabel, the 
Shortlands and Ontong Java to Britain as a consequence of the deal struck in the 1 899 Anglo-German 
Treaty over Samoa. South of the equator the borders of German New Guinea were now identical with 
those of the future Australian territory and were the ones inherited by Papua New Guinea at independence 
in 1975. A final change occurred in 1906, when the German Protectorate of the Marshall Islands, a 
possession which included Nauru, was also added to German New Guinea. When war came in 1914 
German New Guinea was divided along the equator, Japan taking the islands to the north and Australia 
those to the south. 
The Germans distinguished between their Island Territory, all north of the equator except for Nauru, 
and the 'Old Protectorate' ,  that is, the German possessions in Melanesia. Putting the two together was 
administratively convenient. Police from New Guinea helped the Germans to suppress the rebellious 
5 A reproduction of the full text of this introduction is necessary to enable readers to appreciate the strength-or 
weakness-of the critique which follows. The same applies to most other extended quotations in this work. They are not 
inclluded because I want to adopt the statements of their authors as part of my text but, on the contrary, because I believe 
that they need to be challenged. (My reasons for quoting extensively from the annual reports are different, see below p.69 
Fn.6.) 
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Ponapeans and phosphate royalties from the Island Territory contributed towards the cost o f  extending 
control over Melanesians. But Kapingamarangi was the only island north of the equator directly 
administered from Rabaul and in most ways the two parts of the colony functioned as separate colonial 
territories, each with its own system oflabour migration and subject to different administrative policies. 
Albert Hahl, Governor of German New Guinea from 1902 to 1914, thought the aim of German policy 
in the Island Territory was to develop the islanders ' ability to buy western goods, whereas in the Old 
Protectorate it was to teach people to work on plantations. The bifurcation of the colony under German 
rule and its subsequent partition between the Japanese and the Australians provide some justification for 
writing about 'New Guinea under the Germans' rather than attempting a comprehensive account of that 
evanescent colonial territory called Deutsch-Neuguinea. 
The Australians who occupied the Old Protectorate of German New Guinea in 1914  found a territory 
in which Europeans dominated only on the coasts. About 650 Melanesian men wore the khaki peaked 
caps, sailor shirts and red-bordered shorts of the 'police-soldier' , as the Germans called him, and in 
controlled districts the Australians encountered village chiefs with caps and 'a kind of walking stick with 
a fancy knob' .  These chiefs, according to the Australian military administrator Colonel S.A. Pethebridge, 
were referred to as 'Loo Loo Eyes' or 'Cooker Eyes' .  (He meant the luluais and kukurais, village 
headmen appointed by the Germans.) On the copra plantations of the possession there were thousands 
of New Guinean labourers, 'a great number' of whom 'deserted from their German employers and cleared 
off into the bush' when they heard about the Australian soldiers, 'thinking that as the German 
Government no longer had any authority here they could with impunity break their contracts . . .  ' .  The new 
colonial masters went to considerable trouble explaining to the runaways that, although the Germans were 
no longer in control of the administration, 'the situation was just the same as before' .  It was the old 
colonial order under new management. 
The Australians also found roads. The best one ran for 1 60 kilometres from Kavieng along the north­
east coast of New Ireland, another followed the coast south of Namatanai and a network linked 
plantations, villages and mission stations with the capital of Rabaul in the Gazelle Peninsula of New 
Britain. A road with unreliable bridges connected Bogadjim with Madang and Alexishafen and in 
Bougainville a road ran along the coast from Kieta. Nowhere did the roads lead far inland. The highways 
of the German territory had been the sea and the rivers, its administrative centres had been placed close 
to waterways and most of its plantations were within sight of a beach, a lagoon or a bay. It was a maritime 
colony. 
The Germans stuck to the coast for two reasons. First, the inland terrain of the island of New Guinea, 
Bougainville and the large islands of the Bismarck Archipelago is forbidding in the extreme. The high 
mountain ranges of New Britain, Manus, Bougainville and southern New Ireland are dissected by 
precipitous ridges and densely wooded ravines, soaked by rain and obscured by mist. Jungle impedes the 
traveller everywhere, in places becoming impenetrable, and leeches abound. Along much of the north­
east New Guinea range upon range of mountains rise parallel to the coast, sometimes steeply as on the 
Rai coast and near Finschhafen, sometimes leaving a narrow coastal plain of the kind near Madang, often 
cut by ravines carrying fast-flowing streams and always densely forested. The typical view from the coast 
is of endless mountain ridges rising to summits hidden by cloud. Only the river valleys break the 
mountain barrier. The Sepik and Ramu rivers empty into the Bismarck Sea within twenty-five kilometres 
of each other in a mosquito-ridden delta of lagoons, floating islands and swamp. The Markham has 
formed a flat, steep-sided valley which opens into the Huon Gulf but the river is too shallow near the 
mouth to be navigable. In New Guinea the Germans confronted geographical obstacles far greater than 
those in Africa, from malarial swamps and flood plains to tropical rainforests, rugged mountains and long 
stretches of harbourless coastline. 
In the second place the Germans were in New Guinea first and foremost to make money, and only 
secondarily to impose a system of ordered administration on the inhabitants. It was an order of priorities 
institutionalized in the government of the colony from 1885 to 1 899 by a private business firm, the New 
Guinea Company of Berlin, and perpetuated by the imperial administration of 1 899 to 1914, which aimed 
to create a plantation economy by encouraging private investment. No German governor in New Guinea 
compares with Sir William MacGregor, Lieutenant-Governor of British New Guinea from 1888 to 1898, 
for sheer energy in exploring his colonial territory and establishing contact with remote bush 
communities. MacGregor believed in a rudimentary form of administration for its own sake. The 
Germans, by contrast, saw administration as a means to an end, which was the rapid economic 
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development of the possession by Europeans, and therefore hardly bothered with foot patrols in mountain 
country. 
The land itself, then, and the Germans' desire to make New Guinea pay determined where they would 
go as planters, traders, recruiters, officials and to a lesser extent as missionaries. (Lutheran missionaries 
in the Huon Gulf proved to be the most adventurous of all in penetrating the interior.) The map of 
German influence became one which was drawn according to the preferences of traders and planters, not 
according to the presence of population. The Germans did not reach the Highlands, home to hundreds 
of thousands of people, nor did they more than lightly touch further concentrations of villagers in the hills 
north of the Sepik River. The overwhelming majority of New Guinea's people, perhaps five in every six, 
never saw a single German in the thirty years of German rule, even though some of these no doubt came 
into possession of a material artefact of German origin such as a piece of hoop iron or a nail. To speak 
of 'New Guinea under the Germans' is to refer to islands and coastlands: the Gazelle Peninsula of New 
Britain, its shores free of mangrove swamp, its undulating plateau ideal for copra plantations; north-east 
and central New Ireland, a coastal strip of fertile soil; east Bougainville near the safe harbour of Kieta; 
the mainland coast where there are anchorages and level land as at Madang or Alexishafen or where 
fertile offshore islands dot the roadstead as at Aitape; and numerous island groups and atolls which were 
far more important to the Germans' economy than they are to Papua New Guinea today: the Duke of 
Yorks, New Hanover, Tabar, Lihir and Tanga, Nissan, Pinipel, the Carterets, Tasmans and Mortlocks, 
Nuguria and to the west the Anchorite, Hermit and Ninigo groups. 
The questions which this book seeks to answer are familiar in the history of European colonial rule 
over tropical dependencies. Why did Germany annex the territory? Why did the chartered government 
of the Neu Guinea Compagnie fail? When the imperial administration took over in 1 899, what were its 
policies on land, labour, shipping, colonial finances and controlling the population? How influential were 
planters? In what ways did the colonial experience change villagers' lives? 
To an extent the answers have a familiar ring. The Germans exploited traditional rivalries in order 
to achieve political supremacy, obtained land by fraud, theft and purchase, recruited villagers on three­
year indentures, imposed labour discipline based on corporal punishment, imposed a headtax and 
succeeded in constructing a low-wage plantation economy serving markets in Europe. In the tradition of 
German colonial capitalism, the German government subsidized the two largest firms active in the 
territory, the Neu Guinea Compagnie of Berlin and Norddeutscher Lloyd of Bremen, and listened 
sympathetically to the complaints of all firms that the administration mollycoddled the villagers. The 
fundamentals of colonization were the same as in a dozen other tropical colonies of the period. 
Yet colonial rule in New Guinea assumed a special form, the unique product of interaction between 
Germans and Melanesians. Where indigenous states did not exist, languages were legion and few people 
were obvious candidates to become collaborators with the colonial regime, the Germans could extend 
control over the population only slowly and imperfectly. The impact of the Germans on village life 
differed widely from place to place, often depending as much on the attitude of villagers as on decisions 
taken by government officials or missionaries. Much of this book is concerned with events on the 
colonial frontier, where the Germans and their New Guinean police became an extra factor in local 
politics, potential allies who could be drawn into backing one community against another. This emphasis 
is as it should be. German officials had no alternative but to spend much of their time extending control 
over the villagers of the New Guinea littoral, not purely for the sake of the pax Germanica but because 
control alone brought safety to the plantation homestead, labourers for the plantation lines and teams of 
villagers to build roads. 
The most striking characteristic of German colonial control is its unevenness, dictatorial and 
destructive in some communities, paternalistic in others and little more than a show of strength in still 
others. Generally speaking, the Tolai of New Britain came to welcome the Germans as guarantors of a 
new order of prosperity based on copra trading; the Madangs hated the Germans for being land-robbers; 
the Manus, Matankor and Usiai peoples of the Admiralty Islands treated the Germans as foreigners who 
should be killed, ignored or imitated but certainly not obeyed; the Bukas admired the Germans and were 
eager to serve as police; the northern New Irelanders, at first renowned for their hostility to traders, 
decided to make peace and obey orders. Generalizations even of this order, however, fail to do justice 
to the wide variety of responses to the Germans in the villages and hamlets of the territory. 
No judgement of German rule in New Guinea is complete without a recognition that many New 
Guinea villagers were pleased to have the Germans there, whether as allies, providers of iron, healers of 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 23 
the sick, arbitrators of disputes or bearers of a Christian message which promised some protection from 
sorcery. Equally, no judgement can avoid the fact that the Germans killed more people than the British 
or Australians in neighbouring colonies in Melanesia, that they tolerated many more labourers' deaths 
on the plantations, flogged people more frequently and recruited labourers on a scale which threatened 
to depopulate parts of the country. The Germans were in a hurry to develop New Guinea. They laid down 
plantations which were to underwrite the export economy of the territory for another half century. But 
it was development bought at a considerable price in human suffering (Firth 1982: 1 -6). 
At a superficial reading this introduction sets the scene nicely, with its rapid fire of bold 
generalisation, supported by colourful details and strategic comparisons. Unfortunately, the picture 
disintegrates as soon as it is critically examined. This already applies to the seemingly 
straightforward sketch of the territorial fluctuations of German New Guinea. Take, for example, 
the attempt to encapsulate the change of the legal and political status of German New Guinea by 
contrasting what is claimed to be its two different "official titles". In fact German New Guinea 
was neither first officially called a ••protectorate" nor later a "colony", rather it was throughout its 
history "officially" classified as a "Schutzgebiet'', a term created to indicate that Germany's 
overseas territories were neither "protectorates" (Protektorate) nor "colonies" (Kolonien). Now, 
it is perfectly legitimate for a historian to want to avoid having to explain this situation, especially 
in an introduction, but we enter Wonderland if he makes instead a point of contrasting two 
inaccurate translations of the same German term and presents them as two different "official 
titles".6 
This may seem to be a pedantic start, but such legal niceties do have far-reaching historical 
consequences, and if a historian chooses to get involved with them he must explain their legal 
significance instead of transforming them into narratively convenient phantoms. 
Since it is not my task at this point to provide such an explanation, I can turn to Stewart Firth's 
justification of the exclusion of the Island Territory from the scope of his study. We are first told 
that the Island Territory was put together with the Old Protectorate because this was 
administratively convenient. However, the two illustrations given-that Melanesian policemen 
helped to suppress rebellious Micronesians and that Micronesian phosphate royalties helped to 
finance the extension of administrative control in Melanesia-are not meant to be instances of 
administrative convenience but prepare the ground for the subsequent claim that, regardless of 
administrative convenience, the Old Protectorate and the Island Territory continued to function 
in most ways as separate colonial territories. It is only fitting therefore that both illustrations are 
also phantoms, and that the facts behind them point in the opposite direction. 
Melanesian policemen were not just sent to the Island Territory to help to suppress rebellious 
Micronesians, but during the last years of German colonial rule the native police force in the 
eastern Island Territory consisted permanently of Melanesians and the recruitment, training and 
command of German New Guinea 's entire native police force was increasingly centralised. 
Similarly, while it is true that the phosphate concessions in the Island Territory were estimated to 
earn the government almost 190,000 Marks during the 1914 budget year and that this would have 
been ample to cover the estimated cost of maintaining the entire native police force in Melanesia 
in that year, this calculation only makes sense because the Island Territory and the Old 
Protectorate formed since 1910  a single budgetary entity-which is not what one expects to find 
in the case of two largely separate colonial territories. However, by 1914, we are talking of a 
budget of almost 4,000,000 Marks, to which the head tax expected to be paid by Melanesians 
made a much larger contribution than the phosphate royalties, so that it would be equally 
6 Similarly, Gennan New Guinea was, with good reason, never called an "imperial" colony because the emperor merely 
exercised the Schutzgewalt (protecting power) which was vested in the Reich. Hence German New Guinea was, from the 
start, a German Schutzgebiet although the emperor first delegated the exercise of part of the Schutzgewalt to the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie under a charter, whereas he subsequently established his own imperial government. 
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correct-and pointless-to say that the head tax paid by Melanesians paid for the medical services 
provided for Micronesians. 
What about the remote atoll with the sonorous name "Kapingamarangi" and its direct 
administration from "Rabaul"?-which in Firth's terminology appears to stand for the governor, 
regardless of the seat of his office, just as "Berlin" stands for the colonial office, as well as its 
predecessors. The atoll was indeed in 1 902 excluded from the administrative jurisdiction of the 
district office for the Eastern Carolines but it was placed instead under that of the district office 
for the Bismarck Archipelago rather than under the governor. More importantly, the atoll was 
never visited by an official from either district office, and when Assessor Kohler visited it as the 
first German official as late as April 1914 on his way to taking up his appointment as acting 
district commissioner in the Island Territory, he recommended that it be again transferred to 
"Ponape" (AA 1963/83/1 ,  Item 65). 
This leaves us with the claim that the Island Territory and the Old Protectorate had been 
subject to different administrative policies, which is supported by a reference to the thoughts of 
governor Hahl. Now it is quite possible that Hahl contrasted at some occasion the Micronesians 
as consumers of western goods with the Melanesians as plantation labourers, but if this formula 
was sufficient to characterise the administrative policies pursued, it would hardly be worth 
studying the history of German colonial rule in either territory. Naturally it is not, as Firth himself 
accepts later when he writes that the Tolai came to welcome the Germans "as guarantors of a new 
order of prosperity based on copra trading"(!). There is ample evidence to show that the planting 
of cash crops by Melanesians was promoted throughout the Old Protectorate and, conversely, that 
Hahl in particular strongly supported the establishment of plantations in the Island Territory. 
Indeed the historical record generally leaves no doubt that the relations between the two territories 
were characterised by "confluence" rather than "bifurcation". This does not mean, of course, that 
Firth had to include the Island Territory in his study, but to justify its exclusion with a bunch of 
phantoms is a different matter. 
Firth introduces the Old Protectorate as seen through the eyes of the Australians who occupied 
it in 1 914. They are said to have first met about 650 Melanesian policemen, before encountering 
an unspecified number of "village chiefs", and thousands of New Guinean labourers-but 
apparently no Germans. In each case some colourful details are added. While it is significant that 
the Melanesian policemen were called "police soldiers" by the Germans, it contributes nothing 
to an understanding of German colonial rule if we are told that the village chiefs were referred to 
as "Loo Loo Eyes" (luluai) or "Cooker Eyes" (kukurai) by the Australian military administrator, 
since the joke only makes sense in English. By contrast, the statement that a great number of 
plantation labourers deserted from their German employers when the Australians arrived is 
important, since it implies that only the authority of the colonial government had kept them on the 
plantations during the period of German colonial rule. It is therefore remarkable that Firth does 
not quote from a report by the Australian administrator on the general effects of the military 
occupation but from the diary of a junior officer, relating to an expedition to one particular district. 
It is even more remarkable that he uses this source as a basis for his bold claim that the Australians 
continued the old colonial order under new management-which is probably no better justified 
than his claim that the old colonial order in the Old Protectorate differed fundamentally from that 
in the Island Territory. 
Did the Australians meet about 650 Melanesian policemen wearing "khaki peaked caps, sailor 
shirts and red-bordered shorts"? It is unlikely because sailor shirts and red-bordered shorts were 
part of their dress uniforrn.7 whereas their working uniform consisted of a red loincloth, and 
because the figure of about 650 apparently refers to the budgetary strength of the native police 
force in the Old Protectorate on 1 April 1914, whereas the Germans had recruited a substantial 
7 In the actual dress uniform the shirts also had red borders and the trousers consisted of breeches rather than shorts. 
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number of new men after World War I had broken out. On the other hand, perhaps as many as 30 
Melanesian policemen were shot by the Australians during the hostilities on the Gazelle Peninsula 
and many more ran away, probably abandoning whatever uniform they were wearing (see the 
report of the German commander in A WM 33,  32, 2), so that the position is far from clear. 
To be sure, it makes little difference to a history of German colonial rule whether the 
Australians first encountered about 500 or 800 Melanesian policemen, or what uniform these men 
were wearing at the time, but such details are an essential part of the recipe used by Firth, so that 
the legitimacy of his approach stands or falls with their accuracy. 
The urge to enrich his narrative with colourful details, and to give it a reassuring feeling of 
firmness with the help of categorical statements, continuously gets Firth into trouble. Thus he 
supports his uncontentious assessment that the Old Protectorate was a maritime colony with the 
bold claim that "the Australians nowhere found a road which led far inland". This is meant to 
demonstrate the depth of his expertise but, in fact, only shows that he was unaware of the road­
building activities during the last years of German rule, in particular in the Morobe hinterland (see 
Sack & Clark, 1980: 106); and Firth got so carried away by his loving description of the 
forbidding inland terrain, as one of the reasons why the Germans "stuck to the coast", that he 
invented an entire high mountain range on Manus. 
However, it is the second reason for "sticking to the coast" with which the introduction reaches 
its climax; for: "In the second place the Germans were in New Guinea first and foremost to make 
money, and only secondarily to impose a system of ordered administration on its inhabitants". This 
statement is not as radical or novel as it may sound, since official statements along these lines 
were made repeatedly at the time . But it is too bland to be narratively attractive. Hence Firth 
elaborates, claiming that this order of priorities had been institutionalised by putting a private 
business firm in charge of the government of the colony. Whereas it is plausible that a private 
business firm takes on the government of a colony because it wants to make money-provided, 
that is, that it treats its involvement first and foremost as a business venture-the fact that the 
imperial administration encouraged private investment in plantations hardly demonstrates that it 
perpetuated this order of priorities. 
Yet before we have time to reflect on who "the Germans" were, and what "to make money" 
means, Firth switches to a comparison between the exploratory energies of MacGregor and his 
German counterparts. This produces another impressive formula: whereas MacGregor believed 
in a rudimentary administration for its own sake, the Germans saw administration as a means to 
an end, namely the rapid economic development of the colony. But what does this formula mean? 
Does it mean, on the one hand, that MacGregor created a rudimentary form of administration in 
the areas he explored and that he was not interested in the economic development of British New 
Guinea by Europeans? And does it mean, on the other hand, that there were no Germans for whom 
the economic development of German New Guinea was a means to an end, namely an ordered and 
more than rudimentary administration of its inhabitants? 
These are pertinent questions but Firth is not interested in raising them. Having performed his 
brief strategic role, MacGregor is dropped, together with the administration of German New 
Guinea, and Firth returns to the money-making aspect. But now "the Germans" no longer refers 
to the Germans as a nation, or as the rulers of German New Guinea, but to a motley collection of 
individuals, primarily planters, traders and recruiters, but also officials and even missionaries. Yet 
understood in this sense, the term becomes even more problematic. Does it include British 
planters, Chinese traders, Japanese recruiters, French priests, Polynesian mission teachers, 
Australian prospectors and Malay bird-of-paradise hunters? It certainly simplifies matters to 
pretend that all foreigners in German New Guinea were Germans. We can then speak of "the 
Germans' economy", or of the overwhelming majority of New Guinea's people never having seen 
a single German. We can even speak of the German origin of the material artefacts which had 
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nevertheless come into their possession, but we are once more transported to Wonderland, where 
all hoop iron or nails reaching German New Guinea are, so to speak by definition, imported from 
Germany. 
We are not in Wonderland when we are told that: "To speak of New Guinea under the 
Germans is to refer to islands and coastlands", but we return to it with the description of this 
littoral. Are the shores of the Gazelle Peninsula free of mangrove swamps and do they rise to an 
undulating plateau in its centre? Were the plantations on Bougainville in 1914 limited to its 
eastern coast, near the safe harbour of Kieta? Is there any rational justification for the litany of 
island names which omits islands which were of far greater importance to "the Germans '  
economy" than any of those named (i.e. the Vitu Group), but includes several groups over which 
"Queen Emma" and her American/Samoan clan claimed exclusive ownership? 
After this tranquil naming exercise we are in for another change of direction. Instead of 
focusing on "the Germans' economy", we are presented with a new set of questions "this study 
seeks to answer". Although these questions were familiar in the history of European colonial rule 
and the answers, in the case of the Old Protectorate, also had a familiar ring, because the 
"fundamentals of colonialism were the same as in a dozen other tropical colonies of the period", 
Firth identifies a specifically German tradition of colonial capitalism, in accordance with which 
the metropolitan government subsidised the largest firms and listened sympathetically to all 
complaints about an insufficiently employer-friendly native administration. In this context the 
naming device comes once more into its own-and it is certainly easier to name the "Neu Guinea 
Compagnie of Berlin" and the "Norddeutscher Lloyd of Bremen" than to explain what was 
traditional about the compensation paid by the German government to a chartered company for 
its governmental efforts or German about the subsidisation of a private shipping line carrying 
mail. 
On the other hand, it was not only this peculiar tradition which distinguished German 
colonialism from that of other powers, German colonial rule in the Old Protectorate was altogether 
"the unique product of interaction between Germans and Melanesians". Why?-because 
"indigenous states did not exist, languages were legion and few people were obvious candidates 
to become collaborators with the colonial regime". Before we have time to reflect whether the 
same conditions did not also exist in a dozen other tropical colonies, whether the taking over of 
linguistically homogeneous states makes the extension of control not only quicker but also more 
"perfect", or whether members of a single ruling elite are more obvious collaborators than 
members of a multitude of non-hierarchical societies, we move from the conditions under which 
German colonial rule operated to its effects. "The impact of the Germans on village life differed 
widely from place to place, often depending as much on the attitude [ !] of villagers as on the 
decisions [ !] taken by government officials and missionaries [ !]". Hence much of the study had 
to be concerned with neither "the Germans '  economy" nor with the questions it was seeking to 
answer but "with events on the colonial frontier, where the Germans and their New Guinea police 
became an extra factor in local politics". 
This does not mean that Firth intended to move towards a history of the Melanesians under the 
Germans,  rather, the focus on what happened at the colonial frontier was "as it should be" because 
"German colonial officials had no alternative but to spend much of their time extending control 
over the villagers of the New Guinea littoral". 
Again this sounds plausible, but how many of the German colonial officials who served in the 
Old Protectorate actually spent much of their time on extending the colonial frontier? Even their 
native policemen spent far more time being drilled, supervising road works, retrieving runaway 
labourers, carrying messages, guarding prisoners etc. than on doing so. The point is that Firth does 
not focus on the colonial frontier for any of the reasons given but because this is where the 
exercise of German colonial rule is narratively most manageable. Firth was no more inclined to 
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deal with the routine tasks of German colonial officials than with the day to day operations of 
Melanesian local politics. 
But then it was not the preoccupation of German colonial officials with the extension of 
control, but rather the "unevenness" of the process which was the most striking characteristic of 
German colonial rule. Nonetheless Firth felt obliged to generalise, for example, by contrasting the 
"hate" of the Madangs with the "admiration" of the Bukas, even though generalisations "of this 
[apparently modest] order failed to do justice to the variety of responses". Still this difficulty could 
not be allowed to prevent Firth from carrying out the ultimate responsibility of a narrative 
historian, namely to pass judgement over the entire slice of history studied. 
Few people would take issue with his final assessment, that the economic development of 
German New Guinea was bought "at a considerable price in human suffering". But it is again so 
bland that it has to be fleshed out even in an introduction. This time Firth resorts again to a 
strategic comparison. Instead of quantifying the price of human suffering paid in German New 
Guinea he tells us that the Germans killed more people and so on than the British or Australians 
in their Melanesian colonies. There is nothing wrong with such a comparative approach. On the 
contrary, if colonial rule in German New Guinea is to be judged at all, it cannot be judged in 
isolation. The problem is rather that the comparison made is purely rhetorical unless it is backed 
by a detailed comparative study of the costs of human suffering in colonial Melanesia. Taken by 
itself, Firth's final assessment is no more than a strategic phantom. 
Such strategic comparisons are by no means the only rhetorical device used in this 
introduction. Another such device is a kind of phantom analysis. It is, for example, applied to the 
"unevenness" of German colonial control. Is it analytically productive to contrast "dictatorial and 
destructive" with "paternalistic" forms of control? Is paternalistic control a constructive form of 
dictatorial control? Is the contrast not so much concerned with different forms of control but with 
the extent of physical force used in establishing it? Does it view the position from the perspective 
of the German officials or from that of the Melanesians they tried to control? Does it mean to say 
that some German officials were dictatorial and others paternalistic or that "the Germans" 
generally responded with paternalism to peaceful submission, with destructive dictatorial measures 
if they met with armed resistance, and with a mere show of strength if there was insufficient 
economic reason to make the military effort required to crush their Melanesian opponents? Or are 
we not supposed to take anything Firth writes literally but rather to listen only to the implied 
messages he is sending? 
Yet behind his rhetoric stands a solid triangular constellation: the German colonial officials 
who conquer the Melanesian villagers and tolerate their exploitation by the planters for the sake 
of rapid economic development. In this scheme of things any attempt by German colonial officials 
to control the planters was ultimately as futile as the attempts of Melanesian villagers to resist the 
imposition of colonial control. But this scenario is too wooden to offer a satisfying narrative, 
hence it has to be decorated with atmospheric details which indicate that it nonetheless matters 
historically what actions individual human actors performed in particular situations. Narrative 
history only works if history is presented as being at the same time amazingly simple and 
amazingly complex, so that it requires the hand of an expert to guide the pendulum forwards and 
backwards between the specific and the general in order to produce an account of history which 
is both reliable and readable because it presents the unique as being simultaneously typical and 
the typical as always manifesting itself in a unique form. 
Seen in this light a systematic approach to history is counterproductive, and analytical 
precision harmful, because they prevent a historian from capturing the typical in the unique and 
the unique in the typical. Firth says what he means and means what he says when he writes that 
"the Germans were in New Guinea first and foremost to make money", but the language he is 
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using is not meant to further a rational discourse; rather, it is a special narrative language, designed 
to send pointed messages in a conveniently fluid verbal form. 
To say that "the Bukas admired the Germans" does not mean that all or most, or indeed any 
Buka, admired "the Germans". Nor does it mean that "the Bukas" refers to the inhabitants of the 
island of Buka. Nor is the use of the word "admire" a mistake. Firth does not want to say either 
that the Bukas "respected" the Germans, or that they regarded them as powerful leaders to follow 
whom was politically advantageous. He wants to convey a message for which the word "admire" 
is an admirable vehicle. Instead of spelling it out he indicates the direction in which it points by 
adding that the Buka were eager to serve as police, thus suggesting the presence of a strong 
military component in their admiration, although this, of course, does not mean that all young 
Buka males during the period of German colonial rule were eager to join the police, or that the 
Germans were always eager to recruit them, or that the police force consisted predominantly of 
"Bukas", or that they accounted at least for a disproportionately high number of policemen. 
This narrative language is the key ingredient of this introduction. It binds the colourful details 
and the bold generalisations together at a manageable middle level of generality and gives them 
a symbolic yet tangible quality. It provides an apparently solid surface over which we can glide 
effortlessly during the guided tour we are offered, as long as we do not stop to test it; for if we do, 
we sink into a morass of phantoms which covers a bed of uncomfortably bony or spongy bits of 
information which refuse to fit together like the pieces of one enormous narrative puzzle. 
Perhaps such a narrative phantomisation of history is the only way of producing a coherent and 
meaningful account of any substantial slice of the past. But perhaps this introduction is quite 
untypical of what a narrative approach to history has to offer. Perhaps Firth himself changed his 
approach in the body of this study. 
Alas the first chapter of New Guinea under the Germans offers more of the same, even though 
it criticises Lenin for oversimplifying a complex process by arguing that colonial territories "were 
acquired simply as investments for surplus capital or sources of raw materials" (ibid. :  7). Now this 
may seem to be a more sophisticated version of the claim that "the Germans were in New Guinea 
first and foremost to make money", but the narrative language of Wonderland is capable of 
making subtle distinctions when the need arises. Firstly, it can be pointed out that while the clause 
"first and foremost" emphasises the importance of the money-making motive, it qualifies it at the 
same time by allowing for the possibility that all Germans also had other motives, and even for 
the possibility that for some of them the desire to make money was altogether immaterial. 
Secondly, it can be pointed out that the reasons for acquiring colonial territories, and the reasons 
for staying in the territories acquired, can be quite different. Thirdly, it can be pointed out that "the 
Germans" who stayed in this territory and "the Germans" who acquired it were not the same 
persons-and this is the line taken by Firth, for he tells us that the "New Guinea Protectorate" was 
created by one man, Otto von Bismarck. 
According to Firth, Bismarck's creation was the product of a two-stage process: his "decision 
in principle that Germany was to become a colonial power . . .  [was] dictated primarily by the 
metropolitan advantages Bismarck expected would follow" whereas he acquired territory in 
Melanesia in order to solve "peripheral, as distinct from metropolitan, problems". Yet matters 
were more complex because an understanding of these problems "must begin in Samoa, the centre 
of German commerce in the Pacific Islands for more than a quarter-century before 1 884 and the 
focus of Germany's Pacific ambitions in the 1880s" (ibid. :  8)-and this is where the narrative 
proper commences. 
The Hamburg merchants Johann Cesar Godeffroy and Son had opened for business in Samoa in 1 857, 
at the port town of Apia, described by one visiting American as 'composed of a heterogeneous mass of 
the most immoral and dissolute Foreigners that ever disgraced humanity' . Under the management of 
August Unshelm Godeffroys quickly grew to become Apia' s leading traders, their resident trading agents 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 29 
on the Samoan islands, Uvea, Futuna and the Lau Islands of Fiji, trading manufactures for coconut oil, 
pearl shell and beche-de-mer (ibid.). 
Is there any need to confuse matters by adding that the mass of foreigners was "principally 
composed of Americans and Englishmen, several of whom had been Sidney [sic] convicts", or by 
questioning whether the visitor quoted was in a position to judge if it was the worst in human 
history or, at least, worse than in other ports in the Pacific Islands at the time? In the world of 
narrative history the historian is the master of the historical record. A flick of the whip and the 
most ferocious beasts jump obediently through the hoops placed before them. Why should we 
abandon this miraculous place for the inhospitable world of critical historiography, unless we have 
to accept that the accounts of history it offers are typically serious distortions of the historical 
record which prevent us from gaining a better understanding of the past instead of illuminating 
it? Can we not continue indefinitely to insist that, however many phantoms are brought to our 
attention, they are all the result of unfortunate accidents and not an unavoidable consequence of 
the narrative approach to history? 
To be sure, the verdict of the American visitor Firth quotes about the foreigners in Apia is a 
particularly juicy phantom, but it is also quite harmless because it is unlikely that anyone will treat 
it as a statement of fact. Nor does quoting it only in part seriously distort this verdict. But does the 
picture change if we see this instance as the employment of two techniques? Is it generally 
acceptable to construct a historical narrative with the help of statements attributed to others which 
a historian cannot justify as a statement of fact? Is it generally acceptable to use only that 
information from a source which is narratively useful and disregard the rest? What if the American 
visitor had gone on to comment on the salutary role, or the economic influence, of "the Germans" 
in other Pacific Islands, for example Hawaii, before Johann Cesar Godeffroy and Son opened for 
business in Samoa in 1857? 
But looking at another concrete example may be more instructive than such speculations. What 
then about the following anecdote which lends substance to the claim that Germany first acquired 
territory in Melanesia in 1884? 
In November 1884, the people of Matupit Island . . .  thought they were about to be attacked when 200 
German marines came ashore with bayonets to celebrate the declaration of German sovereignty in New 
Britain (ibid. : 7). 
The source referred to is a report by the imperial commissioner Oertzen of 4 December 1884, 
to be found in volume 2797 of the records of the German colonial office. It confirms that 200 men 
had come ashore, although they fixed their bayonets later, in the course of a military parade. It also 
confirms that "the great military pomp", which Oertzen had apparently found inappropriate, had 
caused unrest among the people, although rather than thinking they were about to be attacked they 
had feared, according to the report, that their chiefs would be arrested or that their land would be 
taken away from them Moreover, the report continues to say that Oertzen had called all influential 
men to his house. In order to calm them down he had, inter alia, explained to them the meaning 
of the ceremony "as far as possible". His explanations had fully satisfied those present, and their 
joy and approval had encouraged Oertzen to enter into negotiations about the purchase ofMatupit 
Harbour for the Reich-a move which would have been unnecessary if the whole of New Britain 
had already been declared to be under German sovereignty. 
While this particular report says nothing concrete about the meaning of the flag-hoisting 
ceremony, Oertzen appended the text of the proclamation read by the naval commander to an 
earlier report which is to be found on the same file. Instead of declaring "German sovereignty [ !] 
in New Britain" this proclamation had only been concerned with the protection of private land 
holdings of two particular German firms within an undefined geographical area. 
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In short, Firth's version of this episode continues the pattern set in the introduction, but it 
demonstrates more concretely that a narrative phantomisation of history apparently goes hand in 
hand with a methodical casualness in the treatment of the historical record. Judging by the 
following disarmingly frank confession, Firth is not alone in taking this attitude. It was made by 
a senior historian and relates to the sources on which he had based "the story of Germany's 
adventure as a colonial power" in a two-volume history of the Southwest Pacific (Grattan, 1 963 : 
343). 
It is my understanding that there is a rich literature on New Guinea in German, but because of the 
language barrier it has remained closed to me and I have had to piece my historical notes together from 
such English language sources I could find (ibid. : 740). 
It is certainly no crime to be unable to read German, or any other of the relevant languages, 
including English, and this disability does not even disqualify a historian from dealing with the 
history of German colonial rule in the Pacific, at least not as part of a general history of this area. 
What makes the treatment of the language barrier baffling in this case is rather the list of English 
language sources which Grattan used, since it does not include a single history of German colonial 
rule in the Pacific. This was not due to a lack of diligence on Grattan' s part, as no such history had 
been published at the time of writing. Nor was Grattan' s assessment of the comparative usefulness 
of the available sources for his task unreasonable. But were these sources adequate for performing 
it? Is it academically acceptable to base a history of German colonial rule in the Southwest Pacific 
primarily on an official handbook of the Australian Territory of New Guinea, a volume of the 
official history of Australia in World War I, a history of the Australian military administration of 
German New Guinea and a study of "The Making of Modem New Guinea with Special Reference 
to Culture Contact in the Mandated Territory" (see ibid.)? Or does a historian have to admit defeat 
under these circumstances and explain instead to his readers why he was unable to provide an 
adequate account of German colonial rule in the Southwest Pacific? Yet the patent inadequacy of 
his sources clearly did not worry Grattan. As long as the sources permit a historian to take enough 
notes to piece together a coherent narrative, so it appears, there is no reason for concern. Anything 
in the field of narrative history is better than nothing, and the only thing which is unacceptable is 
a historical vacuum. 
As is to be expected Grattan' s account of German colonial rule contains numerous phantoms. 
What is remarkable is that his account is less intensely phantomised than that of Firth, although 
the latter could read the rich German literature and also had access to the German archival 
materials .  On the other hand, this may be part of the explanation of this apparent paradox: the 
paucity of the information available gave Grattan less opportunity to phantomise history and made 
it easier for him to piece his narrative together. Narrative history works best if it is based on a 
modicum of preferably already narrativised information. The richer the information narrative 
historians draw on, the more phantoms they are likely to create when piecing together their notes. 
Unfortunately, they cannot solve this problem by artificially limiting the amount of information 
they utilise. As long as they maintain that their narratives represent history, they have to accept 
that their narratives are tested against the entire historical record. This also applies to Grattan's 
account, however much we may sympathise with his predicament. He can no more excuse the 
phantoms in his account with his inability to read German than Firth could justify his phantom 
account of the flag-hoisting on Matupit Island by stating that he only made notes on one paragraph 
of Oertzen' s  report and none concerning the text of the proclamation read by the naval 
commander. But then no historian can hope to master even the comparatively small body of 
information relating to the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea with the help of notes, 
much less to be able to piece these notes together into a single narrative which is in accordance 
with a critical reading of all the available information. There is no other choice than either 
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admitting that a narrative approach to history always produces phantom history which is incapable 
of meeting normal academic standards or looking for alternative ways of dealing with the 
historical record which can apply them. What makes the position awkward is that the 
unacceptability of the first option can only be demonstrated in the form of case studies which 
compare particular historical narratives in concrete detail with the historical record relating to the 
slice of history described. An attempt to write a general history of the phantomisation of history 
wou[d be just as futile as an attempt to write a general history of the global colonisation of 
humankind. 
At first glance the historiographical treatment of the history of colonial rule in German New 
Guinea seems to be · a bad choice for such a case study. But it may prove to be especially 
instructive because the treatment of such a peripheral and exotic field of history by narrative 
historians is likely to display the general characteristics of their approach more clearly than the 
treatment of a more familiar field which has been studied by a large number of narrative historians 
over a long period of time, which will weed out a number of phantoms and tum others into 
generally accepted 'historical' facts. 
There is no question that Grattan would not have dreamed of writing a history of, say, the 
Third Reich as part of a history of Central Europe since 1900 based on the same kind of sources 
he relied on for his history of German colonial rule in the Southwest Pacific, for example a study 
of the British military administration of north western Germany between 1945 and 1 949. Yet this 
seemingly absurd comparison only goes to show what narrative historians are capable of, if they 
are given the opportunity-and there is no reason to believe that Grattan fundamentally altered 
his approach because he dealt with the history of German colonial rule in the Pacific rather than 
some other topic. On the contrary, he regarded what he was doing as perfectly normal and beyond 
reproach, because he was doing what narrative historians are expected to do, namely to look at the 
sources available to them and to piece together a coherent narrative from the notes they have 
taken. 
Unfortunately this narve but professionally endorsed innocence gives a critical examination 
of narrative histories the appearance of an arrogant personal attack on people who are merely 
doing their job. But it is impossible to separate narrative historians from their narratives.  They do 
not put forward arguments which could be criticised as arguments. Instead they present a selection 
of facts arranged in the form of a narrative which is meant to be assessed in terms of its artistic 
merits. In doing so, however, they put their personal credibility on the line. A narrative takes the 
factuality of what is being told for granted and expects the audience to trust the narrator on that 
score. Thus any questioning of the factuality of a narrative appears to target the personal integrity 
of the narrator. Yet it is the narrative form of their histories rather than the intention of a critic 
which is responsible for this state of affairs. It is the narvety of a narrative approach to history, its 
lack of any visible kind of intellectual sophistication, that makes it so attractive and places the 
critic in such an invidious position. 
Worse still, the claim that the counterfactual phantomisation of history by narrative historians 
is not the result of individual failings but of defects of the narrative approach can only be 
sustained by repeating these seemingly personal attacks until the evidence becomes overwhelming; 
for narrative historians have also not developed a method which spells out how they are supposed 
to carry out their task and which could be critically examined as a general method. A critic 
therefore has to face the second task of demonstrating, again by way of numerous examples, that 
the results of a careful reading of the historical record are nearly always too complex and 
inconclusive to be captured in a single narrative without serious distortions. 
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IX 
Just as it requires case studies to show what narrative phantom history looks like, alternative 
approaches to history can only be worked out by reference to the historical record relating to a 
particular slice of history, because it is the unique combination of its features that determines what 
historians can and cannot do with the information it contains .  The historical record relating to the 
history of colonial rule in German New Guinea available today is not only vastly different from 
that relating to the history of, say, the colonial rule of the Vandals in Africa over a thousand years 
earlier, it also differs significantly from that relating to the contemporary colonial rule in British 
New Guinea or German East Africa. Different governments produce different records which 
reflect different histories . The subsequent histories of these records can also vary dramatically. 
A single natural catastrophe can wipe out archives housing the records of hundreds of years of 
government, while other governments may engage in the systematic, periodic destruction of the 
records of their activities. Even the historical record of colonial rule in German New Guinea is by 
no means uniform. The records kept differed widely across time and space and between subject 
matters, and their survival rate is remarkably uneven. While it may still be possible to write a 
detailed history of the exercise of German colonial rule in the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula, this 
may be impossible in the case of the northern Solomons or the Palau Group; and while it may still 
be possible to write a fully quantified history of the postal services in German New Guinea, the 
historical record may only offer a few bits of anecdotal information relating to the activities of 
government chiefs in any part of the colony. 
The task is therefore not to work out the ideal recipe for writing academically acceptable 
history but to test a range of approaches against particular sets of historical records in order to 
establish how far each of them permits us to go. The aim is not to replace the narrative approach 
with a single alternative but to utilise a plurality of approaches so as to achieve a maximal 
utilisation of the information available. However, the choice of the optimal combination of 
approaches is only a secondary task, concerned with the best ways of processing and 
communicating information, whereas the primary task of academic historiography is to establish 
as many historical facts as possible as reliably as possible. Ideally historians would therefore begin 
by analysing the entire historical record relevant for their chosen topic and by compiling a list of 
all those statements of fact which have passed the academic factuality test (see above: 5). 
Unfortunately the amount of information available is too large in most cases to be treated in this 
comprehensive manner. But there are at least two acceptable alternatives . 
The first is to start with a critical examination of previous historiographical treatments of the 
topic chosen. Although this also involves an inspection of the sources, we can initially limit 
ourselves to the sources referred to in these accounts in order to test whether they support the 
statements made. But this critical approach leaves us stranded if an account of history passes this 
first test, because we then have to examine whether it is also in accordance with a critical reading 
of other relevant sources. Moreover, if a piece of historiography passes this second test, it shows 
that another account of the same topic cannot make a significant contribution to our knowledge 
of the past. However, it is only then that we can accept an account of history as a solid base for 
the treatment of a broader or related topic. This is how the academic study of any field normally 
advances: by a continuing process of quality control, the results of which are made public and thus 
prevent a duplication of effort. The point is that a narrative approach to history is incapable of 
performing this critical role. Narrative history does not progress, it spreads out sideways in an 
essentially uncritical fashion. 
Narrative history does not popularise the results of a critical analysis of the historical record, 
which were previously published in a fully documented non-narrative form in learned journals. 
It tries to kill two birds with one stone by engaging in an immediate popularisation of history. The 
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problem is not just the narrative form of the finished product, the taking of notes for the purpose 
of piecing together a narrative is already an academically unacceptable procedure which facilitates 
a phantomisation of history instead of minimising it. 
But a critical inspection of this narrative approach to the historical record, as opposed to the 
narrative treatment of the informatli.on it contains, suggests an alternative approach to the 
utilisation of this information. While a narrative approach views the historical record as a random 
accumulation of information, this is, in fact, not the case. The historical record of colonial rule in 
German New Guinea contains its own structures which narrative historians ignore at their peril, 
but which can also be used constructively. 
Taking the structure of the historical record into account makes the task of a historian adopting 
a holistic approach less daunting than it appears to be. It can tell us, before we embark on a 
detailed examination, what the most appropriate starting point is-and, whether we like it or not, 
the most appropriate starting point for a history of colonial rule in German New Guinea is its 
legislative framework, because it is the only part of the historical record that can be dealt with 
independently. 
It is possible to give an account of this framework as a normative or quasi-normative order 
without considering any information beyond the text of the legislative documents which constitute 
it. No additional information can alter the picture of this order these documents present, whereas 
no other part of the historical record can be treated in this manner. On the contrary, no aspect of 
the exercise of colonial rule can be adequately dealt with without taking the legislative framework 
into account. 
This does not mean that the shape of the legislative framework was unaffected by economic 
or ideological factors, or that these factors did not form alternative frameworks of human action, 
but these other frameworks were rarely spelled out whereas most of the fields in which they 
operated were also subject to legislative regulation which is. There are no ideological manifestos 
which could serve as alternative starting points for an examination of the history of German New 
Guinea, and while the economic development of the colony was primarily the result of private 
efforts, an account of its economic history still depends primarily on the relevant governmental 
records, whereas historians would find it impossible to reconstruct the history of German colonial 
rule from the records produced by the private sector. However powerful commercial and other 
private interests were in German New Guinea, it was the colonial government that governed the 
colony and produced the records which show how German colonial rule was exercised. 
These records are not just a source of information about the history of colonial rule, they are 
an essential part of this history: they served practical purposes; they were shaped by these 
purposes. Their own shape reflects how the government operated. This is not to say that an 
account of the changing shapes of these governmental records could replace a history of 
governmental action, but without understanding their structure historians will stumble around in 
the dark and have to rely on what their sense of touch tells them about the particular bits of 
information they are fingering. 
A good illustration of the structural interdependence of different parts of the historical record 
is the exercise of their jurisdiction by the colonial courts. While it may be possible to write a 
satisfactory history of, say, the activities of the Christian missions in German New Guinea without 
a reference to the legislative framework within which they operated, this is impossible for a history 
of the exercise of judicial powers. Courts are meant to apply the substantive law in accordance 
with legally prescribed procedures. This is their task. For the courts the Rule of Law is not a 
means to an administrative end but an end in itself, and indeed the legitimation of their very 
existence. 
As a consequence of their dependence on the legislative framework the exercise of judicial 
powers becomes a model of repetitive actions. Although each case which comes before the courts 
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is unique, they are required to treat like cases alike. Courts put particular cases into pigeon holes 
predefined by law which prescribes their legal treatment. There is no need for historians of the 
exercise of judicial powers in German New Guinea to go beyond the published court statistics, 
provided they are sufficiently detailed and reliable. They will then tell them all they need to know 
about outcomes in simple quantitative terms. Not only the legal reasons for a particular judicial 
decision but also the facts of the cases decided are immaterial for the history of the exercise of 
judicial powers, although the former are relevant for a doctrinal history of the colonial law and 
the latter may offer valuable information for other histories, for example the history of the 
Christian missions. In contrast to the court statistics in relation to the history of the exercise of 
judicial powers, this information, however, is anecdotal rather than systematic. It does not provide 
a body of information sufficient for writing a history of, say, the Christian missions, even though 
such a history, if written without considering this information, may present a seriously distorted 
picture. 
Yet even this anecdotal information has its own quantitative potential. For example, it may 
show that a substantial number of missionaries belonging to a particular mission society were 
consistently judicially punished for assaulting natives whereas no such punishments were recorded 
against members of another mission society-and it is worth stressing that negative results can be 
historically just as significant as positive results. Thus it may be historically more significant if 
the historical record shows that not a single non-native was executed in German New Guinea than 
if it shows that, say, 321 non-natives were judicially fined. The historical significance of the 
negative first result will increase if the historical record also shows that, say, 28 natives were 
executed. It will increase further if it was typical of all German colonies that no non-natives but 
substantial numbers of natives were executed; and it will increase still further if it shows that this 
result differed markedly from the position in non-German colonies in the Pacific and elsewhere 
during the same period. 
There is another negative phenomenon to be considered in this context, namely the absence 
of information from the historical record and, in particular, the absence of certain types of 
information as the result of design rather than chance. This is a phenomenon which can show up 
only if and in so far as a historical record has a structure. But such structures do exist, at least 
where the historical record relevant for a particular topic consists essentially of a body of 
documents produced by a single source for a single practical purpose-as is the case with the 
records produced by the government of German New Guinea for the purpose of governing that 
colony. 
If that government had been fully bureaucratised these records would form a single system 
which would enable historians to predict what kind of information should have been recorded and 
where it could be found, provided, of course, that all these records have survived. This system 
would be shaped first of all by the legislation prescribing what records had to be kept, but it would 
also reflect the organisation of this government and the response to practical administrative 
requirements, for example the need for some kind of filing system which allowed the retrieval of 
information not only by the official who recorded it but also by other officials who replaced him. 
Although the government of German New Guinea was, even at the end of German colonial 
rule, far from being fully bureaucratised, there existed structures which must be understood in 
order to appreciate the historical record, as well as the history, of this colony. For example, the 
changing organisation of its government shows that the information about what went on in 
German New Guinea in the files of the colonial office in Berlin has to differ widely, because the 
administrators of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie reported to its board of directors rather than to the 
German government, as the imperial governors did after 1 899, or the imperial commissioners for 
the Old Protectorate had done between 1 889 and 1 892. But there remained important differences 
after 1 899. The local administrations in the Island Territory reported directly to the German 
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government, whereas those in the Old Protectorate reported to the governor, and often did so 
orally rather than in writing. Hence we can learn a great deal more from the colonial office files 
about the administration of, say, the northern Marianas than northern New Ireland, or about the 
administration of the Old Protectorate by imperial commissioner Rose than that by the company 
administrator Schmiele. 
What we do learn shows that it is impossible to form an adequate picture of what went on at 
the local level anywhere and at any time in German New Guinea on the basis of the information 
contained in the files of the colonial office. Those responsible for reporting to the German 
government had wide discretion as to what they did and did not report. Thus we find a great deal 
of information about matters which had caused trouble, or were likely to do so, about matters the 
handling of which promised to earn particular officials special praise, or matters which supported 
local plans, the realisation of which required headquarters support, usually in the form of 
additional finance, but very little about other matters which are potentially of far greater historical 
significance. 
As we have already seen, the question of administrative discretion is closely linked with the 
question of the quantifiability of information and with the distinction between the typical and the 
unique aspects of human actions. Now I want to go a step further and also link this question with 
a distinction between what was regarded as administratively normal and abnormal. 
From the start of colonial rule in German New Guinea the administration of justice and the 
protection of its indigenous inhabitants were singled out for special treatment. This led to a dual 
system of justice: one for natives and one for non-natives, the latter in principle governed by 
German metropolitan law, the former in principle subject to administrative discretion. What 
concerns me here are the consequences of this dual system of justice for the recording of 
information about the exercise of judicial powers in relation to these two classes of colonial 
subjects. 
The exercise of judicial powers in relation to non-natives was perhaps the most bureaucratised 
aspect of German colonial rule: it involved the least administrative discretion and required the 
most systematic recording of information, which culminated in the publication of annual court 
statistics .  By contrast no such statistics were published for the exercise of their criminal 
jurisdiction by the courts dealing with natives. Instead only penal statistics were published. They 
differed from the court statistics, in particular, in that they did not show how many of the accused 
were acquitted, so that the information they contain, for this reason alone, does not permit a 
quantitative treatment of the exercise of this jurisdiction. This, I am now suggesting, reflects the 
view that these courts were abnormal and temporary institutions. 
However, they were viewed as being sufficiently normal and permanent to be provided with 
their own legislative framework in the form of a native penal ordinance which placed the exercise 
of the criminal jurisdiction over natives under the Rule of Law and is sufficiently detailed to 
permit a structural approach to its history. The records kept by these courts were, in principle, 
adequate for a systematic quantitative approach, although this has become impractical because 
only a small fraction of their decisions has survived. 
As regards the exercise of the civil jurisdiction by the German colonial authorities in relation 
to natives, no quantitative information of any kind was published. This does not mean that no 
administrative practices developed or that no administrative instructions were issued, but as it 
stands the historical record rules out a structural, let alone systematic quantitative approach. 
The same applies to the exercise of judicial powers by the government chiefs . No quantitative 
information about their decisions was published and no systematic records were kept. Indeed, no 
such records were prescribed or kept of their appointment or removal from office. Although public 
notices were issued which defined the powers and duties attached to this office in some local 
languages, and although other legislative acts or administrative instructions referred to the role of 
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government chiefs, the institution remained a creature of administrative discretion. Nor was the 
existence of government chiefs acknowledged in the colony's  budgets. They do not show up under 
the vote for "auxiliary coloured personnel" because they did not receive a regular salary, and the 
budgets also do not indicate how the fines they imposed, or the cut of the head tax they were 
allowed to keep, were handled in accounting terms-all of which, I suggest, is again a reflection 
of the fact that government chiefs, or the practice of giving individuals a cut of taxes, were not 
regarded as a normal part of the colonial government. 
This was also the case with the disciplinary punishments of native labourers. The disciplinary 
powers were defined by legislation but no quantitative information concerning their exercise was 
published, although the keeping of records for internal administrative use was prescribed. By 
contrast no such records were kept for the exercise of coercive administrative powers over natives. 
They remained discretionary throughout the history of German New Guinea, although their 
exercise included measures that were at least as abnormal as the use of corporal punishments for 
the maintenance of discipline among native labourers, for example the banishment of natives from 
their home areas. Similarly no quantitative information concerning corvee labour was published, 
and no systematic records were kept, because corvee labour too was not regarded as a normal 
administrative practice. It was also not regulated by legislation although a general administrative 
instruction laid down some principles which were meant to guide the local authorities, but it 
stopped far short of forming a suitable basis for a structural approach to this field. 
The imposition of a head tax on natives, on the other hand, was seen as a normal exercise of 
governmental powers . It was introduced and regulated by legislation, systematic records were kept 
and the revenue produced was accounted for in the normal way, apart from the abnormal cuts for 
government chiefs about which no systematic information was published. 8 
The most extreme case of an abnormal exercise of governmental powers was punitive 
expeditions. Although they were carried out routinely throughout the period of German colonial 
rule and although narrative accounts of many of them were officially published, no information 
was systematically recorded, and certainly no statistics were published. 
Nonetheless a history of punitive expeditions calls for a systematic quantitative approach, and 
the anecdotal information available is just as quantifiable as the information relating to the 
exercise of their judicial powers by the colonial courts. Nor is the absence of a legislative 
regulation of the use of military force an insurmountable obstacle. It could even be a blessing in 
disguise because it permits historians to proceed directly to a comparative analysis of the 
quantitative data in order to establish the historical patterns in the use of military force, without 
having to deal first with a normative or quasi-normative framework. The problem is rather that the 
information is, and always has been, too incomplete for a systematic quantitative treatment: it does 
not enable historians to construct anything like the counterpart of the contemporary court statistics. 
On the other hand, while punitive expeditions are the most extreme case of an abnormal 
administrative practice, they are not the worst as far as the inadequacy of recorded information 
is concerned. It is much easier to get at least a feeling for what went on in this field than it is to 
get a feeling for what went on in other fields of native administration, for example, the activities 
of government chiefs and their treatment by the German authorities . 
Generally speaking it is clear by now that the historical record produced of the exercise of 
colonial rule in German New Guinea always has been inadequate for giving a systematic account 
of many important aspects of this rule, although such a systematic approach would be the only way 
of achieving a satisfactory result. 
One way of responding to this dilemma is greater modesty. For example, instead of trying to 
write a general history of punitive expeditions in German New Guinea, we could settle for a 
history of punitive expeditions in a particular part of this colony during a particular space of time 
8 The picture sketched here relates to the Old Protectorate. The position in the Island Territory was more complex. 
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for which the historical record is unusually favourable, and we would be able to make some 
headway in this manner, especially if we were looking for negative results. Thus the historical 
record allows us to state with confidence that the Ponape Rebellion in 1910-1 1 was the only 
occasion during the history of German colonial rule in the Island Territory when the authorities 
responded with what could be classified as a punitive expedition. In other words, the history of 
such expeditions in the Island Territory boils down to this single instance for which a narrative 
approach seems to be perfectly appropriate and adequate. But is it? 
For a narrative approach to history the starting point is not the historical record but the unique 
events of which history is composed. The problem here is that these events are artificial 
constructs, the uniqueness of which is the product of a multitude of factors, each of which is the 
product of a multitude of other factors. To come to grips with a cluster of human actions as a 
unique event means to lift up the entire web of history at a particular point and to observe how its 
many strands spread out sideways and backwards. 
If we were to adopt a unique events approach to the history of colonial rule in German New 
Guinea, we would therefore have to start at its end rather than at its beginning, for if we take the 
granting of an imperial charter to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in May 1885 as the official start of 
German colonial rule, its examination can only lead us back in time and away from the Pacific. 
�ut an examination of the capitulation of German New Guinea in September 1914 as the official 
end of German colonial rule is just as unhelpful. Instead of lifting the lid off the history of German 
New Guinea, lifting the web of history at this point passes it by, since the strands emanating from 
this event extend around the globe instead of reaching down into the history of this colony. 
This is not surprising because it is historically immaterial that German colonial rule ended with 
the capitulation of the acting governor. The capitulation was not the culmination of German 
colonial rule, it merely marked its end, which could just as well have come about at a different 
time and in a different way. By contrast the capitulation is a significant event in the history of the 
Australian military occupation of German New Guinea. But its significance in this context is due 
to its structural implications and not to the combination of particular features constituting its 
uniqueness. We can appreciate this significance without knowing anything about the acting 
German governor or the Australian commander as persons, about the events preceding the 
capitulation, about the formalities accompanying it or about the physical environment in which 
it took place; we only have to look at the text of the terms of capitulation, just as we only have to 
look at the text of the 1 885 imperial charter to appreciate the significance of the event of its 
granting for the exercise of German colonial rule. 
What about cases where the historical significance of an event is not so conveniently 
encapsulated in a legal document? What about, for example, the assassination of the archduke of 
Austria which is said to have caused the outbreak of World War I, and thereby also the end of 
German colonial rule in the Pacific? Was this assassination a significant event in the history of 
World War I? Which of the particular features constituting it as a unique event do we have to 
know in order to answer this question? Does historical significance have to do with causation, at 
least in the negative sense that an event is historically insignificant if it did not cause the sequence 
of events a historian wants to describe? 
It is plain that any event is simultaneously part of a multitude of causal chains and that it is 
never the only cause of any other event. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether an event, seen 
as a cluster of human actions and reactions, can as such cause anything. While it may be 
unproblematic to establish a causal link between a particular action of the assassin and the death 
of the archduke, it was not this action but the news of the assassination of the archduke which 
caused the response in distant places which led to the outbreak of World War I. Is it historically 
helpful to speculate what would have happened if the assassination had not taken place, or if the 
archduke had only been wounded, or if he had instead been assassinated during a visit to Paris or 
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shot dead by the husband of a mistress? Is it historically constructive to distinguish between 
immediate and deep causes or between causes, triggers and contributing factors? Is the historically 
important issue a question of responsibility rather than causality? Was the assassin responsible for 
the outbreak of World War I, or does this responsibility lie with the Austrian, or the German, 
Russian, French or British governments? Is it the task of historians to apportion this responsibility 
retrospectively as objectively as possible? 
Conversely, are the causes of World War I immaterial for a history of that war, unless they can 
be shown to affect what happened during or after that war? Is it historically productive to consider 
what would have happened if Germany and her allies had been victorious? Should we begin an 
examination of the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea by asking what would have 
happened if Germany had never become a colonial power in the Pacific? Should we continue to 
apply this speculative significance test right down to the level of particular events? Do particular 
human actions become historically irrelevant if they did not alter the course of history? Do we 
waste our time studying the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea if we come to the 
conclusion that the position in the geographical area in question today would look basically the 
same if we should think it away? Is a study of German colonial law superfluous if it did not leave 
a lasting and unmistakable mark on the legal systems currently operating in this area? Can we 
forget about the hoisting of the German flag on Matupit Island in November 1 884 if we can think 
it away without altering the course of history? 
But what would be left of history after we had finished applying this test? And how do we 
apply it, since we know nothing about alternative courses of history which did not take place and 
produced no historical record against which we can test our imagination? On the other hand, how 
do we deal with the actual historical record unless we can apply some kind of relevance test to the 
vast amount of information it contains? How does a narrative approach to history handle this 
question? 
It is time for another case study, this time E.H. Carr's "acclaimed reflections on the theory of 
history and the role of the historian". Carr approaches the question: "What is history?" with the 
help of a straw man called "the commonsense view of history''. According to this view, Carr says, 
history "consists of a corpus of ascertained facts" which "are available to the historian . . .  like fish 
on a fishmonger' s slab. The historian collects them, takes them home, and cooks and serves them 
in whatever style appeals to him" ( 1990: 9). But, according to Carr, this view "clearly will not do", 
because it fails to distinguish "the facts of history from other facts about the past" (ibid. :  10). 
However, Carr first prepares the ground by making a preliminary distinction, namely between 
"facts about the past" and what may be called facts about the present. 
I shall not embark on a philosophical discussion of the nature of our knowledge of the past. Let us 
assume for present purposes that the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon and the fact there is a table in 
the middle of the room are facts of the same or of a comparable order, that both these facts enter our 
consciousness in the same or in a comparable manner, and that both have the same objective character 
in relation to the person who knows them. But, even on this bold and not very plausible assumption, our 
argument at once runs into the difficulty that not all facts about the past are historical facts, or are treated 
as such by the historian. What is the criterion which distinguishes the facts of history from other facts 
about the past (1990: 10)? 
To be sure, there are differences between our knowledge of the two facts contrasted, but there is 
no need for a philosophical discussion to see that Carr' s  absurdly oversimplified comparison does 
not address the questions raised.9 
9 Did a person who observed Caesar crossing the Rubicon also have a different kind of knowledge of this fact compared 
with the knowledge of a person observing a table standing in front of him? In what respects does their respective 
knowledge differ between a person who is told by another person on the telephone that this person is observing a table 
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But what Carr implies about the differences between our knowledge of the past and the 
present is merely meant to deflect attention from his highly questionable distinction between 
"historical facts" and other "facts about the past"; for had Carr not dazzled us with his absurd 
comparison we might have seen that the difficulty he sets out to overcome is his own creation: 
unnecessary but strategically useful. 10 In other words, all this shilly-shallying is meant to create 
an atmosphere of mysterious ambiguity in which Carr can pose his crucial phantom question: what 
is a historical fact? 
As is to be expected, Carr avoids a straightforward answer. Instead he gives a multitude of 
partial answers before he merges this question with the question: what is history? But his "first 
answer" to this second question also obliquely answers the first question because history, 
according to Carr, "is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an 
unending dialogue between the present and the past" (ibid. : 30). While this answer sounds 
reasonable as a definition of what historians ought to be doing, it contains, at the same time, the 
proposition that history is identical with what historians actually do. But we have already been 
transported to Wonderland where the meaning of words is deliciously flexible. Here "history" can 
indeed almost, but not quite, mean "historiography", just as facts are, "strictly speaking", not at 
all facts because in Wonderland non-historical facts do not exist as such but are "about" 
something else. Hence they can be simultaneously dead and capable of interacting with the 
historian, who, as a spokesman of the present, conducts an unending dialogue with the past. 
Let us see what form this unending dialogue takes; how Carr, by distinguishing between the 
many unhistorical "facts about the past" and the few "historical facts", creates a realm of history 
that is distinct from the past as well as the present, because it is constituted by these historical facts 
that are no longer about something else once the professional consensus among historians has 
given them a timeless narrative factuality. 1 1  
What i s  a historical fact? This i s  a crucial question into which we must look a little more closely. 
According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians 
and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history-the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings 
was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like 
these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was 
fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or 
Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But when points of this kind are raised, I am 
reminded of Housman's remark that 'accuracy is a duty, not a virtue' .  To praise a historian for his 
accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his 
building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters 
in the room from which he is speaking and a person who is reading today an ancient letter in which Caesar described how 
he crossed the Rubicon? Does the knowledge of a person observing the table become more secure, because he can continue 
to touch the table whereas a person who observed Caesar crossing the Rubicon could hardly have asked Caesar to repeat 
this action because he was no longer certain that his eyes had not tricked him the first time? Is it possible for a person to 
know that he is observing a table in the middle of the room, or can he only know that he observed it a split second before, 
when his eyes received the optical signals his brain subsequently translated into the knowledge of this fact? Can we, if 
we can know facts at all, only know facts about the past? Is it the present, rather than the past, that is, in principle, 
unknowable? 
I 0 Carr gains a big advantage by asserting that not all ''facts about the past'' are ''historical facts", rather than making the 
more plausible assertion that not all ''facts about the past'' are historically significant. He strengthens his position further 
by suggesting that being a historical fact and being treated as such by historians is pretty much the same but that being 
"historical'' is nonetheless a property of some ''facts about the past", so that it is the absence of this property that makes 
all other ''facts about the past" ''unhistorical", rather than their treatment as such by historians. 
1 1  If factuality could be achieved so easily Carr' s  reflections would hardly have been necessary. But it is not, and the 
purpose of the reflections is again a strategic muddying of the waters rather than a critical examination of the problem. 
Does Carr's distinction between "basic facts" as the raw material of the historian which is produced by the "auxiliary 
sciences" of history and "history itself' itself stand up to scrutiny? Does Carr seriously believe, for example, that the 
precise date of the Battle of Hastings has been, or could be, established by elaborate astronomical calculations? 
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of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the ' auxiliary sciences' of 
history-archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth. The historian is not required 
to have the special skills which enable the expert to determine the origin and period of a fragment of 
pottery or marble, to decipher an obscure inscription, or to make the elaborate astronomical calculations 
necessary to establish a precise date. These so-called basic facts, which are the same for all historians, 
commonly belong to the category of the raw materials of the historian rather than of history itself. The 
second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts 
themselves, but on an a priori decision of the historian. In spite of C.P. Scott's  motto, every journalist 
knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the 
appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts 
speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in 
what order or context. It was, I think, one of Pirandello '  s characters who said that a fact is like a sack-it 
won't stand up till you've put something in it. The only reason why we are interested to know that the 
battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event. It is the 
historian who has decided for his own reasons that Caesar' s crossing of that petty stream, the Rubicon, 
is a fact of history, whereas the crossing of the Rubicon by millions of other people before or since 
interests nobody at all. The fact that you arrived in this building half an hour ago on foot, or on a bicycle, 
or in a car, is just as much a fact about the past as the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. But it will 
probably be ignored by historians. Professor Talcott Parsons once called science 'a selective system of 
cognitive orientations to reality' .  It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other 
things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing 
objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one 
which it is very hard to eradicate. 
Let us take a look at the process by which a mere fact about the past is transformed into a fact of 
history. At Stalybridge Wakes in 1850, a vendor of gingerbread, as the result of some petty dispute, was 
deliberately kicked to death by an angry mob. Is this a fact of history? A year ago I should unhesitatingly 
have said 'no ' .  It was recorded by an eye-witness in some little-known memoirs; but I had never seen it 
judged worthy of mention by any historian. A year ago Dr Kitson Clark cited it in his Ford lectures in 
Oxford. Does this make it into a historical fact? Not, I think, yet. Its present status, I suggest, is that it 
has been proposed for membership of the select club of historical facts. It now awaits a seconder and 
sponsors. It may be that in the course of the next few years we shall see this fact appearing first in 
footnotes, then in the text, of articles and books about nineteenth-century England, and that in twenty or 
thirty years' time it may be a well-established historical fact. Alternatively, nobody may take it up, in 
which case it will relapse into the limbo of unhistorical facts about the past from which Dr Kitson Clark 
has gallantly attempted to rescue it. What will decide which of these two things will happen? It will 
depend, I think, on whether the thesis or interpretation in support of which Dr Kitson Clark cited this 
incident is accepted by other historians as valid and significant. Its status as a historical fact will tum on 
a question of interpretation. This element of interpretation enters into every fact of history (ibid.: 10- 13  ) .  
How does the "element of interpretation" enter into "every fact of history"?12 How did, for 
example, "the historian" interpret "Caesar' s crossing of that petty stream, the Rubicon" before he 
decided, "for his own reasons", to treat it as a fact of history? What reasons did "the historian" 
have, and did these reasons have anything to do with an interpretation of the fact of Caesar' s 
crossing? Is it an interpretation of this fact that Caesar did not cross the Rubicon by himself, as 
a private individual, but as the commander of the 1 3th legion of the Roman army, and together 
with all his men, or an interpretation that the Rubicon was not any old petty stream but formed the 
border between Italy and Cisalpine Gaul, so that the crossing amounted to a declaration of war? 
Did "the historian" have much choice under these circumstances but to accept it as a "historical 
fact", especially since Caesar apparently made sure that his immortal line "alea jacta est" (the dice 
1 2  "Interpretation" as used here is, of course, a narrative rather than analytical term. It contains not only elements of 
evaluation, as well as explanation, but also justifies the exercise of narrative freedom in the selection of facts to be 
included in an account of history. On the other hand, it is clear that "interpretation" does not refer to a critical examination 
of the historical record with the aim of testing the factuality of the information it contains. After all, the facts about the 
past are not even part of history, as history is a matter of architectural design, not of properly mixed concrete. 
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has been cast) was widely reported? Can a historian today do more than to add in  a footnote that 
according to Plutarch, Caesar-for reasons of his own-had uttered this line in Greek rather than 
in Latin, or that, contrary to Carr's  view, people would now find it difficult to cross the Rubicon 
because it is uncertain whether the river which Caesar crossed is today's Fumicino, or the Rugone 
or even the Lusa, as decreed by the Vatican in 1756?13 
Do historians have their own reasons for regarding the battle of Hastings as a major historical 
event? Does this status owe anything to their interpretation of this event? Is the fact that historians 
treat the battle as a major historical event the reason that "we" want to know that it was fought at 
a particular time in a particular place? Would it diminish "our" understanding of its historical 
significance if we only knew that a great battle had taken place somewhere in southern England 
during the second half of the I Ith century which ended with a decisive victory for the Normans? 
Do historians report these details rather because they give substance to their narratives? Does Carr 
also skip from one mildly relevant quotation to the next, because that appears to give his treatment 
of the question "What is a historical factr' a quasi-narrative substance which saves him from 
having to develop a rational argument? 
At any rate, it is another quotation which lends substance to his observation that historians are 
also a dangerous bunch because "The dead hand of vanished generations of historians, scribes, 
and chroniclers has determined beyond the possibility of appeal the pattern of the past" (ibid. :  14) 
by discarding as unhistorical the "mass of other facts, in which we might have possibly found 
evidence to the contrary". Hence, according to the quote from Professor Barraclough, "The history 
we read, though based on facts, is, strictly speaking, not factual at all, but a series of accepted 
judgements" (ibid.)-which is, of course, strictly speaking, at best metaphorically true. 
Yet, the "vast winnowing process" which this series of judgements has brought about has a 
great advantage for subsequent historians, because it leaves only "a manageable corpus of 
historical facts" at their disposal. But Carr takes shelter behind yet another quotation so that he 
can reach the climax of his observations in an atmosphere of light-hearted irony. 
As Lytton Strachey said, in his mischievous way, 'ignorance is the first requisite of the historian, 
ignorance which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits. '  When I am tempted, as I sometimes 
am, to envy the extreme competence of colleagues engaged in writing ancient or medieval history, I find 
consolation in the reflexion that they are so competent mainly because they are so ignorant of their 
subject. The modem historian enjoys none of the advantages of this built-in ignorance. He must cultivate 
this necessary ignorance for himself-the more so the nearer he comes to his own times. He has the dual 
task of discovering the few significant facts and turning them into facts of history, and of discarding the 
many insignificant facts as unhistorical. But this is the very converse of the nineteenth-century heresy 
that history consists of the compilation of a maximum number of irrefutable and objective facts. Anyone 
who succumbs to this heresy will either have to give up history as a bad job, and take to stamp-collecting 
or some other form of antiquarianism, or end in a madhouse (ibid. : 14-15) .  
Why is it a heresy? Because this "nineteenth-century fetishism of facts was completed and 
justified by a fetishism of documents". 
The documents were the Ark of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The reverent historian approached 
them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed tones. If you find it in the documents, it is so. But 
what, when we get down to it, do these documents-the decrees, the treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue 
books, the official correspondence, the private letters and diaries-tell us? No document can tell us more 
than what the author of the document thought-what he thought had happened, what he thought ought 
to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only 
what he himself thought he thought. None of this means anything until the historian has got to work on 
it and deciphered it. The facts, whether found in documents or not, have still to be processed by the 
1 3  See the Rubicon entry in the 1 886 edition of the Brockhaus encyclopaedia. 
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historian before he can make any use of them: the use he makes of them is, if I may put it that way, the 
processing process (ibid. : 16). 
Moreover, this "processing process" not only has to establish the meaning of a particular 
document but also the meaning of history in general, at least if the historian in question has 
discarded the self-confident ideological baggage which included the naive fact fetishism of the 
19th century. 
Let everyone get on with his particular job [thus goes its obsolete message] , and the hidden hand would 
take care of the universal harmony. The facts of history were themselves a demonstration of the supreme 
fact of a beneficent and apparently infinite progress towards higher things. This was the age of innocence, 
and historians walked in the Garden of Eden, without a scrap of philosophy to cover them, naked and 
unashamed before the god of history. Since then, we have known Sin and experienced a Fall; and those 
historians who today pretend to dispense with a philosophy of history are merely trying, vainly and self­
consciously, like members of a nudist colony, to recreate the Garden of Eden in their garden suburb 
(ibid. : 20). 
By contrast modem historians no longer walk naked before the god of history but are decently 
dressed in their tailor-made phantom clothes, designed for pleasant little fishing trips; for the 
"facts about the past" are "really not at all like fish on the fishmonger's slab", rather, 
They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian 
catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and 
what tackle he chooses to use-these two factors being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he 
wants to catch. By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts he wants. History means 
interpretation. Indeed, if, standing Sir George Clark on his head, I were to call history ' a  hard core of 
interpretation surrounded by a pulp of disputable facts' ,  my statement would, no doubt, be one-sided and 
misleading, but no more so, I venture to think, than the original dictum (ibid.: 23-24). 
This is how simple and confused things are in the Wonderland of modem history, where visitors 
are no longer served a variety of seafood dishes but always the same old narrative omelette, 
although flavoured with a liberal dose of different pre-liberal, liberal, post-liberal or nee-liberal 
phantom spices. Instead of facing the challenges a modem historical record offers, Carr refuses 
to leave the pre-modem paradise of narrative history, because peeping over its walls the outside 
world looks indeed like a madhouse inhabited by frustrated stamp-collectors, whereas in 
Wonderland historians are still entitled to ride on the back of "the •auxiliary sciences' of history" 
when performing their essential function of interpreting a manageable corpus of historical facts, 
which historians are creating by passing judgements on the basis of cultivated ignorance. How 
unfair to expect a historian, as an aspiring man of letters, to make "the elaborate astronomical 
calculations necessary to establish a precise date" for the beginning of German colonial rule in the 
Pacific. Let them get on with what they have been trained to do: stuffing the empty sacks of facts 
about the past with enough phantom details to make them stand up and proudly display the 
messages the historian has written on them Or are historical facts in Wonderland really not at all 
like empty sacks? Are they, in fact, like the skins of colourful balloons which lie around, gathering 
dust, until they are filled with hot air so that they can rise up into the sky to the delight of 
everybody? 
The problem was that all these beautiful balloons burst when they drift across the borders of 
Wonderland and are critically examined-for example by asking what kind of reasons of their 
own historians do, can, may or ought to have for turning a few facts about the past into potential 
facts of history, or on what basis their colleagues do or do not accept such an interpretation as 
valid or significant. 
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It was a sad spectacle to see Carr' s  elegant phantom justification of narrative phantom history 
disintegrate but also frightening to realise that such an intellectual Pavlova-no joke but plenty 
of wit, as an aspiring man of letters might say-is still dished up to students of history as a model 
of what they should aspire to. On the other hand, Carr' s  performance gave me the courage to also 
run the risk of making a fool of myself in the eyes of critical readers by sharing a personal 
reminiscence of my own. 
Like Carr's ,  my personal reminiscence had to do with the shock of discovering what historians 
were doing to history. But since I was not an enthusiastically budding historian when I had this 
experience, the effects on me were more traumatic. Instead of learning to enjoy the power of 
creating phantom history like a true professional, I started to sleep badly and was haunted by my 
dreams even when I was awake. 
Three of these dreams kept recurring. The first was easy to "interpret". I was fighting my way 
through a world of brambles, not towards a sleeping beauty but towards a black hole through 
which I was sucked into Alice' s  Wonderland where I ran into the Queen of Hearts wherever I 
went, her scream, "Off with their heads !" constantly reverberating in my mind. 
In the second dream I was facing an animated but silent copperplate engraving of the Tower 
of Babel: tiny figures milling around the huge, unfinished structure, making mud-bricks and 
carrying them up a spiralling ramp which already reached so high that I could no longer discern 
what was happening at the top. I just watched and watched, endlessly it seemed, until the screen 
was switched off. 
The third dream also featured an illustration I remembered from my childhood: a scene from 
Andersen' s  "The Emperor' s  New Clothes" when the little boy shouted, "Look, he is naked !" But 
as I heard him crow triumphantly, I knew he was wrong, not because the emperor was decently 
dressed in a long-sleeved and long-legged set of heavy unbleached cotton underwear, but because 
the shadowy tailors behind him continued to smile their foxy smiles under their sharp noses with 
the greatest assurance. Since I somehow knew that the little boy was "the historian" and that the 
tailors were "the lawyers", the meaning of the dream could easily be worked out. Although he had 
jolly red cheeks and a merry twinkle in his eyes instead of shooting steely glances over the 
upturned tips of his waxed moustache, the emperor was Wilhelm II parading through his empire. 
But in the background the tailors were busily weaving their legal spider's net. They had thrown 
it over the emperor and its outer strands were already reaching for the little boy' s head. Yet, he 
did not seem to suspect for a moment that he was just providing a welcome distraction-or had 
he seen one of the tailors slinking away to buy him the ice cream he had been promised as a 
reward for his performance? 
The second dream was a harder nut to crack. I vividly remembered how the biblical story had 
outraged me as a teenager, because I had interpreted it as yet another jealous interference of this 
horrible God who wanted to prevent humankind from building a structure so high that it would, 
once and for all, prove that the heavens were empty. Now it seemed to me that God had acted out 
of kindness. He did not employ his divine powers to beat his rebelling creatures into submission 
but to save them from wasting their energies on following an impossible and suicidal vision. 
Instead of commanding the ground to open, to swallow the tower and all engaged in its 
construction, he achieved his altruistic goal by creating a multitude of languages. He shut down 
the construction site simply by breaking the chain of commands which had kept it going. 
Then I had a disturbing afterthought: while the divine intervention had stopped the 
construction of the Tower of Babel, it had left the historians of this event untouched. Their 
narrative could not only be told in any of the multitude of languages which resulted from this 
intervention, but their narrative approach had cornered the global history market; for who, after 
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listening to their catchy little number, would want to learn how the Tower of Babel, or any other 
manifestation of human hubris, was actually constructed? Nor was there any need to perform this 
laborious task since their narrative version of history implied that there would always be a deus 
ex machina who was going to prevent the ultimate triumph of the tailors . As far as narrative 
history is concerned, the emperor is indeed naked, and his new clothes are a conspiratorial 
phantom which the little boy is called upon to expose, without fear or favour. 
This afterthought, however, could still not be the message my dream was trying to convey 
because it was not at all concerned with the divine intervention which is supposed to have taken 
place. In my dream history was not a narrative but a construction site. Yet it had as little in 
common with physical space as it had in common with astronomical time. It formed a fifth 
dimension. History was not the account of events which had once taken place in physical space. 
It was itself a timeless, non-physical space which was real only in the Here and Now, where it was 
represented by the surviving historical record. History was the historical record; and it represented 
a map, instead of serving as a quarry from which smaller or larger quantities of building blocks 
for the construction of historical narratives could be mined. 
Once I had grasped that my kind of history had to do with historical space, I also began to see 
how the historians' Tower of Babel was constructed. It mystified history by treating it as 
something which took place in the astronomical time-dimension. The term "taking place", which 
offered itself in this context, already indicated the problems this created. The mechanical 
"spacing" of time, by the ticking of an imaginary, astronomical clock, is itself meaningless. The 
"passage" of time must be turned into a "journey" in order to become history. It must have a 
beginning and an end, a destination, a purpose. The changes in scenery one encounters in the 
course of a journey through physical space have to be replicated for a journey through 
astronomical time. History constructed as a passage through astronomical time becomes identified 
with change and, more specifically, with change represented by deeds of human actors. These 
actions are, in turn, linked with the purpose of the journey through time. The mechanical ticking 
of the imaginary, astronomical clock is replaced by the mysteriously meaningful, but equally 
imaginary, heartbeat of history. History becomes its own actor. In Hegelian fashion it acts itself 
out, and, in so doing, writes the play it is performing, watched by historians who merely recount 
in their narratives what they see being performed. 
These underlying assumptions of narrative history are, of course, not meant to be spelt out. 
Instead, the transformation of history into meaningfully structured astronomical time begins with 
a strategic division of the time dimension into periods: the Present, the Past and the Future. This 
periodisation not only gives the time dimension a direction-it passes from the Past, through the 
Present, into the Future-but makes it change its quality in the process. Time is somehow real in 
the Present, whereas it has, as the Future, only the potential of becoming real. By contrast, time 
passed no longer has a potential. The Past is dead. But, having once been alive, it is more 
substantial than the Future. The Past continues to lead, as history, a retrievable, ghost-like 
existence. 
To be sure, this periodisation of time was not invented by historians, but it suits their 
professional needs admirably. It marks out the Past as their exclusive domain and endows it with 
all the professionally desirable attributes. It constitutes the Past as something which is neither fish 
nor fowl, and the task of the historian as something which is unique and mysterious. Since the Past 
is no longer real, it is also no longer accessible to scientific methods, so that history cannot be a 
science. On the other hand, having once been real, history cannot be an art either because it must 
be factual. History is neither true nor false, neither real nor imaginary. It is unpredictable but 
meaningful. It is subjective but not arbitrary. By the same token, historians cannot be held 
accountable for what they are doing because they perform an impossible task. Nor is there a need 
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for accountability because their activity is devoid of practical consequences. After all, what they 
are offering is only history. 
A perfect smoke-screen-but no more than that, because the periodisation of astronomical 
time, on which it rests, is itself a phantom. As soon as we examine what is taken for granted, it 
becomes clear that the Present does not exist. Seen as located within the dimension of 
astronomical time, it can be no more than the logical second during which the future turns into the 
past, no more than a door through which the not-yet passes to become the no-more. It acquires a 
semblance of reality if we perceive it as the point where astronomical time and physical space 
intersect, where the former takes place inside the latter. But this still does not give us the space 
of time for which we are grasping. Instead of helping us to understand what we are facing, the 
historical periodisation of astronomical time replaces it with an ideological structure which 
presents the historical time-space as a combination of motion and meaning. History, it tells us, 
consists of the deeds of historical actors who are marching through time, through a present which 
once was, the past behind their backs and their eyes firmly fixed on the future. 
The message conveyed by my dream was that history is no more a journey through 
astronomical time than a journey through physical space. History is not concerned with historical 
actors and their actions but with the historical stages on which they perform. Events become 
historical not because they took place in the Past, but because they took place on a historical stage 
which is different from the one on which we ourselves are living and which we assume to be 
familiar. Events become historical if they require a historical explanation, because they took place 
on a different historical stage and they are historically significant if they help to illuminate the 
historical stage on which they took place. 
But my dream also confirmed that history is mysterious. It merely denied that it was mysterious 
because it was the Past and that it was non-mysterious when it had been the Present. Historians 
are right in claiming that it is impossible to establish what the past was really like-but no more 
impossible than to establish what the present is really like. 
What is the difference between a historian dealing with the assassination of Caesar and a court 
dealing with the murder of John Doe. Not that the former deals with the past and the latter with 
the present. To be sure, there are significant practical differences between trying to establish what 
happened two minutes or two thousand years ago. But they are not decisive. What makes the 
difference is that the tasks of courts and historians are different. Nothing stops us from dealing 
with the assassination of Julius Caesar as a court, or with the murder of John Doe as historians. 
The question is what we are supposed to do, as historians, if we deal with either of these events, 
whereas the tasks of a court are reasonably well defined. 
The first step appears to be the same: the facts of the matter need to be established. But then 
the task of the court enters into a crucial, second phase. It applies the law to these facts and arrives 
at an enforceable legal decision. If we ask historians if their task is also a two stage process, they 
will deny that it is their task to use the facts of history to demonstrate the existence or non­
existence of historical laws but also refuse to accept that their task is completed when they have 
established the facts of history as fully, and as reliably, as possible. They will even deny that the 
historical facts themselves can ever be known, so as to gain for themselves a vague historical 
discretion-which is, of course, claimed to have nothing in common with the artistic licence of 
a historical novelist. 
As far as their own professional activity is concerned, historians refuse to place themselves 
under the Rule of Law. They want to be free to judge historical actors, without binding themselves 
by rules of evidence, and without having to identify the norms of behaviour they are applying. It 
suits them to present history as a troubled water under a twilight sky which permits them to do 
some gentlemanly fly-fishing, without having to bother to distinguish whether they are catching 
pink salmon or red herrings. Naturally, they will assure us that they have instead been tirelessly 
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mining the historical record, under a blazing sun, driven by the stockwhip of their own 
professional conscience, sifting through mountains of historical evidence before cautiously 
constructing their narratives, and that they have removed the scaffolding and the rubble only 
afterwards, in the interests of their readers who deserve the best: elegance, as well as reliability. 
Yet, the historiographical treatment of colonial rule in German New Guinea by narrative historians 
shows that this image is no more realistic than the claim that lawyers are engaged in a continual, 
selfless struggle for justice. 
Seen as a normative order law shares some of the mysterious qualities of history, although it 
is concerned with the future rather than the past, because its primary task is to shape human 
actions which have not yet been performed. Nonetheless normative orders exist as normative 
orders in the Here and Now, and they are applied to judge human actions which have been 
performed in the past. But law as a historical phenomenon is a great deal more than a normative 
order, especially under the Rule of Law, when it becomes the dominant instrument for the 
organisation and operation of government and produces all manner of records which typically 
consist of frozen history and represent, as far as they go, how the past has really been. 
"Stop it, stop it !", I heard the boy from Andersen's  tale shouting at this point, "We all know 
that all this legal and quasi-legal nonsense is not real. Real is only what people actually do. All this 
normative crap is simply not history." Since I could predict what his reaction would be I took up 
the challenge. "Fair enough", I told him, "let us compare what people actually did in German New 
Guinea with what they were supposed to do according to the law, to find out how effective or 
ineffective law was as a normative order". The boy, suddenly looking old, tired and angry, threw 
up his hands in horror. "I am a historian", he screamed, "not a bloody sociologist. Have I not told 
you a thousand times that the past is mysterious and not accessible to scientific methods. History 
has nothing to do with the social sciences or anything else. History is history; and history, dammit, 
is what I, as a historian, declare it to be, and I declare it, following the excellent example of the 
American Legal Realists, to be no more and no less than what I am actually doing, and since I am 
doing narrative, history is henceforth narrative. Whatever is non-narratable is non-history and has 
nothing to do with me or history. Let me tell you for the last time that law is historically irrelevant, 
just as the Never-Never Land of statistical probabilities is not history. Quantification, my foot! 
Reducing history to a set of statistical tables-and this is what all your romantic babble about 
historical space amounts to, isn't it?" 
Was it? Did my dream tell me that I had to count the bricks and weigh the mortar which had 
gone into the construction of the Tower of Babel instead of telling stories about divine 
interventions? I liked the image of the Never-Never Land of statistical probabilities-and was 
beginning to wonder whether this was the Wonderland into which I had been sucked in my first 
dream. 
Since a quantification of history was as likely to produce phantom histories as its 
narrativisation, albeit of a different brand, a combination of these two approaches was perhaps the 
way to go. Quantification as a control-mechanism, as a means of making narrative history more 
objective, as a means of sorting out the narrative sheep from the goats by establishing statistically 
what was typical and what was not? But typical of what? Quantification can substantiate or 
invalidate hypotheses . It can test intuition; it can keep us on track; but it cannot tell us where we 
ought to be going. It cannot tell us which of the myriad of possible quantifications are historically 
rewarding. It cannot provide us with a typology or identify of what an action is supposed to be 
representative. 
A quantification of history can help us, for example, to establish how effective the colonial law 
of German New Guinea was, as a normative order, but it can tell us nothing about it as a normative 
order. Yet it can do something else, namely demonstrate that testing of hypotheses is an odd way 
of doing history. This does not mean that it would be historically inappropriate to raise the 
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question of the effectiveness of the colonial law in German New Guinea, but it is a supplementary 
question which can only be meaningfully addressed after we have established what it was, as a 
normative order. It is, historically speaking, absurd to say "let us first suppose that law is a 
normative order, and then test its effectiveness"; and it is doubly absurd to use a narrative token 
demonstration of its alleged ineffectiveness as an excuse for dismissing it as historically irrelevant 
as a normative order. Even if the test could be carried through, it can only achieve what it set out 
to do, namely to prove empirically the extent of the effectiveness of this normative order; and this 
amounts, historically, to very little. 
Taken by itself quantification is historically meaningless. There is no point in counting the 
bricks and weighing the mortar used in the construction of the Tower of Babel. What matters is 
the structure of the building. But quantification can become an end in itself and this is the ultimate 
goal of the great bureaucratic conspiracy in which the Rule of Law is only a passing phase, a 
concession to the fact that it has not yet been possible to eliminate the human factor from the 
operation of government altogether. The ultimate goal is not a government of people by people 
but the computer management of resource statistics, including human resources, programmed to 
maximise economic growth, not because this is regarded as desirable but because the system offers 
no choice. 
This is what the Tower of Babel may eventually look like and historians only help in its 
construction as long as they erect high fences around the building site and paint them with 
colourful narrative facades which are supposed to depict what is going on behind them but, in fact, 
merely prevent everybody from seeing what this is. 
This was what my Andersen dream was telling me: it was high time to stop shouting "Look, 
he is naked!" and to start inspecting the loom on which the emperor's  new clothes are woven and 
the yam which is used to weave the cloth from which they are fashioned. It is high time to 
recognise that historians are simply not doing their job if they are rowing their boats across the 
ever expanding ocean of "facts about the past", casting their lines until they have caught enough 
fish of the kind they want to catch. The historical record is not an ocean of indifferent facts which 
contains a few special drops which narrative historians can transform with the elixir of their 
interpretations into history, it is itself a product of a historical process which neither begins nor 
ends when the events recorded took place. 
"The dead hand of vanished generations of historians, scribes, and chroniclers" can indeed 
determine the patterns of the past "beyond the possibility of appeal" but this is, for better or for 
worse, not yet the case with the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea. Here many of the 
patterns of the past are still preserved as frozen history in the primary sources to which appeal can 
be made when examining how past and present historians, scribes and chroniclers have performed 
their task. We can still go behind the fences they have erected around the construction site of 
history, compare what we see with the narrative facades they have painted on them and observe, 
at the same time, how history becomes gradually less unique and more typical and hence not only 
less narratable but also less meaningful in human terms-and not just for those who read or write 
it but also for those who make and experience it when it is happening. 
Let me show you what I found when I examined one of the details in one of these facades, 
instead of relishing it as a juicy narrative ingredient as I was meant to do. 
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Chapter I: Morphine, Routine and First Encounters 
I 
Acasual reference to a morphine addiction of the district commissioner in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, Ernst Berghausen (Firth, 1982: 96), caught my attention. It did so, not 
because I was shocked by the claim that a senior member of the German colonial service had been 
drug-dependent, but because the reference suggested that it was not only natural that this should 
have been so, but equally natural that Berghausen' s superiors did nothing about it, although his 
addiction had apparently made him for much of the time incapable of carrying out his duties. In 
other words, what troubled me was not the possibility of Berghausen' s morphine addiction but the 
possibility that German New Guinea had been governed by a bunch of people who were either 
corrupt or incompetent, or both, so that all the governmental records they had produced were 
bound to be unreliable. 
To put my mind to rest, I therefore had not just to establish whether Berghausen had been a 
morphine addict but also, if this had been so, whether his case, including the implied lack of 
remedial action on the part of his superiors, had been typical. When I began to appreciate the 
magnitude of the task, it dawned on me that it was the undramatic reverse side of the coin I was 
looking at which presented the primary challenge. The first question to be answered was not 
whether and to what extent Berghausen had been affected by a morphine addiction in the 
performance of his duties, but what these duties were, and what he had actually done, in his 
official capacity, week after week, from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.,  Monday to Friday, or whatever his 
working hours were. The central issue was routine rather than morphine. Although legitimate and 
potentially illuminating an examination of the role of individual human weaknesses in the exercise 
of German colonial rule was a second order task. It could only be tackled after the shape of this 
rule, for example in the Friedrich Wilhelmshafen district under Berghausen, had been established. 
It seemed sensible to tackle the primary task by ascertaining when Berghausen had served as 
district commissioner in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. This, I thought, could easily be accomplished 
by consulting an authoritative administrative history of Germany which included lists of the 
leading officials in the various administrative divisions of the German colonial empire (the 
"Hubatsch Lists"). In the list for the Friedrich Wilhelmshafen district (Hubatsch, 1984: 5 1 7), 
Erich (not Ernst!) Berghausen was shown as having served as district commissioner in 1913-19 14, 
succeeding Dr Benno Scholz (Madang), who was listed as having served from 1909 through to 
1913 .  But the list also referred to an article by Berghausen, entitled "A Fight with the Mountain 
Tribes in the Finisterre Ranges", in the Friedrich Wilhelmshafen district, published in 191 1 ,  so 
that one would assume that Berghausen had already been active there during or before that year. 
Yet, how could this be since he was also shown (ibid. :  542) as having served as district 
commissioner in the Marshall Islands, between 1909 and 191 1 ?  I was experiencing my first 
encounter with phantom history, for which being in two places at once is but a minor feat. But the 
Hubatsch Lists offered a consolation prize, in the form of a reference to the official obituary for 
Berghausen which, I hoped, would quickly sort out matters. 
Signed by the secretary of the colonial office, the obituary (DKB, 1917 :  129) stated that Ernst 
(not Erich) Berghausen had died on 13 April 1917 of wounds received while commanding an 
artillery unit in Romania, earning the Iron Cross of the second as well as the first class. About 
Berghausen's  time in German New Guinea it had this to say: He arrived in August 1908. After 
serving in different branches of the administration, he was placed in charge of the district office 
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and the district court in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. No date was given but the period of his stay was 
said to have been 1 6  months, of which he spent as many as 23 1 days on "expeditions". In 
recognition of his outstanding service, Berghausen was decorated in 1912  with the Royal Crown 
Order, 4th class with swords. 
This did not read like the biography of a man racked by a morphine addiction, but then this 
obituary also presented phantom history. It suggested that his job in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen had 
been Berghausen' s last posting in German New Guinea-which he was said to have left in March 
1915 ;  that his period of service in this capacity lasted for 1 6  months-which only took me back 
to early 1913,  even if ! disregarded the six months after the capitulation of German New Guinea 
in September 1914; that he was decorated for his outstanding service in that capacity, but that he 
had already been decorated in 1912. Perhaps the sources from which the Hubatsch Lists were 
compiled would help me further. 
Most promising were the public notices concerning administrative postings which, in the case 
of German New Guinea, were published since 1909 in its government gazette, the Amtsblatt. 
There were two such notices relating to Berghausen, but no notices announcing the end of any 
such postings. The first stated that Berghausen took charge of the district office and the district 
court in the Marshall lslands on 21 December 1909 (AB, 1910: 9), the second that he took charge 
of their counterparts in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen on 25 January 1 9 1 3  (AB, 19 13 :  26). Both tied 
in with the Hubatsch Lists. But there were two other notices which contradicted them. One related 
to Berghausen' s  predecessor, Scholz, who was said to have taken charge of the district office and 
the district court in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen on 1 8 October 191 1 (AB, 1 9 1 1 :  238) so that he did 
at least not serve continuously as district commissioner there from 1 909 to 1 9 1 3 .  The other related 
to Assessor Dr Gebhard, who was said to have taken charge of the district office and the district 
court in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen on 1 January 1914 (AB, 1914:  94). 1 This suggested that 
Berghausen's posting had ended no later than 3 1 December 1913 ,  after less than a year. But there 
was also a second notice relating to Gebhard (AB, 1914:  150). It stated that on 26 March 1914 he 
had been appointed as the "general deputy" (Allgemeiner Vertreter) of the district judge in 
Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, although he had by then already himself been in charge of the district 
court for almost three months. Yet, there was some method in this apparent madness :  it simply 
reflected an administrative organisation which was more complex than the Hubatsch Lists 
assumed. 
Fortunately again there existed an obvious source of information: a PhD thesis by Jake Wilton 
Spidle Jr, entitled "The German Colonial Service: Organization, Selection and Training". Despite 
its title the thesis told me little about the organisation of the German colonial service. 2 What it did 
say suggested that its author cared even less, since he did not even bother to distinguish between 
the organisation of the colonial service and the organisation of the colonial government, which 
was to a large extent run by the colonial service but by no means identical with it.3 Besides, the 
narrative that I was offered, instead of the promised account of the organisation of the German 
colonial service, was again phantom history-which I discovered when I was attracted by a 
reference to the former imperial commissioner in German New Guinea, Fritz Rose. According to 
Spidle, Rose was sacked in 1906 by the new director of the colonial department, Bernhard 
Dernburg, a former banker, because his "name had been specifically mentioned in connection with 
several . . .  scandal stories" (Spidle, 1972: 200). 
1 Gebhard does not figure i n  the Hubatsh Lists. 
2 Little attention is paid by Spidle to the voluminous colonial and metropolitan civil service law, with the result that he 
has, for example, most peculiar ideas of the role of the Assessor-as the representative of "Assessorismus" -within the 
system (see ibid.: 1 8, Fn. 4 1 ). 
3 For example the office of "governor" was a government post and not a colonial service rank. 
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Had these scandals occurred when Rose had been in charge of the administration of German 
New Guinea, more than a dozen years earlier? Were they part of the pattern suggested by Firth? 
Since Spidle provided no information I turned to his source, Heinrich Schnee, the last governor 
of German East Africa but also an old German New Guinea hand. Schnee's account did not 
answer my questions either, but I noticed that one of the metaphors Spidle quoted had been used 
by Schnee to make a different point. 
According to Spidle, Schnee had written that the new director hit the Wilhelmsstrasse 
headquarters of the colonial administration "like a bolt of lightning (wie ein Blitz)", whereas 
Schnee had written that the unexpected news of Dernburg' s appointment had hit the officials in 
the Colonial Department. "like a bolt of lightning flashing down from a blue sky [ wie ein Blitz aus 
heiterem Himme[J" (Schnee, 1964: 79). At first I assumed that Spidle had merely been unfamiliar 
with this German expression, but when I compared Schnee's account with Spidle's  narrative I 
realised that I was observing the alchemy of phantomising history at work. 
First Spidle: 
From the start Demburg made no secret of his mistrust of the colonial officials as a group. He obviously 
shared the popular view that they were a shabby lot. After running through his series of interviews, he 
called in Seitz and Schnee, who had apparently impressed him as capable men, and with them ran down 
the full roster of the senior personnel within the office. The new Director bluntly and without 
explanations made curt judgements about who was to go and who to stay. When he reached the name of 
Fritz Rose, a man with 14 years of seniority in the office and who was at the time on vacation, Demburg 
paused for a moment. Rose was one of the senior officials whose name had been specifically mentioned 
in connection with several of the scandal stories. Finally, Schnee wrote, "Demburg smiled menacingly 
and said cryptically, 'He won't  be back. (Der Mann kommt nicht wieder ins Amt zuriick. ) ' .  Through such 
action, noted approvingly by a large portion of the press, the new Direktor succeeded in giving the 
impression that a long overdue purge of incompetent, corrupt officials within the 'Zentralverwaltung was 
in progress. It was a valuable step toward drawing the teeth of some of the criticism of the colonial 
administration (ibid. : 200). 
Now a summary of the Schnee version. The day after Dernburg had taken up his duties Schnee 
arrived at the office at his usual time, at 9.30 a.m.. , only to learn that Dernburg was already at 
work. As acting head of the personnel section, Schnee went to Dernburg to report. He was 
immediately received and Dernburg began to discuss personnel questions with him, soon calling 
in Theodore Seitz, who was in charge of the administrative section. Dernburg asked to be given 
the names of all the higher officials, according to their "seniority" (Dienstalter). When Schnee 
reached the name of Rose, Dernburg declared "with an ominous smile" that he would not be 
returning to the office ("Der kommt nicht wieder ins Amt zuruck!"). He also said Konig, and 
another senior official, would have to go-adding that the chancellor of the Reich had given him 
absolute powers in personnel matters; a statement which caused Schnee to add the following 
comment: 
Demburg apparently really imagined at the time that he could-as in a bank-sack officials as he saw 
fit. In fact only higher officials, holding a political office, could be temporarily laid off [zur Disposition 
stellen ] .  Otherwise the general civil service rules regarding appointment for life applied. (A dismissal was 
only possible as the result of disciplinary proceedings.) (ibid.: 80).4 
While it puzzled me that a historian who was writing a thesis on the organisation of the German 
colonial service should disregard the only part of Schnee' s account which was of direct relevance 
to his topic, I was amazed to see that he had used its other parts in constructing a narrative which 
was plainly irreconcilable with them. Now, it was quite possible that Schnee's account was also 
4 1bis and all following translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. 
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phantom history; that Demburg, in fact, did not have his meeting with Schnee and Seitz on his 
first full day in office but a week or so later, after having interviewed all senior members of staff, 
including Rose, who had been recalled from his "vacation" for the purpose;5 and that he met with 
Schnee and Seitz because they had impressed him as capable men, instead of responding to a 
routine report by Schnee, as the person immediately responsible for personnel, and of calling in 
Seitz, as the most senior official present, when the meeting turned into an exercise of fundamental 
importance. But if this was so, why did Spidle not let his readers into his secret? Why did he not 
tell them that he had found more reliable information to that effect in other sources and that he 
was referring them to Schnee' s account only so that they could see with their own eyes how he 
had distorted the facts? Or had Spidle felt free to 'interpret' Schnee's account the way he did 
because this produced a narratively superior version of history? Perhaps it was better to abandon 
the attempt to solve the riddle of Berghausen's  postings in German New Guinea and to return to 
his alleged morphine addiction, in order to regain at least a small piece of firm ground. 
II 
German recruiters worked the lower reaches of the Sepik in the years before the war and on one of the 
few rises on the banks of that part of the river the Government built the Angoram police post in 
September 1913 .  Sepik labour recruiting in German times can have been little influenced by government 
regulations because even the Madang District officer, Ernst Berghausen, took villagers by force. In 
December 1913,  beginning a stay of two years in the Sepik, the anthropologist Richard Thurnwald 
described in his diary the violent progress of Berghausen up the Sepik as far as Malu near Ambunti. 
Heavily addicted to morphine, Berghausen was said to have recruited wherever he was not sick with fever 
or stupefied. He was unknown to the river people and none volunteered to go with him, so he used police 
to fetch recruits 'whether they resisted or not' : 
He locked the recruited people in the dark, cramped store room of the steamer 'Kolonialgesellschaft' . 
Like an old slave trader, he had 17 people cooped up there . . .  Forced recruiting is suitable after 
fighting. But when conditions are peaceful the people become irritated and many of the murders of 
the last few years which have taken place in the region of this district office are in part no doubt 
attributable to this ill-considered and blunt procedure. 
Travelling upstream Thurnwald encountered villagers planning to avenge the loss of kinsmen by eating 
the 'two white pigs' who had abducted them (Firth, 1982: 96). 
Since this account of Berghausen's violent progress up the Sepik did not claim to be more than 
the summary of a single source, namely the "diary" of Richard Thumwald,6 I moved straight to 
the horse's mouth, only to find that Thumwald did not accompany Berghausen on his trip as I had 
expected, but that he was eagerly waiting in Karadjundo,7 well down from Angoram, for 
Berghausen's return, probably because he was to take over part of his police detachment as an 
armed escort. Furthermore, the "diary" turned out to be a series of letters written by Thumwald 
to his wife-to-be in Germany. It described Thumwald's  progress up the Sepik, including a bloody 
engagement of his police escort, more than a dozen strong, that had left three Sepiks dead, a 
considerable distance upstream of Malu. It was this clash that had caused Thurnwald to mention 
Berghausen's  recruiting activities. 
This was now the third place, he explained in a letter written during the evening of this clash 
on 20 December 1913 ,  at which he would have to exercise special care during his return journey. 
The second was near Maiui, between Malu and Angoram, where he had some trouble in October. 8 
5 Had Rose already been laid off by Dernburg's predecessor, instead of having taken his normal recreation leave? 
6 A photocopy of this document is held in the New Guinea Collection of the University of Papua New Guinea in Port 
Moresby. 
7 I shall generally reproduce lesser known geographical names as they appear in the sources. 
8 The-less violent-details do not concern us. But the date shows that Thurnwald did not begin his stay in the Sepik 
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The third was still further downstream. where two villages, Moiln and Kamblinto, had declared 
war on him This had nothing to do with hiln but was Berghausen's  fault. When Berghausen 
inherited the Kolonialgesellschaft, after the SepikExpedition had been disbanded, he had nothing 
better to do than to steam immediately up the river. He had recruited, as recounted in the passage 
quoted above, "wherever he had not just happened to have fever or to be sick with morphine (for 
he is a heavy morphinist)".9 These two particular villages had taken up arms and showered the 
Kolonialgesellschaft with spears-and those on board must have responded in kind although 
Berghausen was not prepared to admit this. 
When Thurnwald and his engineer, Fiebig, had camped with their flotilla10 near the villages 
on their upstream journey, they received a message that their inhabitants would avenge themselves 
on the two well-nourished and tasty white pigs (Thurnwald and Fiebig) for the taking away of 
their people (by Berghausen). They were already saving up taro and coconuts for the occasion. 
Instead of taking up the challenge, Thurnwald intended to slip by quietly and let Berghausen deal 
with his own mess. This would be a great disappointment to his native policemen who were 
always eager to fight, since this provided them with the opportunity to "interfere" with the women 
of the enemy-a practice which was impossible to stop. One of the men had directly asked hiln 
what he was doing here if he did not want to fight: did he only want to eat and fuck? 
That the last word in this paraphrase was indicated by three dots in the original, gave a good 
indication of the witty, and somewhat condescending, style adopted by Thurnwald throughout his 
letters to his distant beloved. Like scores of other details (for example, the Sepik penis gourds 
featured in his previous letter), the reference to Berghausen's  morphine addiction was included 
for no other reason than its entertainment value. This did not alter the fact of Berghausen's 
morphine addiction, if it  was indeed a fact, but it warned against taking any part of Thurnwald' s 
account at its face value. Since his letters were not intended for public consumption, Thurnwald 
used whatever effect he could think of to amuse his fiancee and to impress her by contrasting his 
own heroics with the failings of others . While this was fair enough, to quote his account as if it 
was history, and indeed a particularly reliable form of history, coming, as it did, from the 
unpublished papers of an eminent anthropologist, was a different matter, especially as the official 
report on Berghausen' s  trip (AB, 1914 :  5 1-55, 62-67) painted quite a different picture. 
When I read the Firth version of this trip, it had conjured up a long and lonely voyage: 
extended periods of fever or morphine stupefaction, interrupted by bursts of brutal recruiting: 
Berghausen dashing at the head of his police troop down the gangway into peaceful villages, 
tearing man after struggling man from the arms of his crying wife or mother until the hold of his 
ship was finally stuffed to the brim with his victims. The official report was less colourful. The 
expedition did last several weeks ( 15  November to 1 2  December 1913) ,  but the trip up the Sepik 
from Angoram to Malu, and back, only took five days, from 29 November to 3 December. 1 1  The 
rest of the time was spent on administrative routine tasks along the coast: taking a census, 
checking up on the coconut palms the natives had been previously instructed to plant and 
inspecting the labourers on non-native plantations. 12 Nor was Berghausen the only German official 
area in December 1 9 1 3  as Firth claims. 
9 Firth translates the expression "morphinkran/C' as "stupefied". I do not know whether this is an appropriate description 
of the effects of morphine but it certainly underlines that Berghausen was supposed to be unfit for duty when he had taken 
morphine, which Thurnwald's  own version also, but less aggressively, assens. 
10 It consisted of three motorboats, two sampans and six canoes-a far cry from the style of modern anthropological 
fieldwork. 
1 1  This expedition was by no means the first trip of the Kolonialgesellschaft in the services of the district office in 
Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, as Thurnwald's letter implies. 
12 Berghausen also returned a group of "prisoners of war" who had been captured when earlier unrest in Hansa Bay had 
been quelled. 
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on board the Kolonialgesellschaft, he was accompanied by Dr Gebhard, police sergeant Knuth, 
as well as 24 native police soldiers. 13 
The trip upriver from Angoram to Malu lasted three days and was uneventful. In Wolem, the 
village next to the new government station, Bakan, a rarity because he had already worked on a 
plantation, was taken on board as a guide, and a second nameless guide, an elderly man, was 
added in Magam. Attempts by Gebhard to enlist further guides in Kambringi, where the 
Kolonialgesellschaft anchored the first night, proved unsuccessful. The inhabitants of Kaubagu, 
the stop for the second night, all ran away when a boat was landed. The third night was spent in 
Malu, the former base camp of the Sepik Expedition. 
In Malu it was decided to make a move in order to make some progress towards opening the 
area to labour recruiting which had "hitherto been negligible". During the return trip "language 
students" (Sprachschiiler) were to be taken back from different villages to the coast to familiarise 
themselves with European ways for eight months. If suitable, they were to be used after their 
return as luluai or tultul (government chiefs and their assistants) in their home villages, a 
procedure which had been successfully tested along the coast. 
A start was made in Timbunket, over 100 nautical miles downstream from Malu, during the 
afternoon of 2 December 1913 .  Four young people were "taken on board". Three were added in 
Kambringi, six in Kanduonum, one in Klingan and three in Magam. This accounted for the 17 
people referred to by Thurnwald. But there were more. Before arriving in Angoram on 3 
December at 1 p.m., the Kolonialgesellschaft met several canoes from Magam and two members 
of their crews were also prepared to come, so that the total yield of the recruiting effort so far, 
which had lasted for less than 24 hours, was 19. Ten further Sprachschiiler were added during the 
trip downstream from Angoram to the mouth of the Sepik, including four supplied by Thurnwald 
when the Kolonialgesellschaft stopped at his base camp-a fact which Thurnwald understandably 
omitted from his story, although he did claim that Berghausen had refused to admit that he had 
violent clashes with the people upstream. 
Now the official version: 
At some of the places the people took up arms. But they quickly calmed down after the interpreter 
explained to them that their fellow countrymen would return after eight months when they had learned 
to communicate with the whites. They then came alongside the ship in their canoes to present those 
departing with food and tobacco for their journey. 
Although this version was also not "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth", it clearly 
reflected the course of events more closely than Thurnwald • s story. Why did Firth adopt the latter. 
distorting it further in the process? Partly, it seems, because he treated Thurnwald as a "goody" 
whose testimony against the "baddy" Berghausen could be blindly relied upon, but mainly because 
it lent weight to his own argument that labour recruiting in the Sepik area during German times 
could have been little influenced by government regulations because even Berghausen took 
villagers by force. It was therefore ironic that Thurnwald had turned the same argument on its 
head; for in that section of the passage quoted by Firth-which is there indicated by three 
dots-Thurnwald assured his fiancee that everything was basically well in German New Guinea 
because any private individual doing what Berghausen had done would have been sentenced to 
several years of "imprisonment with hard labour" (Zuchthaus).  
On the other hand, a comparison between these two arguments proved to be most instructive. 
That of Firth implied that it was the main function of these government regulations to control the 
use of force, and other abuses, in the recruitment of labourers and that they were therefore 
historically irrelevant if they did not perform this task. The beauty of using an a fortiori argument 
1 3  The Kolonialgesellschaft also returned a police sergeant and a medical assistant to the new station in Angoram, after 
the latter had carried out routine inoculations on the way along the coast. 
MORPHINE, ROUTINE AND FlRST ENCOUNTERS 59 
to make this case was that it took care of everything. It saved Firth not only from having to 
establish what these government regulations were, but also from having to demonstrate that they 
were flouted by recruiters and that this flouting was tolerated by the authorities. But the full 
implications of his argument became visible only after I had also taken into account that it rested 
on the further premise that law was, in principle, capable of performing its control function. It was 
only colonial law which did not fulfil this function, and it was not colonial law as such which was 
at fault but the colonial administrators who, by disregarding the law themselves, caused others to 
do the same. The argument made Berghausen personally responsible for all the abuses of private 
labour recruiters, which could remain untold because his violent progress up the Sepik represented 
the essence of all that was bad about German colonial rule. Seen from this angle Berghausen' s 
morphine addiction only made him fit the bill especially well by turning him into a picture book 
representative of the type of man who ruled the German colonies. 
Thurnwald travelled the same road, but in the opposite direction. For him Berghausen was not 
the rule but the exception because Thurnwald took it for granted that German colonial rule in New 
Guinea was essentially a good thing. In his account Berghausen' s morphine addiction accentuated 
his status as a deviant. The severe prison sentences which would have been imposed on anyone 
else doing what Berghausen did were for Thurnwald just as automatic a consequence of his 
preconceptions as the irrelevance of colonial law was for Firth. 14 To tell his bride amusing 
anecdotes was one thing, to give her the impression that German New Guinea was a lawless place 
quite another. The Rule of Law was a vital part in Thurnwald's as well as Firth' s  scenario. It was 
essential for both that Berghausen appeared as a criminal. The difference was that Thurnwald 
presented him as an individual deviant whereas Firth used him to judge German colonial rule, pars 
pro toto, as a system. 
The attraction of this judgemental approach was that it enabled those who took it not to deal 
with what was indirectly judged. In other words, the reason for writing this kind of phantom 
history was not ideological commitment but technical convenience. Firth did not write phantom 
history because he was anti-German, or Thurnwald because he was pro-German, they both 
adopted this style because it made the tedious presentation of evidence magically superfluous. 
Indeed, it was a labour saving device which did the trick even if the primary judgement was 
hypothetical. Firth did not have to claim that violent recruiting was the order of the day in German 
New Guinea, it was sufficient to suggest that government regulations could have had little 
influence on the conduct of recruiters, just as Thurnwald did not have to assert that the prisons of 
German New Guinea were actually filled with violent recruiters. On the contrary, in Thurnwald's 
case the argument had to be hypothetical, because he wanted to assure his fiancee that the fear of 
stiff penalties made all recruiters in German New Guinea, with the deplorable exception of 
Berghausen, behave like model citizens. 
Yet the underlying assumption was the same: a regularity of human behaviour linked to the 
regulatory effectiveness of law. The link was straightforward in the case of Thurnwald. Because 
it could be taken for granted that the law was, generally speaking, strictly enforced in German 
New Guinea, it could also be taken for granted that it was, generally speaking, complied with. 
Ergo: Berghausen' s behaviour was a regrettable exception. By contrast Firth assumed a curiously 
twisted regularity of lawlessness which came about when the law was flouted by the officials 
supposed to enforce it. Whereas it would not have been justified to generalise from the lawless 
behaviour of an ordinary recruiter, it was justified, so ran the gist of the argument, to generalise 
from the behaviour of Berghausen. It followed, it was asserted, that if even Berghausen used force 
14 It probably did not occur to Thumwald that it would have been Berghausen, in his capacity as district judge, who 
would have had to pronounce them. Nor would he have been disconcerted had he been told that not a single labour 
recruiter during the history of German colonial rule had actually been sentenced for recruiting offences to imprisonment 
with hard labour. 
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when recruiting, private recruiters must have broken the law still more blatantly and frequently, 
whereas they would have, as a rule, complied with the law if Berghausen had behaved properly. 
By breaking the law himself, Berghausen had suspended its general deterrent force, so that his 
behaviour could be taken as symptomatic of a general state of lawlessness. 
It was remarkable that Berghausen' s alleged morphine addiction could be utilised in these two 
diametrically opposed arguments-as an indicator of exceptionality by Thurnwald and as an 
indicator of typicalness by Firth. But whereas the former employed it as a touch of local colour, 
it became for the latter the ultimate trump ; for who would dream of questioning the account of 
a historian who knew even the secret vices of his historical actors? 
Why did Firth raise the question of the influence of government regulations if he only intended 
to put forward a bizarre argument in order to reseal the spirit he had released into a tiny bottle? 
It was hard to believe that he did it because it gave him the opportunity to introduce a juicy story 
which permitted him to display his professional omniscience. Yet its casual dismissal made it 
equally hard to believe that he regarded it as a serious issue-and the casualness extended far 
beyond the rhetorical use of a formal argument, since the argument, even if sound, could not 
possibly settle the question raised. It only made sense on the assumption that the regulation of 
labour recruiting in German New Guinea was essentially concerned with the prevention of 
violence-which was not the case. The law governing labour recruiting, naturally, organised it as 
a legitimate and economically desirable enterprise. To be sure, it included penal provisions which 
gave teeth to its organisational provisions relating to recruiting licences and so on, but they did 
not deal with the kind of criminal abuses Firth had in mind. However, recruiters, like everybody 
else, including Berghausen, could be charged under the general criminal law, for instance with 
assault, provided their behaviour was illegal. But this was not at all clear in the case of 
Berghausen, who may well have been legally entitled to enlist Sprachschiiler, in contrast to 
labourers, without their consent, so that any resistance offered became legally a criminal 
obstruction of authority. 
How was it possible that Firth did not understand the role of labour regulations after having 
devoted his PhD thesis to the study of "German Recruitment and Employment of Labourers in the 
Western Pacific before the First World War''? The answer was that he was no more interested in 
the recruitment and employment of labourers in Germany's Pacific colonies than Spidle was 
interested in the organisation of the German colonial service. Instead Firth wanted to write "a 
history of German imperialism in the Pacific Islands" which centred on "the Germans' use of 
labour" (Firth, 1 973: Abstract (emphasis added)). 
In his thesis Firth had reached the conclusion--echoed in the introduction to New Guinea 
under the Germans-that "the conditions of employment under the Germans were inhumane by 
contemporary British standards" and that German labour policy was "dictated by private 
companies to an extent which was rare in the British Pacific" (ibid.). 15 Now, if this was so, was 
it not a waste of time to consider the government regulations into which this policy was translated 
since they did not, in practice, prevent inhumane treatment? The problem was that this convenient 
shortcut led straight into the Wonderland of narrative history. Where else could a young scholar 
have made the following statement without raising an eyebrow among his supervisors or 
examiners? 
[T]he principal sources for any study of German influence, annexation and colonial administration remain 
intact. These are the records of the Auswiirtiges Amt concerning colonial matters before 1 890, of the 
Kolonialabteilung of the Auswiirtiges Amt from 1 890 to 1907, and of the Reichskolonialamt from 1907 
onwards . . .  (ibid.). 
1 5  Firth's thesis does not support these conclusions with comparative studies of the British Pacific. 
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The most disturbing aspect of this statement was that it sounded so  harmless, because this 
showed just how far the phantomisation of history had progressed. We automatically suspend our 
critical faculties when it comes to history. We have been conditioned not to say "wait a 
minute!"-we just read on. The absurdity of the claim that the records of the German colonial 
office, rather than of the colonial governments on the spot, should be the principal sources for a 
study of German colonial administration no longer jumps at us. 16 We do not expect a historian 
who maintains that government regulations could have had little influence on labour recruiting 
along the lower reaches of the Sepik River during the years before World War I to tell us what 
these regulations were, or how energetically they were enforced. We do not want to know how 
many labour recruiting licences were issued for the lower Sepik during this period, or how many 
labour recruiters were taken to court on criminal charges relating to their recruiting activities. We 
do not want facts, we want phantom history. We want historians to cast themselves in the role of 
the little boy in Andersen's  fairy tale. We are delighted to hear that the emperor's  elaborate legal 
wardrobe was a sham and that he ruled, at least in German New Guinea, stark naked; and we are 
ready to offer a standing ovation to a virtuoso who can detectthe tell-tale puncture marks of a drug 
addiction under the carefully starched tropical uniform of one of his servants. 
Again I was offered a consolation prize for my efforts; for if the colonial office records had 
survived intact, it should have been child's  play to establish whether Berghausen' s  alleged 
morphine addiction, which had started me on this journey, was a historical fact. I simply had to 
consult his personal file, which was bound to include a reference to such a serious disability, as 
well as references to the official responses to it. Yet, it was the intactness of these records which 
turned out to be the phantom. Berghausen's personal file, along with an estimated 30 per cent of 
the then extant records, apparently did not survive World War Il and its aftermath. 17 
On the other hand, it seemed unlikely that Berghausen' s morphine addiction was a Thurnwald 
invention, and there was indeed some circumstantial evidence which supported the core of his 
assertion. On 30 December 1909, the commander of SMS Condor reported that he had taken 
Berghausen from Herbertshohe to Ponape as a replacement for district commissioner Wilhelm 
Stuckhardt in the Marshall Islands (RMS/6006). During the entire ten day trip Berghausen had 
been ill-due to "old intestinal troubles" (ein altes Darmleiden). Was this the explanation: 
Berghausen had suffered painful attacks of a chronic illness which he treated with morphine, 
perhaps having become addicted in the process? 
The really juicy bit in this naval report, however, related to Stuckhardt, who had to be replaced 
in a hurry because he had to be sent back to Germany for medical treatment after he had jumped 
into the sea in a fit of depression during a previous trip of SMS Condor. 
It was unlikely that the historical record would readily offer more information on Stuckhardt' s 
apparent madness than on Berghausen's  alleged morphine addiction. But what about their 
predecessor in the Marshall Islands, Eugen Brandeis? Together with the former imperial 
commissioner Rose, he had figured prominently in the great "Colonial Scandal Debate" in 
Germany, so that his sins and their treatment by his superiors were a matter of public record. 
I did not even have to consult the public record myself because the work had already been 
done by Klaus Epstein. Erzberger and the German Colonial Scandals, 1905-1910 summarised 
the Brandeis Case as one item in the "unedifying collection of individual scandals" the Centre 
Party deputy, Matthias Erzberger, had assembled after "far reaching research" (1959: 641) to 
unmask in the Reichstag the "criminal types" in the German colonial service, in particular the "evil 
men" who had attained high positions and whom "the Central Office was greatly reluctant to bring 
to punishment" (ibid. :  642) . What more could I have asked for, especially as Epstein stated that 
16 The diplomatic prehistory of colonial administration is a different matter. 
17 See the relevant Fundbuch of what was until recently the Zentralarchiv of the German Democratic Republic and is 
now part of the Bundesarchiv. 
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most of Erzberger' s accusations were based upon solid evidence "the substance of which even his 
opponents could not question" (ibid.: 652)? 
This is how Epstein summarised the Brandeis Case: 
Then there was the governor of the Marshall Islands, Eugen Brandeis, who loved to administer beatings 
(which he was not authorized to do) and who held back some of the gifts which the German government 
sent regularly to the chiefs under his jurisdiction. His excuse was that the natives' money sense extended 
only to round numbers, and that he retained the residue in order to finance a grand party on the emperor' s · 
birthday. His royalist sentiments were allowed to cover a multitude of sins. Fritz Rose, one of the leading 
figures of the colonial department, when speaking about his case in the Reichstag, managed to joke about 
the beatings and even to defend the interception of part of the payments (ibid. : 641-42). 
Now this was a truly scandalous scenario: the head of a German colonial government who took 
a sadistic pleasure in beating his native subjects and a superior who made jokes about this 
outrageous behaviour when defending the man in parliament. It was surely a waste of time under 
these circumstances to look at any of the governmental records produced during the reign of 
Brandeis in the Marshall Islands which, according to the Hubatsch Lists, had lasted from 1 898 to 
1906 (1984: 541).  It now seemed clear that not only the labour regulations but colonial law in 
general could not possibly have had any historically significant impact on the exercise of German 
colonial rule in this colony during that period. But as I had learned that it was better to be safe than 
sorry I decided to see for myself what the stenographical reports of the Reichstag proceedings had 
to say about this case. 
m 
I began my examination of the Brandeis Case with the reports for 1 3  March 1906, when Erzberger 
addressed it in a plenary session of the Reichstag. It had been raised by another deputy a few 
months earlier as one of several examples demonstrating the "horrifying brutalities" which were 
occurring in the German colonies. The head of the personnel section of the colonial department, 
Konig, had responded to these accusations on 15 December 1905 . Erzberger now claimed that this 
response had been incorrect, inter alia in the Brandeis Case. This was all the more disturbing 
because Brandeis, after his recent return from the Marshall Islands, had been decorated with a 
medal in recognition of his services, although the corporal punishments of which he had been 
accused could have easily started a native rebellion, as in German Southwest and East Africa.­
Erzberger referred in this context to an official report by "one of our most experienced colonial 
experts", the consul-general in Shanghai, Wilhelm Knappe, who had seen corporal punishment 
being carried out in the Marshall Islands-a revolting spectacle, which had excited the 
Marshallese so intensely that only the chance presence of a naval squadron had prevented them 
from openly rebelling. Brandeis therefore did not merely stand accused of a minor criminal or 
disciplinary offence but of behaviour which could have had very expensive consequences for the 
German taxpayer. 
How had Konig responded?-that no reason had been found to take action against Brandeis 
and that it could not be supposed that he had in any way exceeded his legal powers. Now, 
Erzberger went on, this latter claim was demonstrably wrong because Konig' s colleague, Rose, 
had openly admitted in the budget commission that Brandeis had done precisely that. To point out 
this glaring contradiction, Erzberger concluded, had been his aim at this stage. He would return 
to the substance of the allegations against Brandeis during the debate of the colonial budgets 
(Reichstag, 1 1 .  Legislaturperiode, 2. Session, Verhandlungen: 1977). 18 
18 Colonial matters of general interest were conventionally debated with the budget of the central colonial administration, 
that is to say in connection with the budget of the Reich rather than those of its colonies. 
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In his reply the acting director of the colonial department, prince Ernst zu Hohenlohe­
Langenburg, relied largely on the "factual material" presented to the budget commission by Rose. 
Brandeis had been accused of imposing corporal punishments on natives in a few cases several 
years previously. The punishments had consisted of a few strokes, carried out in the presence of 
the government doctor. Brutality was not an issue. There had been no objections to Brandeis 's 
course of action at the time. The allegations now made could all be traced to a disgruntled former 
subordinate. As had been explained in the budget commission, the 1890 Marshall Islands Native 
Penal Ordinance, which did not provide for corporal punishments, only permitted the punishment 
of natives for actions punishable under German law. This had repeatedly caused difficulties for 
officials in cases where the maintenance of public order required the punishment of natives for 
actions which did not fit into the German Criminal Code. Thus Brandeis had had to deal with a 
native who had committed adultery with the wife of a chief, a capital offence under customary 
law. Since an application of the mild punishment for adultery under German law would have been 
unacceptable to the natives, and since the Marshallese could not tolerate long-term imprisonment, 
Brandeis had felt entitled to use his administrative discretion to fix an appropriate punishment, 
consisting of imprisonment of one year combined with corporal punishment. The colonial 
department had no doubt that Brandeis had believed he had acted within his powers. It was 
therefore still of the opinion that it had been proper to explain the limits of these powers to 
Brandeis but to take no disciplinary action against him. The prince merely added to this 
recapitulation that while he recognised that Brandeis had failed to observe the strict letter of the 
law, he should not be blamed too harshly for his mistake (ibid. : 1988). 
On 15 March 1906 Rose tried to explain the apparent contradiction between his explanation 
in the budget commission and Konig' s  earlier statement in the plenum. It disappeared when the 
subjective and the objective aspects of the case were distinguished. Konig had merely meant to 
say that Brandeis' s  character ruled out the possibility that he had been aware of acting illegally. 
He, Rose, on the other hand, had stressed that Brandeis' s actions had been objectively illegal. But 
he had gone on to explain that the colonial law of the Marshall Islands was so complex that a non­
lawyer like Brandeis could easily make mistakes for which he could not personally be held 
responsible. He, and the rest of the colonial department, fully agreed with Konig' s assessment of 
Brandeis's  excellent character (ibid. :  2019). 
On 26 March 1906 Erzberger opened the debate of the budgets for the Old Protectorate and 
the Island Territory of German New Guinea19 with an attack on the costly manner in which this 
colony was administered, but he quickly moved to the Marshall Islands, where the last bastion of 
Bismarck's plan to let German commercial enterprises carry the financial risk of maintaining 
colonies had just fallen,20 and to what he called the "Kiem/Brandeis Affair". 
Kiem had been sent to the Marshall Islands to serve as secretary under Brandeis .  After he had 
got into conflict with Brandeis, he was recalled to Berlin, where he was still working in the 
colonial department. In 1901 he had submitted a detailed complaint to his superiors on which 
Erzberger based his attack. 
The first had nothing to do with Brandeis and little with Kiem, who had reported boasts by 
employees of the Jaluit Gesellschaft that their bosses had no difficulty in bribing the colonial 
department to do whatever was in the company' s  interests. A second hearsay allegation did 
concern Brandeis who, the police sergeant had told Kiem, had refused to listen to his complaints 
about improper interferences of the Jaluit Gesellschaft in administrative matters, but Erzberger 
did not pursue it. This also applied to a third allegation by Kiem, according to which Brandeis had 
1 9  Until 1910  these two parts of German New Guinea were treated as separate budgetary entities. 
20 This is a reference to the cancellation of an 1 888 agreement between the Reich and the Jaluit Gesellschaft, according 
to which the latter, although not a chartered company, had carried the financial responsibility for the administration of 
the Marshall Islands by the Reich. 
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repeatedly kept persons in prison without a hearing for over a week. This left two allegations 
Erzberger wanted to push. One, an accusation of financial misconduct, remained vague at this 
stage, because Erzberger was primarily interested in the other, Brandeis' s corporal punishments. 
According to Kiem, Brandeis had repeatedly sentenced natives judicially to corporal 
punishments, although this was not permitted by the Native Penal Ordinance. Since none of these 
punishments had been entered into the relevant lists, Brandeis, Kiem asserted, had been aware that 
he had imposed an illegal punishment, thus committing a serious offence in public office, 
punishable under Section 345 of the German Criminal Code. In addition, Brandeis had used his 
police powers to punish natives administratively with imprisonment of up to one year. This had 
itself been a dubious practice, which had become plainly illegal when the imprisonment had been 
combined with a corporal punishment, as had happened in some of these cases. 
Although Erzberger claimed that he did not know what investigations the colonial department 
had carried out after Kiem's complaint, he had a copy of a decree in his possession which it had 
sent to Brandeis in 1 903 and which, judging by Erzberger's  quotations, had been its reaction to 
a report Brandeis had been ordered to submit in answer to Kiem's allegations. Erzberger's  first 
quote showed that the warning of Knappe against corporal punishments in the Marshall Islands 
was almost 20 years old, when it had been raised in connection with the 1 888 Native Penal 
Ordinance for German New Guinea, on which the 1 890 Marshall Islands ordinance was modelled. 
Erzberger had chosen the second quote, which included a censure of Brandeis, because it implied 
that the colonial department took it for granted that corporal punishments could be legitimately 
employed as disciplinary punishments in prisons. But this was still part of the build up. "The crux" 
(der springende Punkt) was contained in the third quote. It instructed Brandeis to impose 
punishments on natives-in particular corporal punishments-outside judicial or specifically 
regulated administrative proceedings henceforth only if this was necessary to preserve public 
peace, order and safety. 
A decree of the colonial department, Erzberger cried, had, contrary to all publicly proclaimed 
laws, authorised Brandeis to use discretionary corporal punishments whenever he felt that 
something as rubbery as "public peace, order and safety" was endangered. Considering the 
peculiar way in which the public peace protection clause in Section 1 30 of the German Criminal 
Code had recently been used by the authorities in Germany, one needed little imagination to 
predict how freely such a discretionary power would be wielded in a remote colonial outpost.21 
Erzberger could do even better. Had the Reichstag not been told recently that corporal 
punishments had now been officially introduced as legal punishments in the whole of German 
New Guinea?22 To be sure, this was an improvement, because in the past such a move would have 
been "hidden behind a veil of silence" (vertuschen). Under the new acting director this had 
changed, as he, Erzberger, was glad to admit. Just how much things had changed was well 
illustrated by the Brandeis Case. In late 1905, Rose, representing the prosecution in the 
disciplinary proceedings ( ! )  against Brandeis, had still argued that investigations had proved 
Brandeis's '  innocence. Three months later, after a new acting director had been appointed, Rose 
had suddenly conceded that Brandeis had acted illegally. This had been confirmed by the acting 
director on 1 3  March 1 906. But even at that time he had apparently not been fully informed by his 
"advisers" (Rate), otherwise he would have pointed out that corporal punishments were used as 
a regular disciplinary measure, instead of giving the impression that they were only imposed as 
a humane alternative to excessive customary punishments. Two days later Rose had even 
confessed that a thorough legal examination had convinced him that Brandeis should not have 
imposed the corporal punishments he had ordered, although he had regarded such an investigation 
2 1  Erzberger did not identify the incident in question, presumably because everybody knew what he was talking about 
at the time. (It probably involved some energetic police action against dissidents.) 
22 Erzberger provided no details and I do not know what move he referred to. 
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as superfluous when he had prosecuted Brandeis under the old regime. More importantly, Rose 
had also admitted that it had previously not made sense to him. as a practical administrator, that 
Brandeis should not have been entitled to give the Marshallese an occasional hiding-a medicine 
Brandeis had only administered on rare occasions to some particularly bad customers, according 
to Rose.23 
At this point Erzberger changed tack again. One had to know what effects a dose of this 
medicine had on Pacific Islanders, who were a particularly sensitive lot. As he had been told by 
an outstanding Pacific expert, whose views had been confirmed by several missionaries, a single 
punishment of 25 strokes would in most cases ruin the nervous system of the victim. and few came 
through a second punishment without being permanently broken, mentally as well as physically. 
An immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the ordinance legalising corporal punishments was 
therefore required in the interests of humanity, culture and civilisation. It was also necessary to 
protect the interests of the German taxpayer, Erzberger concluded, for who had to foot the bill if 
these inhuman but legal corporal punishments caused a general rebellion? Not the gentlemen who 
issued such a decree, but the German people. "I therefore urge the director of the colonial 
department to take action and to withdraw this ordinance without any reservations" (ibid. :  
2291-93). 
Although it was by then clear that Erzberger had never been particularly interested in the 
allegations made against Brandeis, but that his aim was the removal of Rose and other members 
of the old guard from the colonial department, the Brandeis Case was still on the table. It was left 
to Rose to deal with it. He focused on the corporal punishments but also added some flesh to the 
financial mismanagement allegation. The Marshallese paid a copra tax which was collected by 
their chiefs who received a share of the proceeds. Since the smallest coin accepted by the 
Marshallese was worth SO Pfennige, Brandeis had rounded all amounts paid to the chiefs down 
to that figure, using the accumulated surplus, around 150 Marks, without specifically accounting 
for it, to make the official celebrations of the emperor's  birthday more enjoyable for the natives. 
Erzberger and some of his parliamentary colleagues tried their best to present this procedure as 
a serious crime, even after Rose had assured them that the chiefs had approved the practice, but 
the debate lacked genuine fire. 24 As regards the corporal punishment allegation, no-one, apart from 
Rose, was any longer concerned with what Brandeis had actually done. 
Rose began his defence of Brandeis by citing Kiem as a witness. Kiem had brought up the 
issue of corporal punishments with Brandeis shortly after his arrival in the Marshall Islands 
because he had regarded them, in contrast to Brandeis,  as illegal. Although he had been unable 
to convince Brandeis, Brandeis had stopped using this form of punishment. Rose then tried to 
show that Brandeis had had good reasons for believing that corporal punishments in the Marshall 
Islands were, despite the 1890 Native Penal Ordinance, not altogether illegal. After pointing out 
that corporal punishments could even be used as disciplinary punishments in German metropolitan 
prisons, he turned to a report one of Brandeis '  s '  predecessors had submitted when a reform of the 
native penal law in Germany's colonies had been discussed during the 1890s. This widely 
circulated report too had taken for granted that corporal punishments were legitimate in the 
Marshall Islands. Instead it had stressed that, in the view of its author, they should only be 
administered to minors and brutal criminals, and never in public, but that they were essential as 
a disciplinary measure against unruly prisoners. It was understandable that Brandeis, as a non­
lawyer, had believed himself to be entitled to use corporal punishments because they had been 
23 The rhetoric used in these debates is difficult to translate. Erzberger purported to quote Rose, who is said to have 
spoken of "einzelne sehr schlechte lndividuen . . .  [ die] einmal ein Bisschen in dieser Weise vorgenommen worden sintf'. 
In this summary I have modified the rhetoric in order to clarify the substance of the arguments as I understand them. 
24 I have no idea how Epstein transformed this procedure into the holding back of "some of the gifts which the German 
Government sent regularly to the chiefs under his jurisdiction''. 
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formally legalised in neighbouring German New Guinea, as early as 1 888, as a punishment for 
disciplinary offences by coloured labourers, because a moderate physical punishment had been 
regarded as more humane than imprisonment, which Pacific Islanders regarded as particularly 
barbaric. This ordinance had not been kept secret but had been published in the Deutsche 
Kolonialgesetzgebung, in volume 6, on page 248.25 He, Rose, had only quite recently convinced 
himself, after lengthy discussions with the lawyers in the colonial department, that the 
administrator in the Marshall Islands had indeed no legal authority to order the corporal 
punishment of natives, but he rejected categorically any suggestions that these discussions had 
been the result ofoutside influences. Rose's final point was directed againstErzberger' s claim that 
corporal punishments would mentally and physically destroy Pacific Islanders. This was sheer 
fantasy. If Germany's colonies in the Pacific were peopled by creatures who were so miserable 
that they could be broken by rare and moderate corporal punishment, there would indeed be little 
one could do with them (ibid. :  2294-95).26 
The Brandeis Case resurfaced in the Reichstag after the upgrading of the colonial department 
to a separate colonial office, with Dernburg as its first secretary and after Rose and Konig had 
been temporarily retired. 
In response to the colonial scandals debates in parliament a judicial commission had been 
appointed. By April 1 907 it had largely completed its investigations and the chancellor of the 
Reich could present its findings to the newly elected Reichstag in which "the government parties" 
now had the absolute majority. 
The Brandeis Case had been one of 26 matters investigated-and the only one relating to the 
colonies in the Pacific.27 The commission had found no reason to start criminal or disciplinary 
proceedings against Brandeis, whose application to be retired on medical grounds had been 
approved on 25 January 1 907. On 9 March 1 907 the colonial department had sent a decree to the 
district office in the Marshall Islands which cancelled its 1 903 decree in so far as it had authorised 
Brandeis to impose corporal punishments under "exceptional circumstances". The report also 
stated that a review of the laws relating to corporal punishment in all the German colonies had 
begun (Reichstag, 12 . Legislaturperiode, 1. Session, Drucksache No. 288). 
On 6 May 1 907 Dernburg went a step further. He used a parliamentary push for a separation 
of the judicial and executive functions in the government of the German colonies as an excuse for 
making an amende honorable to Brandeis. Such a separation of powers was also in the interest 
of the individual officials charged with carrying out judicial duties. This was well demonstrated 
by the case of the former administrator Brandeis who had recently retired after 30 years of 
blameless service. Brandeis, an officer by training, had been asked to carry out judicial functions 
in the Marshall Islands28 under circumstances which would have taxed even a professional judge. 
There was no doubt that he did not know precisely how far his legal powers in relation to corporal 
punishments extended, and an officer could not be expected to have specialised legal knowledge 
of this kind. He, Dernburg, did not want to defend Brandeis against the accusations which had 
25 1bis reference related, in fact, to a second ordinance which replaced the 1 888 ordinance in 1900-but the earlier 
ordinance had also been published in the same collection, in vol. 1 :  552-53. 
26 1bis was presumably the "joke" referred to by Epstein. The Socialist deputy Ledebour turned this argument-with 
the help of the first glowing description of the Marshallese by the German writer Chamisso--on its head: if 20 years of 
German colonial rule had transformed a formerly proud and virtuous people into a bunch of degraded slaves who no longer 
objected to being beaten, it was high time for Germany to abandon this colony and to invite some true Marshallese, if they 
could still be found, to come as missionaries to Germany to strengthen the pitifully weakened moral fibre of her inhabitants 
(ibid.: 2299). 
27 The investigation of Rose-as a member of the colonial department-also dealt with allegations that he had misused 
his powers to order corporal punishments during his tenure as imperial commissioner in German New Guinea. Rose too 
was cleared by the commission, although this did not save his career in the colonial service. 
28 Demburg's knowledge of the geography of the Pacific was still hazy. He first confused the Marshall Islands with the 
Marianas and then the latter with the Carolines. 
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been made against him, but it was his duty to stress the difficulties which an official without legal 
training, and without anyone with whom he could consult in matters of law, had to face in a 
remote archipelago when he was entrusted with the administration of justice. The attacks on 
Brandeis had largely been justified.29 But he could give no assurances that the need for new 
accusations of this kind would not arise in future, unless the Reichstag was prepared to provide 
him with the funds to carry through a separation of powers in the colonies. This would be an 
expensive exercise, but until it had been completed the strict principles which were applied to the 
exercise of judicial and police powers in metropolitan Germany could not be applied in the 
colonies. 
Dernburg returned specifically to the corporal punishments ordered by Brandeis. The head of 
the Catholic mission in the Marshall Islands had assured him that Brandeis had treated the 
Marshallese too softly rather than too harshly, that the execution of the punishments had been free 
of brutality, and pedagogically sound. He, Dernburg, had felt obliged to make these remarks in 
the interests of a man who had been asked to carry out functions for which he had not been 
adequately trained but who had otherwise served the Reich for 30 years in these remote islands 
as a remarkably efficient and decent officer and administrator (ibid. :  Verhandlungen: 1443-44). 
IV 
So much for the debate of the Brandeis Case in the Reichstag. Where was the scandal? The 
reports certainly did not show that Brandeis or his superiors had behaved in a manner which could 
be described as scandalous. By contrast, they demonstrated that Epstein' s  historiographical 
treatment of this case was far more brutal than anything Brandeis had been accused of. But then 
Epstein operated in the Wonderland of narrative history where behaviour of this kind was 
apparently perfectly normal. 
Judging by these reports, the "scandalisation" of Germany's colonial administration had been 
largely a political ploy on the part of Erzberger which had hardly been a complete success. Thus, 
Erzberger watched without a murmur when Dernburg, instead of repealing the ordinance 
legalising the corporal punishment of coloured labourers in the Old Protectorate, approved its 
introduction in the Marshall Islands in June 1907, although a public notice to this effect was 
published in volume 1 1  of the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung on p. 276. However, Erzberger was 
not so politically naYve as to claim during his campaign that Brandeis or Rose were "evil men" or 
"criminal types". This was Epstein's interpretation, and his treatment of the Brandeis Case 
suggested that it had been based on no more "far-reaching research" and that it had produced no 
more "solid evidence" than Erzberger's. 
What I found surprising was that Epstein's  treatment had made the Brandeis Case also 
narratively less interesting than it had really been-and the stenographical reports of the 
proceedings in the Reichstag could with confidence be accepted as an accurate account of what 
had happened during these proceedings, although they did, of course, not prove the veracity of 
anything that had been said. Nonetheless these reports indicated that the primary sources were far 
richer and more reliable than I had hoped. They also showed that colonial law had played an 
important role in the exercise of German colonial rule in the Pacific, which was made historically 
all the more interesting because senior German colonial officials, including Brandeis and Rose, 
had only a limited understanding of the legal framework within which they were operating. Yet 
29 Demburg acknowledged that Brandeis had ordered illegal corporal punishments in about 1 1  cases. He identified three 
of them: firstly, the case of the man who had committed adultery with the wife of a chief; secondly, a minor who had 
sexually interfered with the children of a white trader; and, thirdly, a man who had disobeyed repeated orders to stay away 
from the leprosy isolation ward because he was engaged in an affair with one of the female patients. (I doubt that Brandeis 
only ordered corporal punishments in about 1 1  cases, but this is hardly the same as saying that he loved beating his native 
subjects.) 
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they were forced to improve their understanding of this framework, and it was itself progressively 
elaborated and tightened. 
According to the debates the Brandeis Case had begun with an official complaint by Kiem. 
This had led to formal disciplinary proceedings against Brandeis. Although they had cleared him, 
an instruction clarifying the legal limits of his powers had been issued. Moreover, although the 
judicial commission subsequently appointed had again cleared Brandeis,  the instruction which had 
empowered him to impose administrative corporal punishments to protect public order had 
nonetheless been withdrawn. Instead the Native Disciplinary Ordinance of the Old Protectorate 
had been introduced in the Island Territory. But since it only covered coloured labourers it 
remained, for example, unclear whether corporal punishments were not also legal in the Island 
Territory as an instrument for the maintenance of prison discipline. 
It also remained open on what grounds Brandeis had been cleared of any disciplinary wrong­
doing. Still, the debates left no doubt that the actions of which he had been accused were, taken 
by themselves, historically insignificant. There was thus little point in examining whether these 
particular accusations were supported by information contained in the other historical records. The 
question was rather whether the official sources painted by themselves an adequate overall picture 
of German colonial rule. 
What I had in mind was not a composite picture, which I had to piece together from a variety 
of sources, but one which was painted by a single source. It was still too early to accept that this 
meant that I had to focus on the legislative framework for the exercise of governmental powers 
and work my way through the 13  volumes of the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung. Perhaps it was 
possible, all encounters with narrative phantom history notwithstanding, to avoid this laborious 
exercise and to deal directly, but still factually, with the exercise of colonial rule in German New 
Guinea, and the use of military force against their native subjects by the German colonial 
authorities, as the very opposite of the Rule of Law, offered itself as an apposite test case. 
Chapter 2: The Official History of a Necessary Evil 
I 
In 1912 a public notice in the government gazette of German New Guinea invited applications for the award of a colonial medal the emperor had created (AB, 1912: 237). This "Colonial 
Memorial Medal" (Kolonialdenkmunze) was not designed to honour outstanding military valour 
but to recognise the mere participation in certain military events. It was primarily intended for the 
"colonial army" (Schutztruppe) but also covered engagements of the colonial police forces, and 
of the landing forces of the imperial navy. This was of special significance for German New 
Guinea which had no Schutztruppe and relied heavily on naval assistance. 
Attached to the deed creating this medal were three separate lists-for the Schutztruppe, the 
navy and the police-of the events participation in which qualified for the award. In the case of 
German New Guinea the Police List (Table I) included 27 such events. 1 They were divided into 
"punitive expeditions" (Strafexpeditionen or Bestrafungen) and "the putting down of rebellions" 
(Niederwerfung von Aufstanden). Of the 27 events listed 19 fell into the former category and 
eight into the latter.2 
Not one of these events occurred in the Island Territory, but they were widely distributed 
within the Old Protectorate, although the Bismarck Archipelago figured more prominently until 
1904, whereas Kaiser Wilhelmsland dominated the later years. The frequency of these events did 
not decrease as time went by. On the contrary, only three took place during the time German New 
Guinea was governed by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie under an imperial charter, while the other 
24 were spread fairly evenly over the dozen years of imperial administration covered by the list. 
This pattern differed substantially from that indicated for Togo, which resembled German New 
Guinea most closely, in particular in that it was the only African colony which had no 
Schutztruppe. Its Police List included 36 events, but the last of them had taken place in 1903. On 
the other hand, the Togo entries had a distinctly more martial flavour. While two referred to 
"rebellions" and there were 1 1  "punitive expeditions" (called Straft.uge in Togo), 23 entries spoke 
of "campaigns", "battles" and even of "the taking of towns by storm". This suggested that the use 
of military force varied greatly within the German colonial empire: that Togo was conquered by 
military might with the result that peace reigned afterwards; that German colonial rule in the Island 
Territory was entirely peaceful; and that the expansion and maintenance of government control 
in the Old Protectorate had been neither fish nor fowl. 
These were certainly important questions, but they are only worth pursuing if these lists 
covered all occasions on which a significant amount of military force was used in German New 
Guinea-or Togo-and the Naval List already contained a first correction, because it included the 
putting down of a rebellion by marines on Ponape, in the Island Territory, in 1910/1 1 .  In other 
words, German colonial rule in Micronesia had not been entirely peaceful either. Conversely, I 
was now left with the impression that the navy had, at least until 1912, never used military force 
in the Old Protectorate on a scale comparable to that used by it in Ponape or by the police in any 
of the 27 other events listed. 
The annual reports on German New Guinea were the most obvious official source of 
information against which this list could be checked. 3 
1 This list was published in DKB, 1913 :  353-55. 
2 The second figure includes two events which are, respectively, described as "the dampening of unrests" and "the 
punishment of rebellious tribes". 
3 Annual reports describing the "development" (Entwicklung) of German New Guinea were presented to the Reichstag 
and during the reign of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie to the shareholders of that company. An English translation of these 
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TABLE I 
Military Operations of the Police Troop qualifying for a Colonial Memorial Medal 
1 Puttin_g_ down of a rebellion in the hinterland of HerbertshOhe June 1 893 
2 Punishment of the mountain tribes near Friedrich Wilhelmshafen �ugust 1 897 
3 Punishment of the __Q_irate villag_es of Madine and Sel�u October 1 897 
4 Punishment of the villag_es of TiJ:!P_utz and Datoel A__Q_ril 1 899 
5 Punishment of the Kabin natives Jan� 1 900 
6 Punishment of the Manus natives Jan� 1 900 
7 Punishment of the St Matthias natives Ju!Y_ 1 901  
8 Puttin_g_ down of the rebellion near V arzin A__Q_ril/Ju!Y_ 1 902 
9 Puttin_g_ down of a rebellion in the Witu Grou__Q_ Nov./Dec. 1 903 
1 0  Punishment of the vill� Messi S�ember 1 904 
1 1  Puttil!&_ down of the Bainil!&_ rebellion Au_g/Oct. 1 904 
1 2  Punishment of the A war natives S�ember 1 905 
1 3  Punishment of the mountain tribe Kananitu May_ 1 906 
14 Punishment of the vill� Taguervi M!!Y_ 1 906 
1 5  Punishment of the villa� Tsiwo S�ember 1 906 
1 6  Punishment of the Buin tribes June/Jul_y_ 1 907 
17 Puttin_g_ down of a rebellion in Ar� Maloll, Ser and Karsan Ju1_1/A\!& 1 907 
1 8  Puttin_g_ down of a rebellion of the Orokoza tribes Nov./Dec. 1 907 
1 9  Punitive eig>_edition in the Admiral__!y_ Islands A__Q_ril 1 908 
20 Punitive ex�dition ag_ainst the Ndrano natives A__Q_ril 1909 
2 1  Punishment of the W akaia A.£.ril!M� 1 909 
22 Punitive e�edition ag_ainst the Asmata natives S�ember 1 909 
23 Dampening of the unrest among the mountain tribes inland of Feb/March 1 9 1 0  
Potsdamhafen 
24 Punishment of the rebellious Rai Coast villag_es November 1 9 1 0  
25 Punitive eig>_edition ag_ainst the Womba Jan./Feb. 191 1 
26 Punitive e�edition to Ka_g_am June/Nov. 1 9 1 2  
27 Punitive expedition against the Zedu, Bemari and Koipassin June/Jul_y 1 9 1 2  
annual reports, in so far as they deal with the Old Protectorate, is available (Sack & Clark, 1979). It is supplemented by 
an English translation of the sections of the draft annual report for 1913 which deal with the Old Protectorate (Sack & 
Clark, 1 980). 
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This exercise confirmed the peaceful nature of German colonial rule in the Island Territory, 
apart from the "putting down" of the "Ponape Rebellion".4 But the reports also showed that 
military force was used on many more occasions in the Old Protectorate than the 27 events listed. 
Although they were not sufficiently detailed to permit me to arrive at a precise figure, they 
indicated that it was at least 100---and two punitive expeditions in 1897, shown in the Police List, 
were not even mentioned. On the other hand, this list appeared to cover all other major military 
operations referred to in the annual reports until the end of 1912-with one other early exception: 
the first large punitive expedition by the police force (after the "Malala Massacre") near 
Hatzfeldhafen in 1 89 1 ,  participation in which did not qualify for the Colonial Memorial Medal !5 
Just as important, the annual reports demonstrated that the Ponape Rebellion had not been the 
first time that the navy had become militarily active in German New Guinea. Yet, military action 
had not been an automatic response even to native rebellions. Both an uprising in Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen in 1904 and another planned uprising there in 1912 (the "Madang Conspiracies") 
were dealt with without the use of military force, although the annual reports left no doubt that 
these two events were regarded as more serious than most of the events to which the listed 
punitive expeditions responded. Indeed, only the putting down of the Ponape Rebellion, and of 
two earlier rebellions in the Gazelle Peninsula-the "Blanche Bay Uprising" in 1 893 and the 
"Varzin Murders" in 1 902-were presented as having been of matching importance. 
There was also quite a different discrepancy between the Police List and the annual reports: 
whereas the former classified the operations carried out at Kagam in 1912  (the "Kagam 
Expedition") as a punitive expedition, according to the annual reports the "expeditionary troop" 
had been stationed there for five months, during which the "extensive terrain was recorded and 
mapped by route surveys and the local tribes, who were victims of savage head-hunting practices, 
were pacified" (Sack & Clark, 1979: 354). This was a timely warning that labels like "punitive 
expedition", "unrest", "rebellion" or "pacification" were probably also "narrative" terms without 
a precise meaning. 
The crucial difference between the Police List, and the annual reports, however, was that the 
latter did not treat these military encounters as a chronological sequence of episodes but 
incorporated them into a suspiciously coherent overall picture of German colonial rule. 6 
II 
The Neu Guinea Kompagnie presented itself in its first annual report as anything but an 
enthusiastic advocate of the employment of military force. Rather, it saw it as one of its central 
tasks to "take the measures indispensable for the establishment of the rule of law" (ibid. :  3). 
However, since under its charter the organisation of the administration of justice was reserved to 
the German government, the company had to wait until the government had created a system of 
colonial courts. This happened reasonably promptly, but their jurisdiction extended, for the time 
being, only to 
4 The annual reports did suggest, however, that only the arrival of SMS Cormoran with 100 Melanesian policemen had 
prevented unrest on Ponape in 1908 from turning into an open rebellion 
5 The draft annual report for 1913  referred to a punitive expedition by the police force in southern New Ireland and a 
combined expedition by the police force and SMS Cormoran in southern Bougainville. 
6 I should stress that what follows is not my story but an attempt to present the information provided in the annual reports 
in a condensed form. I have therefore followed the annual instalment format of the reports and quoted extensively, so as 
to let, if not the facts, at least this source, speak to a large extent for itself. I appreciate that a more determined streamlining 
would have made this chapter easier to read but it would have been also much less realistic and thus prevented it from 
achieving its purpose. 
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subjects of civilised nations . . .  and not to the natives or to members of other coloured tribes with 
equivalent status. But neither category may remain completely outside the law . . .  This is particularly true 
in the case of those who enter employment and become dependent. . .  Accordingly regulations have been 
drafted . . .  [ which prescribe] the penalties for punishable actions and the procedure to be followed in these 
cases . . .  In the meantime there is need for some material instruments of power, both vis-a-vis those natives 
who have not yet actually been brought under the new State authority, and for the enforcement of police 
or judicial measures, in particular for the forcible execution of judicial decisions. It is true that the Board 
of Directors has equipped the stations and ships with arms for their protection. But the small number of 
officials and employees . .  .is not adequate to repel an attack or to avenge one, particularly as the stations 
cannot be left for a longer period . . .  The protection which the German Government has promised the 
Company would also have to be called on to repel attacks by the natives . . .  [However,] the only naval 
ships which have been present in the Protectorate-and then only occasionally and for short periods-are 
not suitable for this purpose in any but exceptional cases (ibid. :  1 1). 
The company therefore found itself obliged to establish a small, armed native police force, 
although it expected that the German government would continue to provide additional protection. 
But it did not see a great need for calling on it. 
[l]nsofar as they are already known ... [the natives] are not particularly numerous. Larger communities 
under the centralised leadership of chiefs do not appear to exist. . .  Nor are there larger groups bound 
together by any common language . . .  This fragmentation is an obstacle to winning over the people 
peacefully . . .  On the other hand it reduces the danger which might arise if a group of larger tribes were 
to join forces to attack or resist the sparsely occupied settlements . . .  
As far as is known, in the Bismarck Archipelago the establishments themselves have never been 
attacked, but in recent times scattered traders living in isolation have been murdered. It is difficult to 
discover the reasons for such acts or the culprits, but it is not improbable that in some cases they were 
provoked by actions on the part of the victims. In this connection there have been grave abuses in the 
manner in which the so-called 'labour trade' has been conducted up to the present, that is, recruitment 
for work on the plantations in the Australian colonies. In form, this is carried out by contract, but in 
actual fact frequently force and cruelty are employed and the chiefs are bribed with arms. On the one 
hand this has led among the natives to an embittered attitude towards all whites, so that they respond with 
hostility or distrust even to peaceful approaches. And on the other hand the power of the natives, who 
are already in the majority numerically, has been dangerously reinforced by the possession of firearms .. .  
In Kaiser Wilhelmslandbefore its annexation by Germany the natives came into contact with whites 
only fleetingly and at a few points along the coast. They have no firearms but are skilled in the use of 
spears and bows and arrows. The stations are unanimous in complaints about their tendencies to thieving. 
There were serious conflicts in December of last year on the Huon Gulf and in July of this year at the 
Hatzfeldhafen Station. The former arose when a boat of the [company steamer] Samoa which was about 
to land was attacked with spears, which occasioned the burning down of several huts. At Hatzfeldhafen, 
without apparent cause, a large number ofnatives attacked the experimental tobacco plantation near the 
station and wounded five of the Malays working there, one fatally and the others seriously. Here again, 
as the culprits could not be discovered, the punishment consisted in the destruction of houses and canoes 
in the villages to which the attackers belonged. 
These incidents point to the need for caution and for reinforcing the personnel of the stations. But 
they are only isolated cases and will perhaps not be repeated after effective punishment. .. (ibid.: 19-20). 
The company had been too optimistic. Not only did the unfriendly attitude of the natives force 
it to increase the size of its personnel in Hatzfeldhafen far beyond that required for its normal 
operation, but in the Bismarck Archipelago both its station manager and the imperial judge were 
attacked, the former during an attempt to cross central New Ireland, the latter while on a visit to 
Weberhafen on the Gazelle Peninsula. On the other hand, full jurisdiction over natives was 
transferred by the emperor to the company, which promptly enacted a native penal ordinance. 
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This Ordinance will be of importance particularly for natives of the Protectorate and members of other 
coloured tribes who are in regular employment. Natives of the Protectorate who are not so employed have 
up to the present come under the authority of the State only to a limited extent. However it appeared 
necessary to make legal provisions to cover these natives as well; firstly for the purpose of bringing the 
punishment of crimes and offences against whites under the rule of law and thus preventing their 
occurrence as far as possible; and secondly to protect those who prosecute and punish offenders from the 
provisions of the German Criminal Code according to which such prosecution and punishment, if without 
legal foundation, would be punishable. Although applicable in principle to punishable actions committed 
by natives against each other, the Penal Ordinance is not for the present aimed at these. It can be extended 
only gradually to cover these, as the range of influence of the stations expands and the natives enter into 
friendly relations with them. By the provisions of the Penal Ordinance which leaves it to the discretion 
of the presiding judge to decide whether the circumstances make it desirable to press or drop a criminal 
charge, the way is effectively prepared for extending its application in this direction (ibid. : 28). 
Whereas the annual reports had nothing to say about the exercise of the company's judicial 
jurisdiction, they continued to refer to non-judicial punitive measures in relation to natives who 
had not yet "come under the authority of the State". 
In 1888 SMS Alexandrine sailed at the request of the administrator 
to the Anachorite and Hermit Islands and thence to Neu Mecklenburg. On the former there was no longer 
any occasion for intervention, as the traders stationed there pronounced themselves satisfied. In Neu 
Mecklenburg punitive measures were taken in those places where the inhabitants were suspected of 
crimes (ibid. : 43). 
During the following year 
the warships of the Imperial Navy have had occasion for punitive intervention .. .in some cases . . .  However 
these were isolated incidents. In the light of their temperament, their relatively small numbers and the 
absence of any form of closer association for common purposes . . .  , there appears to be absolutely no 
possibility of a serious interruption or delay in the progress of colonisation due to resistance or attacks 
by the natives (ibid. : 53). 
While these military operations were carried out by the navy, the killing of three Europeans 
and 14 native labourers near Hatzfeldhafen in 1 89 1  led to several punitive expeditions mounted 
by the imperial commissioner "with additional assistance of a warship" (ibid. :  60). The Blanche 
Bay Uprising in the Gazelle Peninsula in 1 893-the first event in the history of German New 
Guinea which earned participants a colonial memorial medal-was also primarily the 
responsibility of the local police force. 
Repeated attacks . . .  [on the company's  station in HerbertshOhe] were repulsed and considerable losses 
inflicted on the hostile tribes by expeditions led by the station manager. Nevertheless, although the main 
instigator of the revolt had fallen, peaceful conditions were not restored. The Administrator proceeded 
to Herbertshtihe in November . . .  But notwithstanding the respect in which he was held by the natives who 
remembered him from his earlier period of duty in the Archipelago, and in spite of all appropriate 
measures, even the Administrator did not at first succeed in concluding a peace which would guarantee 
the settlements against further attack. After the arrival of S.M. Cruiser Sperber at the beginning of 
December, and in consultation with her commander . . .  , he therefore decided on an expedition against the 
hostile tribes, to be led by himself. The police troop was divided into two parties in order to outflank the 
enemy. The warship rendered assistance by disembarking part of its crew and firing a number of shells 
at the enemy position. The advance of the police troop inflicted some losses on the enemy, but there was 
no decisive engagement. 
However, the shells, fired from a distance of 5-7 km had the effect of killing one native and 
paralysing another with fear. 
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As a result of this campaign, all the inland tribes have now declared their readiness to pay in diwarra 
[shell money] the indemnity demanded from them during the first visitation by the Administrator, and 
have in fact paid it in whole or in part. Where this has not been done, it is nevertheless regarded as certain 
that the remainder will be paid in and peace thereby restored. The collapse of the resistance is attributed 
not least to the impression made on the natives by the firing of the shells. They now believe that no 
distance would be great enough to guarantee their safety from the white man's missiles. 
Apart from the necessity for keeping constant watch, the hostilities caused no serious interruption 
to the work of the cotton plantation. On the other hand the food markets, normally attended by the 
friendly natives in large numbers, were deserted, and normal communications with the villages were also 
disrupted. It is anticipated that the peace settlement will have a good effect in both respects (ibid. : 75). 
The company was therefore doubly annoyed when its acting station manager, instead of 
limiting himself to the defence of the colonial settlements, had found it necessary to carry out a 
punitive expedition in the north of the Gazelle Peninsula for "the purpose of punishing a 
chief . . .  who was alleged to have committed acts of violence [against other natives]" (ibid. :  94). 
Even as far as crimes against colonists were concerned it was happy to rely largely on the presence 
of the naval survey vessel SMS Mowe which had been stationed in German New Guinea waters . 
[W]ith its assistance a number of punitive expeditions have been carried out against natives in connection 
with punishable offences which had to be left unpunished for years because no warship could be sent. . .  
I t  i s  anticipated that the punitive measures . . .  , however much their necessity is  to be  regretted, will help 
to prevent excesses by natives even in the remote parts of the . . .  Protectorate (ibid. : 1 1 1) .  
The fatal shooting of its acting administrator by an escaped native prisoner in 1 897 only rated 
a mention under the "Personnel" heading in the annual report, which noted that this "deplorable 
event need give no rise to anxiety on the score of the security of the establishments in general" 
(ibid. :  128). Neither the punishment of the mountain tribes near Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in 
August 1 897 nor the destruction of the pirate villages Madine and Selapiu in New Ireland in 
October of that year were reported, although they were sufficiently significant to earn them a place 
in the Police List of medal-worthy military operations. 
The first annual report of the new imperial government for 1 8987 indicated a fundamental 
change in policy. Progress in the Bismarck Archipelago had so far been seriously hampered 
by the fact that, while it was under the rule of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, the Administration did not 
have at its disposal adequate resources to police the sea and the coastline, or for any intervention outside 
the Gazelle Peninsula. The continuous fighting among the natives, particularly in Neu Mecklenburg, 
adversely affected trade and the recruitment of labour . . .  
On the Gazelle Peninsula the peaceful relations with the natives have continued to develop. The 
jurisdiction of the judge over the natives covers a large district, from which all the more important cases 
are submitted to him for judgment. .. (ibid. : 171) .  
[But, even in] the Gazelle Peninsula i t  has on a number of occasions been necessary to proceed with 
armed force against the natives. In July of last year there was unrest among the tribes around Mt Varzin. 
Peace was restored by armed intervention. In order to reinforce the respect in which the Administration 
is held, in August of last year a peaceful expedition and demonstration to V arzin was carried out in 
company with the landing force of SMS Falke (ibid. : 172). 
7 I no longer agree with the explanation given for the existence of this report in 1 979 (Sack & Clark, 1979: xi). I was 
wrong in claiming that the budget year ran from 1 July to 30 June, although the acting governor believed that this was the 
time span usually covered by the annual reports submitted by imperial colonial governments (see RKA 6513,  fol. 183). 
However, the colonial department was anxious to submit information provided by imperial officials to the Reichstag 
instead of waiting for the 1 899 annual report, although the time before 1 April 1 899 was, strictly speaking, none of its 
business. 
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The imperial government still did not have its own sea-going vessel at the end of the period 
covered by the following report, but the governor had used any available vessel to travel the length 
and the breadth of the Old Protectorate-as well as the Island Territory which had also been 
placed under him-instead of using this delay as an excuse for limiting his governmental activities 
to the area around his administrative headquarters in the Gazelle Peninsula. 
Unfortunately it was also necessary to conduct frequent punitive expeditions. Three of these were 
directed against the Admiralty Group, where three Europeans and about two dozen of their coloured 
employees were attacked and murdered in the course of the year covered by the Report; the schooner 
Nukamanu was also taken and there was an attack on the schooner Nugared, one European being 
wounded. The other punitive expeditions were directed against Neu Mecklenburg and the hinterland of 
Friedrich Wilhelmshafen . . .  , the island of Bili-Bili and Berlinhafen. In two other cases punitive measures 
had to be taken: in the vicinity of Varzin and also in Kabanga on the Gazelle Peninsula. These 
expeditions were carried out by the police troop with consistent success. On the last expedition a landing 
party from SMS Mowe came ashore, and the command over the combined force was therefore given to 
an officer of this ship. SMS Mowe and SMS Seeadler rendered most effective assistance to all major 
military expeditions. The police troop . . .  met with significant resistance on only one occasion, on the big 
punitive expedition in the Admiralty Group at the beginning of the year 1900. No Europeans were 
wounded on any of these expeditions; however a number of police troopers were more or less seriously 
wounded, none fatally. As there are no large united tribes to contend with in the Old Protectorate of 
German New Guinea, and as, apart from treachery and cruelty, Melanesians are characterised by a high 
degree of cowardice, any necessary military expeditions can be carried out by a police troop gradually 
increasing in size to match the number of stations and supported from the sea in emergencies by the 
Imperial Navy. In the selection of members of the police troop care is taken to see that as many tribes as 
possible are represented and that no single tribe predominates, and in this way the risk of mutiny, a 
possible danger in every mercenary force, is eliminated. However it would be still better if the major part 
of the troop were made up of East African Negroes, as the local police troopers cannot be retained in the 
service permanently, and when they return to their home districts trained in the use of arms, they can do 
a great deal of mischief with a rifle and ammunition should they manage to get hold of them At the 
present time there are few rifles and little ammunition in the hands of the natives and these will probably 
gradually be confiscated. Little or nothing has ever been heard of arms-smuggling in the old New Guinea 
Protectorate. The rifles now in the possession of the natives were usually obtained by murdering and 
robbing Europeans, or date from the time when there was no prohibition against trading in weapons, and 
Europeans conducted an irresponsible trade in rifles (ibid. :  194-95). 
The alternative to these regrettable punitive expeditions was an extension of the administration 
of justice. This had been facilitated by the appointment of government chiefs. This had happened 
in a considerable number oflocalities in the Gazelle Peninsula and in the Neu Lauenburg [Duke of York] 
Group, the only areas which, in the absence of a Government ship, have hitherto been easily accessible . . .  
These chiefs have been given authority to decide minor legal disputes involving property up to the value 
of 25 marks or ten strings of . . .  shell money . . .  Limited authority in police and administrative matters has 
also been conferred on the chiefs, in particular the supervision of the maintenance and improvement of 
roads in their districts. Every native has the right to appeal to the final decision of the judge in 
HerbertsMhe against the directives and decisions of the chiefs . . .  The cases are decided in accordance 
with native law, in so far as this is not incompatible with German law. 
As there is no hereditary chieftainship, in fact no distinct chieftainship at all in the Gazelle Peninsula 
or in the Neu Lauenburg Group, in a number of cases considerable difficulty was experienced in finding 
suitable persons whose standing with their fellow-tribesmen was sufficiently high to guarantee their 
authority in the exercise of their magisterial powers. In a few cases it also became necessary to proceed 
against appointed chiefs for exceeding their authority and misuse of their official authority in their own 
interest. In addition to creating peaceful conditions among the kanako.s, which is an essential prerequisite 
for the success of European enterprises, this whole policy towards the natives has made it possible to 
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requisition the natives to assist in works for the common good and this has in fact been done on a 
considerable scale in the construction of roads . . .  
Outside the areas discussed above, the administration of  justice in cases involving natives was 
confined to the prosecution of punishable actions where they affected Europeans and when travel 
facilities permitted, and to settling disputes between natives, where these were brought before the judge 
by the natives during his occasional visits to the various settlements (ibid. : 195-97). 
In 1900 the newly established government station in northern New Ireland succeeded in 
confiscating considerable quantities of firearms and ammunition from natives, mostly without 
bloodshed, and prohibited the carrying of arms. But several punitive expeditions had also again 
been necessary. 
Regrettably, because there is practically no communication between the individual groups of islands and 
tribes on account of the distances and the language differences, a successfully completed punitive 
expedition does not have a far-reaching effect, as in the case of geographically compact colonies. 
Particularly in the Archipelago practically every individual tribe has to be made to feel the power of the 
Administration before it can be induced to desist from robbery, murder and cannibalism. In addition it 
is extraordinarily difficult to make a real impression on the natives in the bush. Only a coloured force 
experienced in jungle warfare, under the command of individual Europeans well acquainted with the bush 
and the ways of the natives can undertake expeditions in the Pacific with prospects of success (ibid.: 
21 1) .  
On the other hand, the natives showed 
a great appreciation of the administration of justice by the German Administration. The collection of the 
money fines imposed does not meet with difficulties. Unfortunately the chiefs appointed by the 
Government do not always appear equal to the task of administering justice to the full extent to which 
it has been entrusted to them. They are occasionally guilty ofinjustices and extortion. Nevertheless native 
magistrates of this type must be regarded as a necessity for the administration of the pacified sections of 
the colony. Government chiefs therefore continue to be appointed, and strenuous attempts are being made 
to remove shortcomings in the discharge of their functions by these village magistrates (ibid. :  2 12) .  
This set the scene. As the annual report for 1 901  put it: 
It. .. will for a long time remain the chief task of the Administration to pay regular visits to the coasts of 
the individual islands in order to foster an acquaintance with the institutions of the Government along 
the coastal tribes and thus to promote peaceful conditions, to establish trade relations and to prepare the 
way for orderly recruiting of labour. Only regular appearances can guarantee that these functions will be 
fulfilled. On land, the construction of a network of roads from the Government stations to win over the 
inland and mountain tribes corresponds to the program of activity at sea just outlined (ibid. :  223-24). 
This had worked well in the case of the new government station in northern New Ireland, where 
there had been 
no occasion whatever to proceed against the natives during the year covered by the Report. No Europeans 
were menaced, and even the feuding among the natives themselves has completely ceased in the vicinity 
of the seat of Administration and on the north and east coasts, formerly so prone to hostilities. The most 
important tribes who were still conducting bloody wars against each other in 1 898-99 elected chiefs at 
a meeting called by the Administration. There is no doubt that this has put an end to open hostilities, 
while the antipathy between the individual tribes remains, as is manifested by the many reciprocal 
complaints which are submitted to the station for settlement (ibid. : 228). 
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By contrast the extension of government control in southern New Ireland by the station in 
Namatanai, established in 1904, was "in some cases associated with fighting and blood-shed" 
(ibid. : 25 1).  The Kieta station in the northern Solomons, established in 1905, also had to use 
armed intervention repeatedly when it extended its "sphere of influence" where natives were not 
allowed to take "the law into their own hand by pursuing arbitrary blood feuds" (ibid. :  265). 
When a station for western Kaiser Wilhelmsland was opened in 1906 such clashes were 
accepted as natural. Yet, the successful punishment of several refractory tribes by the station was 
seen as having brought about "a complete reversal of the native situation", because it had now 
been able "to requisition natives in gratifying numbers for public works connected with the 
construction of the station, of bridges and of roads" (ibid. : 266). 
These initial clashes were generally regarded as a passing phase. The annual report for 1906 
noted with satisfaction that instead of the seven punitive expeditions in the previous year only two 
such expeditions had to be carried out in remoter areas of the Kieta district. However, there was 
"an urgent and pressing need to provide the station with a sizeable seagoing pinnace with which 
regular visits can be undertaken" (ibid. :  275). The call for such a vessel for each of the local 
administrations became part of the standard repertoire, because regular visits were necessary to 
further reduce the need for punitive expeditions, the usefulness of which had already been 
reassessed in the annual report for 1902. 
Experience has shown that temporary punitive measures against excesses committed by the natives are 
worthless, in fact harmful, in that the latter always tend to avenge the losses inflicted on the next comers. 
The application of military force is useful only when the advantage gained by intimidating the natives 
is followed up by a permanent Government station which suppresses the feuds of the natives, gradually 
reconciles the warring factions, and guarantees the security of both person and property simply by its 
presence (ibid. : 236). 
The new weapon was a mobile police unit. It was first stationed in the Gazelle Peninsula near 
the scene of the V arzin Murders, but was soon sent to punish the natives in the Vitu Group for 
"the attack on the [trading] station in Peterhafen and the seizure of the steamboat Meto". There 
too a small "occupation force" was left behind in order to maintain "the security of the station 
until the situation has been fully clarified" (ibid. : 244). That such temporary occupation forces 
were still not the answer was demonstrated by the experience in the Admiralty Islands where its 
"efforts to subdue the volatile and belligerent islanders . . .  has so far not been completely 
successful". The only way of opening up this group was the establishment of a permanent 
government station equipped with a sea-going vessel (ibid.).  
The annual report for 1 902 had also reviewed the success of the administrative organisation 
of the natives.  
Where peaceful conditions have been established and regular contact with the natives has been initiated, 
the developments to date can be described as satisfactory. It must be remembered that. . .  [the natives] have 
no conception of subjection to a territorial power. It has nevertheless been possible to define small areas, 
to place chiefs in charge of these communities and to induce the people to perform services in the public 
interest, namely the construction and maintenance of roads. The use of these chiefs to assist in the 
administration of justice appears to give rise to the greatest difficulty. Self-interest, excessive zeal and 
lack of understanding repeatedly interfere with the course of justice (ibid. : 236-37). 
By 1903 the number of villages which had been "organised" had increased to 107 in the Gazelle 
Peninsula, 27 in the Duke of York Group and 93 in New Ireland. 
The assistance required of the chiefs in administrative and judicial matters has been rendered with 
commendable zeal throughout. Only in isolated cases have orders been disregarded in the most recently 
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incorporated areas, whose population is still far from comprehending even the ideas underlying the 
administration of justice or subordination to state authority (ibid. : 245) .  
Generally the 1903 report was optimistic because "the completion of the most important surveys 
and the consequent final definition of the plantation areas greatly improved relations with the 
natives and their readiness to perform the services required of them" (ibid. :  244). In 1904 
the first organised administrative units were also created near Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. It still remains 
to be seen to what extent this form [of native administrative organisation], chosen to establish public 
order among the coastal tribes of the Bismarck Archipelago, will serve the same purpose for the coastal 
tribes of Kaiser Wilhelmsland . . .  [since] [t]he cultural differences are considerable (ibid. : 252). 
The experiment was not as successful as it had been hoped because the government chiefs did not 
achieve the desired influence in the course of the next year. "But it is anticipated that this situation 
will gradually change when the people become more familiar with the new system" (ibid. :  257). 
The annual report for 1906 suggests that this prediction had not been too far off the mark. 
Further progress has been made with the appointment of new chiefs in the remoter areas around Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen. Although the sparseness of the population, their residual fear of Europeans and the 
inaccessibility of the terrain make it extremely difficult to unite the natives into small village units, 
nevertheless there has been a change in their attitudes. That is to say, no further resistance to the 
appointment of village chiefs has been observed, and they are beginning to show some appreciation of 
the institution (ibid. : 266). 
In 1907 
eleven new chiefs were appointed in addition to eleven already officiating [in the Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen district] . Most of them were assigned two policemen each (totol = messengers) to 
strengthen their influence over the village people. The requisitioning of natives for road-construction 
work was systematically proceeded with . . .  It cannot be maintained that the natives actually show great 
willingness to perform this labour. In the year covered by the Report there were repeated cases of large 
groups escaping from the work-sites into the bush. On a number of occasions protracted expeditions had 
to be undertaken to recapture the escapees. Because of their extreme shyness of Europeans, dealings with 
the natives required great patience. Any moves to strengthen the power of the chiefs must in future be 
carried out and enforced only with great caution. In the area round Potsdamhafen (Monumbo) there is 
a traditional system of chieftainship. In the vicinity of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen a peculiar system oflocal 
law is in force as both public and family law. The oldest men, in consort, as local chiefs, are the main 
arbiters in the village. They also decide on marriages, property matters and the ceremonial funeral rites, 
and determine which children are members of the village community. The appointment of a [government] 
chief and the measures taken by the Government interfere with their influence; they are no longer the 
mighty sorcerers they formerly were. Naturally they are the bitterest enemies of the [government] chiefs 
and the Europeans. Their influence will continue to be felt in secret for a long time to come (ibid. : 
278-79). 
The next report shows that the government did not always proceed with "great caution". In the 
hinterland of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen 
the existing native paths have been opened up over considerable distances and resthouses have been set 
up, so that these districts can be visited more frequently. This has strengthened the influence of the 
Government. Nevertheless the authorities have repeatedly had to take punitive action in these parts. With 
one exception all these cases involved breaking down the passive but stubborn resistance shown by one 
section of the population to the call to band together in administrative units (ibid. : 292). 
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The situation changed when in 1 909 the 
preliminaries to the introduction of the head-tax were completed with the establishment of sixteen tax 
districts for Kaiser Wilhelmsland . . .  
The taxes were paid willingly. In fact the natives make active efforts to have their villages assessed 
for payment of taxes in money instead of the previous compulsory labour. 
The number of chiefs appointed by the Government has risen from twenty-nine to sixty-two (ibid. : 
308). 
In the following year it rose by another 67 (ibid. : 322) and in 191 1 the head-tax was "successfully 
extended to twenty-three additional communities" (ibid. : 338). 
The head-tax was generally a success.  During 1907 it was collected from 104 villages in 
southern New Ireland and amounted to 15,272 Marks (ibid. :  278). Its introduction was closely 
linked with the administrative organisation of the natives-and with the construction and 
maintenance of roads. In the Gazelle Peninsula, where it had been first collected in 1907 in some 
communities, it was introduced in all organised communities in 1908. Its introduction was also 
associated "with efforts by the administration to incorporate in the administrative organisation 
those villages . . .  which had not been subject to systematic control". It was anticipated that in the 
course of the next year the entire north west Baining area would be organised by appointing chiefs 
in all localities whose inhabitants were counted by name. This "will be of importance not only for 
the collection of taxes but for the completion and maintenance of the road at present being 
constructed from Tobaule to Massava" (ibid. :  289). 
The connections reached even further. When the natives in Bougainville were offered the 
choice between paying a head-tax in cash and working for two weeks in lieu of tax at the station 
in 1908, it had been assumed that only the coastal villages would choose the cash option. 
However, the villages situated in the interior also endeavoured to discharge their tax obligations in cash . . .  
In view of  the poverty of the natives and the low level of local production of  marketable goods, an 
increase in tax payments can be expected only after the establishment oflarge-scale plantations offering 
the natives work opportunities and provided their labour is paid for in cash (ibid.: 291) .  
In 1910 the head-tax was increased from 5 Marks "for a number of more prosperous villages and 
localities" to 7 Marks and in some cases to 10 Marks. Still, "[t]he increased tax was paid promptly 
and willingly everywhere" (ibid. :  320). 
While the annual reports provided a good deal of information on the expansion of the 
administrative organisation of the natives, on the introduction of corvee labour and its gradual 
replacement by a head tax, they had little to say about the exercise of their criminal jurisdiction 
over natives by the colonial courts-after the stress placed on their importance and their ready 
acceptance in the first reports by the imperial government. This was largely due to the fact that as 
from 1900 penal statistics for natives were appended to the annual reports. The reports themselves 
could therefore limit themselves to occasional comments. 
The most substantial statement was included in the annual report for 1 907. 
Sentences were passed against 174 . . .  natives. There were seventy-six . . .  cases of crimes against persons, 
mostly offences against morality and bodily harm. There were fifty-four . . .  cases of theft, misappropriation 
and robbery. Disciplinary powers are exercised by employers and police authorities over 8,275 plantation 
labourers, about 600 [police] troopers and Government employees and 400 employees in the shipping 
service and commercial enterprises. The natives subject to [actual Government] jurisdiction endeavour 
as far as possible to take advantage of the power vested in the chiefs in order to dispose of punishable 
offences by payment of compensation amongst themselves. Whenever substantial public interests are not 
adversely affected by offences, these efforts towards developing their own criminal law and system of 
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justice are given all possible support. This explains the small number of criminal cases in a native 
population of about 80,000 subject to a regular system of law. 
The next annual report attributed a large increase in the criminal convictions recorded-from 174 
to 246-not to an increase in the number of crimes but to "the extension of the systematic 
administration of criminal justice over a wider area". Still it stressed again that as "far as possible, 
proceedings were only instituted in grave cases" whereas minor offences "were left to be settled 
by fines imposed by the officially appointed chiefs" (ibid. : 295).8 
Apart from these general comments-and earlier expression of concern about the partiality of 
the government chiefs already mentioned-the annual reports provided no information about the 
exercise of their jurisdiction. The same applied to the exercise of the disciplinary powers by 
employers and police authorities referred to in the 1907 report. The number of persons subject to 
these powers was given, but without identifying the number and nature of the disciplinary 
punishments imposed. In 1908 the number of plantation labourers etc. was still indicated, but this 
time even without an explanation why it appeared under the heading "Administration of Justice", 
and no reference at all was made from then on. 
On the other hand the annual reports showed that at least in some cases the employment of 
military force could also increase the activity of the colonial courts. In 1910  the annual reports of 
the three districts in the Island Territory contained, like the earlier annual reports, no 
"Administration of Justice" section. But that for the Eastern Carolines, which was exclusively 
devoted to the Ponape Rebellion, stated that 17 of the rebels had been sentenced to death and 
executed. This compared with only one execution in the Old Protectorate in the course of that 
year, that of a Chinese who had robbed and murdered another Chinese. 
The annual report for 191 1 attributed the drop in the number of criminal convictions in the 
Eastern Carolines from 241 to 137 to the fact that the number in the previous year had been 
unusually high on account of the Ponape Rebellion. By contrast, the annual report for 1912 
explained a dramatic increase from 629 to 886 in  the total number of  criminal convictions for the 
whole of German New Guinea by the non-compliance with police orders in the Eastern Carolines, 
where it had been necessary to protect the new native settlers on the land of the banished 
Dschokadsch rebels from trespass by other natives. According to the draft annual report for 1913  
(Sack & Clark 1980: 14-15) the "abnormally high . . .  number of  fines imposed by the Ponape 
District Office . . .  for offences by natives against the new settlements on the island of 
Dschokadsch" had no longer been necessary-and the total number of criminal convictions in 
German New Guinea dropped by 14 to 872. They included two death sentences which had been 
carried out, whereas three ofthe six death sentences imposed during 1 9 1 2  had been commuted to 
long-term prison sentences. 
Alongside the increased activities of the colonial courts the exercise of military force 
continued-and not only in the case of the Ponape Rebellion which was put down, according to 
the annual report for 1910, by a combined force of four warships and 222 Melanesian policemen. 
The military capacity of the native police force was considerably strengthened by the appointment 
in 191 1 of an active army officer as the commander of the mobile police unit (Sack & Clark, 1979: 
337). This appointment also signalled yet another change in the general approach.  
8 When I checked the German original because I was puzzled by  the contrast between "the payment of  compensation 
among themselves" in 1 907 and the "fmes imposed by . . .  chiefs" in 1 908, I discovered that I had participated in the creation 
ofa nice little phantom. Firstly, the reports had used the awkward term "Busszahlung", which stands for something which 
is neither quite a "fine" (Strafe) nor quite a "compensation" (Schadensersatz), in both cases. Secondly, the 1908 report 
did not speak of the "imposition" of a "Busszahlung" by the chiefs but of their participation in arranging it. My excuse 
is that the German text is far from clear, as we pointed out in a footnote in 1 979 (ibid.: 295, Fn. 1 ) .  
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After adequate training under his direction, the troop, when not required for military purposes, i s  to 
engage as far as possible in practical exploration, gradually advancing into unknown tracts of country, 
reconnoitring tracks and making contact with natives. Due to the shortage of training personnel and the 
absence of adequate reserves for the troop itself, it was not able to make an advance into the bush until 
the first few months of the 1912 financial year (ibid.). 
m 
The annual report for 1912 provided a convenient resume of German colonial rule-not because 
it anticipated its end but because it was related to an ambitious development plan. 
It may be pertinent to set down the following conclusions based on developments up to the present and 
as guidelines for future policy. 
European settlement has followed the coastline, leading to great dispersion and requiring heavy 
expenditure on communications and public administration, certainly more than would have been 
necessary if activities had been confined to alimited area. However this pattern of expansion of European 
influence has brought greater advantages for the country than concentration in one more restricted area 
It made it necessary to establish public peace among the coastal tribes quickly. This in turn made 
available the large numbers oflabourers for the plantations which were being established. Development 
has therefore been more rapid than would have been possible if progress had been along different lines. 
The principles for the transfer ofland have become accepted practice and seem to correspond to the 
needs of the particular type of agriculture in the colony. The great expansion of European plantations is 
based mainly on the accessibility of the natives as a result of their pacification and on the conditions on 
which land is made available. It may be said that today the only limitation on the expansion of European 
economy (hitherto predominantly German ventures) is the availability of labour. Capital has become 
available on an increasing scale, in fact more quickly than the unpacified regions could be opened up. 
In 1897 the first Government chief was appointed on Blanche Bay. This was an attempt to induce the 
primitive natives to unite within a particular locality, to undertake certain obligations and to cooperate 
for the good of their fellow-tribesmen. From these experiments a permanent institution has evolved which 
has proved its value for attaining the objectives-naturally still very modest at the present time-<>f a 
native administration dealing with primitive tribes. 
The successes achieved up to the present are based on mobility by sea The further development of 
European colonisation, the process of civilising and raising the level of the natives, must also in the 
future rest on the assumption that this vast spread of islands and the long coastline of Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland will enjoy a regular system of communications from a central point (ibid.: 353). 
Seen in this light the government would probably have preferred its relations with the natives to 
have been more peaceful than they were. This applied in particular to a "conspiracy" among the 
villages around Friedrich Wilhelrnshafen caused by 
dissatisfaction on the part of the natives at the purchase of part of their land . . .  This purchase could not 
be avoided without giving up all plans for the future development of . . .  [the] town. Adequate reservations 
had been set aside for the natives in the forthcoming subdivision. The conspiracy was betrayed by 
natives; the main ringleaders were taken prisoner and banished to the Bismarck Archipelago. The villages 
taking part-Siar, Ragetta, Panutibun, Beliao and Jabob-were resettled on the Rai Coast and in Megiar 
near Cape Croisilles and their land near Friedrich Wilhelmshafen was confiscated (ibid. : 354). 
The annual report was pleased to state that: 
There were no other disturbances in areas controlled by the Administration. But just outside their 
boundaries there were a number of major attacks on Europeans and by natives on each other, which made 
intervention necessary . . .  
The natives inland from Hansa Bay, particularly the so-called Kagam tribes, had made repeated 
attacks on native bird-hunters. The establishmentoflasting peaceful conditions appeared indicated if only 
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to ensure the security of the plantations and mission settlements in that area. The expeditionary 
troop . . .  was therefore stationed for five months in the [Ramu] plain .. .inland from Hansa Bay. This 
extensive terrain was recorded and mapped . . .  and the local tribes, who were the victims of savage head­
hunting practices, were pacified . . .  
In  the middle of June a hunter named Peterson was murdered in the hinterland of Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen. This was followed in August by the murder of the planter Miculicz by natives on the 
right bank of the upper Ramu. As far as can be ascertained, it appears that these acts of violence were due 
to the natives' desire to gain possession of firearms for use in head-hunting and in indiscriminate fighting 
in the wilderness. In October the Weber brothers were murdered on the island of Umboi, where they had 
intended to establish themselves as planters. The south-eastern part of the island may be regarded as 
pacified, whereas the north-western section is not yet under the control of the Administration. 
Disregarding all warnings, the Weber brothers chose that area for their venture. Although they believed 
they knew the character of the natives well, they fell victims to the rapacity of the mountain tribes. The 
guilty parties were killed in a fight against the police troop of the district office. One of the murderers was 
captured and shot in accordance with martial law. In November 1912 a village of the Wir people attacked 
a village of the Aichumki in the Baining Mountains near the boundary of the organised district. About 
thirty-two persons are said to have been killed and partly consumed. There was some danger of the 
resultant blood feud spreading to the recently pacified areas. Intervention by the expeditionary troop not 
only succeeded in punishing the aggressors but in occupying the country as far as the central massif of 
the Sinewit and preparing it for administrative control. In Bougainville and Manus serious outrages by 
feuding tribes . . .  repeatedly required intervention in order to put an end to the murders and to maintain the 
prestige of the Administration. The Administration intends to employ the expeditionary troop to pacify 
South Bougainville, as this is absolutely essential for the successful development of the numerous newly 
established ventures on that island. There are similar plans for the Ramu region and the Markham Valley, 
in order to open up the approaches to the populous interior. 
The extension and effective functioning of the peaceful administration of the natives encountered in 
some districts an unprecedented degree of resistance, which indicates that some tribes were in a state of 
profound ferment. 
In the interior of Neu Hannover armed intervention on the part of the Kaewieng district office became 
necessary against recalcitrant natives, mostly absconders and former labourers. 
In the Eitape District, in Maurik, a chief s assistant [tultul] , that is a functionary of the natives' own 
administration, was murdered. The investigating official was resisted with an open show of force. In April 
1912 natives of Orat killed some natives of Damon. The former offered violent resistance to the police 
with spears and arrows. In July 19 12, a Malay living on the coast of Leitere was threatened by the bush 
natives. When the police troop appeared however, the natives fled into the rugged, broken country inland. 
In September 1912, when pursuing absconding labourers, the police sergeant was hard pressed in the 
villages of Pes, Wohun etc. near the station, and a coloured policeman who was carrying a message was 
murdered. 
In spite of these cases of resistance in different parts of the country, the peaceful extension of the area 
under orderly administration has made progress. In Baining some of the natives living in the Wir 
Mountains between the Kerawat and Vundal Rivers were successfully brought into closer contact with 
the Administration, as was shown clearly when they moved their homes towards Taulil. The recruitment 
of labour was also extended immediately to the newly organised areas, and the recruiters were very 
successful. The administrative organisation made further advances in the north-west Baining region. This 
was manifested by the fact that a large number of Baining men were constantly employed on 
neighbouring white plantations. In addition, about two hundred Baining men were employed for several 
months on preparatory work for the construction of the radio station which was to have been built in 
north Baining. Plans for this station were later abandoned. The administration also succeeded in making 
contact with the Baining living in the mountains in the south-western section of the Gazelle Peninsula 
inland from St George' s  Channel. These Baining are very warlike and have hitherto remained 
inaccessible to white contact. It is extremely difficult to bring the Baining natives under administrative 
control. The greatest obstacles are the wild and rugged mountains which they inhabit, their nomadic way 
of life and their difficult language, which is totally different from that spoken by the coastal people, 
together with their low level of cultural development. Only these factors can explain the fact that the 
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process of opening up this part of Neu Pommem, situated immediately to the rear of the seat of the 
Administration, had made less progress than in the remotest coastal areas of the island. 
The creation of peaceful conditions, the growth of social intercourse among the natives themselves, 
an improvement in labour recruitment figures and the appointment of village officials (sixty-one chiefs 
and forty tultuls) may be regarded as the fruits of the extensive official voyages made to the coastal areas 
of Neu Pommem over the past two years . . .  In the course of the administrative organisation of the coastal 
areas it was found that the population here is not nearly as dense as had been previously assumed. 
Alongside thickly populated localities are vast uninhabited stretches of country. Accurate population 
counts were undertaken at all points, but the data for some places still need to be completed before 
comprehensive statistics of the coastal population can be compiled. 
In Kaiser Wilhelmsland the administrative organisation has been completed without a break along 
the coast from the British border as far as the mouth of the Kaiserin Augusta River. In the Eitape District 
the process has come to a halt, as indicated by the unrest among the natives referred to above. It is not 
improbable that this is to be attributed largely to the frequent personnel changes among the senior 
officials in Eitape, which in tum were due to serious illness. In the Morobe District on the other hand, 
the sphere of control of the Administration has been extended by peaceful means as far as the upper Daria 
and its tributaries. It has been possible to extend the form of organisation which has proved successful 
with the coastal tribes (Melanesians) to the mountain tribes (Papuans) as well. In Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
the population count has made good progress in all districts. The laborious task of recording particulars 
of population in the coastal tribes alone will still require several years to complete. It would seem that 
the figures will in most cases be lower than previous estimates (ibid. :  354-56). 
In the Island Territory public order was nowhere disturbed. Native administration had focused 
on reforming the traditional sociopolitical organisation. The distribution of the land on Ponape to 
individual tenants had been completed "with the intelligent co-operation of the people" and all 
feudal tributes to the chiefs had been abolished in conjunction with the introduction of the head 
tax. The chiefs only retained a few ceremonial privileges. The "obsolete" matrilineal inheritance 
had also to a large extent been terminated by stipulating that land, in contrast to other forms of 
property, was inherited patrilineally. In the Marshall Islands chiefs had been appointed for the 
various atolls in preparation for reforms of the government and the land tenure in these islands. 
In Palau and on Yap the traditional political organisation was to be left intact for the time being. 
Only its worst drawbacks would be tackled. In particular the social position of women had to be 
improved by removing them from the control of their sibs and larger social bodies. However these 
social reforms which, at any rate, could only be gradually implemented, were not as important as 
improvements in the fields of health and education, in order to put an end to half baked ideas 
which the uneven influences of a foreign culture produced among the natives. 
For many years the circumstances described above will determine our policies towards the natives: in the 
Old Protectorate we must aim at pacification, in the Island Territory at a social transformation of the 
tribal system and in general at the highest possible degree of medical care and education, in order to 
achieve as the ultimate goal an appropriate rise in cultural and economic standards (ibid. : 356). 
By contrast, the draft report for 1913  opened with the bold statement: "The year just past may be 
said to have run a course favourable to the Protectorate in every respect" (Sack & Clark, 1980: 2). 
Nonetheless, two major military operations were carried out: by the expeditionary troop in 
southern New Ireland (the "Southern New Ireland Rebellion") and by a combined force of the 
local native police unit and the landing detachment of SMS Cormoran in southern Bougainville 
(see ibid. : 5-6, 56-57 and 71-72). While this combined expedition (the "Buin Expedition") was 
of considerable general importance because it suggested that a more active involvement of the 
navy was again on the cards, my attention was especially attracted by the report of the district 
office in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, since it took me back to district commissioner Berghausen and 
his trip up the Sepik, as it mentioned that a number of pupils who had been "brought in from the 
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central Sepik for language tuition . . .  [had] made good progress and will soon be repatriated" (ibid. : 
8 1). 
When I looked more closely at this district report I noticed a number of additional, relevant 
details.  One of them suggested that there were other reasons why the relations between Thurnwald 
and Berghausen might have been somewhat strained: the new government station at Angoram had 
been "virtually paralysed for months for want of a serviceable vessel" because the pinnace Papua, 
which it was to inherit from the Sepik Expedition, was "at present still at the disposal of Dr. 
Thurnwald" (ibid.:  83). Another such detail was the conviction of one non-native because he had 
uttered "menaces . . .in the course of recruitment". Whereas this person was only fined an 
unspecified amount-and the place at which he committed his offence was also not 
identified-another recruiting incident was regarded as more serious : 
In November, a recruiter for the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was threatened with violence by a large number 
ofnatives on the island of Umboi. He ordered his men to fire at them, and two of the natives are reported 
to have fallen. He then withdrew. Presumably the incident was preceded by misunderstandings arising 
out of the recruitment, and it has also been alleged that coloured recruiters from another recruiting ship 
had previously committed improprieties against the natives on Umboi. The matter is still being 
investigated (ibid. :  82). 
Yet even clashes such as this were regarded as being only of "minor significance", at least "in 
comparison with the outrages committed by them [the natives !] in the previous year" (ibid.).9 
The Old Protectorate was still a violent place, and traditional violence continued side by side 
with colonial violence, but the German authorities could respond with considerable restraint to the 
former. 
In a head-hunting incident, six people from Mgiri, a village in the hinterland of Awar, were killed by 
natives of the village of Bodsknun, 17 miles upstream in the Ramu River lagoons. Without using force 
of any kind, the guilty village was successfully induced to surrender. The villagers were solemnly warned 
not to commit similar murders in future and six young men were taken to work for the District Office for 
two years (ibid. : 82-83). 
IV 
There I had it: punitive expeditions were a necessary evil, an abnormal instrument of government 
which had to be resorted to during the initial phase of the colonisation process in order to defend 
the first small colonial enclaves. They became superfluous as these colonial enclaves grew and 
eventually merged into a single colonial territory whose government was supplied with sufficient 
means of power to operate in a normal fashion and to assure its economic development by 
peaceful means. 
Punitive expeditions were described as parts of an overlapping series of natural progressions : 
from the punishment of attacks by unpacified natives on Europeans and their employees to the 
protection of pacified natives from their unpacified neighbours, to the suppression of opposition 
against colonial rule within pacified areas and to the reform of the traditional way of life where 
it was irreconcilable with civilised practices or hampered economic development; from individual 
punitive strikes to temporary police posts and permanent government stations, equipped with sea­
going vessels and engaged in the construction of an expanding network of roads; from military 
to administrative and disciplinary and then to judicial punishments; from the punishment of crimes 
committed by natives to the imposition of corvee labour on them and then to their transformation 
into taxpayers whose taxes were used to fund schools and hospitals and other normal 
9 This is a reference to the murder of the "Weber brothers" mentioned in the annual report for 19 12. 
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governmental services which would also gradually do away with the need to appoint government 
chiefs, or to recognise traditional chiefs as agents of the colonial government exercising various 
governmental functions. 
It was tempting to elaborate this official version of the history of German colonial rule but was 
it worth the effort? Was the account presented in the annual reports mere propaganda, a 
strategically manipulated mixture of facts, lies and omissions? Although a thorough test of this 
possibility required a detailed examination of the historical record, the role of these annual reports 
permitted some provisional observations. 
Since they were, at least from 1 899 onwards, directly linked with the approval of the funds 
available to the colonial government, their compilers must have been tempted to improve on the 
facts so as to present its performance in a more favourable light. But they had to weigh this 
temptation against the danger of being found out, and the risk of exposure was especially great 
in relation to dramatic events, like punitive expeditions, which attracted considerable attention in 
the metropolitan press. Moreover, there were reasons for suspecting that the German 
government-in contrast to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie- exaggerated the role of military force 
instead of playing it down, not as an exercise in masochism but in an attempt to secure funds for 
allegedly superior but also more expensive control mechanisms: permanent government stations, 
each supplied with a substantial armed police unit and a sea-going vessel, backed by a large, well­
trained mobile unit, a government steamer capable of transporting it to trouble spots or to areas 
which had been earmarked for systematic pacification exercises-and, of course, an expanding 
network of roads. 
On the other hand, while it was politically expedient to portray the use of military force as a 
temporarily necessary evil, it remained tempting to improve other features of the portrait by 
showing the government as more in control than it actually was. In addition, by placing a few large 
punitive expeditions into the limelight, scrutiny could be directed away from a myriad of small 
brutalities which had been committed, or at least tolerated, by government officials. 
Taken together these considerations made it more likely that the annual reports over­
dramatised the picture rather than prettying it. This was a mixed blessing; for if the annual reports 
were a whitewash exercise, my task would have been simple: I only had to identify a few hidden 
skeletons in order to demonstrate that punitive expeditions were not only less necessary and more 
evil than the annual reports would have me believe, but that they had been merely the most visible 
and therefore least deniable manifestation of an all-embracing morass of brutality, incompetence 
and corruption. By contrast, if the annual reports were reasonably honest as far as they went, I had 
to turn my attention in a different direction. Instead of challenging me to investigate a manageable 
number of military encounters between the colonial government and its native subjects, the annual 
reports compelled me, in this case, to come to grips with the entire field of native administration, 
as well as with the attempts by the government to control the use of violence against natives by 
non-natives, including its own officials. 
Furthermore, scanty as it was, the information provided by the annual reports on the use of 
military force was far richer than that on other types of governmental activity. This took me back 
to an issue raised in the introduction: the difficulty of dealing with repetitive human actions which 
were historically significant not because they were unique but because they were performed 
routinely. The problem was that such routine actions had no story to tell or, more precisely, that 
the story they told, if they were treated as unique episodes, was historically insignificant. 
The most obvious way of compensating for the non-narratability of routine, apart from hiding 
behind bland generalisations-for example, that the head-tax had been paid willingly 
everywhere-was quantification. The annual reports adopted this method occasionally even in 
relation to punitive expeditions-for example by expressing satisfaction that only two such 
expeditions had been carried out in an area whereas it had still been necessary to intervene seven 
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times in this manner in the course of the previous year-but they were careful not to push this 
quantification alternative too far. Punitive expeditions could not be officially acknowledged as a 
regular administrative tool. However common they were in practice, they had to be presented as 
exceptional events which could not be reduced to annual statistics, showing how many such 
expeditions had been undertaken and how many casualties had been inflicted. 
This was different in the case of the judicial punishments of natives which were shown in the 
statistical appendices attached to the annual reports. But this was as far as the government was 
prepared to go. There were no statistics for their administrative banishment, or for the punitive 
expropriation of native land, although instances of both measures were reported. Nor was an 
attempt made to quantify the exercise of their judicial powers by the government chiefs, or the 
imposition of disciplinary punishments on native labourers or, for that matter, native policemen 
and their non-native superiors. While the annual reports proudly, although not regularly, referred 
to the amounts of the head-tax collected, they were less forthcoming with a quantification of the 
corvee labour performed. It was as if all these activities were perceived as necessary evils which 
had to be replaced as soon as possible by proper administrative arrangements in the metropolitan 
German mould. 
By the same token, the annual reports did not suggest that the colonial authorities were 
embarrassed about using these abnormal measures. The creation of the colonial memorial medal 
showed that at least the emperor regarded it as perfectly normal under the extraordinary conditions 
existing in Germany's tropical colonies to use military force against his native subjects as long as 
they refused to behave in a civilised manner. But this did not help me with my problem: the 
absence of a systematic record of the relevant information. I had no choice but to go out and hunt 
for it myself, piecing bits together wherever I could find them, in the knowledge that even the 
greatest diligence was unlikely to yield satisfactory results. 
Despite my first round of encounters with phantom history I therefore could hardly afford to 
ignore a study which promised to have already covered the entire field, namely Peter 
Hempenstall ' s  Pacific Islanders under German Rule: a Study in the Meaning of Colonial 
Resistance (1978). 
Although Hempenstall modestly denied that he was offering an "exhaustive analysis of 
German administration in the Pacific", he assured his readers that "there is much in the book that 
relates to German colonial attitudes and policy, to their methods of administration and control" 
(ibid. :  viii). He also maintained that "research on the Pacific . . .  [had] reached a stage" which called 
for a "comparative approach" and that such an approach was feasible because historical events, 
their "so-called uniqueness" notwithstanding, "contain common elements which make them 
amenable to generalisations" (ibid. :  ix) . Hence Hempenstall was able to offer "a framework for 
interpreting and explaining 'resistance' in all its forms in the German Pacific" (ibid.) which, I was 
told subsequently, covered "varying degrees of accommodation . . .  [as well as] opposition" (ibid. : 
201 ). In short, I was promised an account of the entire interface between German colonial rule and 
its native subjects, seen from a counterhegemonial perspective, a discussion of the natives' 
responses to punitive expeditions as well as to the imposition of corvee labour and taxes, a 
discussion of their role as policemen, as government chiefs, as interpreters, carriers, labourers and 
domestic servants, as sexual partners and spouses, as mission teachers, students and perhaps even 
friends. What more could I have asked for? 
Chapter 3: A Charge of the Light Brigade 
I 
As I had enjoyed reading Pacific Islanders under German Rule when it was published over 20 years ago, I was not prepared to believe my eyes when I began to re-read it critically. No 
longer able to let myself be carried along by Hempenstall' s contagious optimism, I now saw 
signals flashing all over the preface, warning me that behind its attractive facade analytical 
ambition was rearing to trample narrative caution, and narrative commitment was poised to 
strangle analytical rigour. There would have been no point in reading on had the preface not also 
promised that this study would show that narrative historians phantomise history "methodically" 
rather than accidentally, but that they nonetheless expect to be praised when they turn what they 
happen to see, or believe they have seen, into yet another phantom map that can be added to the 
vast collection making up the atlas of Wonderland. This was the map Hempenstall was offering 
me: 
II 
The book is divided into two parts. The first consists of 'case studies' of Germany' s three colonial areas 
in the Pacific, Samoa (now Western Samoa), New Guinea, and Ponape in Micronesia. If the treatment 
of Ponape, an island only some 334 square kilometres in area, seems to exaggerate its importance within 
the Pacific empire, that is because its people became the most serious threat to imperial domination 
within Micronesia, perhaps within the whole Pacific. For this reason it is also a convenient basis for 
comparison with Samoa: both were the scenes of large-scale, open opposition to German policy which 
required a massive response from the Reich in order to overcome. There are other reasons for 
comparison: both presented similar problems of scale to the German administrations, with relatively 
small, homogeneous populations enjoying comparable economic standards; both had superficially similar 
cultures;  both could boast of well-developed political systems which had a long history offamiliarity with 
European civilisation. The small size and isolation of Ponape and Samoa from metropolitan centres 
meant also that the character of German rule on both islands bore very much the imprint of their 
individual chief administrators. 
German New Guinea provides a special case study. In its geographic size, in its diversity of 
population groups, of cultures and languages, New Guinea represented a different sort of colony from 
the comparatively small islands of Samoa and Ponape, indeed from any other colony in Africa or the Far 
East. The history of contact here is of a unique quality, for the German period was one largely of 
discovery and exploration, and much of the contact with local inhabitants was desultory and fleeting. The 
records on German New Guinea are impressionistic, of whole populations rather than of individual 
people, except in the areas of dense white settlement. To avoid too uneven a treatment, therefore, I have 
concentrated on three areas within the protectorate for which there was an abundance of evidence about 
the changing pattern of colonial rule. These are the Gazelle Peninsula in New Britain, Madang and the 
Astrolabe coast on the mainland, and the Huon Peninsula, also on the mainland, south of Madang. As 
an area of subsidiary interest the Admiralty Islands, Manus especially, have been touched upon because 
they afford a special insight into changes of traditional leadership structures brought about by German 
rule ( 1978:  viii-ix). 
While this map had looked perfectly reasonable when I had read it as a narrative, it started to look 
bizarre when I took it seriously as the "framework for interpreting and explaining 'resistance' in 
all its forms in the German Pacific" it purported to be. 
To start at the end, the body of his book showed that Hempenstall did not choose the 
Admiralty Islands as an area of subsidiary interest because they "afforded a special insight into 
changes of traditional leadership structures", but because they had been the target of an unusually 
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large number of punitive expeditions over unusually many years. Similarly, it showed that he did 
not choose the Huon Peninsula because it offered an "abundance of evidence about the changing 
pattern of colonial rule", but because it formed an attractive counterpoint to his other two main 
areas, the plantation centres around Blanche Bay and Astrolabe Bay, since it was largely left to 
the Neuendettelsau Mission, after the abandoning of Finschhafen, German New Guinea' s  first 
capital, in 189 1 .  Moreover, it showed that he had chosen these two main areas because the intense 
colonial demand for land gave rise to dramatic events he wanted to narrate and not because "the 
records" for areas of dense white settlement were somehow less "impressionistic". Nor had he 
singled out Ponape because he had convinced himself that it was more significant "for a serious 
comparison of the experience of Pacific Islanders under German rule" than other parts of the 
Island Territory, but because its history too had been more dramatic and therefore offered a more 
congenial target for a narrative approach. In short, Hempenstall had no intention of capturing the 
full range of Pacific Islanders' responses to German colonial rule. He wanted to retain his 
narrative freedom and use "comparative analysis" merely as an additional spice. 
Once the cards were on the table, it was easy to see that Hempenstall was going to focus on 
the same five dramatic events highlighted in the annual reports : the 1 893 Blanche Bay Uprising 
and the 1902 V arzin Murders in the Gazelle Peninsula, the two Madang Conspiracies in the 
Astrolabe Bay in 1904 and 1912 and the Ponape Rebellion in 1910/1 1 .  But he was also searching 
for Micronesian and Melanesian counterparts of his Samoan stars, especially Lauaki and his 
struggle with the "Solf System". 1 In this regard the Ponapean Henry Nanpei was the obvious 
Micronesian choice, although he was, unfortunately for Hempenstall, not the leader of the Ponape 
Rebellion. However, Ponape oral traditions offered Hempenstall the opportunity to present its 
leader, Soumadau en Sokehs, as a tragic hero of classical proportions. The Old Protectorate was 
more problematic. There only the " 'cannibal' catechist" Pominis (ibid. : 221-22) in the Admiralty 
Islands stood out as a promising candidate, until Tolai oral traditions produced To Bobo, not just 
as a star behind the scenes of the Blanche Bay Uprising, but as the spokesman of the Tolai in their 
subsequent dealings with the German authorities . The Astrolabe Bay remained a disappointment 
on this score. But this was a blessing in disguise because the two conspiracies could instead be 
linked with an impersonal cargo cultism which provided a convenient stepping stone to the "strong 
millennial expectations which accompanied the mass conversion strategy of the Neuendettelsau 
Mission in the Huon Peninsula" (ibid. :  190). 
I would have found this approach unobjectionable if Hempenstall had simply tried to dish up 
a tasty narrative omelette. But his analytical ambitions got the better of him and caused him to 
produce a series of subsidiary phantoms: for example the claim that the people of Po nape had been 
"the most serious threat to imperial domination within Micronesia, perhaps within the whole 
Pacific . . .  which required a massive response from the Reich to overcome". 
Had the Ponape Rebellion been a serious threat to imperial domination? Had there been other 
serious threats in other parts of Micronesia, or, for that matter, in Melanesia? Was the massive 
response made required to overcome this threat, or could district commissioner Kersting and the 
native police force have put down the rebellion without naval assistance? To be sure, the Ponape 
Rebellion was taken seriously and the response to it was massive. But this was not the point. The 
question was whether it had, in fact, posed a serious threat to imperial domination and whether 
it had, in. fact, been necessary to deploy four warships to put it down. Put differently, the point was 
whether Hempenstall, like Firth, used a special narrative language in which words no longer mean 
what they say. 
Was Ponape especially "comparable" to Samoa? Had the position of Solf in Samoa not more 
in common with that of administrator Brandeis in the Marshall Islands than with that of district 
1 German Samoa was Hempenstall's main centre of attention-but it is outside my field of interest so that I did not 
examine the treatment of its history. 
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commissioner Boeder in Ponape, who not only had to administer the rest of the Eastern Carolines 
district but was also placed under the governor of German New Guinea as well as the colonial 
office? Did the character of German rule on Ponape bear a stronger imprint of its individual "chief 
administrators" than, say, German colonial rule in northern New Ireland bore the imprint of the 
legendary Franz Boluminski? 
Was there a mysterious link between the density of white settlement and the richness of the 
historical records? Where the contact with the natives in a certain area consisted of a single, 
exploratory expedition the records of German colonial rule, if any, were certainly bound to be 
impressionistic. But did more contacts translate into more detailed records? Did denser white 
settlement bring about closer contacts between natives and non-natives? Were the records kept by 
the district office in Rabaul more detailed than those kept by the government station on Manus? 
Was a lonely missionary on a remote station not more likely to keep a detailed diary of interactions 
with his Melanesian flock than his confrere working in the mission's headquarters with plenty of 
other Europeans to talk to? 
This brought me to the crux of the matter: what did the "records on German New Guinea" 
consist of? Instead of addressing this question, Hempenstall assured his readers that he had 
consulted "as wide a range as possible" (ibid. :  ix). But this was merely another phantom, and a 
particularly troubling one, because it implied that we were living in the best of all possible worlds 
where historians had the commitment, as well as the funds, to study all available sources before 
composing their narratives. Yet Hempenstall did not consult the potentially most important source 
of information on the history of Ponape under German rule, namely the records of the local district 
office. Did they still exist? Had Hempenstall been unable to locate them? Had it not occurred to 
him that they could be worth consulting? Did "as wide a range as possible" mean no more than: 
"I have looked at a bit of this and a bit of that until I had made enough notes to piece together a 
satisfactory narrative"? Or did such strategic phantom statements become immaterial as soon as 
they had fulfilled their purpose-in this case the assurance that Hempenstall had done more than 
could be expected of him in order to give his case studies a broad and solid basis? 
Hempenstall did not hesitate to transcend the geographical limitations he had set himself, or 
to treat events within his areas of interest with sovereign unevenness, when this suited his 
narrative purposes. Thus resistance to the expansion of the plantations around Blanche 
Bay-which, inter alia, took the form of the 1 893 uprising-was covered, while Hempenstall said 
nothing about the resistance to the expansion of the plantations around Astrolabe Bay before 1904, 
although he quoted imperial commissioner Rose as having warned, as early as 1 89 1 ,  that the 
people there "feel themselves cramped; and ignorant of the existence of a regime which will also 
protect their interests, they will be moved easily to arbitrary acts of violence in their distress" 
(ibid. :  17 1  ). Were they so moved? How did their response compare with that of the Tolai around 
Blanche Bay during the 1 890s, or, for that matter, with that of the Tolai when plantations began 
to expand along the northern coast of the Gazelle Peninsula, which Hempenstall also ignored? 
How did the response of the Marshallese to the imposition of German colonial rule differ from 
that of the Ponapeans? How did the Nauruans respond to the large scale mining operation on their 
small island as compared with the Palauans on Angaur? What factors did a serious comparative 
analysis of all forms of responses of Pacific Islanders to their colonisation have to take into 
account? Hempenstall' s preface certainly did not indicate that he gave serious consideration to this 
question.2 
m 
Perhaps the most ambitious section in Hempenstall's  case studies was an attempt to cover the 
administrative innovations in the Old Protectorate after 1900 in just three short paragraphs. 
2 I have indicated in the introduction what such a consideration might involve (see above, pp. 17-1 8). 
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Administrative innovations after 1900 included organised public works and a poll tax. The former was 
an integral element of the direct control idea: in particular, the construction of roads was intended to 
inprove [sic] access to villagers so that they could be taxed. In November 1903, a Government Instruction 
(Anweisung) authorised officials to co-opt all able-bodied men in the areas of control for up to four weeks 
a year to assist in the construction and maintenance of roads, or to work on government plantations. By 
19 14, using this ordinance [sic], the Germans had built a network ofroads in the vicinity of all their main 
settlements, though outside the Gazelle Peninsula none of the roads stretched very far into the interior. 
In the Gazelle there were 209 kilometres ofroad between the Warangoi River and the Baining Mountains 
by 191 1 :  a series running north and west of the Kokopo coast linked most of the inland districts and 
reached beyond the V arzin to Taulil, while a proper shoreline road was constructed between 
Herbertshohe and Rabaul. There was also a road from Rabaul over the Ratavul pass to Talili Bay on the 
north coast, and from Weberhafen to Massawa on the north-west coast, and into the B ainings. 
Not all these roads, whether in the Gazelle Peninsula or outside, were constructed with willing co­
operation. More-or-less stern resistance occurred in areas where villagers saw no immediate advantage 
accruing (for example, in Bougainville), or where it was part of a wider and deeper protest against white 
presence flowing from the loss ofland resources (as was to be the case at Madang, on the mainland). The 
coastal Tolai helped build the first roads willingly enough, because they were paid for it, and because 
roads gave them better access to markets. After 1900, however, their attitude changed, particularly under 
the corvee regulations, when it became clear that they were being used to extend the road network mainly 
for the regime' s  purposes. Their growing distaste for roadwork made the Tolai particularly amenable to 
Hahl's second new measure, the head tax levy. 
When Hahl introduced the head tax to New Guinea in 1906, it was designed to act as an alternative 
to forced road maintenance and to push more villagers onto European plantations. For this reason Hahl 
delayed its introduction in the Gazelle Peninsula at least six months, so that he could exploit free Tolai 
labour in order to finish his road-building program. Such was the Tolai dislike for the roadworks that 
Hahl knew they would gladly grasp any opportunity that delivered them from it. With their comparatively 
large cash reserves from trading, the Tolai would have no trouble paying a tax the moment it was 
imposed, leaving Hahl with insufficient labour to carry out his projects. His fears were well-founded. 
When the tax was finally introduced into the Gazelle in 1 907, the Tolai offered no resistance; even when 
in 1910 it was doubled in many areas from five marks a year for every adult male to ten marks, people 
continued to pay it willingly in preference to working on the roads (ibid. : 141-3). 
At a superficial reading this summary looked impressive, with its mixture of concrete details 
and deft generalisations. But, like the introduction to New Guinea under the Germans, it 
disintegrated under closer scrutiny. Thus what was "to be found in the Parliamentary Papers of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the 
Territory of New Guinea, September 1914 to 30 June 192 1 ,  Appendix B ,  p.40", to which 
Hempenstall referred, was not the "only extant copy" of the 1 903 instruction, but part of an 
English "Summary of the Legislation of the German Government" prepared by the Australian 
authorities. Moreover, according to this summary the instruction also dealt with compulsory "war 
services" and "emergency services", in addition to the road and plantation work discussed by 
Hempenstall. Besides, it referred to the authority of officials to require labour of "the natives", 
instead of limiting this authority to "all able-bodied men in the areas of control". 
Attention to these details would have helped Hempenstall greatly to put his account on a firmer 
basis. For example, he might then have looked for the head tax counterpart of the 1903 instruction, 
instead of claiming that Hahl introduced "the head tax to New Guinea in 1906 . . . [but] delayed its 
introduction in the Gazelle Peninsula at least six months, so that he could exploit free Tolai labour 
in order to finish his road-building program". Now, it was quite possible that Hahl wrote about 
such a delay in the report to the colonial department, dated 30 May 1906, to which Hempenstall 
referred, but this was, at best, part of the story, since the official introduction of a head tax in the 
Old Protectorate took the form of an ordinance proclaimed on 1 8  March 1 907.3 
3 It was, inter alia, published in the DKG, vol. 1 1 :  145-46. 
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It provided that every able-bodied adult male native had to pay a head tax of five Marks per 
annum, but that natives employed for ten months during a tax year by a non-native, or a native 
paying commercial tax ( !), were exempted.4 However, the duty to pay tax arose only after a 
community had been declared to be taxable by the local administrative authority. Although the 
Head Tax Ordinance did exempt natives paying the head tax from the performance of "corvee 
labour" (Frohnarbeit), it therefore still permitted the government to continue the regime of corvee 
labour indefinitely, simply by not declaring a particular community to be taxable. 
What effects the Head Tax Ordinance had on the construction and the maintenance of roads 
by unpaid native labour further depended on whether it counted as Frohnarbeit-a term the 
ordinance did not define. Perhaps the 1903 instruction could help me further. While it was not 
published in any of the standard metropolitan sources, it was included in a collection of laws, 
published by the government of German New Guinea in 1912, a copy of which was held by the 
National Library of Australia. It showed that the instruction did not use the term "Frohnarbeit" 
either. Instead it distinguished three categories of "public services" (ojfentliche Dienstleistungen) 
which corresponded to those identified in the League of Nations summary. 
Since "emergency services" and "war services" plainly did not qualify as Frohnarbeit, I was 
left with the third category, called "continuing services" (dauernde Leistungen). It was divided 
into two sub-categories: the construction and the maintenance of roads and the work on 
government plantations. But the summary got it wrong when it said that all these services were 
restricted to no more than four weeks per year, and Hempenstall, apart from adopting this error, 
added an error of his own by claiming these services were restricted to able-bodied men in "areas 
of control".5 In general, the scheme under the 1903 instruction was designed quite differently 
from that under the Head Tax Ordinance. The duty to construct and maintain roads was to be met 
by the whole community, including women and children, whose land bordered on the road in 
question. Similarly, work on government plantations had to be performed by entire communities. 
In contrast to the construction and the maintenance of roads, work on government plantations was 
treated as having the character of a tax. Communities could even be requested to leave their home 
area to perform this tax labour. But they had to be housed, fed and clothed by the government, like 
paid labourers, and had to be given free medical assistance, as well as two sticks of tobacco and 
a clay pipe per week. Most importantly, it was only this tax labour that was not permitted to 
exceed four weeks per year. There was no time limitation on other public services.6 
Taken together, the 1907 Head Tax Ordinance and the 1 903 instruction suggested that the 
former intended to exempt those paying the head tax only from having to work, in lieu of tax, on 
government plantations, but not also from having to construct and maintain roads in their own 
areas without payment. On the other hand, the 1903 instruction was indeed only an administrative 
instruction-and not the "ordinance" Hempenstall claimed it to be-so that it was quite possible 
that by 1907 a different administrative practice had developed, with the knowledge and even the 
encouragement of the governor. 7 Then again it was significant that the 1903 instruction was still 
4 A consideration of the fact that natives too were required to pay commercial tax could have had a major impact on 
Hempenstall's study, because it suggested that the financial records generally were a potentially crucial source of 
information for the history of the responses of Pacific Islanders to German colonial rule. 
5 It hardly needs saying that it would usually have been impractical to compel natives outside "areas of control" to 
perform "continuing services", but this did not apply to "emergency services" and "war services". Moreover, the Head 
Tax Ordinance, which did refer to the "friedliche Machtbereich"-the area in which the local authorities could exercise 
their powers peacefully-<lid not also exempt other areas from the duty to pay this tax, but made its imposition instead 
subject to a discretionary decision by the local authority. 
6 Such a limit would again have been inappropriate in the case of "emergency services" and ''war services". What 
government would dream of sending people performing compulsory services home after four weeks if the "emergency'' 
lasted for a longer period? 
7 Subsequent legislation invalidated such administrative instructions, in so far as they were inconsistent with them. 
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included in the 1912  collection of laws, instead of being omitted because it had become obsolete, 
although the annual reports suggested that it was by then interpreted rather liberally. 
Another legal document, however, was even more relevant: a 191 1 Roads Ordinance (DKB 
1912: 3). It provided, inter alia, that natives had to maintain public roads traversing their land free 
of charge, and that this obligation, in line with the 1903 instruction, had to be met by entire 
communities. In other words, irrespective of whether or not able-bodied Tolai males paid their 
head tax, willingly or otherwise, they, along with the rest of their communities, did at least not 
escape the obligation of maintaining certain sections of existing public roads without pay. 
Did the Tolai pay the head tax willingly? Instead of supplementing the scant information in 
the annual reports, Hempenstall accepted the ritual claim that they did. And instead of elaborating 
what the annual reports had to say about the resistance the natives offered to corvee labour, he was 
satisfied with pronouncing that the resistance offered was "more-or-less stem"-presumably in 
proportion to the degree of the immediacy of the advantages they saw accruing for themselves 
from the labour required from them. But if the Tolai were such staunch economic rationalists that 
they began to resist roadwork only when they felt that they were being used by the government 
for its own purposes, why did this sensitivity not also extend to the payment of taxes? Did 
Hempenstall mean to imply that the government spent the head tax in ways that served the 
immediate interests of those paying them rather than its own? Similarly, what did Hempenstall 
have in mind when claiming that villagers were forced to build roads so that they would become 
accessible to the tax man if the government knew that they would pay taxes willingly to avoid 
having to build these roads? Is "the direct control idea" to which German officials subscribed as 
absurd as the Tolai 's  version of economic rationalism? 
As far as "administrative innovations" in the Old Protectorate after 1900 are concerned, 
Hempenstall' s study is no improvement on the annual reports. 8 On the other hand, Hempenstall 
provided a great deal more information than the annual reports about his chosen dramatic 
highlights. However, the central difference between the reports and his accounts was that 
Hempenstall did not present the imposition of German colonial rule as an encounter between "the 
government" and "the natives" but as a process dominated by a handful of individual German and 
indigenous actors. This produced, for example, a gallery of portraits of the "chief administrators" 
on Ponape. 
8 This even applied to such a straightforward and specific topic as the extent of the road network in the Gazelle Peninsula 
in 19 1 1 .  According to the annual report for 19 10: 
The Barawon road connecting Rabaul and HerbertshOhe was completed after more than three years of work and 
opened for traffic in June 1 9 1 0. In Baining the road along the coast was continued as far as Neinduk. The completion 
of the Bara won road and the extension of the Baining road have created a single continuous road of about 200 km 
running from the mouth of the Warangoi (St George's  Channel) far into the Baining region, mainly following the 
coastline. Of the total length of the road about 150 km are suitable for vehicular traffic. Work was also continued on 
improvements to the existing roads. The bridge over Kabakaul Creek was replaced. A new iron bridge was built over 
Kabaira Creek. The timber cladding of the Ratavul tunnel, which collapsed last year, was completely replaced. The 
access roads to the tunnel, which were very badly affected by the heavy rain on account of their steep gradient, 
required constant repairs (Sack & Clark, 1 979: 334). 
Where did Hempenstall leam that the length of all roads in the Gazelle Peninsula in 191 1 was precisely 209 kilometres? 
Or was that another phantom, just as his claim that none of the roads outside the Gazelle Peninsula stretched very far into 
the interior? Or had Hempenstall also found information which showed that the "main inland road" in the Morobe district 
which, according to the annual reports, had already reached the Wayaka villages in the central range during 191 1 (Sack 
& Clark, 1979: 35 1 )  did in fact not exist, or that it at least did not qualify as a road? While, according to the 1912  report, 
many of the ''roads" in German New Guinea consisted of tracks rather than vehicular roads (Sack & Clark, 1978: 370), 
the Morobe/Y akuna road, the first 40 km of which had been completed in 1913 (Sack & Clark, 1 980: l 06), was six metres 
wide, and 22 "major river and water crossings" had been constructed during that year in this district alone. Yet, as we have 
seen, Hempenstall is not alone in claiming that none of the roads in German New Guinea "stretched very far into the 
interior". Indeed, he is less categorical than Firth (see above: 24) because he was prepared to make an exception in the 
case of the Gazelle Peninsula. But then, what does "very far into the interior" mean, especially if the term is used in a 
narrative history? 
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IV 
The first sketch showed the back of Albert Hahl who, according to Hempenstall, left at the end 
of 1901 ,  after only two years,9 "a disappointed man, after doing all in his power to win . . .  [the 
Ponapeans' ]  trust and make them loyal subjects without apparent success" (ibid. : 82). Yet Hahl' s 
memoirs gave a different impression. 
Before my departure I had to make my farewells. Since hate and discord had been laid aside, the people's  
love of festivities, of singing and dancing, feasting and ceremonial libations had revived, I prefer to spare 
the reader details of all the feasting I was obliged to submit to on my farewell tour of the island (Hahl, 
1980: 80). 
Now it could be argued that it did not matter historically whether or not Hahl was a 
disappointed man when he left Ponape, but for Hempenstall' s approach to history these personal 
details were crucial, so that it was also crucial that they were accurate in the sense that they were 
in accord with the evidence. In this case Hempenstall himself presented evidence, albeit in a 
footnote, which supported Hahl's  version. "Paradoxically present day memories of Hahl on 
Po nape", it read, "make Hahl the best-liked administrator during the German period . . .  [who lived] 
with a Ponapean woman, drank the native beverage, sakau, and on ceremonial occasions wore the 
Ponapean grass skirt and allowed himself to be rubbed down with coconut oil" (Hempenstall, 
1978: 82, Fn. 1 8). Did that sound like a disappointed man, or one who had a distaste for 
Ponapeans, because he had described them in an early report as "distrustful, treacherous and 
apathetic" (quoted ibid.)? 
Hahl's  successor, Victor Berg, was introduced as "a forty year old civil servant with some 
experience in German East Africa" (ibid.). This was correct but misleading, because Berg, before 
being posted to East Africa, had served in the Cameroons since 1 89 1 ,  a time when Hahl was still 
a law undergraduate. 10 The manner of Berg's death in 1907, one of "the three outstanding events 
in his five-year [sic] tenure of office", gave Hempenstall another opportunity for introducing oral 
tradition. 
Officially he died of sunstroke while out surveying-an unusual death for a man who spent some nine 
years [ !] in the tropics. The Ponapeans themselves believe differently. Their oral traditions tell of Berg's 
digging in the ruins of Nan Madol and disturbing the tombs of the ancestral kings. He died a few days 
later, without any prior signs of illness, pursued to the end by the sound of ghostly shell trumpets echoing 
through the mountains. It is a tale of retribution entirely in keeping with the brooding atmosphere of 
Ponape and its people (ibid. : 84). 
This added a welcome local dimension, the significance of which would be in no way 
diminished if the official cause of Berg's death was medically more plausible than Hempenstall 
suggested. But this local dimension was itself considerably more complex because the Ponapeans 
had nonetheless been saddened by Berg's sudden death and had attended his funeral in large 
numbers, although he had been specifically warned by his mistress and her family, which 
controlled Nan Madol, not to interfere with the ruins (see Ehrlich, 1978: 1 1 8). 1 1  
Who came next? According to Hempenstall no-one for about a year (1978: 87), although he 
later mentioned "an acting administrator, Sttickhardt [sic]" (ibid. :  97), whom he also counted when 
9 According to his memoirs Hahl had already left Ponape in May 190 1 ,  making his tour of duty even briefer than 
Hempenstall reported. 
10  Thus Berg's official obituary (DKB 1907: 724 ) . It may, of course, also not be free of phantoms, if the official obituary 
of Berghausen is any guide (see above: 54 ). 
1 1  According to Hempenstall, Berg had initially shared Hahl's "distaste" for Ponapeans. 
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stressing that, in 1 909, Ponape "received its fifth administrator in ten years" (ibid. :  98). In any 
case, the new district administrator who arrived "many months later, in April 1908" (ibid. :  87) was 
Georg Fritz, "a young, ambitious man, sensitive about professional status and esteem who had just 
completed a successful tour of duty as administrator of the Mariana Islands" (ibid. :  87-88). 
It was hard to believe that Fritz, who had found his work "among the peaceful and passive race 
of Chamorros and Micronesians" so congenial that "he came to Ponape unwillingly at first" (ibid. :  
88), was an "ambitious man".  He was certainly not young. Born in  1 865, he was 42 at the time and 
three years older than governor Hahl. Besides, it appeared that Fritz had been transferred to 
Ponape because his previous job had disappeared when the Marianas were administratively 
merged with the Western Carolines. This information also shed some light on Fritz's "sudden 
transfer" fromPonape to the Western Carolines in October 1909, the reasons for which, according 
to Hempenstall, were "not known" (ibid.: 98), although he speculated that it was the result of 
"pressure [put] on Berlin for his removal" by the Capuchin Order through the Centre Party (ibid.). 
Perhaps this pressure had been applied, although the Catholic missions usually lobbied the 
colonial office more directly, but there was another relevant factor: the death of Arno Senfft, the 
oldest member of the trio sent out from Germany to administer the Island Territory in 1 899, who 
served as district commissioner for the Western Carolines and Marianas, had given Fritz the 
chance to apply for a transfer back to his old stamping ground. 12 
His replacement in Ponape was "Carl Boeder, and he came directly from Dar-es-Salaam in 
East Africa where he had been involved in Germany's struggle against the Maji Maji uprising of 
1905--06" (ibid. :  98). This fanfare prepared the ground for an account of the Ponape Rebellion that 
put the blame for this event squarely on Boeder, who had also been its first victim. 
His personality was ill-suited to the monotonous life of a small, close-knit island community isolated 
from the rest of the world; his experience in Africa was certainly no guarantee of success in dealing with 
Pacific Islanders. A correct and rather distant man, Boeder tended to assume that his personality and 
authority would ensure peaceful solutions to any problems which might arise between the two cultural 
communities. To the job of dealing with other races he brought goodwill, but he was authoritarian and 
demanding, and he carried with him from Africa the conviction that the rod was a legitimate and effective 
method of instilling 'colonial discipline' into fundamentally primitive peoples; in fact, rumours later 
circulated in Ponape that he had been in trouble in Africa because of his severity. With these attitudes, 
and despite the warnings of his predecessor, Boeder set out to re-invigorate the German presence on 
Ponape (1978: 99). 
That was a fitting portrait of a man cast in the role that Hempenstall had given him, but was 
it realistic? To begin with Boeder's first name was "Gustav" rather than "Carl". To be sure, a 
minor point, but a mistake which did not augur well for the reliability of the other features of the 
portrait. Were the rumours which later (when?) circulated in Ponape (among which group of 
people?), that Boeder had been in trouble in Africa because of his severity in fact true?13 Had 
12  This explanation is supported by a letter by Hahl to the district office in Ponape, dated 1 8  August 1909 (RKA 2599). 
It foreshadowed that Fritz would take over the district office in Yap after returning from his mid-term leave, and that 
Boeder would replace him in Ponape. However, a recent history of the northern Marianas under German rule (Hardach, 
1990) suggests that the decisive step was not the removal of Fritz from Ponape but his subsequent removal from Yap. 
According to Hardach the return of Fritz to Yap at "the end of 1909" was no triumphant new start. "Fritz drew personal 
conClusions from the conflict .. [ which had arisen with his superiors over his administration of Ponape] and decided to quit 
the colonial service. On his own wish he was retired on health grounds and travelled back to Germany in October 1910" 
(ibid.: 82). Fritz's own version-at least the one he voiced in the course of his defamation case against Pater Venantius 
(see RKA 2594 and 2595)-moves closer to Hempenstall's version, but with an intriguing twist according to Fritz, it 
was Hahl, rather than the Capuchin order, who had engineered his premature departure from the colonial service. 
13 Was it legitimate to incorporate such an unconfirmed rumour into a portrait of Boeder but not to report that his 
successor Kersting-whose first name was, incidentally, "Hermann" rather than "Heinrich"-had been investigated as 
a result of Erzberger's  scandal campaign for misdeeds, including manslaughter, he was alleged to have committed in 
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Boeder' s personality been ill-suited to the monotonous life of a small, close-knit island community 
isolated from the rest of the world? Perhaps it was, but would I have been inclined to accept this 
assessment if Hempenstall had also told me that Boeder had applied for a transfer from bustling 
Dar-es-Salaam to remote Ponape because he was seeking a more relaxed environment for his 
young family, as was claimed in his official obituary in the Amtsblatt of German New Guinea 
(1910: 134)? How did a wife and small children, the youngest born after Boeder's arrival on 
Ponape, fit into the picture? Was it likely that Boeder had travelled directly from Dar-es-Salaam 
to Ponape instead of spending a period of leave in Germany where he would have been-briefed 
by the colonial office and governor Hahl who was on home-leave at the time. Was it likely that 
Boeder, as the district commissionerresponsible for the capital Dar-es-Salaam. had taken an active 
part in the struggle against the Maji Maji uprising some four years earlier? 
But Hempenstall's  highest trump in his account of the Ponape Rebellion was another 
traditional factor. About a month before the beating ordered by Boeder, which had triggered off 
the rebellion, 
a comer of Pan Kadara, the most sacred location in the stone city of Nan Madol, had crumbled. The 
comers of Pan Kadara were revered in Ponape as symbols of the various districts, and if any were to 
crumble it signified the impending destruction of that area In this case it had been the Sokehs comer. 
Thus the Sokehs people knew and accepted that Sokehs must die but, if so, they desired to die fighting, 
as men (ibid. : 104). 
This was potentially a crucial piece of evidence, but one which had to be handled with caution 
since it was part of an alternative, Ponapean form of history, which could be so different in its 
purposes and methods from the modem western approach that a transplant of selected bits of 
information was untenable. Yet, Hempenstall treated this story not just as another piece of his 
narrative mosaic but made it a keystone of his subsequent comparative analysis. Far from having 
been "a crusade for Ponape's  liberation", the Ponape Rebellion had been "an angry reaction 
against Carl [sic] Boeder's mounting prosecution" during which all Ponapeans were moved by 
"only one vision": "the negative belief that Sokehs was to be destroyed, an idea which applied to 
Sokehs alone and which made the rest of Ponape hang back in fear when Germany brought in her 
military might" (ibid. :  215).  An awesome vision, but largely a figment of Hempenstall's 
imagination. 
v 
The history of German colonial rule in Melanesia was a less personal affair for Hempenstall. 
Although Albert Hahl, first as imperial judge and then as governor, was his star, Hempenstall 
shied away from portraying his reign as a "Hahl System", paralleling the "Solf System'' in Samoa. 
But he did use another of his little character sketches to introduce the first governor, Rudolf von 
Bennigsen. 
Von Bennigsen was an old-style Prussian army officer, whose scarred face betrayed the number of duels 
fought in his youth. His formula for control of the protectorate was brutally direct and simple: expansion 
by pacification; and his short tenure of office is notable for several bloody campaigns against recalcitrant 
New Guineans. A man whose sense of honour was absolute and unyielding, von Bennigsen is said to 
have resigned in a fit of pique, after Bishop Couppe persuaded Berlin to reverse a decision by the 
Governor not to sell land to the Catholics in the Duke of Yorks group, a Methodist preserve (ibid.: 140). 
Africa, although he had been cleared, together with Brandeis, Rose and others? 
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Did a Hanoverian who studied law and became a professional administrator, first in Germany and 
then in East Africa, before taking up his governorship, qualify as an old-style Prussian army 
officer? Of course not, I was tempted to answer, but then Bennigsen probably did perform his 
compulsory military service in the Prussian Army, leaving it as a lieutenant of the reserve, because 
the kingdom of Hanover had been annexed by Prussia when he was a boy, so that he had no 
choice. Did Hempenstall claim that scarred faces were typical of Prussian army officers and that 
Bennigsen acquired his facial scars by fighting a number of duels as a young officer? He would 
have been wrong on both counts-but then he did not quite say that. Besides, Bennigsen's face 
was indeed scarred, although most likely on account of the ritual duels he fought as a member of 
the student fraternity Suevia. 14 Did Bennigsen at least resign in a fit of pique because a particular 
decision of his had been reversed in Berlin? Although he probably retired from the colonial 
service some time after his return to Germany, there was abundant evidence that relations between 
him and the colonial department had been strained for a variety of reasons. 15 But instead of 
looking for this evidence, Hempenstall relied on another bit of local gossip. 16 On the other hand, 
had he looked further he might have noticed a report by Bennigsen dated 1 9  May 1 901 (RKA 
2755), according to which the Sacred Heart Mission had bought a large area of land in the Duke 
of Yorks from the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellschaft, "concerning which a settlement 
will have to be reached"-which would rather have spoiled the story. 17 
What had possessed Hempenstall to create such a monstrous phantom? It appeared that he had 
wanted to dismiss Bennigsen as quickly as possible to clear the deck for a more sympathetic 
account of German colonial rule under governor Hahl-the star impatiently waiting in the 
wings-and that turning Bennigsen into a negative stereotype had been the most effective, 
narratively acceptable way of achieving this. 18 
The aftermath of the V arzin Murders-of the wife of the planter Rudolph Wolff and their 
small son-on the Gazelle Peninsula in 1900 called for a different approach. 19 Hence Hempenstall 
painted "a young magistrate, also by the name of Wolff'20 as a counterpart of district 
commissioner Boeder in Ponape. But while Wolff was made personally responsible for what had 
happened, he was not presented as a "chief administrator" who, over time, left a personal imprint 
on the history of German colonial rule but as another stereotype: the brash young official who 
found himself wearing boots which were too big for him and who could be unfavourably 
contrasted with Hahl, the real "chief administrator", who unfortunately "lay stricken delirious with 
an attack of blackwater fever" (ibid. :  145) at the crucial time, so that Wolff had to take charge, 
only to make a total mess of things. 
Like most of the colonial Powers, Germany lacked experienced administrative personnel. Wolff was a 
good example of the authority bestowed on officers who showed initiative in the field; an example, too, 
of the effect which a single individual could have on the pattern of racial relations in his area of German 
14 Bennigsen fought at least one serious duel, as the treasurer of German East Africa, when he was challenged by its 
chief justice (see Reichstag, Stenographische Berichte of 22 May 1 895). But this duel was almost certainly fought with 
pistols and unlikely to have added to Bennigsen' s facial scars. 
15 While these tensions are, understandably, not mentioned in Bennigsen's official obituary (DKB 1 9 1 2: 432), they are 
referred to in that of the Kolnische l:eitung (4 May 1912) for which Bennigsen had subsequently worked. 
16 Hempenstall's source is a privately held manuscript by W.C. Groves which I did not consult. 
17 As far as the transfer of land from one non-native owner to another was concerned, German New Guinea was a free 
market and no government controls applied. 
1 8  After all, Hempenstall could not simply tell his readers that he did not care a damn about Bennigsen. 
19 It is worth noting that there had also been additional, native victims who are rarely mentioned even by counter­
hegemonial historians. 
20 In contrast to Hempenstall's other leading actors, Wolff is not given a first name. I should perhaps add here, for the 
record, that it was "Emil". 
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New Guinea. Wolff interpreted the murders as proof of wide-ranging, acute resentment against white rule, 
and he suspected that some 1200 people in the districts of Paparatawa, Tomanariki and Viviren were 
involved, at least tacitly. Instead of mounting a quick police raid to seek out the ringleaders, as was the 
normal practice, Wolff responded by arming and releasing onto the V arzin districts 2000 labourers 
offered by white planters. 
It was a decision which the Colonial Department later described, with masterly understatement, as 
'injudicious' .  In fact Wolff with this one decision turned what had been a local incident into a racial 
campaign, a total war in which leaders of the Tolai finally rejected any idea of co-existence. Old inter­
group hostilities, dormant since pre-contact days, were rekindled as coastal people fought inland tribes 
and New Irelanders and Solomon Islanders invaded the territory of the Tolai. A war of indiscriminate 
slaughter followed, in which innocent men and women were shot and missionaries threatened, the 
hostilities penetrating far inland to the newly-contacted Taulil people and reaching back to pacified 
districts where the lives of whites and New Guineans alike were in fresh danger; even pacified Tolai in 
reserves between Herbertshohe and the V arzin showed solidarity with the offenders by signalling troop 
movements to them with drums. For their part, Europeans aided and abetted the reprisals because, in their 
eyes, the slaughter of a white woman and her child represented the ultimate desecration of the white race. 
Even the Catholic Mission allowed itself to be drawn into the fighting when the war threatened to 
envelop its stations in the more settled districts (ibid. : 145-46). 
Hempenstall was still on firm ground when stating that Germany lacked experienced 
administrative personnel for her colonies, but he began to sink into a bog of phantom history when 
he claimed that Wolff had been a good example of the authority bestowed on officers who showed 
initiative in the field. What authority had been bestowed on Wolff, as a result of what initiative 
and by whom? Had it been bestowed on Wolff by Hahl when he had lain stricken and delirious 
with blackwater fever? If so, as a result of what initiative, since Wolff had as yet not responded 
to the murders? Did Wolff need additional authority as he had already been in charge of the local 
administration in HerbertshOhe before Hahl fell ill? Was Wolff off the mark when interpreting the 
murders as a manifestation of a wide-ranging unrest, ifthe house of his planter namesake had been 
surrounded by "some two to three hundred warriors from two districts" before the murders, as 
Hempenstall stated in the preceding paragraph? Besides, if it had been an ordinary murder, there 
would have been no ringleaders Wolff could have arrested, quite apart from the fact that it had 
never been a practice in German New Guinea to make quick police raids to peacefully arrest the 
leaders of some two to three hundred warriors who had just captured, according to Hempenstall, 
"thirteen rifles and 1000 rounds of ammunition". 
On the other hand, while this was quite an arsenal for a one-man plantation, the pool of 
weapons Wolff could have drawn from would have made it impossible for him to arm the vast 
majority of 2,000 labourers with more than their agricultural tools. 
Could Hempenstall' s  scenario be reconciled with Hahl's staunch defence of Wolff who, 
according to Hahl's memoirs, had "performed his functions admirably in these difficult times" 
(1980: 94)? Had at least the colonial department later censured Wolff, albeit with "masterly 
understatement"? 
Alas, its "Denkschrift [sic] of 27 February 1904, RKA 2990", to which Hempenstall referred, 
did not contain an all too lenient censure of Wolff; rather, the document was an internal response 
to a request by Wolff to be given public support by the colonial department against attacks on his 
handling of the matter which had been published in the German press. Fritz Rose, the former 
imperial commissioner who first dealt with the matter, had been willing to assure Wolff that his 
superiors approved of his actions, but only 'privately' ,  because public servants had no right to 
expect a public defence of their official actions. He had even been prepared to certify that Wolff 
had acted "judiciously" (umsichtig). His colleague, Heinrich Schnee, Wolff's predecessor once 
removed, had thought that this went too far. He had therefore added in the margin that "Umsicht" 
was hardly the right word to describe Wolff's actions and that it would be more appropriate to call 
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them "intrepid" (unerschrocken), when expressing the colonial department' s  approval to Wolff. 
So much for the story behind another phantom. 
VI 
Hempenstall also offered a Melanesian counterpart of the crumbling of the Sokehs comer of Pan 
Kadera: the role of "the bullet-proof ointment" in the 1 893 Blanche Bay Uprising. He 
distinguished three versions of its end: an official European version, according to which the Tolai 
were shelled into submission by SMS Sperber; an unofficial European version, according to which 
the uprising collapsed when the inventor of the bullet-proof ointment was killed during the 
fighting; and a Tolai version which gave an additional reason for the change of heart among the 
Tolai. 
[A]n alualua [sic] called To Bobo, from Vunabalbal, managed to obtain some magic ointment and took 
it to the Germans who smeared their forces with it before going into battle. Not only did it strengthen the 
resolve of the Melanesian troops, but in the eye of the enemy also made them invulnerable; thus the Tolai 
sued for peace (ibid. :  1 30). 
This third version was especially attractive to Hempenstall because it went on to present To Bobo 
as the leading spokesman of the Tolai in their relations with the colonial government-thus 
turning him into the counterpart of Henry N anpei on Ponape. But Hempenstall was not prepared 
to stick to this version because the second version, according to which the "enterprising young 
sorcerer . . .  Tavalai of Ulagunan" (ibid. :  128) died as "a victim of his own delusions" (ibid. :  130), 
offered him Tavalai as a Melanesian counterpart to the leader of the Ponape Rebellion, Soumadau 
en Sokehs. He therefore combined the two versions, using the third to gloss over the problematic 
relationship between them by stating that "[w]ithout doubt, Tavalai' s  death and the use of his 
ointment against them were greater shocks to the Tolai than the whistle of a few artillery shells" 
(ibid.). 
Now it was logically possible for the three versions to co-exist as factual history. I only had 
to imagine that the Germans smeared their Melanesian troops with the ointment procured by To 
Bobo before the very same battle during which Tavalai was killed, while the shells fired by SMS 
Sperber were whistling over his head, but I had to keep my narrative visor tightly closed to prevent 
me from seeing that the second and third version, in particular, pulled-ideologically-in opposite 
directions. 
The attribution of the collapse of the uprising to the killing of Tavalai was a frontal attack on 
Tolai culture. It marked a victory of modem western technology over primitive magical 
superstition. The "To Bobo Version", on the other hand, reinforced the power of Tolai magic by 
demonstrating its superiority over colonial guns. More importantly, there were no losers: To Bobo 
created a stalemate which resulted in peace rather than in a victory of the colonial forces. To Bobo 
was not a traitor who wanted to bring about a defeat of his fellow Tolai-which he could have 
done by supplying the Germans with a superior form of an aggressive Tolai war magic which 
would have given their weapons the power to penetrate the protective shield of Tavalai' s magic.21 
Instead this version celebrated To Bobo as the ultimate Tolai hero who achieved a political victory 
by successfully manipulating everybody. He used Tolai magic to silence the colonial guns by 
making his brothers submit, their cultural self-esteem intact, to that magic. But he thereby also 
brought the age of military opposition to colonial rule to an end. To Bobo was the prophet of 
21 This was the aspect which puzzled me when I first heard the To Bobo Version in 1 975. My Tolai informants agreed 
that the use of an aggressive form of magic would have made greater technological sense--if it had been the aim to assure 
a victory of the colonial forces. It was only when I considered the ideological aspect of the To Bobo Version that I realised 
that precisely this had not been the aim. 
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peaceful accommodation on the best possible terms-as Hempenstall well appreciated. But if it 
was to fulfil its ideological purpose the To Bobo Version could not be reconciled with the 
"Tavalai Version". Its own logic demanded that Tavalai did not die, certainly not as a victim of 
his delusions, but quietly disappeared from the scene. 
On the other hand, while ideologically satisfying from a modern western perspective, the 
Tavalai Version made no sense historically, if it presented the invention of a bullet-proof ointment 
as the decisive event, because this form of war magic was a regular part of the traditional Tolai 
armoury.22 Hempenstall sensed that it was not magic as such which made the 1 893 bullet-proof 
ointment "special" and Tavalai "enterprising". He therefore stressed that it "proved to be a perfect 
integrating mechanism", "something to fuse the different groups together" (ibid. :  1 28). But he did 
not pursue this angle, because he apparently shared the belief of the contemporary European 
observers, that the decisive integrative force had to be the superstitious, but for this reason 
psychologically even more powerful, belief of the heathen Tolai in their own invulnerability. 
Since it was not my task to elaborate the Tavalai Version in a direction which made historical 
sense but also took the structure of traditional Tolai culture into account, 23 I moved on, as eagerly 
as Hempenstall, to To Bobo as the spokesman of the Tolai in their relations with the colonial 
government. 
As Hempenstall amply acknowledged, much of the information presented by him on this score 
was derived from a study by the anthropologist Richard Salisbury (ibid. :  1 30, Fn. 20 and 1 33 ,  Fn. 
25), who primarily reported and interpreted what members of To Bobo' s Vunabalbal clan had told 
him. The main ingredient of Hempenstall' s account was therefore doubly distilled clan history. 
For example: Salisbury's informants apparently told him that it had been To Bobo who had 
persuaded Hahl to set aside the first native reserve located within Queen Emma's Ralum 
plantation. In the main body of his study Salisbury was still cautious : 
The leader of Vunabalbal village, a man named Abram To Bobo, went to the newly arrived judge at 
Kokopo [Herbertshohe], Dr Albert Hahl, and pleaded with him to allow the natives to remain (cf. 
Kleintitschen 1906: 126). Dr Hahl was sympathetic with native claims that they had not enough land to 
live on . . .  (Salisbury, 1970: 81) .  
In Salisbury's biographical sketch of To Bobo this became: 
It was undoubtedly his arguments that persuaded Dr Hahl to make the initial decision to set up Ralum 
Reserve . . .  (ibid. : 3 1 6) 
which Hempenstall translated into: 
To Bobo, in particular, was able to persuade Hahl that Vunamami hamlets should be allowed to hold on 
to their extensive coconut stands as well as subsistence land (1978: 133).  
22 It could be argued that the innovation was not the invention of a protective magical ointment as such but the invention 
of an ointment which worked, for the first time, against European bullets. However, this too would run against the grain 
of traditional Tolai culture, which endows its magical technology with the power to adjust automatically to the advances 
of western scientific technology. This is taken for granted in the To Bobo Versiom and was confirmed by my Tolai 
informants, who stressed repeatedly that their protective magic had had no difficulty in turning even aerial bombs aside 
during World War II-without the need for changing the traditional recipe. 
23 Salisbury's To Bobo Version offers food for constructive speculation. It suggests that Tavalai was enterprising 
because, instead of secretly offering a conventional ointment at a conventional price to a particular clan leader, he let it 
be known that he had invented an ointment which was capable of being mass-produced, and that he would make it 
available to all those who combined to pay the vast amount of shell money he was asking. 
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If Hempenstall had instead followed up Salisbury's  reference he would have found that 
Kleintitschen was, in fact, a decidedly hostile witness. He wrote: 
Some kanaka [no names are given] approached the Imperial Judge [no name or date is given], asking him 
to enlarge [ !) the size of their reserve. He listened sympathetically and promised to do what he could to 
fulfil their wishes. The next morning a rumour spread that the Judge had returned to the natives all land 
they had previously sold. They came together in their hundreds and wanted to take . . .  [it] again into 
possession, which almost led to a bloody clash (Kleintitschen, 1906: 126-27). 
Having thus been alerted, Hempenstall might have also consulted Hahl' s memoirs before outdoing 
even Salisbury's Vunabalbal informants by presenting To Bobo as having also "led the way in 
planting coconuts regularly and processing them into copra" (1978: 133)24-and again with good 
reason since To Bobo did not rate a single mention in them. Instead Hahl wrote that he introduced 
systematic cash-cropping to the Tolai as a kind of occupational therapy for unemployed warriors. 
I started with chiefTokinkin in Raluana, who had at his disposal a large number of people and good land, 
and persuaded him to establish a coconut plantation in the European style. There were no technical 
difficulties because the young men had the necessary experience, gained in the course of their 
employment on the plantations. But it was difficult to persuade these good folk of the advantages of a 
large-scale plantation which could not be expected to yield a harvest for years. But this venture too 
succeeded and was copied by others. A certain degree of pressure was always essential, but in the Gazelle 
Peninsula no actual compulsion or threat of punishment was ever used. All these efforts were assisted 
by the favourable market for the sale of garden produce and copra (1980: 43). 
Yet Hempenstall was not prepared to accept everything Salisbury had to say about To Bobo's  
status under the German colonial government, perhaps because Salisbury himself was uncertain 
as to how far he could trust the accuracy of his informants on that score. 
To Bobo, as the most active protagonist of peace, was later selected by Dr Hahl as his direct agent for 
contacts with the villages surrounding Vunamami. The exact status of this position is not clear, but 
informants say that the Germans used for it the pidgin title nambawan, which the Tolai translated as 
lualua. Informants also say that at first four nambawan were appointed, for Raluana, Davaon, Birara, and 
Vunamami, and subsequently two more for Toma and Paparatava. To Bobo' s jurisdiction is also unclear; 
it definitely covered Vunamami, Vunalbalbal, and Bitarebarebe but his efforts to extend it to other 
villages may well have been illegal, as when he was fined in 1896 for dictating what mission Takabur 
village would adhere to ( 1 970: 3 1 6). 
Rather than clarifying To Bobo' s position with the help of the archival sources available to him25 
Hempenstall wove this vague information into a personalised version of some of the general 
24 Hempenstall also presents To Bobo as the leader of a "Vunamami confederacy'' and claims that he decided ''to lower 
bride prices by fiat in order to encourage marriage and increase the population" (ibid.}-presumably throughout the 
territory of this (phantom) confederacy. 
25 For example, RKA 2992 contains a 1907 list of government chiefs who held office in the Tolai area. h includes the 
name of To Bobo and gives a fairly clear idea of his status at the time. At least by then To Bobo was no longer the 
spokesman for the mysterious Vunamami confederacy. Vunamami had another luluai, To Materia, and Bitarebareba had 
its own luluai, To Vurgilo. As far as the early days are concerned, Hahl' s memoirs suggest that the key figure in the 
construction of the road to Takabur had been Turandawai of Bitarebarebe rather than To Bobo (1980: 13) .  If we read 
Hahl's memoirs together with the annual report for 19 12, it appears likely that To Kinkin was the first luluai appointed 
in 1 897, so that the fining of To Bobo in 1 896, mentioned by Salisbury, if it took place in that year, would have preceded 
his appointment as luluai. On the other hand, Hahl also wrote in his memoirs that the first luluai was chosen by the Tolai 
themselves in the district adjoining Herbertsh<>he in August 1 896-which would fit To Bobo-and that he introduced this 
new system in the Duke of York Group in September 1 896 (1980: 1 8). Perhaps Hahl distinguished between this 
preliminary effort and a more permanent version of the system involving the official appointment of luluai who were given 
"cap and staff, the insignia of a chief holding office in association with the Government" (see ibid.: 49). 
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information provided in the annual reports, relying primarily on a section of the report for 
1 899-1900 (see above: 75). 
In August 1 896 . . . Hahl nominated the first individual New Guineans to convey his wishes to groups of 
hamlets: among them was To Bobo. These new officials whom the Germans called originally lualuai1'6 
but later luluais after the Tolai name for a district war leader, were given limited administrative and 
police powers to supervise road construction in their localities and to adjudicate small, local disputes. 
Fines of up to twenty-five marks or ten fathoms of tambu could be imposed, but villagers had the right 
to appeal against decisions to the Imperial Judge at Herbertsht>he. 27 
The system of luluais was designed basically to encourage the peaceful solution of difficulties, and 
to act as a lever through which the government could 'draw' New Guineans to work within the colonial 
economy as roadbuilders, plantation labourers and, later, taxpayers. To delegate a more autonomous 
'chiefly' power to these agents was impossible, for the social and political authority of the traditional 
alualua [sic] , on which the appointments were based, was generally well circumscribed, and the Germans 
soon found themselves dealing with numerous complaints against luluais for exceeding their authority. 
Moreover, as the system expanded and single villages were given government luluais, the new appointees 
were not always the natural clan elders or 'big men' of their districts, so that some experienced difficulty 
in exerting their newly-ascribed authority. By 1900 Hahl had appointed forty-four of the new officials 
in the Gazelle and twenty-three on the Duke of York Islands, the only areas which his administration 
could reach effectively ( 1978: 134-35). 
Even if this account had been phantom-free it would hardly have been an improvement on the 
information provided in the annual report on the institution of government chiefs, but it too was 
thoroughly phantomised. With the last of these phantoms Hempenstall even reached new heights, 
because he created a phantom Hahl who continued to appoint luluai in the Bismarck Archipelago 
after the real Hahl had left it at the end of 1 898. Nor was the attribution of the post-1 898 
appointments to Hahl an accident. Rather, it was part of a methodical phantom obliteration of 
governor Bennigsen. 
According to Hempenstall: "In 1901 ,  after the virtual bankruptcy of Company rule, Hahl had 
to start from scratch" (ibid. :  141)-as if Bennigsen had never existed. Indeed, when stating later 
specifically that "Finally, in 1901 ,  after appeals by To Bobo, Hahl had the area [of the Vunamami 
reserve] properly surveyed and concrete markers erected . . .  " (ibid. :  144), Hahl even appeared as 
the author of a report to the colonial department of 23 January 1901 in RKA 2575 to which 
Hempenstall referred as his primary source (ibid. :  233, Fn. 9), although the real Hahl was serving 
in Ponape at the time. I did not check this report since it was plain that its author was not Hahl and 
that it did not refer to a survey of the Ralum reserves which Hahl had carried out in late 1 900 or 
early 1 90 1 ,  but I did look at Hempenstall's  secondary source, which was again Salisbury's 
Vunamami. 
As Salisbury had written that the surveys had been carried out "shortly after 1 90 1 ,  when Hahl 
was made Governor . . .  " ( 1970: 8 1 )  it was not difficult to imagine how Hempenstall' s  phantom 
version had arisen. At the same time, taken together with the incident referred to by Kleintitschen 
a more realistic, alternative scenario suggested itself: the Ralumreserves had indeed been enlarged 
and surveyed not long before 23 January 1901 but this had not been done by Hahl but by Wilhelm 
Stuckhardt who had replaced Heinrich Schnee as imperial judge when the latter had left German 
New Guinea at the end of September 1900. 
26 Neither Hahl ( 1 897) nor Parkinson ( 1907) use the term "lualua"in their description of Tolai sociopolitical 
organisation. According to Salisbury's infonnants, "the Germans" had used instead "the pidgin term Nambawan" which 
the Tolai had translated as "lualua". It is unlikely that "the Germans" ever used this Pidgin term, at least officially, or that 
the term "lualua" was ever officially used. 
27 The annual report for 1 899 indicates that the figure of 25 Marks, or ten fathoms of shell money, did not relate to the 
fines the government chiefs could impose but to the value of the property involved in civil disputes they were empowered 
to decide-which does not mean that they referred all disputes above this limit to German officials. 
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There was no point in speculating further about what had actually happened. What mattered 
was that there was also no point in continuing a critical examination of Hempenstall' s account, 
since it was more than likely that his treatment of the history of German colonial rule in the 
Astrolabe Bay, the Huon Peninsula and the Admiralty Islands would display the same typical 
phantom characteristics. 
But there was something about Pacific Islanders under German Rule which still puzzled me: 
while its examination had revealed a vast army of phantoms, it had not identified a single 
skeleton, not one instance where Hempenstall' s study showed that the official version of the use 
of military force in German New Guinea in the annual reports was seriously flawed. 
Since this was too good to be true, I started to look specifically for such an instance. It did not 
take too long to find one: an early military confrontation which had been "so bloody that Bismarck 
had suppressed its publication for fear of political repercussions" (ibid. :  170). 
VII 
According to Hempenstall this confrontation had consisted of "a series of punitive raids in 1 886 
by SMS Albatross", during which "[t]wenty-six New Irelanders were killed and several marines 
wounded" (ibid. :  234, Fn. 15). These raids were indeed neither mentioned in the annual reports 
nor included in the Naval List of military encounters qualifying for a colonial memorial medal. 
Yet they had been written up in detail in the German press at the time (see, for example, DKZ, 
1886: 365-66). Although this showed that at least the implied effectiveness of Bismarck's 
suppression order was another phantom, my curiosity had been roused. Despite my misgivings I 
therefore followed up Hempenstall' s  reference to "Admiralty to Bismarck 1 1 April 1 886, RKA 
2976" (ibid.) in order to clarify the situation. 
The file did contain a letter by the admiralty addressed to "Bismarck", dated 1 1  April 1 886, 
even though is addressee was count von Bismarck, who was serving as under-secretary in the 
foreign office at the time, rather than his father, prince Bismarck, the chancellor of the Reich. 
However, the question the letter raised was sufficiently important to be referred to the latter: did 
the foreign office have objections to the publication of a cable the admiralty had received from 
SMS Albatross? Fully quoted in the letter, it reported on military actions which had taken place 
in New Ireland and New Britain. The former had caused two naval casualties, the latter six, 
including three serious ones. All told 26 enemies had been killed (the number of New Irelanders 
among them was not identified). In New Ireland order had been restored, but in New Britain the 
enemy had not been completely "subjugated" (unterjocht), so that it was necessary to send a larger 
force to achieve this. In the chancellor' s view it was better to delay the publication of this cable 
until it was known "how the matter had arisen", since it might otherwise create "too much of an 
impression" (zu viel Eindruck machen). 
But this was not the end of the story. The following day the foreign office wrote to the 
admiralty in line with the chancellor's comments. The admiralty responded on 1 6  April by 
reference to another Albatross cable, received in answer to a telegraphic request by the admiralty 
to provide the information sought by the chancellor. According to it the cruiser had been 
requisitioned because murder and theft had seriously endangered public peace and its landing 
force had taken military action after it had been attacked while trying to make arrests. 
The admiralty was moving so fast because, in its view, it should publish the news of these 
military encounters as soon as the relatives of crew members had reason to be concerned, as was 
the case here because private circles already knew that they had taken place. The foreign office 
checked with its commercial contacts which denied such knowledge, as it wrote to the admiralty 
the next day, repeating the chancellor' s  request to refrain from publishing the information for the 
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time being and suggesting it respond to inquiries from concerned relatives by assuring them that 
all those who had been wounded were out of danger. 
The admiralty waited until 25 May, after the mail dealing with these military encounters had 
been received. It proposed to the foreign office the publication of a detailed casualty list, together 
with a statement that the ability of those wounded to continue their naval service was unimpaifed. 
The chancellor was not convinced: was it not preferable to inform the relatives of those wounded 
through personal letters, instead of publishing such a list? But this time he went further. He issued 
written instructions to the foreign office, listing the points he wanted it to discuss with the chief 
of the admiralty. Why was it desirable to publish such casualty lists? Did the navy simply follow 
army traditions, or was it moved by the wish to gain glory? Yet, it was the detailed accounts of 
such naval engagements, rather than the casualty lists, which concerned him, because these 
accounts always created an unpleasant impression, leading to undesirable consequences in "our 
parliamentary system", and suggesting to other naval powers that Germany was an "irritable 
thrower of cannon-balls". The instruction closed with an "official" (dienstlicher) request that 
reports by naval commanders about such engagements be kept strictly secret so as to avoid as far 
as possible exaggerated versions of them finding their way into the press. 
On 27 May the foreign office relayed the outcome of these discussions back to the chancellor. 
The chief of the admiralty did not like the reporting of the military encounters of the navy in the 
colonies in the German press either, because they rarely covered the imperial flag with glory. He 
therefore did all he could to prevent their discussion in private letters by navy personnel. But this 
was of little use because the agents of the German commercial firms regularly reported them 
home, so that the metropolitan press was already informed about every detail of the military 
operations of SMS Albatross.28 
As for the publication of casualty lists, the admiralty had no choice because this was required 
by a general imperial instruction. In this particular case it had sought and obtained special imperial 
approval for a delay, but, apart from again requiring imperial approval, a decision not to publish 
them at all would create difficulties because the purpose of publishing this list was not so much 
to inform the relatives of the eight casualties but to put at rest the minds of the relatives of the 120 
men who had escaped unscathed. Under these circumstances the chief of the admiralty hoped that 
the chancellor would drop his objections to its publication. 
Bismarck was not so inclined. He not only insisted that this particular casualty list should not 
be published, but expressed confidence that the emperor would grant him his wish that henceforth 
no such lists would be published because any general instruction which proved to be "impractical" 
(unpraktisch) should be withdrawn. 
In short, what concerned Bismarck was not that the "punitive raids" of SMS Albatross had 
been too bloody, but rather that they had not been sufficiently bloody to justify taking them 
seriously as military events. What Bismarck had feared was that turning these military molehills 
publicly into mountains would expose Germany to ridicule abroad and use up valuable "emotional 
capital" within Germany on which the government had to draw when it came to mobilising public 
opinion in support of a major military involvement, rather than public outrage about the excessive 
use of military force against the natives in Germany's colonies. Instead of presenting Bismarck 
as a frightened tyrant, the documents showed him as a cynical pragmatist, but they did so in a 
manner which could not possibly be condensed into a narrative one-liner without replacing 
Hempenstall's  phantom version with another, but equally counterfactual, alternative. 
It was the by now familiar story: the information a critical reading of the historical record 
revealed was not only significantly different from the phantom version presented by narrative 
historians, but also far more complex and far less conclusive. Hempenstall simply could not have 
28 How did these agents learn about the details of the military operations of the navy? Unless they themselves 
participated, talkative crew members would appear to be the most likely source. 
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integrated the "real" story of Bismarck's "suppression order" into his narrative treatment of "the 
inadequacy of the navy as a police force" (ibid.:  171  ) . By the same token such concrete details 
were an essential ingredient of a narrative approach: Hempenstall could not have done without 
them. The problem was that the historical record offered too many rather than too few of them. 
and that these details interlocked, forming smaller and larger clusters which were all part of a 
continuous web. Hempenstall did not phantomise history in order to close gaps in the historical 
record, rather his phantoms were the product of an embarrassment of riches. They were the price 
he paid for oversimplifying history to a point where it became narratable. 
The question was whether Hempenstall had merely gone too far, whether he had phantomised 
history because he had kept on crossing the line between legitimate simplification and 
unacceptable oversimplification, or whether a phantomisation of history was a necessary 
consequence of a narrative approach. Was Pacific Islanders under German Rule merely another 
unfortunate exception, or did it demonstrate that a narrative approach to history was generally 
incapable of giving an account of the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea which 
reflected a critical reading of the historical record instead of seriously distorting it? 
Although I was satisfied that the proliferation of phantoms I had encountered in all the 
histories I had so far examined did reflect defects of the narrative method, another case study was 
probably required to convice others that there was indeed no choice but to explore alternative 
approaches. 
The best way of testing whether these phantoms were symptomatic was to examine how one 
of the key events in the history of German colonial rule had been treated historio graphically since 
it had occurred. An obvious choice was the Ponape Rebellion, since recent academic discussion 
claimed that so much had already been written about it that it was superfluous to go into details 
and sufficient to point out some of its special features (Hiery, 1995: 283). 
Chapter 4: A Layer-cake of Phantom Histories 
I 
According to the annual reports the peaceful development of the Eastern Carolines district of German New Guinea was suddenly interrupted by an uprising of the Jokoj tribe on Ponape. 1 
Its deeper reasons were identified as a general discontent among the native population of the 
island with the tax and road work required from it and a dissatisfaction among its chiefs with the 
recent abolishment of the traditional feudal system. Whereas the other four tribes on the island had 
accepted these measures, the Jokoj had been unwilling to do so. The ferment had exploded when 
a refractory native had been punished by the district office. On 1 8  October 1910 district 
commissioner Boeder, the secretary of the district office, Brauckmann, the officials Haefner and 
Hollborn and five natives were killed by the rebels. Since only 50 Melanesian police-soldiers were 
stationed on Ponape it had been impossible to take immediate action against the rebellious tribe. 
The government doctor, who had taken charge after the murders, had called upon the four other 
tribes to assist in the defence of "die Kolonie", the seat of the administration. This successful 
measure had also prevented the spreading of the rebellion to other parts of the island. 
After seven weeks, a reinforcement of 172 police-soldiers arrived from Rabaul, so that the 
Ponapeans could be sent home. By 10  January 191 1 a large naval force, consisting of the station 
cruiser Cormoran, the survey vessel Planet and the cruisers Niimberg and Emden from the East­
Asian squadron had been assembled. A force of this size had been required to dislodge the 
rebels-about 200 men, armed with rifles-with the help of the ships' artillery from their 
mountain fortifications on the offshore island of Dschokadsch. By 22 February 19 1 1 the military 
operations had been successfully completed. On 23 February 17 rebels, who had participated in 
the murders of 1 8  October 1910, were sentenced to death and executed the following day. The rest 
of the Jokoj tribe, 426 persons, was banished to Palau and its land was confiscated (see: Die 
deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika, und der Siidsee, Amtlicher Jahresbericht 1910111, Ost­
Karolinen: 170-72). 
Although this official version was more factual than any of the subsequent accounts I 
examined, it contained at least one phantom, since a critical reading of the historical records 
strongly suggested that only 15  of the 17 Ponapeans sentenced to death were executed. But while 
this inaccuracy was regrettable, it was not a historically significant distortion, because it did not 
alter the actual order of magnitude of the measures taken. On the other hand this phantom also 
illustrated how much easier and more satisfying it was to give precise details rather than to talk 
in terms of approximations. For example, it would have looked decidedly odd if the annual report 
had said that between ten and 20 rebels had been executed soon after the rebellion had been put 
down.2 
Seen in this light the number of details included in the full text of the official version was not 
surprising. What was more interesting was that their selection reflected certain conventions. Thus 
the names and ranks of all the whites killed-but not their first names-were identified but none 
of the names of any of the blacks killed or of the whites wounded. Nor were the names of the 
government doctor or of the naval commanders, or the leaders of the rebels,  given. Indeed, the 
annual report attributed all happenings to the district office, the rebels or the combined forces. The 
annual report presented a pointedly impersonal picture of history which described factually 
specified events rather than individually motivated actions or reactions. 
1 The spelling of Micronesian proper names did and still does vary widely in the literature. 
2 It would have suggested that the authorities did not know what they were talking about and were therefore incompetent. 
Do narrative historians fear the same reaction? 
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II 
In his discussion of the Ponape Rebellion 80 years later, Hiery basically agreed with this official 
interpretation, although he used a more fashionable language, calling it a "social-reactionary, 
traditionalist revolt" which had, at the same time, been an "ethnic-national war against foreign 
domination" ( 1 995 : 284). But Hiery offered numerous details not included in the annual report. 
For example he informed his readers that the punishment of the refractory native had consisted 
of a corporal punishment and that this form of punishment had been introduced by district 
commissioner Boeder, because he had believed, contrary to his clear instructions, that he could 
subdue a stubborn Pacific colony by using the methods employed in German East-Africa, where 
he had previously served. Nonetheless, Hiery insisted that "the corporal punishment, which had 
been ordered by the supervisor of the road-works, Holborn [sic], was only the trigger and not the 
primary cause of the revolt" ( 1 995 : 282).  
An even more colourful example was Hiery' s account of the proceedings before the "colonial 
court martial" which had tried the "Dschokadsch leaders". 
Their enemies during the war had become their judges during the trial. The soldiers and officers from the 
German warships and the rest of the European settlement Kolonia were the jury; judge was the new 
German District Commissioner Kersting, a government medical officer [sic] with administrative 
experience in Togo and Yap.3 The Dschokadsch had been permitted to conduct their own defence. As 
courageous as they had shown themselves during their defensive war, they now fought before the colonial 
court. When the paramount chief [sic] Jomatau Niue was asked what caused him to commit the deed, he 
put the finger on the open wound of any regime of colonial rule: "My ancestors have ruled this land for 
a thousand years. What are you Germans doing here? We did not call for you!" According to the 
evidence of a German eyewitness the German judges were "impressed" and became "thoughtful". But 
the judgement itself was never in doubt because it [the death sentence] was "required by the prestige of 
the German name and the German flag" ( 1 995: 284-85). 
Hiery not only enriched the picture presented by the annual report, his version also contradicted 
it at several points. Thus he stated that 24 rather than 50 Melanesian police-soldiers had been 
serving in Ponape at the beginning of the Ponape Rebellion, that 18  rather than 1 7  Ponapeans were 
sentenced to death-although only 15 of them were executed-and that their execution took place 
on 25 rather than 24 February 1 9 1 1 (see 1 995 : 283-84) . 
Where did Hiery get his information from? Instead of relying on the accounts of other 
professional historians, he chose two exotic sources : the memoirs of a German naval officer 
(Spiegel, 1 934), presumably because he claimed to have been an "eyewitness", and the "only 
indigenous source", The Book of Luelen ( 1 977). Hiery took the date of the execution-which was 
not given by Luelen-from Spiegel, whereas he took the number of death sentences and 
executions-which were not given by Spiegel-from Luelen, who provided a list of 1 8  names, 
including the titles and clan affiliations of the persons named, and added that three of the men, 
who were to be killed in Yap, were not killed because "it was said that they had no guilt" ( 1977: 
145). 
Hiery also combined information from both sources . This was how Spiegel' s  "paramount chief 
Jomatau" acquired the name "Niue", given to him by Luelen, although the latter gave Niue' s title 
as "Jaumatonjokaj"  and did not indicate that this title made him the "paramount chief' 
(Oberhiiuptling), which it did not. 
When his two sources contradicted each other, Hiery tended to favour Spiegel, to the extent 
that he bluntly declared Luelen' s  statement that 50 Melanesian police-soldiers had been serving 
on Ponape-which was supported by Luelen's  editors-by reference to Spiegel to be "false" 
3 Dr Kersting held the post of "Bezirksamtmann" (district commissioner) and had a medical degree, but he was not a 
medical officer (Regierungs!JW although he had earned the civil service title of "Regierungsraf'). 
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(''falsch", see 1995 : 283, Fn. 107). On the other hand, Hiery did not accept everything Spiegel had 
to offer. For example, Spiegel's  claim that the few Europeans and Melanesian police-soldiers on 
Ponape had faced 3 ,000 to 4,000 Ponapean men able to carry arms became "about 4000 
Ponapeans, the men among whom were not armed with bows and arrows but with modern rifles" 
( 1995 : 283). 
Hiery also did not follow Spiegel' s  version of the enlisting of the four other Ponapean tribes 
for the defence of the Kolonie by the government doctor. According to Spiegel, Dr Girschner had 
been an honorary chief of Kiti and Metalanim whose 30 years [sic] of loyalty to them the 
Ponapeans now repaid by sending their warriors in hundreds of war canoes, which arrived just as 
the sun was rising over Langar Island on the morning after the murders-that is on 19  October 
1910 (1934: 177).4 Although this was, narratively speaking, good stuff, Hiery preferred to state 
instead-with a reference to Luelen-that Net, U, Metalanirn and Kiti decided, "after lengthy 
deliberations", not to take part in the rebellion of the Dschokadsch but to send troops to defend 
the Germans ( 1995: 283), even though Luelen had merely written that "on 20 [sic] October the 
States of Ponape came together at Kolonia to guard it" (1977: 144). 
But whatever the attractions ofLuelen he could not compete with the immortal lines attributed 
by Spiegel to Jomatau. In Spiegel's  own words: 
All of us who were sitting at the judges' bench were impressed by the proud demeanour of the 
vanquished enemy. There were even moments during the trial which lasted for two days when every one 
ofus became thoughtful, for example when Jomatau in answer to the question as to what had caused him 
to commit the deed, declared with the pride ofa king: "My ancestors ruled this land . . .  [and so on]" (1934: 
196). 
ill 
The oldest academic history of the Ponape Rebellion I consulted was that of the anthropologist 
Paul Hambruch who conducted fieldwork on Ponape between March and September 1910 ( 1932: 
V). In it Hambruch attributed a different statement to Jomatau, although he claimed that it had 
been made in response to a similar question during his trial. When asked who had spoken in 
favour of war, Jomatau, according to Hambruch , had answered that he "had believed he could 
beat the whites and then become himself the ruler of Ponape" (ibid. : 301) .  
According to Hambruch the Ponape Rebellion had been the culmination of ten years of effort 
by a secl'et society, lead by Jomatau, to prepare the overthrow of German colonial rule.5 
It consisted of conservative elements who wanted Ponape for the Ponapeans, and Ponapean law and 
custom rather than a foreign order. The society was therefore a patriotic association which wanted to 
terminate foreign domination (ibid.: 300). 
While this supported Hiery's interpretation, Hambruch also claimed that the rebellion had been 
planned for 2 June 1910, when Boeder would have left Ponape with the government steamer and 
no other vessel was expected for some weeks. But the plan was dropped after it had been betrayed, 
and Boeder did not pursue the matter after his return. On the contrary, he brushed aside the 
warnings of Hambruch, who had discovered this secret society in the course of his fieldwork. Nor 
did he believe Jomatau when the latter had told him pointedly some time before the rebellion: 
4 This 30 year span would take us back to 1 880, that is to say to a time before the beginning of Spanish colonial rule. 
S This means that plotting had started as soon as Germany had taken over from Spain. 
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The Spaniards were brave and in the end a bit frightened because we Ponapeans have always beaten 
them. But you Germans are cowards. You only talk about your soldiers, your ships and your Emperor, 
but you do nothing (ibid. :  Fn. 1) .  
After a visit from the East-Asian cruiser squadron, Boeder decided that the time was ripe to 
introduce tough reforms which consisted of corporal punishments for persistent lying and 
insubordination and a strict regime for prison inmates, which included the shaving of their heads. 
In Hambruch' s  view these measures acted as a provocation rather than as a deterrent, since 
touching the head of a Ponapean was a serious customary offence and a beating obliged the victim 
and his relatives to kill the person responsible in revenge. Yet it was not the first beating, 
administered to a man from Kiti, but rather that of the Tsokes man, Nan ponpei Maluk, which 
caused the unplanned explosion. When he had "offered resistance" to the road-works supervisor 
Hollborn on 1 7  October 19 10, he was taken to the district office and given by the Melanesian 
police-soldiers the corporal punishment announced for this offence, namely six strokes. He was 
then sent back to the road-gang with the message that other cases of insubordination would be 
dealt with in the same manner. As a result a decision "to make war against the whites" was arrived 
at, Jomatau was elected as the leader and the killings took place the following day ( 1932: 301). 
Hambruch had a great deal to say about these killings and the military operations following 
them, but showed little interest in the trial or the executions . Instead he emphasised that "the great 
ones from Jokes", as the executed men were henceforth called, were laid to rest at the old cult and 
burial ground Kumunlai. Many songs which did not exactly flatter European ears subsequently 
glorified their actions. "Their horrible and insidious deed may make them criminals and rebels in 
our eyes, for the Ponapeans they died for the liberation and the lamlam of Ponape" ( 1932: 309) . 
Whereas this nicely supplemented Hiery's version, what little Hambruch had to say about the 
trial painted a different picture. 
On 23 February the court convened. The accounts of eyewitnesses and the admissions of the prisoners 
had produced so much material that the guilt of individuals was often already firmly established. 
Nonetheless every man was given the opportunity during the exhaustive hearing to defend himself. Then 
the judges cast their votes and passed the judgement. . .  Seventeen men were sentenced to death. The 
others were sentenced to forced labour and banished for life to the Palau Islands. On the morning of 24 
February the sentence "death by shooting" was made known to the murderers in a solemn assembly and 
the presence of all chiefs (1932: 308-09). 
Hambruch said nothing about the execution and even the statement attributed to Jomatau was 
quoted in another context. Yet the only direct contradiction between Hambruch' s  and Hiery' s 
version was the number of death sentences: 17  as against 1 8 . But there were other, more 
significant, discrepancies. This applied, in particular, to the Ponapean response to Girschner' s call 
for support. While Not, U, Matolemin and Kiti had acted in unison according to Hiery, although 
after "lengthy deliberations", the first three tribes had responded immediately, according to 
Hambruch, whereas Kiti had delayed by three days because Nanpei had initially advised against 
supporting the Kolonie during a council meeting ( 1932: 303).6 As we have seen, Hiery based his 
version on Luelen, who indeed implied that the support had been unanimous although he said 
nothing about "lengthy deliberations". Had Hiery selectively combined information from Luelen 
and Hambruch, thereby creating a second-hand phantom of his own? 
Given the gist of his narrative, Hambruch had good reasons for playing down the personal role 
of Boeder in bringing about the Ponape Rebellion. After all, if events had unfolded according to 
plan, the rebellion would have taken place before Boeder introduced his reforms, and during his 
6 The role of Henry Nanpei in the rebellion is outside the scope of my examination. 
A LA YER-CAKE OF PHANTOM msTORIES 109 
absence. By contrast the anthropologist WilliamR. Bascom, who carried out fieldwork on Ponape 
in 1 946, presented in 1 950 a fully personalised version of the reasons for the Ponape Rebellion. 
By reference inter alia to Hambruch, he maintained that this event had hitherto been generally 
interpreted as 
a native rebellion in protest against German modifications of land tenure or the regulations affecting 
district labour and taxation. Both these changes, on the contrary, are widely approved today, and 
Ponapeans explain the outbreak as the result of the cruelty and the wickedness of two men: the German 
overseer, whose acts were immediately responsible and the Governor [sic] Boeder, who was shot with 
his secretary when they appeared in Sokas (1950: 61) .7 
According to Bascom's Ponapean informants: 
the German overseer . . .  had ordered a member of Kawath clan to be beaten with a wire-lined rubber hose 
for laziness or insolence, or perhaps both. When the road gang, in protest, did not return to work the next 
day the overseer and the chief surveyor set out to round them up. When they appeared in Sokas district 
at the home of the man who had been beaten, it was assumed that they had come to inflict further 
punishment. His clan members came to the rescue and fighting broke out (ibid.). 
Their evidence concerning Boeder' s "wickedness" was equally graphic, for he 
used to question Ponapeans at trials with a drawn revolver pointed at them, which he shot off in their 
faces to frighten them. When he travelled about the island he flew into fits of rage if he stumbled on a 
stone or a coconut, threatening to beat his guides and carriers for not having properly cleared the path 
(ibid.). 
They even had an explanation for Boeder' s behaviour: Dr Girschner had told them "that Boeder 
was mentally unstable and that he had killed many natives in Africa where he had spent twenty­
five years [sic] before coming to Ponape" (ibid.). 
Perhaps because neither Jomatau nor his main lieutenant, Samuel, were members of the 
Kawath clan, Bascom' s clan revenge theory did not find any followers,8 but his emphasis on 
Boeder's "wickedness" was eagerly taken up-in particular by Hempenstall, to whose 1978 
version of the Ponape Rebellion I now want to return. 
IV 
Hempenstall' s  account included only one direct reference to Bascom, in connection with a 
"Ponapean tradition" that 
Boeder would use a drawn revolver to interrogate Islanders during a trial, occasionally shooting it off in 
their faces to frighten them; and that if he stumbled on a stone or a coconut while on an expedition he 
would fly into a rage and threaten to beat his guides and bearers (1978: 102-03).9 
7 While this is the interpretation advocated in the annual report, it has little to do with the views expressed by Hambruch. 
8 It is also difficult to reconcile a revenge theory with what Bascom's informants had told him. How can a fight which 
broke out because the clan wanted to rescue one of its members from a second beating which had not yet taken place be 
interpreted as a revenge for a previous beating to which it had responded by a refusal to work? 
9 Hempenstall, in fact, refers to a 1965 publication of Bascom, which I did not consult. He also refers to a report written 
by "Ignatius" on 27 December 1910  in the archives of the Kapuziner Mission in Miinster, which apparently already 
contained similar information. But if this is so, why did Hempenstall choose to paraphrase Bascom as a "Ponapean 
tradition" instead of relying on information recorded during the Ponape Rebellion? 
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Yet the "wire-lined rubber hose" was also featured by Hempenstall, although it was identified with 
Boeder rather than with Hollborn. According to Hempenstall, Hollbom merely sent one of the 
Sokehs labourers, Lahdeleng 
to the administrator [sic] with a piece of paper alleging insubordination; Boeder had no hesitation in 
ordering ten strokes with a wire-lined rubber hose. The beating was administered by a Melanesian and 
Lahdeleng was helped back to Sokehs barely able to walk ( 1978: 103). 10 
Whether the "rumours [which] later circulated in Po nape that he [Boeder] had been in trouble in 
Africa because of his severity" ( 1978 :  99) was an understated version of the information attributed 
by Bascom' s informants to Dr Girschner was anyone's guess, since no source for this rumour was 
given by Hempenstall. There was no question, however, that he was attracted to presenting 
Boeder's "wickedness" as the decisive reason for the Ponape Rebellion. 
But, as we already know, Hempenstall had come across an even more tempting Ponapean 
tradition, which had apparently been referred to in a conference paper by the historian Paul Mark 
Ehrlich in 1975 . 1 1  
About a month before Lahdeleng' s beating, a comer o f  P an  Kadara, the most sacred location in the stone 
city of Nan Madol, had crumbled. The comers of Pan Kadara were revered on Ponape as symbols of the 
various districts, and if any were to crumble it signified the impending destruction of the area. In this case 
it had been the Sokehs comer. Thus the Sokehs people knew and accepted that Sokehs must die, but, if 
so, they desired to die fighting as men. Their decision was probably strengthened by the belief that they 
could expect assistance from other districts because of cross-district clan relationships; Soumadau' s own 
clan Dipwenpahnmei, was the ruling clan of Madolenihmw and Net was ruled by Soun Kawad ( 1978: 
104). 
In Hempenstall 's  "final analysis" a combination of these two strands of Ponapean evidence 
dominated the entire picture because the 'Ponape Rebellion' had not been 
a crusade for Ponape' s liberation, but an angry reaction against Carl [sic] Boeder' s mounting persecution, 
and most of the district' s  people followed Soumadau in loyalty to clan and district. Only one vision 
moved them all: that was the negative belief that Sokehs was to be destroyed, an idea which applied to 
Sokehs alone, and which made the rest of Ponape hang back in fear when Germany brought in her 
military might ( 1978: 215). 
Although the first part of Hempenstall' s personalised interpretation stood in sharp contrast to 
the structural interpretation of the Ponape Rebellion by the annual report, as well as by Hambruch 
and Hiery, I found the role he attributed to the collapse of the Sokehs comer more interesting, 
because it looked so suspiciously like a phantom. The difficulty was that Hempenstall merely 
asserted that the Sokehs people were solely moved by "the negative belief that Sokehs was to be 
destroyed", although he produced some evidence for Boeder' s "mounting persecution" . 12 I 
therefore turned to Ehrlich and discovered that the collapse of the Sokehs comer had already been 
known to Hambruch, although, as Ehrlich noted "with interest", he did not refer to it in his history 
of the Ponape Rebellion but rather in a description of the ruins of Nan Madol published four years 
1 O A "wire-lined rubber hose" was certainly not a regulation instrument for the administration of corporal punishments 
in German New Guinea or, for that matter, in German East Africa. I do not know what "wire-lined rubber hoses"-which 
are presumably reinforced with a wire spiral to cope with high pressures-were normally used for on Ponape in 1910, or 
if they were even manufactured at the time. 
1 1  I did not try to obtain a copy of this unpublished paper since I had access to Ehrlich's PhD thesis, submitted in 1978. 
12 Even taken at face value Hempenstall' s interpretation is unconvincing. Why should the rest of Ponape hang back in 
fear if only Sokehs was to be destroyed? Was the legend not rather an invitation to the rest of Ponape to join in the 
rebellion and to bring it to a successful conclusion, although sacrificing Sokehs in the process? 
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later. It was clear therefore that this legend was not a recent invention. This did not mean, 
however, that it had also played the part in the Ponape Rebellion which Hempenstall, following 
Ehrlich, ascribed to it. 
Ehrlich had learned about this "legend" not from Hambruch but from one of his Ponapean 
infonnants, although this had only happened eight months after he had started his fieldwork on 
Ponape in 1973. Yet when he had requestioned a number of his informants "obliquely about 
events which might have predicated the rebellion . . .  [a]ll mentioned the Sokehs comer in Pan 
Kedara along with the legend" ( 1978: 193, Fn. 16). This was sufficient for Ehrlich to conclude 
that "given the dire portents displayed at Pan Kedara, it no longer mattered what Soumadau did, 
Sokehs was going to die" (1978: 167). Was that also the conclusion which the Sokehs people had 
reached-even before Lahdeleng's beating?13 
The evidence presented by Ehrlich provided good reasons for doubting this.  According to his 
main infonnant, the W asai of Sokehs (its 'real' Oberhiiuptling) had pronounced that "Sokehs was 
going to be destroyed", when Soumadau had called for war, but the same informant had also 
quoted Soumadau's  lieutenant, the divination expert Samuel, as having pleaded with Soumadau 
to postpone fighting with the Germans for three years, when they would have a chance to win after 
a long struggle: "If you chose to fight now, we will join you, but we will weep" ( 1978: 168). 
Sokehs fought and wept. Yet it took little more than three years before German colonial rule 
ended, whereas Sokehs did not "die"-the legend notwithstanding-since the survivors of the 
Ponape Rebellion were permitted by their next colonial masters, the Japanese, to return to Sokehs. 
There was little point in further examining this legend and its impact on the Ponape 
Rebellion, 14 since it was no longer mentioned in a 1991 account of this episode co-authored by 
Hempenstall, which replaced the personalised interpretation adopted by him in 1978 with an 
elaborate, structural interpretation. By contrast, Hempenstall' s  1978 version of the trial and the 
executions which followed the collapse of the Ponape Rebellion was worth a closer look. 
v 
The denouement was swift. A court-martial was convened on 23 February, the day after military 
operations were declared at an end. Representatives from the two missions and the trading company 
joined with Kersting, Girschner and a naval officer to try summarily those accused of the murder of 
Boeder and his companions. Though each of the leading Sokehs figures was given a full opportunity to 
13  When did the Sokehs comer crumble? Or, rather, when was the collapse noticed? When did the news, that all was now 
lost, reach Sokehs? Why does this apparently traumatic event not figure prominently in Ponapean oral tradition? 
14 The legend itself is more ambiguous than Hempenstall's  treatment suggests. To begin with, the comers of Pan Kedara 
did not represent the five "districts" on Ponape in 1910. According to Ehrlich there were only four comers known as "the 
comers of Sokehs, Kiti, Madolenihmw and Katau" ( 1 978: 163 ). Moreover, the comer of Ka tau represented Kusai Island, 
about 300 miles away, whereas the remaining three comers were only later equated with Madolenihmw, Kiti and Sokehs 
but had originally represented the ancient kingdoms of Malenkopualele, Kopualeng and Puapualik ( 1978: 21). In other 
words the new kingdoms of Net and U were either not represented at all or they were, for the purposes of the legend, still 
treated as part of old kingdoms from which they had separated. What did "Sokehs must die" mean under these 
circumstances, when the Sokehs comer collapsed in September 191  O? Did its fate include the new kingdom of Net which 
had formerly been part of Sokehs-and which helped to defend the Germans against Sokehs? Did it exclude the semi­
autonomous district of Palakir which, we are told, remained neutral during the Ponape Rebellion? In addition it is far from 
clear what "dying" signifies in this context? Had Sokehs already died when the Soun Kauwad had conquered it around 
1700 AD ( 1978: 157)? Was it a self-fulfilling prophecy, so that Sokehs was effectively dead as soon as the comer had 
collapsed? Was Soumadau-a member of a clan which had no rank in Sokehs-therefore free to lead a rebellion for the 
liberation of the whole of Ponape from German colonial rule, like the legendary Isokelkel, who had ended the tyranny of 
the Sau Deleur ( 1 978: 24)? Did the Germans know about the collapse of the Sokehs comer and its significance? 
Hambruch's account suggests that at least he did, since he wrote: "In September 1910  the comer collapsed. The 
Ponapeans took it henceforth for granted that Tsokes would perish" (1936: 27). Did he warn Boeder? Did Girschner use 
the legend to persuade the other four tribes to support the Germans instead of being drawn into the inevitable destruction 
of Sokehs-in addition to blaming the treatment the Ponapeans had recently received on Boeder's mental imbalance? 
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defend himself, the tribunal was interested less in the justice of the result, which was already a foregone 
conclusion as far as the judges were concerned, than in the necessity to make an example which would 
deter malcontents in the future. The bulk of evidence revealed that resentment of Boeder' s actions had 
run deep and wide, and there were no regrets that he was dead. It also became clear that there had been 
a lingering, almost desperate belief that the Germans might be driven out as had been the Spaniards. After 
all, until Boeder's arrival, none of the districts had really experienced the strong hand of Germany. 
Deputy Governor Oswald had concluded when he first heard of the uprising: 
In the final analysis they did not fear us and did not believe we were earnest in our threats . . .  We 
suffered from the mistakes of the Spanish. Perhaps if we had begun energetically this would have 
been avoided. 
But the court-martial tribunal was not interested in why the revolt occurred, only that it had and therefore 
that it must be punished. The trial lasted only a day and the court agreed that seventeen Sokehs should 
be executed, several others sent to prison with hard labour at the Angaur phosphate works, and the rest 
of the district banished en masse to the Palau group. Ironically, the only call for clemency towards those 
to be executed came from the navy' s  representative. Though Kersting himself acknowledged that Sokehs 
had suffered under Boeder, his concern for 'consistency' of punishment, together with the 'deterrence' 
arguments of the missionaries and traders easily won the day. 
The very next day, 24 February, fifteen of the condemned prisoners, handcuffed together and escorted 
by Melanesian police, were marched down to Kumunlai, an old cemetery and cult place outside the 
colony. There they were lined up against a makeshift fence strung between coconut trees and tied with 
their arms outstretched, 'as Christ crucified' . 15 The Melanesian soldiers (for the tribunal had decided that 
German soldiers should not be subjected to this undignified ritual) ranged themselves in two lines, one 
standing, one kneeling. Soumadau was refused permission to speak to the expectant crowd, but in a quiet 
voice he greeted the people and urged them not to follow the Sokehs example. Before he could finish, 
the first volley of shots rang out; the soldiers kept firing until all were dead. Then the bodies were thrown 
into a common grave and the crowd, now hushed, was told to return to their districts ( 1978: 1 12-13). 
Apart from two minor factual discrepancies (the number of death sentences and the date of the 
execution, where Hempenstall agreed with the annual report), this account could easily be 
reconciled with Hiery' s 1 995 version, 16 if l assumed that Spiegel was the naval officer mentioned 
by Hempenstall and that the statement attributed by Spiegel to Soumadau was part of the evidence 
which, according to Hempenstall, showed that, despite the legend, there had been "a lingering, 
almost desperate belief that the Germans might be driven out". However, the 1991 version of the 
Ponape Rebellion, just referred to, suggested that all three versions were off the mark. 
A summary court of justice met in Kolonia on 23 February 191 1 .  The members were Dr Kersting as 
judge, Dr Girschner, the Commander of SMS Planet, a representative of the Jaluit Gesellschaft and three 
representatives of the missions. Kersting made it clear that he sat as Chairperson and District Officer, that 
they were dealing with 'natives' ,  and that the other members were only advisers, not a jury. There was 
no defence counsel for the accused. According to the protocol of the hearing the death sentence was 
decided for all the accused from the beginning. The only point for discussion was the question of hanging 
or shooting. Strikingly, Father Gebhardt contributed particularly vigorously to the discussion. Finally 
Kersting pronounced sentence: 17 of the accused were to be summarily executed, several others were 
sentenced to hard labour in the phosphate mines of Angaur (Belau), all other members of the Sokehs 
district were exiled to the island Yap (426 people). All landed property was confiscated and declared 
property of the Reich; some was given to the local islanders who had helped the Germans in Kolonia 
(Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf, 1 99 1 :  271-72). 
15  Hempenstall added in a footnote: "This is the way present-day Ponapeans remember the execution and may or not 
be significant" ( 1 978: 230, Fn. 49). 
16 Hempenstall agrees with Hiery rather than the annual report as far as the number of executions carried out on Ponape 
is concerned, but he agrees with the annual report, rather than Hiery, that the total number of executions had been 17  rather 
than 1 5 .  According to Hempenstall, two of the condemned rebels had already been transported to Yap where they were 
executed later ( 1978:  20, Fn. 49). According to Hiery's version-based on Luelen-the three ( !) condemned rebels who 
had been sent to Yap were later pardoned. 
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While there were no straightforward contradictions between the 1 978 Hempenstall version and 
the 1 991  Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf version, the different emphases were 
remarkable. In 1 978 readers were told that "each of the leading Sokehs figures was given a full 
opportunity to defend himself', whereas they were told in 1 99 1  that the accused had "no defence 
counsel". Similarly, the 1978 version stressed that the only case for clemency came "ironically" 
from the navy's representative, whereas the 1 99 1  version singled out Father Gebhardt's 
"strikingly" vigorous contribution to the hanging versus shooting discussion. More importantly, 
both versions indicated that their authors did not understand what the trial was about and how it 
proceeded. Was it a "summary court of justice" or a "court-martial"? Was its task "to try 
summarily those accused of the murder of Boeder and his companions" or the punishment of those 
who participated in the revolt? How could "the protocol of the hearing" show that the death 
sentence "was decided for all accused from the beginning" when several of them "were sentenced 
to hard labour in the phosphate mines of Angaur", not to mention en masse banishment of "the 
remainder of the district"? Had all these 426 people (or was it 426 plus 17,  plus "several"?) been 
accused? Was their banishment, the confiscation of their land, as well as the gift of some of it to 
"those local islanders who had helped the Germans", part of the sentence announced by Kersting? 
As far as the Hiery version was concerned, Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf 
confirmed what was plain to any critical reader of Spiegel's  memoirs: that their author had no 
qualms about letting himself be carried away by his imagination; for Spiegel was not the 
commander of SMS Planet but had served as first lieutenant on SMS Cormoran, so that it is 
highly unlikely that he ever sat at "the judge' s  table" during the trial. Nonetheless, Christmann, 
Hempenstall and Ballendorf did not hesitate to quote such a dubious "eyewitness" in their very 
next paragraph. 
The next day 15 of the condemned men were shot. Soumadau tried to speak to those Ponapean spectators 
who stood some distance away. He was refused permission; perhaps it was feared he would repeat his 
outburst in the courtroom where he proudly proclaimed: 'My forefathers have ruled this land for a 
thousand years .. .' ( 199 1 :  272). 
Why did they not tell their readers instead that Soumadau, according to Hempenstall 's  1 978 
version, had disregarded the refusal of permission to speak and had urged the expectant crowd not 
to follow the Sokehs example? Why did they not inform them about the statement which 
Hambruch attributed to Soumadau, although Hambruch' s account is identified as one of the main 
sources for the 1 991  version of the Ponape Rebellion (199 1 :  3 1 8, Fn. 17)? Or why did they not 
simply disclose what Soumadau was reported as having said in the "protocol of the hearing"? 
The reason, it appeared, was that narrative historians behave as if they were free to pick and 
choose whatever information they did or did not want to present in a particular account. Nor did 
it seem to matter whether the Ponape Rebellion was a "social-reactionary revolt", or an "ethnic­
national war", or both (Hiery 1 995: 284), or whether it was "an angry reaction against Carl [sic] 
Boeder' s mounting persecution" (Hempenstall, 1 978: 2 1 5).  In "the final analysis" the causes, the 
course and the consequences of the Ponape Rebellion were no more important for narrative history 
than whether Boeder' s first name was "Gustav" instead of "Carl". Indeed they counted for less, 
since such minor details were the lifeblood of narrative history. Precise names, dates and figures 
had to be given because they demonstrated that the author knew what he was talking about. By 
themselves general statements about historical events, however ideologically satisfying, did not 
qualify as narrative history. They had to be supported by enough details to establish the author' s  
credentials. The art of writing narrative history was not to worry about their factuality. 
It made no difference whether Lahdeleng (or was it Nan ponpei Maluk, or both or neither?) 
was given six or ten strokes, no difference who ordered this punishment or which instrument was 
used to carry it out. A huge stick, or the tail of a stingray, was just as good as a wire-lined rubber 
1 14 THE TOWER OF BABEL 
hose (see Ehrlich, 1 978:  1 65). It did not matter whether the trial was conducted by a "summary 
court of justice" or by a "court martial", whether 15,  17 or 1 8  people were sentenced to death and 
how many of them were executed or pardoned. It did not matter how long the trial lasted, who was 
accused or what the accused were accused of. Yet all these phantoms had to be treated as facts by 
the authors as well as their audience. This applied to Bascom's and Ehrlich's  Ponapean 
informants, and to Luelen and Spiegel, as much as to professional historians like Hempenstall, 
Christmann and Hiery. Although phantom history looked like an exercise in make-believe, if it 
was seen from the outside, viewed from an internal perspective it was history, and indeed the only 
proper form of history. To write phantom history professionally was not a clandestine operation 
but a respectable academic enterprise. Phantom historians did not look guiltily over their 
shoulders, trying to cover their tracks, they performed their academic phantomrituals for everyone 
to see and with total innocence. 
VI 
A quote from a report by Girschner of 22 November 19 10, appended to a report by "the Imperial 
Governor of German New Guinea of 1 8  December 1 9 1 0" in Christmann, Hempenstall and 
Ballendorf' s account of the introduction of the corporal punishment by Boeder attracted my 
attention because it bore an uncanny resemblance to the Hambruch version. "Punishment by 
beating [Girschner was quoted as having reported] has neither an improving nor a deterring effect 
here, only an inflaming effect" ( 1 99 1 :  263 ; for Hambruch's version see above: 1 08).  But instead 
of addressing this unlikely coincidence, the relevant footnote in Christmann, Hempenstall and 
Ballendorf posed another puzzle: 
Whether Hambruch was correct that islanders who made a bad impression were given a 'punishment 
mark' which had on it how many strokes they had received and which had to be surrendered at the end 
of work could not be ascertained from the records (199 1 :  3 1 8, Fn. 1 3). 
What had been the purpose of these mysterious "punishment marks"? Were Pon;i.peans beaten 
as soon as they made "a bad impression" but issued with a certificate of their punishment which 
they had to surrender subsequently for statistical purposes? If this was so, why were the persons 
responsible for carrying out corporal punishments not simply asked to keep lists of the 
punishments which had been administered? How was I going to solve this puzzle, since 
Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf did not identify the source in which Hambruch was 
supposed to have made this claim? 
It was hardly encouraging to discover that the reference to "Hambruch, 1932, S. 1 98" ( 1 99 1 :  
3 1 8,  Fn. 14) in the following footnote gave a wrong page number (it should have been 298), or 
that the text to which it related mistranslated a quote from Hambruch, who had said that Boeder 
had been reluctant to accept well-intentioned and sensible advice rather that he had been "very 
well meaning" and "amenable to intelligent advice"-as the English version claimed ( 1 991 : 264). 
Moreover, when I checked the authors' German version, it turned out that it had quoted Hambruch 
correctly. When I therefore looked at the German version of the footnote quoted above, I found 
that it too differed in several respects from the English version: for example, it did not boldly refer 
to "the records" but only to the files which the authors had "used" (die benutzten Akten). 
However, these files were also not identified. This was doubly disappointing because I had begun 
to wonder whether Hambruch had described the mysterious procedure in a document contained 
in one of these files, since I could not remember having read anything like it in his 1 932 account, 
although it was the only "Hambruch" referred to in this chapter. Perhaps the other "Hambruch" 
was included in the same colonial office file as the report of Girschner to which this footnote 
primarily referred? Since a microfilm of this file-RKA 3009-was held by the Australian 
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National Library it was easy to test this possibility, and for a moment I believed that I had struck 
gold, because another appendix to the report in question consisted of several handwritten 
manuscripts by Hambruch, but they were illegible. Since I did not want to return empty-handed, 
I started to read the legible main report. 
After a while it too struck a familiar chord. Had these lines not been quoted by Hempenstall 
in his 1 978 version of the trial? This time my memory had served me well, but only to reveal 
another bunch of phantoms. According to Hempenstall "Deputy Governor Oswald [sic] had 
concluded when he first heard of the uprising": 17 
In the final analysis they did not fear us and didn't believe we were earnest in our threats . . .  We suffered 
from the mistakes of the Spanish. Perhaps if we had begun energetically this would have been avoided 
(1978 :  1 12). 
While Hempenstall got the date of the report right (it was written on 29 rather than 18 December, 
as stated by Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf (199 1 :  3 1 7, Fn. 1 0)), acting governor 
Osswald had not arrived at this conclusion when he first heard about what he described as "an 
unrest"-which, according to the document, had happened during the night from 29 to 30 
November-but a month later, after he himself had inspected the situation in Ponape. Besides, 
after the first sentence quoted by Hempenstall, Osswald had continued: 
They [the Ponapeans] had already killed a governor and massacred 30 police-soldiers during the Spanish 
period. They received-it is fair to say-virtually no punishment. It is not surprising they got the idea 
that they could get away with the same kind of behaviour in relation to us as under the mistaken Spanish 
policy. If more energetic measures had been taken, we would perhaps be spared the sad experience we 
are making now. 
While the meaning of the last sentence was not a model of clarity, the context left little doubt that 
Osswald referred to a lack of energetic punitive action on the part of the Spanish administration 
rather than expressing regret that the German administration had not begun more energetically. 
But the world of narrative history is a weird place. Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf 
gave the same document here referred to as a "Bericht des Kaiserl. Gouvemeurs . . .  v. 1 8 . 12. 191  O" 
( 1 99 1 :  3 17,  Fn. 10) a few pages later its correct date of 29. 12. 1 9 1 0, although now describing it 
as a "Schreiben Osswalds an RKA" (ibid. :  320, Fn. 54). This did not mean, however, that they had 
consulted the document on that occasion. It rather looked as if they adopted the reference from 
Fn. 40 on p. 230 of Hempenstall's  1978 version. Nor did they re-read their own footnotes, 
otherwise they would have noticed that the next specimen was not referred to in the text and did 
not fit together with the paragraph where it would have had to be located. Instead it was linked 
with the text above footnote 25-but with a nice phantom twist, because the W asai of Sokehs was 
there reported as having stated that the Sokehs would die before they let themselves be treated like 
pigs, whereas footnote 55 claimed: 
The expression of the High Chief of Sokehs that they "did not want to be treated like pigs" reflects this 
vague feeling [of rebelliousness?] better than any concrete example like compulsory labour or beatings. 
While this made sense in Wonderland it became absurd as soon as it was treated as a text which 
was supposed to have a definite meaning. Who outside the realm of phantom history would dream 
of suggesting that the performance of compulsory labour, let alone being beaten, could be 
17 While there is some uncertainty about the spelling of Osswald' s name (Oswald, Ohswald, OBwald, Osswald), there 
is no question that he wrote this report as acting governor so that Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf were correct 
in describing it as a report of the governor. 
1 16 Tiffi TOWER OF BABEL 
described as concrete examples of a vague feeling of anything? By the same token there was no 
better way of experiencing phantom history than concrete examples such as this bizarre, free­
floating footnote. 
In order to restore my sanity I decided to take a look at the "protocol of the hearing" which, 
according to Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf, had taken the form of a report by the 
district office in Ponape, dated 24 February 191 1 ,  on the same file (see 199 1 :  3 19,  Fn. 46) . But 
matters did not improve, since I could neither find this report nor a "protocol of the hearing" in 
"RKA 3009". I was more successful when I followed Hempenstall's  1 978 reference to the "full 
account of the trial" in RKA 3010 ( 1978: 230, Fn. 48), although its description as a 
"Gerichtsprotokoll des summarischen Verfahrens gegen die Marder [sic] von Boeder und seine 
[sic] Kameraden, 23 Februar 1911" suggested that it was another phantom. The two minor 
linguistic inaccuracies aside, it was unlikely that this document would have named the victims of 
the crime rather than the persons accused of having committed it and unthinkable that it would 
have described three junior German officials killed, let alone their native boat crews, as "the 
comrades" of Regierungsrat Boeder. 
But there it was , although without this phantom heading, running to over 70 typewritten pages. 
However, the picture it painted of the trial differed so markedly from the 1 978 Hempenstall and 
the 1991 Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf versions that it was plain that none of these 
authors had read this document. Indeed neither Hempenstall nor Christmann, Hempenstall and 
Ballendorf even got its date right, which was given as "Ponape, den 22123. F ebruar 191 1" rather 
than as the 23rd or 24th of February. Moreover, as if this was not clear enough, its first 
substantive sentence spelled out that the trial had started on 22 February and its last sentence 
confirmed that it had lasted for two days. Nonetheless, Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf 
did not hesitate to tell their readers that the court had convened on 23 February and Hempenstall 
even stressed that "the trial had lasted only a day". 
To be sure, this document too did not necessarily report what actually happened during the 
trial. Indeed, it did not even purport to record the evidence given by the Ponapean accused or 
witnesses verbatim. 18 Still, the summaries provided made it, for example, highly improbable that 
J omatau ever made the statement attributed to him by Spiegel and quoted by Christmann, 
Hempenstall and Ballendorf as well as Hiery. Instead they showed that Hambruch had been a 
more careful reader since they stated: 
Asked whether he had believed that the Jokoits-people would beat the whites in the war following the 
murder, he states, that he had supposed that and that he had believed that he would become the ruler once 
the whites had been got rid off. 
Naturally, Hambruch was also not perfect since he too claimed, for example, that the court had 
convened on 23 February, but the difference between the degree of phantomisation in his account, 
as compared with those of the professional historians who followed him, was remarkable. 19 But 
then the "protocol" offered a likely solution of the puzzle of the mysterious "punishment marks" 
which suggested that anything was possible in the Wonderland of narrative history. 
When I returned to Hambruch' s 1932 account after reading parts of this "protocol", things 
suddenly fell into place. Hambruch had not just extracted the statement he attributed to Jomatau 
from this document, he had also read what Jomatau had to say about the events during the evening 
1 8  The evidence was given in Ponapese and translated into German by a Ponapean interpreter, but he was closely watched 
by four of Kersting's  eight ( !) "assessors" (Beisitzer!)-rather than six "advisors"-who were fluent in that language and 
who confirmed with their signatures that the document was "in accordance with the conduct of the proceedings". 
19 As far as the date of the trial was concerned, Hempenstall and Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf probably had 
relied on Hambruch rather than on this document whereas Hambruch had probably relied on the date given in the annual 
report, without appreciating that it specified the date of the death sentences rather than that of the beginning of the trial. 
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before the killings, when he and the 80 members of the road-gang had inspected the 
"Prugelmarken"-the marks of the beating-on "Latelung (Nanpanpei Maluk)". Hambruch had 
adopted the unusual term "Prugelmarken" without clarifying that he meant Marken in the sense 
of "traces" rather than "tokens". Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf had misunderstood this 
term, translating it as "punishment marks" in their English version20-and their imagination had 
done the rest. 
Although this left me holding yet another bunch of phantoms, their pointlessness provided a 
key to understanding the whole process of phantomisation: taken individually, phantoms did not 
have to have any rhyme or reason, because the phantomisation of history was an instinctive rather 
than a purposive process. Narrative historians did not set out to phantomise history, they merely 
could not help it. But nor did they try to eliminate phantoms, because they had constructed a self­
contained Wonderland in which phantoms were real, because the historical record was also treated 
as a phantom: as a garden of exotic flowers from which each historian could pick his own 
narrative bouquet, without having to pay attention to the lay-out of the garden or to the 
composition of previously assembled bunches. Although a commitment to factuality still played 
a crucial role, in the sense that concrete details had to be given, this commitment too had become 
a phantom. 
Since this was so, it would also have been unfair to criticise Hempenstall for telling his readers 
that "the tribunal" had decided that the Ponapeans whom it had sentenced to death were to be 
executed by Melanesian police-soldiers, because "German soldiers should not be subjected to this 
undignified ritual". True, the "protocol of the hearing" did not indicate that this matter had been 
considered, and it was improbable that the possibility of requisitioning the imperial navy to 
provide a firing-squad to carry out the sentence of a civilian court had ever been raised, but did 
this statement not make narrative sense, and should Hempenstall not rather be praised for boldly 
capturing the spirit of German colonial rule in this aside, even if it was another figment of his 
imagination? 
Yet, while the rituals of phantom history were more dignified than executing real people, their 
effects were just as deadly. Instead of gradually advancing our knowledge and understanding of 
the Ponape Rebellion, sixty years of historiography had effectively killed this episode as a 
historical event by burying it under a heap of contradictory phantom narratives. Worse still, there 
was no point in trying to resurrect it. The self-assurance with which Hempenstall, Christmann, 
Ballendorf and Hiery presented their phantom histories clearly showed that they all believed they 
had done a professional job. In "the final analysis" the explanation of the phantomisation of 
history was therefore quite simple: phantom history had generally come to be regarded as "the real 
thing"; professional historiographers were expected to write phantom histories consisting of bold, 
exchangeable conclusions supported by a collection of concrete but variable, quasi-factual 
phantoms. Historians had achieved the ultimate professional triumph; they had developed a 
product which was one hundred per cent consumer as well as producer-friendly: history as a form 
of serious but harmless entertainment which made no strenuous demands on anybody. 
VII 
Still, it was "ironic" that Spiegel' s  memoirs turned out to be the only version of the Ponape 
Rebellion that got at least the length of the trial right in the sense that it was in accord with the best 
available evidence, and doubly ironic that Hiery missed this rare opportunity of being right with 
Spiegel by not identifying the length of the trial, although happily adopting Spiegel' s  wrong 
execution date. It was also "striking" that Hiery managed to back the wrong horse at almost every 
20 My guess is that the term "Priigelmarken" had reminded Christmann of the "Lebensmittelmarken" (rationing cards) 
of his youth. 
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opportunity and without hesitation-for example by falling for one of Spiegel ' s  more daring 
phantoms: the killing of a Catholic brother by the rebels after 1 8  October 1910 ( 1995: 284), for 
which there is, as far as I can see, not a single shred of supporting evidence. 
Moreover, this phantom played a strategic role: together with the mixed phantom that the four 
other tribes on Ponape had after "lengthy deliberations" unanimously decided to "protect the 
remaining Germans . . .  against the Dschokadsch" it gave substance to Hiery' s conclusion that the 
Ponape Rebellion had been an "ethnic national war", in which the Dschokadsch, after this killing, 
concentrated exclusively on defending "their own 'state"' (ibid.). Similarly, Jomatau's  immortal 
phantom lines helped to prepare the ground for Hiery's conclusion that the German response to 
the Ponape Rebellion formed just one link in a long chain of colonial injustices that neither started 
nor ended in Ponape (ibid. :  285) ; for in Wonderland such general statements, however 
ideologically pleasing, remained empty words unless they were substantiated in some way. 
Hempenstall' s interpretation of the Ponape Rebellion as "an angry reaction against Carl [sic] 
Boeder' s mounting persecution", provided a good illustration for this need. Apart from the 
"negative belief that [only] Sokehs was to be destroyed", Hempenstall did not just rely on graphic 
instances of Boeder' s personal "wickedness" but also asserted that Boeder "had been able to act 
for nine months virtually in contravention of guidelines laid down by Berlin, [governor] Hahl and 
[Boeder' s predecessor] Fritz" ( 1978: 105-6). 
While Hiery did not discuss this personalised interpretation, although it was inconsistent with 
his own, he did adopt these phantom "guidelines", even turning them into "clear instructions", 
although Hempenstall himself had long abandoned them, proclaiming instead: "Of course Boeder 
was not only personally responsible, he was also the leading instrument of the new Berlin policy 
guidelines" (Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf, 1 99 1 :  266). Yet Christmann, Hempenstall 
and Ballendorf still relied on Hambruch's  personalised version of the introduction of corporal 
punishments by Boeder in July 1910, although they mentioned in another context ( 199 1 :  203) that 
an ordinance by the governor of German New Guinea, which provided for the corporal 
punishment of coloured labourers, had already come into effect in the Eastern Carolines on 28 
June 1907, that is to say, three years earlier. 
This was how phantom history worked: by first selecting narratively attractive bits of 
information which were then mixed together, instead of being critically examined, to form a new 
narrative which was again not meant to be critically examined. Even the occasional critical 
outbursts of narrative historians were phantoms rather than manifestations of a sustained critical 
attitude-for example that of Hiery concerning the number of police-soldiers stationed on Po nape: 
it was not the result of a critical examination of Luelen but of an uncritical reliance on Spiegel. 
Phantom historians did not critically analyse and compare what others or they themselves had 
previously written. They prepared their narrative omelettes with whatever tasty ingredients came 
to hand. 
This could involve astonishing metamorphoses. For example, the old ( 1978) "guidelines" for 
Boeder, which had supposedly been laid down by "Berlin, Hahl and Fritz", aparently grew out of 
a "censure" one of Fritz's  predecessors had been given in 1902 ( ! )when he had, according to 
Hempenstall, reported to the colonial department that he intended "to assert imperial authority 
'forcefully' and to meet local resistance with 'relentless '  reprisals" (see 1978: 82-83 and 105). 
Now it was reasonable to conclude from the historical record that Boeder too was expected to 
move cautiously and not to let things get out of control. But this was too vague for narrative 
history. Hence the multiple phantom guidelines which were sufficiently tangible to be at least 
"virtually" contravened, without having to be specified, let alone critically examined-and how 
could they have been examined since they were mere phantoms? 
The new ( 1 99 1 )  guidelines had an even more tenuous link with the historical record. 
Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf deduced their existence from the "sudden transfer" of 
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Fritz from Ponape to Yap. "One could conclude that in Berlin Fritz' s  course was considered to 
be still too unenergetic.  The Colonial Office wanted to change the situation on Pohnpei. . .and at 
the same time strengthen Demburg' s  new policies" ( 199 1 :  263) .  
Had Boeder's "reforms" in July 1910 been a belated implementation of Demburg' s  "new [ !] 
policies"?-belated because Demburg had left the colonial office during the previous month, after 
heading it for almost four years. But then Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf not only had 
a low opinion of these "brutal new methods" but also criticised Hambruch for describing them as 
"reforms", though they missed the opportunity of criticising him for describing these reforms as 
"necessary" (see 1991 : 3 1 8, Fn. 22 and Hambruch, 1 932: 300). 
But this was Wonderland where all inconsistencies between phantoms could ultimately be 
"virtually" reconciled. 
In the end, the uprising shows that, despite the dictates of official policy, the initiative for handling the 
colonised Ponapeans lay squarely with the individual officer in Po nape . . .  Boeder incorporated all the 
functions of colonial rule: legislative, executive and judicial . . .  Most importantly, Boeder had been able 
to act for nine months virtually in contravention of guidelines laid down by Berlin, Hahl and Fritz . . . .  That 
he could do so without censure from Berlin demonstrates that, in the final analysis, Ponape was too far 
from German New Guinea, let alone Europe, for the actions of its executives to be supervised in detail 
(Hempenstall, 1978: 105-06). 
But when Boeder came and .. .introduced his brutal new methods and made one psychological mistake 
after the other, then an explosion was inevitable. Of course Boeder was not only personally responsible, 
he was also the leading instrument of the new Berlin policy guidelines. As the highest official he 
combined in himself all the forms of colonial authority in Pohnpei: legislative, executive and 
judicial-the dominant instruments of structural power. The distances from his superiors in New Guinea 
and in Berlin also enabled these personal blunders to occur. Thus it was inevitable that the anger of the 
people should first be directed against him (Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf, 1 99 1 :  266). 
Better still, there was no need to reconcile anything because nothing in narrative history had a 
fixed and precise meaning. 
When Hiery stated that so much had been written about the Ponape Rebellion that it was 
superfluous to go into "details" (Einzelheiten), he did not mean to say that the details he was going 
to present were superfluous, any more than he meant to say that the "special features" 
(Eigentiimlichkeiten) he was going to point out distinguished the Ponape Rebellion from other 
rebellions against German colonial rule in the Pacific. On the contrary-if there is such a thing 
in Wonderland-he could happily state two pages later that: "The rebellion of the Dschokadsch 
was the only military uprising of a group of the indigenous population against the German 
administration in the Pacific" ( 1995: 285). But then the term "military uprising" (militiirische 
Erhebung) was, of course, merely another phantom. Similarly, Hiery was free to turn whatever 
detail he chose into a "special feature". Thus it was a special feature of the Ponape Rebellion that 
four German officials, including the district commissioner, and six Truk people were killed; that 
there were only 17 Europeans on Ponape and only six Germans (four men and two women) in the 
Kolonie, together with 24 Melanesian police soldiers; and that Hahl had razed two thirds of the 
walls of the Spanish fortifications. (1995 : 283). 
Moreover, these special features only existed as part of this particular narrative, so that another 
narrative historian could choose to present a different set of special features without either of them 
having to feel embarrassed. There was no reason to get worried when I read that, according to 
Hempenstall, there were "less than fifty" Europeans on Ponape, who were protected by "another 
fifty police-soldiers" in a settlement with a two kilometre perimeter and no walls ( 1978: 106), or 
that the six Truk people killed came, in fact, from the Mortlock Islands, not to mention that they 
were only five of whom only four were killed (1978:  105). 
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Put bluntly, it was neither superfluous to go into the details of the history of the Ponape 
Rebellion nor sufficient to point out a few of its special features, but it was a waste of time to do 
either as long as this kind of phantom history was treated as an academically acceptable form of 
historiography. 
But why should historians abandon the mixture of big words and little phantoms, which was 
phantom history, if it allowed them to write the history of almost everything although they knew 
almost nothing about it? Who was going to force them to change? Was it not preferable to be told 
that Boeder "combined in himself all the forms of colonial authority in Pohnpei: legislative, 
executive and judicial" and that these were "the dominant instruments of structural power" rather 
than having to face a discussion of the possible structures of power, or a description of the actual 
structures of German colonial authority in the Eastern Carolines in 1910? Was it not more 
satisfying if a historian reinforced the illusion of professional omniscience by telling us that the 
426 persons making up the entire banished Dschokasch tribe had included "Y elirt, the widow of 
Kubary" (Hiery, 1995: 285, Fn. 1 1 7)-the renowned Polish naturalist and ethnographer-instead 
of complicating matters by also referring to a footnote by Hambruch (1932: 343 , Fn. 1 )  where he 
bitterly complained about the misuse of the name Kubary?21 
Generally Hambruch' s account showed a much more complex and inconclusive scenario than 
that depicted by Hempenstall or Christmann, Hempenstall and Ballendorf, let alone Hiery. 
Hambruch still had a lot to learn about writing proper narrative history. But then he not only 
suffered from the lack of a professional historical training, he was also handicapped by his 
personal acquaintance with the leading historical actors as three-dimensional human beings and 
with the contemporary, physical features of the historical stage on which they were performing. 
More recent amateur historians did considerably better than Hambruch, and none more so than 
Wolfgang Eckart in a paper on 'Medicine and German colonial expansion in the Pacific' ( 1988). 
I read with awe that Eckart was able to state that: "Between 1 884 and 1914, exactly 5 1 0  German 
physicians were sent out to Germany' s  Schutzgebiete in Africa and the Pacific, and to her Chinese 
Pachtgebiet, Kiautchou" (ibid. : 8 1) ;  and with even greater awe that: "Between 1 884 and 1 914, a 
total of 32 of the 130 [civil] Regierungsarzte [in contrast to the 380-military-Stabsarzte] were 
sent to the Pacific, most of them to Kaiser-Wilhelmsland" (ibid. :  84) . Although I had my doubts 
about the accuracy of these figures, since the 1914 budget of German New Guinea provided for 
as many as 16 current positions for medical doctors, and since it was unlikely that during the 
preceding 30 years of German colonial rule only about another 1 6  doctors should have been sent 
out to the Old Protectorate, the Island Territory, the Marshall Islands and Samoa, I was prepared 
to bow to Eckart' s expertise in this particular field. But when I read that the post of district 
commissioner in the Marianas had never been filled and that the group had been administered by 
the district commissioners in the Eastern Carolines until 1 906 and by those in the Western 
Carolines afterwards (ibid. : 89) I realised that I had stumbled over an intuitive master 
phantomiser--or was Hubatsch to blame, since Eckart referred to his lists as the source of the 
information reported? 
Despite my bad experiences with these lists I was not prepared to believe that they were so far 
out, and they indeed duly listed Georg Fritz as having served as district commissioner of the 
Marianas between 1 899 and 1907 ( 1 984: 536). But Eckart had not only missed what Hubatsch had 
to say about the administration of the Marianas, he had also added to the phantoms these lists 
included, for example by inventing a doctorate for the secretary of the district office, Baumert, 
who was wrongly shown by Hubatsch as having served as district commissioner of the Western 
21 According to Hambruch, Y elirt was not banished as the widow of Kubary but as the widow of the Jokasch man, 
Keroun en Toi e tik, who had been one of the rebels executed for the killings of 1 8  October 19 10. It had been the ultimate 
in bad taste, so Hambruch, that the name of Kubary had been transferred to this man and that it had even been used in 
court. "It would have been the duty of Herr Girschner to inform the court, which did not know the name and importance 
of Kubary, in time so as to avoid that the deceased would be burdened with the shame of his successor . . . .  " 
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Caro lines between 191 1 and 1914 (ibid.). Moreover, while Eckart, in  line with Hubatsch, showed 
Arno Senfft in this context as having served as district commissioner between 1 899 and 1 909, he 
had earlier stated in a biographical sketch that Senfft had become district commissioner in 
1901-and this sketch generally and effortlessly. outphantomised even Hempenstall' s  
biographical sketch of  governor Bennigsen. 
According to Eckart, Senfft was not "an old-style Prussian army officer" but "a typical 
Imperial German government official" who was, of course, not a Prussian but 
was born in Weimar, on 28 March 1864. After making his way up in the Saxon (GroBherzogtum Sachsen­
Weimar) and Wiirttemberg (Konigreich Wurttemberg) civil service,. he, highly bemedalled, entered the 
German colonial service in 1899, and was ordered to hoist the Kaiserreich' s flag on the Caroline Islands. 
Together with the governor of German New Guinea he took possession of Sonsorol (6 March 1901) ,  
Merir, Pulo Ana (7 March 1901 ), Tobi, and Helen Reef ( 12  April 1901 ) . Senfft became Bezirksamtmann 
of Yap in 190 1 .  In 1907 he was entitled Vizegouvemeur (Vice-Governor), and made himself a name as 
a political expert on Pacific affairs in the Kolonialabteilung des Auswiirtigen Amtes. His most important 
articles on 'Germany and the Pacific' were published between 1 903 and 1905. In 1 909, Senfft travelled 
to Hong Kong, in an unknown capacity, and died there, of unknown causes, on 16  March 1909 (ibid. : 
86). 
So impressed had Eckart been by the array of medals of his phantom hero that he added in a 
footnote: 
Senfft must have been very successful in his posts before entering Germany's colonial service because 
he was highly bemedalled: among other things, he was bearer of the GroBherzogtum Sachsischer [sic] 
Hausorden der W achsamkeit, the Wtirttembergischer Friedrichsorden, the Preussischer roter Adlerorden, 
4 Klasse, and, interestingly enough, also bearer of the [Spanish] Amerikanischer Orden Isabellas der 
Katholischen (ibid. : 99, Fn. 1 5). 
Instead of checking any of the obituaries which Eckart identified as his sources, in particular that 
in the Deutsches Kolonialblatt which was claimed to have been published five years after Senfft' s 
death, I was happy to settle for the information provided in a single obituary published shortly 
after that event in the Amtsblatt of German New Guinea. It told me that Senfft had died on 14 
February (rather than 16  March) 1909 on his way back to Germany because of a serious illness; 
that he had entered the Prussian legal (rather than the Saxon civil) service in 1 882 and the employ 
of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in 1891  ; that he had worked for four years in the administration 
of the Marshall Islands before being promoted and sent as district commissioner to the Western 
Carolines in 1 899; and that his greatest honour had been the granting of the title "Regierungsrat" 
in 1906 (19 14: 46). All this was probably factual, but what a mundane existence compared with 
a vice-governor who died mysteriously during what might have been a secret political mission to 
China, proudly wearing the medal with which the grand duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach had 
honoured him for his "vigilance", no doubt in matters of utmost delicacy and vital importance. 
Whereas I was beginning to enjoy fanciful displays of phantoms such as this, I was getting 
worried about a more serious aspect of the phantomisation process. I could dismiss the entire 
secondary literature as unreliable, but what was I going to do about the phantomisation of history 
in the primary sources, the phantomisation of history in which the historical actors themselves had 
engaged? 
Were, for example, the reports which Spiegel had submitted to his superiors during his naval 
career factual, or had he already used the same kind of poetic licence his memoirs displayed? Or, 
to give a concrete example, was the following character sketch of governor Bennigsen on which 
lieutenant commander Seiferling of SMS Moewe drew in a personal report to the chief of the 
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naval staff of 2 December 1902 (RM3/3 1 15) any more reliable than the portrait Hempenstall had 
painted some 75 years later? 
Gouvernor von Bennigsen was obviously in no way equal to his task. Here he has gained recognition-if 
at all-only by the large firms because he moved the seat of government to their centre in Herbertshtlhe 
and because he granted them land with great abandon. Judging by all I have heard and seen, he was a 
jolly bonvivant who had no interest in, or understanding for, the development of the country. 
It was time to delve in the historical record to find out for myself what it had to offer and this 
report by Seiferling was part of a cluster of documents which turned out to be unexpectedly 
illuminating because they suggested that imperial German officials and officers in the colonies 
hardly needed natives or colonists to keep themselves busy. 
Chapter 5: Of Wolves in China Shops 
I 
On April Fool's  Day 1 903 admiral von Tirpitz, secretary of the naval office, wrote a top secret letter to the chief of the naval staff, Btichsel, caused by another top secret letter, written by 
Stuebe!, the head of the colonial department, which, in turn, had been prompted by a complaint 
by the Jaluit Gesellschaft. It concerned the behaviour of captain von Burski, commander of the 
station cruiser SMS Cormoran, during a visit to the Marshall Islands in 1902. 1 
There had been long-standing tensions between visiting naval commanders and the company, 
because the commanders believed the company provided inferior service at exorbitant prices to 
the navy and, having successfully conned the colonial department, felt perfecty safe in doing so. 
These tensions had reached a new peak during the B urski visit. This pleased the company because 
Burski had also attacked the colonial department. His alleged outburst was connected with the 
discovery of phosphate on Nauru, from which the company was expected to make a vast profit, 
since its exploitation was seen as falling under a guano monopoly it had been granted in 1 888. 
According to the company, Burski had told its local representatives that he knew of an expert 
opinion which concluded that phosphate was technically not guano. Since it therefore did not fall 
under the existing monopoly he could not understand why the company had also been given the 
right to exploit this resource. He was said to have continued, thereby casting a "scandalous 
suspicion on the colonial administration": "any impartial observer, like myself, must get the 
impression that this agreement involved corrupt dealings [dass bei dem Abkommen 
Durchstechereien vorgekommen sind]." 
Tirpitz consulted the report Burski had submitted on his visit to the Marshall Islands. Although 
it mentioned no such comment, it gave him the impression that Burski had not been as careful as 
he should have been in what he had said about "the internal politics of the Marshall Islands". He 
therefore asked Btichsel to order Burski io submit a supplementary report, so that it could be 
determined how far he had spoken in a private or official capacity. 
As the marginal notes on the Tirpitz letter showed, the naval staff was annoyed by it. Why was 
it necessary to distinguish what Burski had said in a private or an official capacity? For what 
purpose? And, most importantly, by whom? Besides, it was not prepared to accept that Burski 
had failed to observe the necessary caution in either capacity. Still, Burski was asked for a 
supplementary report. 
Not surprisingly, he denied having used the words attributed to him. But his own version 
showed that he had at least come very close. A meeting with the representatives of the company, 
during which he had intended to discuss an improvement in the supply of coal to the navy, had 
turned to its general business practices and, in particular, to the exploitation of the phosphate 
deposits on Nauru. As he had implied in his previous report, Burski had personally taken the view 
that the arrangements with the company could only have been made because the authorities at 
home did not sufficiently appreciate the conditions in the Marshall Islands, and that administrator 
Brandeis was the wrong man to look after the interests of the Reich on the spot. Naturally, Burski 
had not withheld these personal views when explaining to the representatives of the company that 
in all these arrangements the company had always been the receiving and never the giving part. 
He had then used words to the effect that a foreigner, who was not familiar with German 
conditions, but who saw how little the company was prepared to make sacrifices, had to get the 
idea that "among us" corrupt dealings were also possible (dass auch bei uns Durchstechereien 
m0glich waren). He was at a loss to see how anyone could conclude from these remarks-which 
1 Unless otherwise indicated the information in this section comes from a single naval file: RMS/601 1 .  
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he had also made to the acting administrator, von Bunsen-that he doubted the honesty of any 
colonial official. Surely the director of the colonial department would not think that a commander 
of one of the S.M. ships was capable of casting such an outrageous suspicion. On the other hand, 
he certainly had not presented himself as an impartial observer but had openly admitted his 
partiality. Nor had he claimed that an expert opinion had concluded that phosphate was not the 
same as guano. Instead he had said verbatim: "I was told in the office of the administrator that the 
question has been raised as to whether phosphate actually is guano. I also learned there that expert 
opinions have been sought in this matter. It is therefore highly questionable that it was, contrary 
to the company's view, a foregone conclusion that it should have been granted this concession." 
Burski also denied that previous naval reports had caused him to avoid social intercourse with 
the representatives of the company on Jaluit, as Stuebe! apparently believed. He had done his duty, 
and one could not blame him for being reserved, if one knew that one of the company's  former 
representatives had exchanged blows with the then administrator and that the German consulate 
in Sydney had stopped all contact with the company's agent there because it had been unable to 
confirm that the prices this man had charged the district office in Yap had been fair. As a result 
the colonial department had instructed the local administrations in the Pacific no longer to obtain 
their supplies from that source, whereas the company had happily continued its own links with this 
dubious man. 
True, he had not visited the house of its representative in Ponape, but only because he had a 
half-caste wife, whereas its Truk representative had spent Christmas Eve with his-presumably 
eligible-wife on board SMS Cormoran. On the other hand, Burski stood by all of the negative 
comments he had made about the company's  performance in his first report. They were partly 
based on his own observations and partly on information provided by the acting administrator. He 
had fully agreed with his views-and, Burski added "in confidence", had given him access to the 
government files, which had told him not only many interesting things about the company, but had 
also enabled him to form the negative opinion about administrator Brandeis he had expressed in 
his main report. 
On 25 July 1 903 the naval office wrote again to the naval staff, enclosing lengthy comments 
the colonial department had made at its invitation on this earlier report. Tirpitz was worried by 
their "aggressive tone". He therefore sought information about discussions between the naval staff 
and the colonial department in 1901 about an incident involving governor Solf and the navy in 
Samoa which demonstrated that colonial officials too could make serious mistakes and which 
could thus perhaps be used to counter the colonial department in the Burski case.2 
On 19  October 1903 Tirpitz responded to Stuebe!' s comments. They had climaxed in a request 
to censure B urski for his repeated interference "in the sphere of power" reserved for the colonial 
administration and to take the measures necessary to prevent such occurrences in the future. As 
far as the corruption allegation was concerned, Stuetiel had asked for an appropriate disciplinary 
punishment unless,  as he assumed, Burski denied having made it. 
Although Tirpitz did not approve of Burski' s behaviour, he tried to protect him. He suggested 
that Burski ' s  supplementary report-which he discussed in his response, without sending a copy 
to Stuebel-had taken care of the corruption allegation, even though, according to Burski' s own 
version, his remarks had been out of place. He also admitted that at least one of the measures taken 
by Burski, about which Stuebe! had complained, had been rash. But he did not believe that Burski 
had intended to trespass on the preserve of the colonial administration. On the contrary, he was 
convinced that Burski, like all naval commanders, had acted with the best of intentions, trying to 
strengthen the authority of the colonial government, and that he had merely permitted himself to 
be carried away by his enthusiasm He, Tirpitz, had taken action to have his views communicated 
2 Solfhad done the unforgiveable by suggesting that the navy, like the colonial department, was subject to instructions 
from the chancellor of the Reich, instead of acknowledging that it was under the direct command of the emperor. 
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to Burski and trusted that such unfortunate incidents, no doubt due to regrettable but fortuitous 
personality clashes, would not happen again. 
The naval staff saw this response as another interference by Tirpitz in its responsibilities. It 
instructed the commander of the North Sea station, where Burski was now serving, to show him 
the correspondence between the naval office and the colonial department, but it also attached a 
copy of a letter to the naval office in which it had criticised "the incorrect handling" of the matter 
by Tirpitz, informing him that it had no intention of censuring Burski. 
Tirpitz responded three weeks later, defending the stand he had taken. Contrary to the view 
of the naval staff, the "Burski Case" had not started with Burski's report of 30 November 1902 
but with a complaint by the colonial department to the naval office. He had asked the colonial 
department for its comments on Burski' s report because he had wanted to clarify the business 
practices of the company, with which the naval office had ongoing contractual relations. It was 
not his fault that Stuebe! had dragged in matters covered by Burski in his subsequent reports. In 
general, the case had been such that it was impossible to separate its economic from its 
"military/political" (militiirpolitische) and personal aspects (which were both the responsibility 
of the naval staff). Under these circumstances there could be no question that he had been 
competent to deal with the matter and, in doing so, to express his views on all its aspects. As far 
as the personal aspect was concerned, he had handed the matter over to Burski' s military superiors 
for internal treatment. In his response to the colonial department he had defended Burski as 
strongly as one could possibly justify. He had expressed the view-shared by the chief of the 
naval staff-that some of Burski's remarks had been incorrect. This had not been intended as a 
formal censure, which, if appropriate, could only be issued by Burski' s military superior. 
Tirpitz clearly felt that disciplinary measures were called for. But the naval staff, as well as the 
commander of Burski 's current North Sea station, did not take them. partly because they resented 
Tirpitz' s  treatment of the case but also because they were in sympathy with Burski's behaviour, 
although he had perhaps been a fraction too forthright in the expression of his views. It is likely, 
therefore, that Burski felt that he had emerged victorious and that he and his comrades would 
receive the full support of their military superiors if they behaved in future in the same way as he 
had behaved during the round trip of SMS Cormoran in the Marshall Islands and German New 
Guinea between November 1902 and March 1 903.3 
II 
The main event during SMS Cormoran' s  stay in the Marshall Islands was a ten day trip to the 
Ratak Chain, including Mejit Island. 
Mejit was densely populated and rich in coconuts, but it had no harbour so that it was difficult 
to ship its copra to Jaluit. As a result the Mejit people had received twice the usual wage of 2 
Marks per day to load the company's vessels. In mid-1901 administrator Brandeis had suddenly 
reduced wages to the standard rate in order, so Burski said, to further the company's commercial 
interests-and Mejit had gone on strike. During a visit of SMS Cormoran in December 1901 
Brandeis had ordered the corporal punishment of seven men who had refused to follow his order 
to work for 2 Marks per day, but he had changed his mind when the crowd had adopted a 
threatening attitude. Instead he had fined Mejit collectively 50,000 kilograms of copra-worth 
4,000 Marks-for disobedience and ordered that its inhabitants should only be paid 6 rather than 
8 Pfennigs per kilogram until they were willing to load at the reduced rate. In addition he had 
instructed the high chief in Maloelab not to respond to requests from Mejit to send his vessel to 
3 Burski submitted several reports on this trip. I have used the following copies: 30 November 1 902 (RKA 265 1), 3 
January 1903 (RM3/3015), 10 February 1903 (RKA 265 1)  and 4 April 1903 (RM3/3015) 
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supply Mejit with goods in exchange for copra which only the trader for the company was entitled 
to purchase. 
Burski found the entire affair disgraceful and used it as an excuse for a general review of the 
relations between the colonial government and the company. In his view, the administration of the 
Marshall Islands could be turned into a highly profitable enterprise as soon as the company' s  
commercial privileges were removed, and i t  was asked, instead o f  underwriting the budget, to pay 
the same kind of taxes and duties which had been introduced in other German colonies. It was 
intolerable that the natives regarded the imperial administrator as an instrument of the all-powerful 
company which not only refused to do anything for the economic development of the colony, but 
also insisted on charging the navy almost three times the cost price for fresh meat, although it had 
been paid 26,000 Marks for other supplies during the latest visit of SMS Cormoran alone, which 
too had primarily served the commercial interests of the company. 
SMS Cormoran reached its next stop, Ponape, on 1 December 1902. Vice-governor Berg 
immediately paid it a visit which was promptly returned. The two weeks stay in Ponape was 
uneventful, apart from the familiar supply problems caused by the indifference and greed of the 
company. Burski had convinced himself that there was no need to fear unrest among the natives, 
whose more important chiefs did not fail to pay him their respects. Otherwise he singled out the 
Catholic mission for comment because he believed it was gradually dying. Its current head lacked 
both energy and intelligence, and the brother assisting him was even less capable of showing any 
kind of initiative. 
On 16  December 1902 SMS Cormoran travelled to the Truk group, reaching Uola Island two 
days later. The most influential chiefs of the island immediately appeared on board. The natives 
made a good impression. They were neither shy nor fearful. A lively barter trade developed. Chief 
Gurrit returned in the evening with about 40 people to entertain the crew with dances. Presents 
of food were exchanged. The natives were most impressed when the floodlights were turned on 
after dark and a few signal rockets were fired. The next day SMS Cormoran moved to Toloas 
Island. The chiefs of that island, as well as those of Umam and Tefan, promptly paid their 
respects. 
In addition to the company representative Petersen-a young man who had only arrived two 
weeks previously-the trader Ahlers and a half-caste trader by the name of Hartmann appeared 
on board. Ahlers, an honest and reliable man of more than 60 years of age, told Burski that the 
native missionaries of the Boston mission had preached against the emperor, the Reich, and the 
governor, telling their congregations that the Germans had come to Truk to kill them and to take 
their land. The governor had no say on Truk, its boss was chief Nanpei of Ponape. All land on 
Truk belonged to the mission society in San Francisco. They should bring all their copra to the 
mission and not to the German traders who would only cheat them and who, as a result of these 
falsehoods, had indeed obtained some 25 tonnes less than during the previous year. 
Burski regarded the matter as sufficiently important to order his "judicial officer" 
( Gerichtsoffizier) to take evidence from five native witnesses. They confirmed that they had heard 
the native missionaries making such statements. Burski had therefore decided to arrest the 
missionaries, and to take them to Ponape for punishment. He had sent an officer to the mission 
station to order its head, the American missionary Stimson, to appear on board with the four native 
missionaries in question. Burski had informed Stimson about the accusations, asking him whether 
the native missionaries had acted in accordance with his instructions.  Stimson had denied this 
"with a sneering smile", adding that he had always strongly supported the German government 
in its endeavours. When Stimson had wanted to continue along these lines, Burski had told him 
to stop since he had no proof whatsoever of Stimson' s loyalty. On the contrary, on the basis of the 
assessment of his predecessor, captain Grapow-according to whom Stimson was no more 
Christian than choosey in his methods-he was inclined to suspect the opposite. He then informed 
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Stimson that he would take the four native missionaries to Ponape and only regretted that he did 
not have sufficient reason to arrest him as well. Stimson had become excited and begun to make 
"improper speeches", stressing that he was an American citizen, that Burski had no right to take 
the actions he had taken and that he protested against the removal of his "pupils"-throwing in 
some derogatory comments about the trader Ahlers for good measure-whereupon Burski had 
asked Stimson to take his leave. When Burski had subsequently left his cabin to make 
arrangements for the accommodation of the four arrested native missionaries, he had observed 
Stimson giving them instructions. When he had ordered him to leave the ship, Stimson had refused 
and continued his protests. In order to bring this unpleasant scene to an end, Burski had ordered 
his guards to escort Stimson to his boat. 
As Burski was convinced that Stimson would use every means at his disposal to create the 
impression that he had been violated by the warship, he had ordered his judicial officer to draw 
up a formal record of the events. Moreover, to balance the scale he had ordered Snelling, a 
renegade missionary, to cease his missionary activities until the vice-governor had made a final 
decision-although he believed that Snelling was being unfairly persecuted by Stimson. On the 
other hand, Burski believed that Snelling was mentally deranged, as evidenced by the fact that he 
frequently ordered his native followers to climb the highest mountain to pray there from sunrise 
to sunset. 
After investigating a murder case, taking the confessed killer with him to Ponape for 
punishment, and after admonishing the assembled chiefs to obey the laws and orders which his 
majesty the emperor issued to them through his governor, Burski left Truk with such a favourable 
impression that he recommended moving the seat of the district office for the Eastern Carolines 
from Ponape to this group. 
Burski had mixed feeling about Yap, in the Western Carolines, where he anchored on 3 1  
December 1902. The harbour was good, but all the buildings, including those belonging to the 
government, were neglected. Moreover, the native hospital, full of patients with the most horrible 
afflictions, was situated next to the road from the harbour to the district office so that they were 
in full view of every arriving foreigner. Still, the place had the major advantage that the company 
played as yet an insignificant role. This was about to change, since it was set to take over the 
O'Keefe firm which had provided the navy with excellent service. Typically the company was 
already using its connections with the colonial department to have the tax payable by this firm 
reduced in preparation for its takeover. Now was the time to buy a small island in the harbour for 
a government coaling depot, to avoid having to put up with the exorbitant prices the company 
would demand, once it had firmly established itself. 
The natives were peaceful and the major chiefs had visited him on board soon after his arrival 
to assure him of their loyalty and satisfaction with the measures taken by the German government. 
But Burski was concerned about the manner in which it was currently represented. The popular 
district commissioner Senfft was on leave and the young government doctor was deputising for 
him. This was in any case undesirable, because the natives could not appreciate that a medical 
man, whose duty it was to look after their physical well-being, could at the same time be their 
judge. In addition, Dr Born had no idea how to treat natives socially. Instead of drawing a strict 
line, he played blind man's buff and other childish games with them, thus quickly undermining 
the respect in which the highest government official should be held. 
In Palau Burski was greeted by an ancient mulatto, Gibbon, whom Senfft had placed in charge 
of the local administration-an appointment of which Burski did not approve, although he 
acknowledged that Gibbon handled the natives firmly and with dignity. In this regard he was 
certainly better than Dr Born, who had recently ordered Gibbon to treat adultery among the natives 
of Palau no longer as a criminal offence, whereas Senfft, before going on leave, had specifically 
instructed Gibbon not only to punish adulterers but to send men who had committed adultery with 
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the wives of chiefs to Yap, because of the seriousness of the offence. When Gibbon told Burski 
about his dilemma, Burski instructed him not to proclaim or apply Born's new ordinance. "I 
informed Dr Born of the above when I arrived in Yap and hope that I convinced him that his hasty 
measure was untenable." 
By contrast, the visit to Saipan was a full success .  Burski assured the emperor that district 
commissioner Fritz was the right man for this post and fully equal to his task. Fritz had arranged 
a big feast to celebrate the emperor's birthday on 27 January. It had started with native dances, ox­
cart races and cock fights and continued as a proper ball, in which the crew of SMS Cormoran 
and the Chamorro girls had taken an equally active part. 
A second stop in Ponape confirmed Burski' s  view that this was the least promising of all the 
large islands in German Micronesia. It was comparatively infertile and inhabited by an indolent 
and suspicious population. To introduce taxes was unthinkable. Even a peaceful disarmament 
could only be considered after the large store of ammunition in the hands of the natives had 
dwindled and their confidence in the government had increased. Still, some progress was being 
made, as the two leading chiefs had, for the first time, celebrated his majesty, the emperor, in long 
speeches during an official dinner in honour of his recent birthday. 
Upon the arrival of SMS Cormoran in Herbertshohe, on 22 February 1903, acting governor 
Knake had made his obligatory visit on board, and had received Burski's obligatory return visit, 
but this had been the sum total of social contact, since Knake had not even maintained the limited 
social contacts with one of S.M. ships which the general code of politeness would have required. 
After coaling in Matupi, Hernsheim & Co providing its usual excellent service, Burski therefore 
went for a round trip to New Ireland and, after coaling again, for a second round trip to the 
northern Solomons to show the flag, since Knake also had made not a single requisition for naval 
assistance. 
In Petat Harbour, on Buka, SMS Cormoran was approached by a large number of canoes, 
carrying about 300 warriors in immaculate formation-which the chiefs explained as a gesture of 
welcome and appreciation. The next stop was Queen Carola Harbour, also on Buka. Burski had 
heard in Petat that the natives there were fighting. The armed cutter sent to summon the chiefs had 
met them already on their way to assure Burski that peace had been concluded. They promised 
him, after his earnest admonishments, that they would keep the peace in future, so that SMS 
Cormoran was ready to sail to Nissan Island where the resident trader had asked urgently for a 
visit from a warship. 
The disputes between him and the natives turned out to be trivial and were settled quickly to 
the satisfaction of all concerned. Nonetheless, Burski was satisfied that the visit to Nissan had 
been important because its inhabitants had, following a punitive expedition by administrator 
Schmiele some years earlier, quite wrong ideas about the military might of the Reich. 
Schmiele had limited himself to taking three children to Herbertshohe, about whose fate the 
Nissan people had since heard nothing. As the acting governor had incomprehensibly failed to 
brief Burski on this matter, although he knew that a visit to Nissan had been intended, Burski had 
been unable to respond to the inquiries. After his return to HerbertshOhe he had ascertained that 
one of the children had died, that another was working as a houseboy and that the third had 
supposedly been returned to Nissan, although no-one there knew anything about it. If the 
government intended to treat the women and children whom SMS Cormoran under his 
predecessor had brought back from St Matthias in a similar fashion-which seemed likely, since 
three of the women had already been married off to policemen and one of the boys had been 
allocated to a government official as a domestic servant, it would take a long time before the St 
Matthias Islanders would learn to trust the government. 4 
4 Burski had learned from the reports of his predecessor that it had been intended to have the women and children 
educated by the Catholic mission before returning them home so that they could enlighten their fellow islanders about the 
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In northern Bougainville Burski sent an armed boat ashore in Tinpuz because its inhabitants 
had killed a schooner captain in the past so that he wanted to see the chiefs on board. Although 
they were frightened, the landing party succeeded in bringing in the two most important chiefs, 
to whom he could give the appropriate warnings. His visit to the station of the Marist mission in 
Kieta convinced him that father Meyer had virtually abandoned his pastoral duties to get on with 
the development of plantations around the station. This commercial approach was even more 
marked at the head station of the mission, on Poporang Island, in the British Solomons, where the 
mission was said to own 500 acres. From Poporang the Cormoran had sailed northward, along 
the west coast of Bougainville, in the hope that the display of the large number of cannons and 
rifles would have a strong and lasting effect on the natives, most of whom had never seen a 
warship. 
Burski concluded this final report with some general comments. In Samoa, as well as in the 
Marshall Islands and the Carolines, he had only met the deputies of the respective governors and 
administrators, who had known little about local conditions. This also applied to the largest and 
most promising of Germany's Pacific colonies, the Bismarck Archipelago. 5 Here the government 
had, for a year, been headed by an inexperienced Assessor who was plainly unable to cope with 
his important and difficult office. This view had already been expressed in a report by the 
commander of SMS Moewe with which he, Burski, fully agreed. But he wanted to mention 
another instance, since it illustrated what was bound to happen if the administration of a German 
colony was not in the hands of mature officials who were familiar with local conditions. He 
enclosed for this purpose an excerpt from the Singapore Straits Times which his enquiries had 
regretfully shown to be correct (see below). 
Stuebe! probably responded with special vigour to Burski's reports, because he had just had 
to deal with a formal complaint by Tirpitz about acting governor Knake. He did not dispute the 
facts reported by Burski, although he pointed out that Knake's report had shown the behaviour 
of Burski in the Bismarck Archipelago in a different light-and there was no need to do so 
because the facts spoke loudly and clearly for themselves. In particular the arrest of the four 
mission teachers in Truk by Burski, and his order to Gibbon in Palau to disregard an instruction 
issued by his superior, provided Stuebe! with welcome ammunition. Yet, it was B urski' s arrogance 
in his relations with all colonial officials that was Stuebe!' s main concern. He therefore stressed 
"with the greatest satisfaction" that it was only due to their exemplary restraint that open clashes 
with Burski had been avoided. But it worried Stuebe! even more that Burski might represent 
typical naval attitudes, especially as regards the Jaluit Gesellschaft and its role in the government 
of the Marshall Islands. 
The fact that Burski had expressed his feelings so indiscriminately was therefore manna for 
Stuebe!, since it gave him an opportunity to get even with the navy. Tirpitz rightly saw Stuebel's 
complaint in this light-and so did the naval staff, which represented the navy as a military 
establishment, whose members only owed obedience to the emperor and loyalty to each other, and 
which resented the interference of the bureaucrat Tirpitz who, it believed, should stick to securing 
more ships for the navy and, in particular, a more efficient supply of coal by the company. It was 
therefore unlikely that Stuebe!' s justification of the arrangements between the foreign office and 
the J aluit Gesellschaft-described in a supporting memorandum as the only appropriate form of 
government under the circumstances obtaining in the Marshall Islands, which had fully proved 
its worth in practice-was given serious consideration by Burski, or by his military superiors. It 
smelled of the same "grocer's mentality" (Kriimergeist) the navy detested in the company, and 
Stuebe! did not improve his case by stressing that the 1 888 agreement with the company had 
received imperial approval. To hide behind the emperor when defending the greed of the company 
ways of the world. 
5 Burski had not visited Kaiser Wilhehnsland and (therefore?) did not consider how it fitted into the picture. 
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and the colonial department' s  own lack of high-minded national principles was sacrilege. How 
could such people expect a censure of Burski who had only acted as his honour and the best 
interests of the Reich had demanded?6 
Ill 
Some weeks before Stuebe! ' s complaint to Tirpitz about Burski, Tirpitz had sent a complaint about 
acting governor Knake to Stuebe!, attaching an exchange of letters between Knake and lieutenant­
commander Seiferling of the naval survey vessel SMS Moewe.1 
Tirpitz found it incomprehensible that an acting governor could have written such an offensive 
letter and formally asked Stuebe! to call Knake to account. 
I believe that Your Excellency shares my view that the co-operation between the Colonial Authorities 
and the Navy is an important precondition for a strengthening of German power and prestige in our 
overseas possessions . . .  Incidents such as this are unlikely to bring about such a co-operation; rather they 
must give rise to a serious ill feeling among naval officers. This will make the service in our Pacific 
colonies less than attractive and that would certainly not be in their interests. 
Although Stuebe!, like Tirpitz in the "Burski Case", made excuses for Knake, he agreed that 
Knake's  behaviour had been unacceptable and announced that he would be censured. Co­
operation between the navy and the colonial authorities was highly desirable. He, Stuebe!, was 
using every opportunity to remind his subordinates that it was their duty to maintain good relations 
with the commanders of S.M. ships. "I therefore feel justified in expecting that differences, such 
as these, belong to the rare exceptions." 
On 9 October 1902 Seiferling had informed the government in HerbertshOhe that he had 
ordered an inspection of the Japanese schooner Z.abra, to ascertain whether it was in possession 
of the legally required papers. Since her master had plausibly asserted that she had been chartered 
by the government, and since he, Seiferling, had therefore assumed that the absence of the 
required papers had merely been an "oversight" (Versehen), he had taken no further measures, 
although he had felt obliged to report the matter. 
The inspection report of lieutenant Wieting showed that he searched the vessel in the company 
of Herr Thiel of Hernsheim & Co. Her Japanese master told Wieting that he was recruiting for the 
government in Herbertshohe and that he was destined for Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. 8 When 
Wieting wanted to see the vessel 's  papers, he was only shown a document which certified that the 
Z.abra was entitled to transport so and so many labourers . Asked for additional papers, the master 
had claimed to have neither a written charter agreement with the government nor sailing or 
recruiting orders . Since this claim was credible, and sufficient to establish that the vessel did not 
have the required papers, Wieting did not regard it necessary to open a sealed letter addressed to 
the harbour master in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. On the other hand, further questioning of the 
master revealed that there were also no papers recording the recruitment of the two labourers 
already on board, although Wieting believed that they were also legally required. However, the 
master asserted that these documents were always drawn up after the arrival of the labourers in 
6 It hardly needs saying that much in this paragraph is my "interpretation" rather than a restrained summary of statements 
contained in the historical record. But rather than "entering into" the facts it reported (see above: 42), it led me to invent 
additional statements of fact, although I am reasonably confident that they are in accord with the views held by many naval 
officers at the time 
7 Unless otherwise indicated the account of this episode given here is based on RMS/601 1 .  
8 The name of the Japanese master-Isokide Komine-is not given in the naval reports. B y  contrast, governor Hahl 
described Komine' s arrival in HerbertsMhe in January 1902 as "an answer to my prayers" (1 980: 91-92). Komine became 
an influential businessman in German New Guinea and had, according to local rumours, been an officer in the Japanese 
navy. 
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Herbertshohe. On the other hand, the two recruited labourers appeared to be on board voluntarily 
and the cargo included no prohibited items. 
Before writing his response, on 16 October, Knake had heard the version of the 7.abra's 
master. He had feared that the vessel was about to be seized by the navy for the benefit of Thiel, 
representing a group of Australians who claimed that the vessel had been illegally removed from 
Australian waters and had taken court action in Herbertshohe to secure its return. As Knake had 
no idea on what legal basis Seiferling had ordered the inspection, he recapitulated with obvious 
puzzlement the various steps taken before focusing on two points. 
The first was concerned with the involvement of Thiel, because the master of the 7.abra had 
believed that Thiel was about to enforce the private claims he represented with the military might 
of the navy. One could therefore hardly blame him if he was prepared to risk the use of extreme 
measures by the navy rather than to produce his precious papers in the presence of his legal 
opponent, who was likely to have them confiscated. 
The second point followed from the fact that the military operations after the V arzin Murders 
had not been completed at the time. In Knake's view the search of the 7.abra had therefore 
damaged vital government interests, because she was the only vessel available for the recruitment 
of additional policemen who were essential to assure public order in the colony, and because 
potential recruits could easily be put off by a naval search of a vessel recruiting for the 
government. Under these circumstances, of which Seifer ling was surely aware, Knake respectfully 
requested him to inform the government if he intended to continue such inspections, because it 
would then be Knake' s duty to take the steps necessary to avoid the dangers which this would 
create for the well-being of the colony. 
Seiferling refused to enter into any discussion, assuring Knake that he would continue to act 
in accordance with his instructions in a manner he hoped to be able to justify to his superiors, to 
whom alone he was accountable. As regards the views expressed by Knake-which he had 
reported to his superiors-it was obvious that, as a commander of one of S.M. ships, he could not 
possibly comment. 
After this blast Knake tried to backtrack. He had no doubt that Seiferling had acted in 
accordance with his instructions, and had had no intention of asking Seiferling to justify his 
actions. But since he did not know what Seiferling' s instructions were, he had wanted to point out 
the serious consequence conforming with them had had for the government. He had merely sought 
an exchange of views as the quickest way of establishing how such consequences could be 
prevented from occurring again in the future. 
Seiferling knew that he held the stronger hand. The government could avoid similar 
investigations, he responded, by informing S .M. ships about the charter of private vessels or by 
requesting them not to investigate certain vessels. Like all naval commanders, he was only too 
happy to exchange views with the government, provided they were expressed in a form other than 
that chosen by Knake in his letter of 16 October. 
In his report to the naval staff Seiferling justified his inspection of the 7.abra by reference to 
an 1 894 naval instruction. It obliged S .M. ships to search any vessel met outside the usual 
shipping routes in German New Guinea waters. According to his version, he had gone out of his 
way to make life easy for the government by not also following an even older naval instruction, 
according to which he had to put any foreign vessel met without the required permits under arrest 
and hand it over to the local authorities for punishment. 
Not surprisingly, Seiferling denied that he or any of his officers had known that Thiel had 
personal reasons for wanting to have a look at the Zabra's  papers. He had asked Thiel to 
accompany Wieting as an interpreter because none of his officers had been sufficiently fluent in 
"Pigeon Englisch", the language which would probably have had to be used. True, he had heard 
rumours that the Zabra had been illegally removed from Australian waters, but he had assumed 
132 THE TOWER OF BABEL 
that the matter had long been cleared up, since governor Hahl himself had chartered the vessel for 
a tour of inspection. He had not specified the legal basis for his actions when informing Knake 
because he had taken it for granted that the government was aware of the relevant naval 
instructions, since they had been issued in response to requests from the local authorities.9 He 
could not understand how the search of the 'Zahra could be seen as damaging vital government 
interests. Natives observing the search could only have been favourably impressed by the fact that 
it had not revealed any breaches of the law. The real problem was that natives only trusted 
European recruiters-and there had been no European on board-not even to act as a witness able 
to certify that the native recruits had signed up voluntarily-another legal requirement the 'Zahra 
had not complied with. 
Instead of taking the view that its master could not be blamed for taking extreme risks out of 
fear of being violated by the navy, it would have been better for the prestige of the Reich if Knake 
had assured him that he could rely on always being treated justly by S .M. ships. Besides, 
Seiferling could not believe that even a Japanese could for a moment suspect that a German naval 
commander could lend the authority of the war ensign of the Reich to a private individual pursuing 
commercial interests . More importantly, he found it incomprehensible that Knake had feared that 
a colonial official could ever find himself in a position where it became necessary to protect the 
safety of a German colony against a naval vessel acting in accordance with her instructions. 
Seiferling had good reasons for adopting this self-righteous attitude since the search of the 
'Zahra had, in fact, been most unusual. As Stuebel pointed out in Knake' s defence, no other vessel 
known to the navy had ever been searched in German New Guinea. Besides, Seiferling should 
have been especially careful not to get involved in activities outside his survey task because one 
of his predecessors had recently been in trouble with Tirpitz, who had criticised the amount of 
survey work accomplished by SMS Moewe under his command. The commander' s excuse, of 
having been slowed down by numerous requisitions by the colonial government for military 
assistance, had led to an instruction by the naval staff, dated 25 April 1900, to the effect that SMS 
Moewe was to refuse military assistance to the local authorities, unless immediate action was 
absolutely necessary to prevent damage to the prestige of the flag (see RM3/3 l 14). Although this 
instruction dealt expressly only with the Moewe's  military activities, it should have left her 
commanders in no doubt that they were expected to stick to survey work and leave all other 
matters to the station cruisers-unless the circumstances were quite exceptional, which did not 
apply in this case. 
While Knake's reports of his encounter with Seiferling, together with Stuebel's  reprimand, 
were put on Knake' s personal file-which, along with all the other personal files kept in Berlin, 
did not survive World War II-the personal consequences of the flogging of ten Chinese Assessor 
Wolff had ordered on 2 November 1 902 were handled differently, since the matter first attracted 
attention from the colonial department because Knake had responded to the flogging with his 
legislative pen. 
IV 
On 16  January 1 903 Knake sent an amendment of a 1900 "Ordinance concerning the Maintenance 
of Discipline among Coloured Labourers" to the colonial department. It outlawed the corporal 
punishment of Chinese labourers so as to prevent the repetition of undesirable incidents like the 
mass flogging ordered by Wolff. The legal section had no difficulties with the amendment, but 
Rose was reluctant to recommend its approval because he believed that Knake had overreacted. 
Although Wolff had acted imprudently, it was, in Rose's  view, advisable to retain the possibility 
9 It is obvious that Knake was not aware of these naval instructions and likely, since one would assume that he tried to 
inform himself, that they were not on the files kept in the governor's office in HerbertsMhe. 
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of corporal punishment of Chinese as a legitimate disciplinary measure in case coolies were again 
employed in large numbers, as had been the position ten years earlier, during Rose's reign as 
imperial commissioner, when this measure had been found to be indispensable. He therefore 
suggested that the views of governor Hahl be sought-who was already on his way back to 
Gennan New Guinea when Knake's report arrived in Berlin10-and that the amendment should 
for the time being not be published in Gennany. 1 1  
A month later the matter took on a different complexion. This was the result of  a report by the 
Gennan consul-general in Singapore, Eschke, on enquiries by the British colonial authorities to 
whom the Chinese had complained about their flogging and subsequent sacking after their return 
to Singapore. Wolff's "imprudence" had become an "in all respects most inconvenient 
business"-so went the leading marginal comment, presumably by Stuebe!, on Eschke's report. 
Rose responded by calling for Wolff's head. His ill-considered action had interfered with 
Hahl' s  plans to encourage the immigration of Chinese to Gennan New Guinea and embarrassed 
the consulate-general in Singapore which had been instrumental in securing the approval of the 
British authorities for the exportation of this particular group of Chinese. Hence, it was suddenly 
clear that Wolff was unable to muster the foresight and restraint the colonial service demanded, 
so that he should be recalled forthwith. 
Rose's colleagues agreed. But the recall instructions, issued in early May, could not be 
expected to reach HerbertshOhe for eight weeks or so. By then a great deal had happened on the 
other side of the globe, about which the colonial department learned with the same kind of delay, 
so that the matter turned into a game of ping-pong played with an increasing number of balls 
whose trajectories crossed somewhere between Berlin, Singapore and Herbertshohe. 
Hahl had learned about the flogging in Berlin, from a private letter by Wolff, dated 16  
December 1902. Hahl passed it o n  to his superiors in the colonial department, and the letter was 
temporarily added to Wolffs personal file before being returned to Hahl. Together with 
information received about other problems, it gave rise to instructions, dated 28 February, to 
Knake to report officially on the matters in question. 12 When Hahl reached Singapore about that 
time, Eschke informed him about the reaction of the British authorities to the flogging and 
encouraged him to minimise the damage through personal discussions with them. Although Hahl 
created a favourable impression, the British authorities now wanted to know from Eschke, as he 
reported to Berlin on 9 April, whether disciplinary action would be taken against Wolff. 
Long before Hahl' s arrival in Herbertshohe in April, Knake had off his own bat sent an official 
report by Wolff on the flogging to Berlin. It arrived there in early May. It was passed on by Rose 
to the personnel section as "further material for the manner in which Wolff carries out his duties". 
This did not spare Hahl from responding to the instructions of 28 February, which had barely 
arrived when he sent his first report in the matter, dated 1 8  April, announcing that he had set the 
requested official investigations in train. 
Hahl's  substantive report followed a month later. It enclosed a second report by Wolff which 
indicated that the colonial department had been primarily interested in establishing whether Wolff 
had been legally entitled to order the flogging of the ten Chinese. According to Wolff, his powers 
as district commissioner were a matter of administrative practice since they had never been legally 
defined. Section 6 of the Disciplinary Ordinance provided that disciplinary punishments were 
imposed by the official authorised to exercise the criminal jurisdiction over natives-an authority 
which Wolff also had never been formally given. On the other hand, he and his predecessors, in 
10 Hahl had gone on sick leave to Germany to recover from the blackwater fever attacks which had put him out of action 
at the time of the V arzin Murders. Knake had been sent out as a temporary replacement. 
1 1  Unless otherwise indicated, the correspondence referred to in this section is included in RKA 2308. 
12  This report by Knake-together with the recall instructions for Wolff-were presumably put on Wolff's personal file 
and are therefore no longer available. 
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HerbertshOhe as well as Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, had always, as a matter of course, exercised the 
disciplinary jurisdiction with the governor's  approval. 
As regards the particular case, Wolff stressed that the Chinese had twice refused-in a 
provocative manner and in front of numerous Melanesian labourers and policemen-to carry out 
orders to complete an urgent road building job. Corporal punishment, permissible under the 
Disciplinary Ordinance, had been necessary to force them to do their duty forthwith, since earlier 
fines had been to no avail. It had been effective because the job was completed before the 
imminent rain could cause thousands of Marks worth of damage. Since it was plain for every 
reasonable person that the punishment was well deserved, he could not have foreseen that it might 
have a negative impact on the future recruitment of Chinese. However, in order to prevent 
malicious attacks of the kind the British press had launched against him, he submitted that 
corporal punishment of all coloured labourers be abolished, since it was far easier to do without 
it in relation to Melanesians, who were unlikely to refuse openly to carry out orders, than in 
relation to Chinese. 
Hahl agreed that Wolff had been legally entitled to order the flogging. But he believed that 
Wolff could have found other ways of assuring that his orders were followed, although the 
Chinese's  public refusal to do so largely excused his reaction. However, Wolff should have 
known that a public flogging would have a negative impact on the policy of encouraging the 
immigration of Chinese. Thus far Wolff had therefore failed in his duties. Nevertheless Hahl 
requested that the colonial department-for reasons he had explained in a separate report-should 
put the matter to rest with an official expression of its disapproval. 
The report Hahl referred to (see RKA 2576) showed that there had also been serious tensions 
between Wolff, as well as Knake, and the Sacred Heart mission. They had reached a climax when 
Bishop Couppe had been fined by the district court for defaming Wolff. However, peace had now 
been restored and Hahl did not want the Catholic mission to get the impression that its campaign 
against Wolff had been successful. 
Although hampered by the fact that Knake had sent the relevant files to Berlin, Hahl was 
confident that there was no reason to take disciplinary action against Knake. He was not so sure 
in the case of Wolff-but there the "extraordinary merits" (ausserordentliche Verdienste) had to 
be taken into account which Wolff had earned by the manner in which he had conducted the 
military operations after the V arzin Murders. Hence, Hahl pleaded, the colonial department should 
on no account go further than to reprimand Wolff for having acted imprudently in the various 
matters raised by the Catholic mission. 
The colonial department agreed that disciplinary measures against Knake were unwarranted, 
although it was unhappy about his handling of the tensions . 13 It was also of the opinion that, after 
his recall, disciplinary proceedings against Wolff were inappropriate. 14 Whereas it could afford 
to drag its feet in this internal matter-it took until 9 February 1 904 before it responded to Hahl' s  
report o f  15  May 1 903-the external aftermath o f  the flogging could not be dismissed s o  easily. 
On 27 May Hahl reported again because Eschke, when reporting to Berlin in April, had also 
written to Hahl, informing him that the British authorities were not satisfied with Wolff' s first 
report, which Knake had sent to Singapore, and wanted to know whether disciplinary action would 
be taken against him. As Hahl now reported to Berlin, he had refused to provide additional 
information because the British authorities had no standing in the matter, as the Chinese in 
1 3  Its legal section noted, for example, that Knake had failed to include the judgement fining Couppe for defaming Wolff 
in the court statistics he had sent to Berlin. More importantly, it pointed out that Knake' s political solution, of killing the 
case retrospectively, by withdrawing his application, as Wolffs superior, to have the defamation prosecuted, had been 
illegal because, under section 64 of the German Criminal Code, this was no longer pennitted, once a judgement had been 
pronounced. 
14 The recall of Wolff had been an administrative not a disciplinary measure. Wolff was recalled because he was no 
longer regarded as suitable for the office he was holding, not as a punishment for performing badly in the past. 
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question were not British subjects, although he had told Eschke that he had submitted the case to 
Berlin for a final decision. 
Hahl' s next report followed a few days later because he had in the meantime received Rose's 
March instructions concerning the fate of Knake' s January amendment to the Disciplinary 
Ordinance. Hahl had gathered from the stand ta.ken in Berlin that the amendment would only come 
into force after it had been published in Germany and agreed with the decision not to go ahead 
with the publication. He was happy to continue the practice of not treating the Chinese artisans, 
cooks and traders employed in the Bismarck Archipelago as "coloured labourers" within the 
meaning of the Disciplinary Ordinance, from which Wolff had unfortunately departed, and would 
reissue instructions to make sure that it would now be rigorously followed. 
The legal section of the colonial department was puzzled by this response and enquired in early 
August whether the amendment had merely been a draft sent to Berlin for approval or whether it 
had been proclaimed in German New Guinea and was therefore in force. Only if the former was 
the case was it possible to proceed as Hahl had proposed, whereas it was otherwise necessary to 
repeal the amendment, at least for Kaiser Wilhelmsland, should Hahl want to regain a legal basis 
for the corporal punishment of Chinese, although it assured Hahl that if this was the case the 
colonial department would be happy not to publish either the amendment or its subsequent repeal 
in the colonial gazette. 
In July Hahl had to respond to new instructions from Berlin. They had criticised Knake for 
sending Wolff's first report on the flogging incident without comments and asked for additional 
information. They also informed Hahl that it was intended to instruct Eschke to respond to the 
enquiry by the British authorities by telling them that Hahl had been asked to carry out a thorough 
investigation. As an afterthought, Rose, who once more drafted these instructions, added that Hahl 
should inform Berlin about his response to Eschke, and decided to await this information before 
instructing the latter. 
When Hahl' s  response arrived in Berlin in October, Rose believed that the matter was under 
control. It was 6 November before instructions were sent to Eschke. They were as curt as Hahl's 
response had been. Since Wolff had not acted illegally, the German Civil Service Act ruled out 
disciplinary action against him. Solely for Eschke' s personal information, Rose mentioned that 
Wolff's behaviour in this matter had nevertheless contributed substantially to the decision to recall 
him from his posting. 
A week later a second report from Eschke, dated 17 October, shattered Rose's  tranquillity. 
Eschke had not transmitted Hahl' s  response to the British authorities, because he regarded it as 
undiplomatic and was hoping for more helpful instructions from Berlin. Since the British 
authorities were pressing him for an answer, he had sent them an edited version of Hahl's 
response, which had omitted Hahl' s  claim that they lacked standing in the matter. As the 
immigration of Chinese from Singapore to German New Guinea depended on the approval of the 
British authorities it was essential to avoid anything that might offend them. The good personal 
impression Hahl had made during his visit had resulted in the approval of the exportation of 
another group of 30 labourers. To assure further supplies, it was crucial to authorise him, Eschke, 
to answer as quickly, and as soothingly, as possible. 
Rose rushed off a cable, requesting Eschke to await supplementary instructions. They were sent 
off, marked "most urgent", the same day, 21 November. They authorised Eschke to express official 
regret about the incident, to inform the British authorities that Wolff had been reprimanded, and 
to assure them that Chinese working in German New Guinea would have no reason to complain. 
Eschke was given full discretion to phrase the note as he saw fit. 
Eschke used this discretion to stress the enactment of Knake' s January amendment, which had 
generally outlawed the corporal punishment of Chinese-a reference to which Rose had carefully 
avoided-and continued, in ceremonial English: 
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I have . . .  been instructed by the Imperial Chancellor to express to the Government of this Colony the regret 
of my Government at this incident and to add that their disapproval has been notified to the Magistrate. 
By that time Wolff' s personal fate had long been sealed. He had returned to Germany, left the 
colonial service and was serving at a court in provincial Posen, near the Polish border. But his 
colonial past had followed him, so that he urged the colonial department to defend him at least 
against the malicious attacks on his handling of the aftermath of the V arzin Murders which had 
appeared in the German press-as we have seen, with limited success (see above: 97). 
Wolff was gone, but Knake' s amendment of the Disciplinary Ordinance was still on the 
table-as an October report by Hahl confirmed. It had been notified to the public in German New 
Guinea as soon as it had been issued, so that it was indubitably in force. Hahl was now under the 
impression that the colonial department wanted him to repeal it, at least for Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
This he was reluctant to do because a repeal, in order to be effective, would also have to be 
notified to the public and because he was sure that the British press would seize this opportunity 
to deter Chinese from coming to German New Guinea. It was better to do nothing until the 
memory of the incident which had given rise to this amendment had paled. This presented no 
practical problems since the Neu Guinea Kompagnie only employed a few handpicked Chinese 
in Kaiser Wilhelmsland who could easily be kept in order without having to resort to corporal 
punishment. 
Under these circumstances Rose gladly recommended postponement of further instructions to 
Hahl until the latter had had the opportunity to comment on the supplementary instructions to 
Eschke, a copy of which had been sent to him. He gave Hahl plenty of time, ordering his clerk, on 
3 1  December 1903, not to bother him with the matter for another five months, probably in the hope 
that Hahl would be sensible enough to let it quietly fade away. 
v 
I had enjoyed this little narrative journey as it had allowed me to drift with the natural flow of 
information emanating from the historical record instead of trying to trace the steps of other 
historiographers . But where had it taken me? Not far and yet, so it appeared, to the end of the 
narrative road. The same details which made the narrative illuminating also warned against any 
attempt to generalise from it. While I had no reason to believe the cluster of episodes examined 
was untypical, the behaviour of the historical actors could clearly not be seen as representative, 
for example, of the relations between the colonial authorities and the navy during the period of 
German colonial rule. On the other hand, the problem was not that the rich texture of details which 
had brought these episodes to life made them atypical, it was rather that they could not possibly 
tell me for what which details were, or were not, typical. This did not mean that typicalness could 
not be used as a selection criteria in the narrative streamlining of information, but looking back a 
distinction between their typical and unique elements appeared to be a distinctly unhelpful guide. 
These episodes had been illuminating because they had given me a vague but palpable feeling for 
the stage on which the historical actors had performed. They had illustrated how German colonial 
rule had actually operated. They were historically significant not because they described what 
particular actions particular historical actors had performed in particular situations but because 
they showed that these actions had been part of broader processes and reflected broader attitudes. 
Whether the treatment of Stimson and his Micronesian pupils by Burski had been typical in the 
sense that other German naval commanders would have acted as he did, or whether German naval 
commanders treated European and native missionaries in German New Guinea always in that 
manner, was not the issue. Just as Knake' s  response to the search of the ZAbra by Seiferling, the 
"Stimson Incident" was unique. German naval commanders did not routinely arrest native 
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missionaries and German colonial officials did not complain regularly that the actions of the navy 
were threatening the safety of German colonies. Nonetheless, it was not their uniqueness that made 
these episodes historically significant but that they illustrated something beyond themselves, even 
though it remained too imprecise to make them representative of anything. 
This interpretation was in accord with the content of the documents in question. They were not 
concerned with the performance of actions but with the reactions to actions already performed. The 
mass flogging ordered by Wolff was especially instructive in this regard. It was treated as if it had 
been a stone Wolff had thrown into a pond. Whereas the stone had quickly disappeared from sight, 
the ripples it had caused were spreading in all directions and demanded attention. 
What was surprising and, for me, reassuring was that law played a central role in all these 
episodes. Acting governor Knake had responded to the flogging with an amendment of the 
Disciplinary Ordinance, and the initial concern of the colonial department had been the legality 
of Wolff's action. When the British authorities had called for disciplinary proceedings against 
Wolff, Hahl had rejected their call because the Chinese had not been British subjects, and Stimson 
had used his American citizenship as his highest trump card. To be sure, the episodes also revealed 
that Wolff had never been formally authorised to exercise judicial powers over the natives in his 
district and that the general administrative powers of district commissioners in German New 
Guinea had not been legally defined. On the other hand, the colonial department was sufficiently 
concerned about the Rule of Law to even take note of the fact that the politically expedient 
termination of Wolff' s defamation case against the Catholic bishop by Knake had been illegal, so 
that it had therefore also been improper to exclude this case from the court statistics (see above: 
Fn. 13).  
Yet these episodes were merely illustrative. They offered reflections of how German colonial 
rule had operated; they did not describe the structure of this operation. Still, it was these reflections 
which made these episodes historically significant. This was just as well, because the information 
on which I had based my narrative was patently insufficient for a satisfactory account of, say, the 
Stimson Incident as a unique episode. In order to give such an account it would have at least been 
necessary to compare Burski 's  version with that of Stimson, which the latter was bound to have 
reported to his American headquarters. Even Burski' s claim that Stimson' s Micronesian pupils had 
consistently taken an anti-German stance rested on shaky ground since it had probably been the 
trader Ahlers, by whom Burski had first been alerted, who had also acted as interpreter for 
Burski's judicial officer when he had taken the confirmatory evidence from the Trukese. 
On the other hand, however many phantoms Burski' s  reports contained, they remained a 
genuine part of history. They showed what B urski had in fact reported to his superiors. Irrespective 
of their veracity, these reports were themselves an exercise of German colonial rule. They were 
part of the information to which the naval and colonial authorities actually responded. And they 
had no choice but to respond to such reports as they stood. Although Stuebe!, for example, had 
made it clear that he was not going to believe Burski's  expected denial of the aspersions he was 
said to have cast on the colonial administration, he could not ignore this denial, once it had been 
expressed; all he could do was to foreshadow that he would not bother to take the matter further 
after this had happened. 
It was unlikely that I would be able to locate enough clusters of such narratively pre­
programmed information to cover the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea. Besides, 
they could only provide an internal perspective which showed how the machinery of government 
operated but not what effects it produced on the environment in which it operated. But even such 
a limited patchwork quilt would have taken up too much space. To be sure, I could have omitted 
more details from my account; yet my narrative instincts urged me to move in the opposite 
direction. They wanted to hear more, not less, for example, about Wolff's mass flogging. They 
wanted me to link this episode with Wolff's handling of the V arzin Murders and with the tensions 
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between him and the Catholic mission. They wanted me to present a sequence of anecdotes 
featuring Emil Wolff which was sufficiently detailed for him to emerge as a three-dimensional 
human being, instead of showing him as a young 'cardboard' Assessor who happened to be a 
minor cog in the machinery of colonial government at the time. For the same reasons my narrative 
instincts had also been dissatisfied with what his reports had told me about Burski as a person, 
since they had made him look like his own caricature: totally arrogant, totally narrow-minded and 
totally insensitive. I was therefore delighted when I came across another case involving Burski, 
although it had taken place in Germany rather than the Pacific. 15 
About a year before taking over the command of SMS Cormoran Burski had made a formal 
complaint about the insulting behaviour of a railway conductor in Cuxhaven to the Prussian 
minister for public works . Instead of disciplining his lowly subordinate the minister had lodged 
a counter-complaint about Burski with the naval office. By the time it had reached Burski's 
military superiors it had been too late to have the matter dealt with by the courts, because insults 
could only be prosecuted if the victim had made an application to this effect within three months 
after the behaviour in question had taken place. Burski' s  military superiors also decided against 
starting formal disciplinary proceedings against Burski, although they censured himinformallyfor 
the offensive language he had used, and for not referring the matter to his superiors before lodging 
his complaint. But they rejected the accusation that Burski always entered the train in Cuxhaven 
drunk when he came back from one of his hunting trips and insisted that the conductor' s  refusal 
to address Burski with his naval rank had been a grave insult. The minister in turn instructed the 
official in charge of the railway station in Cuxhaven to make sure that naval officers would in 
future always be treated with proper respect so that unfortunate incidents such as this would not 
occur again. He also requested, however, that the conductor be informed confidentially, and in a 
form which spared Burski's  honour, that his military superiors had taken the appropriate steps in 
this matter. 
While this additional information made Burski more solid as an individual human being, 
although hardly more endearing, the glimpses this case offered of the manner in which the 
authorities had operated in Wilhelmine Germany made my task only more difficult. Although I did 
not doubt that there was also ample anecdotal evidence to show that naval officers were treated 
as demigods by German civilians and that unquestioning submission to any form of military 
authority was regarded as the natural order of things, a case like this-which was clearly also not 
untypical-illustrated that the actual state of affairs displayed a far wider range of colours than 
literary works, like Carl Zuckmayer's Der Hauptmann von Kopenick, had led me to believe. 
Since there was no reason to asssume that official behaviour and civilian responses to it in the 
German colonies had been more uniform than in metropolitan Germany, it was futile to try to piece 
together a representative picture of colonial rule in German New Guinea as a narrative mosaic 
composed of such anecdotes. I had no choice but to sacrifice richness of detail for a greater breadth 
of coverage. I also had to focus attention on the external aspect of colonial rule, instead of the 
internal operation of the machinery of government. I had no choice but to start defrosting the 
historical record of the routine exercises of governmental powers in relation to Germany's colonial 
subjects. 
As I did not know where, and how far, this would take me, it seemed appropriate to start this 
exercise by examining a slim financial register which had lost its cover, as well as its first page, so 
that I was even left in the dark as to which "authority" had kept it and what purpose it had served. 
15 The information about this case is to be found in RM3/2460. 
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Chapter 6: A Trail of Random Registers 
I 
The register (AA 02541146) consisted of printed forms divided into five columns. The first called for a consecutive number, the second for the name and place of residence of the person 
obliged to pay, the third for a description of the "fee" (Gebuhr) in question, the fourth for its 
amount, and the fifth for the date of its payment. The entries were handwritten and sometimes 
impossible to read. 
The first available entry, No. 9, told me that To Lambarone of Rakunai paid, on 7 April-the 
year was not given-a fine of 6 Marks for stealing food. According to the next entry Hemsheim 
& Co. paid on 21  May a fee of 0.50 Marks for the copy of a contract identified as "Freiw. Ger. 
10/04"-which stood for the tenth file in a "voluntary jurisdiction" (Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit) 
series for 1904. The two following entries related to licences of the Deutsche Handels- und 
Plantagen-Gesellschaft obtained for two Chinese: Jau Lung was issued with a "full" licence, at 
the cost of 30 Marks, and Li Sui with an "explosives" licence, worth 20 Marks. The next entry 
related again to a payment made by a native: Nematik from Makada, in the Duke of Yorks, paid 
a fine of 5 Marks for creating a public nuisance. Then came a payment made by a native woman, 
Ja Konontabu of Gunanba, who had been fined 4 Marks by chief To Voai for making false 
accusations. Both entries referred to entries in a general business journal: "J. No. 1 54/04" and "J. 
No. 157/04" respectively. The last entry on this first surviving page showed that "E.E. Forsayth 
of Ralum", the firm of "Queen Emma" Forsayth/Kolbe, paid a fee of 2 Marks, resulting from an 
unsuccessful "procedural appeal" (Beschwerde) against a decision to impound "business records" 
(Bucher) in a court case only identified as "1/04", so that it was unclear whether it involved 
criminal or civil proceedings. 
None of these seven entries was by itself particularly informative; the question was rather 
whether the over 300 entries contained in the register would add up to an overall picture at least 
some aspects of which were historically illuminating. The first step in finding out was a systematic 
sorting of the information. The most obvious way of doing this was to rearrange it in accordance 
with the types of payments made, or with the types of persons making the payment. This exercise 
was only worth carrying through, however, if the information was reasonably reliable and 
complete. The first step in establishing that was to ascertain what kind of register this was: who 
was registering what, and what geographical area and period of time did it cover? 
As regards the time span the register left no doubt that its entries related to the 1 904 budget 
year, which ran from 1 April 1904 to 3 1 March 1 905, but it gave no clear answer to any of the 
other questions. The first puzzling aspect was that the form used the term "Gebuhr" (fee) whereas 
entry No. 195 described it as a "Kostenregister' (a register of costs) in contrast to an 
"Einnahmejournal " ,  a register of moneys received. While the differences between "fees" and 
"costs" mattered little, neither of these terms covered the "fines" the register also listed, not to 
mention the refund of an overpayment which was shown as well. It also seemed odd that a register 
of fees-or costs-should show the date the payment was made but not the date the fee had been 
imposed, especially since it was not the date of the payment which determined the sequence of the 
entries . In addition the register recorded some payments made to another office, some fees not 
imposed by the office keeping it, as well as some payments made during the 1 905 budget year. 
The geographical coverage of the register too was puzzling. In most cases the place of 
residence of the person obliged to pay was within the Bismarck Archipelago, usually within the 
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Gazelle Peninsula, but in some cases that person resided in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Island 
Territory and even Germany. 
The greatest surprise was the range of subject matter covered. Administrative matters were 
listed side by side with station court matters, district court matters and even one supreme court 
matter. Payments for the issuing of some types of licences were listed but not others; payments 
for the registration of land were covered but not those for its sale, lease or survey by the 
government; and payments of taxes and customs duties were excluded altogether. 
In short, the register should not have existed at all. There was not a single government office 
competent to impose the range of fees covered whereas the register did not include the full range 
any one government office was entitled to impose. Yet the register did exist, and it did contain 
potentially valuable information worth processing. 
II 
The register closed with entry No. 334. It included the 326 effective entries to be expected after 
deducting the missing first eight entries. But this was the result of chance rather than design, 
because the crossing out of two entries before a payment was received (Nos 291 and 305) was 
compensated for by the squeezing in of two additional entries (Nos 53a and 66a) .  
The payments shown amounted to around 9,800 Marks. 1 This meant an average payment of 
about 30 Marks, whereas the actual payment per entry ranged from less than 1 Marks to 600 
Marks. However, the largest payment covered not one but 15 sub-trader licences issued to the 
Forsayth firm. 
Such multiple entries were not uncommon; and they obviously had to be split before a serious 
quantification exercise could be attempted. The same applied to the mixed entries combining 
payments belonging in different categories . The largest single payment, a fine of300 Marks, made 
by Queen Emma' s  husband, Paul Kolbe, was a case in point. It also covered a payment of 57.50 
Marks for court costs. On the other hand, some payments were made in instalments so that the 
entries in question had to be combined, and in some multiple entries neither the number nor the 
amounts of the individual fees imposed could be distinguished. Moreover, a serious quantification 
exercise had to address the question of the missing first eight entries. Although they represented 
less than three per cent of all entries, leaving the possibility of additional or cancelled entries on 
this page out of account, they could still have had a significant impact on the overall picture if all 
or most of them belonged in the same category, especially if one or more of them were multiple. 
But it was premature to worry about these finer points before the examination had progressed 
further. For the time being, the number of effective entries could serve as a rough guide for the 
quantitative weight of the information provided. 
The entries could be divided into ten groups according to their subject matter. The largest 
group, with over 60 entries, dealt with licences.2 Next came shipping matters with 50 entries, land 
matters with 40 entries and a mixed bag of voluntary jurisdiction matters with 35 entries. 
Administrative punishments also accounted for 35 entries, and payments relating to the civil 
jurisdiction of the district court for 30. Thirty entries were concerned with fines imposed or 
handed in by government chiefs. The exercise of its criminal jurisdiction by the station court 
accounted for 20 as did the district court. A single entry related to a supreme court matter: a 
payment of 5.50 Marks made to the "cash office" (Kasse) in Ponape by the "renegade missionary" 
Snelling (see above: 127). 
1 This was the equivalent of almost ten per cent of the revenue the Old Protectorate was expected to raise during the 1904 
budget year. 
2 All the following figures are approximate. 
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As the entries relating to natives, which accounted for almost half of the total, looked 
especially tempting, I proceeded to consider the four most relevant categories more closely, 
beginning with station court matters. 
The 21  entries in this category related to the 14 different cases listed in the following table. 
1 .  No. 5 1  
2. No. 63 
3.  Nos 82, 87 
4. No. 1 17 
5. No. 148 
6. No. 136 
7 .  Nos 141 ,  142 
8. Nos 149, 178 
9. Nos 1 86- 188 
10. No. 199 
1 1 .  No. 214  
12. Nos 242-43 
13 .  Nos 245-46 
14. No. 309 
TABLE II 
Fines imposed by the Station Court, Herbertshohe 1904 
Chief Tamlik from Reinau was fined 50 Marks for exceeding his official powers 
(Amtsbefugnisse) (St. Ger. 45/04). 
Tschang Tiang from Rabaul was fined 30 Marks for defamation (St. Ger. 48/04 ). 
William To Putur from Rakunai paid a fine of 50 Marks under Section 132 of the 
German Criminal Code (unlawful assumption of public office) in two instalments 
(St. Ger. 54/04). 
Monikin from New Ireland was fined 10 Marks for assault (St. Ger. 57/04). 
Tahija (a Malay?) from Herbertshohe paid costs of 5 Marks (St. Ger. 59/04 ). (He 
was not fined but probably received a prison sentence.) 
To Guarar from Gunamba was fined 20 Marks for defamation (St. Ger. 66/04). 
To Momong and Ja Vaga from Takabur were each fined 20 Marks for adultery 
(St. Ger. 72/04). 
Ah Hang from Herbertshohe paid a fine of 100 Marks and 60 Marks costs (St. 
Ger. 74/04). The offence is not identified. 
Timan, Ja Rigalaga and Daniel from Matupi were each fined 10 Marks for an 
unidentified offence (St. Ger. 85/04). 
The Neu Guinea Kompagnie paid a fine of 40 Marks in "Lapule and others" (St. 
Ger. 89/04). The offence is not identified. 
To Kanunur from Napapar paid a fine of 20 Marks for an unidentified offence 
(St. Ger. 96/04). 
To Ke and Ja Mamakeke from Unanuleiting were each fined 10 Marks for 
adultery (St. Ger. 104/04). 
To Warto and Ja Dongon from Kunakunai were each fined 10 Marks for an 
unidentified offence (St. Ger. 108/04). 
Tui Weng was fined 60 Marks for an unidentified offence (St. Ger. 12/05). 
Taken together this information suggested that only one in five of the cases decided by the 
station court in 1 904 had consequences in terms of fines or costs.3 This also reminded me that 
these were the only cases about which the register could tell me anything. It neither covered non­
pecuniary punishments nor acquittals, which between them accounted for the other 80 per cent of 
cases decided. Secondly, while local natives never paid court costs, Chinese and other foreign 
natives sometimes did. Thirdly, in as many as eight of the 14 cases the accused were Tolai from 
the Gazelle Peninsula.4 Fourthly, although the offence was expressly identified as adultery in only 
three cases, it was probably also the offence in case 13 ;  and case 9 too had a distinctively marital 
flavour. Adultery therefore accounted for perhaps more than one third of all cases in which the 
station court imposed fines in 1904. 
Next the administrative fines. There were 35 relevant entries. Three related to Chinese. Two 
were fined for a breach of a police ordinance and the third 60 Marks for employing an unlicensed 
3 This estimate is based on the assumption that cases Nos 1 to 44 were completed before the register started and that case 
No. 108 was the last case which became pending in 1904. This left 65 cases of which 13 were covered. 
4 Tolai names are prefixed by "To" for males and "Ja" for females-apart from cases where the name of a male starts with 
a 'T' (hence "Tamlik" rather than "To Tamlik"). Legally the jurisdiction of the station court in Herbertshohe at the time 
still covered most of the Bismarck Archipelago. In practice it operated as a court of the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula. 
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native sub-trader. The remaining 32 entries related to 19 cases. With one exception they involved 
Tolai.5 Several of these cases were unique: at the traditional end of the scale the imposition of a 
fine of 10 Marks each on six men from Birara for continuously staging the tubuan,6 and at its 
modem end the fining of To Watambe for illegal copra trade. But there were repetitions . In three 
cases fines of between 3 and 6 Marks were paid for the theft of food. In two cases Tolai were fined 
20 and 1 0  Marks for not following a "summons of the authorities" (Nichterscheinen am Termin) . 
Even heavier were the fines levied in three cases for "disobedience" (Ungehorsam), namely 40, 
40 and 10 Marks. In one of the more serious cases it was stated expressly that the disobedience 
had been shown to a government chief rather than a German official. Similarly, in one of the four 
defamation cases, with fines ranging from 4 to 40 Marks, the victim was identified as "chief Alik 
of Bai". On the other hand, in one case two chiefs were administratively fined 20 Marks each for 
misusing their official powers. 
In short, it looked as if administrative fines in 1904 were predominantly used to control 
government chiefs or to protect them from their subjects. It was likely that as many as 1 1  of the 
1 8  cases listed fell into this category7 and probable that other, more serious cases of this kind were 
dealt with by the station court.8 
The next category of entries showed these chiefs doing their job by handing in fines they had 
collected from their subjects . The register identified 21 chiefs by name. One of them came four 
times, one three times and three appeared twice. The amounts handed in ranged from 4 to 80 
Marks. The reason for imposing the fines was described in different ways. 
The 10 Marks delivered by Susten-the only chief who came from New Ireland-was a 
punishment he had imposed for defamation-probably of himself. To Poipoi of Takubar handed 
in 20 Marks which he had collected as fines for disobedience. The payments of Tombola from 
Navia and Tolamar from Urara were simply classified as fines. In the remaining 25 cases two 
formulations were used. Twelve payments were classified as fines chiefs had imposed in the 
"exercise of their official duties" (in Ausfahrung ihres Amtes) and 1 3  payments as fines imposed 
for the "non-performance of roadworks" (Nichtarbeiten am Wege). 
Whether, and to what extent, these sub-categories overlapped was not clear. The most frequent 
visitor, To Ramit from Tavui Cape, made two payments in the non-performance sub-category and 
two in the official duties sub-category.9 Ti.man from Tavui Liu made one payment in each of these 
sub-categories . While two of the three payments of To Poipoi fell into the non-performance sub­
category, the third fell into the disobedience sub-category. On the other hand, Hempenstall' s hero 
To Bobo came from Vunabalbal twice to make payments in the non-performance category. The 
same applied to To Materia from Vunamami, and to three chiefs from Ulagunan, further up the 
road to Takabur, who also only made payments in that sub-category. 10 
But why did the register only record payments by 21 government chiefs although, according 
to the annual reports, 107 chiefs had been appointed by 1904 in the Gazelle Peninsula, not to 
mention the 27 in the Duke of Yorks, none of whom made an appearance? Were payments by 
other chiefs recorded in another register? Did the other chiefs keep the fines they collected? Did 
5 The exceptional case, featuring two Tolai and two non-Tolai, who were all fined 1 0  Marks, looks like a brawl between 
government labourers. 
6 This included the appearance of masked dancers who collect sometimes rather arbitrary fines. 
7 My guess is that the victims in all three disobedience cases, and all four defamation cases, were government chiefs but 
that it was also in both cases such a chief who was fined for not following a summons of the authorities. 
8 I see cases 1 ,  3 and 6 as falling into this category, and the target of Tschang Tiang' s defamation may well also have been 
a chief, quite apart from cases in which the accused were imprisoned or acquitted. 
9 To Ramit appears to have been an unusually powerful individual. He is still remembered as having toured his district 
in a horse-drawn carriage. I know ofno other Tolai government chief who is said to have done so, but I have no idea how 
many horses or carriages Tolai had acquired by 1914. 
10 In other words by 1 904 To Bobo's official authority was limited to Vunabalbal, the base of his own vunatarai. 
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they not impose any fines? How complete was the register in the coverage of any of the fields with 
which it was concerned? 
The entries in this particular category contained no information which answered these 
questions. However, the entries relating to licences looked more promising. The 63 licence entries 
could be divided into three sub-categories : firstly, licences issued to foreign natives, giving them 
privileged access to liquor, explosives and firearms, which accounted for 26 entries; secondly, 
licences to employ local natives as sub-traders, which accounted for 23 entries; and, thirdly, 
licences to employ local natives as hunting boys, which accounted for 14 entries, although multiple 
entries in all three categories made the number of licences issued considerably higher. 
Chinese accounted for the bulk of the 45 licences in the first sub-category, namely for 23 
drinking licences, 1 1  full licences and four explosives licences. In the majority of cases where the 
licence holders were not identified, they were probably also Chinese. There were only two certain 
exceptions: Sago, a veteran trader from the Solomons, who obtained a full licence, and one 
William-whom I imagined as a former Methodist teacher from Polynesia-who was issued with 
a drinking licence. 
The 67 local natives licensed as sub-traders worked for 1 3  employers. Most of them had 
between one and three sub-traders. Some whom one would have expected to have more, for 
example the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft, had none. By contrast the Forsayth 
firm obtained 22 such licences, closely followed, with 20 licences, by Captain Randahl, who had 
married into Queen Emma's clan. Three Chinese employed local natives as sub-traders. Kong Pau 
in Makurapau employed five of them-as many as the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. They cost him 200 
Marks. He also paid 30 Marks for a full licence. In addition he was the only Chinese who paid 10  
Marks for a licence for a hunting boy. 
All told, 23 hunting boy licences were issued according to the register. Heinrich Fellmann, the 
head of the Methodist mission, was the first to pay for his on 2 February 1905. The Catholic 
mission obtained them in bulk, and at a concessional rate: ten for a fee of 50 rather than 100 
Marks. But none of German New Guinea's leading secular citizens, official or private, appeared 
to have obtained a licence-which seemed to be even more unlikely than the number of 
government chiefs shown in the register as having imposed fines. 
This time one of the cancelled entries-No. 291 ,  relating to a drinking licence issued to Ah 
Sin-suggested a way to solve the puzzle. It had been made by a rather clumsy hand, which was 
responsible for entries Nos 272 to 299. Then a clerkish hand took over. It entered the issue of 
another drinking licence in No. 305 but crossed it out before the next entry was made, adding that 
the licence had instead been recorded in the "Licence Register" (Lizenzregister). The new keeper 
of the register then went back and crossed out entry No. 291 ,  presumably because at the time no 
payment had been recorded. He also added next to entries Nos 294 and 26 1 that the licences 
covered, which had already been paid for, had also been entered in the Licence Register under Nos 
36 and 25 . In other words, a special licence register had been kept alongside the general Fees 
Register until its new keeper decided to discontinue this confusing overlap-but as this Licence 
Register still existed (AA G255/5 1) ,  I could see for myself. 
It included 64 entries for the 1 904 budget year. Of these 16-rather than 12 in the Fees 
Register-related to drinking licences, ten-rather than five-to explosive licences, and 
12-rather than nine-to flll l licences . On the other hand, the Licence Register only included 
six-rather than 23--entries relating to sub-traders, and only ten-rather than 14--entries for 
hunting boy licences. Furthermore, it covered types of licences which did not figure at all in the 
Fees Register, in particular five trepang licences and two pearl shell licences. 
The first effective entry in the Licence Register for a hunting boy licence was No. 39, 
according to which such a licence had been issued to governor Hahl. However, there had been an 
earlier entry No. 39. It had shown that such a licence had been issued, for the usual fee of 10  
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Marks, to the Catholic mission. This entry had then been amended by a note to say that the licence 
had been issued free of charge, before being crossed out altogether. 
Could all this be coincidence, or did the information reflect something like the following 
scenario? The new keeper of the Licence Register was not sure how to handle the application of 
the Catholic mission for a hunting boy licence. When he had gone to the governor for instructions, 
Hahl decided not only this particular matter-and applied himself for a hunting boy licence ("what 
a good idea !")-but also instructed him to sort out the messy overlap between the two registers. 
Hahl' s decision, it appeared, was that ten hunting boys were enough for the Catholic mission, 
so that it should not be granted an additional licence free of charge but that it should pay for the 
first ten at a discounted rate. Consequently entry No. 39 in the Licence Register was crossed 
out-Hahl ' s  application being recorded instead-and entry No. 270 in the Fees Register was 
amended by altering the amount payable from 100 to 50 Marks and by specifying that this was a 
special "flat rate" (Pauschgebuhr). 1 1  
At first glance Hahl' s instructions for the sorting out of the general mess were less successful 
since two further sub-trader licences were entered in the Fees Register under Nos 300 and 302 . 
However, it was the crossed out entry No. 305-the counterpart of the crossed out entry No. 39 
in the Licence Register-that marked the beginning of the cleaning up operation, and no further 
licence was listed in the Fees Register after that number, whereas 25 entries were made in the 
Licence Register after the new entry No. 39. As far as the past was concerned, the Licence 
Register showed that I had seen nothing yet. 
m 
In contrast to the 1904/05 Fees Register, it still had its original cover, but that gave little away. It 
bore the handwritten identification "Lizenz-Register", to which someone later added " 1 899/1900". 
Its first page consisted of a hand-ruled sheet, divided into seven columns, intended to show a 
consecutive number, the name and place of residence of the licence holder--or the payee-the 
type of licence, the due amount, the date of issue but, instead of the date of the payment, a 
reference to the corresponding entry in the "EinnahmejournaI", the general register of moneys 
received. 
The first entry referred to a full licence issued on 1 April 1 899, the first day in the life of the 
imperial government of German New Guinea, to Ah Yeng, paid for by the Deutsche Handels- und 
Plantagen-Gesellschaft. In the course of April 1 899 seven full licences, one trepang licence for the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie and Mouton & Co. and one pearl shell and trading licence for captain 
Hamilton were issued. This was followed by the issue of three pearl shell licences in September, 
an explosives licence in October, and in November Wahnes from Bogadjim in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland paid 50 Marks for a licence to hunt birds-of-paradise. Early in 1900 a similar bunch 
of licences was issued, plus a permit for the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft to 
maintain a "labour depot". 12 No entries were recorded for the next two years, but in 1902 a new 
start was made in the same volume. In the course of the 1902 budget year 22 entries were recorded, 
including six trepang licences, five pearl shell licences and what looks like two general commercial 
concessions, for which captain Hamilton, now trading as Hamilton & Wolff, and Queen Emma 
paid, respectively, 1 ,000 and 500 Marks. 
For 1 903 there were 30 entries, including seven trepang licences. The largest payment was 
made by German New Guinea's star Chinese, Ah Tam. He paid 140 Marks for seven drinking 
1 1  As it turned out, this was not the only instance where a consideration of the changing legislative framework would 
have simplified matters. But the purpose of this exercise was to test how far an examination of these registers would take 
me. 
12 It was used to house new recruits until they were shipped to its plantations in Samoa. 
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licences for unnamed Chinese, but he did not renew the trepang licence he had obtained the 
previous year. There were also no large concession payments . Instead Hamilton & Wolff settled 
for drinking licences for "Willie, Joe Fernandez, Ah Back and Jack". The keeping of the register 
was still erratic, so much so that the entries for the second quarter had to be added after those for 
the third had been completed. 
This brought me back to 1904 but to a different register, namely the "EinnahmejournaI'' (AA 
G255/61 )-henceforth Payments Register-which shed some light on this unhappy state of affairs. 
According to this register a total of 8 1 .40 Marks were received during April 1904. The accounts 
were checked and certified as being arithmetically correct by district judge Kornmayer. The money 
was transferred to the "central cash office" (Hauptkasse). Its receipt was signed by Warnecke. 
The accounts for May were treated in the same manner. The June receipt was signed on behalf 
of the Hauptkasse by Ludwig. The July receipt bore the same signature. In August W amecke was 
back in the Hauptkasse. In September Ludwig signed again for the Hauptkasse. He was replaced 
by V ahlkampf in October when W amecke acted as district judge. Warnecke again acted as district 
judge in November, but Ludwig was back in the Hauptkasse. He was still there in December, when 
Kornmayer returned to the district court. In January 1 905 the keeping of the Payments Register 
was formally handed over by "secretary" Sigwanz to the "office assistant" Adelmann-the man 
with the clumsy handwriting-who soon handed over to Worbs-the new broom. In February 
1905 Warnecke was back in the Hauptkasse, but not for long, since he took over the keeping of 
the Payments Register from Worbs in March, who certified the correctness of the accounts acting 
for the district judge. Nonetheless Warnecke, although the official keeper of the Payments 
Register, also signed the receipt for a record amount of 1 ,3 19.30 Marks for the Hauptkasse. 
Perhaps because things were going so well, the receipts for April 1905 were still entered in the 
same register, instead of that for the 1905 budget year. This did not bother the new acting district 
judge, Wuchert, who certified their correctness. The receipt was signed by Warnecke for the 
Hauptkasse, although he was officially still the keeper of the district court's Payments Register 
which had, in fact, been kept by Worbs since February. The formal handing over from Worbs to 
Warnecke in March, it appears, had been little more than a charade enabling Worbs to certify the 
correctness of his own accounts. 
This merry-go-round-which changed the person in charge of the Hauptkasse at least six times 
in the course of a single budget year-was not a temporary disturbance. The administrative mess 
to which it contributed was even worse in earlier years. This was illustrated by an earlier Payments 
Register (AA G255/62). It started with entry No. 1 in August 1 901 ,  that is to say in the middle of 
the second quarter of the 1901  budget year. On 3 September 1901  district judge Stuckhardt 
certified the correctness of its first 30 entries, and a simple note, rather than a formal receipt, 
showed that all payments had been transferred to the Hauptkasse. 
The next certificate was signed by Warnecke as acting district judge-and Schulz signed a 
receipt on behalf of the Hauptkasse, although he was also the keeper of the Payments Register. 
Warnecke continued to act as district judge until Hempenstall's  anti-hero, Assessor Wolff, 
appeared as a permanent replacement for Stuckhardt in February 1902. Wolff made sure that the 
Hauptkasse, still represented by Schulz, signed at least a proper receipt the next time round. Schulz 
did so again in April, but he also certified the correctness of his own accounts-and he did so in 
his own capacity, rather than as acting district judge. 
On 9 May, 1902-rather than on 1 April -someone made a fresh start. This new round lasted 
until the end of the 1902 calendar year-rather than until 3 1  March, 1903 . Wolff certified on 1 3  
January 1903 that it had reached 77 entries-compared with 1 82 entries between August 1 90 1  and 
early May 1902. The transfer of moneys to the Hauptkasse continued at irregular intervals. Wolff 
not only certified the correctness of the accounts, but also took over their keeping in October, 
when Schulz in the Hauptkasse was replaced by Voigt. 
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By now it looked as if, imperfect as these registers were, they were at least all still available. 
But this was not so. There was a gap between the 1902 Payments Register and that for 1904, which 
I had inspected earlier, and the predecessors of the Fees Register for 1 904, my starting point, also 
did not survive. By contrast the Payments Register following that for 1 904 still existed, although 
it had a different format and although it too had lost its cover and its first page (AA G254n3). 
The accounts for May 1905 were certified by Wuchert as district judge and by Warnecke for 
the Hauptkasse. In June 1905 Worbs formally handed over the keeping of the Payments Register 
to a person with an illegible signature. In August 1 905 Wuchert was replaced as district judge by 
Karlowa. Warnecke stayed on, signing for the Hauptkasse until March 1 906 when he was replaced 
by Merz. Karlowa, on the other hand, was kept on the move. He signed in September and October. 
There was no signature for November, and Worbs certified the December accounts in an acting 
capacity. There was again no signature for January 1 906, when the keeper of the register also 
changed-without a formal transfer. The February accounts were formally certified. The 
certificates for March and April were signed by Karlowa. There was no signature of the person 
in charge for May. Instead an entry by Gentner, presumably from the Hauptkasse, showed that the 
accounts had been audited and that those for January 1 906 had been found to have produced a 
surplus of 20. 1 0  Marks-presumably because one or more payments had been added to the cash 
box without having been recorded in the Payments Register, or some other register in which it 
should have been shown. 
However, this episode can also be seen in a positive light: the discrepancy was discovered and 
recorded, instead of being swept under the carpet. Accounting was taken seriously. The seeds of 
an orderly bureaucratic government had been sown, although the environment, after 20 years of 
colonial rule, was still distinctly unfavourable. 
On the other hand, a somewhat erratic accounting practice was not the only irregularity my 
examination revealed. The most serious defect was the treatment of Chinese. They were legally 
natives and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the district court. Nonetheless, the district 
court had, according to the Fees Register, imposed three fines of 50 Marks on Chinese. It had also 
issued two "summary ci vii judgements" ('Zahlungsbefehle) against Chinese and even a formal ci vii 
judgement against See Song. He had to pay 20. 70 Marks in court costs which would not have been 
payable if the district court had refused to hear the matter and referred the plaintiff, Mouton & Co., 
to the district office for an informal administrative treatment of the claim-but then the district 
judge and the district commissioner were still the same person, and there were considerable 
practical advantages in following the district court procedures in these cases. 
Yet all these irregularities showed how German colonial rule actually operated, and while it 
had been tedious to observe this operation in detail, it had given me a more tangible feeling for 
what had happened at the grassroots level than the general statements, for example about serious 
staff shortages, which I had previously read and which had gone in one ear and straight out the 
other. 13 I was therefore ready to continue my experiment, although now rather more selectively. 
IV 
When I had looked at the unusually erratic early Payments Register my attention was caught by 
the name "To Bobo". He paid a fine of 3 Marks for neglecting his road building duties on 12  June 
1902, that is to say only a few weeks after the military operations following the V arzin Murders 
had come to an end. It turned out to be the first payment of its kind recorded in this 
register-which had been started under Stuckhardt in August 190 1 .  It was mild, compared with 
1 3  To be sure, the information raises more questions than it answers. It was clearly not just a problem of staff shortages. 
There are also indications of a rapid tum-over. But this still does not explain the frequent movements of the available 
personnel from one position to another. 
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a fine of 15 Marks for the same offence which a chief whose name was illegible had paid the 
following month. 
Six of the 1 1  entries for September 1902 related to fines imposed on Tolai. In three cases fines 
of 10 Marks were imposed for thefts, whereas the fines of 14, 30 and 20 Marks paid by Noah, To 
Maidang and Meli probably consisted of fines they had collected in their capacity as government 
chiefs rather than fines imposed on them personally. 
In October 1902 Wolff fined the entire district of Tomananambu 20 Marks for disobedience. 
In November and December six Tolai were fined for theft or attempted theft: 5 Marks each in 
cases where the stolen objects, bananas or coconuts, were identified and 10 Marks each-the 
September rate-in the other cases, which probably did not involve food. The two largest 
payments, of 30 Marks each, were simply identified as "punishments" (Strafe) and probably again 
consisted of fines collected by To Kaliwurwur and Tinduk as government chiefs. 
The lack of detail made this cluster of cases-which was followed by a gap until April 
1904 !-unusually inconclusive. Still, it suggested that such administrative fines were an 
innovation by Wolff, and that administrative intervention in native matters increased generally and 
permanently after the Varzin Murders. 
My next stop was a Fees Register covering the last quarter of the 1905 budget year and the 
whole of the 1906 budget year (AA G255/66). The accounting procedures were still not under 
control. 14 They also continued to change. As a consequence this register included only eight entries 
for the last quarter of 1 905/06, whereas its predecessor showed over 80 entries for the last quarter 
of 1904/05. This was mainly due to the fact that licences and district court business were no longer 
included. On the other hand, 1907 brought a rush of entries concerning personal status matters. 
It began once more with an entry relating to governor Hahl. He paid a fee of 6 Marks for a birth 
certificate for his daughter, Bertha, who was recorded as No. 1 in the Births' Register for 1904. 
Within a few weeks a dozen birth certificates for 1904, 1905, 1906 and 1907 followed. Apparently 
no births had been registered for more than three years. 
More importantly, the register suggested that the number of cases heard by the station court in 
1906 had been much smaller than in 1904. The highest file number referred to was 69 compared 
with 108 two years earlier. 
Five of the relevant 1 3  entries related to foreign natives : four Chinese and the Solomon Island 
trader, Sago, who was fined 30 Marks for an unidentified offence. Judging by the names, all local 
natives fined were Tolai. The most prominent name was that of To Poipoi of Takubar. He was 
fined 40 Marks for an unidentified offence. 15 Only one charge was identified: To Birao of Gunanur 
was fined 20 Marks for misusing his official powers. The only female referred to was Ja Poka of 
Bitarebarebe. One Marks was confiscated from her because it had been obtained by committing 
an offence for which she had been punished in 1905. The dearth of female names indicated that 
the station court no longer imposed fines in cases of adultery in 1906. 16 
The administrative punishments confirmed the impression that the scene had changed 
remarkably since 1 904. Four Chinese were fined administratively, three of them receiving fines 
of 3 to 5 Marks for non-registration-which had been treated as a district court matter two years 
earlier and had attracted fines of 50 Marks. Moreover, in 1906 five Malays were fined-one for 
negligently damaging property-whereas not a single Malay had been fined in 1 904. The local 
natives fined included three non-Tolai-one of them a police corporal who was fined 5 Marks for 
disobedience. The same fine was imposed on a Tolai labourer for desertion whereas no fines for 
14 For example, this volume included a few entries for 1907 which were crossed out with the explanation that a new 
volume had been started. 
15 To Poipoi was also fined administratively 20 Marks, again for an unidentified offence. 
16 This could, of course, mean two different things: that cases of adultery were now punished with imprisonment or that 
they were no longer prosecuted. An improbable third explanation would be a dramatic drop in the number of adulteries. 
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desertion had been imposed in 1904. Another Tolai was fined 10  Marks for property damage, 
seven were fined 10 Marks each for a mass brawl, and one 20 Marks because he had disregarded 
"the orders concerning the tubuan", which had apparently been issued in the meantime. It was, of 
course, possible that the majority of the eight unidentified charges, including one against a woman, 
were concerned with the theft of food, or with the defamation of government chiefs, or with the 
misuse of their official powers, or with adultery, as in 1904, but I suspected that things had 
changed in this respect as well. 
They certain! y had changed as regards the fines collected by government chiefs. Only Tombola 
from remote Navia was identified as having handed in fines-and he brought a mere 38 Marks, 
compared with 80 Marks in 1904. The register made no reference to To Bobo or To Materia, or 
to To Ramit, the most frequent visitor in 1 904-which implied that the role of government chiefs 
had also changed. 
An incomplete Payments Register covering the time from May 1905 to May 1906 (AA 
G254n3) helped to link the scene in 1906 with that in 1904. Although it provided even fewer 
details, the register did suggest that 1 905 had prepared the ground for 1 906. In May 1 905 To 
Kukawi was fined 30 Marks for "non-appearance", in June To Ramit handed in 16 Marks he had 
collected as fines, and in December Sago paid yet another fine of 30 Marks. But To Ramit did not 
return and only about a dozen government chiefs, rather than 20, were identified as having handed 
in fines. Some of the 1904 names were listed but most were new, and no places of residence were 
given. There was no reference to To Bobo, To Materia or To Poipoi, and apparently not a single 
Tolai woman was administratively fined in the course of the 1 905 budget year. 
The continuation of the 1906 Fees Register (AA G255/543) covered the 1 907 and 1 908 budget 
years. It contained 106 entries for 1907 but only 58 for 1 908-although the last two entries for 
1907, in fact, belonged to 1908. As in the 1906 Fees Register, licences and district court business 
were excluded and native matters and personal status matters of non-natives figured prominently: 
In addition new types of entries appeared, such as building permits and licences for private 
individuals to carry out disciplinary punishments of their native employees. Other innovations 
were the employment of licensed "field guards" (Feldwiichter) and permits allowing non-natives 
to take their native servants abroad. 
The references to station court files indicated a continuing drop in the number of judicial 
decisions although the highest number referred to in 1908 (57) was higher than in 1 907 (37). All 
told, the station court imposed fines in 25 cases. Five of them involved Chinese, but not a single 
Malay was fined in 1 907. The highest fine, 400 Marks, was imposed on Ah Tui, a regular 
customer. In one case a 60 Marks fine was reduced to 20 Marks by way of a pardon. The highest 
fine paid by a Tolai-who accounted for all but two cases involving local natives-was 92 Marks. 
It was paid by Ja Tameana in place of a shell money fine imposed on her. Such conversions, 
including conversions of prison sentences into fines, were recorded several times. In one case, Ja 
Welo, who could only pay 40 Marks of the 50 Marks fine imposed on her, had the outstanding 10 
Marks even converted into compulsory labour. Among the Tolai charged were eight women. 
Although adultery was identified as the charge in only one case it was likely that it was also the 
charge in at least three others. 
Administrative fines accounted for 45 entries. Although a few labourers, three Chinese and a 
policeman from the Carolines were represented, the bulk of the entries related to Tolai. Where the 
charges were identified, the flavour resembled 1904 rather than 1906. Three Tolai were fined for 
creating a public nuisance, two for non-appearance, two for adultery, one for defaming a chief, and 
one chief for misusing his official powers. The fines imposed on Tolai ranged from 3 to 130 
Marks-which was paid by To Wurgilo and others fromBitarebarebe for an unidentified offence. 
A few days later To Wurgilo handed in 30 Marks he had collected as fines from his people for 
non-performance of roadwork. In this case it was not certain whether road maintenance was the 
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issue, but the 20  Marks paid in by  Tukal of Malaguna were expressly identified in  this manner. 
Two other government chiefs came from remote areas to hand in fines-from Anapapar and from 
what looks like "Makadau", in the Duke of Yorks-but none of the 1 904 names resurfaced. Not 
a single fine for non-payment of the head tax was recorded. 
While the next Fees Registers were no longer available, the surviving record included a 
differently designed register which covered the 1913  budget year, although it had lost the first 904 
-out of 1 ,850---entries (AA G255/576). Its printed forms distinguished between quarantine fees, 
fees for hunting boys, labour recruiting fees, fees for permission to carry out commercial activities, 
fees in shipping matters, fines and other small payments. They also included two blank columns, 
one of which was used for drinking and explosives licences. 
The large majority of the surviving entries related to labour recruiting matters-which I 
ignored, together with the fees paid in shipping and quarantine matters. Around 50 hunting boy 
licences were issued to non-natives by what I took to be the district office, now in Rabaul, during 
the period covered and about ten foreign natives bought the same privilege. Most of them were 
Chinese, but Sago was still active. Chinese also employed a substantial portion of the about 80 
licensed native sub-traders. 
While there had been a manifold increase in the number of hunting boy and sub-trader licences 
since 1 904, the number of drinking licences had only risen by about 50 per cent. Most of them 
were held by Chinese residents in Rabaul-plus, of course, Sago in Tomalili. The building boom 
in Rabaul had come to an end. Only three building permits were issued, two of them to Chinese. 
Chinese also ran several of the dozen or so licensed premises, and Ah Tam paid a fee of 100 
Marks for what looks like a "casino licence" (Spielsaalgebiihr).  
The register referred to only ten station court files for 1913 and to three for 1914-but the 
highest file number for 1913  was No. 133 .  This indicated a large increase in the activity of the 
station court since 1 908 but a substantial drop in the proportion of cases in which fines were 
imposed. In seven of the 13  cases the accused were Chinese. Those in the other six were Tolai, all 
of whom were males . No charges were identified. The fines ranged from 5 to 60 Marks. The 
decrease in the range of fines was as remarkable as the increase in the proportion of the Chinese 
fined. 
By contrast all 28 administrative fines were imposed on local natives, mostly Tolai and mostly 
male. 17 The charges were not identified. The fines ranged from 3 to 7 Marks. No fines handed in 
by government chiefs were shown. There was no indication that any fines had been imposed by 
the district office for the non-performance of roadwork, or for non-payment of the head tax. 18 
A list of fines received by the Hauptkasse allowed me to follow developments in this particular 
field right through to the end of German colonial rule; for while the list (AA G255n6) was only 
supposed to include entries for the first quarter of the 1914  budget year, it was, in fact, continued 
into the second quarter, and even into World War I, although it was then kept by the district cash 
office because the Hauptkasse had been evacuated from Rabaul after the outbreak of hostilities. 
Seven of the 32 fines listed were paid by non-natives. All but one, of 20 Marks, amounted to 10 
Marks. The offences were not identified, but it  was clear that none of the fines had been imposed 
by the district court. 
Of the 25 entries dealing with fines imposed on natives nine referred to files of the station 
court. The numbers ranged from 25 to 63, so that it was likely that the total number of cases heard 
by the station court in 1914 would again have reached the one hundred Marks, if war had not 
intervened. 
17 Three women were fined 5 Marks each in the same matter. 
1 8  It was possible, but unlikely, that all 14 payments were made during the first six months for which the entries were 
lost. It was also possible, and more likely, that the "Polizei-Register''-if this was what it was-also included warnings, 
and other non-punitive police measures. 
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The station court imposed 1 1  fines on foreign natives, ten of them Chinese, although five of 
them were fined in the same matter. Four received a fine of 20 Marks and the ringleader, Ah Tip, 
240 Marks. On 25 August 1914  one of the other four, Ah Kui, was even fined 500 Marks, the last 
fine shown in the list. However, the size of this fine, just as that of the only fine imposed on a local 
native by the station court-200 Marks on To Urakawil ofMalagunan-probably reflected the war 
climate. 
The non-judicial punishments imposed on natives were divided into three categories : 
"disciplinary punishments" (Disziplinarstrafen), "monetary punishments" (Geldstrafen) and 
"Ordnungsstrafen"-punishments for disorderly rather than criminal behaviour. The payment of 
a single Ordnungsstrafe (of 20 Marks) was recorded, but four disciplinary fines, between 3 and 
20 Marks, were listed-which was much higher than I had expected in the light of earlier 
information. The rest were administrative fines. The highest was a low 30 Marks, the lowest, 3 
Marks, was paid by Ja Pangatan-the only woman shown in the list. No charges were identified. 
While this trail of registers suggested significant changes in the role of government chiefs and 
the station courts, in the position of Chinese and so on, the information was not sufficiently 
complete to draw conclusions with a satisfying degree of confidence. Nor was it sufficiently 
detailed to give a feeling for what had been happening. On the other hand, there was no question 
that the information was of considerable importance and reasonably reliable. Hence it was 
worthwhile to continue the experiment with an examination of one of the general business journals, 
since they had a much wider scope than the financial registers I had inspected so far. It appeared 
sensible to return for this purpose to 1904, and the relevant Eingangsjournal of the district office 
in HerbertshOhe had survived (AA G255/57). 
v 
Its first entry, headed " 1904 continuation", was numbered 1 10, and the volume continued into the 
1905 calendar year. The last entry for 1904 carried the number 4 1 6, so that I had to deal with a 
total of 306 entries. 19 
Entry No. 1 10 concerned instructions sent out on 12 March 1904 to the government station in 
Kaewieng in connection with five land titles. On the same day Miss Macco requested a certificate 
which officially proved that she was alive and Ah Mock applied for an unspecified licence. Not 
an exciting day, and nothing at all, according to the journal, happened in the course of the next. On 
14 March Buddeus, a minor official, complained about the noise in the police barracks, and Isokide 
Komine reported that a large number of people had been killed in Muriama [sic] , in New Ireland. 
The following day To Bulukua complained about "the Tamanairiki people" having passed "illegal 
judgements" (unrechtmaj3ig Richten). On 16 March Wendt applied for certified copies of his 
power of attorney and some personal status certificates were sent ex officio to the governor. Later 
that day several labourers of Mouton & Co. demanded to be sent home. On 1 7  March Gango 
accused Mrs Hopfel of not paying him his wages and Mouton & Co. reported Kilan for poisoning 
19 In fact there were 307 effective entries, because one additional entry (No.239a) was added. No entries were crossed 
out, but there were again many multiple and mixed entries. The journal consisted of printed forms, divided into seven 
columns. Their headings showed that the forms had been designed for a more advanced bureaucratic system in which 
administration consisted primarily of written communications. The first column called for a consecutive number, the 
second for the date the communication had been received, the third-which was never used-for the identification of the 
file to which it had been added; the fourth for an identification of the communication received, the fifth for the date of 
the instruction, the sixth for a short description of its content, and the seventh for the date on which the matter had been 
finalised. It was generally used to show where the matter had been filed away, although the date when that happened was 
never given. On the other hand, often two or more instructions and their dates were shown in the fifth and sixth columns, 
although some of the matters reappeared in later entries, without a strictly applied system of cross references. For example, 
entry No. 142 showed thatGango's complaint listed in entry No. 1 1 9 (see below in the text) was rejected on 1 2 April 1 904, 
although this outcome was not shown in entry No. 1 1 9 and no cross references were made. 
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the overseer Sioni. Nothing happened on 18  March. The only business recorded during the next 
three days was a report that To Buibui had deserted his employer Randahl. 
The last days of March were more eventful, after an unpromising start: two Catholic 
missionaries wanted their employment by the mission officially certified and the Methodist mission 
applied for the registration of three land titles. Then Pieper, the official in charge of the police post 
in Toma, was instructed to investigate reports of a planned attack on the establishment of the 
Catholic mission in Mandres. Pieper reported the government chief To Imire for "rebellious 
behaviour" (Aujlehnung)-and two natives complained that they had been attacked by the native 
machinist of the Nugeria, whose name is illegible. 
On 4 April the shooting of a chief named Han in the Solomon Islands was reported; Augustin 
was reported for having sent his labourers to work the previous Sunday; SMS Condor requested 
the punishment of Kabariab, another land registration matter was dealt with, and "To Pakupak alias 
Taeng" complained about a school father His gen was building on native land in Vunavar. The next 
day father Abel reported two Methodist mission teachers in New Ireland for falsely accusing the 
catechist Magis and "misusing the name of the governor". The Catholic mission sent a list of the 
"Baining slaves" kept on Watom Island; the Methodist mission refused to agree to the setting aside 
of a native reserve on Ulu Island in the Duke of Yorks; and the Catholic mission complained about 
arrangements for the religious education of Ja Tade.20 
These first 30 entries showed that the journal indeed covered a wide range of matters. 
Unfortunately the coverage was far from complete. Only about one fifth of the cases which came 
before the station court were covered. Only about a third of the criminal matters before the district 
court were referred to, and not a single civil matter the court had dealt with. 
Yet, when I compared the entries relating to the fines handed in by government chiefs with 
those in the Fees Register, the coverage was virtually identical, although there were a few apparent 
discrepancies. However, they disappeared under closer scrutiny, and it was reassuring to find that 
the register included the appropriate cross-reference to the business journal in all cases. 
In the first instance the chief was merely given different names in the two registers, presumably 
another case of a confusing alias. In the second case it appears that a chief who had fined one of 
his subjects 40 Marks for extramarital intercourse was allowed to keep 5 Marks because only 35 
Marks appear in the Fees Register as having been handed in. Although the suggestion that 
government chiefs were permitted to keep part of the fines they imposed is historically significant, 
the two other problematic cases were more intriguing. 
According to the Fees Register, Timan of Tavui Liu handed in 1 1  Marks he had collected from 
his people for the non-performance of roadwork, whereas the corresponding entry in the journal 
showed that father Winthuis had made an application concerning the road between Tavui Liu and 
Keravia. The plot began to thicken when I included the fourth discrepancy. According to the Fees 
Register, about two weeks earlier Noah of Malmaluan had handed in fines of 22 Marks he had 
collected for the non-performance of roadwork. Instead the journal recorded a complaint by Noah 
that father Winthuis had taken his people away from their work on the road. The plot thickened 
further when I learned from the journal that this was followed, four days later, by a second 
complaint by Noah about father Winthuis.21 
Since I found this narrative embryo tempting, I decided to test what the entries in the journal 
would tell me about the "Baining Massacre"-the killing of ten Catholic missionaries and by far 
the most dramatic event in the Bismarck Archipelago in 1904.22 
When examining the Fees Register I had not appreciated that a fine of 10 Marks To Lauva of 
Vunavar paid on 9 January 1 905 was an early indication that something was brewing. The 
20 For a detailed discussion of this particular case see Sack, 1973. 
21 The complaint was eventually filed under "Discontinued Criminal Matters". 
22 For a phantom history of this event see Hempenstall, 1978: pp. 149-52. 
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corresponding entry in the business journal left no doubt that this was so-"the teacher" in 
Vunavar had claimed several weeks before the event that the Catholic missionaries in Baining had 
been killed. In other words, To Lauva was the teacher in question and he had been fined for failing 
to follow a summons to give evidence. Yet the journal did not refer to actions the district office had 
taken in response to the actual massacre. But a cluster of entries suggested an explanation. On 20 
September 1904 the office received three relevant reports. According to the first To Viringe and 
To Pal, two traditional Tolai big men, were partly responsible for the killings ; according to the 
second the Tolai living inland of the coastal station of the Catholic mission at Mandres had incited 
the Baining to commit the murders at the hill station, St Paul, and according to the third "the 
Livuan", a name for the Tolai living around Weberhafen, had been actively involved in the killings. 
What action did the district office take in response to these reports? It referred them to the 
governor, although it put copies on a file, presumably on the Baining Massacre, which was kept 
for the colonial department. It therefore looked as if this event had, from the start, been treated as 
a matter for which the governor was directly responsible-and I had no intention of extending my 
examination to the journals and registers kept by his office. Instead I wanted to test whether the 
filing instructions in the business journal of the district office could help me in processing the 
information it contained. 
As it turned out the first entry was untypical in this regard because it was the district 
commissioner, albeit in his capacity as district judge, who took the initiative, whereas the journal 
usually showed him as reactive. But this reflected the nature of this journal, rather than the nature 
of his role. It also explained, at least in part, its incompleteness .  For example, it appeared that 
criminal investigations in response to a formal complaint by a member of the public were listed 
whereas those the district commissioner initiated ex officio, say after a report by his police sergeant, 
were not. 
Still it was worth looking at what happened after the instructions concerning the five land titles 
in New Ireland had been sent to the government station in Kaewieng. The matter was temporarily 
added to the "Land Files" and entered into a list "La.nge Fristen", as not requiring action in the 
short term. The next two matters were dealt with immediately. Miss Macco was issued with her 
certificate and Ah Mook with his licence on the spot so that the matters could be filed 
away-under "District Office, General" in the first case, and under "Licences" in the second. The 
complaint about the noisy police barracks was referred to the police sergeant for action and, 
presumably after his report, filed away under "Police Troop". Komine's  report about the killings 
in New Ireland was first put in a folder "Neu Mecklenburg" (New Ireland), in which business 
relating to that island, in so far as it was not the responsibility of the government station in 
Kaewieng, was collected until it could be dealt with during a visit. In this case it proved 
unnecessary because a government station for southern New Ireland had just been established in 
Namatanai so that the matter could be passed on to the local district officer. 
Tobulukua' s complaint about the Tamanairiki people was put in the "Toma" folder on 15  
March. It was apparently dealt with during a visit by the district commissioner to Toma late in  May 
and afterwards filed away under "Native Matters", together with about a quarter of all matters 
listed in the journal. 
These few entries cover between them most of the ways in which incoming business was 
handled. The two basic possibilities were immediate action or deferral. Immediate action, in tum, 
could consist either of a referral to somebody else or of dealing with the substance of the matter. 
Referrals were not uncommon and could be horizontal or vertical. The district commissioner 
/district judge could refer a matter to another local administration, for example, the government 
station in Namatanai, or to a specialist, for example the government doctor. He could delegate 
business downwards to one of his subordinates, for example, his police sergeant, or refer it 
upwards to the governor. 
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The most common reason for deferring action was "geographical". The matter could not be 
dealt with in the office in HerbertshOhe but required the district commissioner, or one of his 
subordinates, to travel. Hence the various travel folders : "Salomonen", "Toma" and so forth. The 
deferral could be "long-term" (Zange Fristen) or "short-term" (kurze Fristen). The period involved 
was usually specified. At its end the matter was presented for another decision. In most cases 
substantive action was eventually taken and the matter was filed. 
The filing of matters requiring judicial or quasi-judicial treatment was straightforward, 
especially as regards the exercise of the regular jurisdiction over non-natives because case files had 
to be kept. The same applied to criminal prosecutions of natives before the station court. By 
contrast the filing system for administrative matters,  especially those involving natives, was still 
in flux. Apart from a general file "Native Matters" there was an increasing number of specialised 
files. Some, like a file on the "Police Troop" or "Disciplinary Punishments", were well established, 
but, for example, a new file "Marital Disputes" was created when the first case of divorce in a 
marriage between Tolai came before the district commissioner in November 1904. Similarly a 
special file on "Chiefs" was created when, presumably for the first time, the borders of two chiefly 
districts were formally altered by taking the place Vunagalgalut from chief Timan and allocating 
it instead to chief Paula, whereas no reference was made to this file when chief Topui in Birara was 
removed from office a month earlier. 
While it was not surprising that such specialised files were rarely used, it was puzzling that 
others that one would have expected to be used routinely were not used more often. Only two 
matters were filed under "Disciplinary Punishments", although it was, for example, unlikely that 
the policeman Patinot, who was "never there" (presumably in the barracks) in the evening, received 
a disciplinary punishment, whereas the "soldiers" Turan and To Marmai, who wandered around 
Herbertshohe for three days after being discharged from hospital, did not. Yet their case was filed 
under "Native Matters"-rather than under "Disciplinary Punishments" or at least under "Police 
Troop". The action taken, if any, was not identified. Even more surprisingly, to give just one other 
example, the secondment of 15  police soldiers to SMS Mowe was also filed under "Native 
Matters" rather than under "Police Troop". I therefore tested the filing practices more 
systematically, using "Discontinued Criminal Matters" as a case study, because this information 
provided an important supplement to the court statistics for non-natives and the penal statistics for 
natives, since neither indicated how many of the criminal matters investigated were not even 
prosecuted. 
In an ideal world-ideal, that is, for a quantitative historian-the journal would have told me 
how many crimes were reported during the period in question, how many of them were 
investigated, and how many of those investigated were, respectively, discontinued and prosecuted. 
That would only have been the beginning, because either the journal or other sources would have 
also told me how many of the accused were acquitted, what kind of punishments those convicted 
had received, and whether their sentences were actua!ly carried out. In the "historical" Bismarck 
Archipelago in 1904 the position was different. 
As I read the entries, a total of 94 dealt with alleged criminal behaviour by natives and 38 with 
that of non-natives, so that the relevant entries accounted together for well over a third of the grand 
total. Of the 38 accusations against non-natives, three were referred: one to the government station 
in Kaewieng, one, involving a charge of manslaughter against a Catholic missionary, to the district 
office in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and one to the district office in Apia because the woman Kudikan, 
whose illegal recruiting was alleged, had been sent to work in German Samoa. It appeared that only 
four of the remaining 35 cases were prosecuted, whereas 1 7  were formally discontinued. In one 
case-which was more in the nature of a disciplinary offence-the governor decided that no formal 
punishment of the official in question, who had slaughtered two of the government' s breeding pigs, 
was required, and in a defamation case the matter apparently did not proceed beyond the 
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compulsory mediation stage. What was worrying, however, was that the journal did not record the 
outcome in the other 12  cases, although it was unlikely that any of them led to a prosecution. 
This inconclusiveness could have different reasons : for example, it appeared that in the most 
serious case, involving the killing of a chief in the northern Solomons, the merchant seaman in 
question had left German New Guinea, at least temporarily. But in five cases the matter was filed 
under "Native Matters" . This suggested that the complaint against the non-native had been 
unsuccessful. In one additional case the native accuser was instead prosecuted before the station 
court, presumably for defamation. 
The picture in the cases involving natives accused of criminal behaviour was still less 
conclusive. As many as 17 of the 94 cases were referred including seven to the governor. In only 
nine cases-or roughly one in ten-was the investigation formally discontinued. Twelve cases 
were prosecuted before the station court. Administrative and disciplinary punishments were 
pronounced in another seven cases. One native was fined by a chief for extramarital intercourse 
and the Methodist teacher Solomon got away with a warning for refusing to recognise the authority 
of chief Urapil. The most dramatic outcome was a punitive expedition-the only one shown in the 
journal, and one which was not identified in the annual reports . It was carried out after five natives 
in Luban in New Ireland had killed three labourers who had deserted from Mouton & Co. in the 
Gazelle Peninsula. Two cases were added to a special file dealing with illegal corporal punishments 
in Queen Emma' s  establishments-the "Forsaythsche Priigelsammlung".23 
The main problem, however, was again the cases where the outcome remained uncertain. Since 
they represented more than 40 per cent, a meaningful quantification of the information was out of 
the question. This was doubly frustrating because a comparison between the two groups of entries 
indicated that there were significant quantitative differences in the treatment of accusations of 
criminal behaviour on the part of natives and non-natives. 
Although the information provided in the journal on particular cases was minimal, it did show 
human beings interacting with each other rather than grains of sand running through the hourglass 
of history. It would therefore have been a pity to lose this personal flavour by treating these cases 
merely as instances of types of behaviour-for example, the case of the woman Ja Tatamut who 
claimed to have invented a dance which made shell money magically rise out of the ground, as a 
case of fraud. But what could I do, historically, with cases such as this-or with that of chief 
Titiven who had proclaimed an illegal ordinance prohibiting marriages between Methodists and 
Catholics in his district, or with that of chief Timoti who asked the district office for instructions 
as to whether his jurisdiction extended to the fining of hunting boys employed by non-natives and 
who requested to be supplied with a "statute book" (Gesetzbuch) on which he could henceforth 
base his decisions? 
It was plain that this kind of information was vital for any serious attempt to write, for example, 
a history of the government chiefs in German New Guinea, which was clearly far more colourful 
and varied than Hempenstall' s phantom version (see above: 101  ) . But it was by now also plain that 
the information in these registers did not permit a systematic, quantitative approach. Yet it 
represented more than a collection of anecdotes . These cases were all part of a composite picture. 
Moreover, they were informative precisely because they were not typical. Government chiefs in 
the Bismarck Archipelago did not routinely proclaim illegal ordinances or ask for statute books. 
But the actions of Titiven and Timoti illustrated the range of behaviour displayed by government 
chiefs in the Tolai area in 1904. They were actual instances of something that was generally 
possible. Other government chiefs could have acted similarly, although these registers suggested 
that they did not. 
23 This file became even more intriguing because it was connected with another special file concerned with perjury 
accusations against district commissioner Kornrnayer. 
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Put differently, the entries illuminated the stage on which the historical actors were performing, 
but instead of lighting up the whole stage they moved like a spotlight through a dark room, picking 
out details for just a moment. However, these registers contained some clusters of information 
which painted larger and more lasting pictures. The most impressive, shown in Table ill, were the 
entries relating to complaints by natives about Catholic missionaries and to complaints of Catholic 
missionaries about natives. 
4 April 
5 April 
9 April 
13  April 
? May 
20 May 
1 June 
5 June 
9 June 
lO June 
21 June 
22 June 
1 1  July 
1 August 
24 August 
TABLE III 
Complaints by and about Sacred Heart Missionaries, Herbertshtlhe 1904 
To Pakupak complains about a school father Hisgen is building in Vunavar. 
Father Abel charges the teacher Rupeni with misusing the name of the governor, and the 
teacher Daniela-both in New Ireland-with falsely accusing the catechist Magis. 
The Catholic mission complains about the arrangements for the religious education of Ja 
Tade. 
Fellmann (the head of the Methodist mission) reports complaints by the Boava people 
about father Schumm. The Catholic mission comments on the complaints of To Lemba 
against father van der Aa. 
To Roge deserts from the Catholic mission. 
The religious education of Ja Tade is raised again. 
The teacher in Nonga defames the Catholic mission. 
Investigations against father Schumm concerning the 'keeping back' of Ja Valawalai. 
Father Eberlein reports a number of polygamous marriages. 
Tamlik complains about father Oberreiter. 
Father Winthuis and Timan are reported for extortion. A quarrel between father Riederer 
and the teacher Joni in Ratavul ensues. 
Noah complains about father Winthuis. 
Noah complains again about father Winthuis. 
The teacher Armel buries the Catholic Turakit and a second Methodist burial of a Catholic 
in Ratongor is barely stopped in time. 
The teacher in Kabanga is reported for spreading rumours that all Popi were going to be 
killed. 
1 0  September The Catholic mission asks for the punishment of To Manuke, Ja Takunia and To Vurgelo. 
1 1  October The heirs of Lambet refuse to pay father Hisgen 10 Marks compensation. 
1 8  October Father Baumann threatens to punish To Wewut. To Baining deserts from the Catholic 
mission. 
3 1  October To Doke complains that father Oberreiter shot his dog. 
1 November Father Btlgershausen reports Timan and Ja Rigalaga for adultery and Daniela for judging 
in marital matters. 
7 November Father Baumann complains about the poor maintenance of the road by To Wewut. Father 
Btlgershausen threatens a native with imprisonment ifhe does not pay a fine of 2 Marks 
to his church. It is reported that a teacher in Vunavar said several weeks before the event 
that the Catholic missionaries in Baining had been killed. 
26 November To Balai from Watom complains that the Catholic mission takes coconuts from his land. 
14 December The Catholic mission reports thefts in Malaguna and Vunakakambi. 
22 December Father Baumann reports indecent dances. 
3 1  December Daniela complains that father Btlgershausen falsely accuses natives. To Kapindik asks for 
the return of his second wife, Ja Kambara, whom father Btlgershausen has sent away. 
Table III represents about ten per cent of all matters recorded in the journal, whereas it did not 
record a single complaint by a native against a Methodist missionary, or, for that matter, a Catholic 
catechist. Moreover, while Catholic missionaries complained about eight Methodist mission 
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teachers, only two other complaints against them were recorded: one an adultery charge against the 
teacher Tomas and the other concerning the refusal of the teacher Solomon to recognise the 
authority of the government chief Urapil. Nor did the journal record complaints by Methodist 
missionaries against polygamous marriages or indecent dances, although one case of adultery was 
reported. Finally, an interpretation of this list had to take into account that while native labourers 
also deserted from other employers and while there was one other complaint that non-natives had 
taken coconuts from native land, the complaint that father Hisgen was building a house on native 
land, that father Oberreiter had shot a native dog, that father Winthuis had interfered with the 
corvee labour arrangements by a chief, or the refusal of natives to make a compensation payment 
to father His gen, were all unique in the sense that no other cases falling into these categories were 
recorded. 
Taken together this information suggested that the Catholic mission and a large number of its 
members did not believe that meekness was a virtue when it came to saving souls, and anything 
that went with it, whereas the Methodist mission had adopted an official attitude of pointed 
restraint, although its native teachers were engaged in fierce denominational trench warfare. It was 
even more significant that the Tolai were unwilling to take the assertive approach of the Catholic 
mission lying down and that they were ready to take their complaints to the colonial 
government-and the unexpectedly large number of native complaints recorded in the journal was 
perhaps the most important result of my examination. 
However, there was little point in compiling another table, starting with the demand by 
labourers employed by Mouton & Co. to be sent home and ending with the demand by To 
Kapindik for the return of his second wife, Ja Kambara, whom father Bogershausen had sent away, 
or to pick out a few dramatic highlights, for example, the charge of the murder of seven men and 
seven women which Zaue from Lavangai (New Hanover) brought against Mindi, or the report that 
Turandawai and others had buried Ja Kokok although she was "not yet dead". 
Nor was it helpful to focus on a particular type of case, such as assault charges against non­
natives, because the familiar uncertainty problem arose again. Of the ten cases recorded the victims 
were only identified in six, in all of them as natives. But whereas four of them were employees, 
this was only likely in the fifth case and did not apply in the sixth: a fight between Sago and one 
of Queen Emma ' s  relatives, which led to a prosecution of both before the district court. Two cases 
of maltreating labourers were prosecuted before the district court while two others were filed away 
under "Native Matters". This still left another four cases with unidentified victims. Two of them 
were discontinued, although the information in one involving a minor government official was 
added to his "Personal File". The third case was referred to the government station in Kaewieng. 
The fourth was filed in the "ship's-folder ("Schiffsmappe"), perhaps because the accused was a 
seaman. 
Could I at least be sure that these cases included all those where non-natives had been reported 
for assaulting natives during the period in question? What about the cases included in the 
"Forsaythsche Prugelsammlung". According to the journal entry No. 250 To Marian had deserted 
after an illegal corporal punishment had been administered, a fact which had apparently come to 
light in the course of case 54/04 before the station court. Had other such cases come to light? Did 
the district commissioner or his subordinates deal with accusations of assaults by non-natives 
against natives on the spot when visiting outlying parts of the district, without recording the matter 
in the journal? Were the three identified cases the only ones where non-natives were prosecuted 
before the district court for assaulting natives during the period in question? Had the alleged 
shooting of chief Han in the Solomons been the only case in which a non-native was investigated 
for killing a native in the Bismarck Archipelago? Was it a fact that not a single non-native had been 
reported for having committed a sexual offence against a native? 
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Then there was the question as to how many or how few of the serious acts of violence by non­
natives against natives remained unreported. The general impression given by the journal was not 
that the natives in the Bismarck Archipelago were too shy or frightened to complain about their 
treatment by non-natives, but even a substantial number of recorded complaints did not rule out 
that a much larger number of cases had remained unreported, because there had been no 
opportunity to make such a report, or because the victims were too afraid of a particular non-native 
employer. Moreover, all these figures still had to be put into context: how many non-natives lived 
in the Bismarck Archipelago in 1904; how many natives were employed by them; how many of 
them were legally beaten every day? How typical were the figures for 1 904? Had natives just 
started to make complaints? Did they give up complaining three years later? 
Had business journals like this one been kept since the beginning of German colonial rule? 
How many of them had survived? How much had the range of subject matter and the geographical 
area covered by them changed in the course of the years? How was I going to process the many 
thousands of entries, considering the difficulties I had experienced in dealing with a few hundred? 
On the other hand, the business journal for 1904 and the other registers and lists 
examined-which represented only a small fraction of those local administrations were supposed 
to keep24 -demonstrated that the history of German colonial rule had to be approached in a more 
systematic manner than a narrative approach permitted. Even narrative historians could not afford 
to ignore the information they contained, as I discovered when the name of another of 
Hempenstall' s heroes, Pominis, attracted my attention, as entry No. 169 showed that the "cannibal 
catechist" had been banished from the Admiralty Islands on 4 May 1904. 
According to Hempenstall, Hahl had regarded Pominis as "a political delinquent who must be 
removed". Hence "Hahl wasted no time . Without formal court proceedings, he convicted Pominis 
as a menace to public order and banished him to Kaewieng for ten years" ( 1978 :  156). This 
informal treatment got Hahl into trouble when the case was later reopened. "It was not long before 
an investigation by the colonial department discovered that Pominis' conviction had been secured 
in an irregular fashion: no defence counsel had been provided, nor had Pominis been informed of 
the verdict against him. Hahl was rebuked for his haste. Pominis was released" (ibid.). 
According to the journal Pominis had not been informally banished by Hahl but by the station 
court which had produced a record of the proceedings in file "Sta. Ger. 36/04". Although this was 
by itself sufficient to show that Hempenstall' s  version was another display of phantom history, I 
felt that after my struggle with these bits of frozen history I deserved some relief, and a comparison 
between Hempenstall' s narrative and his footnotes promised a nest of delicious phantoms; for how 
was it possible that Pominis had been released after Hahl had been rebuked by a decree of 5 
October 1908 if, as Hempenstall claimed in the next paragraph, Pominis had been back in the 
Admiralty Islands in 1905? 
As was to be expected the sources referred to told a far more interesting but less conclusive 
story than Hempenstall's  phantom version. Roughly speaking it went something like this. The 
Pominis case had resurfaced four years after he had been banished when deputy Erzberger raised 
it in the budget commission by reference to a recent article in a Catholic mission journal. To be 
prepared if Erzberger decided to pursue the matter, the colonial office asked Hahl for a report. 
According to that report Pominis had been banished to Kaewieng for ten years of hard labour by 
an administrative decision of the district office without formal court proceedings. Hahl had altered 
this decision by ordering that Pominis be only banished for the time being. Hahl had released 
Pominis in March 1905 after he had satisfied himself that interventions by the police troop had 
ensured that no further violent acts by the natives in Pominis ' s  home area would take place. Hahl 
had been unhappy about the district office' s  handling of the case, which had not even recorded the 
24 According to a circular decree by the governor of 26 March 1 909 (see AA 1963/83,  B36/l ) each district office and 
government station was supposed to keep at least 35 journals, lists and registers. 
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evidence given by Pominis. Hahl had therefore questioned Pominis himself and had put a record 
of his interview on file. Although the colonial office regarded the banishment as fully justified, it 
also felt that the procedures followed had left much to be desired. Its main problem, however, was 
that the banishment had been combined with compulsory labour. That had given this administrative 
measure a punitive character, and the punishment of Pominis could only have been imposed in 
accordance with the procedures laid down in the Native Penal Ordinance, which had clearly not 
been observed. Under these circumstances the colonial office was probably relieved that Erzberger 
did not pursue the case during the next session of parliament. It happily returned all the documents 
to Herbertshohe which Hahl had appended to his report. It certainly did not rebuke Hahl, let alone 
order the release of Pominis, who had been released three years earlier. 
There was no point in examining how Hernpenstall had concocted this particular phantom 
cocktail, but the disturbing fact remained that Hahl too had claimed that Pominis had been banished 
without formal court proceedings. This historical fact did require an "interpretation", although not 
of the kind proclaimed by Carr as the central task of historians (see above: 42). A critical 
examination of the historical record surrounding this statement showed that it too was merely a 
politically convenient phantom. Yet it was precisely the counterfactuality of Hahl' s  statement 
which made it historically significant. However, this significance was not a consequence of how 
Pominis had been banished but had to do with the subsequent treatment of this case by Hahl and 
the colonial office. The fact that the reference to file 36/04 in the journal shows that the case had 
been handled judicially by the station court, rather than administratively by the district office, let 
alone the governor, is therefore merely the starting point for the required interpretation. What made 
the case problematic was that the station court had disregarded the procedures laid down in the 
Native Penal Ordinance and exceeded its judicial powers.25 Seen from Hahl' s perspective it was 
much easier to pretend that the matter had been treated administratively, and the colonial office had 
readily accepted Hahl' s strategy when it saw that Erzberger was not going to make a fuss. But this 
was no reason for a historian to accept Hahl 's phantom version as factual. Hahl was no more 
entitled to determine retrospectively what had actually happened than Hempenstall. What counted 
historically was what the historical record had to say, and it showed unequivocally that Pominis 
was banished by a seriously flawed decision of the station court. It was perfectly understandable 
that Hahl had been unwilling to admit this because he too would then have had to deal with the 
case in accordance with the Native Penal Ordinance which would not have permitted him to do 
what he did. So he made life easier for himself by phantomising history-and this particular 
phantom was probably not the only one in his report.26 
The phantomisation of history certainly simplifies matters, but the price of this simplification 
was, in my view, unacceptably high. There was no choice but to come to grips with the bits of 
frozen history that made up the bulk of the historical record of colonial rule in German New 
Guinea. But I could improve my chances by focusing on a more specialised and regulated exercise 
of this rule than the activities of the district office in HerbertshOhe/Rabaul. Ideally this would be 
a body which had operated throughout its entire duration and produced a more easily quantifiable 
record of its activities. The institution most likely to answer this description was the supreme court 
of German New Guinea. 
25 The maximum term of imprisonment with compulsory labour under the ordinance was five rather than ten years. 
26 For example, Hempenstall was probably right in claiming that bishop Couppe had more to do with the release of 
Pominis than Hahl's version acknowledged. 
Chapter 7: A Non-event? 
I 
Colonial courts can play different roles: they can protect the indigenous population from maltreatment or assist in its exploitation and oppression; they can provide a forum where 
power struggles between the colonists and the colonial executive are acted out or they can perform 
a very minor part. Which role, or roles, did the "supreme court" (Obergericht) of German New 
Guinea play in the history of that colony during the 25 years of its operation, from the beginning 
of 1 889 to the end of German rule in September 1914?1 
The auspices under which the supreme court started life were not favourable. It was designed 
as a court of appeal, so that it could become active only when a decision of a court of the first 
instance was challenged before it; it could only hear appeals against decisions of the regular 
colonial courts, which, in principle, only had jurisdiction over the colony' s  non-native population;2 
and the office of the "chief justice" ( Oberrichter), who presided over it, was, for most of the time, 
held by the head of the colonial executive, although this arrangement was for financial rather than 
political reasons: throughout the life of the court the volume of judicial business was too small to 
warrant the appointment of an independent, full-time j udicial officer.3 
During the 25 years of its existence the supreme court dealt with around 1 60 appeal cases, an 
average of only about six cases per year. 4 Yet, this was an extraordinarily large volume of business 
compared with that handled by the supreme court of the Marshall Islands. It dealt with j ust two 
or three appeal cases between 1 889 and 1906, when the Marshall Islands were placed under the 
supreme court of German New Guinea. Whereas an examination of the history of the supreme 
court of the Marshall Islands would hardly have been worth the effort under these circumstances, 
the supreme court of German New Guinea was sufficiently active to offer a potentially rewarding 
target.5 On the other hand, the number of cases was small enough to be manageable, and this was 
crucial for the purpose of this exercise, since it was aimed at testing systematically how much the 
surviving historical record could tell me about the judicial activities of this court, rather than at 
demonstrating that it had played a hitherto overlooked key role in the history of colonial rule in 
German New Guinea. 
I The supreme court continued to exist during the Australian military occupation, but it was obviously no longer the same 
institution. 
2 To be more precise, the jurisdiction of the regular colonial courts of the first instance was limited to non-native 
defendants or accused. The supreme court therefore could and did hear appeals by native plaintiffs who had taken court 
action against non-native defendants. 
3 As from 191 1 ,  the chief justice was no longer the governor but rather his "deputy' (Erster Referent). Earlier the supreme 
court was also often chaired by an acting chief justice who was usually a senior member of the colonial executive. This 
imperfect separation of judicial and executive powers also prevailed at the district court level. Even in 1914  there was only 
one designated judicial officer-for the Bismarck Archipelago-in German New Guinea. 
4 The terms "case" and "appeal" are flexible. One criminal "case" could involve several charges, several accused and 
several events. Different appeals against the same decision could be heard together as one "case"; and what had been 
different "cases" at the first instance could be combined into one "case" by the supreme court-all of which makes precise 
quantification difficult. 
5 The judicial activity at the district court level in the Marshall Islands was by no means correspondingly lower than in 
German New Guinea, especially during the early years of colonial rule. The lack of activity at the supreme court level is 
nonetheless historically significant, if only indirectly, because it suggests major structural differences in the operation of 
the colonial governments in the two colonies. 
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II 
For most of its life the judicial activities of the supreme court were accounted for in the court 
statistics,  which were published annually in the Deutsches Kolonialblatt. The following table 
combines these figures in a simplified form. It shows the number of appeals lodged in the course 
of the year, whereas the court statistics also show the number of appeals carried over from 
previous years, the number of appeals disposed of in the course of the year, and the number of 
appeals carried over to the next year. Otherwise the table follows the format of the court statistics 
in that it distinguishes between civil and criminal matters and between substantive and procedural 
appeals (Berufangen and Beschwerden) .  
TABLE IV 
Appeals decided by the Supreme Court 
Civil Criminal 
substantive procedural substantive procedural 
1889 
1890 
1 89 1  
1 892 1 
1893 3 
1894 2 1 3 
1 895 1 1 
1896 
1897 2 
1898 3 3 
1899 2 3 
1900 3 2 1 
1901  3 1 3 
1902 2 6 3 
1903 1 4 
1904 5 4 
1905 3 5 
1906 2 5 
1907 6 
1908 6 2 3 2 
1909 3 1 8 
1910  2 I 
191 1 2 4 1 
1912  1 6 2 
1 9 1 3  6 1 1  
1914  2 6 2 
Total 49 6 87 20 
Grand Total 1 62 
The few appeals in the field of voluntary jurisdiction, and the column devoted to the supreme 
court's bankruptcy jurisdiction, which consistently showed nil returns, have been omitted. 6 On the 
6 The fact that the supreme court did not deal with a single bankruptcy case has again an indirect historical significance. 
But its actual importance depends on a number of variables which can lead to quite different results. Did the district courts 
in German New Guinea also never exercise their bankruptcy jurisdiction? Did no businesses in the colony fail? Did the 
creditors of failed businesses write off their claims instead of pursuing them in court? Did the situation in German New 
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other hand, I have filled the gaps which came about because the supreme court filed no returns 
for 1 896, 1 897 and 1 899. To do so for 1 897 and 1 899 was simple, because the figures shown the 
following year as having been carried over could be used-on the perhaps naive assumption that 
they had been lodged the previous year, instead of having been carried over from further back. But 
because of the two year gap this device did not work for 1 896. Here I assumed, on the basis of 
other information, to be discussed later, that no appeals were lodged. I also completed the table 
by extracting the relevant information for 1913  and 1914, which are not covered by the published 
court statistics, from the supreme court' s Appeals Register (see below in the text). 
The gaps in the court statistics raised the question of their general reliability. I was not unduly 
concerned when I noticed that the supreme court had filed a nil return for 1 891 ,  whereas the return 
for 1 892 showed one substantive criminal appeal had been carried over, because I assumed that 
this was simply due to a clerical error which had wrongly put a new case in the carried over 
column.7 But when I compared the other carried over columns with those for the following years, 
it emerged that the position was more serious. While they matched from 1 902 onwards, they did 
not in four of the five previous years for which a comparison was possible. During the logical 
second separating 1 900 from 1901 ,  one substantive civil appeal evaporated, whereas one 
substantial criminal appeal materialised out of thin air. On the other hand, I found these 
discrepancies reassuring. At least the court statistics were not transporting me to a competently 
manipulated phantom world. Although it would have been reckless to take any of the figures 
shown in the table at face value, taken as a whole, it offered an honest, if imperfect picture which 
was probably not far out. 
It was tempting to read the table as confirming what I could have easily guessed, namely that 
substantive appeals outnumbered procedural appeals, that criminal appeals were more frequent 
than civil appeals, and that the number of appeals increased over the years. Yet I would have been 
equally justified in expressing surprise that civil appeals were so frequent, or that procedural 
appeals were lodged at all in a colony which did not have a single resident "private legal 
practitioner" (Rechtsanwalt). Put differently, observations of this kind were pointless unless they 
were placed in a comparative context, for example, by placing this table side by side with a table 
of the same design, showing the judicial activities of, say, a metropolitan German "supreme court" 
and that of the supreme court of British New Guinea. 
The table had other features, however, which were by themselves instructive. It indicated that 
the increase in the volume of judicial business was not steady but resembled an elevation from one 
undulating plateau onto another, which coincided with the end of company rule. But this 
observation too needed to be placed into context. The change may have had less to do with the end 
of company rule than with the fact that the seat of the supreme court was moved from Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland to the Bismarck Archipelago, and that its jurisdiction was extended to include the 
newly acquired Island Territory. 
Much of the additional information required to make sense of these internal aspects was again 
comparative. The increase in the volume of judicial business between 1900 and 1914,  for instance, 
was much slower than the population increase of around 700 per cent for non-natives during this 
period, so that the relative significance of the supreme court may have actually declined. 
Conversely, the reason why the growth in the quantity of judicial activity did not keep pace with 
the population increase may have been its outstanding quality. The supreme court may have done 
Guinea differ in these regards from that in other German colonies? 
7 When I rechecked it turned out that this particular error had been mine. I had not appreciated that the court statistics 
for 1 890-in contrast to those for subsequent years-distinguished between appeals from Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the 
Bismarck Archipelago. As a result I had taken for granted that the nil return for Kaiser Wilhelmsland covered all activities 
and overlooked the separate return from the Bismarck Archipelago, which was published on the next page of the DKB (see 
1892: 247 and 248). It indeed showed that one criminal appeal had been lodged and carried over. The other discrepancies 
I had identified (see above in the text) did survive the second round of examination. 
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such a sterling job of clarifying the law that fewer and fewer parties bothered to appeal, or to take 
matters to court at all, because the position the courts were going to take had already been 
established and was known to everybody. 
But all these questions were academic at this stage because the information contained in the 
court statistics was too general to be by itself of much historical interest. I needed more details, 
but not too many. The most economic step was to inspect what information got caught in an only 
slightly finer net: the supreme court' s appeals registers . 
m 
Unfortunately I could find only one such register. It covered appeals lodged between I January 
I909 and the end of German colonial rule (AA 63/83,  B I S/I) .  This did not mean that earlier 
volumes had been kept but subsequently disappeared. The supreme court apparently only started 
to keep its own Eingangsregister, a register of incoming business, in I 9 I3-at least a note on its 
cover stated that such a register "had not been kept so far" (AA 63/83, B 1 5/2) .  On the other hand, 
this could merely mean that the author of this note was unaware of earlier registers of this kind, 
because they were not among the records held by the supreme court at the time. How far back did 
these records go, and how complete were they? I was unable to answer this question, but I did 
know of the existence of one older journal of the supreme court which had been started, at the 
latest, in 1 89 1  and left behind in Kaiser Wilhelmsland when its seat was moved to HerbertshOhe. 8 
Moreover, no entries were made in this journal between April 1 892 and August 1 897 and it was 
discontinued at the end of 1 898, rather than being formally closed at the end of company rule, on 
3 1  March 1 899. 
It was pointless, under these circumstances, to try to work out what the records of the supreme 
court should have consisted of in 1914. I had to take the historical record as I found it and learn 
to be grateful for small blessings-here the fact that the supreme court's surviving appeals register 
confirmed the information contained in the court statistics for the period of overlap.9 
It also provided additional details. According to the forms used, the entries were supposed to 
identify the case in which the appeal was made; the party which made the appeal; the district court, 
a decision of which was appealed against; the decision of the supreme court and the appropriate 
dates and file numbers : but the entries often failed to record all the required information. Still, they 
were more informative than the court statistics. 
The first appeal, a substantive criminal appeal, was lodged on I 7 March 1909 in a defamation 
case against one Rundnagel. It had been decided by the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago 
on 17 February 1909. The district court case file-with the serial number 03/09-arrived at the 
supreme court on the same day. The supreme court decided the appeal less than two months later. 
It cancelled the judgement of the district court and sentenced Rundnagel to a fine of 1 00 Marks. 
However, the entry did not identify by whom the appeal was lodged. Hence different scenarios 
were possible. Firstly, Rundnagel had been acquitted, or had been fined less than 1 00 Marks, and 
was now fined 100 Marks on an appeal by the public prosecutor. Secondly, Rundnagel had a more 
severe punishment than a 100 Marks fine reduced as a result of his own appeal. Thirdly, both 
Rundnagel and the public prosecutor had appealed against a judgement which was either more or 
less severe than a 100 Marks fine, the former with the aim of having his punishment reduced, or 
being acquitted, the latter with the aim of having the punishment increased, so that I could not 
8 I have to remain vague, because I have to rely on notes taken many years ago, when the journal, together with other 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland material, was located in Box 210  in the 63/83 series of the Australian Archives. When I wanted to 
inspect it again I was unable to identify its reclassified home. 
9 This was not surprising since the court statistics were probably compiled from the Appeals Register. Nonetheless, it 
showed that reasonable care was taken during later years when the data was processed for publication. 
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even tell, in this scenario, which of the two appeals had been successful. Nonetheless the Appeals 
Register was helpful. 
Three of the 36 appeals in the largest group, the substantive criminal appeals, remained 
pending at the end of German rule, including one lodged back in 1 9 1 1 .  This was by far the longest 
delay. Usually appeals were dealt with relatively quickly, on average within three months. In four 
cases the appeal was withdrawn. In the remaining 29 cases the decision was clear cut in only nine: 
there were four acquittals and five rejections. This left 20 cases in which at least one of the 
appeals, if there was more than one, was at least partly successful. In other words, well over 50 
per cent of all district court decisions against which appeals were lodged were overturned. 
The Appeals Register showed only in 1 8  of the 36 cases by whom the appeal was lodged. The 
accused featured in 1 3  of them. The public prosecutor added his appeal in three cases and 
appealed by himself in another three. One appeal was lodged by the plaintiff in a private 
prosecution. Another private plaintiff, who had joined a public prosecution, appealed as well as 
the accused. If I assumed that the appeals pattern was similar in the remaining 1 8  cases, the 
success rate of the accused was remarkably high, certainly much higher than that of appeals by the 
public prosecutor, who lost three of the six appeals for which the results were shown. This 
suggested that the supreme court regarded the judgements of the district courts, generally, as too 
harsh. Put differently, it looked as if it had been the role of the supreme court to ensure that non­
native offenders received a comparatively mild punishment. 
The Appeals Register identified 1 8  punishments. They consisted of 1 1  fines, ranging from 3 
to 1 ,000 Marks, and seven prison sentences, ranging from one day to one year, six months and 20 
days with hard labour-the only Zuchthaus sentence, and the only custodial sentence of more than 
one year, imposed by the supreme court during this period. While this result was in itself valuable, 
its full significance could only be ascertained if the severity of the sentence could be related to the 
seriousness of the offence for which it was imposed: did non-native offenders in German New 
Guinea get away with a fine for murder, or did the supreme court never have to sentence a non­
native for a serious crime? At this point the Appeals Register let me down, because the type of 
offence was-with one exception-only identified in the first three entries. 
Usually it also only identified the surnames of the parties, without first names or initials, so 
that it was impossible to say for certain whether a reappearance of the same name indicated a 
reappearance of the same person. For example, the name Rundnagel, and a few other names, 
appeared twice. On the other hand, no name appeared more than twice, so that I could safely 
conclude that the supreme court was not kept busy by a handful of troublemakers who appealed 
again and again. 10 
By contrast, the message contained in the column identifying the district court, a decision of 
which was appealed against, was unequivocal: that for the Bismarck Archipelago dominated the 
scene: it accounted for 26 out of the 36 appeals. Five appeals were directed against decisions of 
the district court for Kaiser Wilhelmsland. The district courts in the Island Territory shared the 
remaining five appeals between them. This reflected primarily the general pre-eminence of the 
Bismarck Archipelago as the most populous and economically most developed part of German 
New Guinea but also had logistic reasons. The supreme court only sat in the capital in the 
Bismarck Archipelago, so that an appeal lodged by an accused living in Kaiser Wilhelmsland or 
the Island Territory required a much greater investment of time and money. Other consequences 
of this state of affairs were also reflected by the Appeals Register: the ten appeals from the outer 
districts accounted for three of the four withdrawals, and the punishments pronounced by the 
supreme court in other cases were higher than average, suggesting that people who lived in the 
10  The gender of the accused was only indicated once, in a case in which a husband and his wife were fined. The 
profession of the accused too was only given once, in the case of a Catholic missionary. 
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Island Territory or Kaiser Wilhelmsland were less likely to appeal and more likely to withdraw 
their appeals than residents of the Bismarck Archipelago. 1 1  
The first of the five procedural appeals in  criminal matters was a mystery. It involved the 
colonial office, but the only other information consisted of a marginal note stating that the 
supreme court had added an unidentified document to an unidentified file. The four other 
procedural appeals were all directed against decisions of the district court for the Bismarck 
Archipelago. Two of them involved arrest warrants-an indication of the seriousness of the 
charge-the third a decision not to proceed with a prosecution, and the last an unidentified 
decision against which father Dicks appealed in his capacity as defence counsel. 
As regards substantive civil appeals, the register showed that the role of the district court for 
the Bismarck Archipelago was even more dominant than in criminal matters. Its decisions 
accounted for 1 3  of the 1 6  appeals. 12 Only four of the 14 cases disposed of-two remained 
pending at the end of German rule-were disposed of by judgement. The court settled three cases, 
and in seven the appeal was withdrawn, presumably in at least some of them as a result of an out­
of-court settlement. This suggested that the role of the supreme court was not that of an 
adjudicator but rather that of a mediator, who assisted the parties in reaching a compromise, and 
the parties were well advised to accept such a compromise because only a single appeal was at 
least partly successful; in the three other decided cases the appeal was rejected. 
In 1 1 of the 14 cases where the appellant could be identified the appeal was lodged by the 
defendant. Two of the three appeals lodged by the plaintiff remained pending. The third appeal 
by a plaintiff was the only successful appeal, although the Appeals Register did not tell me how 
successful it was: it only stated that the decision of the district court had been cancelled, without 
indicating what decision replaced it. 
The major weakness of the Appeals Register was again that it did not identify the subject 
matter of the dispute. I therefore did not know whether the cases involved employer/employee 
relations, relations between commercial firms, those between them and their customers, or family 
matters and so on. The names of the parties did not help me much further in this regard. They 
showed, however, that one of the large firms, Hemsheim & Co.,  was uncommonly litigious. It was 
involved in six of the 16  appeals,  lodging as many as four of them. Both appeals lodged by its 
opponents were subsequently withdrawn. The firm itself withdrew none of its appeals and agreed 
to a settlement in only one case. It lost two appeals but was at least partly successful with one of 
them--thus accounting for three of the four appeal judgements issued by the supreme court in 
civil matters between the beginning of 1909 and the end of German colonial rule. 
The supreme court had no other regular customers in civil matters. But it is worth mentioning 
that the Appeals Register listed the names of two Chinese who did rather well. 13 By contrast the 
colonial government, or the Fiskus, the colonial state in its property-owning capacity, did not 
appear once as a party in the Appeals Register. 
Finally, a word about the two procedural civil appeals. Both were directed against decisions 
of the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago: one became immaterial when the case was 
settled; the other was rejected. 
I I The outcome of the five appeals from the Island Territory was as follows: one withdrawal, one acquittal, one fine of 
500 Marks (the second highest on record), a prison sentence ofone week each for the two accused and one prison sentence 
of five months. 
· I 2  Two appeals were directed against Island Territory decisions. Only one civil appeal was lodged against a decision of 
the district court for Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
I 3 Chinese counted legally as natives. They could not therefore legally be sued before a district court. However, once 
they sued a non-native before a district court they could appeal against its decision as much as the non-native 
plaintiff-and they obviously did. Besides cases involving Chinese defendants and accused were in fact also dealt with 
by the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago. None of these cases was taken to the supreme court between I 909 and 
I 9I4, although it is possible that appeals in such matters were dealt with administratively. 
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IV 
Although the Appeals Register provided useful information, it whetted my appetite rather than 
satisfying it. All my preliminary conclusions still needed to be tested against more detailed 
sources. This would have been a straightforward task, had these decisions been published. But this 
was not the case. 14 I was dealing exclusively with unreported judgements which were kept, in the 
original, in the case files. To make matters worse, these case files were not separate files kept by 
the supreme court but files kept by the various district courts, which sent them to the supreme 
court when an appeal was lodged and had them returned after the appeal had been disposed of, 
together with any decisions the supreme court had made. 15 It therefore looked as if I had to move 
from the supreme to the district court level, at the cost of having to examine six sets of case files 
instead of one and thousands of cases rather than 160 or so. 
Fortunately the surviving supreme court files included a collection of copies of decisions (AA 
63/83, B20)-henceforth the Collection. It neatly supplemented the Appeals Register, although 
the period covered was even shorter: it only included decisions pronounced as from the beginning 
of 1910. For this period, however, it included all substantive criminal and civil appeal judgements 
the supreme court had made according to the Appeals Register. Indeed, it included one additional 
judgement-on a substantive criminal appeal-not shown in the Appeals Register and, 
consequently, also not in the court statistics. 16 
For procedural appeals the situation was different. The one civil procedural appeal shown in 
the Appeals Register as having been decided by the supreme court was included, but the two 
decisions on criminal procedural appeals were not. Instead, the Collection included two additional 
decisions which did not respond directly to formal appeals. 
In one case the chief justice explained to a complainant that a civil judgement against him was 
not only absolute, so that it was no longer appealable, but that the decision of the district court for 
the Bismarck Archipelago, as well as the manner of its execution, had also been substantially 
justified. The judge went out of his way in this manner because the complainant had faced 
considerable logistic difficulties. He therefore suggested an application for an ex gratia quashing 
of the outstanding costs and expenses, totalling 16 Marks. 
The second decision also related to expenses, but of a different magnitude. As a consequence 
of a partly successful appeal against a conviction for fraud by the district court for the Western 
Carolines the supreme court decided that the public purse had to refund half of the accused's 
necessary expenses. When the accused claimed expenses of almost 16,000 Marks-twice the basic 
annual salary of a senior government official-the supreme court reduced this claim to less than 
ten per cent, because the rest of the expenses had been unnecessary. 
What made this decision historically interesting was the fact that the main expense had 
consisted of hiring a German legal practitioner based in China. The supreme court therefore had 
to address the question of the kind of legal representation to which a party before a court in 
German New Guinea-which had no resident legal practitioners-was entitled. It rejected the 
14 The Amtsblatt of German New Guinea started to publish edited versions of judicial and administrative decisions of 
general interest in 1913 .  Of the 1 3  decisions so published three were issued by the supreme court-<:ompared with seven 
decisions by the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago. None of the other district courts was represented, whereas 
the district office in Rabaul (in a mixed-jurisdiction case) figured once, and the governor (deciding administrative appeals) 
figured twice. The Deutsches Kolonialblatt, and a private journal with a special interest in colonial law, had by then been 
publishing relevant decisions-more often than not by metropolitan rather than colonial courts-for some time. They 
include an excerpt from a single decision by the supreme court of German New Guinea, compared with eight decisions 
by the supreme court of German East Africa and seven by the supreme court of German South West Africa. 
15 This arrangement made sense because district courts were responsible for the execution of the supreme court's 
decisions. Nonetheless, a small handful of"anomalous" supreme court case files (or reference files?) are still in existence. 
16 I decided against amending my table accordingly. 
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view of the public prosecutor that parties had to put up with a second-rate representation by non­
lawyers, insisting that even the expense of hiring of a lawyer from abroad was justified in legally 
more difficult cases-provided that no legally qualified representative could be found locally. 
This, however, was not so. At the seat of the supreme court several legally qualified government 
officials were available, who had repeatedly represented private parties in the past. In addition, 
some of the private residents had at least passed the first legal state examination, including one 
of the planters, who could also have been easily reached. Although the court appreciated that the 
accused would suffer greatly by having to foot his entire lawyer' s  bill, it had to ensure that the 
public purse had to pay only its judicially determined share of those costs which had been actually 
necessary. 
This was not the kind of decision I had expected to find among the procedural appeals. The 
same applied to one of the appeal decisions in voluntary jurisdiction matters, which I had intended 
to exclude from my survey altogether. It did not involve an appeal by a private party in a land 
registration or guardianship matter but an appeal by the governor against a decision of the district 
court in the Bismarck Archipelago which had refused to lend him "legal assistance" (Rechtshilfe) 
in a deportation case. The supreme court decided that the district court had wrongly interpreted 
the relevant imperial ordinance and that it was obliged to examine a witness in this matter under 
oath, which the governor was not empowered to do. In other words, the supreme court was also 
beginning to play a part in inter-governmental disputes. 17 
A judgement covering two of the four judicially decided substantive civil appeals also was of 
greater historical significance than I had expected. On the surface it concerned an ordinary dispute 
between the Hernsheim firm and a former employee about the termination of his contract, but 
underneath there loomed broader issues. 
When the employee terminated his contract without notice because of health reasons, the firm, 
believing that he had walked out because he wanted to make a quick fortune from hunting birds­
of-paradise, denied the validity of his termination but sacked him on the spot because of his 
allegedly deficient performance. Moreover, it sued him for damages for breach of contract and 
refused to give him a reference describing his duties without evaluating his performance. The 
employee responded by filing a counterclaim for damages resulting from wrongful dismissal and 
demanded, in a separate action, the issue of the kind of reference he had requested. He achieved 
a total victory before the district court. The firm appealed-with limited success .  It was ordered 
to issue the reference and had its claim for damages reduced, although the amount of damages 
granted to the employee by the district court was also reduced, because he had been compensated 
for lost earnings for some weeks in excess of the period of three months notice required under the 
contract. 18 
What made these decisions remarkable was first of all that the court stressed in an obiter 
dictum that the firm had thrown away its chances of achieving a different result by insisting that 
its sacking of the employee had only been based on his deficient performance-of which it had 
been unable to convince the court-instead of taking up the court's suggestion that it might have 
been justified in sacking his employee, irrespective of his performance, if he had walked out 
without sufficient reason for terminating his contract without notice. It was clear that the court 
agreed with the firm that the employee had been a victim of a birds-of-paradise fever, which had 
reached its peak in 1913 ,  instead of suffering from any debilitating medical condition, as he had 
claimed. 
17 I should also mention a counterpart of this case where the governor ordered the district office in HerbertshOhe, in 
response to an appeal by the district court, to carry out certain police measures, because it was its statutory duty under the 
German Criminal Procedures Code which it had to perform regardless of the manpower at its disposal. 
18 This small gain had made this case appear as a victory for the plaintiff in the Appeals Register-another illustration 
of the risks in drawing general conclusions from its entries. 
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Nonetheless, it was clear that the Hernsheim firm, despite its misguided legal strategy, had 
pursued this case so vigorously because it was worried that other employees would succumb to 
the same fever and desert under any pretext, if this employee was allowed to get away with his 
scheme. As the supreme court saw the case in the same light it was a preliminary argument put 
forward by the employee which caused it the greatest concern. It was directed against a practice 
of denying employees the right of terminating their contracts prematurely by giving notice, without 
undertaking to pay them as a consideration their full return fare at the end of the contract, as the 
German Commercial Code required under these circumstances. 
The argument was that all contracts which were defective in this manner-and they were 
apparently not uncommon-were therefore void, so that all commercial employees who had 
entered contracts of this kind could walk out whenever they felt like it. The prospect of 
destabilising German New Guinea' s  economy by declaring all these contracts void by implication 
was too frightening. The court was therefore relieved that the Hernsheim firm had undertaken to 
pay most of the return fare and held that its incomplete compliance with the law was not 
sufficiently serious to void the contract altogether. Still, the decision sent a clear message to 
employers that they would have to tidy up their game-and the court could be sure that this 
message would spread quickly, even without published law reports, since it included two leading 
members of the small business community as lay assessors. 19 
However tempting a closer examination of interesting individual cases was, it was not the 
purpose of this exercise. The aim was not to assemble a collection of colourful butterflies but the 
identification of patterns displayed by the judicial activities of the supreme court, no matter how 
unexciting they were. As far as this aim was concerned the four judgements in substantive civil 
matters passed between 1910 and 1914 represented a sample which was far too small to tell 
anything of general significance. Perhaps the more numerous judgements in exercise of the court's 
substantive criminal jurisdiction were more instructive. 
The 24 substantive criminal judgements dealt with 34 appeals. Of these 1 9  were lodged by the 
accused, 13  by the public prosecutor and two by private plaintiffs. But the accused were less 
successful than the Appeals Register had suggested. Their chances were only slightly better than 
even: ten victories compared with nine defeats. But the public prosecutor did considerably worse: 
he won only four appeals before losing the other nine.20 In other words, the preliminary 
conclusions I had drawn from the Appeals Register went too far. It remained true that the accused 
had a better chance of winning their appeals than the public prosecutor,21 but it was not j ustified 
to conclude that it was the role of the supreme court to reduce the punishments pronounced against 
non-native offenders by the district courts. Nonetheless, the punishments the supreme court 
pronounced were remarkably mild: it acquitted five accused, fined 14, and pronounced only six 
prison sentences. There was not a single death or long term prison sentence. 
While this merely confirmed what the Appeals Register had already told me, the collection also 
provided information on the type of offences committed.22 Crimes against the person, using 
physical violence or coercion, dominated the scene: they figured in 1 3  of the 24 cases. The second 
most frequent offence was defamation. It accounted for five charges. Next came sexual offences, 
with three charges. Only two property offences reached the supreme court: a trivial case of 
embezzlement by a minor official, which took on a serious complexion because he had violated 
19 This brief summary of a complex case is, of course, heavily coloured by my interpretation. It emphasises what I saw 
as the two underlying general issues more strongly than the supreme court actually did in its main decision. It runs to 
almost ten typewritten pages which I could not possibly hope to summarise adequately in a few sentences. 
20 The overall performance of the prosecution was improved by the fact that both private plaintiffs were at least partly 
successful with their appeals. 
21 The district courts fared statistically worst. Two out of three of their judgements were overturned on appeal. 
22 The following figures take into account that a number of accused persons were convicted on a multitude of charges, 
although some minor charges-and the resulting punishments-have been disregarded. 
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the sanctity of public registers in the process ,  and an equally trivial series of thefts by a planter 
who had tried to protect himself by attempting to induce a witness to commit perjury in his favour. 
The other three cases were even more undramatic. The supreme court did not have to deal with 
a single crime which was grave in terms of the harm caused to individual victims. Not a single 
case of murder, rape, arson or robbery came before it during the period in question. 
The attempted subornation to commit perjury earned the highest single sentence:  one year and 
six months imprisonment with hard labour.23 Then followed the embezzlement in public office 
case. The supreme court clearly would have liked to increase the sentence of six months 
imprisonment imposed by the district court, had it not been bound by the legal prohibition to 
increase a sentence in response to an appeal by the accused. 24 Next came two prison sentences of 
five months each. One of them had been imposed by the district court for the Western Carolines 
in response to a pub brawl among employees of the phosphate mine on Angaur, one of whom had 
smashed a bottle on the skull of another, without causing permanent damage. It was confirmed by 
the supreme court. 25 In the other case the supreme court increased a one month sentence imposed 
by the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago on the captain of a trading vessel, not so much 
because he had assaulted his native crew but because he had committed homosexual acts with 
them. A few weeks later the district court imposed the same penalty in a defamation case in which 
the commander of the mobile police unit had been physically insulted by a woman who believed 
she was defending the honour of her sister-a sentence the supreme court saw fit to confirm. The 
last prison sentence was symbolic : a planter who had been acquitted of a charge of moving 
boundary stones on to native land was sentenced to one day imprisonment to set a warning 
example. 
The largest single fine, 960 Marks, was imposed on a planter for repeated maltreatment of his 
native labourers. Although this was a sentence the supreme court could not exceed because only 
the accused had appealed, it was significant that it did not take the opportunity to warn the 
accused, who had been in trouble on this score for almost ten years-and through him the public 
at large-that it would henceforth resort to prison sentences in similar cases. On the contrary, it 
almost apologised for the size of the fine, which had been necessary because previous attempts 
to teach him a lesson through smaller fines had failed. This stance was all the more remarkable 
since the supreme court not only rejected the appeal of a Catholic missionary against a 100 Marks 
fine for defaming the district commissioner in the Eastern Carolines, increasing it on the 
commissioner's appeal to 900 Marks, but told the accused in no uncertain terms that he could 
count himself lucky to have escaped a prison sentence. The next highest fine, 600 Marks, was also 
imposed for the defamation of an official, a police sergeant in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. The honour 
of private individuals was less valuable. A business man, who had told "the natives" that a 
competitor had stolen their island, although he knew that the latter had leased it from its registered 
owner, was fined a mere 200 Marks26-and only because the spreading of rumours of this kind 
was likely to cause serious unrest in the native population. 
With one exception all other fines ranged between 3 and 150 Marks. The lowest fine was a 
warning shot fired at a Catholic missionary who had "illegally compelled" (notigen) a native 
23 This was still comparatively mild since the relevant section of the German Criminal Code carried a mandatory 
minimum punishment of one year with hard labour. 
24 It made its point by convicting the accused for a more serious offence-legally not an uncontroversial step. 
25 The second pub brawl appeal was lodged by the manager of the hotel in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. The district court 
had fined him 300 Marks for assaulting one of his drunken guests, who had caused trouble, for which he was fined 10  
Marks. The supreme court reduced the manager' s fine to 50 Marks but agreed with the district court that the rowdy scenes 
in his establishment had to stop. 
26 The punishment could have been as low as 100 Marks. Both figures were given in the text of the judgement and it is 
not clear which was the correct one. 
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woman whose behaviour he disapproved of. 27 It was unsuccessful because he was back two years 
later, when the supreme court confirmed a 100 Marks fine for excessive corporal punishment of 
one of his pupils-a sentence against which both he and the public prosecutor appealed. The 150 
Marks fine imposed on a trader who had beaten his labourers when he found out that they had 
used his prolonged absence to sleep in the shade, day after day, was comparatively high because 
he had employed a dangerous weapon-an oar-although without causing serious injuries. Much 
lower fines, of 30 or even 10 Marks, were common in ordinary cases of maltreating native 
labourers by first offenders. 
The exception mentioned above was the only major labour recruiting offence which came 
before the supreme court between 1910  and 1914. In this case the court increased a 300 Marks 
fine imposed for illegal compulsion, on an appeal by the public prosecutor, to a 500 Marks fine 
for deprivation of liberty, stressing, moreover, that the recruiter had only escaped a prison 
sentence because his recruiting activities had so far caused no complaints. The other recruiting 
offence led to an acquittal, because the supreme court was not convinced that the accused had 
instructed a native to recruit regardless of whether he had the required permission from the district 
office. A second acquittal was pronounced in an equally insignificant case. 28 
The remaining two acquittals both concerned indecent acts with native girls. In the first case 
the accused, who had been sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labour by the district 
court for the Western Carolines, was acquitted because the supreme court accepted he had 
believed the girl to have been over 14 years of age. In the second case the accused, sentenced to 
six months imprisonment by the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago, was acquitted 
because the supreme court accepted that the girl had in fact been more than 14 years 
old-although she, like the girl in the first case, looked sexually immature.29 
Taken together this information suggested that the central task of the supreme court in the 
exercise of its criminal jurisdiction during the last years of German colonial rule was the control 
of violence used by non-natives against natives, and, more precisely, in relation to natives they 
employed, or whom they recruited for employment. 
To appreciate the approach, it had to be taken into account that disciplining native labourers 
with corporal punishments was legal, provided the employer had been granted the necessary 
licence. What was legally wrong was not the use of physical force as such, but the abuse of the 
power to do so. Seen in this light, it was striking that the cases of abuse which came before the 
supreme court were all relatively minor. Judging by its decisions, the colonists did not kill, maim 
or torture their native labourers-let alone other natives-but merely occasionally overstepped 
the mark. To be sure, it was possible that these cases represented the tip of an iceberg, but it was 
improbable that people who received a small fine for a minor assault appealed to the supreme 
court whereas others, who were imprisoned by the district courts for more brutal offences, never 
did. To be sure also, it was possible that the most serious cases were not judicially decided, 
because the culprits had fled the colony, or were deported from it, or because the effective 
exercise of the courts' criminal jurisdiction did not extend to the colonial frontiers where violence 
27 Section 240 of the Criminal Code defines "compulsion" (Notigung) as the use of force or threats to cause another 
person to perform an action, to refrain from performing an action or to suffer the performance of an action-if the use of 
the means employed for the intended purpose is ''reprehensible" (verwerjlich). For example, the missionary might have 
threatened a native woman with reporting her for a theft of coconuts if she did not come to church regularly. 
28 The district court had fined the joint owners of a plantation and trading enterprise 30 Marks for a breach of a police 
ordinance which prohibited the granting of credit to natives but made an exception for licensed native sub-traders. The 
point at issue was whether a particular sub-trader had continued to trade illegally for the accused after his licence had 
lapsed. The district court accepted this as proven whereas the supreme court gave the accused, who were well-known for 
their aggressive business practices as well as for their belligerent attitude towards the government, the benefit of the doubt 
29 There was more to both these cases than meets the eye. In the first case, in particular, the sentence would have been 
otherwise manifestly excessive, since there had been, just as in the second case, no violence or compulsion but, on the 
contrary, customary arrangements with the girls and their relatives. 
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against natives was most likely to occur. Nonetheless, as it stood, the evidence suggested that the 
question of a general brutalisation of colonial society in German New Guinea required careful 
investigation and that it was hardly justified to take an affirmative answer for granted. 
How did the supreme court view the use of physical violence against natives during this 
period? Perhaps the most important chord was struck in a case where a plantation manager had 
been fined 30 Marks for intentional assault by the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago 
because he had administered corporal punishments to two labourers before the legally prescribed 
interval after a previous corporal punishment had elapsed. He was acquitted from this charge by 
the supreme court because he had wrongly believed that corporal punishment was legitimate as 
soon as physical signs of the previous punishment had disappeared. But he was fined for negligent 
assault because he had failed to inform himself about the limits of the disciplinary powers with 
which he had been entrusted. Furthermore, these powers were classified as the consequence of 
assuming a "public office" (Amt). The supreme court stressed that employers had no private right 
to beat their native employees. Rather, the disciplinary powers under the labour legislation were 
an extraordinary extension of the general punitive powers of the state, the exercise of which could 
be entrusted to private individuals when it was impractical to have them exercised by public 
officials. Such an authorisation went hand in hand with special public duties, in particular the duty 
to inform oneself about the limits of the powers granted. 
The legal implications of this decision-not spelled out by the supreme court-went much 
further: it brought private individuals exercising these disciplinary state powers within the purview 
of those sections of the German Criminal Code sanctioning offences committed in the course of 
performing public duties with substantially higher punishments. 30 Whereas an ordinary assault 
could be punished with a nominal fine under section 223, an assault committed while performing 
a public duty carried a minimum prison sentence of three months under section 340, and the 
minimum punishment for the illegal use of official penal powers under section 345 was even one 
year imprisonment with hard labour. 31 
The leading decision concerning the abuse of a licence to recruit labourers was more 
straightforward because the use of violence or coercion when recruiting native labourers was in 
principle illegal. The supreme court therefore sounded a different signal: non-natives offending 
in this manner could henceforth expect to be sent to jail rather than being fined. 32 But it was again 
an obit er dictum which deserved special attention. In this particular case the supreme court let the 
accused off with a substantial fine because he was a first offender whose previous recruiting 
activities had not given rise to complaints . But it stressed the regrettable laxity of public opinion 
in German New Guinea as to what was permitted when recruiting natives, although it was 
gradually being accepted that natives too had "personal" (that is to say, human) rights which had 
to be strictly observed. 
While the supreme court was undecided as to whether the time had come to give the personal 
rights of natives the full protection of the law, it had no doubts about the moral standards applying 
to non-natives. One of the cases involving indecent acts with a native girl provided the court with 
30 The supreme court had no reason to address this question, since sections 340 and 345 only applied to intentional but 
not negligent acts. 
3 1  While it was not judicially tested whether the authority to administer disciplinary punishments to labourers made 
private indi victuals indeed public officials within the meaning of the German Criminal Code, another consequence of the 
supreme court's decision was recognised by the executive. It decreed that disciplinary powers could henceforth only be 
given to individuals who were in full command of the German language-presumably because this was necessary to 
inform oneself about the precise legal limitations of these powers. It is also worth noting that the supreme court ignored, 
or was unaware of, the many (inconsistent) judgements of the supreme courts of the German colonies in Africa dealing 
with the disciplinary powers of employers. 
32 There were, in addition, powerful administrative measures which could be taken against such offenders: their recruiting 
licences could be cancelled and they could, in more serious cases, be deported from the colony. 
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the opportunity to sound a trumpet call in this direction. Although it acquitted the accused, it took 
objection to a subsidiary line of defence he had prepared by asserting that, all else apart, he should 
be acquitted because the natives did not regard sexual acts with children as indecent-a view the 
supreme court found reprehensible. 
Perhaps the natives do not object to such acts. But if this is so, it would be an aberration which calls for 
our pity because it would form a major obstacle to the moral and cultural advancement of an ignorant 
people, whom to educate by all possible means-but in particular by way of example-is the first and 
foremost duty of the colonising master race. No crime committed by a white man can ever be excused 
by reference to the moral standards of the natives. On the contrary, it is our own moral standards which 
apply in this colony. 
All these signals added up to a single message: the wild pioneering days, when the government 
had had no choice but to tum a blind eye to irregularities, were over. The Rule of Law had arrived, 
and it would be enforced more and more strictly. But this normalisation did not mean equality 
before the law. It was a special colonial form of the Rule of Law, with distinct racist overtones, 
although they responded ostensibly to a temporary cultural backwardness, rather than to 
permanent biological features of German New Guinea's  indigenous population. 
What messages had the supreme court signalled before 1910 and what mix of cases did it have 
to deal with during the earlier periods of its life? 
v 
Although the file in which the judgements pronounced between 1910 and 1914  were collected 
carried a note in English ( ! )  on its cover, according to which it represented "Volume IIT' of "Court 
of Appeal" decisions, the other two volumes, if they ever existed, were no longer available. 33 
There still existed, however, an older and less incomplete collection of decisions. It covered the 
years between 1 893 and 1 895 (AA 63/83 G254/5), but included only six of the 1 6  decisions made 
in the course of these three years according to the court statistics. 34 
The supreme court decided two major substantive criminal appeals in 1 893. Both involved 
ordinary property offences but resulted in remarkably high sentences: nine months imprisonment 
in one case and three years and six months imprisonment with hard labour in the other. Both 
accused tried to have their cases reopened which required decisions of a procedural nature. 
Judging by this second collection of judgements, most of the other decisions during this period 
were, for one reason or another, also concerned with procedural questions . The supreme court 
upheld a third criminal appeal because the person in charge of the police in the Bismarck 
Archipelago had had no authority to fine a trader for the breach of a police ordinance prohibiting 
the supply of firearms, ammunition and liquor to natives. It cancelled a civil judgement because 
the district court had had no jurisdiction in the matter and nipped another civil appeal in the bud 
by rejecting the plaintiff's application for "legal aid" (Armenrecht) . Both these civil matters, as 
well as a third one, in which the supreme court issued an interlocutory judgement, concerned 
disputes between the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and former employees, or their heirs, which the 
company pursued with great vigour, so that settlements were out of the question.35 
33 What survived were the copies of some decisions put loosely into non-original folders. They mainly duplicate the 
1910-1914  collection, although there were a few older ones. 
34 It included decisions for all three appeals lodged in 1 893 but only two out of seven for 1 894 and only one out of six 
for 1 895. 
35 In this context, I am treating the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and its daughter companies, the Astrolabe Kompagnie and 
the Kaiser Wilhelmsland Plantagen-Gesellschaft, as a single unit. 
174 THE TOWER OF BABEL 
Taking into account that the court statistics indicated that there had been a significant change 
in the activities of the supreme court after the end of company rule, it was now possible to pose 
two more pointed questions:  firstly, was the picture presented by the 1 893-1 895 collection 
representative of the entire period of company rule; secondly, was the picture presented by the 
1910-1914 collection representative of the entire period of imperial administration? 
Since I had discovered a shortcut to a preliminary answer to the second question I tackled it 
first. The shortcut was a list covering the judicial activities of the supreme court-and those of the 
district court for the Bismarck Archipelago-compiled in the course of 19 10  (AA 02551102). 
Although this list-the List-consisted alm6st exclusively of references to file numbers and 
sections in legislative enactments, it was useful because it thereby identified the subject matter of 
the case in question. Moreover, one of its shortcomings-its incompleteness-turned into an 
additional source of information, when I compared the List with the Appeals Register, with which 
it overlapped in 1909. 
According to the Appeals Register, eight substantive criminal appeals became pending in that 
year, whereas the List included only five of them, namely Nos 1 ,  2, 5,  6, and 7. But the Appeals 
Register also showed that one of the missing cases was decided in 19 1 1 ,  that is to say after the List 
was compiled; that the appeal in another case was withdrawn, which disqualified it, because the 
List only covered cases where a judicial decision had been pronounced; and that the third case was 
an appeal against a decision by the district court for the Marshall Islands, for which the case file 
was not available to the compiler of the List. He had relied solely on the locally available 
information, which apparently left a great deal to be desired, since the judicial activities of the 
supreme court between April 1 899, when its seat was moved to the Bismarck Archipelago, and 
the end of 1 901 were not covered at all, whereas those of the district court were at least covered 
as from the beginning of 1900, the first full year of imperial administration. 
If I assumed that the same explanation of its incompleteness held true for the other years 
covered by the List, I could deduce from it that of the 1 9  substantive civil appeals, which became 
pending between 1902 and 1 908 according to the court statistics, eight were either withdrawn or 
directed against decisions by a district court outside the Bismarck Archipelago. This meant that 
the supreme court disposed of a much higher portion of substantive civil appeals by judgement 
during this period than between 1909 and 1914.36 
By contrast, the same exercise for substantive criminal appeals suggested that of the 41 appeals 
which became pending between 1902 and 1 909, 12  were either withdrawn or directed against 
decisions by other district courts than that for the Bismarck Archipelago-a ratio which was 
similar to that for the later period. 37 
As regards the subject matter of the substantive civil appeals, the position for the 1 902 to 1908 
period was as follows. 38 Of the 1 1  relevant judgements, four involved employer/employee 
relations ; two cases involved contracts of purchase and sale; two cases involved unspecified 
contracts; there was one tort action; one action was concerned with unjust enrichment; and the last 
action had to do with the immigration of impecunious persons39 -all of which was not particularly 
illuminating. 
36 According to the Appeals Register the ratio between 1 909 and 1 9 1 4  was 4: 10.  The List showed that at least 1 1  of the 
1 9  appeals lodged between 1 902 and 1908 were disposed of by judgement, not counting the unknown number of 
judgements concerning appeals against decisions by the district courts for the Island Territory and Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
37 Of the 36 appeals lodged, 1 1  were withdrawn or directed against decisions of other district courts, or both. 
38 The List only accounts for one procedural criminal appeal and shows no procedural civil appeals. This was rather 
unexpected, because eight procedural criminal appeals had become pending. But an attempt to solve this puzzle was hardly 
worth the effort. 
39 The last was presumably an action by the government trying to recoup from his former employer the costs of sending 
an impecunious person back to Germany. 
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According to the List the supreme court issued 28 judgements between 1902 and 1909 which 
disposed of substantive criminal appeals against decisions of the district court for the Bismarck 
Archipelago. 40 Half of them were concerned with assaults or coercion. There were six defamation 
cases, three breaches of police ordinances, three property offences and one case each of adultery 
and unfair competition-which closely paralleled the picture for the 1910 to 1914 period. There 
were again no cases of murder or other serious crimes. Property offences had already lost their 
earlier prominence, while the relative importance of assault and defamation cases continued to 
increase.41 
This left the question as to whether these general similarities justified the conclusion that the 
assault victims during these years were typically native employees, and that coercion cases 
typically involved illegal recruitings, but it was clear that the supreme court's  exercise of its 
criminal jurisdiction between 1902 and 1909 generally had more in common with that in later 
years than with that between 1 893 and 1 895. 
This suggested that I should focus my attention on the first years of imperial 
administration-which coincided with the governorship of Rudolf von Bennigsen. On the other 
hand, the fact that the List covered the activities of the supreme court only as from 1902 lent 
added weight to the suspicion already raised by the poor reliability of the 1 899 to 1901 court 
statistics: that governmental practice during this period had been unusually messy. I therefore 
decided against searching for further shortcuts and to face up to the task of searching the haystack 
of district court case files for the needles representing the activities of the supreme court. 
VI 
When I inspected what was left of this stack the task became less frightening, but also less 
rewarding. The four smallest of the six bundles making up the haystack, representing the district 
courts in the Island Territory, had apparently disappeared altogether,42 and the two larger ones, 
representing the district courts in the Old Protectorate, had suffered a decidedly mixed fate. 
The criminal case files of the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago had been, and still 
were, the largest series of court files. Yet there were no survivors for 1 886 to 1 892, for 1 894 to 
1 896 and for 1904 and 1908-a combined blank of 12 years, or about half of the period of 
German rule. There were also many smaller gaps of varying size, ranging from as little as ten per 
cent in 1 898 to almost 100 per cent in 1 914. Even the distribution of gaps within any given year 
appeared to be random. Thus in 1902-a good year!-the first three case files were missing, as 
well as Nos 6, 18 ,  2 1  and 22 and all files after No. 28-according to the List another nine ! All 
told, well over half the case files in this series had disappeared, and the overall mortality rate of 
district court case files was much higher. Still, there were needles, and the oldest took me back 
to the very first day of the supreme court' s life. 43 
On 1 April 1 889 the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago sent a civil appeal to the 
supreme court in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. It did not even reach the court statistics because the 
appellant did not pay the required security for costs so that no further action was taken. On the 
other hand, not one of the district court case files relating to the three substantive criminal appeals 
40 I am disregarding one judgement, which was issued in 1910 and therefore included in the collection already discussed. 
41 The last three of the eight years covered account for half the assault appeals and for two thirds of the defamation 
appeals. 
42 Since we are not living in the best of all possible worlds, I was unable to investigate the possibility that the files of the 
district courts in the Island Territory were still hidden away in some archives in Japan. The assessment of the situation 
by Kennedy ( 1977: 3 8 1 )  is far from satisfactory. 
43 No specific references to these cases will be given. Some of the case files had not yet been indexed when I consulted 
them in the Australian Archives. The signatures under which I had listed most others are now obsolete. It should not be 
too difficult, however, to identify the files in question in the new index. 
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and the one substantive civil appeal which were shown in the court statistics as having been 
lodged between 1 889 and 1 892 survived. 
For the 1 893-1 895 period the haystack only yielded one needle-in addition to the decisions 
already discussed-a case of illegal self-help in the form of a bloodless punitive expedition 
undertaken by a group of traders in New Ireland. They were fined by the district court for the 
Bismarck Archipelago. Like the other surviving cases during this period, it raised a spate of 
procedural issues. But they did not have to be resolved because the appeal one of the accused had 
lodged against a decision rejecting his application to have the case reopened was withdrawn. 
That the 1 896 and 1 897 layers in the haystack yielded no needles only added weight to the 
impression that the supreme court had been dormant during this period. Nor was there a backlog 
of cases when it became again active. The first case dealt with in 1 898 was the private prosecution 
of a recent defamation: on 30 April 1 898, on an appeal by the private plaintiff, the supreme court 
increased a 25 Marks fine imposed by the district court for Kaiser Wilhelmsland to 40 Marks. On 
the same day it reduced a 50 Marks fine of the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago for a 
breach of a labour ordinance to 30 Marks. 
A few weeks before company rule ended on 3 1  March 1 899, the supreme court was given the 
opportunity for a more impressive swan song. It reduced a three year prison sentence for assault 
with a dangerous weapon causing death to two months imprisonment for negligent homicide, 
because the claim of the mate of a trading vessel that a shot fired by him, which had killed a native 
crew member, had been intended as a warning shot could not be disproved. 
For the same reason the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago found a trader who had 
shot dead a native woman employed in his house only guilty of negligent homicide. However, it 
sentenced him to one year imprisonment on this lesser charge. Governor von Bennigsen had no 
chance to review this decision. Both the public prosecutor and the accused withdrew their appeals. 
Although about a dozen cases were disposed of during Bennigsen' s  short reign, only one of 
the case files survived: it dealt with the captain of a foreign vessel who was fined 1 50 Marks for 
trading without a licence. By the time the most important criminal appeal lodged during his time 
as chief justice was heard, Bennigsen had left German New Guinea and the supreme court was 
presided over by acting governor Hahl. 
The case concerned multiple charges against the manager of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s  
outpost in Berlinhafen for maltreating native labourers and shooting a "free" native. 44 The accused 
had been sentenced by the district court for Kaiser Wilhelmsland in three separate judgements to 
two months imprisonment and a 250 Marks fine for assault and some minor offences; to nine 
months imprisonment for manslaughter under extenuating circumstances; and to a 600 Marks fine 
for another assault and the breach of a police ordinance regulating the hunting of birds-of­
paradise. The public prosecutor as well as the accused appealed against these decisions. The 
supreme court combined their appeals and dealt with them in a single judgement. It essentially 
confirmed the assessment of the district court by sentencing the accused to a combined period of 
ten months imprisonment, not counting the fines it imposed or confirmed. 
This case had special significance because it was the first manslaughter conviction of a non­
native by the supreme court on record, and because an apparently unusually brutal, but otherwise 
ordinary, maltreatment of a native labourer was punished with a substantial prison sentence, 
namely two months. Moreover, the court explicitly rejected the defence of the accused that he had 
exercised quasi-parental disciplinary powers. The case was treated as an intentional assault with 
a dangerous weapon, a walking stick, and without extenuating circumstances. The signal Hahl was 
sending was clear: the maltreatment of native labourers was a serious matter-and there would 
henceforth be no playing around with finer points of law. 45 
44 This was the term officially used to describe natives not employed by non-natives. 
45 This applied, in particular, to the questions of the legal significance of errors about the existence and limitations of 
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The survival rate of case files during Hahl' s own long governorship, between 1 902 and the end 
of German rule, varied considerably.46 According to the court statistics six substantive criminal 
appeals became pending in 1902.47 Three of the case files survived. One concerned the defamation 
of the district judge for the Bismarck Archipelago by the Catholic bishop. The bishop was fined 
60 Marks. He appealed, but the matter came to an abrupt end when the acting governor withdrew 
the original complaint on which the prosecution had been based. The second appeal concerned a 
charge of theft. It ended with the acquittal of the accused, who had been sentenced to two weeks 
imprisonment by the district court for the Bismarck Archipelago. The district court had also fined 
him 3 Marks for assault and acquitted him of the more serious charge of arson. Moreover, the 
prosecution of this particular man had only been a side-line. The main culprit, another trader, had 
fled the colony-not an uncommon end for a criminal prosecution in German New Guinea. 
The adultery case, covered by the third file, became historically interesting because the 
German Criminal Code stipulated a mandatory prison sentence for adultery. The district court, 
taking a stem view, sentenced the two accused to three weeks prison each. The male accused 
appealed and the supreme court reduced his punishment to the permissible minimum of one day 
imprisonment. The accused appealed to the emperor for mercy-as did his female partner in 
crime, although she had not appealed to the supreme court. The emperor commuted the respective 
prison sentences to fines of 200 Marks each. 
For the four substantive criminal appeals which became pending in 1903, all case files 
survived. One was the first documented case of illegal recruiting to come before the supreme 
court. It was therefore especial! y disappointing that the public prosecutor withdrew his appeal-as 
well as puzzling, because the district court had acquitted the non-native accused, whereas three 
of his native helpers were sentenced by the station court to eight days prison each. The second 
case, in which a Japanese sailor had been fined 100 Marks for resisting a public official, also 
concerned illegal recruiting. It had the potential of causing considerable embarrassment. The 
woman in question, whom the sailor had refused to hand over to a local official in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland, had been "ceded" by a senior official to his successor who was now serving in the 
Bismarck Archipelago and had asked to have her brought to him. The official representing the 
public prosecution before the supreme court withdrew the appeal after the accused had 
conveniently left the colony. 
The third assault case fell into the pub brawl category. It ended with a replacement of the five 
day prison sentence, against which the public prosecutor as well as the accused had appealed, with 
a fine of 105 Marks. In the fourth case, a charge of illegal compulsion against a Catholic ex­
missionary, the appeal by the public prosecutor against his acquittal was rejected by the supreme 
court. 
For 1 904 the haystack produced not a single needle. The yield for 1 905 was instructive only 
because the surviving case files demonstrated that both cases of assault were pub brawls, instead 
of concerning the beating of native employees. 1906 provided the greatest disappointment. Three 
assault cases and two cases of deprivation of liberty were shown in the List, but all relevant case 
files had disappeared. 
The result for 1 907 was hardly better. The List accounted for four of the six substantive 
criminal appeals lodged. The first-a negligent homicide, almost certainly with a native 
victim-would have been of special interest, but there was no corresponding case file. On the 
other hand, there was another surplus needle. It even concerned an assault case. But it was a 
private prosecution, to which the accused responded with a defamation action. It earned his 
disciplinary powers. 
46 I should stress that even before Hahl ceased to be chief justice in 191 1 the supreme court was often presided over by 
an acting chief justice. 
4 7 I only checked the criminal case files for this period. 
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accuser a fine of 75 Marks, whereas the accused was only fined 50 Marks for assault-'-a good 
indication of how the district court for Kaiser Wilhelmsland apportioned the blame. The supreme 
court did not have to decide because both parties withdrew their appeals. The same plaintiff-a 
somewhat paranoid employee of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie-had lodged a second appeal in a 
private defamation prosecution because he regarded the token fine of 5 Marks imposed on the 
defendant as insufficient. His appeal was rejected. For the three substantive criminal appeals 
lodged in 1908, according to the List two assaults and one defamation, not a single relevant case 
file survived. 
This left 1909-and eight substantive criminal appeals. Two of them were decided in 1910 and 
191 1 and therefore included in the collection already discussed. Of the remaining six appeals two 
were accounted for by case files. The first concerned a defamation of the governor. The supreme 
court reduced the 300 Marks fine imposed by the district court to 100 Marks. The other case 
concerned a quarrel between two planters, one of whom the district court had fined 200 Marks for 
criminal trespass and threatening behaviour whereas the other was fined a mere 20 Marks for 
assault. Understandably, the first planter, who had taken the matter to court, was dissatisfied with 
the outcome. He persisted, even when his appeal was rejected, and successfully forced a reopening 
of his case. It led to a reduction of his fine on the basis of new evidence. 
In addition, the haystack for this year yielded yet another surplus needle. The wife of a senior 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie employee in Kaiser Wilhelmsland had received a summary fine for 
smuggling birds-of-paradise. She objected and was acquitted by the district court. This annoyed 
the customs official involved, who was probably more concerned with the lady' s  arrogant 
behaviour than with her illegal activities. His direct superior lodged an appeal but it was later 
withdrawn. The reasons were not apparent from the file, but it was tempting, although perhaps 
unfair, to imagine that the district judge who, in his capacity as district commissioner, was also 
the highest local customs official, persuaded his subordinates not to be silly. 
Although the 1910- 1914 period was, generally speaking, well covered by the collection, I 
continued the search for case files relating to cases where appeals in criminal matters had been 
withdrawn, so that they remained outside its coverage.48 The first relevant case file had not 
survived, but the information in the Appeals Register and the List was sufficient to determine what 
had happened. It concerned a second charge of embezzlement in public office against the same 
accused whose first appeal had been rejected by the supreme court. When he accepted that he 
stood no chance, he withdrew the second appeal. 
For the only substantive criminal appeal withdrawn in 191 1 ,  I could not expect to find a case 
file because it was directed against a decision by the district court for the Western Carolines. In 
1912  there were no withdrawals. Both 1913  withdrawals could be accounted for. They related to 
appeals against fines imposed by the district court for Kaiser Wilhelmsland in 191 1 and 1912  for 
breaches of the ordinance regulating the hunting of birds-of-paradise. Although the fines were 
substantial ( 100, 150 and 200 Marks), the two accused withdrew their appeals in 19 13 ,  when the 
hunting had reached its lucrative peak, presumably because they knew that even a successful 
appeal involving their absence from the field would cost them a great deal more in lost profits than 
these fines. 
None of the substantive criminal appeals lodged in 1914 was withdrawn. But the haystack 
produced another needle for 1914.  It was connected with one of the procedural criminal appeals 
lodged during that year. The relevant entry in the Appeals Register was undated and gave no file 
number. It only stated that the appeal was directed against an arrest warrant issued by the district 
court for the Bismarck Archipelago. However, since the name of the accused was given, it was 
not difficult to identify the case, because the case file had survived. The accused almost became 
48 I also kept an eye open for other case files, but I only located one which went with any of the 20 supreme court 
judgements pronounced during this period. 
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the first non-native convicted of murdering a native in German New Guinea. He had administered 
a large glass of undiluted painkiller to one of his sick labourers who subsequently died. In the end 
he was only found guilty of poisoning, a qualified form of assault, because it could neither be 
proved that he had intended to kill the man, nor that the labourer's  death had been caused by the 
painkiller rather than his sickness. Although the accused was only given the prescribed minimum 
sentence of one year imprisonment with hard labour,49 there was little doubt that the case would 
have come before the supreme court, had there been time. Since World War I had already started 
when the district court pronounced its verdict, it was up to the Australian military authorities to 
deal with the matter.50 
Finally another oddity of general interest: a case where the file showed that it should not have 
been listed in the Appeals Register, or the court statistics .  It was the mysterious procedural 
criminal appeal involving the colonial office (see above: 1 66). Although the proceedings against 
a man accused of having breached the Bird of Paradise Hunting Ordinance had been squashed, 
he complained to the colonial office that his summons had stated that he would be brought before 
the district court by police soldiers, if he did not appear voluntarily. The colonial office referred 
the complaint to Rabaul, where it was handled by the chief justice, because it was calling for 
disciplinary action against a judicial officer. The chief j ustice upheld the complaint and 
reprimanded the district judge because "police soldiers" could only mean "native policemen", and 
because it was offensive to tell a white person that he could be forced by natives to make a court 
appearance. Since such a procedure threatened the standing of the white race, it was justified only 
in extreme emergencies. Even the physical assistance of native policemen in the arrest of a 
resisting white offender could only be approved if the white officials available were unable to 
subdue him. 
VII 
This was as far as I intended to take my examination. Where had it got me? The court statistics 
had given me a reasonably reliable overall picture of the judicial activities of the supreme court, 
but it was not sufficiently detailed to be of much historical interest, unless it was placed in a 
comparative context. The 1 909 to 1914 Appeals Register, and the list of the judicial decisions of 
the court between 1902 and 1 909, added some flesh to these bare bones, but the result was still 
too incomplete to support any firm conclusions. 
Since the decisions of the supreme court were not reported, I had to rely primarily on two 
archival collections. The first covered, more or less comprehensively, its decisions between the 
beginning of 1910 and the end of German colonial rule. The second included about a third of the 
decisions it made between 1 893 and 1 895. Between them, the two collections accounted for 
around a quarter of the cases shown in the court statistics, but it was also clear that a number of 
cases had not been judicially decided. 
An inspection of the district court case files revealed an erratic survival rate. It was, on 
average, probably as low as 25 per cent. Nonetheless the surviving files accounted for a substantial 
number of additional cases in which appeals had been lodged. All told, an adequate amount of 
information was available for around 40 per cent of the cases which had come before the supreme 
court. This sample, however, was still far too small for a systematic quantitative analysis. Indeed, 
I subsequently learned that I would have been well advised to draw no conclusions at all from the 
information I had assembled. 
This information had strongly suggested that during the period of company rule the supreme 
court had played no significant part in controlling the use of violence by non-natives against 
49 The accused was also convicted of other, lesser offences. 
50 What they did does not concern us. 
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natives, whereas this had become its main role during the later years of German colonial rule. But 
then I came across a reference to an 1 892 decision in which the supreme court had confirmed a 
prison sentence of six months the imperial court for the Bismarck Archipelago had imposed on 
a trader in New Ireland for the negligent homicide of a native. On the other hand, imperial 
commissioner Rose, who had probably chaired the supreme court on that occasion, warmly 
supported a clemency petition the trader was sending to the emperor, although imperial judge 
Geissler insisted that the trader should serve his full sentence because he had treated natives with 
extraordinary brutality in the past and because he had recently been accused of having performed 
"unnatural" sexual acts with them. 
Since the trader had died before a decision about his petition was made, the file (RKA 4948) 
did not tell me how the authorities in Berlin had viewed the matter. Nor did it contain either of the 
two judgements by the courts in German New Guinea. Instead the case file, which had been sent 
to Berlin, together with the petition, was returned to the imperial court in HerbertshOhe and no 
longer survived. 
In other cases copies of the decisions of courts in German New Guinea were kept in a variety 
of colonial office files . One such decision presented an even greater surprise. It was a judgement 
the supreme court had pronounced in 1 897, when I had believed it to have been comatose. On 7 
August of that year, chaired by Hahl-who was then serving as imperial judge in the Bismarck 
Archipelago-as acting chief j ustice, the supreme court fined a former employee of the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie 1 , 150 Marks for having physically insulted its then administrator in 1 894,51 
whereas the imperial court for the Bismarck Archipelago, under Hahl' s  predecessor, Mellien, had 
acquitted the man on a technicality (see RKA 2412) .52 
Did this mean that I had created my own phantom when closing the gap in the court statistics 
for 1 896 and 1 897 in my table? I had closed it by assuming that no appeals had been lodged in 
1 896, and by inserting for 1 897 the appeals shown in the 1 898 return as having been carried over. 
I had been aware that this was a dubious procedure because it was possible that the appeals which 
had been carried over to 1 898 had been lodged before 1 897, but I had not appreciated that I had 
also assumed that no appeals had been disposed of in 1 896 or 1 897; and this latter assumption 
'now turned out to be false. 
I had made these assumptions because a single gap in my table would have rendered it useless 
as a basis for a systematic quantitative analysis, because this method only worked in a closed 
universe. But I had not grasped that it did not matter how this closure was achieved. Instead of 
closing the gaps in the court statistics with the help of risky assumptions, I could have simply 
omitted the three years for which they were not submitted, pretending that they had not taken 
place. But this would have meant an open admission that the entire exercise was a game divorced 
from historical reality-an admission which I had instinctively refused to make. 
It therefore also did not matter that this particular case had not affected the factuality of my 
table because the judgement showed that the appeal had neither been lodged in 1 897 nor in 1896 
but already in 1 895, so that it was accounted for in its 1 895 entry. Nor did it matter that I had 
learned that other entries were wrong in the sense that they included cases which should have been 
excluded, or excluded cases which should have been included, because the entire exercise had not 
got me very far in the end. 
It did matter, however, that it looked in retrospect as if the entire exercise had been misguided. 
My narrative instincts had urged me to treat the supreme court as a historical actor whose history 
consisted of the actions it performed. Moreover, the decisions it pronounced had urged me to blur 
the distinction between the legal treatment by the supreme court of the cases which had come 
before it and these cases as social events. Although I had resisted the temptation to exploit their 
5 1  It also confiscated the riding whip which had been used for the attack. 
52 By the time the supreme court made its decision the administrator had been dead for about two years. 
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often considerable narrative potential, I had been unwilling to accept that they had, as historical 
events, no more to do with the history of the supreme court than the food a person consumes had 
to do with the history of that person. On the contrary, I had used these cases as a means of gaining 
access to the general history of German New Guinea. Thus I had been more interested in the use 
of physical violence by non-natives against natives than in the legal treatment of cases of this kind 
by the supreme court. And I had been anxious to establish the quantitative weight of this type of 
case in relation to other types not because I wanted to know what proportion of the judicial 
business of the supreme court it accounted for, rather I had wanted to establish what role inter­
racial violence had played in the history of this colony. 
I still found it perfectly understandable that this had been my priority, but I had laboured under 
an illusion in expecting that the few cases which had happened to come before the supreme court 
would allow me to draw any conclusions about the social history of German New Guinea. They 
merely offered a vastly incomplete and decidedly unsystematic collection of anecdotal evidence 
in this context. 
Whether I liked it or not it was generally most improbable that a systematic, quantitative 
approach to the exercise of any other governmental power would take me further than it had in the 
case of the exercise of its judicial powers by the supreme court. Yet this did not necessarily mean 
that I had to abandon a systematic approach altogether. Perhaps I had merely been mistaken in 
looking at the supreme court as a corporate actor, instead of looking at the persons through whom 
it had acted, not as a collection of individuals but as a species of government official? Was it 
possible and practical to write a systematic history of one of these species? 
The most promising species were not the judges of the supreme court for whom the exercise 
of their judicial powers was merely an appendix to their executive functions, but the imperial 
judges. Besides, the life of this species was conveniently short and unusually well documented 
because each of its members required a personal authorisation by the chancellor of the Reich and 
because the two colonial office files dealing with this matter (RKA 5344 and 5345) were still 
available. 
Chapter 8: A Species Doomed 
I 
In the imperial charter granted to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, the administration of justice was excluded from its governmental responsibilities and reserved for the emperor and his 
government. But instead of entrusting the exercise of this jurisdiction to imperial officials, the 
company's  first administrator, Georg von Schleinitz, a retired naval officer without legal training, 
was empowered by a decree dated 24 June 1886, to do it. However, Schleinitz received his judicial 
powers as an individual rather than ex officio, and the decree foreshadowed that additional, 
subordinate judicial officers would be appointed. 
Within three years "the official empowered to exercise jurisdiction" had grown into a hierarchy 
of courts. German New Guinea had been divided into two judicial districts : the westerly district 
comprised Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the easterly district the Bismarck Archipelago and the 
German share of the Solomons. There was one "imperial court" (Kaiserliches Gericht) of the first 
instance, placed under an "imperial judge" (Kaiserlicher Richter), for each of these districts and 
a supreme court, under a chief justice, as a court of appeal. The jurisdiction of these courts was, 
in principle, limited to non-natives. The administration of justice in relation to natives was treated 
as an executive task which was transferred to the company. But it established special criminal 
station courts for natives and placed them under the imperial judges as a sideline to the exercise 
of their jurisdiction over non-natives . On the other hand, while the imperial judges derived their 
regular judicial powers from a personal authorisation by the chancellor of the Reich, they were 
employees of the · company who could also be required to carry out administrative 
functions-although this was not the intention of the company' s  first administrator. 
II 
The first imperial judge was Assessor Georg Schmiele, a fully qualified lawyer on leave from the 
Prussian judicial service. He was empowered by the chancellor of the Reich on 14 July 1 886 and 
installed by Schleinitz in the easterly of the two judicial districts he had created. Whereas 
Schmiele also acted as a legal adviser to Schleinitz, the administration of the Bismarck 
Archipelago was to be the function of the company' s  "station director" (Stationsdirektor) . 
This arrangement changed in 1 889 when an agreement between the company and the Reich 
transferred the powers of the administrator to an imperial commissioner, Fritz Rose. But Schmiele 
stayed on. He left the employ of the company, joined the colonial service of the Reich and was 
appointed as a kind of deputy administrator with the title "imperial chancellor" (Kaiserlicher 
Kanzler). Nonetheless he also remained imperial judge for the Bismarck Archipelago, until he 
went on leave during the second half of 1 89 1 .  He was relieved by Assessor Geissler1 as acting 
imperial chancellor, who had also been empowered by the chancellor of the Reich to exercise the 
jurisdiction of the first instance. 
While Schmiele was on leave the 1 889 agreement between the company and the Reich was 
terminated. Schmiele was appointed administrator in June 1 892, after rejoining the service of the 
company. This meant that the post of imperial judge in the Bismarck Archipelago now had to be 
filled on a permanent basis. The company was anxious that it should be held by an imperial 
official who would appear to be independent in the eyes of the white residents in this politically 
sensitive district. 
I Geissler' s first name is not identified in the file. I have made no attempt to discover it or those of other minor characters 
appearing in this chapter. 
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Since Geissler was not prepared to stay on, arrangements were made in Berlin to send the 
secretary of the imperial commissioner in the Marshall Islands, Eugen Brandeis, as acting imperial 
judge to the Bismarck Archipelago. Brandeis was conveyed there by SMS Sperber and took over 
directly from Geissler-to the annoyance of chief justice Schmiele, who had not been informed 
about this move and could only give it his retrospective blessing by a decree of 5 February 1893. 
After this unhappy start relations between Schmiele and Brandeis deteriorated to a point where 
the company asked the foreign office, in January 1 894, for Brandeis's  recall. After further 
incidents Brandeis was instructed to relinquish his post on 29 August 1 894. Assessor Mellien was 
sent out to replace him. In the meantime the post was temporarily taken over by the imperial judge 
for Kaiser Wilhelmsland, Maximilian Krieger. 
The company was also unhappy with Schmiele and terminated his contract. Seriously ill with 
malaria, Schmiele left in February 1 895 and died, en route to Germany, in Batavia. He was 
temporarily replaced, in his capacity also as chief justice, by his deputy, Hugo Rudiger, another 
retired naval officer, who had previously commanded the Schutztruppe in German East Africa. 
Not long after his arrival in the Bismarck Archipelago in December 1 894, Mellien took ill, so that 
the company's  station manager,2 the engineer Wasa Mende, had to be empowered to deputise for 
him. 3 This was ironic because the company had just obtained approval from the foreign office to 
also transfer the administrative functions of its station manager to the imperial judge. 
Mende continued to act as imperial judge until he could hand over his judicial, as well as his 
administrative functions to Assessor Dr Albert Hahl, who arrived in January 1 896. With Hahl's  
arrival a period of renewed judicial stability began for the Bismarck Archipelago. He stayed until 
the end of 1 898, when he was, according to plan, replaced by Assessor Dr Heinrich Schnee. 
When Schleinitz had created the two judicial districts in November 1 886, he had reluctantly 
taken on the exercise of the jurisdiction of the first instance in Kaiser Wilhelmsland himself-until 
the arrival of a second judicial officer, which he expected in the near future. He could do this 
because, at the time, the supreme court of German New Guinea did not yet exist.4 When it was 
established the second judicial officer had still not arrived. Instead Schleinitz had continued to 
serve as imperial judge until he went on leave on 1 March 1 888-from which he was not to return. 
When his replacement, acting administrator Reinhold Kraetke, a senior official on loan from 
the German postal service, became Oberrichter on 1 January 1889, he authorised Schmiele, for 
the time being, to exercise also the jurisdiction of the first instance in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. This 
provisional solution was still in force when imperial commissioner Rose took over from Kraetke. 
Rose found it unsatisfactory and asked the chancellor of the Reich on 8 December 1 889 to 
empower his secretary, Jordan, although he was not a fully qualified lawyer. He had only passed 
the first of the two legal state examinations and was therefore merely a Referendar rather than an 
Assessor, like Schmiele. 
By the time the authority arrived in Finschhafen, Jordan had died of tuberculosis in Sorabaya. 
In his place his successor as secretary of the imperial commissioner, Arthur Hildebrandt, another 
Referendar, was made imperial judge on 27 July 1 890. Hildebrandt did not last long, because he 
died in January 1 89 1  as one of the first victims of the traumatic "malaria epidemic" in 
Finschhafen. Nor did his successor, Otto Wenzel, who was sworn in as imperial judge on 5 
August 1 89 1 .  He left German New Guinea on medical advice in January 1 892, having suffered 
from malaria since his arrival six months earlier. His successor, Cordes, was empowered in March 
2 The position of the company's  most senior administrative official in the Archipelago had long been downgraded from 
station director to that of station manager. 
3 Mende's  authorisation was dated 1 July 1 895, but Mellien had by then already left so that Mende had to start acting 
as an "emergency judge" (Notrichter). 
4 Decisions of the imperial courts could initially be appealed to the Reichtsgericht in criminal matters and to the German 
consular court in Apia in civil matters . 
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1 892, but Rose found him to be incapable of dealing with complex legal issues, so that he 
transferred the exercise of the civil jurisdiction of the first instance to Assessor Geissler, the 
imperial judge in the Bismarck Archipelago, in June 1 892. 
When Schmiele took over from Rose, he installed his secretary, Hasse, another Referendar, 
as imperial judge for Kaiser Wilhelrnsland with full powers on 5 February 1 893.5 Schmiele found 
Hasse even less satisfactory than Rose had found Cordes and asked the company for his recall. 
When it was unable to find a replacement, it turned to the foreign office for help. Despite the bad 
experiences with Cordes and Hasse-which were at least partly due to their limited legal 
abilities-the foreign office was inclined to settle again for a person who had failed the second 
legal state examination and was therefore unable to pursue a legal career in metropolitan Germany. 
In the end, however, it was the company that found what it thought to be a suitable person, 
although the man in question, Maximilian Krieger, fell into the same category. It asked the 
chancellor of the Reich on 8 November 1 893 to authorise Krieger to exercise the jurisdiction of 
the first instance, and its request was readily granted. 
When Krieger arrived in German New Guinea he immediately got caught up in the tensions 
between Schmiele and Brandeis .  The situation worsened when Schmiele accused the company's 
station manager, Paul Kolbe, of embezzlement and Kolbe responded by physically insulting 
Schmiele in public. 6 Krieger became directly involved in these matters when he was sent to the 
Bismarck Archipelago to take over from Brandeis. His performance did not satisfy the company 
at all, so that it informed the foreign office in April 1895 that it intended to recall Krieger-whose 
main job at the time was that of secretary under the acting administrator Rudiger, since Schmiele 
had by then departed. As negotiations between the company and the Reich, aimed at handing over 
all governmental responsibilities permanently to the Reich, were already well advanced, it thought 
that it was important to replace Krieger in his capacity as imperial judge for Kaiser Wilhelrnsland 
with a well-qualified person who could continue to serve under an imperial administration. 
It was only because the company found it more difficult than expected to unload its 
governmental responsibilities that Krieger remained on the bench until Rudiger was informed in 
April 1 896 that Krieger, as well as the company's station manager in Friedrich Wilhelrnshafen, 
had engaged in homosexual acts with Melanesian plantation labourers. 
Rudiger was out of his depth. He started disciplinary proceedings against the two men, who, 
in tlirn, charged their accusers with defamation. Thereupon Rudiger, in his capacity as acting chief 
justice, instructed Hahl to come to Kaiser Wilhelrnsland to carry out judicial investigations. But 
instead of awaiting their outcome, Rudiger decided that the accusations could not be sustained and 
reinstated Krieger in his office as imperial judge, from which he had earlier suspended him. In 
addition he dismissed two of the accusers in his capacity as acting general manager of the 
company. 
Since the other accusers were about to complete their contracts, without a prospect of having 
them renewed, and since the two accused also decided to quit the colony, soon none of the parties 
were left. They were followed by Rudiger, who departed in August 1 896---ostensibly for health 
5 Rose had also appointed the clerk of the court, Amo Senfft (see above: 1 2 1 )  as auxiliary judge (Hilfsrichter)--an 
appointment which Schmiele also terminated. 
6 Yes, it was Kolbe, by then already married to Queen Emma, who struck Schmiele with his riding whip, trying to 
provoke Schmiele to challenge him to a duel. It was also Kolbe who was sentenced by the supreme court for committing 
adultery with one of Queen Emma' s nieces. And it was another of these nieces who followed Kolbe' s example by striking 
captain Prey, the commander of the mobile police unit, with her riding whip. And yes, it was Assessor Wolff who 
instructed the Japanese sailor to bring the woman whom he had "inherited" from his predecessor Boether to HerbertsMhe 
on the Z.abra-and who was, perhaps, also the author of the sealed letter to the harbour master in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen 
which, perhaps, confirmed these instructions. And so it goes on. Even Berghausen figures marginally in one of the 
supreme court cases because the man fined for defaming governor Hahl had claimed that Hahl had perverted the course 
of justice in Berghausen's favour. But what do such juicy stories, which I covered with a veil of anonymity in the previous 
chapter, contribute to an understanding of the history of German colonial rule? 
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reasons-after he had been severely criticised by the company, which described the relations 
among its employees in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen as "truly hopeless". While Hahl' s  judicial 
investigations dragged on, conveniently prolonged by the need to obtain evidence from witnesses 
who had returned to Germany, Kaiser Wilhelmsland was once more without an imperial judge. 
On 25 August 1 896 the company renewed its plea to the foreign office for help in finding a 
replacement for Krieger, although this time without a reference to an imminent assumption of the 
governmental responsibilities by the Reich. Again it was the company which eventually found a 
candidate: Hugo Skopnik, a practising lawyer, whom it regarded, despite his "advanced age" of 
39, as superbly fit for service in the tropics. 
Skopnik was empowered to exercise the jurisdiction of the first instance in June 1897. Less 
than a month later the company approached the foreign office to empower him instead to exercise 
the j urisdiction of the second instance, as it had been necessary to appoint Skopnik as acting 
administrator, because Rudiger' s successor as acting administrator, Curt von Hagen, had been shot 
dead while trying to recapture the suspected Melanesian murderers of the explorer Otto Ehlers.7 
As Skopnik' s promotion left the position of imperial judge in Kaiser Wilhelmsland vacant, the 
company suggested filling it with one of its assistant plantation managers, Erich von dem 
Knesebeck, who happened to be a Referendar. But Knesebeck never went into action as a judge, 
or even learned about his elevation to the bench. The company returned his authorisation to the 
foreign office in March 1 898, informing it that Knesebeck had left its services. 8 
Neither the company nor the foreign office were unduly concerned about this turn of events, 
although Kaiser Wilhelmsland had now been without an imperial judge for almost two years. But 
things were about to change. The foreign office had resumed negotiations with the company about 
the conditions for a termination of its charter and was therefore prepared to make an effort to see 
that the position was filled with a person whom it was happy to employ when it took control. On 
18 April 1 898 the chancellor of the Reich authorised Assessor Paul Boether, a junior official in 
the colonial department. Boether arrived in Kaiser Wilhelmsland in June 1 898, as an employee 
of the company but confident that his transformation into an imperial official was not far off. The 
metamorphosis took place on 1 April 1 899. Yet it was Schnee, rather than the more senior 
Boether, who was appointed acting governor-and acting chief justice-because the capital was 
moved from Kaiser Wilhelmsland to the Bismarck Archipelago. Boether stayed on as imperial 
judge, although now with added administrative responsibilities, until he fell victim to a campaign 
by his former company colleagues who did not like the way he carried out his duties. 
On 21 May 1901 a senior employee of the company, who was also serving as public 
prosecutor, reported to governor Bennigsen, in his capacity as chief justice, that the "sexual 
perversions" of the imperial judge B oether-who had allegedly been observed performing 
cunnilingus on a Malay woman-were the talk of the town. Bennigsen was willing to back 
Boether to the hilt and lent his full support to the defamation charges laid by him against his 
accusers. However, Bennigsen had left German New Guinea and Boether had gone on his regular 
home leave before the matter was finalised. 
Hahl, who had returned as acting governor to his old stamping ground, and Wilhelm 
Stuckhardt, who had succeeded Schnee as imperial judge for the Bismarck Archipelago, held a 
different view. Stuckhardt had investigated the matter which Bennigsen had referred to the 
imperial court for the Bismarck Archipelago until he was posted to Kaiser Wilhelmsland. When 
he was no longer judicially responsible, Stuckhardt wrote to Hahl on 15 November 1901 
suggesting a political solution: to ask the company to recall the two employees against whom the 
7 Hahl, who stepped into the breach as acting administrator in August 1 897, was more urgently needed in the Bismarck 
Archipelago 
8 Skopnik also never officiated as imperial judge. He had been promoted before he arrived in Kaiser Wilhelmsland in 
September 1 897. 
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defamation charges had been laid and to drop the charges afterwards.  Hahl was all in favour of 
doing the latter, before an embarrassing public hearing took place, but had little hope that the 
company could be persuaded to part with the more senior of the two persons charged, who was 
one of its most valued employees. Instead he emphasised in his report to Berlin that it would be 
unwise to send Boether back to German New Guinea after the end of his leave.9 
By the time the files-but not Boether-had returned, Hahl was himself in Germany on sick­
leave, and the matter rested until Boether made an application to join the defamation prosecution 
as a private plaintiff in December 1902. The application went to the court in Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen, but was referred by Stuckhardt to Emil Wolff, who had succeeded him as imperial 
judge for the Bismarck Archipelago, and by Wolff to acting governor Knake, who decided to 
reserve this delicate matter for Hahl whose return was by then imminent. 
Should the defamation proceedings be continued, Wolff had wanted to know. There were good 
reasons for discontinuing them, Hahl commented on 17 April 1903, in particular as one of the two 
accused had died in the meantime, but he did not want to interfere in any way with Wolff' s 
judicial independence. So Wolff had to bite the bullet himself. Ten days later he admitted Boether 
as a private plaintiff but immediately discontinued the defamation proceedings because one of the 
accused had died and because the other was protected by section 193 of the German Criminal 
Code, as it had been interpreted by the supreme court of Saxony in a decision in 1889, according 
to which it was legitimate to bring slanderous rumours about an official to the notice of his 
superior10-and this was the end of that matter. 
m 
The imperial judges did not become suddenly extinct as a species when the Reich took over full 
governmental responsibilities for German New Guinea. Instead its two resident specimens, 
Boether and Schnee, began to transform themselves into district commissioners, for whom their 
judicial powers as district judges, and as chairmen of the station courts, were extensions of their 
executive powers. This transformation became more clearly visible when additional government 
stations were opened, because it was taken for granted that station courts would be attached to 
each of them and that they would be chaired by the local district officer rather than the district 
judge. On the contrary, it became customary for district judges to delegate more and more of their 
other judicial powers to these district officers. It took until 1909 before at least the office of 
district judge in the Bismarck Archipelago was separated from the office of district commissioner. 
Even then the district judge remained obliged, in the view of governor Hahl, which was shared 
by the colonial office, to carry out administrative tasks at the instuction of the governor. 1 1 
The survival of the species "imperial judge" had, from the start, depended on the peculiar 
division of governmental powers in the imperial charter granted to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie 
which had constituted the administration of justice as an imperial enclave in the domain of 
company government. 
The charter itself had weakened its vital force by insisting that the administration of j ustice, 
although a responsibility of the emperor, had to be paid for by the company, thus necessarily 
giving it some influence. The second blow came when it was decided, instead of establishing a 
separate imperial judicial service the running costs of which were refunded by the company, to 
9 In his memoirs Hahl claimed that Boether had left because he-like Bennigsen-had been unable to withstand the long 
term effects of the climate on his health ( 1980: 89 and 80). 
10 See AA 63/83, B46: Kaiserliches Bezirksgericht HerbertsMhe, Str. Pr. 1 5/190 1 .  
1 1  The position of the district judge for the Bismarck Archipelago was a "Hauptamt", which did not preclude that its 
occupapnt coculd be askaed to carry out "subsidiary functions" (Nebentimter), as the best, but still misleading, English 
translation-"full time position"-suggests. 
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entrust the administration of justice to company employees who were, as such, hired and fired by 
the company. The third blow was the creation of a dual system of justice which excluded natives 
from the jurisdiction of the imperial courts , combined with the decision to transfer the 
administration of justice in relation to natives altogether to the company, instead of establishing 
imperial courts for natives. It was the company that softened this blow by establishing its own 
criminal courts for natives and by placing them under the imperial judges rather than its station 
managers . 
On the other hand, the company was not prepared to send out the second full-time judicial 
officer administrator Schleinitz had expected. Acting administrator Kraetke, upon becoming chief 
justice, placed the imperial court for Kaiser Wilhelmsland, over which he had until then presided, 
under the imperial judge for the Bismarck Archipelago and not under one of its local 
administrative officials .  The secretary solution was only adopted by imperial commissioner Rose, 
when he requested that his secretary be authorised to exercise the jurisdiction of the first instance 
in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. This solution was not an invention of Rose; it was routinely used in other 
German colonies, including the Marshall Islands, which never had a full-time imperial judge of 
the first instance. On the contrary, the German government also transformed the position of 
imperial judge for the Bismarck Archipelago by attaching the exercise of the j urisdiction of the 
first instance to Schmiele' s new office as imperial chancellor, which was primarily administrative. 
The decisive test came when Schmiele was installed as the company's  new administrator, with 
a seat in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and after acting imperial chancellor Geissler had left the Bismarck 
Archipelago. 
It is indicative of the attitudes prevailing in Berlin at the time that the transfer of Brandeis from 
the Marshall Islands was carried out without consultation with Schmiele as chief justice, that the 
transfer was used to downgrade this politically sensitive office from the level of "chancellor" to 
that of "secretary" and that it was filled, although it required considerable legal ability, with a 
person who had no legal training at all. 12 
Matters were made worse when this new breed of imperial judge-an imperial official placed 
under a chief justice who was a company employee-was, after Schmiele' s  departure, also 
entrusted with administrative responsibilities. Indeed this new arrangement made sense only as 
a partial anticipation of the takeover of full administrative responsibilities by the Reich. It left the 
company's  administrator in an impossible situation, with which he could only cope by treating this 
imperial official as the representative of a foreign government and not as someone who was 
legally a subordinate in his administrative as well as judicial capacity. 
In practice the situation was even more problematic because the company did not bother to find 
a permanent replacement for Schmiele as administrator and chief justice for what turned out to be 
another four years. The German government took its responsibility for assuring an adequate 
administration of justice in Kaiser Wilhelmsland hardly more seriously. By the time Boether 
arrived as the first fully-fledged imperial judge in 1 898, whom Schleinitz had expected more than 
ten years earlier, the colonial government of German New Guinea had, generally, become little 
more than a farce. 
Seen in this light Boether was the counterpart of Schmiele in the Bismarck Archipelago at the 
beginning of company rule, so that it is fitting to compare how these two only true specimens of 
the species "imperial judge" tackled their task. 
1 2  Despite his unimpressive performance, Brandeis was subsequently promoted to administrator and chief justice of the 
Marshall Islands-which gives Demburg's defence of him, on account of his Jack of legal training (see above, p. 66), a 
rather hollow ring. 
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IV 
When Schmiele was installed in the Bismarck Archipelago in November 1886, he found little 
order, or respect for law, but a motley group of white residents who were quite happy with this 
state of affairs, although they would call, from time to time, for more energetic naval protection. 
Schmiele was therefore not received with open arms .  Besides, he was, according to imperial 
commissioner Oertzen, probably "a very good lawyer", but a person who "completely lacks the 
gift of adjusting to new conditions and shows his ill humour so openly that after only two months 
no one likes to see him and the navy refuses to see him at all"-according to his final report of 29 
January 1887 (RKA 2977). But then the "new conditions" confronting Schmiele were hardly 
conducive to improving his humour. Thus the company's  physician in Finschhafen noted in his 
diary on 7 August 1 887 that the settlers had again taken the administration of justice into their own 
hands. "They had 25 strokes administered to a native, after sending the imperial judge a friendly 
invitation to attend these judicial proceedings" (Schellong, 1934 : 150). 
All Schmiele could do in response to such provocations was to keep his temper as best he 
could, as he had, at the time, no jurisdiction over natives and would have made a fool of himself 
if he had ordered the white residents responsible to appear before his court because he also had 
no means of enforcing a summons. Schmiele had learned that persuasion did not do him much 
good either, because he had already tried this method by sending a carefully worded circular to 
all the settlers under his jurisdiction on 28 January 1 887, the day before Oertzen' s parting shot. 13 
After explaining that all non-natives, irrespective of their nationality, had been subject, since 
1 September 1 886, to a slightly modified version of the Gennan/Prussian civil, criminal and 
procedural law, Schrniele singled out some of the consequences of this state of affairs which were 
of special practical importance. 
As regards the civil law he focused on the large areas of land non-natives claimed to have 
bought from natives before further acquisitions had been declared to be invalid in 1 8  85. The most 
significant point made by Schmiele in this context was the foreshadowing of the need for setting 
aside native reserves . Even where natives had sold all their land, they nonetheless retained a claim 
to their dwelling places and to enough land for gardening in line with customary practices. 
Schmiele also pointed out that the sea-shore up to the high water mark in these areas was public 
property and that all traditional public markets and meeting places, as well as regularly used native 
tracks, had to remain accessible to the public and that their closure constituted a criminal offence. 
Hence non-natives claiming tracts of land could not legally prevent competitors from buying 
coconuts from natives at the beaches adjoining that land or at public markets situated on it. 
On the other hand, Schmiele stressed that coconut palms growing on privately owned land 
"doubtlessly" belonged to its owner, so that persons buying nuts which they knew, or had reasons 
to believe, had been collected by their native sellers on land belonging to others were guilty of 
receiving stolen property. Schmiele also criticised the practice of paying natives for coconuts they 
had collected on land the buyer claimed to own. To avoid confusion, the buyer had to make clear 
that he did not pay the natives for the nuts, which he already owned, but merely for the labour of 
collecting them-a fact which had to be reflected in a distinctly lower rate of pay. 
As regards the criminal law, Schmiele was emphatic that it recognised no distinction between 
natives and non-natives. The burning down of a native hut was as much arson as the burning down 
of a planter' s residence, and the killing of a native was legally the same as the killing of a white 
person. Since the German Criminal Code provided heavy penalties for all such acts, Schmiele 
implored all settlers to refrain from resorting to self-help, as had been the practice in the past. As 
long as natives were not placed under the jurisdiction of courts, complaints against them had to 
be taken to the administrator or an administrative official authorised by him. 
1 3  I spotted a copy of this circular in the archives of the Archdiocese Rabaul (No. 1 28 NGC 1 887). 
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Schmiele' s circular closed with an expression of confidence that the settlers would support the 
imperial court in its difficult task of making German law and order also a reality in this colony; 
for those who stood firm in "the fight for law" (der Kampf ums Recht) would be richly rewarded, 
because it was only under the Rule of Law that their enterprises could economically flourish. 
The settlers disagreed. As one of the most prominent among them put it: Schmiele had selected 
"fiat justicia pereat mundus" (let justice be done though the world perish) as his motto and would 
have destroyed the existing trade in the Bismarck Archipelago within a year if he had had the 
means or power to enforce his orders (Hernsheim, 1983:  106). 
It is hard to imagine that Boether, even if he had been a reincarnation of the young crusader 
Schmiele, could have resorted to the same blue-eyed pathos when he arrived in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland in June 1 898. His problem was not a wild bunch of competing traders, used to 
taking the law into their own hands, but a shrinking band of disgruntled company employees who 
felt that they had been buried under an avalanche of regulations, of which they took as little notice 
as possible. 
Boether was horrified when he inspected the files kept by the imperial court in Stephansort. 
Files dealing with matters completed ten years ago were still floating around, without any 
instructions as to what was to happen with them. Since there were also no legal provisions 
covering this question, Boether appealed to acting administrator Skopnik to approach the 
company' s  board of directors to request a decree by the chancellor of the Reich which would 
declare two time-honoured decrees of the Prussian minister of justice dealing with the storing and 
the destruction of court files to be correspondingly applicable in German New Guinea. Skopnik 
sent Boether's proposal with his luke-warm blessings to Berlin, but by the time the proposal had 
reached the colonial department, the assumption of full administrative responsibilities by the Reich 
was only a few weeks away and it refused to consider it. 
Boether was informed about this decision by Skopnik and, three months later, by the new 
imperial governor Bennigsen. Boether added the latter notification in October 1 899 to the most 
general of the files of the imperial court in Stephansort he had established shortly after his arrival. 
It became the last document on that file (AA G254/1 ). But if Boether' s reformist zeal had by then 
been crushed, he had expressed it all the more vigorously during his first six months in office. 
He had showered Skopnik with requests, ranging from one for literature which would assist 
him in learning a native language to one for information as to whether implementation regulations 
had been enacted for the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance-which had promptly happened, although 
no copy of the regulations was held by the station court in Stephansort. Above all Boether 
struggled to make the commercial arm of the company more law-abiding, since it was not only 
reluctant to send native labourers as witnesses in court proceedings, or non-native employees who 
could defend accused natives or interpret for them, but often openly disregarded the laws it was 
meant to follow. For example, the company store was selling liquor without the required licence. 
When Boether laid charges, station manager Wandres simply issued a retrospective licence, with 
the instruction that the licence fee be credited to the administrative accounts of the colony, 
although W andres should have known better since he had also been in charge of the station court 
until shortly before Boether' s arrival. 14 But then he had been removed from this office by Skopnik 
because he himself had been accused of maltreating his labourers (see AA G254/1 and 4). 
While the accusations and counter-accusations connected with this move (see RKA 2414) 
merely illustrated that the relations between the employees of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland were as "hopeless" in 1 898 as they had been two years earlier, the case of 
14 Wandres had probably been placed in charge of the station court because the position of imperial judge was unfilled. 
It would seem that the establishment of a second station court for Friedrich Wilhelmshafen happened for the same reason. 
It is worth mentioning that Wandres later became one of the main agents recruiting coolies for German New Guinea in 
China. 
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the Arnboinese Leunard Weinand da Costa, who had been charged with murdering a native near 
the company' s  westerly outpost in Berlinhafen, proved to be unexpectedly illuminating (see AA 
63/83, Item 957). 
On 1 November 1 898 Paul Luecker, in his capacity as "chief of police" (Polizeivorsteher) in 
the Berlinhafen district, investigated accusations that da Costa had shot dead a native on Tarawai 
Island. He did so in the presence of Boether who, for reasons which will become apparent, chose 
to remain officially in the background. The case was cut and dried because the accused made no 
attempt to deny the accusation. 
Da Costa had been sent to Tarawai to buy coconuts and turn them into copra which was then 
collected by Luecker, who was also in charge of the company' s commercial operations in the area. 
Da Costa's problems started when the natives refused to sell him nuts because they preferred to 
keep themfor Malay traders they expected from Temate-who supplied them with large quantities 
of Dutch gin which they were happy to share with da Costa. After a good lunch, to which he had 
invited another Malay trader who was working for the company on a neighbouring island, and 
reinforced by half a bottle of gin, da Costa went off with two of his labourers to tell the natives 
in no uncertain terms that he wanted their nuts-and without delay, because Luecker was due 
shortly to collect da Costa's copra and da Costa was loath to face him empty-handed. When his 
attempts at persuasion failed, da Costa calmly shot a chief through the head, and this worked, 
because about 3,000 coconuts were brought to his station in the course of the same afternoon. 
Boether was shocked that da Costa had found it natural to kill a native in order to overcome 
the reluctance to sell him coconuts. He therefore asked him whether he had shot natives before. 
Yes, he had, da Costa replied. In 1 891  his boss in Stephansort, Herr von Puttkamer, had instructed 
him to cut a road from Stephansort to Erilna. The inhabitants of a native village through which it 
was routed threatened his labourers with their spears. When da Costa reported that to Puttkamer, 
he was told to try again. He was given an escort of four armed native policemen, supplied with 
fuel to bum down the houses, and ordered to shoot one of the natives should they attack, because 
the rest would then run away. The natives did attack, da Costa did shoot one of them, and the rest 
of them did run away. When he had reported this to Puttkamer, he had been told he had done a 
good job. 
The case was clear, but what to do with it? Was da Costa legally a non-native who had to be 
prosecuted before the imperial court, or was he legally a native who had to be prosecuted before 
the station court? If the latter was the case, it first had to be determined which station court was 
competent to handle the matter, because the Berlinhafen district did not have its own station court 
and because Boether was only in charge of the station court in Stephansort, but not of the 
geographically closer station court in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. 
As da Costa's papers did not answer the first question, Skopnik suggested that Boether write 
to the Dutch resident in Arnboina. 15 Boether decided that it was more proper to write to the 
German consul in Macassar who then contacted the Dutch resident in Arnboina who answered it 
in the negative: da Costa was not regarded as a European on Arnboina but came exclusively under 
"the indigenous law" (die einliindischen [ ! ]  Gesetze). That left the second question, which 
Skopnik answered on 14 March 1 899. Instead of establishing a third station court in Berlinhafen, 
he officially closed down the station court in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen and extended the 
jurisdiction of the station court in Stephansort to the whole of Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
The hearing on 1 9  May 1 899 was brief, as da Costa again readily confessed. The court found 
him guilty of intentional homicide but did not pronounce the death penalty. Instead it sentenced 
da Costa to six months compulsory labour without imprisonment, because his level of education 
did not allow him to appreciate that natives had "the same rights" (die gleiche Rechtsfiihigkeit) as 
IS The papers did show, however, that da Costa had been treated as a non-native by the company which had therefore 
paid him a salary rather than wages. 
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other people and because i t  accepted that da Costa, in  the light of his 1 891  experience, had 
genuinely believed that what he had done, although wrong in principle, had nevertheless been 
justified under the circumstances. 
What I found most shocking about this case was not the callous behaviour of da Costa, nor the 
explanation he provided for it, nor even the fact that Boether took it for granted that da Costa's 
account of the 1 89 1  incident was true, but that the file showed no indication that Boether, or 
anyone else, pressed charges against Puttkamer over his role in the 1891 shooting. It was unlikely 
that Boether did not pursue the matter because he regarded Wilhelm von Puttkamer, the brother 
of the governor of the Cameroons and the grand nephew of Bismarck, as not sufficiently educated 
to appreciate that natives had the same rights as non-natives. Nor did I believe that Boether had 
been afraid to target Puttkamer because of his high connections. To be sure, Boether probably 
thought that there was little point in prosecuting Puttkamer, who had long left German New 
Guinea, as the chances of proving, after eight years, that he had given da Costa the instructions 
the latter claimed to have received were slim indeed, but it rather appeared that Boether had 
accepted that "the conditions" in Kaiser Wilhelmsland in 1 89 1  had been such that Puttkamer too 
could not be held legally responsible for the manner in which its indigenous population was 
treated and that "the conditions", at least at the colonial frontier, had still not sufficiently 
normalised in 1 898 to apply civilised legal standards, certainly not to people like da Costa. 
After a dozen years of German colonial rule the Rule of Law had not yet become a reality. 
Another dozen years later the supreme court was still uncertain whether the time had come to 
enforce equal legal protection for natives. Nonetheless, a comparison between the messages sent 
by Schmiele in his 1 887 circular, by Boether in the da Costa decision in 1 899 and by the supreme 
court in 1912 indicated significant historical changes. It was tempting to fill in the gaps in this 
progression with a detailed discussion of other cases, for example, the case against Behse, 
Luecker' s successor in Berlinhafen (see above: 176), in which the decision of the district court 
for Kaiser Wilhelmsland, under the chairmanship of Boether, was essentially confirmed by the 
supreme court under acting chief justice Hahl in 190 1 .  The decision of the supreme court had 
focused primarily on Behse' s maltreatment of a native employee, whereas it had little to say about 
the main charge of manslaughter, because it agreed with the decision of the district court, which 
had sentenced Behse to nine months imprisonment for the killing of a native in the course of a 
kind of private punitive expedition-a form of behaviour the court had found unacceptable in 
principle, although it still took the abnormal frontier conditions into account when sentencing 
Behse. 
It was also tempting to investigate to what extent Schmiek, contrary to Oertzen' s predictions, 
had gradually adjusted to the "new conditions", or to what extent Boether's inability or 
unwillingness to do so sufficiently-at least in the view of Hahl, who took a more pragmatic 
position than either Boether or governor Bennigsen-had been the main reason for his career in 
German New Guinea, and indeed the colonial service, coming to a premature end. 16 
On the other hand, the history of the imperial judges strongly suggested that it was "the 
conditions" existing in German New Guinea, and the changes in these conditions during the period 
of German colonial rule, that mattered historically, rather than particular actions particular 
historical actors had performed on this historical stage. Who was responsible for "the conditions" 
around Stephansort in 1 89 1 ,  or Berlinhafen in 1 898? Station manager Puttkamer? Imperial 
commissioner Rose? Acting administrator Skopnik? The Neu Guinea Kompagnie's  board of 
directors? Or the German government, which had certainly not lived up to its obligations under 
the imperial charter to assure that adequate institutions of government and, in particular, an 
1 6  Judging by the "Hubatsch Lists", Boether was also not sent out as a ''field officer" to another Gennan colony. But 
then Boether does not figure at all in the Kaiser Wilhelmsland liist because no information for the 1900- 1 901 period is said 
to have been available ( 1984: 5 17)-which is, of course, another convenient phantom. 
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adequate administration of justice were maintained in German New Guinea? Had it been the 
Reichstag, because it had refused to approve the 1 896 agreement with the company which would 
have brought its rule to an end long before Boether' s arrival? Had the exercise of German colonial 
rule been predominantly shaped by the physical conditions and especially by their impact on the 
state of health of the colony' s  non-native population and that of their native employees? Or had 
it, by and large, all simply been a matter of money? Had the colonial law indeed been historically 
irrelevant under these circumstances? Was the best way of painting a general picture of German 
colonial rule an examination of its financial aspect? Before putting my fate into the cold hands of 
accountants another narrative excursus was called for. 
Chapter 9: No Roses For Winter 
I 
My tale begins as one of the few success stories in the early history of German New Guinea. Julius Winter arrived in a small sailing vessel from British New Guinea in January 1 887, 
entered the services of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and quickly rose to the position of manager 
of its central station in Finschhafen. His rise was largely due to the fact that he was the first 
company employee who succeeded in recruiting a substantial number of natives as labourers in 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland. This gave the company hope that local recruitment would soon replace the 
more expensive importation of Melanesian labourers from the Bismarck Archipelago, and the still 
more expensive importation of Malay and Chinese coolies from abroad. A separate labour depot 
was proudly established in Finschhafen in April 1 890 and placed under Winter (NKWL, 1 890: 8 1) .  
But the situation soon changed. The next reference to Winter in the company's  journal is an entry 
under "personnel changes", according to which Winter had been dismissed (NKWL, 1 89 1 :  4). 
Winter's downfall was brought about by imperial commissioner Rose, who had taken charge 
of the administration of German New Guinea in November 1 889 (NKWL, 1 890: 7). In September 
1 890 he reported to the chancellor of the Reich that it was necessary to ensure that all company 
employees who were entrusted with the exercise of governmental functions had the appropriate 
"moral quality" . 1 As manager of the company's  central station Winter was an obvious candidate 
for such an authorisation, but his past was covered by a veil of darkness. 
According to the register of non-natives, Winter had been born in Bezdan, Hungary, in 1 856. 
He was a "reformed Protestant"-an indication that he was of Jewish descent-and his father was 
a professor in Budapest. His last residence before coming to German New Guinea had been 
Kimberley, Western Australia. 
Rose had become suspicious that all was not well with Winter's past, so he claimed, because 
Winter had taken no steps to acquire German citizenship, although the company had made the 
confirmation of his temporary appointment as station manager subject to such a change of status. 
Were the rumours true that he had left Hungary to escape a conviction for embezzlement, so that 
he could not satisfy the legal requirements for becoming a German citizen? Since it was in 
Winter's interest to have the situation clarified-unless he had something to hide--Roserequested 
that official inquiries be made about Winter' s past. But Rose also expressed a different concern: 
the company appeared to believe that Winter was irreplaceable and was therefore resolved to 
retain his services at all costs. 
By the time the foreign office had instructed the German consulates in Budapest and Sydney 
to investigate, a second report by Rose was on its way to Berlin. In it Rose complained bitterly 
about the difficult conditions under which the few imperial officials had to work in Finschhafen. 
For these he held Winter largely responsible, who resented the curbing of the virtually unlimited 
powers he had wielded in the district until Rose's  arrival. Initially Winter had been kept in check 
by the company's  energetic general manager, Hans Arnold, and the situation had improved further 
when he, Rose, had also temporarily taken over the company' s  commercial management after 
Arnold's death. On the other hand, this had heightened Winter' s  resentment which he had vented 
with renewed vigour since the decent but weak Eduard Wissmann had become the company's  
general manager in  July 1 890. Thus, Winter had publicly ridiculed the appointment of  imperial 
secretary Jordan as "chief of police" (Polizeivorsteher) in his place by claiming that he could still 
do what he liked in and around Finschhafen because all land was the private property of the 
company. He had also ridiculed Jordan in public, when the latter had complained that Winter had 
1 Unless otherwise indicated the following account is based on RKA 2409 and 2410. 
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delayed passing on communications addressed to the "ch ief of police" , although he had known 
that Jordan was mortally ill at the t ime. However , Rose was especially offended because Winter 
had declined a dinner invitation by him , with the excuse of having to rest after a strenuous hunting 
expedition , although this had not prevented him from spending the even ing instead with capta in 
Herbing on SMS Sophie, which was visiting Finschhafen at the time. 
The main purpose of Rose's second report was to ask the foreign office to persuade the 
company's board of directors to remove Winter as conditions in Finschhafen would otherwise 
become intolerable. Rose also seized a local opportunity when the captain of the company's  
steamer Ysabel complained to him that W inter had beaten one of  his native crew members. Rose 
passed the matter on to Jordan's successor , Hildebrandt , who , in his capacity as imper ial judge , 
immediately interrogated Winter , in addition to taking evidence from h is alleged victim and from 
Dr Carl Weinland as a medical expert witness. 
The facts of the case were undisputed. The victim , a Tolai who went under the name of 
Hannes , together with a fr iend , had gone to Winter's house the previous even ing w ith the intention 
of "sexually misus ing" (geschlechtlich missbrauchen) a Melanesian woman who worked for him. 
They were disturbed before they could carry out their plan and ran away , but Hannes was 
recognised. When Winter heard about the inc ident the next morning he went to captain Schne ider 
and demanded that Hannes be handed over to him for punishment. Schneider refused but Winter 
managed to get hold of Hannes when he came ashore and gave him "about ten lashes" with the 
rope which was used for disciplinary punishments at the station. Although Hannes had suffered 
some bruis ing , he was not seriously hurt. 
Winter admitted that , strictly speaking , he should have informed the station court about the 
incident , instead of punishing Hannes himself , but he also insisted that he had nonetheless been 
just ified in what he had done , because he had defended "the honour of his house" and had only 
administered what had been an appropriate and speedy punishment. The imperial court under the 
chairmanship of Hildebrandt disagreed and sentenced Winter to two months imprisonment. 
In his report Rose claimed that he had been far from happy, because the punishment had been 
excessive and because Hildebrandt had legally bungled the case by overlooking section 228 of the 
German Criminal Code. This would have allowed him to cons ider extenuating circumstances , 
which would have given him the option to go below the otherwise mandatory minimum penalty 
of two months imprisonment prescribed by sect ion 223a for an assault w ith a dangerous weapon. 
Nonetheless , Rose had been surprised by the intensity of the public antagonism to Winter's pr ison 
sentence. In a third report , dated 25 November 1 890, he therefore stressed that the judgement had 
offended the general sense of justice in the colony and had undermined the confidence in the 
imper ial authorities-perhaps to let the effectiveness of his own damage control shine all the more 
brightly. 
Hildebrandt , accord ing to Rose , had made matters worse for himself by wrongly claiming in 
the wr itten reasons for the judgement that he had considered but rejected the application of section 
228. Unfortunately this "falsification" had only been discovered after a copy of the judgement had 
been served to Winter so that it was too late to persuade Hildebrandt to remove the offending 
sentence (auf eine Streichung hinwirken). Instead Rose had relieved Hildebrandt of his judic ial 
duties and banished him to the Bismarck Archipelago , pending further instruct ions from Berl in. 
Winter had lodged an appeal on 6 October 1 890. It was heard just two days later by the 
supreme court , chaired by imperial chancellor Schmiele , since Rose had ruled himself out as 
pres iding judge in this case. It was a lucky coincidence that not only Schmiele , but also two 
Rheinish missionaries from Astrolabe Bay were present in Finschhafen , who could serve as 
"neutral" lay assessors. Their joint performance fully satisfied Rose. The court stressed that 
Winter had not been entitled to punish Hannes and that his unjustified bel ief in his omnipotence 
had made the offence unusually serious . On the other hand it decided that the rope used for the 
beating was not a dangerous weapon in the meaning of section 223a , so that the offence came , as 
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an ordinary assault, under section 223 . This gave the court wide penal discretion. It settled for the 
highest permissible fine, namely 600 Marks, but stopped short of a prison sentence because Rose, 
who appeared as a character witness on behalf of Winter, attested that Winter was generally 
known for his humane treatment of native labourers.2 
This public gesture, however, did not stop Rose from restricting Winter's disciplinary powers 
as station manager a few days later by making their exercise in each case subject to written 
permission by himself-a provocation to which Winter responded with a formal complaint to the 
chancellor of the Reich. By the time the complaint reached Berlin it had become immaterial, 
because Rose had put so much pressure on Wissmann that he had terminated Winter' s contract 
on 25 November 1 890--at considerable expense to the company, since Winter had made his 
agreement to this termination without notice subject to the payment of three months salary, a free 
trip to Australia and the return of the substantial bond which served as security for any subsequent 
claims on the company resulting from his employment. 
But this was not the end of the matter; for when the company's  board of directors passed on 
Winter's complaint about Rose to the chancellor of the Reich in February 1 891 ,  pointing out that 
there was no need to respond to it, since Winter had in the meantime left German New Guinea, 
it had added a complaint of its own, because it found Rose's  campaign against Winter 
objectionable. Yet its complaint too was overtaken by events on the other side of the globe. 
On 4 December 1890 the company's accountant in Finschhafen, Friedrich Jager, reported to 
Rose that his key to the safe had disappeared. When Rose informed Wissmann a few days later, 
Wissmann ordered the safe to be opened with a reserve key. It was empty; about 9,000 Marks had 
gone. This led to the forced opening of the safe of the Finschhafen station, which had been under 
Winter's control, for which no reserve key was available, and the disappearance of about another 
2,000 Marks in cash was discovered. For Rose the case was clear: Winter had cleared out both 
safes before his departure and he, Rose, had been right all along in his suspicions. The company 
was less certain, but it too had lost faith in Winter since an examination of the station's accounts, 
which he had kept, had revealed discrepancies which amounted to several thousand Marks. 
It was time to go after Winter, so that the investigations carried out by the German consulates 
earlier acquired a new practical importance. While the consulate in Sydney had unearthed no 
useful information, the response of the Austro-Hungarian authorities revealed that the information 
"Winter" had provided about himself was fabricated. There were no "Winters" in Bezdan, nor was 
there a "Professor Winter" in Budapest, and a "Julius Winter" had never come to the notice of the 
authorities in either Budapest or Vienna. 
Although "Julius Winter" was therefore merely an alias, the company could provide the 
foreign office with a suitably sinister description of the man who used it. He was small and hairy. 
Despite his Hungarian-Jewish features, his appearance was "interesting if not pretty", although 
he had remarkably bad teeth, chronically dirty fingernails and a "wave" tattoo, several inches long, 
on one of his arms , a visible sign that he had become the blood brother of one of the native chiefs. 
Unfortunately its informants had been unable to confirm whether the man had been circumcised, 
his alleged Christian faith notwithstanding. 
Yet, what was the use of the most lurid description? Even if it helped to locate "Winter" in 
Australia, where he would most likely be, the Anglo-German extradition treaty, although it 
covered Australia, did not apply to offences allegedly committed in a German colony. But was 
"Winter" in Australia? An 1892 report by the German consulate in Sydney suggested that he had 
indeed spent a brief period in the Kimberley region, but that he had moved on, first to Japan and 
then to Hawaii, from where he had caught a steamer to San Francisco in March 1 891 .  During this 
trip he had met a former employee of the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellschaft, whom 
2 I came across this case after I had completed my examination of the historical record relating to the judicial activities 
of the supreme court. The relevant case file of the imperial court in Finschhafen no longer exists. 
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he had told that he had applied for a job with that company in Samoa but that he first intended to 
pay a visit to Germany and Hungary. 
Yet even if "Winter" was innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, in retrospect he might well 
have been grateful to Rose for forcing him out of German New Guinea; for not long after the 
discovery of the empty safes Finschhafen itself was vacated. During January 1 891  a "malaria 
epidemic" killed inter alia general manager Wissmann and the accountant Jager, imperial 
secretary Hildebrandt and the clerk of the imperial court, Appel, as well as the man who acted as 
the clerk of the supreme court during Winter's appeal, and even the medical expert witness, Dr 
Weinland (see NKWL, 1 89 1 :  4 ) . Although Rose himself escaped unharmed he probably felt, after 
this experience, that "Winter" had been a comparatively minor nuisance. 
I found this case instructive in several respects, albeit in a frustratingly inconclusive manner. 
Had "Winter" been "a criminal type" or an innocent victim of a campaign by Rose to destroy a 
powerful rival? Rose himself certainly did not emerge from the record as a model character, or 
even as a particularly skilful administrator. Had he, in addition, been motivated by anti-Semitic 
sentiments? On the other hand, Winter' s Jewish background had not disturbed the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie, 3 nor had it prevented captain Herbing from spending a social evening with Winter 
on board SMS Sophie to which Rose had not been invited.4 Had Hildebrandt treated the case 
against Winter the way he had because he had believed that this was what Rose expected of him? 
Had Rose only turned against Hildebrandt when the prison sentence had caused a public outcry? 
Had Winter's treatment of native labourers been generally humane? Did Rose know any more 
about the treatment of native labourers in Finschhafen than he did about the treatment of the 
natives living around Stephansort under the management of Puttkamer? 
There was no question that stories such as this were an important part of the history of colonial 
rule in German New Guinea. But they only represented bits of flesh, as it were, whereas I had to 
try to identify the structure of its skeleton, and an examination of the financial framework of 
governmental action still appeared to be a promising way of making some progress in this regard, 
since it was plain that the best laws could do no good, and that the worst policies could do no 
harm, if there was no money to implement them. 
But it seemed sensible, before moving to the big picture, to take another look at the Winter 
Case because what it had told me about Rose had been miles apart from the assessment of the man 
I remembered reading about in Firth's  New Guinea under the Germans. 
II 
When I refreshed my memory I found that Firth had indeed adopted Rose as one of his heroes. 
The Company expected the Imperial Commissioner . . .  to be a cipher. But Fritz Rose, the Prussian civil 
servant who took the job, was far from that. Determined to assert the independence of the imperial 
administration, he was a fearless critic of the NGC and refused to be swayed by its complaints about him 
( 1982: 30). 
What I had not remembered, however, was that Firth had used the Winter Case as his main 
illustration of Rose' s fearless assertion of his independence. 
3 This was not surprising since some of the company's  leading shareholders were Jews. 
4 I do not know whether this had been a calculated move on Herbing's part. Perhaps "Winter'' was just pleasanter 
company than Rose? But it is also worth pointing out that the navy' s favourite German in German New Guinea, Eduard 
Hernsheim, was also a Jew (see Hemsheim, 1983: iv). The historical record generally does not suggest that anti-Semitism 
was a significant factor in the history of German New Guinea. This does not mean, of course, that there were no anti­
Semites among its population-and Rose may well have been one of them. Nor does it alter the fact that "Winter's" 
Jewishness moved all too readily into the foreground when he came under suspicion. 
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Rose further offended the NGC by forcing the dismissal of the officer-in-charge of Finschhafen station, 
Julius Winter, a tough colonial adventurer of Hungarian origin who had reached Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
in 1 887 by sailing in a small vessel from Australia. The Company had given him a job and because of 
his skill as a recruiter of mainland labourers he had become one of its valued employees. Rose, 
punctilious, aloof and an upholder of the law who believed that labour recruiting was 'in truth nothing 
other than the sale of human beings' , was appalled that this 'rough, uneducated man' Winter should have 
the responsibilities and disciplinary authority of an officer-in-charge. The two soon quarrelled and Rose 
found himself ostracized by the Company men in Finschhafen. Winter kept a house-girl, and when he 
flogged a Tolai called Hannes for trying to seduce her, he was charged with breaching regulations. In his 
defence he appealed to the need for the whites to maintain their authority over the blacks, and said he 
would have flogged every one of his labourers, 'perhaps even more severely' ,  for that reason alone; he 
had acted with a view to the moral effect on his house-girl; he had used the regulation flogging rope, 
about three feet long, and ifhe had gone to the trouble of notifying the court officially of the punishment, 
as the law required, time would have been lost and no impression made on the black workers. Winter was 
found guilty and Rose persuaded the pliable general manager of the Company in Finschhafen to dismiss 
him. The NGC's  directors in Berlin had already asked the Colonial Department to restrain Rose' s 
'bureaucratic tendency' and Rose was ordered to avoid taking measures 'which seem likely to restrict the 
Company and its enterprises' . The primary task of the imperial administration, he was told, was to further 
the interests of the Company. The news that Winter had been sacked provoked another blast by the 
Company against Rose (ibid. : 30-3 1) .  
There were no major factual discrepancies between this account of the Winter Case and my 
reading of the files . Yet the overall impression created was very different. This was partly due to 
the selection and "interpretation" of the information presented by Firth5 but mainly attributable 
to the fact that he used it as a vehicle for sending general messages which had little to do with its 
particular circumstances. For example, they hardly suggested that Rose had been "punctilious, 
aloof and an upholder of the law".6 
I had no intention of returning to the files to ascertain whether the Neu Guinea Kompagnie 
had, in fact, asked the colonial department "to restrain Rose's 'bureaucratic tendency'", or 
whether the latter had ordered Rose "to avoid taking measures 'which seem likely to restrict the 
company and its enterprises"', but I had become curious as to whether Hempenstall too had 
incorporated the Winter Case into his narrative. 
He had, but the reference to Winter in his index which I followed up first took me to the 
history of the Neuendettelsau mission in which the star, naturally, was its "senior", Johannnes 
Flierl, rather than Winter or Rose. 
Sensitive to local mores and the fears the villagers had of being pushed out by the white people, Flierl 
had early recognised that the Company's  station manager in Finschhafen, Julius Winter, was a direct 
threat to the possibility of coexistence with the Finschhafen people, and he joined in a campaign with 
Fritz Rose to have Winter removed (1978:  175). 
Hempenstall did not say how Flierl had "joined in" Rose' s  campaign, but he referred to a letter 
"Flierl to Deinzer, 23 July 1891 ,  NH (Neuendettelsau Hauptarchiv), Flierl letters". Judging by 
Hempenstall ' s  assessment of Rose, it was probably not worth consulting this letter because this 
5 Firth's views as to which details are and are not significant naturally differ from mine, and I have no problems with his 
selection. His interpretations of the selected facts are a different matter. For example, it may well be that Hannes intended 
to seduce Winter's house-girl rather than to rape her. Indeed, it is possible that the two already had consensual intercourse 
on previous occasions. But it is impossible to appreciate what happened afterwards, unless one is told that Winter chose 
to present the incident as a case ofattempted rape, although it may again well be that the beating of Hannes was also meant 
as a warning to the house-girl to reject the sexual advances of anyone apart from Winter. To simplify all these ambiguities 
away necessarily leads to additional misunderstandings and misrepresentations. 
6 Nor did any of the other of the other cases involving Rose, which I had examined (see the Brandeis Case above: 62 or 
the Wolff Case above: 1 32). 
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assessment suggested that the "mainland" chapter of Pacific Islanders under German Rule was 
phantom history of the same order as the chapters I had already examined. 
Just as Boeder "had been able to act for nine months virtually[ !] in contradiction of [his] 
guidelines" in Ponape, according to Hempenstall Rose had "virtually" run the colony during an 
"interlude of imperial administration from 1 889 to 1891" (ibid. :  17 1 ). But unlike Hahl who, 
according to Hempenstall, started from scratch a dozen years later after "the virtual bankruptcy 
of Company rule", Rose had only "felt acutely the need to start again from scratch" after 
"surveying the New Guinea Company's record" by establishing shipping connections, locating 
harbours and landing places, cutting roads and improving relations with the inhabitants (ibid.). Did 
Rose actually establish shipping connections, and so on? Had his "virtual" running of the colony 
actually come to an end in 1891?  Had it been, as long as it lasted, an "interlude of imperial 
administration"? Or had the Neu Guinea Kompagnie not only hoped to retain "full control of the 
colony" (Firth, 1 982: 130) but been "virtually" able to do so? 
What was the point of writing this kind of "virtual" history? -and it appears that Flierl too 
had only "virtually" joined in Rose's  campaign to dismiss Winter: 
W. has also long gone. He beat a black labourer, who, he believed, had chased after his servant girl, so 
savagely that he was taken to court, sentenced in the first and second instance and afterwards sacked by 
the general manager at the instigation of the imperial commissioner. It was also good for us that he went. 
He was friendly to our faces but secretly sought to harm us. He had initially been very much persona 
g rata, because he was in many matters practical, skilled and experienced-a German-Hungarian without 
papers, but he made quite a career without them. 
Did Flierl ' s  letter at least support Hempenstall ' s  claim that Winter had been "a direct threat 
to the possibility of coexistence with the Finschhafen people"? According to Flierl the main threat 
to friendly relations had been the black plantation labourers who frequently molested the women 
and girls from the neighbouring villages, plundered their gardens and sometimes even wounded 
or killed a native who defended his property. Such misdeeds were punished if the plantation 
managers learned about them, but often they did not, especially about "the little pin-pricks" which 
could drive the local people to desperation. Some of the officials did not always treat the natives 
justly either, so that they were inclined to overlook the outrages of their labourers. In addition, 
most of the officials gave the labourers a bad example as far as the Sixth Commandment was 
concerned, by living together with native girls from the Bismarck Archipelago. The authorities 
believed that they had to tolerate this state of affairs as a necessary evil. Flierl and missionary Eich 
of the Rheinish mission had repeatedly testified against these immoral practices , but without 
results. Flierl had even personally spoken to station manager Winter who was himself involved. 
Winter had listened quietly and then hidden behind the unworthy excuse that "we are all weak 
human beings", adding that the situation in other tropical colonies was much worse than in 
Finschhafen where each official kept only one particular house-girl. Imperial commissioner Rose 
had merely conceded that it would be better if these relations were conducted less openly. 
Flierl also made other general statements of this kind, but he felt more comfortable with 
particular instances, such as the "recruitment" by Winter of a girl for his personal servant from 
the Bismarck Archipelago in one of the Kai villages in the mountains behind Finschhafen. When 
the people had refused to hand over the girl, so Flierl had been told, although he was not sure 
whether to believe this information, Winter had demonstrated the urgency of his demand by 
burning one of the houses whereupon the villagers had chased him and his party away with a 
"blind" barrage of spears. When Winter had reported that he had been attacked in the course of 
an ordinary recruiting attempt, Rose had ordered a punitive expedition, consisting of himself, 
Winter, a few other whites and the native police force of eight blacks, armed with Mauser rifles. 
The expedition found that the village had already been burnt down by its neighbours. They had 
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also killed the girl and some of her relatives, probably at the instigation of the coastal people of 
Busum, whose chief, Gasai, had accompanied Winter on his "recruiting" trip and who had later 
told the Kai that Winter would avenge the attack by punishing the Kai who were working as 
labourers in Finschhafen. 
But fate had quickly caught up with Gasai. A few months later he had been sent "with a sealed 
paper" to the Kai villages to recruit more labourers. In one of them the people, still angry about 
the previous incident, had tom up the paper and killed Gasai and several other men from Busum. 
The response had been another punitive expedition. It had found the village deserted but had 
destroyed its houses and gardens.7 
Hempenstall had incorporated some of this information into his account of the early history 
of Finschhafen, as I found when I followed up the other reference to Winter in his index. 
At Finschhafen the local residents never provided more than occasional day labour, at first for the novelty 
of working with iron implements, and then to acquire iron themselves in order to trade with inland tribes 
for traditional valuables like dogs' teeth. But within a couple of years of the Europeans' arrival they 
became reluctant to work for them at all, out of fear, Makiri claimed, that they were contributing to the 
growth of the whites' power and restricting their own independence. From October 1 886 onwards the 
Company was forced to import labourers from the Bismarck Archipelago. Increasingly harsh treatment 
from Company officials alienated the Finschhafen people further. The foreign labourers from Asia and 
the Archipelago repeatedly abducted women and plundered plantations. But particular offence was given 
by the Austrian station manager, Julius Winter, who in 1 890 organised a raid against a mountain village 
of the Kai people when they resisted his attempts to obtain a concubine for his black personal servant. 
The resulting destruction helped to poison relations among tribes in the entire Finschhafen area. 
By 1 890 local distaste for the New Guinea Company had intensified to such a degree that a black 
recruiter was murdered in nearby Busum village. On another occasion the Germans received quite a scare 
when all relations were suddenly broken off by villagers, and a fleet of strange war canoes appeared in 
the harbour. Gradually, the local residents pulled back away from the station, selling their land and 
houses to the Company. However, they continued to resist attempts by Europeans to penetrate the 
hinterland, for traditionally they had enjoyed a monopoly over trade with inland tribes and, since the 
arrival of the Germans, had become prosperous entrepreneurs through the flow of trade goods into the 
interior (1972: 166-67). 
I had to go no further than Flierl ' s  letter to see that many of Hempenstall' s  "facts" were 
phantoms; but this was no longer the issue, because it now appeared that Hempenstall was only 
purporting to describe what had actually happened whereas he was, in fact, giving an account of 
what could have appropriately happened, if history had actually taken place in the form of a 
narrative. In this narrative phantom world it did indeed not matter whether the 1 890 punitive 
expedition referred to had been "organised" by Winter or "ordered" by Rose, whether or not it had 
caused any destruction, whether it had taken place in 1 890, rather than in 1891 ,  or whether it had 
taken place at all. Similarly, it did not matter whether a black recruiter had been killed in Busum 
village or whether it had been the Busum chief Gasai who had been killed when recruiting in a Kai 
village. Nor did it matter whether a fleet of war canoes had in fact ever appeared in Finschhafen, 
after the local people had broken off all relations with the whites. All these episodes figured in 
Hempenstall' s  narrative not as actual events but as representations of types of events which had 
occurred at some time somewhere in German New Guinea and which could therefore also have 
occured in and around Finschhafen between 1 885 and 1 89 1 .  
7 I found the reference to a "sealed paper" given to Gasai intriguing. What had been the purpose of a written message 
which none of the Kai could read-and why seal it? Who was supposed to break the seal? On the other hand, the fact that 
Aierl reported this information, which he had obviously been given by his Melanesian contacts, without criticially 
reflecting on the significance of the reference to this new form of white magic, makes him, historically speaking, a 
particularly valuable witness. 
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On the other hand, narrative considerations required that these representations be given a 
concrete location in time and space. Quasi-generalisations-such as the claim that the Finschhafen 
people had been further alienated by increasingly harsh treatment from company officials-were 
permissible and indeed necessary, but only occasionally. Specific markers had to be incorporated 
into the narrative at short intervals . To say that the company had been forced to import labourers 
from the Bismarck Archipelago from "October 1 886 onwards" was narratively more effective than 
to say that the company had started to recruit labourers in the archipelago during the second half 
of 1 886-and to quote a named Finschhafen chief in support of the claim that his people had 
become reluctant to work for the Europeans at all "within a couple of years" still more effective. 
Yet it was plain to every critical reader that this quote had to be a phantom since Makiri could not 
possibly have expressed his views about the likely effects working for the Europeans would have 
on "the independence of his people" in a verbal form which any of the Europeans would have 
understood at the time. 
This did not mean that Hempenstall had invented this quote. He had merely constructively 
interpreted a convoluted reference to Makiri in a long report by the botanist Dr Hollrung on his 
research in Kaiser Wilhelmsland between April and December 1 886. According to Hollrung 
(NKWL, 1 888:  234) one of the reasons why the Finschhafen natives were reluctant to work for 
Europeans had been the "recognition" (Erkenntnis), which had probably been primarily brought 
about by Makiri, that they were expanding the power of the whites by working for them while at 
the same time "pushing themselves further back" (sich zurUckdrii.ngen). 
Whether or not Makiri and the other Finschhafen people believed that they were contributing 
to their own displacement by working for the Europeans, they did not bring this process to an end 
by withholding their labour. Instead, on 27 November 1 886, Makiri and his co-villagers sold the 
entire village of Suam to them, because, according to the company physician Dr Schellong, the 
presence of the large number of native labourers "whom we now have on the station" had made 
them feel uneasy. 8 Although the villagers had shown great satisfaction when they were paid an axe 
and two pieces of iron for each house and had not been worried about leaving, Schellong had been 
concerned that the "displacing influence" (verdrangender Einfluss) of the presence of Europeans 
had made itself felt despite all the consideration with which the natives had been treated. 
Schellong regarded the sale of Suam also as a sign that the attempt to win over the local natives 
as regular labourers had been a failure. This did not surprise him; for what did the Europeans have 
to offer them for surrendering their freedom? They did not like the clothes the Europeans wore, 
or the food they ate, they grew their own tobacco ( !)  and had already obtained enough axes and 
iron, the only items they coveted (1934: 103).  
What about Hempenstall' s claim that the Finschhafen people wanted to obtain iron "in order 
to trade with inland tribes for traditional valuables, like dogs ' teeth", as a modern extension of 
their old trade mono po I y which was turning them into "prosperous entrepreneurs" and made them 
"resist" attempts by Europeans to penetrate the hinterland? Another stereotyped phantom scenario 
but again one which Hempenstall did not have to invent. Hollrung' s  colleague, the astronomer Dr 
Schrader, had reported as early as July 1 886, just eight months after the founding ofFinschhafen, 
that the coastal people had "always tried to prevent us" from reaching the Kai villages in the 
mountains, "obviously [offenbar] because of the trade monopoly". However, Dr Schrader's 
expedition to the Sattelberg had "broken this spell" and numerous Kai had subsequently visited 
Finschhafen (NKWL 1 886: 121) .  
8 According to Schellong, Schleinitz had returned in early November with 1 00 labourers from the Bismarck Archipelago, 
whom he had leased at a high price from the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft ( 1934: 102). The first attempt 
by company officials to recruit labourers in the archipelago had taken place in September-with limited success (ibid.: 
90). Schellong made no reference to anything having happened in October 1 886 on the recruiting front. Nor did the 
Nachrichten, although they confirmed what Schellong had to say about the relevant happenings in September and 
November (see NKWL, 1 886: 1 1 6 and 1 887: 62). 
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What had the coastal people actually done to prevent the Europeans from reaching the interior? 
According to Schrader the defence of their "trade monopoly" had taken the form of telling the 
whites that the mountain people were fierce cannibals. But then they were told the same kind of 
stories by the mountain people about the coastal people. Did the mountain people also tell these 
stories because they wanted to defend their trade monopoly with the coast? Or were all these 
stories mere talk? Was what Schrader had to say about trade monopolies, about the coastal people 
having tried to prevent the Europeans from penetrating inland and about his expedition having 
broken the spell also mere talk? 
How, for example, did the visit by Schellong to a market which a Kai village had organised 
in August 1 886 fit into the picture painted by Schrader-and Hempenstall? According to 
Schellong, people from far and wide had been invited, including the "wig-people" from distant 
Kamoko, who needed an interpreter to make themselves understood. Pyramids of yam and taro 
had been laid out, each one for a particular buyer. His name had been called out by the Kai chief 
and he then stepped forward and offered a price which was usually accepted. Makiri had also been 
there, but he had bought a pig for which he had paid three pieces of iron, three pieces of cloth and 
three strings of glass pearls ( 1934: 88). 
On the other hand, how far could this entry in Schellong's  diary be accepted as a factually 
accurate account? Had Schellong interpreted correctly what he had seen, for example, that the 
pyramids of yam and taro had been earmarked in advance for particular buyers? Had other 
Finschhafen people, perhaps even Makiri, also exchanged iron and other European goods for 
dogs' teeth? Had they done so, not because they wanted to keep the teeth, but in order to sell them 
to Europeans at a higher price?9 
Was what Flierl had to say in his letter about the part played by Gasai of Busum factual 
history? Flierl was obviously well informed, but he essentially reported his interpretation of local 
gossip. Why was he reluctant to believe that Winter had burnt down a house when the Kai refused 
to give him the girl he wanted but readily accepted the rest of the story, instead of Winter' s  
version, or, rather, what he had been told about Winter' s  version, according to which it had been 
an ordinary recruiting attempt? Was it usual for whites to obtain sexual partners for their personal 
black servants? Why did Winter go to an inland village for this purpose instead of simply 
allocating his servant one of "the girls from the Bismarck Archipelago", or of asking his 
henchman Gasai to procure a girl from Busum or another coastal village? Did Flierl have reasons 
of his own to present Gasai in an unfavourable light? Had Gasai, like Winter, been an enemy of 
the Neuendettelsau mission? More importantly, had the attack on Winter, and the punitive 
expedition following it, been the first of their kind in the Finschhafen area? 
I had not come across an official report on this punitive expedition, or on that following the 
killing of Gasai, but I had noticed a "registration" (Registratur) by imperial commissioner Rose 
of 30 March 1890 (AA G254/l 29) which illustrated a different aspect of the relations between the 
Europeans and the natives in the Finschhafen area-and of those between Rose and Winter before 
the former had started his "dismissal campaign". 
Some time earlier the people from Bussum (including Gasai?) and Qualla had come to 
Finschhafen to demand the punishment of a man from Gambini because they were no longer 
permitted, according to the "registration", to take the law into their own hands. The Gambini man 
had seriously wounded a man from Bussum whom he had chased with three others after the 
Bussum man had tried to abduct a woman from Gambini. Winter had advised Rose against a 
punitive expedition. Instead he had arranged peace negotiations between the villages involved. 
They had culminated in a big feast in Quollem which Winter had attended. During the feast the 
Gambini and Buss um had presented several dogs' teeth ornaments to "the government". Since the 
9 Hollrung' s report attributed the reluctance of the Finschhafen people to work for the Europeans partly to the fact that 
they could obtain iron more easily by selling them artifacts at inflated price 
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authority of the whites had been recognised throughout and since the wounded man was likely to 
survive, Rose decided that judicial prosecutions were inappropriate. Instead he and a senior 
company official bought the dogs ' teeth ornaments privately for 1 2  Marks. The money was paid 
into the accounts of the government, and Rose stressed in his "registration" that it represented a 
higher price than a public auction had been likely to achieve. 
There was no need to add further bits of information to this mosaic of the history of the first 
years of German colonial rule in the Finschhafen area. The sample already presented amply 
demonstrated that it was impossible to condense this history into a narrative of a few hundred 
words of the kind Hempenstall had written without producing phantom history. Why did he do 
it? Because he clung to the illusion that history was and had to be narrative. Hence he had to force 
narrative to do something which it was inherently incapable of doing, namely to paint a general 
picture of what had happened in the past, while at the same time preventing it from doing what 
it was well suited to achieving, namely to provide illustrations of the inconclusive complexity of 
human behaviour. Hempenstall had to construct a fictitious narrative middle level of generality 
by presenting generalisations as statements of particular facts and particular human actions as if 
they were representative of entire categories of human behaviour. 
Thus Hempenstall 's claim that "[i]ncreasingly harsh treatment from Company officials 
alienated the Finschhafen people further" was not, and did not purport to be, the result of a critical 
analysis of the situation. Hempenstall had neither measured the increasing harshness of the 
treatment the Finschhafen people were receiving from company officials, or their growing feeling 
of alienation, nor had he established a causal link between changes in these two variables. Rather, 
the statement was the reassuringly precise expression of a mysterious kind of narrative intuition. 
In the same vein his statement that "[b ]y 1 890 local distaste for the New Guinea Company had 
intensified to such a degree that a black recruiter was murdered in nearly Busum village" did not 
refer to a particular incident but to a type of event-the killing of a black recruiter-which was 
somehow also typical of what had been going on around Finschhafen at the time . Yet this 
statement did not suggest that the killing of black recruiters had been a common occurrence. On 
the contrary, the incident was presented as an extreme but therefore especially appropriate 
expression of an intense feeling of distaste. It suggested that some such act of desperation had 
been natural under the circumstances, so that these circumstances, as well as the substance of the 
feeling of distaste, could be represented by the typification of a particular event. At the same time, 
this typification gave this event a symbolic factuality of a higher order. It became part of a quasi­
general and quasi-factual narrative encirclement of the insoluable mysteries of history. 
But Hempenstall ' s  narrative encirclement of the early history of Finschhafen was so highly 
stylised that it was less instructive than Firth' s  treatment of the Winter Case. His claim that Rose 
had been determined "to assert the independence of the imperial administration" was the 
counterpart of Hempenstall' s claim that by 1 890 local distaste for the New Guinea Company had 
been intense. But while Hempenstall would have been hard put to identify the structural 
framework within which this local distaste had intensified, Firth could have easily described the 
legal framework within which Rose operated and thereby shown what the independence of the 
imperial administration had actually looked like. But Firth chose not to. Instead he used the Winter 
Case as a "representation", just as Hempenstall used the killing of the black recruiter. However, 
Firth stuck out his neck further because he wanted to use the Winter Case as a representative 
illustration for a multitude of points-for example, the flogging of Hannes by Winter as an 
illustration, on the one hand, of the manner in which company employees treated Melanesian 
labourers and, on the other hand, of the manner in which Rose responded to this treatment. 
As I read Firth, although Winter had exercised his disciplinary authority as "officer-in-charge", 
he had nonetheless acted in breach of regulations, because he had failed to inform "the court" 
officially of the punishment. He was prosecuted for this breach, found guilty and subsequently 
sacked. What made this narrative especially instructive was that it did not merely phantomise the 
NO ROSES FOR WINTER 203 
facts of this particular case but invented a general legal phantom framework which went with these 
specific phantoms. Was it also typical of narrative history that such phantom frameworks did not 
even make sense in their own terms? 
Why should Winter have lost time if he had notified "the court" of the punishment unless this 
statement actually meant to say that an official-in-charge had to inform "the court" before carrying 
out a disciplinary punishment because such a punishment required judicial approval, so that it 
could not legally be carried out until such an approval had been obtained? But this interpretation 
did not help because the duty of an official-in-charge to inform "the court" about disciplinary 
punishments was a phantom. Instead of giving substance to the general claim that Rose had been 
determined to assert the independence of the imperial administration, Firth' s  treatment of the 
Winter Case merely demonstrated that he did not understand what had happened. 
This was not surprising because the legal aspect of the flogging of Hannes had been unusually 
complex. Whereas I had been able to circumvent much of this complexity because I had only been 
interested in this case as a unique illustration of Rose's personal style of government, Firth's 
generalising approach had taken him right into its centre. He had no hope of handling this case 
realistically without understanding its legal dimension. But ifFirth had gained this understanding 
he would have seen that the case was quite unsuitable for the purpose for which he wanted to use 
it. 
When captain Schneider had reported the beating of Hannes by Winter to Rose, Rose-like 
Firth-had seen it as an exercise of Winter's disciplinary powers as officer-in-charge. These 
powers had been defined in the Disciplinary Ordinance of 22 October 1 888 and the 
implementation regulations thereto of 1 5  January 1889. They had been further supplemented by 
a decree by Rose of 4 December 1 889, according to which the company's station managers 
retained these powers under the imperial administration. This meant that Winter had indeed, in 
principle, been legally entitled to order an official disciplinary punishment, including a beating, 
of Hannes. 10 It was by no means clear, however, that Winter had been entitled to order a corporal 
punishment in this particular case and that he had followed the prescribed procedure-which did 
not include a duty on the part of the officer-in-charge to inform "the court" of a punishment. On 
the contrary, the courts played no part whatever in the disciplinary punishment of coloured 
labourers. Instead station managers had to report monthly to the head of the colonial executive on 
all disciplinary punishments they had imposed. But Winter's actions were legally questionable in 
several other respects. Firstly, it was doubtful whether he had been entitled to impose a 
disciplinary punishment on Hannes without an application by, let alone against the wishes of, 
captain Schneider. Secondly, it was doubtful that he had been entitled to impose a corporal 
punishment without first trying other disciplinary measures. Thirdly, it was doubtful that he was 
entitled to treat what he saw as an attempted rape as a disciplinary matter-and this is where "the 
court" did come in, since the punishment of a native for a criminal offence, such as an attempted 
rape, was the exclusive responsibility of the station court under the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance, 
and since this process was indeed likely to take some time. 
Similarly Rose had to consider if he was entitled to treat the flogging of Hannes by Winter as 
a disciplinary matter, if he decided that Winter had misused his powers, or if he had to report the 
matter to the imperial court for a criminal prosecution of Winter. But it was Winter who had taken 
the initiative; for when Rose had called him in to defend himself against the charge of having 
misused his official disciplinary powers, Winter had refused to do so because he did not want to 
have his case dealt with by Rose as his administrative superior. Winter therefore insisted that he 
had not acted in his official capacity but as a private individual. Hence he was not answerable to 
Rose but only to the imperial court, which, as we have seen, did not prosecute Winter for the 
10 The implementation regulations also stipulated that a rope had to be used to carry out such a punishment-although 
they did not specify its length. Firth may well be right in claiming that the rope used was usually about three feet long, 
although from my layman's  perspective this would appear to be awkwardly short. 
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breach of some regulation and, in particular, not for his failure to inform it officially about the 
punishment, but for an assault with a dangerous weapon under the German Criminal Code. Taking 
further into account that Rose testified during Winter' s trial that the flogging of Hannes had been 
exceptional and that Winter usually treated coloured labourers humanely, it was clear that Firth 
could hardly have chosen a worse case in support of any of the points he was trying to make. 
Indeed, it became useful for his purpose only because he ignored most of what the historical 
record was telling him. 
But while the result had little to do with history, it was at least narrative, whereas an exposition 
of the respective powers of the imperial commissioner, the German government and the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie under the 1 889 agreement and of the legislative framework for the exercise 
of disciplinary powers in relation to natives, was not. 
To be sure also, it would have made the reading and writing of the history of German colonial 
rule under Rose more enjoyable if it had been possible to summarise it by stating: "Determined 
to assert the independence of the imperial administration, he was a fearless critic of the New 
Guinea Company and refused to be swayed by its complaints about him". Unfortunately such 
statements only worked in the wonderland of narrative history. Outside its borders the historical 
record was always more complex and less conclusive, just as in the Winter Case. For example, 
how did the fact fit into Firth's  picture that the "fearless critic" Rose had also acted as the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie's  general manager between the death of Arnold and the arrival of Wissmann 
and that he was paid a handsome premium by the company for his trouble? 
By the same token, I had a great deal of sympathy with Firth' s  reluctance to come to grips with 
the legislative framework of colonial rule in German New Guinea. The problem was that it is 
impossible to avoid these general, structural frameworks altogether. This applied in particular, but 
by no means only, to the legislative framework-and in this context Hempenstall' s  substantiation 
of his claim that Rose "virtually" ran the colony during "the interlude of imperial administration" 
was especially instructive. 
Hempenstall did not refer to a particular case but to the "acute need" which Rose had generally 
felt to start from scratch, although the main reasons for this need-the lack of shipping 
connections and so on-were identified. While this approach saved Hempenstall from having to 
worry about the legal framework within which Rose had to operate, what he had to say 
nonetheless had a strong phantom flavour, because he also ignored the financial limitations of the 
legal powers Rose could exercise. 
Just as Rose knew, contrary to Firth, that the imperial administration in German New Guinea 
was not independent of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, there was also no doubt that he appreciated 
better than Hempenstall that there was no point in making grandiose plans if he could, by and 
large, only attempt to do what his budget permitted him to do and that this budget required the 
approval of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. The task Rose was facing was to fight a multitude of 
small battles, to make minor tactical gains, to work patiently towards larger goals which, he knew, 
would not be realised for some time to come. Above all, the task was to survive, physically as well 
as professionally-and the former task was by itself quite daunting in German New Guinea in the 
early 1 890s. 
On the other hand, the financial and legal limitations of his powers were not just obstacles for 
Rose, they also structured his activities positively; they could even be used as weapons-and seen 
in retrospect their existence is perhaps the only chance for a historian to gain access to the big 
picture. Perhaps the financial framework of colonial rule was historically a more palatable 
alternative to an examination of its legal framework-at least it was worth finding out how far an 
approach to the history of German New Guinea from a financial perspective would take me. 
Chapter 10: Mostly a Matter of Money 
I 
When the emperor assumed sovereignty over German New Guinea, he also became responsible for the financial aspect of its government. In theory he had a wide range of 
choices as to how he would carry out this responsibility. He could minimise governmental 
activities in the colony or maximise its local revenue. He could also seek external funds to pay for 
whatever governmental activities were regarded as desirable, or use existing institutions under his 
control-such as the imperial navy or the imperial consular service-for this purpose. More 
tempting still, he could transfer his governmental responsibilities to somebody else, who would 
foot the bill. Since the emperor had no interest in administering German New Guinea, provided 
he retained some measure of political control, the last option was the preferred choice. 
It was put into effect by issuing the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, a private commercial enterprise, 
with an imperial charter obliging it to maintain institutions of government at its expense. The 
charter did not define these institutions.  Instead it distinguished three major governmental tasks : 
firstly, the administration of justice, the organisation of which remained an imperial responsibility; 
secondly, the economic development of the territory; and thirdly, the cultural advancement of its 
native inhabitants. To carry out these tasks the company was given the "corresponding" rights of 
local sovereignty and,  in addition, a monopoly to acquire ownerless and native land. It was left 
to the company, under the supervision and protection of the Reich, to finance the exercise of these 
rights, and to fund an adequate administration of justice, by imposing taxes on its subjects , by 
selling the land it acquired in exercising its monopoly, or by some other means. 
Initially, the company had no alternative but to rely on its own resources. It raised capital of 
1 million Marks, divided into 800 shares of 1 ,250 Marks each. 1 But its shareholders committed 
themselves to contribute up to 5,000 Marks per share, if necessary, so that a total of 4 million 
Marks was available. Three years later expenditure had already exceeded this amount. By the time 
the company relinquished its governmental responsibilities in 1 899, the contributions made by its 
shareholders had reached nearly 10 million Marks. When it was subsequently reorganised as a 
purely commercial enterprise, they were asked for a further contribution. It brought the total to 
close to 12  million Marks. More than two thirds of it was then written off. The privilege of 
governing German New Guinea had cost the company' s  shareholders some 8 million Marks, equal 
to an annual subsidy of around 600,000 Marks.2 
Because of the double role of the company it was difficult to determine how much of its 
expenditure was devoted to governing German New Guinea and how much was a commercial 
investment. The answer depended on how broadly the concept of "government" was perceived. 
How much of the amount spent on shipping, which accounted for a large portion of the company' s  
early losses,3 was attributable to its governmental responsibilities?-and w e  need to take into 
account that the Reich was heavily subsidising shipping connections between Germany and other 
German colonies, whereas it cost the company a quarter of a million Marks annually to connect 
German New Guinea with the subsidised East Asia line of North German Lloyd.4 
According to its charter its central governmental task was not the maintenance oflaw and order 
but the encouragement of the economic development of the colony. It was expected, as the 
1 For a detailed account of the financial affairs of the company see Jaeckel, 1 909: 1 12- 1 2 1 .  
2 It took until 1 9 1 2  before the company paid the firs t  dividends of five per cent on its reduced capital. 
3 By March 1 89 1  its shipping account was already in the red to the tune of nearly 2 million Marks. 
4 It managed to rid itself of this burden in 1 893, when the Reich finally subsidised the Lloyd to extend its services to 
German New Guinea. 
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governing authority, to explore the country, to investigate its economic resources, to experiment 
with their exploitation and to create an economic infrastructure for the colony as a whole rather 
than merely to pursue its own commercial interests . It was not surprising therefore that the 
agreement terminating the company' s  rule acknowledged that much of its expenditure had been 
governmental and that it was entitled to be compensated for at least some of it. The size of the 
compensation, 4 million Marks, gives an indication of how the position was viewed. On the other 
hand, this compensation was intended to compensate the company for preparing the ground for 
a direct imperial government and not to reimburse it for the costs of actually governing German 
New Guinea-and it was the size, the form and the financing of this operation at the local level 
that interested me. 5 
II 
The hallmark of the company's plan for the organisation of its government was a combination of 
commercial and administrative functions. This was less problematic than might appear, because 
it saw itself as a commercial promoter rather than as a commercial producer who was competing 
with his subjects . It therefore placed its administrator, the head of its local executive, also in 
charge of its largely experimental and developmental commercial activities. The same applied to 
the managers of its main stations, four of which were projected as a start. Only its auxiliary 
stations were to have no governmental functions. 6 
Apart from general clerical and commercial support for the administrator and the station 
managers, provision was made for specialised staff, including an engineer, a building expert and 
two surveyors, as well as a "scientific expedition", consisting of an astronomer, a botanist and a 
geologist. A medical doctor and two medical assistants were appointed, and three experienced 
plantation managers were hired to conduct agricultural experiments . In addition, three steamers, 
two steam launches and several boats were maintained. 7 
The company had also reluctantly accepted the need for maintaining an armed police force to 
deal with hostile natives .  To gain "peaceful mastery" over German New Guinea' s  indigenous 
population-as its first annual report put it-was to be left to the missions . There were no plans 
to set up any kind of native administration, and no insistence on the part of the German 
government that the company carry out this part of its obligation under the charter. The 
explanation, it appears, was that teaching "the natives" to work and to consume was seen as the 
main aim of their cultural advancement, so that it became a natural part of the economic 
development of the colony, which was to proceed by establishing and gradually expanding 
5 The company's  headquarters management, as well as the involvement of the German government in the administration 
of German New Guinea, are outside the scope of this chapter. 
6 Only one main station, with primarily an administrative function, was envisaged for the Bismarck Archipelago. The 
company's  plans were focused on Kaiser Wilhelmsland which had so far hardly been touched by colonial influences, so 
that it actually could and had to start from scratch. It would have preferred the same to have been the case in the 
archipelago where its relations with the existing commercial firms and mission societies were, from the start, uncertain 
and uneasy. 
7 I am limiting myself in this context to summarising information made public by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie at the time, 
which did not always distinguish clearly between what was planned and what had been achieved. This reflects the 
ambiguous nature of the language of financial planning for which the allocation of funds in a budget is already an achieved 
reality rather than a mere listing of goals. I will have more to say about this question later, but it is prudent to keep in mind 
from the start that the information presented here does not purport to consist of straightforward statements of fact. For 
instance, the statement that a medical doctor and two medical assistants were appointed does not mean that a medical 
doctor and two medical assistants were actually serving in German New Guinea at the time the statement was made. It does 
not even necessarily mean that these posts had already been filled at the time. But it means more than to say that these 
posts were regarded as desirable and that some consideration had been given to creating them. However, it is linguistically 
awkward to express this ambiguity consistently in the text. Hence this general warning to treat the factuality of all 
information in this preliminary survey with caution. 
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colonial enclaves, the administration of which was the initial task of "the institutions of 
government". 
The company was not free in the design of these institutions. This applied first of all to the 
administration of justice. Its organisation was prescribed by a metropolitan act which extended 
the existing system of Gennan consular jurisdiction to the German colonies. Moreover, "the 
official empowered to exercise the judicial jurisdiction" had important executive and even 
legislative functions. In particular, he was responsible for the prosecution of criminal behaviour 
and for the execution of its judgements, in criminal as well as civil matters. While this removed 
the need for a separate public prosecutor's  office and prison administration, there still had to be 
court clerks, assessors and counsels, bailiffs and gaolers, although even the judges did not have 
to be full-time judicial officers. 
Legislative measures taken by the company also had administrative implications. If it wanted 
to collect customs duties, for example, it had to set up a customs service, however rudimentary; 
and at least a minimal accounting system had to be introduced for the company's governmental 
as well as its commercial operations. It was not surprising therefore that after a year of operation 
the non-native staff employed in German New Guinea, in addition to native labourers, carriers, 
boat crews and policemen, numbered more than 50. 
How did the company expect to pay for an establishment of this size? It appreciated that it 
could not, for the time being, derive a substantial income from imposing taxes, duties or fees on 
its subjects . It dreamed, of course, of a major mineral strike, but its main hope was to make, if not 
a fortune, at least the colony pay its own way by selling or leasing land to settlers-and it 
expected a large influx, especially from Germans living in Australia who, it believed, were eagerly 
waiting for the opportunity to move to a German colony. 
When these hopes were dashed, after the colony was opened to settlers in 1888, the company' s 
enthusiasm evaporated. In 1 889 it concluded an agreement with the Reich, under which its 
governmental responsibilities were to be carried out by imperial officials at its expense, while the 
company would concentrate on its commercial activities. This meant not only a separation of 
governmental and commercial functions but also a minimisation of the former, and a full 
commercialisation of the latter. The government of German New Guinea was no longer 
understood as a developmental enterprise but as being solely concerned with the maintenance of 
law and order. 
The two engineers, the surveyor, the two medical doctors and the three medical assistants, 
whom the company employed in 1 889, were henceforth counted as part of its commercial 
establishment. The colonial government as such was not expected to engage in exploration or 
experimentation, or to provide services which were not legally required but consumed additional 
funds. 
As a result the colonial government consisted of a core of only three imperial officials: an 
imperial commissioner who took over the governmental functions of the company' s  administrator 
and was also in charge of the supreme court, an imperial chancellor in the Bismarck Archipelago 
who was also in charge of the imperial court there, and an imperial secretary in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland with the same judicial powers. The company had to refund the salaries of these 
three officials. It was also obliged to provide five full-time subordinate officials, who were its 
employees, as well as 36 native policemen, who could, however, be used as labourers when they 
were not required for governmental duties. Eight full-time white officials and 36 part-time native 
policemen were the establishment of the government of German New Guinea, although other 
company employees were to lend additional administrative assistance. 
The company also had to supply and maintain the necessary buildings and equipment-but 
they remained its property. The government of German New Guinea as such owned nothing, and 
it could not own anything, because it had no legal personality. Nor could it physically move under 
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its own steam, since it was not allocated a vessel to be used exclusively, or even primarily, for 
governmental business. 
As from 1 889 the company showed the annual costs of this minimal government separately 
in its accounts-as well as the corresponding governmental revenue. Although it terminated its 
agreement with the Reich and resumed full governmental responsibility in 1 892, because it 
believed that it could reduce costs by re-combining the political with the commercial 
administration,8 it continued this practice. It was therefore possible to collate the relevant figures 
in Table V to get a preliminary overview of the financial aspect of the government of German 
New Guinea for the 1 889 to 1 898 business years. 
According to these figures the salaries paid to white officials accounted for around half of the 
total costs of government. During the first three years a distinction was made between the salaries 
paid to officials entrusted with the government of the colony as a whole and those paid to local 
officials. The first category was identical with the three imperial officials, for whom the 1 889 
agreement had stipulated the following salaries: the imperial commissionerreceived 30,000 Marks 
per annum, the imperial chancellor 15,000 and the imperial secretary 7,500, so that the salary of 
the three most senior officials represented about one third of the total cost of governing the 
colony. The support staff, of supposedly five persons, only accounted for around 13,000 Marks 
per annum.9 
The arrangements under the 1 889 agreement came to an end on 1 September 1 892, that is to 
say in the course of a business year. However, the salary expenses for 1 892 were similar to 
previous years. Nor did the drop in 1 893 reflect a reduction of staff but rather the fact that the 
imperial judge in the Bismarck Archipelago continued to be an imperial official whose salary the 
company no longer had to refund. 
The accounts did not say how much the company paid its employees, in particular its 
administrators, 10 nor how the figures reflected the renewed combination of political and 
commercial functions of its station managers as well as its administrator. The figures for office 
expenses, where the same question arose, suggested that from 1 893 onwards only notional figures 
were entered. Accounting practices changed in 1892 also as far as "travelling expenses" were 
concerned. They included from then on not only the allowances paid to officials travelling on 
government business but also the fees the government had to pay the company as a commercial 
enterprise for the use of its ships. 1 1  The way in which the costs of the police force were debited 
to the government probably also changed in 1 892. The jump from less than 5,000 to more than 
12,000 Marks certainly did not reflect a corresponding increase in its actual strength. 12 
The fact that expenditure figures for 1 895 and 1 896 were, with one exception, identical, 
indicated that the accounts kept in German New Guinea were still far from perfect. 13 Yet there 
was no reason to believe that these notional figures were strategically inflated or deflated in 
9 According to Blum (1900: 164) the company ranked its own local employees in three levels. They received, respectively, 
average annual salaries of 2,000, 4,000 and between 6,000 and 9,000 Marks. 
10 It was rumoured that the salary of its first administrator had been even higher than that of the imperial 
commissioner-at private enterprise rather than public service rates. 
1 1  The 1 889 agreement provided for free travel for the imperial officials on government business on company vessels. 
The company saw no need to continue this hidden subsidy. The costs of travelling to German New Guinea to take up an 
appointment and similar external travel were also accounted for under this heading. 
12 One possible but partial explanation was that the imperial commissioner had only debited the costs of maintaining the 
part-time policemen on a pro rata basis whereas subsequently the full costs were debited. 
1 3  Judging by the lament of the company's auditors, voiced after examining the accounts for 1 891 and 1 892 in 1 894, 
book-keeping in German New Guinea was in a complete mess: those responsible apparently just could not understand that 
proper accounting was a precondition for a profitable conduct of business ! 
TABLE V 
Government Revenue and Expenditure 1 889 to 1 898 (in 1 ,000 Marks) 
1 889 1 890 1 89 1  1 892 1 893 1 894 1 895 1 896 1 897 1 898 
Local Revenue 
a. Taxes 3 7 7 9 8 8 1 0  10  9 9 
b. Customs duties 1 4  3 1  45 49 55 19  22 23 22 34 
c. Other 4 1 6  1 3  6 1 7  12  18  18  18  27 
d. Total 2 1  54 65 64 80 39 50 5 1  49 70 
Local E�nditure 
a. Salaries 73 64 6 1  6 1  45 43 49 49 44 40 
b. Police Force 5 8 5 1 2  1 5 1 4  1 3  1 3  9 1 3  
c .  Travel 7 4 1 2  23 3 1  33 3 1  23 27 33 
d. Office 0.8 1 0.7 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 
e. Maintenance 1 2 9 8 8 8 8 8 9 1 3  
f. Total 87 79 87 1 06 1 02 1 00 1 04 96 9 1  1 02 
Subsic!Y_ 66 25 22 42 22 6 1  54 45 42 32 
210 TIIE TOWER OF BABEL 
Berlin. The overall costs of governing German New Guinea shown in Table I were fairly realistic. 
That is to say, they were minimal and surprisingly stable. The company had good reason for 
minimising government expenditure. Local revenue did not even grow sufficiently to match the 
just over 100,000 Marks to which it amounted in 1 898. 14 
The most remarkable feature on the revenue side of Table I was negative: it showed no income 
derived from the sale or leasing of land the company had acquired in the exercise of its monopoly. 
This monopoly was now treated as a commercial asset which had nothing to do with the 
government of German New Guinea in its minimalist post- 1 889 sense. 15 
Among the sources of government revenue the customs duties were the most important. They 
consisted primarily of a variable import duty on different types of alcoholic beverages, for 
example 0.10 Marks per bottle of beer, and an export duty on copra of 4 Marks per tonne. The 
problem was that these duties could not explain the jump in receipts under this heading in 1890 
and the drop in 1 894. Copra exports during the 1 890s fluctuated little, before increasing sharply 
in 1 898. They probably accounted for only between 7,000 and 10,000 Marks of the customs 
receipts per annum-and for close to 1 5,000 Marks in 1 898.  
This left a highly improbable pattern of alcohol consumption:  a fourfold increase in 1 890, and 
an even larger decrease in 1 894/95, representing the equivalent of around 350,000 bottles of beer 
for a non-native population of around 200. 16 A more likely explanation was that the government 
derived a substantial additional income during the four years in question-and there was a likely 
candidate: the company paid an import levy of 40 Marks per kilogram of opium smoked by the 
Chinese coolies it employed in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. On the other hand, the date of the relevant 
amendment of the Customs Ordinance did not coincide with the increase in revenue, nor did its 
drop, four years later, coincide with the departure of most of the Chinese coolies . 
The tax receipts were produced by a modest commercial tax (up to 600 Marks) and an equally 
modest income tax (up to two per cent). In 1 898 it did not even cover the costs of maintaining the 
few buildings and the equipment used for governmental purposes . "Other income", derived from 
a variety of fees and fines, was erratic, but there was little sustained increase. 17 
In brief, the containment of the growth of government went hand in hand with economic 
stagnation. 18 The question was whether the latter was a consequence of the former: Did the 
company, apart from its own commercial losses, strangle the colony's  economic development by 
minimising governmental activities? There was no better way of finding out than to observe what 
happened after the Reich assumed full governmental responsibility. Still, it was also useful to 
compare the developments with those in neighbouring British New Guinea. 
14 This amount does not include various hidden subsidies by the Reich. Among them the salary of the imperial judge in 
the Bismarck Archipelago only represented a minor item, compared with the shipping subsidy paid to North German Lloyd 
for its New Guinea line, let alone the costs of naval protection . 
15 To have included income derived from this source would have made little difference. Genuine receipts only came to 
a few thousand Marks for the entire period. On the other hand, there were two major book transactions because the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie provided the Astrolabe [tobacco] Company and the Kaiser Wilhelmsland [cocoa] PlantationCcompany 
with close to 20,000 hectares of land in exchange for shares with a nominal value of around 400,000 Marks. However, 
both companies failed, so that it gained nothing in the process. 
16 The supply of liquor to natives was generally illegal, although special licences could be issued. The crews of visiting 
ships, naval and commercial, would have made some contribution, but visiting ships would have preferred to stock up in 
cheaper ports. Moreover, there was no indication of a corresponding dramatic change in the shipping patterns. (I am 
grateful to Margrit Davies for drawing my attention to this possibility.) 
17 The licence fees charged for carrying out certain commercial activities gave the best cause for optimism. Yet even this 
was something of an illusion, since the income from trepang licences, which figured prominently in 1 898, was set to drop 
because the most rewarding areas had been almost exhausted. 
18 There was also the cotton export from the Bismarck Archipelago, which had peaked at about 60 tonnes in 1 894, and 
the tobacco export from Kaiser Wilhelmsland, which had peaked at about 80 tonnes (worth around 400,000 Marks) even 
earlier, but, generally speaking, the trade figures, including the mainstay copra, were nothing to be proud of. 
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The similarities between the trade figures shown in a contemporary study (Blum. 1900: 159) 
were startling. Exports in German New Guinea rose from 440,000 Marks in 1 888  to 8 15,000 in 
1 897 and in British New Guinea from407,000 Marks to 997,000. The total trade in the latter year 
was almost identical with, respectively, 1 .96 and 1 .94 million Marks. However, in the case of 
German New Guinea, copra accounted for around 90 per cent of exports in 1 897 whereas it 
contributed only around five per cent in British New Guinea, where gold accounted for more than 
half of the total exports for that year. 
The annual report on British New Guinea for 1897, 19 the last of the ten year rule by lieutenant 
governor MacGregor- which almost coincided with the ten years of minimal company rule in 
German New Guinea-contained a series of convenient financial summaries. They suggested that 
the government of British New Guinea worked to an annual budget of £15,000, or 300,000 Marks. 
Revenue rose from about £2,800 to over £10,000. Throughout it was dominated by customs 
duties. They accounted for about £9, 700 in 1 897. This represented ten per cent of the value of the 
exports from the colony during that year-more than five times as much as in German New 
Guinea. 
Unfortunately it was impossible to determine the subsidies paid for the government of British 
New Guinea by subtracting the revenue figures from the expenditure figures in the annual report. 
Rather, it looked as if British New Guinea received a fixed annual grant of £15,000 and treated 
its local revenue as a bonus. Additional funds for the maintenance of the government steamer 
were also made available. They amounted to around £76,000 for the ten year period (see Joyce, 
1 97 1 :  1 20-22) . Total government expenditure during the first ten years of British colonial rule 
therefore probably approached 6 million Marks, compared with less than 1 million Marks during 
the last ten years of company rule in German New Guinea. The total subsidy was probably well 
over 4 million Marks, that is to say more than the amount paid under the 1 898 agreement as 
compensation to the company for its governmental efforts. 
The government of British New Guinea in 1897 consisted of four senior officials: the 
lieutenant governor, his private secretary, the chief judicial officer and the government secretary. 
They drew between them an annual salary of over 60,000 Marks-a rate of pay similar to that of 
the three senior imperial officials under the 1 889 agreement. But then there were four resident 
magistrates, one assistant magistrate and two government agents, suggesting a total of seven local 
administrations. The central administration in British New Guinea was also larger. In addition to 
the commander and the first engineer of the government steamer, it comprised the commandant 
of the police, a government storekeeper, a head gaoler and overseer of works, a government 
printer, and the treasury as its largest department: a treasurer and collector and three sub­
collectors. Only one further official was listed, a temporary clerk in Samarai-but there had to be 
some additional, non-native support staff. There was also an armed native police force of well 
over 1 00 men, 25 of whom were stationed as a mobile force in Port Moresby, and 202 native 
"village constables" had been appointed. Disregarding the latter-and the unknown number of 
non-native support staff-the government establishment in British New Guinea in 1 897 was made 
up of around 20 officials and a police force of around 120, compared with an establishment of less 
than ten officials, most of whom also had commercial responsibilities, and a part-time police force 
of around 40 in German New Guinea at the end of company rule. 
The most striking difference was the flotilla. Whereas the government of German New 
Guinea, apart from some small boats, had to rely on commercial and naval vessels, the 
government of British New Guinea not only had its expensive steamer with annual running costs 
which were about 50 per cent higher than German New Guinea's total budget in 1 898, but also 
four substantial sailing vessels, one for each district, plus a spare one, as well as a river launch 
19 The budget year ran from 1 July to 30 June, rather than from 1 April to 31 March as in the case of German New 
Guinea. 
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in Port Moresby-and MacGregor regarded a flotilla of this size as the minimum for "anything 
approaching an efficient administration". 
m 
On 1 April 1 899 the imperial government of German New Guinea consisted, on the ground, of 
five officials. The imperial judge in the Bismarck Archipelago had also been made acting 
governor. He was supported by a court clerk and a police sergeant who were both retained by the 
Reich. The imperial judge in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, hitherto a company employee, was also 
retained-and given administrative responsibilities-as was a police sergeant, but not the court 
derk. However, the imperial governor was due to arrive shortly, with some additional staff. 
Just as important, but less visible, was another strengthening of the position of the government 
of German New Guinea. The last stroke of midnight on 3 1  March 1 899 saw the birth of a colonial 
state. The 1 892 Colonial Budgets Act, which had not applied to German New Guinea as long as 
its government was a financial liability of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, came into force at this 
moment and brought to life the Fiskus of this colony as a separate legal entity, which was capable 
of owning property and incurring debts . It was to this new colonial state that the emperor 
transferred the economic privileges, in particular the land acquisition monopoly, which the 
company had renounced, rather than reserving them for the Fiskus of the Reich, or relinquishing 
them altogether, thus opening the way for a free market economy. 
The colonial state therefore started life with some assets, but it also inherited considerable 
debts, because it became liable to pay 400,000 Marks annually to the company for the next ten 
years, the compensation it had been granted in the 1 898 agreement. Short of a miracle, it 
consequently needed substantial subsidies from the Reich for some considerable time, simply to 
cover its existing commitments. Moreover, it had inherited the company's economic privileges 
but not its political powers, such as they were. The imperial governor merely slipped into the 
shoes of the company's administrator, whereas the political powers of the company were 
exercised by the emperor on behalf of the Reich. Yet, he was less free than the company had been, 
because it was not the emperor but the Reichstag which held the colonial purse strings and 
ultimately determined the rate of growth of government in German New Guinea. 
It was uncertain how the Reichstag would respond to this challenge. On the one hand, its 
criticism of company rule promised that it would help the new imperial government to get off to 
a favourable start. On the other hand, it had criticised the company for having tried to govern too 
much rather than too little. Perhaps I could get an idea of things to come by considering the 
position in which the Reichstag had placed the government of the newly acquired "Island 
Territory" in Micronesia. 
While the "Old Protectorate" was liable to pay the 4 million Marks compensation the Reich 
had granted to the company, the Island Territory was not saddled with the responsibility of 
refunding the 1 6  million Marks which it had cost to buy it from Spain. It started with a clean slate 
and a generous blanket budgetary allocation of 465,000 Marks for the 1 899 financial year, 
although it had already run half its course. Of these 355,000 Marks were earmarked for non­
recurrent expenditure, including 140,000 Marks for the purchase of government vessels :  1 2  boats 
and a steam-assisted sailing ship-and 100,000 Marks for the chartering of commercial vessels 
until government vessels had been acquired. The recurrent costs of governing the Island Territory 
were estimated to be around 220,000 Marks per annum-twice the amount of the budget of 
German New Guinea during its final year under company rule. 
The Island Territory was to be divided into three administrative districts : the Eastern 
Carolines, the Western Carolines and the Marianas. The first was to be placed under a vice­
governor, the other two under district commissioners. The size of government at the district level 
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was comparable to that in the Old Protectorate under the company, but the emphasis was squarely 
on the executive government, rather than on the administration of justice, as had happened in the 
Old Protectorate as a consequence of the arrangements under the company' s  charter. Rather than 
appointing imperial judges with subsidiary administrative responsibilities, it was now taken for 
granted that the heads of the local executive would also exercise judicial functions ex officio. 
Instead health moved into the centre of the stage: provisions were made for a government doctor 
in the Eastern Carolines and for a medical assistant in each of the other two districts. Otherwise 
there was to be just one senior official, supported by a police sergeant. Only the vice-governor 
was given the assistance of a secretary. 
But there had been a striking change in the hierarchical salary differential compared with the 
position under the 1 889 agreement with the Neu Guinea Kompagnie: the salary allowed for the 
vice governor was 12,000 Marks, compared with 30,000 for the imperial commissioner; that of 
the district commissioners 10,000 Marks, compared with 15 ,000 Marks for the imperial 
chancellor, and that of the secretary 6,000 Marks, compared with 7,500 Marks for the imperial 
secretary. On the other hand, 5,000 Marks were now provided for each of the police sergeants and 
medical assistants and a total of 22,000 Marks for the officers running the government vessels. 
The cost of the native police force, including the native crews of the government vessels,20 was 
estimated to be 65,000 Marks per annum. Its strength was not given, but it was probably 
calculated to be around 65, at an average annual cost of 1 ,000 Marks per head-a high figure 
because it was intended to recruit Malays in the Dutch East Indies for the purpose. 
The recurrent non-salary items, some 60,000 Marks, held no surprises. Travel expenses-at 
20,000 Marks-were the largest. Five thousand Marks were provided for the equipment of the 
police force, and 4,000 Marks for medical supplies. The entire expenditure was to be covered by 
a subsidy from the Reich although the introduction of taxes, duties and fees was planned. The 
economic development of the Island Territory and the role of the government in this development 
was of no immediate concern. Like the government in the Old Protectorate since 1 889 this was 
to be a minimal law and order government, expected to do as little, rather than as much, as 
possible. 
Yet, by 1906 the number of officials in the Island Territory had almost doubled, from ten to 
19. This was a modest increase compared with the Old Protectorate. On 1 January 1900 there had 
been eight government officials present: five in the Bismarck Archipelago and three in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland. Six years later the number had reached 39. 
At the beginning of 1914 the number of government officials actually serving in the Old 
Protectorate was 105. That in the Island Territory, now including the Marshall Islands, was 30.21 
The number of officials on the payroll of the government of German New Guinea in 1914 when 
the Old Protectorate and the Island Territory formed a single budgetary unit was considerably 
higher. The last budget proposals for German New Guinea provided for a total of 190 officials. 22 
The budget was balanced at 3,833 ,886 Marks. This figure included a subsidy from the Reich 
of some 1 .7 million Marks, although local revenue had increased from 75,000 in 1 899 to over 2 
million Marks. Customs duties were still the most important source of local revenue. They 
accounted for about 60 per cent. Chief among them was an import duty on tobacco, expected to 
yield around 350,000 Marks. Next came a general ten per cent ad valorem import duty estimated 
to earn slightly less. The import duty on alcoholic beverages and an export duty on copra were 
20 No explicit provision was made for the employment of native labourers or artisans by the government. 
21 These figures are taken from the population statistics attached to the annual reports. 
22 I had come across a copy of this particular document, the Etat far das Schutzgebiet Neuguinea einschliesslich der 
Inselbezirke der Siidsee auf das Rechnungsjahr 1914, which had been sent to the "Kaiserliche Station Nauru" in the 
Australian Archives and had been pleasantly surprised by the amount of detail it provided concerning the size and the 
structure of the colonial state in German New Guinea at the end of its life. 
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expected to produce similar amounts, but they now accounted together for only around 40 per cent 
of the revenue under this heading. With one exception receipts were expected to rise: the decision 
to stop the hunting of birds-of-paradise was going to produce a loss of about 40,000 Marks in 
export duties and of some 10,000 Marks in licensing fees, reducing the total local revenue by as 
much as 2.5 per cent. 
The bulk of the taxes-around 400,000 Marks, or more than 75 per cent-was to come from 
a head tax paid by natives. Next came a commercial tax with around 80,000 Marks. The mixed 
bag of "other income" amounted to over 500,000 Marks. Most important was a phosphate levy, 
paid by the mining operations in the Island Territory. It was expected to contribute 1 87,000 
Marks,23 whereas the expected income from the selling or leasing of government land still only 
amounted to 60,000 Marks. 
The basic division on the expenditure side was between recurrent and non-recurrent 
expenditure. The latter had not been part of the budgets under company rule because a colonial 
state as a discrete legal entity did not exist. Its share amounted to 700,000 Marks, well above 20 
per cent of total expenditure. The recurrent expenditure was subdivided into "personal" and 
"material" expenditure (personliche und sachliche Ausgaben). The budget also singled out the 
flotilla-as opposed to the civil administration-for special treatment. It divided the civil 
administration into the central administration, a local administration and specialised services. In 
addition the budget distinguished several categories of personnel : the regular establishment and 
three kinds of auxiliary staff-staff required on a continuing basis, temporary auxiliary and relief 
staff, and coloured support staff.24 
The non-recurrent expenditure-and the running costs of the flotilla-left some 2.7 million 
Marks for the recurrent costs of the civil administration. Of these around 800,000 Marks were 
accounted for by "material" expenditure, so that the "personal" costs of the civil administration 
were about 1 .9 million Marks, or 50 per cent of the total budget. 
The cost of the regular establishment was 8 1 6,000 Marks. The next largest vote was 426,000 
Marks for coloured support staff. The regular staff consisted of 96 positions and the continuing 
auxiliary staff of 49, and an additional 45 positions were kept in reserve for relief purposes. The 
vote for the coloured support staff allowed for 932 native policemen, 5 17 native labourers and 45 
Chinese or Malay artisans, clerks, overseers-a total of just under 1 ,500. This did not include the 
native crew of the flotilla and a substantial number of auxiliary native support staff, in particular 
for hospitals, which was budgeted for elsewhere, so that probably well over 1 ,700 natives were 
on the government's payroll. 
The cost of employing this staff of almost 2,000 people ranged from just over 200 Marks per 
annum for a native labourer to about 30,000 Marks for the governor, including a colonial loading 
and his entertainment allowance. 25 The standard annual salary for Chinese or Malays was 1 ,200 
Marks-but costs were rising. The 1914 budget proposal provided for 1 ,400 Marks for Chinese 
stokers and for a wage rise of ten per cent for the native crews of government vessels. As a result 
the highest native wage was the same as the lowest basic salary for a non-native government 
employee, but the latter was effectively trebled by colonial loadings not paid to natives. 
The local administration accounted for 52 of the 96 regular positions. Although the 
geographical distribution of these positions was not shown, their hierarchical classification gave 
23 This was only about half of the import duty on tobacco-most of which would have been passed on to native 
consumers. The natives generally made a larger contribution to the costs of governing German New Guinea than its non­
native residents. 
24 The budget made no provision for the ''native organs of the administration", primarily the government chiefs. Nor did 
it acknowledge the existence of the Gouvemementsrat, the council advising the governor, or the Bezirksriite, which had 
been established in some districts. 
25 This was the same as the salary of the imperial commissioner under the 1 889 agreement, although he had been in 
charge of a total staff of only around 50 people and administered a budget of only around 1 00,000 Marks. 
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a good indication. Its core consisted of five district commissioners, nine district officers grade II 
and one district officer grade ID. But provisions were made for one additional district officer 
grade II and two district officers grade ID under the continuing auxiliary staff vote. This added 
up to 1 8  local administrations of varying importance-<:ompared with seven, including the then 
separate Marshall Islands, in 1899. In fact, there were a total of 19, since the government station 
in Koror, in the Palau Group, was placed under the government doctor, although he himself was 
not part of the local administration. 
Of these 19 local administrations only one-a grade ID station at the mouth of the Markham 
River-was new in 1914. The main concern was the improvement of the agricultural services . 
Whereas the 1913  budget had only provided for one auxiliary agricultural expert, in 1914  two 
senior agricultural experts were added, plus four middle-ranking district agronomists .26 The 
second largest growth area was education: three new teachers were to be appointed, bringing the 
total number to eight, although only three of them were as yet regulars. The third growth area was 
the survey of land. There were three regular surveyors, but a fourth, and two draftsmen, were on 
the auxiliary list. In addition a mobile survey unit, consisting of two surveyors and two draftsmen, 
was to be financed as non-recurrent expenditure-although probably no one seriously expected 
that it would bring the survey of land up to date within a single year. 
The surveyors were the kings among the middle-ranking officials .  It was, for this reason alone, 
unlikely that they were formally subordinated to the district commissioners. This applied even 
more strongly to the agricultural experts, whose salaries equalled that of a district commissioner. 
One of them was in charge of an experimental station in Kaiser Wilhelrnsland, for which the 1 9 1 3  
budget had provided 30,000 Marks for capital expenditure. Another was to head a new 
agricultural laboratory in Rabaul, to be established at a cost of 50,000 Marks, and a third a 
research station for the cultivation of coconut palms, to be established at the cost of 33 ,000 
Marks.27 Even education was not integrated into the local administration, and the budget made 
separate provisions for "education and training" under the material expenditure. 
Taking the ranking of the positions into account, the likely distribution of technical and office 
staff could be worked out. As the budget provided for.five district commissioners,.five secretaries, 
five technicians grade II and.five assistants grade II, it appeared safe to conclude that the typical 
establishment of a district office now consisted of a district commissioner, supported by a 
secretary, an assistant grade II for the office and a technician grade II for public works, and at 
least one police sergeant, who still doubled as harbour master and customs collector. Since one 
of the district offices-presumably Rabaul-probably also accounted forthe single assistant grade 
I and the single office assistant, it was likely that only two of the larger government stations had 
any office assistance and that most of them were, as ten years earlier, manned by the official in 
charge, supported by a police sergeant, and a now more generous standard contingent of 50 native 
policemen, 20 native labourers and two Chinese artisans.28 
The central administration accounted for 19 of the 96 regular positions, although it gained 
another eight from the auxiliary vote. At the top it consisted of the governor, his "deputy", the 
Er:ster Referent, and, as a new addition, a third senior official (Referent) for general administrative 
purposes . The next level comprised three middle-ranking officials who were in charge of the 
general office, the "central cash office" (Hauptkasse) and the new "accounts and auditing section" 
(Kalkulatur). Then came six secretaries, two of them new, one assistant grade I, two technicians 
26 The figures for the previous year were also given so as to indicate the size of proposed increases or decreases. 
27 A third agricultural project for 1914 was an enlargement of an animal breeding station, at a cost of 20,000 Marks, for 
which the 1 9 1 3  budget had allocated 30,000 Marks for breeding stock. However, it was treated as part of the central 
administration. 
28 The government station in Eitape, which was groomed to grow into a district office, acquired an assistant grade Il in 
1 914. 
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grade I, one assistant grade 11, two technicians grade II, one store manager, one office assistant 
and one veterinary assistant. However, this last group also had to serve the specialised services. 
The oldest of the specialised services was public works, headed by a Referent. It probably 
accounted for all four technicians.29 But there were five other specialised senior positions, three 
of them recent: a mining expert, a forestry expert, an agricultural expert, an animal husbandry 
expert, in charge of the breeding station, and a veterinary officer, who was in charge of the animal 
quarantine station. All of these senior positions were likely to grow eventually into specialised 
services-and one had already done so: the medical service. In 1914 it was headed by a 
Medizinalreferent, who was no longer shown as part of the central administration. His 
establishment consisted of 1 3  doctors and 12 medical assistants, plus a new mobile medical unit 
of two doctors and two medical assistants, funded as non-recurrent expenditure. 
The second specialised service, about to be born, was finance. The appointment of a director 
of finance had been delayed until the 1915  budget. But an accounts and auditing section had 
already been split off from the central cash office, gaining its own section head and a second 
secretary, so that the combined financial sections accounted for five of the nine middle-ranking 
positions within the central administration. This reflected the recognition, already voiced by the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s auditors 20 years earlier that a proper accounting system was the basis 
of any orderly administration, so that it had to be created, even if this meant a financial service 
which was by itself larger than the entire government of German New Guinea had been in 1 899. 
It was unlikely that finance would have developed within the foreseeable future into a fully­
fledged specialised service, with representatives at the local level. Agriculture and, at some later 
date, education were more likely candidates to achieve this status. Similarly, it was improbable 
that the police or public works would have been centralised in that way for many years to come. 
The same applied to the administration of justice-although it did have its own personnel vote in 
the 1914 budget. But it remained an oddity because the district judge for the Bismarck 
Archipelago was the only designated judicial officer, so that he and one secretary made up the 
entire judicial service. All other courts were still run by senior administrators as a sideline to their 
executive functions. 30 Despite a metropolitan push for an independent judiciary in the German 
colonies this was unlikely to change in the short term, because the volume of judicial business in 
German New Guinea still did not justify the expense of such a separation of powers. Indeed, if 
the material expenditure was any guide, the importance of the courts was declining. The vote was 
the only one under this heading which had been reduced-by 5,000 Marks to 30,000 
Marks-because the 1913  allocation had been underspent by that amount. 
This left the police troop. Its regular establishment was one inspector, whose position had been 
upgraded from first lieutenant to captain, and a single police sergeant. But the auxiliary list 
contributed one armourer and as many as 12 police sergeants, of whom five were new. However, 
only three of these new positions had been earmarked for the mobile police unit stationed in 
Rabaul. One was to go to the new government station at the Markham River and the occupant of 
the other was already serving at the recently established Sepik station. Nonetheless,  it was 
primarily the development of the specialised services, rather than a geographical expansion of the 
local administration, or an elaboration of the bureaucratic core hierarchy, which had produced the 
staggering growth in the size of the colonial state since 1 899. 
29 There had earlier been a discrete Technische Abteilung but it had been reabsorbed into the central administration. 
30 When the government station in Kaewieng became a district office, the district commissioner did not also become a 
district judge. The same was likely to happen when Eitape became a district office-with the consequence that Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland too would probably have acquired a "designated" judicial officer. It was also on the cards, however, that 
the district judge for the Bismarck Archipelago would have been placed as a circuit judge in charge of district court 
business in the whole of German New Guinea, including the Island Territory, as its total non-native population came to 
less than 2,000 in 1 9 14. 
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The flotilla was as important for an orderly administration of  German New Guinea as 
accounting and it was even more expensive, so much so that the running costs of the government 
steamer Komet were, at 357 ,OOO Marks, greater than the entire budget of the expanded medical 
service. The total running costs of the flotilla were 5 13 ,000 Marks. This was 55,000 Marks less 
than in 1913 ,  due to the decommissioning of a second government steamer, the Delphin, with 
annual running costs of about 90,000 Marks. But there were now seven smaller, motorised 
government vessels-including the launch ordered forthe district office in Rabaul, which was still 
using a cutter intended for Palau. The oldest of them was the Buka, serving the northern 
Solomons, the largest the Kolonialgesellschaft, serving Kaiser Wilhelmsland. The Kaewieng, for 
northern New Ireland, and the Manus, for the Admiralty Islands, had been purchased in 1 9 1 2  and 
1 9 1 3  outside the budget-the decommissioning of the Delphin serving as a justification. A third 
cutter, for Truk, was on order. 
At the end of German rule, the government had therefore six substantial vessels operating and 
two more on order. The estimated running costs of over 0.5 million Marks compared with around 
20,000 Marks paid for official sea transport during the last year of company rule, an increase of 
2,500 per cent in 1 6  years. 
How did the colonial state achieve this kind of growth? Through an increase in subsidies of 
over 5,000 per cent. In terms of volume the subsidy had increased from 32,000 Marks in 1 898 to 
over 1 .7 million Marks in 1914. Even as a proportion of total expenditure the relation was 
significantly different. Whereas the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's  shareholders paid for about 30 
Marks out of every 100 Marks spent by the government of German New Guinea in 1 898, 16 years 
later the German taxpayers paid for almost 45 Marks. German New Guinea was financially less 
self-sufficient at the end of German rule than it had been 15 years earlier. Yet its government now 
cost 40 times as much. 
IV 
Tracing the financial growth of the colonial state between 1 899 and 1914 proved to be more 
difficult than I had expected, because I found myself in another Wonderland, consisting of 
different sets of figures which were all unreal. I was confronted by five sets of published figures: 
those in the budget proposals submitted by the colonial office to the Reichstag;31 those in the 
budgets approved by the Reichstag, which were shown in the budget proposals submitted by the 
colonial office to the Reichstag the following year; those in the preliminary accounts, although 
these were abolished in 1908; those in the final accounts; and those in the audited accounts. 
Moreover, these published figures represented only the middle section of a much wider range. It 
started with budget proposals by the local administrations. They were reviewed by the governor, 
and then by the colonial office and the ministry of finance, before the official budget proposal was 
submitted to the Reichstag. Similarly, the budget allocations were subsequently divided among 
the local administrations in a Winschaftsplan, and accounting too started at the local level and 
passed through different stages before it reached the audit office of the Reich. 
In other words, the financial system of German New Guinea was at least as complex as its 
legal system. But it had produced a historical record that contained information which no serious 
historiographer could afford to ignore; and it could only be appreciated if it was considered as part 
of an operating system. 32 
3 1  In order to simplify matters, I am using the term "colonial office" to also cover its predecessors. For the same reason, 
I am ignoring the fact that the budget proposal first had to be approved by the "federal council" (Bundesrat) before they 
were presented to the Reichstag. 
32 A critical examination of another phantom statement may illustrate the risks of a less cautious approach. "Since . . .  
land-based security forces were too expensive and inefficient to maintain, the Pacific administrations leaned heavily on 
the German Navy for support" (Hempenstall, 1 978: 23). As usual the "narrative" language used makes it impossible to 
determine what this statement actually means, but among the messages it signals is the suggestion that it had been cheaper, 
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The existence of these different sets of figures was only part of my problems. The more 
immediate difficulty was that the relevant published documents were not available in Australia. 
Since I did not live in the best of all possible worlds a trip to Germany to test their usefulness was 
impractical. Instead I had to find out how far the locally available information would take me. 
My starting point was a summary of the income and expenditure of German New Guinea 
between 1901 and 191 1 attached to an article by governor Hahl published in 1 9 1 2. Since it did 
not cover the first and the last two years of German colonial rule, I continued looking and came 
across another summary, appended to the annual report for 1912. It covered the ten years between 
1904 and 19 14. When I compared these two sets of figures, it emerged first of all that they 
differed for the last three years of the overlap, the years between 1909 and 1 9 1 1 .  This did not 
worry me unduly, because Hahl had probably taken the figures for these years from the budgets, 
or even the budget proposals, whereas the summary in the annual reports had listed the figures 
from the final accounts. I did become concerned, however, when I saw that Hahl' s  "income" 
figures differed throughout from those shown as "own income" (eigene Einnahmen) in the 
appendix to the annual report. 
The explanation was that Hahl had not only included the genuine local revenue raised during 
a given year but also "savings from previous years" and "funds provided for overspending", 
which were shown in the final accounts. The first year of the overlap demonstrated what a 
difference this could make: of the 444,000 Marks shown as "income" for 1 904 by Hahl a mere 
21 1 ,000 Marks had been genuine local revenue, whereas 1 00,000 Marks had been saved from 
previous years and 133 ,000 Marks had been provided in subsequent budgets to cover 
overspending. 
Hahl's  figures became even more unreal, when I compared them with a third summary 
(Kucklentz, 1914: 184-85), because the summary attached to the annual report, in contrast to 
Hahl, did not distinguish between the Old Protectorate and the Island Territory, whereas the 
Kucklentz summary did. It also allowed a comparison with Hahl ' s  figures for the years 1901 to 
1903, which were not covered in the annual report summary. As regards the Island Territory, the 
Kucklentz summary indicated that most of the income shown by Hahl for these three years had 
been the result of accounting magic. Only 38 ,000 of the 242,000 Marks in 1 90 1 ,  only 44,000 of 
the 253,000 Marks in 1902 and only 64,000 of the 279,000 Marks in 1903 in the Hahl summary 
had consisted of local revenue raised during these years. 
The income figures given in these two summaries for the Old Protectorate were even more 
problematic, precisely because they were identical. This appeared to make sense only if I assumed 
that its government had acted as an administrative model child and had faithfully stuck to its 
budget allocations as well as always estimating its local revenue correctly, both of which was 
highly unlikely. 
It was tempting under these circumstances to dismiss German New Guinea's  financial records 
altogether. On the other hand, the growth of the colonial state was a quantitative phenomenon. Its 
history was a history of figures. Even if the figures which showed what had actually happened 
remained elusive, the attempts to shape this history through budgets were themselves informed 
and more efficient, to rely on naval support than to maintain land-based security forces. My point is that this is a message 
which can only be signalled by someone who does not understand the financial aspect of German colonial rule in the 
Pacific. A comparison between the costs of maintaining the 932 native policemen in German New Guinea of just over 
250,000 Marks and the running costs of the government steamer Komet of over 350,000 Marks in the 19 14  budget makes 
clear that the costs of maintaining the two cruisers of the Australian station, which were mainly responsible for German 
New Guinea and German Samoa, must have been much greater than those of maintaining substantial land-based native 
forces in both colonies would have been. The expense of a naval presence in the Pacific was probably of the same order 
as the combined budgets of the governments of German New Guinea and Samoa. To be sure naval expenses were, in 
principle, not debited to these colonies, so that it was, in this sense, not only cheaper for their governments to rely on naval 
protection, but they were provided with a free service-but this was clearly not the message this phantom statement was 
sending. 
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by the figures which appeared in these records, however imperfect they were. Even if all these sets 
of figures represented phantom history, they were thus nonetheless important historical facts in 
their own right. Moreover, because of their political importance, the quest for more reliable 
figures was a vital part of this history, although this naturally included their manipulation by 
historical actors. 
The manipulation of these figures depended for its effectiveness as much on the assumption 
of their factuality as their honest use. Hahl did not forge the figures in his summary, he simply 
chose those figures which best supported his case. That they did not mean what they said to an 
unwary reader was not his problem. Why should he explain that the income shown in his summary 
did not represent the genuine local revenue and that German New Guinea was, and had been since 
1901 ,  fiscally in a much weaker position than his summary suggested? After all, he was 
campaigning for an increase of the Reich subsidy for his colony, and winning this battle was for 
him, understandably, more important than historical accuracy. 
For the same reason, Hahl drew attention in the body of his article to the fact that the subsidies 
paid to the Old Protectorate had, until 1908, been inflated by the 400,000 Marks compensation 
which had to be paid annually to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie under the 1 898 agreement, whereas 
this inflation suited him well when it came to showing how these subsidies had been cut in recent 
years. Why tell his readers that, instead of dropping by about 100,000 Marks in 1909, as his 
summary implied, they had effectively increased by 300,000 Marks, or that the 191 1 subsidy was, 
effectively, not lower than it had been in 1901 but twice as large? 
I had no choice but to use the figures contained in the available sources, but I did not have to 
let them dazzle me. I therefore took the summary attached to the 1912 annual report as the most 
up-to-date official set of figures available, and modified it, in the light of what I had learned, as 
a basis for examining how the budgets had tried to shape the activities of the government of 
German New Guinea and how effective these attempts had been. 
The subsidy column in Table VI suggested that there had been three major policy changes : a 
half-hearted financial boost in 1906, a belt-tightening period between 1909 and 191 1 and growing 
support as from 1912. Two of these changes could be linked to increases in the local revenue. 
German New Guinea was first rewarded with a doubling of its subsidy for a doubling of its local 
revenue but was then punished when it quadrupled its income from customs duties in three years 
by a cut of the subsidy to a level which was in 1 9 1 1 only about two-thirds of what it had been in 
1906. By contrast, the subsidy increase in 1912 had little to do with local revenue changes, 
although it looked as if local revenue responded instantly and positively to that increase. On the 
other hand, apart from a puzzling drop in expenditure in 1907 and the expected drop in the 
drought year of 191 1 ,  expenditure increased regardless of policy changes. 
The position became even less clear when I looked at Hahl' s figures, which distinguished 
between the Old Protectorate and the Island Territory. They indicated that the Island Territory, 
which had received the lion' s  share of the 1906 subsidy boost, also bore the brunt of the subsidy 
cut in 1909, when its subsidy was scrapped, whereas the subsidy paid to the Old Protectorate was 
further increased. 
The mystery deepened when I distinguished between the recurrent and non-recurrent 
expenditure for the belt-tightening period. Instead of imposing an embargo on new capital works, 
the government had increased its non-recurrent expenditure to a new peak in 1909, whereas the 
recurrent expenditure had dropped markedly. By the same token, during the drought year 191 1 ,  
the non-recurrent expenditure dropped to its lowest level since 1 904, while the recurrent 
expenditure increased markedly. 
TABLE VI 
Government Revenue and Expenditure 1904 to 1 9 14 (in 1 ,000 Marks)* 
1904 1905 1 906 1 907 1908 1909 1 9 1 0  1 9 1 1 1 9 1 2  1 9 1 3  1 9 1 4  
Local Revenue 
a. Taxes 57 74 122 1 69 2 1 1 203 308 254 303 366 399 
b. Customs Duties 49 129 208 2 12  556 7 14 849 806 870 955 1 , 1 50 
c. Other Income 105 126 142 2 1 3  1 83 237 398 3 1 9  383 434 547 
d. Total 2 1 1 329 472 594 950 1 , 1 54 1 ,555 1 ,379 l ,556 1 ,755 2,096 
Subsi<!Y_ 676 614 1 ,267 1 ,094 1 , 124 9 1 6  923 759 1 ,208 1 ,327 1 ,7 17  
Eig>enditure 
a. Recurrent 887 1 , 1 5 1  1 ,33 1 1 ,280 1 ,698 1 ,577 1 ,720 1 ,935 2,3 1 5  2,624 3 , 1 30 
b. Non-recurrent 194 249 399 297 503 75 1 677 248 449 698 704 
c. Total 1 ,082 1 ,408 1 ,73 1 1 ,577 2,201 2,328 2,397 2, 1 83 2,764 3,322 3 ,834 
* The income figures in this table only show the genuine local revenue. They also exclude some extraordinary income outside the budget which amounted to less than 
200,000 Marks for the entire period. The 400,000 Marks paid annually to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie until 1908 have been subtracted from the subsidy received from 
the Reich, as well as from the recurrent expenditure, where this payment was shown. As from 1 9 1 1 the figures are budget rather than accounts figures. 
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When I compared the final accounts figures given in the appendix to the 1912  annual report 
for the belt-tightening period with the formal-and much less detailed-budget acts which were 
published in the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung, a different explanation suggested itself: a 
massive budget blow-out in 1908, when the Island Territory and the Old Protectorate had together 
been allocated 1 .45 million for recurrent and 226,000 Marks for non-recurrent expenditure, but 
had spent 2. 1 million and 503,000 Marks respectively. Seen in this light the 1909 budget for the 
Old Protectorate was generous. In addition to providing funds to cover overspendings to the tune 
of 317  ,OOO Marks during the 1905 and 1906 budget years, the allocations were increased 
substantially. But only half of this increase was covered by an increase of the subsidy. The budget 
allocations for the Island Territory also showed a modest increase in 1 909, but it was now forced 
to stand on its own fiscal feet. This was deemed possible because the introduction of customs 
duties, which had hitherto been non-existent in the Island Territory, had dramatically lifted local 
revenue. It had been estimated at 175,000 Marks in the 1908 budget but was shown to have been 
412,000 Marks in the final accounts. 
If it had been the purpose of the 1909 budget to force the government of German New Guinea 
to live within its means, it appeared to have been successful because the final accounts for this 
year were balanced. But then the 1913  budget belatedly had to take care of an overspending of 
the 1909 budget amounting to 160,000 Marks. In other words, even the final accounts could 
include a hefty dose of accounting magic. 
Nonetheless I could draw one conclusion from the table with confidence: whatever happened 
in German New Guinea between 1904 and 1914, and whoever tried to control what was 
happening, for whatever reasons, through its budgetary allocations, it had no lasting impact on the 
overall growth of the colonial state. The colonial state did shrink momentarily in 1 907 and again 
in 191 1 ,  but it more than made up for this shrinkage by an accelerated expansion on both 
occasions, and it achieved this each time through an increase in its subsidies. Hahl' s campaign on 
the second occasion was particularly successful, leading to a subsidy increase of more than 50 per 
cent in the 1912  budget. 
Had this increase been the result of Hahl' s efforts, or had the growth of the colonial state been 
inevitable? If the latter had been the case, was it worth examining the financial records of German 
New Guinea in detail? Although the few bits of information I had considered indicated that the 
budgets since 1899 had hardly determined what the colonial government had actually done in 
German New Guinea, the situation during the period of company rule had been different. The Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie's board of directors had been able to cut governmental expenses drastically 
in 1889 and to freeze them at this minimal level for the next ten years. Why did the freeze end 
when the Reich took direct control? 
v 
I thought it would be helpful in addressing this question to take another comparative look at 
British New Guinea, which had become Papua when it was placed under Australian rule in 1906. 
In Papua too the colonial government had grown rapidly. Whereas there had been 50 government 
officials in 1906 (see the annual report for this year), the "List of Officers connected with the 
Government Services" appended to the annual report for 1913  included almost 140 names, 
compared with 190 government officials in German New Guinea in 1 9 14. 
Papua's last pre-war budget allowed for an expenditure of about £8 1 ,000. Local revenue had 
reached £55,000, and the colony received a subsidy of £30,000 from Australia. 33 This suggested 
a government of about half the size of that of German New Guinea which had a comparatively 
33 In the case of Papua a different kind of accounting magic was used: for example, the budget closed with a notional 
surplus of around £4,000 instead of balancing the estimates by reducing the apparently fixed subsidy to £26,000. 
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large number of non-native officials but a much lower non-recurrent and recurrent material 
expenditure. Moreover, Papua was financially less dependent than German New Guinea. Its 
subsidy accounted for 37 rather than 45 per cent of the budget. Indeed it was financially less 
dependent in 1 9 14 than British New Guinea had been in 1 897. 
It was tempting to link the slower rate of governmental growth in Papua to the differences in 
the economic development of these two colonies, since the value of the total trade of German New 
Guinea at the end of German rule was about three times that of Papua. But this did not help me 
much further, because governmental growth in Papua had still been substantial.34 
Perhaps a comparison with the financial history of the Marshall Islands before their 
incorporation into German New Guinea in 1906 was more useful. When the Marshall Islands 
came under German sovereignty in 1 885, the government of this colony by a chartered company 
had been the preferred option. But the counterpart of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft, was less enthusiastic so that a different arrangement was worked out in 1 888 .  The 
Marshall Islands were to be administered by an imperial commissioner, supported by a secretary, 
whose salaries were to be paid by the Jaluit Gesellschaft. The costs were 22,500 Marks: 15,000 
Marks for the commissioner and 7 ,500 Marks for the secretary. A budget was to provide for 
additional support staff, but it had to be agreed to annually by the German government and the 
J aluit Gesellschaft. The financial responsibility rested fully with the latter. It was obliged to cover 
account deficits, although it was also entitled to retain any surplus. As a reward the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft was granted certain economic privileges, among which a guano monopoly turned out 
to be the most important asset.35 
The 1 898 budget of the Marshall Islands (reproduced in Fabricius, 1992: 291 -94)36offered a 
comparison with German New Guinea during the last year of company rule. It provided for a total 
governmental expenditure of 24,000 Marks and a local revenue of 43,000 Marks. This left a 
nominal surplus of 19,000 Marks. But this was only a shadow play because the budget did not 
include major government expenses, such as the salary of the imperial commissioner-now 
"administrator"-and his secretary. The Jaluit Gesellschaft could therefore rightly claim that it 
paid a substantial subsidy. How large, was another question. In the spirit of the play it went so far 
as to suggest that the entire commercial tax it contributed should be counted as part of its subsidy. 
The 15,000 Marks in question accounted for more than a third of the local revenue. The next 
largest item was a native head tax of 9,600 Marks.37 Compared with German New Guinea, the 
main difference was that no customs duties were levied, perhaps because the Gesellschaft would 
once more have had to pay the lion' s  share.38 
The expenditure side of the budget looked more familiar. Apart from the administrator and his 
secretary, who were not included, there were two local officials: a police sergeant (cum everything 
else), at the headquarters on Jaluit, and a lone district officer on Nauru. These two officials cost 
between them around 10,000 Marks. 39 The allocation for the small Marshallese police force was 
34 The geographical expansion of German New Guinea after 1 899 was immaterial for my purposes. 
35 At the time no-one knew about the phosphate deposits on Nauru which was soon afterwards added to the colony, 
although Nauru was valued as a producer of copra and as a stepping stone towards the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. 
36 I was grateful for the inclusion of this particular budget in this collection of documents but also puzzled by it, because 
I was unable to understand its special significance for the history of Nauru. 
37 The tax was paid in the form of copra. The cash yield was 50 per cent higher than shown in the budget because one 
third of it was credited to the chiefs who collected the copra. This 'accounting magic' had the advantage that no payments 
to chiefs had to be shown as governmental expenditure. (The English translation of the comment to this item (Fabricius, 
1 992: 292) makes no sense, but then there also appears to be something wrong with the German text (ibid.: 1 19).) 
38 It made no practical difference whether the Jaluit Gesellschaft paid taxes, duties and so on, or whether it covered 
account deficits, but the first alternative had optical advantages because it suggested that the Gesellschaft was just another 
taxpayer. 
39 The budget also made a contribution towards the costs of maintaining a medical doctor who was a company employee, 
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high: 3 ,500 Marks for four to six men. Non-salary items accounted for 9,000 Marks, including 
3 ,000 Marks for travel expenses as the largest amount. As in the case of German New Guinea 
under company rule, there was no provision for non-recurrent expenditure. All buildings and 
equipment used by the government of the Marshall Islands were the property of the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft. Nor was the government provided with a sea-going vessel for official purposes. In 
short, the Marshall Islands in 1 898 had the same kind of minimal government as German New 
Guinea at the end of company rule, only on an even smaller scale. But in the Marshall Islands this 
state of affairs continued until 1 906, and it came to an end only as a result of external pressures. 
Why did it last for almost 20 years? Because the two leading actors, the German government 
and the Jaluit Gesellschaft, were happy with the status quo. The Jaluit Gesellschaft delighted in 
bemoaning the financial sacrifices the 1 888 agreement demanded, but it knew very well that it 
would be financially worse off if the agreement was terminated and its subsidies were replaced 
by customs duties and higher taxes. More importantly, in contrast to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, 
the Jaluit Gesellschaft was a commercial success. It paid its first dividend of four per cent after 
only one year of operation. This had increased to 15 per cent by 1905, even before the tapping of 
the phosphate riches of Nauru. 40 Nevertheless, the German government was not at all eager to rock 
the boat, as long as the financial responsibility of the company removed the government of the 
colony from parliamentary scrutiny, and as long as everything remained quiet and did not attract 
the attention of the metropolitan press. 
This was as far as I needed to go, because I could now put my finger on what appeared to be 
the key factor in determining the growth of colonial government, at least in German New Guinea. 
It was wrong to attribute the minimisation of government expenditure to the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie' s  lack of commercial success, because the same happened in the Marshall Islands, 
despite the profitability of the Jaluit Gesellschaft. To be sure, the Neu Guinea Kompagnie did 
reduce the size of the government of German New Guinea for financial reasons. But this was not 
the reason why it succeeded in doing so, since the factor which was responsible for this success 
was also present in the Marshall Islands. 
In other words, the question was what did the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
and the German government have in common? The answer was simple: a lack of ambition 
concerning the role of colonial government. The growth of the colonial state, it appeared, 
depended primarily on a single choice: was the colonial government to be responsible for the 
economic development of the colony as whole, or was it not? Once the Neu Guinea Kompagnie 
had accepted that it could not finance its grand political ambitions-and only then-was it in a 
position to control the growth of government in its colony. This put it in the same boat as the 
Jaluit Gesellschaft, which had accepted the 1 888 agreement precisely because it enabled it to 
restrict the economic development of the colony in so far as it did not serve its own commercial 
interests. For the Jaluit Gesellschaft the 1 888 agreement was a sound commercial investment, not 
because it made money out of the government of this colony, or even out of its economic 
privileges, but because the arrangement enabled it to curb the commercial activities of its 
competitors. 
The position of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was different. It did not fear commercial 
competition during the 1 8 80s and 1 890s. Yet, it too regarded, as from 1 889, the presence ofother 
colonists, whether they had commercial interests or not, as a nuisance, because each new trading 
or mission station increased its governmental responsibilities and the financial burdens on its 
shareholders. It was more surprising that the German government should have held similar views. 
But it too had no ambitions of its own for the government of the German colonial empire, 
especially if this meant battling with the Reichstag for funds. The 1 888 agreement with the Jaluit 
but provided free medical services to government officials. 
40 A detailed account of the history of the Jaluit Gesellschaft is given by Treue, 1 976. 
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Gesellschaft suited it well, and the termination of the 1 889 agreement with the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie even better, whereas the 1 898 agreement, which terminated the latter' s financial 
responsibility for the government of German New Guinea, was a setback because it moved this 
colony under the financial control of the Reichstag. 
It was the 1 898 agreement that opened the door for a renewed growth of colonial government 
in German New Guinea. It did so by permitting two new actors to enter the stage: the Reichstag 
and the Fiskus of German New Guinea, as a separate, property owning legal entity. It was 
primarily the embryonic colonial state which pushed the economic development agenda because 
the growth of colonial government meant a growth of its own body, and because the economic 
development of its territory ultimately had to produce a growing volume of its lifeblood in the 
form of local revenue. 
That the colonial state should have subscribed to this economic developmentalism made 
immediate sense, since this was the only effective way of justifying its existence. The maintenance 
of law and order was by itself incapable of providing a convincing raison d'etre for a colonial 
state. It was only by identifying itself with the economic development of the territory under its 
rule, in the interests of the colonisers as well as of those who were being colonised, that it could 
present itself to the outside world and to itself in a positive light. 
What was curious was that the same should have applied to the Reichstag but not to the 
German government, or the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and the J aluit Gesellschaft. Here the question 
was: what was the difference? In this case the answer was more involved but the factor of public 
accountability played a key part. 
Under the 1871  constitution of the Reich only the Reichstag was directly accountable to the 
German public as its electorate, whereas the emperor headed its executive ex officio as the king 
of Prussia, who also appointed and dismissed the chancellor of the Reich and all other Reich 
officials. But the executive was not only retrospectively financially accountable to the Reichstag, 
because the chancellor of the Reich had to report annually how the income of the Reich had been 
used, the Reichstag also controlled it prospectively because the annual budgets of the Reich 
required its approval. In other words, the Reichstag was ultimately responsible for what the 
executive was financially capable of doing, but it was also accountable for the exercise of this 
responsibility to the German public.41 
As a federation of states in which the powers of the centre were limited, the core functions of 
government within the Reich were performed by the various states and therefore outside the 
financial control of the Reichstag. However, the position in the German colonies was different. 
On the one hand, the Protectorates Act vested the full executive, legislative and judicial powers 
of the Reich in principle in the emperor, so that their government was in principle outside the 
control of the Reichstag. On the other hand, the Colonial Budgets Act extended its financial 
control powers to the colonies, in so far as they were the financial responsibility of the Reich. This 
meant that these control powers covered in the colonies the full range of governmental functions, 
including those which, in Germany, were performed by the states. As a result the financial powers 
and responsibilities of the Reichstag in relation to the German colonies were much more extensive 
than they were at home. 
In theory the Reichstag could have used its powers to force the executive to get rid of all 
German colonies by denying it the funds for governing them But to do so would have indirectly 
diminished its powers in the metropolitan context, quite apart from the electoral impact this 
extreme course of action might have had on the German public. It was natural under these 
circumstances for the Reichstag to embrace the economic development of the German colonies 
4 1  I am again disregarding the "federal council" (Bundesrat) representing the states which had federated in the Reich and 
formed the unelected 'first chamber' of its legislature. 
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as a positive goal and use it as a yardstick against which the performance of the colonial 
governments and the allocation of funds to them was to be measured. 
By contrast the metropolitan executive had initially no reason for committing itself to the 
economic development of the German colonies. The focus on economic development in the 
charter issued to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was merely a political gesture: cheap, because it was 
made at the expense of the company but also appropriate because economic development as a goal 
of government had, even then, a positive ring. To present the economic development of German 
New Guinea, as well as of the Marshall Islands, as the financial responsibility of private 
commercial firms was thus doubly advantageous. It allowed the emperor and his government to 
treat their colonial responsibilities as an extension of the foreign affairs of the Reich and, more 
particularly, as an extension of the consular services it provided to German citizens abroad. Hence 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and the Jaluit Gesellschaft were seen as sometimes troublesome but 
useful allies who did the metropolitan executive a favour by assuming the financial responsibility 
for governing these colonies, no matter what they actually did or did not do, as long as they did 
not create trouble which required action by the Reich. 
This attitude also explained the generosity towards the Neu Guinea Kompagnie when it 
surrendered its charter in 1 899, and the even greater generosity shown to the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
when the cosy 1 8  8 8 agreement had to be cancelled because of the international complications it 
was causing, just when its guano monopoly was finally beginning to translate itself into profits. 
The conservation of this monopoly and the low payments stipulated for its exercise were a reward 
for having underwritten the costs of governing the Marshall Islands for almost 20 years-and this 
reward did not even require additional funds which had to be approved by the Reichstag, although 
it disadvantaged the colonial state of German New Guinea into which the Marshall Islands were 
incorporated, because it could have significantly increased its local revenue by insisting on higher 
payments. 
But the attitude of the metropolitan executive was also beginning to change at that time, partly 
in response to parliamentary pressures. These changes manifested themselves in the establishment 
of a separate colonial office. It was the corporate interest of this new body that committed the 
metropolitan executive to making the German colonial empire an economic success. 
It was typical that this new approach to colonial administration was to be "scientific", an early 
German version of economic rationalism. The colonies were to be managed along sober 
commercial lines, and under the leadership of a former banker, Bernhard Dernburg. But the goal 
was fiscal self-sufficiency for the colonies rather than the production of budget surpluses which 
were transferred to the coffers of the Reich as a reward for the subsidies the colonies had received 
in the past. It was also typical that this new approach failed, because fiscal self-sufficiency makes 
no sense as a political goal. Fiscal belt-tightening is marketable only as a means to an end, as an 
unpleasant phase one had to go through in order to reach a glorious future-which only economic 
development has to offer. 
This, finally, let the cat out of the bag: economic development as a political goal has little to 
do with rational economic considerations. It is an ideology which can operate independently of 
actual economic performance. Indeed, it is essential for its continued operation that economic 
development remains a promise which can never be fully realised. On the other hand, it can only 
operate independently or, at least, in advance of improved actual economic performance, if it can 
be presented as a sufficiently realistic promise to secure a continuing stream of external subsidies 
which allow the colonial government to pursue this goal. 
But there had to be another ingredient present for this process of a continuing subsidisation 
of the pursuit of economic development to work: the subsidies had to be approved by people who 
did not have to pay for them out of their own pockets. It was precisely the lack of this ingredient 
that enabled the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, whose chairman of directors personally footed a large 
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part of the bill for governing Gennan New Guinea, to cut government spending to a minimum. 
Moreover, while the company's  shareholders could and did derive a personal financial benefit 
from this cut, the members of the Gennan colonial service or the Reichstag could not derive such 
a profit from a similar cut. What counted for them were not profits or savings but the promise of 
future economic growth which could be translated into an immediate increase of the funds 
available-and this meant the ability to finance a larger, better endowed and therefore more 
powerful government establishment. 
The Marshall Islands offered a good illustration of the differences between the promise of 
economic growth and the actual improvement in economic performance. Although the discovery 
of large deposits of phosphate on the tiny island of Nauru was economically the most important 
event during the history of Gennan colonial rule, its political impact was minimal. It was useless 
for ideological purposes. It was a valuable but finite resource which did not promise by itself 
indefinite economic growth, not even for Nauru itself. Indeed, not just Nauru and the Marshall 
Islands, but the whole of the Island Territory held out no such promise. The Old Protectorate and, 
in particular, Kaiser Wilhelmsland, were different. But there too it was not its potential mineral 
wealth that mattered, although it played an important prompting part. Minerals were like an 
internal form of subsidy; they did not represent a promise of continued economic development. 
Economic development as an ideology is concerned with people, albeit as taxable consumers and 
not as human beings. It centres on the production of consumables and on increased consumption. 
It requires large spaces teaming with taxpayers who go on producing and consuming more and 
more, for ever and ever. In the Gennan Pacific only the Old Protectorate was big enough to 
provide a realistic basis for such a dream, and it was primarily the agricultural potential of Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland which had attracted the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and which kept the subsidies 
coming until the end of Gennan colonial rule. 
For as long as economic development remained the ruling ideology among those who 
governed this territory and for as long as money for subsidies was available somewhere, where 
the people approving such subsidies shared this ideology and did not have to pay for them out of 
their own pockets, the growth and the essentially colonial character of government, at least in the 
Old Protectorate, was assured, irrespective of who were its rulers . To be sure, some temporary 
setbacks had to be expected, but I was not surprised to find that 50 years after the 1914  budget, 
the last under German colonial rule, the number of government employees in the Old Protectorate, 
now a United Nations Trust Territory under Australian administration, had increased to almost 
30,000, although the external subsidy, now close to £17,000,000, accounted for more than two 
thirds, rather than for less than half, of government expenditure (see the 1964/65 annual report). 
Was the growth of colonial governments, and perhaps even the globalisation of the colonial 
state, inevitable, or could it again be halted by privatisation? The history of German New Guinea 
suggests that it had not been the transfer of government to a private company that had curbed its 
growth but the eventual rejection of economic development as a governmental goal by the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie. Or had it not been the abandonment of this goal but its replacement by the 
goal of private wealth accumulation which had been decisive? Was it important that the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft had succeeded in combining this latter goal with a curbing of the growth of 
government in the Marshall Islands because it did not try to tum government itself into a 
profitable operation? It had not got rich by appropriating a share of a growing economy in the 
form of taxes, but by preventing others from accumulating private wealth at the expense of the 
profitability of its own commercial operations . 
Did the failure of the self-sufficiency campaign indicate that it is general! y misguided to treat 
government as a commercial operation, because it is the nature of governmental activities to cost 
rather than to earn money? Is it merely an ideological trick to claim that their privatisation can, 
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for example, turn prisons into profitable enterprises because a private entrepreneur can run them 
more cheaply than the public sector, although his tender includes a healthy profit margin? 
Did the self-sufficiency campaign stop short of advocating that the government of the German 
colonies should make a profit which would benefit the metropolitan German taxpayer because it 
went against the ideological grain to turn government into a public money-making exercise, while 
it was ideologically acceptable, and even advantageous, to exploit the colonies for the benefit of 
private German business interests, provided this cost the German taxpayer nothing? 
Did the failure of this campaign, on the contrary, suggest that the German government had not 
gone far enough? Should it have fully implemented the user-pays principle? Should it have 
insisted that the Neu Guinea Kompagnie paid an annual fee for the privilege of governing German 
New Guinea? Should it have established courts run by imperial officials which charged those who 
chose to use them the full cost of their services? Should it have demanded a naval protection levy 
from all non-indigenous residents? Should the Neu Guinea Kompagnie have hired a group of 
mercenaries prepared to carry out punitive expeditions for an appropriate payment? Should the 
governments in the various German colonies have competed with each other to attract German 
capital by offering lower taxes than their rivals, or the confiscation of any native land chosen for 
a plantation, or a guaranteed supply of conscripted native labourers? Should they have globalised 
this competition by attracting, for example, British capital away from neighbouring British 
colonies? 
The Neu Guinea Kompagnie certainly had misplaced its hopes when it had expected that 
German settlers would eagerly move across from Australia so as to live again on "German soil". 
On the other hand, had there been nationalistic or racist factors at work which had prevented the 
German colonial governments from opening their territories to Japanese capital or to Chinese 
immigrants for the sake of speeding up their economic development? Had colonial rule in German 
New Guinea been generally driven by an ideology that made the financial as well as the legal 
frameworks for governmental action historically irrelevant because they merely implemented that 
ideology? 
At this point one of my dreams resurfaced. I saw myself sitting on a stage, staring at heaps of 
files, books and microfilms in front of a blank wall. Then I heard steps approaching from behind 
until a breathless voice, which I knew to be that of the little boy from Andersen ' s  fairy tale, was 
blasting triumphantly into my ears. "I told you so, I told you so", he shouted, "it has all been a 
waste of time! The emperor is naked! And he lives off other people' s  money! Let us go and play 
with my balloons,  they are much more fun than your old registers, court files and budgets." I was 
still not ready to believe this voice, but it did seem sensible to test where it would take me if I 
approached the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea from an ideological perspective. 
As was to be expected, the ideological aspect of this rule was never spelled out as a coherent 
political manifesto. Instead it remained a conveniently fluid hotchpotch of often contradictory 
ideas about everything, from biology to religion, which were all part of the imported European 
baggage and which were usually reinforced rather than modified by local conditions. But chunks 
of it were occasionally articulated, and it was fitting that the author of one of the most systematic 
attempts had been the star of my first chapter. 
Chapter 1 1 :  Voices From the Past 
I 
In August 1 9 1 3  district commissioner Berghausen could bear it no longer. The opinions aired in Germany in connection with the "bird-of-paradise question" (Paradiesvogelfrage)1 about the 
ways German New Guinea, and Kaiser Wilhelmsland in particular, ought to be governed were, 
he believed, damaging its vital interests. Since he needed, as a member of the colonial service, the 
permission of his superiors before he could publicly counter these views, he used a visit by 
governor Hahl to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen to enlist his support. It was readily given, and on 2 
September a draft article for the Kolnische Zeitung was sent, with Hahl' s endorsement, to the 
colonial office. On 3 1  October it approved publication, provided Berghausen agreed to omit the 
section where he argued against a total ban on the hunting of birds-of-paradise, which was about 
to become official policy, at least as a temporary measure. Berghausen reported his agreement, but 
his report got caught in the cog-wheels of the headquarters bureaucracy. Assuming that the 
manuscript generally did not have the colonial office's  blessing, Berghausen asked, in June 19 14, 
through acting governor Haber, for permission to withdraw it altogether. By the time this request 
was presented in Berlin for a decision on 10  August 1914, the world had changed and 
Berghausen' s  effort was quietly filed (see RKA 27 13). 
II 
Because other participants in the debate had referred to their personal expertise to lend weight to 
their opinions, Berghausen began by identifying his credentials. He had served for four years in 
the colony, camping more than 300 nights among "the brown sons of Papua" ,2 penetrating deep 
into the interior into many hitherto unknown areas. These experiences had convinced him that the 
view that the natives of Kaiser Wilhelmsland could be controlled entirely peacefully could only 
be advocated by people who did not understand what went on in the Papuan mind. Even in areas 
where the government and the missions had been active for a quarter of a century, they had only 
been partly successful in rooting out superstition and the belief in the justification of revenge. It 
had to be remembered that most of Kaiser Wilhelmsland was still living in the Stone Age and that 
the inhabitants of vast areas, which whites were only just beginning to enter, continued to practice 
head-hunting and cannibalism undisturbed. How could a thinking person fail to see that contacts 
between these cannibals and a culture a thousand times more advanced than their own had to lead 
to some bloody clashes and blame them instead on individual whites or on misguided government 
policies? 
The same-unidentified-author who described the natives of Kaiser Wilhelmsland as "the 
most good-natured people on earth" had to admit that the Lae Womba, in the lower Markham 
Valley, had not long before murdered at least 1 30 members of neighbouring tribes, 70 of them in 
the course of a single night. 3 Entire villages along the Maklay Coast had been wiped out by 
mountain tribes, also hardly a manifestation of a peaceable character. All those who really knew 
the position agreed that even in pacified areas most natives would be delighted to kill all whites 
in order to become their own masters again, if the presence of a stronger power did not prevent 
them from trying. All this was not due to wrong policies, or to a disregard for native law, but 
1 For a detailed account of the long history of the exploitation of birds-of-paradise see Swadling, 1 996. 
2 According to his official obituary, Berghausen had by then already served five years in the colony, although he had, 
by the end of German rule, only spent 23 1 days on expeditions. 
3 For more information on the Lae Womba see Sack, 1 976. 
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attributable to the natives' warlike character, their superstitious fears, their belief in revenge and 
their desire to continue practising their traditional vices. That the Neuendettelsau mission had 
persuaded the coastal tribes on the Huon Peninsula and along the Huon Gulf-who were in any 
case much less warlike than those living in the northwest and the interior-to break with their 
heathen past, or the limited successes of the Divine Word and Rhenish missions in more difficult 
areas, did little to alter this overall picture. 
Justice to the memory of the whites who had fallen victim to the natives required the claim to 
be strongly rejected that they had only themselves to blame because they had treated the natives 
badly or had been ignorant of their customs. All of them had known when they had entered the 
wilderness, be it as planters, prospectors or bird-of-paradise hunters, that good relations with the 
natives were essential for their success. It was certain, therefore, that they had acted accordingly. 
They had all taken large quantities of tradegoods with them into the bush to gain the natives'  
friendship and to pay for services and food. All of them-Dammkohler, who had been killed in 
the Markham Valley in September 1909, Richards, killed in the Herzog Mountains in January 
19 10, Peterson, killed in the Friedrich Wilhelmshafen hinterland in June 1912, and Miculicz, 
killed near the Ramu in August of that year-were experienced men. Most of them had been 
widely known for the kindness with which they treated the natives. Miculicz, in particular, had 
always relied on his virtuosic violin playing to calm the natives, rather than on his pitiful armory. 
So firmly had he been convinced of the natives' non-aggressiveness that he had refused to believe 
the warnings of his native servant that he was about to be attacked until it was too late to defend 
himself. An official investigation had found no evidence for the allegation that he had already 
fought with the natives four times before he was killed. Another investigation, in February 1913 ,  
had established beyond doubt that the Weber brothers had been killed o n  Umboi Island solely 
because the natives had coveted their tradegoods. One should let the dead rest in peace, 
Berghausen continued, and grant the Ii ving the funds necessary to set up a network of government 
stations which would open up the country, and provide them with sufficient "means of power" 
(Machtmittel) to minimise the need for armed intervention, since it could not possibly be avoided 
altogether. 
This led Berghausen to the "so-called punitive expeditions", which had been attacked as being 
totally inappropriate because the natives had done nothing wrong in accordance with their 
customs. Should the whites let themselves be slaughtered passively because the blacks regarded 
revenge as legitimate, because their superstitions justified the unprovoked killing of strangers, or 
because they wanted to get rid of the whites so as to be free to satisfy their desires for human 
heads and human flesh? Those who were lucky enough to have returned from the interior 
unscathed, thanks to the generous support of experienced missionaries, should be grateful for this 
support instead of blaming those who, to their misfortune, had had to do without it. 
To be sure, the law of the natives should be respected, unless it was itself criminal or immoral. 
Wherever public peace had been established, and as long as it could be peacefully maintained, this 
certainly could be done, and was, in fact, already being done. But where this was not the case, 
force had to be used because tolerance under these circumstances would be weakness and be seen 
as such by the natives. This did not mean that every murder gave rise to a punitive expedition. 
Force was used only when a serious breach of the public peace made this necessary or when the 
natives persistently resisted a peaceful extension of civilisation. Besides, force was used not so 
much as a punishment but to prevent further murderous deeds which would inevitably follow if 
no action was taken. It would also be wrong to believe that these punitive expeditions ended with 
the extermination of the guilty natives . They were followed by attempts to establish amicable 
relations with the help of friendly tribes so as to bring about public peace. 
Next Berghausen turned to the attacks on the "conscription" (Aushebung) of natives as 
labourers, which had been carried out in the interests of securing public peace in the lower 
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Markham Valley. To maintain that these conscripts could not be expected to appreciate that they 
were performing a noble task of acculturation if they cleared land for the whites, planted it with 
coconut palms, and spent their hard-earned wages on cheap umbrellas and other rubbish, 
ultimately led to a rejection of any form of practical colonial development. Was the first principle 
of colonisation no longer valid, according to which "We have our colonies not for their sake, not 
for the benefit of the natives, but for our own"? On the other hand, this first principle could easily 
be reconciled with the duty to advance the natives culturally because practical considerations alone 
demonstrated that the native inhabitants of a tropical colony were its most valuable asset which 
could only be preserved and increased through their cultural advancement. 
The last section of Berghausen' s manuscript was devoted to countering the call for a total 
prohibition of the hunting of birds-of-paradise, which was not only based on a concern for the 
protection of these birds but also on the law and order problems their pursuit was said to create. 
Berghausen started his argument with the admission that Richards, Peterson and Miculicz would 
not have gone into the interior if they had not been tempted by the large profits to be made from 
hunting these birds. He argued, however, that they would also have been killed if they had gone 
for quite different reasons-like Darnmkohler or the Weber brothers, who had had no interest 
whatever in these birds. Conversely, a number of bird-of-paradise hunters had not only returned 
alive but had peacefully opened up areas from which natives had subsequently volunteered to 
work on plantations. 
The environmental arguments were no more convincing. Everybody agreed that these beautiful 
birds had to be protected, but "the colony" (die Kolonie) was convinced that the measures already 
taken-the setting aside of protected areas, the closure of the hunt for six months, and a limitation 
of the number of natives who could be employed as shooters-were more than adequate, 
especially if the issue of hunting licences was, as planned, restricted to persons who had settled 
in the colony or who contributed in other ways to its economic development. This move would 
also rule out the undesirable hunting of birds-of-paradise by Chinese and Malays, whose 
behaviour towards the natives in the interior, as recent experience had shown, was indeed not 
always acceptable. Moreover, they were lured away from their jobs as artisans and overseers in 
which they were indispensable by the vision of vast riches-and they sent their profits abroad, 
instead of investing them in the colony. 
There was no danger that birds-of-paradise would become extinct in German New Guinea. 
They were only hunted in less than one tenth of the area where they naturally occurred, and the 
various species were more numerous and more widely distributed than had been previously 
assumed. They had already returned in force to a section of the Rai Coast which had previously 
been exploited with unusual intensity, since it had been declared a protected area. In short, the 
survival of all species of birds-of-paradise was secure, and this was all the animal protection lobby 
could fairly demand. He, Berghausen, at least, was of the opinion that the commercial wealth these 
birds represented was there to be exploited. The approximately 10,000 skins which would be 
exported in 1913  were worth about 1 million Marks, most of which would be invested in the 
colony. Quite a number of smaller coconut plantations in Kaiser Wilhelmsland had already been 
established in this manner. They would face bankruptcy if the hunting of birds-of-paradise was 
prohibited before the coconut palms began to bear. These plantations were making a significant 
contribution to the economic development of Kaiser Wilhelmsland. This was all the more 
important because "German capitalists were still reluctant to invest in this remote colony. 
III 
Although Berghausen identified several newspaper articles in his manuscript he did not name his 
main opponent. There was no doubt, however, whom he had in mind: professor Richard 
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Neuhauss, an anthropologist with a medical background, who had spent well over a year in 
German New Guinea, mainly in the sphere of the Neuendettelsau mission, and who, after his 
return to Germany, had become a prolific critic of punitive expeditions and the hunting of birds­
of-paradise-in his view two closely related and quite unnecessary evils. 
While Berghausen had waited for permission to publish at least the main part of his 
manuscript-and the colonial office had decided to impose at least a temporary ban on the hunting 
of birds-of-paradise, but not on punitive expeditions-Neuhauss had been busy condensing the 
first volume of his magnum opus (Neuhauss, 191 1 )  into a small monograph, Unsere Kolonie 
Deutsch-Neu-Guinea, for publication in a series sponsored by the "Association for [the support 
of] German Culture Abroad" (Vereinfar Deutschtum im Ausland). 
In this monograph, which was published in 1914, Neuhauss returned again and again to the 
"bird-of-paradise question". 4For him birds-of-paradise were the crowns of creation. But they were 
facing extinction since the wholesalers of plumes had decided in 1909 to make them the fashion. 
As a result prices had skyrocketed and the birds were pursued further and further into the interior. 
This had brought about a fundamental change in hunting methods. Instead of sending individual 
hunting boys into the bush for a few days from a base at the coast, large groups of them, under the 
command of a European licensee, were now marching for months through the interior. The main 
problem was food, because each hunting boy could carry only enough rice to feed himself for two 
weeks. As the natives in the interior had themselves barely enough to eat, and as they regarded all 
food in their territories as their property, clashes were unavoidable and sooner or later some of the 
European hunters were also killed. A survivor of the party of the hunter Miculicz, for example, 
had reported that the party had fought with the natives four times before Miculicz was killed.5 
Then follow punitive expeditions which naturally give the natives a rough time. The shooting dead of 
blacks on these occasions gives rise to more killings because the next white who passes through a village 
in which a white has murdered a black must be killed in accordance with the law of blood-revenge which 
applies throughout the interior (ibid. : 17) .  
The "terrifying increase" in the number of murders of Europeans had convinced not a few 
people that the infamous blacks, who had nothing better to do than to slaughter innocent whites, 
should be completely exterminated. 
In fact, the whites are always and exclusively responsible for these unfortunate events because they 
expose themselves blindly to dangers without knowing the customs of the blacks, thus frequently 
behaving in a manner which tries them to their limit. There are first of all the bird-of-paradise hunters 
who shoot down the birds of the bush which the blacks regard as their property and who, due to the force 
of the circumstances already described, get into conflict with them. But there are also the gold 
prospectors who, in their hunt for a fortune, disregard all other considerations. Eventually the blacks vent 
their hatred in attacks on the settlements of the whites . . .  when they see that their land was being taken 
away from them, that they are forced to perform corvee labour and that their old customs are no longer 
tolerated (ibid. : 92). 
Neuhauss used the killing of Dammkohler as his main illustration, claiming that he and his 
companion Oldorp had been attacked because they continued their search for gold after their 
native servants had left them, because travelling by themselves they were mistaken for evil spirits . 
How wrong would it be to avenge such occurrences with punitive expeditions !  The black does not think 
for a moment that he has done anything wrong. The idea that he deserves punishment is incomprehensible 
4 It preoccupied him to the extent that he devoted half of the chapter on the flora and fauna of German New Guinea to 
this question. 
5 Berghausen specifically rejected this claim (see above: 229). 
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to him, because he merely acts in self-defence if he puts an end to the spirit which tries to destroy him 
(ibid. : 95). 
After the killing of Dammkohler no punitive expedition was carried out, because it had been 
impossible to locate the "guilty" natives. 6 The blacks who had subsequently killed bird-of-paradise 
hunters had fared worse. Thus the official report on the punitive expedition following the killing 
of Richards stated that about 40 W amba had been shot dead and that their large village had been 
burnt down. 
True, the government finds itself in a difficult position when such murders take place because it fears to 
lose face if the deed remains unpunished. One should therefore do whatever is possible to prevent them 
from happening. This requires first of all a total prohibition of the shameful slaughter of the birds-of­
paradise which time and time again gives rise to bloody conflicts with the natives. Should an event 
nevertheless take place which, from the European perspective calls for a punishment, it must be carefully 
examined if the blacks did not have the law on their side-which should, of course, be determined, not 
by applying the rules of Roman law, but the local standards of right and wrong which cannot be replaced 
overnight by imported norms. The difficulties are naturally considerable, and it goes without saying that 
the officials have to learn to project themselves into the spirit of Papuan law. But much harm can be 
avoided in this manner and the blacks can be educated to become friends and helpers-a result which 
cannot be achieved in any other way. The task is made easier by the good-naturedness of the natives who 
can be guided like children if they are appropriately treated. The outstanding progress which the missions 
have already made by adopting this approach leaves no doubt that it will be ultimately successful (ibid.: 
95-96) . 
Neuhauss supported this line of argument with additional illustrations. Thus he maintained that 
while the Europeans had a duty to put an end to the frequent abortions-the result of the Papuan 
"Mutterrecht",7 which permitted women to dispose freely of their unborn children-the use of 
force to achieve this end again could be counter-productive. 
Within the sphere of influence of the Neuendettelsau mission abortions have virtually disappeared, yet 
another proof that the natives will do anything if they are treated with kindness. Elsewhere it was thought 
that strictness was more appropriate. The police were called in. Unable to arrest the guilty [sic] mother 
they burnt down her village. This produced a tremendous hatred against the whites without achieving 
anything in the matter concerned. Heavier penalties were imposed sometime later, until the natives finally 
decided to kill all Europeans-a plan, the execution of which could barely be prevented at the last 
moment. Thus one punishment follows another. More and more blood is shed and the blacks become so 
deeply embittered that they would rather die than let themselves be advanced and converted by these 
methods (ibid. : 1 04). 
Other illustrations suggested that the situation was more complex. For example, some coastal 
groups used the government to fight their feuds for them. They would go to the government station 
and eloquently describe the precariousness of their situation and the evilness of their neighbours. 
The official then arranges, in good faith and with the best of intentions, "a punitive expedition in order 
to force the recalcitrant blacks into submission". This, of course, is easily done because a few well aimed 
shots speak a persuasive language. The result is an intense hatred of those punished for the whites who 
interfered without reason in the exercise of their rights and merely brought about what the natives saw 
as a state of lawlessness (ibid. : 104-05). 
6 The inverted commas were also used by Neuhauss, although he had no qualms about pronouncing Melanesian women 
who performed customary abortions "guilty" without inverted commas (see below in the text). 
7 The meaning of the term "Mutterrechf' is closer to "matrilineality" than "matriarchy". It indicates that the legal status 
of a person follows that of his or her mother rather than the father. 
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Eloquent as the natives could be on such occasions, there were serious communication 
problems on others, since the officials had to use Pidgin in their judicial investigations-a bastard 
language which was quite inadequate for the purpose. Thus "the judge" had convinced himself 
in one particular case that the confused evidence of the native servant of a bird-of-paradise hunter, 
who in the meantime had died of pneumonia, proved that the natives had treacherously fired 
arrows at the hunter before he fell sick, forcing him to shoot one of his attackers in self-defence. 
Because the official had already received several other complaints about the same village he 
ordered a punitive expedition. What had in fact happened, according to Neuhauss, was this: The 
hunter's dog had attacked the village dogs and had bitten a native who had interfered in the fight. 
When the natives had thereupon speared his dog, the hunter had shot one of them dead and 
seriously wounded several others. The "treacherous attack" for which the natives had been 
punished had never taken place. "We do well to remember incidents such as this when we hear 
about yet another native rebellion" (ibid. :  106). 
IV 
Both Berghausen and Neuhauss were more concerned with arguing a case than with presenting 
history. But whereas Berghausen spoke for the government, N euhauss spoke for "the opposition". 
This gave him a distinct advantage. He could focus on criticising a few negative features while 
Berghausen, in addition to countering this criticism, had to paint a fundamentally positive overall 
picture. On the other hand, his favourable position tempted Neuhauss to present more details than 
necessary and to paint them in the brightest colours-and N euhauss was not the man to resist such 
a temptation. This was shown most clearly by his treatment of the killing of Dammkohler which, 
he claimed, was based on a personal communication by Dammkohler' s companion, Oldorp, who 
had subsequently drowned during a second attempt to reach the gold of the Watut. 
According to Neuhauss' s full version, Dammkohler and Oldorp had been sitting in their tent 
when they were suddenly showered with arrows by 30 screaming natives who had lined up in the 
shallow water of a river in front of them. 
Oldorp had the presence of mind to hold a piece of tarpaulin like a shield in front of himself. Both 
[Oldorp and Dammkohler] fired their rifles incessantly and shot down one [native] after the other. But 
one arrow after the other also found its mark. Dammkohler was soon pierced by four in his arms, chest 
and lower abdomen and five in his legs. He started to cough blood, a sign that his lung had been tom. 
Oldorp received six wounds but none of them was life-threatening because the tarpaulin he held in front 
of himself had weakened the power of the arrows. When they had used up all their arrows the five 
surviving blacks-25 were lying as corpses in the bed of the river-retreated with measured steps as if 
nothing had happened. Two hours later Dammkohler died, due to internal bleeding (ibid. : 94). 
Neuhauss' s  interpretation of the event reads as follows : 
What caused the natives to carry out the attack? Anyone familiar with their way of thinking will conclude 
without hesitating for a moment: the two whites came by themselves, unaccompanied by blacks but in 
the company of enormous animals. They could therefore only be spirits, and naturally evil ones, because 
friendly spirits are exceedingly rare in New Guinea. The warning shots Dammkohler had [earlier] fired 
had strengthened their view that the spirits had come to destroy them with thunder and lightning. During 
daylight the cowardly Papuans never attack human beings. They wait until night has fallen. Moreover, 
if they had thought that they were confronting human beings, they would have run away without fail, after 
one of them had been shot down. Instead 25 let themselves be killed without retreating a single step, and 
afterwards the five survivors walked home with measured steps. If the natives had only seen one or two 
of their own kind together with the whites they would have known that they could negotiate with them 
and deal with them on friendly terms (ibid.) .  
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I was back in the Wonderland of narrative history, where whites could fire their rifles incessantly, 
and with deadly accuracy, while simultaneously holding tarpaulins in front of themselves as 
shields ,  and where the blacks, who were such cowards that they attacked human beings only at 
night, made a habit of fighting evil spirits en masse in broad daylight. Yet not even Berghausen 
appeared to have noticed that Neuhauss was talking colourful nonsense instead of demonstrating 
his expertise in understanding "the native mind". But then Berghausen also suspended his critical 
faculties when he presented his own case. 
For example, did it not follow from the argument that the colonists were bound to treat the 
natives well because it was in their economic interest to do so, that any governmental control of 
their behaviour in relation to the natives was superfluous in this self-regulating universe of 
enlightened self-interest? It certainly did not follow for Berghausen. Nor did he apply the 
argument to Chinese or Malays. In their case economic self-interest could not be relied upon to 
assure a humane treatment of German New Guinea' s  indigenous population if they were left to 
their own devices. But this was just as well, because their proper place in Berghausen' s  scheme 
of things was to work as artisans and overseers for the white colonists. As for "the natives", the 
argument was altogether immaterial because they still behaved in a fundamentally irrational 
manner. This too was convenient because it would have been difficult to convince them that it was 
in their economic interest to let white colonists shoot birds�of-paradise on their land, to remove 
gold from it, or even to sell the land to them, so as to be able to enter their services as plantation 
labourers. Instead Berghausen stood defiantly by what he proclaimed as the first principle of 
German colonial rule: "We have our colonies not for their sake, not for the benefit of the natives, 
but for our own!" 
What made Berghausen' s manuscript interesting was that it transformed this "brutally honest" 
principle into an ideological phantom which obliged the metropolitan German taxpayer to 
subsidise the activities of the colonial government. How did he do it? By means of semantic shifts 
which blurred distinctions instead of identifying them, but which were instinctive rather than 
calculated. Like Neuhauss, Berghausen did not set out to trick his readers, he himself believed that 
what he was saying made convincing sense. 
The formulation of his first principle already prepared the ground for these shifts. It began by 
contrasting a "we"-which meant "we Germans" as a nation-with a "they"-the colonies as 
territories-but immediately replaced this "they" with another "they", namely "the natives" as the 
indigenous inhabitants of these territories, who were not recognised as nations but treated as an 
aggregation of colonial subjects who came with the colonies as territories and whose interests 
were not going to determine how these territories were ruled. Nonetheless,  it was "the colonies" 
which gradually moved into the centre of the stage albeit in the shape of "the colonists" as the 
colonisers, in contrast to "the natives" as the colonised. Moreover, while "the colonists" were 
ideally a part of "we Germans", their "Germanness" was replaced by their shared colonising task 
as the decisive identifying feature. 
To be sure, Berghausen did not believe that "we Germans" had "our colonies" in the interests 
of Chinese or Malays, who were themselves not colonists but were instruments of colonisation, 
to be used by the true colonists, namely the whites . But non-German whites could also qualify as 
colonists in Berghausen' s book. Even more importantly, the crucial argument for excluding 
Chinese and Malays from the profitable hunting of birds-of-paradise was not that they were not 
white but that they exported their profits instead of investing them in the colony-now clearly 
seen as a territory. Indeed, in this case Berghausen applied the same argument to whites, including 
Germans. He did not propose to restrict the hunting of birds-of-paradise to German nationals but 
to colonists who invested their profits in the economic development of German New Guinea in 
contrast to metropolitan German capitalists who failed to appreciate the economic potential of this 
remote colony. 
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Although Berghausen used the reluctance of German capitalists to invest in German New 
Guinea as a reason why "we Germans" as a nation had a special obligation to subsidise the colony 
with "our" taxes, until it could stand financially on its own feet, his manuscript, taken as a whole, 
gave the impression that he preferred this public subsidy alternative to large-scale private 
investment, because he saw economic development as a means to an end, as a means of financing 
a civilised form of territorial government. Indeed, for him, economic development was a 
consequence of civilised government rather than a precondition, because it was "the natives" who 
represented "our most valuable capital" in German New Guinea. To preserve and increase this 
capital was therefore more important than to attract German, much less foreign investment, and 
this aim could only be achieved by advancing "the natives" culturally, by turning them into 
civilised participants in a market economy. 
Once the key role of the cultural advancement of "the natives" was appreciated everything fell 
into place. To say that "we" had "our colonies" for "our sake" merely meant that "the natives" had 
no right to refuse to be culturally advanced by "us". On the contrary, they had a duty to let 
themselves be so advanced, just as "we" had a corresponding duty to bring about this 
advancement, for "our" sake as well as theirs . There were no contradictions, rather a natural order 
of priorities and a natural division of labour. 
The cultural advancement of "the natives" had to pave the way for the economic development 
of the colony, and the former was essentially the task of the colonial government, whereas the 
latter was essentially the task of "the colonists" who, together with the colonial government-and 
"the natives", as they became civilised-formed "the colony" as a body of people. The task of "we 
Germans" as a nation was to provide the colonial government with sufficient "means of power" 
to carry out its task of bringing the colonisers and the colonised together under a civilised 
government until the economic development of the colony had progressed far enough to continue 
under its own steam. 
To say that "we have our colonies for our sake" did not mean that German colonies were to 
become territories from which large German companies transferred big profits to their 
metropolitan shareholders, or which allowed a small group of individual German businessmen to 
get rich so that they could retire with their fortunes to Germany or, worse still, to the French 
Riviera. The aim was to create a Neu Deutschland in the tropics, an ordered local community, in 
which "we Germans" formed a quasi-feudal upper-class-but one into which "the natives" could 
also be integrated as they advanced culturally, first replacing the Chinese and Malays as artisans 
and overseers and then becoming small entrepreneurs in their own right, who would be able to see 
that German colonial rule was also in their best interests, economic and otherwise. This was why 
"we" had "our colonies"; they gave the Fatherland an opportunity to spawn strong sons in other 
parts of the globe who would owe it filial love and support if "we" nurtured them generously 
during their infancy. 
But this goal was still a long way off, at least in German New Guinea, where "the colony" 
continued to live on a volcano which could erupt any minute. This was exclusively due to the 
warlike character of its natives and to the tenacity with which they clung to their savage customs. 
It was only by providing the colonial government with sufficient means of power to demonstrate 
that resistance to German colonial rule was pointless that this situation could be changed and the 
economic development of the colony could be accelerated. "Give us funds to establish a network 
of government stations" was Berghausen' s message, "and the rest will follow, because the natives 
will not fail to appreciate the advantages a civilised government is bringing them, once their 
primitive superstitions have lost their hold and they begin to think rationally. To impose instead 
a total ban on the hunting of birds-of-paradise, which is at long last giving a boost to the economic 
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development of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, is an irrational response which will only make life harder 
for everybody."8 
What little Neuhauss had to say about the prospects of German New Guinea sounded 
remarkably gloomy. The climate was rotten, the soil was poor, and there was a serious shortage 
of labourers because the native population was small and the importation of labourers expensive. 
Besides, "any friend of the natives could only wish that as few natives as possible will work on 
plantations" ( 19 14:  135-37). But this was going too far-although Neuhauss had gone even 
further three years earlier when he had expressed the view that one could only hope that as little 
gold as possible would be discovered, because unscrupulous prospectors would do irreparable 
harm to the natives ( 191 1 :  44 1 ) .9 Neuhauss therefore warned that it would be totally wrong to 
conclude from his description that it would be best to abandon German New Guinea as quickly 
as possible. If the colonists played it safe and stuck to the production of copra, something could 
be achieved, although the colony would never become a second Java. Better still, the prospects 
could substantially improve, "once we know New Guinea [that is to say Kaiser Wilhelmsland] 
better". Perhaps its interior concealed rich and readily exploitable mineral resources. Perhaps its 
population was also more numerous than had hitherto been assumed ( 1914:  137-141) . 10 
How did Neuhauss, as a friend of the natives, see the future of the colony? No punitive 
expeditions, no hunting of birds-of-paradise and as few plantations as possible. On the other hand, 
he did not believe that the natives could be left to their own devices because their own culture had 
been doomed since the first whites had settled in their country to make commercial profits (ibid. : 
1 30). Economic colonisation was bound to undermine the old culture without putting a new one 
in its place. Under these circumstances it was best to rely as much as possible on the missions. The 
natives needed a new faith which gave them the strength to let go of their intolerable heathen 
superstitions and permitted them to become more civilised-which, for Neuhauss too, primarily 
meant working harder. 
Neuhauss was all in favour of teaching the natives to work, but for themselves rather than for 
the colonists. Once more he presented a specific illustration: the native community which had been 
created by the N euendettelsau missionary Christian Keysser on Sattelberg, on the Huon Peninsula. 
Within 1 5  years, Neuhauss claimed, Keysser had turned a tribe of savages into an industrious 
people, living in a well ordered polity. Using gentle force at first, he had persuaded natives who 
had hitherto lived in scattered hamlets to move together into larger villages, where they could 
assist, encourage and supervise each other. The people were so impressed by the advantages of 
this move that Keysser could soon introduce a communal "work scheme" (Arbeitsordnung ). Under 
the two overseers whom each village elected, its inhabitants worked together for the first three 
days of the week, building houses and roads, and making gardens. At the end of each week the 
overseers came together to report to Keysser and to exchange their experiences among themselves. 
This too proved so successful that a referendum carried out by Keysser had unanimously endorsed 
the scheme. No-one wanted to return to the old chaos. 
The crowning achievement had been the construction of village prisons and the administration 
of strict punishments ,  including corporal punishments, which, Neuhauss claimed, reflected the 
natives' own sense of justice. 
If the government had imposed the same punishment, the natives would have seen this as an interference 
in their rights. No-one wants to be patronised, including the blacks. Since the natives have a fine feeling 
8 These are, of course, my words, rather than Berghausen's. 
8 This new optimism was probably linked with an extravagant project Neuhauss was advocating: the systematic 
exploration of the interior of the main island of New Guinea by airships at an estimated cost of 3 million Marks (ibid.: 
141 -44).  This was almost twice the total subsidy of the Reich to German New Guinea's 1914 budget, although the 
expenses were to be shared between Germany, Britain and Holland. 
9 The discovery of an uncommonly populous tribe by the British/German Border Expedition had made this likely. 
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for their own customs and laws-and for their own lies and tricks-a guilty native will rarely escape 
punishment if he is tried by a court the natives hold themselves. Along the coast the government has 
appointed headmen by giving them a cap and a stick. It was inevitable that they occasionally exceeded 
their official powers. They also sent their people to do the work while they themselves lazed around. 
When one of the overseers the natives had elected wanted to follow this example his people gave him 
quite a surprise (ibid. : 133) ! 
The test came when a bird-of-paradise hunter requested Keysser to get him carriers. 
I asked the village overseers at their meeting [Neuhauss quoted Keysser] 1 1  to supply the carriers. They 
promised to pass on the request of the white man. Because of his unpopularity it was predictable that no­
one would volunteer to carry his boxes. I therefore insisted that the overseers immediately nominate 25 
carriers and that their names be written down. Each overseernamed two and the whole matter was settled. 
Not one of those named refused to go. For anyone who knows the people here an astonishing result 
(ibid.). 
All this could be accomplished, Neuhauss concluded, if a man knew what he could ask from his 
people and had the courage to get his way. 
Neuhauss appreciated that it was unrealistic to expect that German New Guinea would be 
handed over to the missions. Nor was he against economic development, but he wanted it to 
progress slowly, steadily and peacefully. He also agreed with Berghausen that a successful 
colonisation of German New Guinea required greater financial metropolitan support. In contrast 
to Berghausen, who was handicapped in this regard, Neuhauss put the blame for a lack of support 
and for a premature push for financial self-sufficiency squarely on the colonial office. This comes 
through particularly clearly in his 191 1 discussion of corvee labour, of which he also 
approved-in principle. Again Neuhauss used a particular case to make his point, this time the 
establishment of the government station in Morobe, which had required a large labour force. 
A few black police soldiers were sent out who had to conscript blacks for a month along the coast, right 
up to the mouth of the Markham River. This was done as follows: the black soldiers, armed with their 
rifles, ordered the villagers to line up and selected the required number without the least concern as to 
whether a man had perhaps to leave behind a mortally ill wife or son, or frail parents. This caused much 
bad blood, and it was only due to the influence of the resident Neuendettelsau missionaries that serious 
conflicts were avoided . . .  
When I talked about these problems with the government official, an unusually understanding and 
humane man, he told me: "What could I do? I know very well that my presence would be necessary when 
the people were enlisted, to avoid harshness and injustice, but I am more than fully occupied at the station 
and do not know where to start. I must have labourers, and since I am unable to get someone to relieve 
me at the station, I have no choice but to send the black police soldiers without any supervision." 
This system saves the salary of one white official and when the tempest sweeps across the country 
four warships have to be mobilised to punish the "guilty" persons (who, in fact sit. . .in Berlin) and "to put 
down the rebellion"-which costs, quite apart from the loss of human life, a hundred times more than 
the salary saved. 
The causes of the unfortunate events on Ponape bear a fatal resemblance to the conditions just 
described. It was reported for Ponape that: "Development accelerated under the new district 
commissioner. Until then the natives had been treated extraordinarily gently. Now more energetic action 
was taken. They were required to perform tax labour not only for 1910 but also for the previous year . . .  
The road building programme was rapidly pushed ahead . . .  All this caused deep ferment." 
The Papuan is a good-natured fellow who is prepared to put up with a great deal. But if his anger 
piles up because he was continuously put under too much strain, he behaves as any other human being 
would (Neuhauss, 1 9 1 1 :  453-54). 
1 1  Neuhauss relied exclusively on a paper published by Keysser, rather than on observations he had made during his visit 
to Sanelberg, when he had apparently shown little interest in issues of this kind. 
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Three years later Neuhauss used even stronger colours, warning that, if sufficiently provoked, the 
good-natured black would "unleash the animal within him with unusual abandon" ( 1 914: 1 27). 
He also contrasted the soft Polynesians and Micronesians, who had quickly crumbled during the 
clash of cultures, with the tough Melanesians in the Bismarck Archipelago, and the even tougher 
Papuans in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. They were likely to put up a much more determined resistance. 
The whites would find them a harder nut to crack and probably break a few of their own teeth in 
the process (ibid. : 121). 
In other words, the situation in Kaiser Wilhelmsland was far more serious than it had been in 
Ponape and the rebellion there would come to be seen as a minor ripple compared with the tidal 
waves which were likely to sweep across the former, unless the misguided policy of accelerated 
economic development was abandoned. 12 This assessment of the situation came in its core close 
to that of Berghausen who even regarded the coastal tribes along the Huon Gulf-which Neuhauss 
had had specifically in mind in 191 1-as being disappointingly effete compared with those in the 
western part of Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the interior. But Berghausen drew different conclusions. 
For him the "Papuans" were not good-natured children who could be gradually persuaded to do 
anything, but savage grown-ups who would only submit to superior military force. The quicker 
and more convincingly it was demonstrated to them that resistance to colonial rule was pointless, 
the better it would be for all concerned, just as it was also in the best interests of the natives to 
speed up economic development, since this would allow them to participate more quickly in the 
material advantages of civilisation. 
Berghausen did not have the opportunity to respond to Neuhauss ' s  praise of Keysser's 
approach around the Sattelberg, but I could easily imagine what he would have said. What future 
did these people have, if they did not sell their labour or their cash crops? To be sure, it was 
foolish to put too much pressure on them and to let things get out of control, but it was ridiculous 
to permit a few savages to dictate the rate of progress. The natives had to learn their lesson, and 
to teach it firmly and speedily was more humane than to prolong the agonies of frontier wrangles. 
The only realistic response to the challenge of German New Guinea was a strong colonial 
government which could establish and maintain public peace and create conditions under which 
the whites and the blacks could enjoy the fruits of their labours, until the differences between 
them-in both senses of the word-would disappear, and they would disappear most rapidly in 
areas which initially offered the most determined resistance, because its strength was, at the same 
time, a manifestation of the high quality of the local population as "human material" 
(Menschenmaterial). 
Although I was confident that this captured Berghausen' s  sentiments I felt uneasy because my 
desire to be conclusive had tempted me to rely more on my intuition in my interpretation of the 
views of Berghausen and Neuhauss than I would have liked. I was therefore delighted when I had 
the opportunity to visit the archives of the Neuendettelsau mission to investigate what its 
missionaries had written at the time about my two protagonists. 
v 
Since I had found the account of the recruitment of corvee labourers by the government station 
in Morobe by Neuhauss his most persuasive illustration, I began my search by consulting the 1910 
annual report of  the mission station in  Malalo, its closest neighbour. 
Its body (NDM 55/1) offered no relevant information, but it was followed by a brief 
postscript-not intended for publication by its author, Karl Mailander-which went straight to the 
point. The establishment of the government station had caused widespread unrest among the 
people. This was mainly due to misunderstandings, but they also grumbled about their corvee 
12 In fact the Madang Conspiracy in 1 9 1 2  was a flash in the pan compared with the Ponape Rebellion. 
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labour, mainly because the official in charge, unable to do the recruiting himself, had sent his 
native policemen whose behaviour had left much to be desired. 
The 191 1 report, written by Hermann Boettger (ibid.), was more forthcoming. It appeared that 
the government had started to organise the natives "in the name of the kiap", 13 although Boettger 
could only report what his flock chose to tell him about these important developments, since he 
had not been officially informed about them. According to these reports, district officer Klink had 
announced that corvee labour would soon be replaced by a head tax, whereas district 
commissioner Dr Stuebel14 had earlier informed the people that they would be drafted to serve the 
government in other parts of the colony. This had created "a healthy terror". Even old women and 
young children suddenly wanted to earn money for the kiap. But the natives were disappointed 
with the wages Boettger was able to pay; and he was disappointed with their efforts, because they 
rarely turned up before eight or nine in the morning and often left before noon. Moreover, he had 
now been told that the kiap had instructed the people to go and work on a new plantation north 
of the Markham River. Objectively speaking, it was to be welcomed that the government applied 
some pressure, as the people were unwilling to work on their own initiative and consequently 
walked around in a state which made one feel ashamed for them. But where was the mission going 
to get its workforce?-in particular as governor Hahl was reported as having told the coastal 
natives: "You are my people whom I will take as my police boys. You are not to go with the ships 
[recruiting for the plantations] . They should get their labourers from the Kai and Kaiwa [further 
inland] ." When the Madang had come to recruit a few months later, the tultul from Laukanu had 
rushed back to his village to stop anyone from signing on because the time for corvc�e labour was 
drawing near, for which each village had to produce between 20 and 40 men. It was 
understandable that the villages wanted to keep their young men back for this purpose. Boettger 
could only hope that he would be able to obtain enough labourers for the mission from among the 
married men. 
These glimpses of "subaltern" history were intriguing because they suggested that, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, "the natives" had not experienced German colonial rule as "harsh but 
just" but as a confusing array of contradictory orders and announcements. Yet this had not been 
the kind of information I had been looking for. I therefore turned to the letters the mission's  
senior, Johannes Flierl, had written to his German headquarters, since he was more likely to have 
expressed his personal views about local officials and important visitors in this confidential 
correspondence. 
When I flicked through the several hundred letters-or, rather, a collection of typewritten 
copies (NDM 52121)-a reference to Neuhauss in a letter of 24 May 1 9 1 2  caught my attention. 
According to Flierl, his "Berliner Schnauze", the big mouth for which Berliners are notorious, had 
made Neuhauss intensely unpopular among all local officials. Unfortunately this had also affected 
their attitude to the mission because they knew very well "which calf had pulled his plow" (that 
is to say who had provided him with the information used) when he criticised the authorities. "If 
we had only been able to put a different face [frisieren] on what he said and wrote about our 
mission." 
This cri de coeur led Flierl directly to Berghausen who, he claimed, had been sent by acting 
governor Osswald, a Catholic, to Kaiser Wilhelmsland with instructions to destroy the 
"Neuendettelsauer Kirchenstaat" (church-state) in a frontal attack while governor Hahl, a 
1 3  Pidgin terms like "kiap" were beginning to gain wider currency at the time. Their spelling was still idiosyncratic-just 
as was the spelling of the term "Pidgin" itself. I am generally using the modem version. The term kiap referred to all 
government officials but in particular to the person in charge of a local administration, the district officer or district 
commissioner. 
14 The government station in Morobe was placed under the governor rather than the district commissioner in Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen so that Hahl may well have decided to send Stuebe!, the district commissioner in Rabaul, rather than 
district commissioner Scholz in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, as his agent to Morobe. 
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Protestant, was on home leave. Berghausen had finally given up this attack, but perhaps only 
because "he now wants to cut us down to size with a series of pinpricks". On the other hand, to 
be censured, after having been praised for so long, also had a positive side: "it makes us careful". 
Which reminds me: please examine all our reports from the field thoroughly before printing them. I found 
in the latest issue of the Missions Blatt something which should not have been published, and I have 
written today to brother Keysser in this matter. Missions Blatt, No. 2, page 1 1 , second column, last 
paragraph: ten strokes with the cane, under the supervision of the missionary, administered by a former 
police soldier as a corporal punishment to enforce church discipline! Such beatings are only permissible 
here if the person ordering them has been expressly authorised by the government. .. and each beating has 
to be reported to government, identifying the reason, the number of strokes and so on. All other beatings 
will be punished. If they do take place in Keysser' s district, they should at least not be publicised. 
While it was too late to do anything about the damage caused by Neuhauss, Keysser and 
Berghausen were continuing concerns. Flierl had already voiced them in a letter of 1 1  October 
191 1 .  An atheist with a Catholic background, Berghausen was a determined enemy of the 
Neuendettelsau mission-and a dangerous one, because he was a man of much energy and 
boundless ambition, anxious to earn himself a medal. He was due to go on home leave but planned 
to return. This was a prospect not to be relished because he wanted to separate the natives from 
the mission as well as the planters. Berghausen was especially opposed to the mission's "boarding 
schools" (Kostschulen) because they helped to strengthen its influence over the natives. He had 
therefore insisted that the mission register its boarders as labourers and pay the appropriate fees 
for them. When told of governor Hahl' s decision that boarders did not have to be registered as 
labourers, he had responded that he would make sure the mission got no new boarders and that 
he had advised the planters that they were free to recruit the mission's  current boarders as 
labourers. 
Berghausen had gone as far as threatening natives with kalabus (prison) if they went to the 
mission. His motto was parity between Christianity and heathendom. He demonstrated his 
neutrality by refusing to sleep or eat at any of the mission's stations . Where heathen customs were 
still firmly rooted, the natives therefore believed that the kiap favoured their continuation. Yet, 
Berghausen had himself tried to demolish their belief in sorcery in Astrolabe Bay. He had decreed 
that every death be reported to him, so that the government doctor could examine the corpse and, 
by publicly pronouncing the official cause of death-in "Pidgeon Englisch" rather than in 
Latin-remove the basis for any sorcery accusations. This scheme had, of course, proved to be 
impractical, and Berghausen, fortunately, had also failed to secure funds to establish a government 
school for 400 pupils in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, although he perhaps now wanted to finance this 
venture with the fees he was trying to charge the mission for its boarders. 15 
The Rhenish mission in Astrolabe Bay, on the other hand, regretted Berghausen's  departure, 
because he had become more reasonable in the course of the year, and because Scholz, who would 
replace him, was a practising Catholic who would favour the Catholic mission. The white 
community in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen had used the wedding of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's  
manager to express its feelings about Berghausen in the form of a poem comparing him to Baron 
Milnchhausen. Each verse had ended with the refrain: "And all this was my work". Berghausen 
had put on a smiling face and declared that being forced to look in a mirror which showed how 
one was seen by others was not a bad thing. Flierl was not sure whether Berghausen had 
mellowed, or whether Scholz would be worse, but he was convinced that relations between the 
mission and the government had reached a delicate point where all tensions had to be avoided. 
1 5  One of Berghausen's  objections against the Kostschulen was the mission's policy of using native languages, rather 
than German, as a medium of instruction, because this isolated the pupils from the outside world and locked them into 
little mission enclaves. 
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Although he was concerned about some particular "foolish actions" (Dummheiten) of several 
missionaries, he was more worried about the whole approach Keysser had adopted. 
In a letter of 10 September 1912, Flierl returned to this question. There was something 
basically wrong with the community government Keysser had introduced in the Sattelberg area. 
Until recently Keysser had also worked through church elders . Now he regarded them as "softies" 
(Waschlappen) and had replaced them by forceful overseers, armed with a cane and backed by a 
prison. To report these changes to the government had been unnecessary as well as unwise. 
Governor Hahl would be pleased if the natives were taught to work, no matter how, because he 
could then tax them, but another official could easily twist this "system of beatings" 
(Priigelsystem) into a rope with which to hang the mission. 
Flierl was also sceptical about the comparisons with ancient history which Keysser had 
apparently made in his report to the governor. These arrangements were not a plant which had 
grown from traditional roots but something entirely new which had been inspired by Keysser. It 
was Keysser who was holding all the strings, and the theocratic republic he was creating was 
bound to degenerate into a secular despoty, if it was given enough time. But this was unlikely to 
happen, since the government would soon organise the natives and replace Keysser's overseers 
with its own luluai and tultul, thus leaving the mission with nothing. 
Flierl was in favour of maintaining a healthy church discipline, but it had to be maintained 
verbally rather than physically. This did not mean that minors did not sometimes deserve a hiding 
and some really bad ones even a proper beating, but these punishments had to be carried out 
"privately and quietly" (in aller Stille), because one smack in the face could earn a missionary a 
fine of 20 Marks if a complaint was made to the government. 
Another letter by Flierl, written the same day, painted a different picture of colonial law in 
German New Guinea. It grew out of a plea to spare his son the strain of having to study colonial 
law as part of an updated form of missionary training. The farmers in his part of Bavaria, Flierl 
began, had a saying that the law had a waxen nose which could be turned in all directions. In the 
colonies this proverb had to be modified because the waxen nose of the law was always turned 
to disadvantage the natives and to favour their colonial masters, naturally behind a facade of 
legality. Colonial legislation proliferated with tropical fertility. It already filled more than a dozen 
volumes-the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung-which cost over 100 Marks. 16 No doubt students 
in Germany would be taught an ideal colonial law designed to bring culture and humanity to 
primitive tribes . All the greater would be their shock when they came to the colonies and 
discovered that it was, in fact, used as "Kolonial-Unrecht" (colonial 'un-law' = in-justice) fortheir 
brutal oppression. All one had to know about colonial law in colonial practice, as the missionaries 
had learned with great pain, could be summed up in three short sentences: 1 .  No native had a 
lasting claim to land which was suitable for whites. 2. All natives had the duty to cultivate as much 
land as possible for the whites so as to make them rich quickly. 3. The missionaries had to put up 
with this and teach the blacks to become obedient subjects and efficient labourers. 
This gloomy picture had also been prompted by the news of a conspiracy in Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen, said to have been caused by the natives' loss of their land. Similar reactions could 
be observed on the Huon Peninsula and in the Huon Gulf, although here-where the 
Neuendettelsau mission was by far the most expansive landlord-naturally they had nothing to 
do with the alienation of land. Instead they were produced by the recruiting of natives as labourers 
which often involved the use of "gentle force" (sanfte Gewalt). Already statements like "If the 
whites did not have their guns . . .  " were reported from all along the coast. Flierl could understand 
the mood of the people. They could neither decide for themselves whether or not they wanted to 
16 Was I unduly cynical when I read this as also implying that this was a great deal more than a poor missionary could 
afford to spend on a sideline of the education of his son? 
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sign on, nor were they drafted into service by the government in an orderly manner. Rather they 
were confronted by a barrage of lies and coercion. 
When the natives had asked him to complain to the governor about a particular group of 
recruiters, an official investigation had confirmed their accusations, but the main culprit had by 
then already fled the colony. Moreover, the officials who had conducted the investigation had 
themselves tried to persuade a guide supplied by the mission, and a houseboy serving at one of 
its stations, to sign on with the government. The government steamer Komet had taken 27 men 
from another station , including two pupils and many married men. When police soldiers had come 
soon afterwards to recruit for the district office in Madang, this had caused such a panic that even 
a seriously ill man had asked to be carried to the ship to enlist. Of course he had not been 
accepted, since the mission was welcome to look after the old and sick. But if such visitations 
continued the entire coastal population would disappear within a few decades and Germany could 
only sell her empty colony at a loss to an Asian power! 
When a maj or disturbance in the Sattelberg hinterland came to a head with bloody fights only 
a month later, it required yet another explanation because neither the alienation of native land nor 
the recruitment of natives as labourers could be held responsible. In a letter to governor Hahl, 
dated 2 November 1912-the height of the crisis-Flierl gave his "official" version: 
The sudden unrest. . .is not a local feud among natives, during which the whites and the missionaries are 
al ways treated as neutral, but it was caused by a fundamental opposition to Christian morality and culture 
and a fanatical defence of the evil heathen ways. The ferment could easily bring us misfortune. Yet, it 
may also mean that Good will soon triumph in the entire area. 17 For the time being we do not fear for the 
safety of our stations, since the natives here were always braver in their words than in their deeds and 
rarely dare to attack over long distances. 1 8  
When Berghausen returned as district commissioner to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in January 1913 ,  
"Good" had not yet triumphed, but things had calmed down and Flierl had more urgent matters 
to consider than the natives ' opposition to Christian morality. District commissioner Scholz had 
been more cooperative than had been expected-but then he had hardly been in a position to 
complain about failings on the part of the mission, since one of his subordinates had removed 
stacks of official correspondence from the district office, because he had been unwilling or unable 
to deal with it. 19 By contrast, Berghausen, the new broom, wanted to sweep all the more 
energetically. Flierl found his letters courteous enough but dreaded their first meeting because he 
had heard that Berghausen often lost his temper during personal encounters. "I shall show the 
imperial district office all due respect and can only hope that the young man representing it will 
suspend his medieval [sic] behaviour'', he wrote on 17 March 1913 .  
A week later Flierl was able to report how he  had fared. Berghausen had been better than his 
reputation. He had expressed his general satisfaction with the activities of the mission and had not 
even pushed the question of the registration of its boarders too hard-probably because he knew 
that an ordinance dealing with native education, about which Flierl had been told by governor 
Hahl, was in the pipeline. The other major bone of contention-the role the mission was expected 
17  Flierl meant "das Gute" -as opposed to "das Bose" ( evil)-in the sense of a superhuman force, rather than in the sense 
of "goodness" as an attribute of human beings. 
1 8  Flierl had sent this letter to Neuendettelsau, "for the files", although he claimed that it had not been posted because 
of "an oversight" (aus Versehen). I rather suspect that Flierl decided not to post this letter-in which he had also asked 
the governor for 1 2  rifles as a matter of urgency-when he learned the next day that an expedition sent out to rescue 
Keysser had returned safely with him. 
19 According to another letter by Flierl, dated 22 November 1 9 1 2, the man had been arrested when trying to depart for 
Australia. Since he had drawn his revolver, he was tied up and escorted by 15 policemen to "the prison in Rabaul". Over 
1 30 official letters were found in his suitcase, including several from the Neuendettelsau mission. 
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to play in the compilation of a tax census-had also disappeared because Berghausen did not 
intend to introduce the head tax on the Huon Peninsula, which Scholz had announced a few 
months earlier, 20 and because Berghausen himself had counted the coastal population right down 
to the mouth of the Markham River. 
Regrettably Berghausen had cut down the size of a block of land granted to the mission on 
Umboi Island because coconut palms belonging to natives had been found to grow on much of the 
area and because missions would henceforth be granted no more than 25 hectares for a station 
manned with a "priest".2 1 In Flierl 's view there was little that could be done to alter this new 
policy, although this did not matter in this particular case, since probably no station for a white 
missionary would ever be built on the land. 22 Berghausen had also mentioned that native labourers 
had complained about their treatment in one of the mission' s  commercial establishments: illegal 
beatings and underpayments-to which Flierl had responded with the promise that he would do 
all he could to make sure that everything would be handled correctly in future. Finally, 
Berghausen had requested further information about various blocks of land the mission had 
applied for along the Huon Gulf. So as to be able to discuss these matters promptly and properly, 
Flierl had arranged that all the mission's land files would be available in Finschhafen before 
Berghausen's  arrival. 
Our entire conversation was quiet and friendly. I have gained the impression that we will be able to get 
along with district commissioner Berghausen if we all behave as correctly as possible. 
This was a far cry from Flierl' s earlier assessment of Berghausen-and of the role of colonial 
law in German New Guinea. Perhaps Flierl would have requested that the legal training of future 
missionaries be intensified, had he dealt with that topic on this particular day, instead of 
dismissing it as a waste of time. But perhaps he had merely been lucky because he had met 
Berghausen on one of the rare days when he was not "stupefied by morphine" (see above: 
54Mr cranky because he was in need of another shot? On the other hand, was it likely that 
Flierl, who found it worth reporting that Berghausen had only gone to mass once, at his father's 
funeral,23 would not have also mentioned this "problem", if it had been as serious as Firth made 
it out to be?-and Flierl was obviously well informed about other gossip circulating locally about 
Berghausen. But was likelihood an appropriate yardstick when it came to interpreting the views 
of a man who complained about the waxen nose of the colonial law in German New Guinea but 
treated its history as if it consisted entirely of putty which he could give whatever shape was most 
advantageous in a particular context? 
Had his conversation with Berghausen convinced Flierl that the Rule of Law had finally 
arrived in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and that it would henceforth be governed in accordance with "the 
book", that is to say the numerous volumes of the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung, or had he 
merely come to the conclusion that it was in the interest of the mission to put on a show of 
correctness for the time being, to please Berghausen and prevent him from causing trouble? Was 
Flierl in his own way just as firmly committed to the Rule of Law as Berghausen and Neuhauss? 
Did they all see colonial rule in German New Guinea as an essentially legal enterprise, aimed at 
approaching the ideal of justice and equality before the law as closely as possible? Or had all the 
references to the Rule of Law, from Schmiele's 1 887 circular onwards (see above: 1 88), been 
20 Flierl was rather pleased about this decision because he hoped that a continuation of corvee labour would in time 
produce a rideable road from Finschhafen to the Markham. 
21 It was Flierl who placed this offensive term, which Berghausen had apparently used, in inverted commas. 
22 Nonetheless Flierl had applied, just in case, for the previous maximum size of 100 hectares for a station under a white 
missionary. 
23 See Flierl' s letter of 1 1  October 191 1 .  
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empty rhetoric? Did the planters and traders, the prospectors and bird-of-paradise hunters also 
believe that economic development and the Rule of Law had to go hand in hand, or did they not 
care about either and see the colonial government as interfering in their attempts to amass a 
personal fortune as quickly as possible? Did they at least by and large treat the natives humanely 
because they accepted that this was in their own economic interests, or did they consider them as 
a disposable resource to be exploited as vigorously as possible? Did they prefer the freedom of 
using the gun, the cane and the torch to a maximisation of profit? Conversely, was the Rule of 
Law seen not as a political ideal but as an inevitable product of history which would come about 
sooner or later, no matter what people did, because it was part of a natural and necessary 
evolutionary process? Or were the attitudes and actions of "the whites" in German New Guinea, 
collectively and individually, shaped by a changing mixture of all these and many other ideas, 
instincts and emotions? 
It was plain that this last question had to be answered in the affirmative, but this did not help 
me. On the contrary, it demonstrated that it was pointless to approach the history of German 
colonial rule from the ideological perspective. It was clear that racism, nationalism, the self­
interest of groups and individuals, personal greed and brutality, sexual and religious preferences 
and prejudices, the desire to save souls and the pleasure of causing others to suffer and, above all, 
the ability not to see what one did not want to see but to see what one wanted to see, even if it was 
not there, all played their part. But to identify the mixture of all these ingredients in particular 
instances, let alone changing patterns of typicalness, was a different matter. 
Did Berghausen, for example, spend so much time on "expeditions", not because he regarded 
this as administratively essential but because each night spent away from Friedrich Wilhelmshafen 
on official business earned him a special travel allowance of up to 12  Marks? Did he even need 
this extra money to pay for a morphine addiction? How could I expect the historical record to 
provide answers to such questions, if it did not even allow me to establish whether or not 
Berghausen had in fact been a morphine addict?24 
Perhaps quite recent and much grander historical developments had altered the situation in my 
favour? Perhaps the personal files kept by the colonial office had, in fact, not been lost, as I had 
been told by the Zentralarchiv of the German Democratic Republic, but had been merely kept 
under lock and key for political reasons? Perhaps these files had in the meantime been discovered 
after the reunification of Germany and were now available to me? 
Alas the Bundesarchiv of the Federal Republic of Germany informed me that no hidden 
treasures had been found by the new management. But my hunting instincts had been reawakened. 
Perhaps I had not cast my net sufficiently widely? Perhaps the colonial office, or some other 
metropolitan office, had kept other files dealing with personnel matters in the colonial service, in 
particular their disciplinary aspect? Perhaps Berghausen had been investigated for breaches of 
discipline and the records of this investigation had survived. And if no such investigations had 
been carried out in the case of Berghausen, what about the hundreds of other officials who had 
served in the German Pacific? Indeed, I already knew that at least one of them, administrator 
Brandeis in the Marshall Islands, had been formally prosecuted for alleged disciplinary offences, 
although he had been acquitted. Had Brandeis been the only one, or had dozens of local officials 
at all levels been dismissed, demoted or fined because of their brutality, corruption or other 
failings? Had there been other files covering resignations from the colonial service or early 
retirements on health grounds which would, for example, clarify whether Hempenstall had been 
right after all in claiming that Bennigsen had resigned in a fit of pique (see above: 95)? 
24 On the other hand, the historical record permitted me to state with confidence that his "violent progress up the Sepik" 
had earned Berghausen 300 Marks in travel allowances. They were paid to him on 25 December 1 9 1 3 ,  presumably a 
welcome Christmas bonus. The receipt is part of the surviving accounts of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen for the third quarter 
of the 1913  budget (AA, G254/1 ,  Item 1 1 2). 
VOICES FROM THE PAST 245 
The response of the Bundesarchiv to my inquiries was encouraging: its holdings included large 
numbers of relevant files which had been kept by the ministry of the interior, the ministry of 
justice and the chancellery of the Reich. More importantly this time I had an opportunity to visit 
the archives in Potsdam to see for myself what information these files contained. 
Chapter 12: A Never-ending Story 
I 
During my trip to Potsdam I had a brilliant idea: the Reichsarchiv, from which the Bundesarchiv had inherited, via the Zentralarchiv, its colonial office holdings had also 
produced records of its own. Did the Bundesarchiv hold the indices the Reichsarchiv had prepared 
of its colonial office holdings as archival material? It did (BAP 15.06), but when I consulted the 
"New Guinea and Pacific" index, I found that the first 27 of 29 folios had been torn out. 1 
Moreover, another document showed that a decree of 25 February 1925 had ordered the 
destruction of a large number of colonial office files. However, this had not included the over 
5,000 personal files, for which the index was fully preserved. It confirmed that a personal file on 
Berghausen, comprising two volumes, had indeed existed. But the files were no longer available. 
Nor was a special file on a 1909 conflict between Berghausen and his colleague, Assessor Full, 
available, although it had been part of a different series. More importantly, the entire series of 
colonial office files on disciplinary matters had disappeared. 
But the surviving records of the ministry of the interior included boxes with some 4,000 index 
cards relating to the cases the disciplinary court of appeal of the Reich, the Disziplinarhof, had 
heard between 1 874 and 1937 (BAP 15 .03). Fortunately less than 400 of the cards represented 
cases heard between 1 884 and 1914, the effective lifespan of the German colonial empire. When 
I started to inspect these cards, I soon struck gold: case F2/1894 dealt with Germany's first major 
colonial scandal, featuring the imperial chancellor in the Cameroons, Heinrich Leist. This was 
followed by a second scandalous Cameroon case, that of Assessor Karl Alwin Wehlan (F4/l 896). 
Then I drew a blank year after year. I therefore did what I should have done in the first place, 
namely examine the legislative framework. It did not take long to find that an imperial ordinance 
of 9 August 1 8  96 had established special disciplinary courts for the colonies. I therefore could not 
expect colonial cases to have come before the Disziplinarhof after that date. 
As an atonement for this lack of foresight I persisted. To my surprise I discovered another 
quasi-colonial case (F3/1906) . The accused, Oskar Poeplau--one of Erzberger' s main informants 
in his colonial scandal campaign-had served in the colonial department in Berlin rather than in 
the colonies . Although I was not especially interested in this case, the discovery spurred me on, 
and I was rewarded because case F6/1907 involved disciplinary proceedings against the governor 
of the Cameroons, Jesko von Puttkamer. The case had been dealt with in the first instance by the 
Disziplinarkammer in Potsdam. Although I did not understand why this had happened, it seemed 
sensible to look for more information about the activities of that court as it might also have dealt 
with other matters of colonial interest which had not come on appeal before the Disziplinarhof. 
The Bundesarchiv held a series of ministry of interior files relating to this court 
(BAP1 5 .0l/565 1 -53) .  But its first four volumes, covering the years before 1903 , were missing. 
This mattered little, however, since the entire series was only concerned with administrative 
matters. Still, the files included at least annual summaries of the judicial activities of this court. 
They showed that it had not been overworked. It did not sit at all in 1908, and the highest number 
of cases heard between 1903 and 1914 was 10 cases in 1909. Only three colonial cases-Poeplau, 
Puttkamer and Mettke, the latter another minor headquarters official-had been dealt with. 
Moreover, they had all gone on appeal to the Disziplinarhof, so that they were already accounted 
for. 
Another series of ministry of interior files was more helpful. It contained a collection of copies 
of the judgements pronounced by the Disziplinarhof (BAPlS .01/5670-72). They included those 
I None of the other indexes I checked had been so vandalised. 
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in all the five colonial cases-the three just mentioned, plus Leist and Wehlan-1 had so far 
identified. 
Because things were going so well I had inflated hopes when I looked at a file of the ministry 
of the interior on the disciplinary courts in the colonies (BAP15.01/5679). The fact that these 
courts came under the colonial office rather than the ministry of the interior should have warned 
me that I could expect little useful information. The confirmation that this was indeed so helped 
me to control my enthusiasm when I inspected the files of the ministry of justice on particular 
disciplinary matters (BAP30.01 ,  Nos. 368-78, 380-81 and 383). Although one of these files was 
exclusively devoted to disciplinary proceedings against a colonial official in Togo-one Wistuba, 
Erzberger's second main informant-and although other files also featured some colonial cases, 
the information related, understandably, to technical legal questions on which the ministry had 
been asked to give its expert opinion. 
This left the chancellery of the Reich. Its disciplinary jurisdiction series (BAP7.01/1 892-98) 
was unrewarding. While it had kept special files on most German colonies, there was none on 
German New Guinea. I would have been delighted with its files on the colonial office and its 
secretaries (BAP7.01/1662-64), had I been interested in the personnel aspect of headquarters 
administration at the highest level, but I was not. The German New Guinea content in the files on 
subordinate headquarters officials (BAP7 .01/1665-67) was minimal. The same applied to the files 
on "defects in the colonial administration" (BAP7.01/941 -46). 
I therefore had good reason to be disappointed with the fruits of my labour, but I was not. To 
be sure, I had found no information on a single case where disciplinary action against an official 
serving in German New Guinea had been taken. However, if I utilised what I had learned about 
the structure of these historical records, I could conclude with confidence that only very few of 
such cases would have come before the disciplinary courts. Indeed, it was not unlikely that the 
case of administrator Brandeis had been the only disciplinary prosecution of a colonial official 
serving in German New Guinea and the Marshall Islands. 
It was certainly regrettable that the records of the Disziplinarkammer and the Disziplinarhof 
for the German colonies were no longer available, but the relevant index of the Reichsarchiv 
provided by itself a reasonably clear overall picture. It identified only six colonial cases as having 
come before the Disziplinarkammer between 1897 and 1922. This could, of course, represent the 
tip of an iceberg-and the Brandeis Case was indeed not listed-but the file numbers suggested 
a different story. The identified cases bore the following numbers: DKl/97; DK2/97; DKl/05; 
DKl/07; DKl/08 and DK2/08. Not a single higher file number, say DK7/06, appeared. The five 
appeal cases also showed the lowest possible file numbers: namely DHl/97; DHl/98;  DHl/06; 
DHl/07 ; DHl/14. While it was to be expected that a case which had first come to the 
Disziplinarkammer in any given year would also be the first in which an appeal was lodged to the 
Disziplinarhof, what the index had to say about the volume of business dealt with by these courts 
confirmed that they-like the Disziplinarkammer Potsdam-had not been overworked. In 1900 
and 191 1 they had only become active once. Even in 1 897-their first and busiest year of 
operation-they had only become active on 77 occasions. This did not mean, however, that they 
dealt with 77 different cases. On the contrary, the total number of cases dealt with by these courts 
until 1914 was well below this figure. It was probably not higher than 20, and most of these cases 
would have related to Germany's African colonies. 
Yet, I had also learned that I could not rely blindly on these structural implications. Had I 
accepted that the Disziplinarhof of the Reich did not deal with colonial cases after special 
disciplinary courts for the colonies were established I would have missed the Puttkamer Case. I 
would also have failed to appreciate the key role it had played in the "defects in the colonial 
administration" files of the chancellery, which probably offered deeper insights into the culture 
of government in Wilhelmine Germany than any of the disciplinary cases which might have arisen 
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in German New Guinea and thereby made a significant contribution to an understanding of 
German rule in that colony that was shaped by the same metropolitan factors . 
A comparison between the information in these files about the Puttkamer Case and the 
phantom version of this case presented by Epstein-alongside his phantom version of the Brandeis 
Case discussed at the beginning of this volume-also demonstrated just how defective a narrative 
approach to history could be. It showed that Epstein had not just distorted the facts of this 
particular case as brutally as that of Brandeis but that, by falling for Erzberger' s  self-promotion, 
he had also failed to appreciate that the big picture painted by Erzberger had to be counterfactual 
because it is only in the Wonderland of narrative history that events unfold as Erzberger described 
them. But then this was the realm in which Epstein was also at home and where the Puttkamer 
Case readily took the following shape: 
There was the case of the Cameroon governor, Jesco von Puttkammer [sic] who had built a special house 
for his African concubines while also forging a name in the passport application of his white mistress. 
When some Cameroon chiefs had petitioned Berlin against his maladministration, he used his judicial 
powers to sentence them to long jail terms for libel. The Berlin colonial department was shockingly slow 
to punish this kind of conduct ( 1 959: 641) .2  
How did the case look according to the chancellery files?3 
II 
The first document on the files of the chancellery dealing with the "defects in the colonial 
administration" (BAP 7.01/941)  is a news service cutting, dated 1 8  February 1906. It reported that 
governor von Puttkamer had had misgivings about the severity of "the sentence"-presumably 
against "the Cameroon chiefs"-and that he had refused its confirmation. "The 
investigation"-presumably conducted by the colonial department-had produced so little 
damning evidence against him that his return to the Cameroons as governor was likely. Then came 
the crunch: the Tagliche Rundschau, which was paraphrased in this report, threatened that it would 
start firing its own shells, should this happen, which would remove Puttkamer for ever from the 
circle of German colonial officials. 
In May 1906 Puttkamer tendered his resignation; but, after discussions with the colonial 
department, he applied instead for disciplinary proceedings against himself in order to clear his 
name. The chancellery was pleased because it hoped that this move would take the wind out of 
the sails of those who were attacking the colonial administration, as Lobell, its administrative 
head, informed chancellor von Bulow, who was holidaying on a North Sea island at the time. 
Two weeks later Bulow was stirred up by a cable from the emperor: Was there no way of 
protecting "Our Officials and Officers" from this professional gossip, vilifier and defamer 
Erzberger, it asked, suggesting that it was high time that the government showed its teeth to 
Erzberger' s  Centre Party. The chancellor was not so inclined, because he believed that the 
mismanagement in the colonial department had been shocking and that in all probability things 
had happened which could not be covered up but had to be dealt with ''ferro et ignt' (with iron 
2 Jn this case Epstein did not only refer to Erzberger' s writings-which I did not check-but also to "Townsend, op.cit.: 
230". This reference I did check, only to find that the page reference should have read 250-5 1 ,  and that Townsend's claim 
that Puttkamer had been dismissed in 1 907 was yet another phantom (see below in the text). 
3 I should stress that I am not criticising Epstein fornot consulting these files which would probably have been inacessible 
to him when we wrote his article. However, a critical examination of the information at his disposal would have clearly 
indicated that Erzberger was presenting phantom history. The value of the chancellery files is not that they identify some 
of these phantoms but that they give some idea of what had actually happened. 
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and fire). The only effective course of action was a ruthless investigation which would punish the 
guilty officials without mercy. 
Lobell did not share this defeatist view. In his opinion the reports in the "Erzberger Presse" 
consisted mainly of libellous accusations which ought to be prosecuted. He therefore suggested 
that Billow' s  draft response to the emperor "be modified in some points". In fact, he proposed a 
different tune. It started with an assurance that the chancellor shared the emperor' s  indignation 
at the unbelievable aspersions cast by the "anti-colonialists" (Kolonialgegner). This was to be 
followed by Lobell' s  prosecution theme before incorporating Billow' s  investigation melody. 
Furthermore, there was to be an energetic coda. 
It is urgently necessary to change the body of officials in the colonial office [sic] substantially. Your 
Majesty will shortly receive an application from me for the appointment of four new, highly 
recommended senior officials [vortragende Rate] so that order in the colonial department [sic] can be 
restored and the Erbprinz [Hohenlohe-Langenburg, its acting director] will be given strong support. 
On the same day, 3 July 1906, Lobell sent this revised response to Billow-who, still on holiday, 
apparently accepted it-Hohenlohe-Langenburg suggested to the chancellery that the disciplinary 
investigation of Puttkamer be entrusted to Kammergerichtsrat Straehler, a judge of the Prussian 
supreme court. This appointment failed to have the desired impact on the attacks from the anti­
colonialists. By the end of August the colonial department had reached breaking point. It asked 
the chancellery for the appointment of a commission to carry out a general investigation of the 
colonial administration so that it could resume its task of administering the colonies instead of 
having to spend its time on defending itself against personal attacks. 
The next move in the Puttkamer Case-one of the last made by the former imperial 
commissioner Fritz Rose for the colonial department-was a memorandum of 1 1  August for the 
chancellery. It summarised the developments so far. Puttkamer had been recalled in December 
1905 as a result of complaints by "the Akwa chiefs". He had arrived in Berlin in February 1906. 
Before the investigations by the colonial department had been completed, Puttkamer had first 
tendered his resignation and then asked for disciplinary proceedings against himself. Having 
gathered evidence in Germany, judge Straehler was about to travel to the Cameroons. He would 
report after his return, which was expected in November. Rose also referred to a petition made to 
the chancellor in November 1904 by the Geheime Sekretariatsassistent Poeplau-a minor clerk 
with access to confidential files-which had inter alia accused Puttkamer of knowingly forging 
a document in "the case of Frau von Eckardstein". The files of the colonial department showed 
that Puttkamer, although on leave in Germany at the time, had not been confronted with these 
accusations, presumably, Rose added, because Poeplau was known as a common informer of the 
worst kind who had repeatedly made untrue accusations. 
In other words, the "so-called Frau von Eckardstein'', Puttkamer's so-called "cousin", Maria 
Ecke, who, in the meantime, had married and divorced a Herr von Germer, had replaced "the 
Akwa chiefs" as the cornerstone of the case against Puttkamer. This had happened although 
Puttkamer's  short affair with Maria Ecke had by then been over for about ten years, not just 
because this switch was politically convenient but also because the colonial department was 
concerned that "Frau von Eckardstein" had appeared in the Cameroons together with Puttkamer 
during official functions at which officers of the imperial navy had been present and because this 
affront to naval honour was more serious than any form of colonial maladministration (see 
RM3/25 1 1). 
The next move was made by Dernburg--one of his first as acting secretary of the colonial 
department-on 14 September 1906. Dernburg asked the chancellor to suspend Puttkamer from 
his office as governor because he could not return to his post, irrespective of the outcome of the 
disciplinary proceedings against him, since he had been certified as medically unfit to serve in the 
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tropics, and because this important post had to be filled as soon as possible on a permanent basis.4 
The chancellery sought the advice of the ministry of justice. It declared a suspension to be legally 
permissible but politically undesirable, because it would essentially be a temporary disciplinary 
measure which might not be justified by the facts but would be seen by the public as a 
prejudgement of the accusations against Puttkamer. The chancellery agreed and rejected 
Dernburg's  application. 
On 10  November Dernburg reported the return of Straehler and asked for the appointment of 
an alternative prosecutor as the original appointee was now himself under investigation.5 
Straehler' s report focused on two "false" passports Puttkamer had allegedly issued to Maria Ecke 
(as she then was) a decade earlier. But it also proposed the laying of new charges, because 
Puttkamer had recently approached Frau von Germer (as she now was) in order to obtain from her 
a favourable account of the passport affair. 
The colonial department requested that all these charges be referred to the "competent 
disciplinary court". It was the Disziplinarkammer Pots dam. 6 It reprimanded Puttkamer on 25 April 
1907 and fined him 1 ,000 Marks (see BAP15.0l/5657) . Both Puttkamer and the prosecutor 
appealed, the former seeking his acquittal, the latter Puttkamer' s  dismissal. 
Puttkamer was partly successful because a reprimand was the only punishment imposed by the 
Disziplinarhof (see BAP15.0l/5671) .  Of the three "crimes" listed by Epstein-the building of a 
special house for his African concubines ; the forging of a name in the passport application of his 
white mistress ;  and the misuse of his judicial powers to sentence some Cameroon chiefs-the first 
and last did not figure at all in the decision. Moreover, Puttkamer was not charged with "forging" 
a name on Maria Ecke' s "passport application" but with issuing her knowingly with two passports 
under false names. On the other hand, Puttkamer had been charged with attempting to pervert the 
course of justice by asking Frau von Germer to cover up for him, with interfering in the 
administration of justice in the Cameroons by instructing a district judge to drop a criminal charge 
against a planter and, most seriously of all, with ordering his subordinates to give preferential 
treatment to a particular plantation company. 
Puttkamer was cleared of the last charge, and of the second passport charge, because it was 
doubtful that this second passport had ever existed. As regards the first passport charge, the court 
accepted Puttkamer' s defence that he had believed that "von Eckardstein" had been Maria Ecke' s 
real name, as had several other witnesses. However, it found that while Puttkamer had been 
entitled to hold this naive belief as a private citizen, he should have checked with Maria 
Ecke-which he had not done-before issuing her with a passport in that name in his official 
capacity. 
The Disziplinarhof took a dimmer view of a decree Puttkamer had issued in 1904. It had 
expressed the opinion that a planter, whom natives had accused of threatening to burn down their 
houses, should not have been prosecuted-apparently because of the "notorious unreliability" of 
native witnesses-and that he should certainly not be convicted. But the Diszplinarhof accepted 
that Puttkamer had been rightly concerned with the impact the administration of justice by this 
newly arrived official was generally having on the state of affairs in the district and found that 
Puttkamer had only used the wrong method to convince the man of the error of his ways.7 
4 Seitz had apparently already been earmarked for this post under Hohenlohe-Langenburg, so that the end of Puttkamer's 
colonial career had been a foregone conclusion before Demburg had come on the stage, just as Rose and K1inig had by 
then already been temporarily retired (see above: 55). 
5 He was later cleared of accusations relating to his administration of the German consulate in Cape Town. 
6 Puttkamer had probably come under its jurisdiction because he too had been "laid off' and was now on the payroll of 
the Reich rather than that of the Cameroons. But it would also have been politically awkward if the case had been heard 
by the special colonial Disziplinarkammer which came under the administrative responsibility of the colonial office. 
7 Perhaps the man learned his lesson too well, for it was he rather than Puttkamer who subsequently pronounced the 
excessive sentences against "the Akwa Chiefs". 
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Nonetheless it would have let Puttkamer off with a warning, had he not persuaded Frau von 
Germer to sign a letter confirming that he had believed that "von Eckardstein" was her real name. 
The Diszplinarhof accepted that Puttkamer had held this belief and held that it had not been 
improper of Puttkamer to get in touch with the woman, but saw his offence in giving the letter a 
form which wrongly implied that he had had nothing to do with its writing. The Disziplinarhof had 
a great deal of sympathy with Puttkamer, who had been publicly accused of "forgery", and whose 
ability to defend himself against this false accusation depended to a large extent on such a 
thoroughly unreliable person as Maria Ecke, who had subsequently given the press interviews 
which were teeming with lies, and who could certainly not be believed if she now insisted that 
Puttkamer had known all along of her real identity. 
Barely a week after the decision of the Disziplinarhof was pronounced on 1 3  January 1908, 
Puttkamer approached the chancellor, asking for an appropriate post in the service of the Reich, 
because he had been cleared of all the serious allegations which had been publicly levelled against 
him.8 Dernburg was invited to comment. He was unsympathetic . Discussions between him and 
Lobell resulted in an agreement to put the matter on ice. Lobell therefore strongly advised a 
brother of Puttkamer, on 23 February, that Puttkamer would only harm his prospects if he sent a 
second-presumably more strongly worded-application to the chancellor.9 
In May Dern burg advised the chancellery that it would be best to retire Puttkamer in "the usual 
manner", as the colonial office could not offer him a post commensurate with his age and rank. 
Since Puttkamer had himself applied for the medical assessment in 1906 which had found him to 
be permanently unfit to serve in the tropics, his retirement on health grounds could be affected as 
soon as he made another application to this effect, replacing the one he had withdrawn when he 
had asked for a disciplinary investigation. 
Puttkamer was persuaded to make this application, so that Lobell could ask Dernburg on 3 1  
May 1908 how the "title question" was to be handled: should Puttkamer be treated like governor 
von Soden-who had presumably been retired with a higher title-or should he be only permitted 
to retain his current title? Dernburg was not in the mood to make concessions, so that the second 
option was implemented, and Puttkamer kept his peace until 191 1 .  Then, with the help of Lobell, 
who had himself retired in the meantime, the colonial office-no longer headed by 
Dernburg-was convinced to accept that Puttkamer was entitled to call himself "Gouvemeur" 
without having to add "a.D." (retired), but it still drew the line at his entitlement to wear the 
gubernatorial full-dress uniform: only Wirkliche Geheime Riite-"truly confidential 
councillors"-had this privilege. 10 
This decision was made by the then acting head of the colonial office, Conze. Four years later 
his boss, Solf, was more generous. On 28 June 1915 he wrote to Lobell' s  successor, Wahnschaffe, 
that Puttkamer had poured out his heart to him. He had still not got over the fact that he had been 
retired, unwept and unsung, without being given a brevet rank, or at least a medal, in contrast to 
governor von Rechenberg for example, who had been made a "Wirklicher Geheimer Rat" on his 
retirement after a much shorter period of service. Solf would personally be delighted if Puttkamer 
could be honoured in some way, and such an honour would be well deserved, because he had 
earned considerable merits during the difficult first years of colonial administration. No-one would 
raise an eyebrow if Puttkamer were now made a "Wirklicher Geheimer" because his escapades, 
which had occupied the public in unseemly detail and with a tendency to unfortunate 
8 The following account is based on another series of chancellery files: BAP 7.01/1665-67. 
9 Puttkamer's brother, a senior official of the Reich, who was serving in Alsace-Lorraine at the time, had apparently 
become involved because he was personally acquainted with Lobell, who signed his letter "in old friendship". My guess 
would be that this Puttkamer-who was not identical with the "Wilhelm" who had served as a station manager of the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie-had been a member of the same student fraternity as Lobell. 
10 This literal translation is, of course, not very helpful. But do we need to know more than that this title was reserved 
for very senior officials? 
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exaggerations, had long become part of the history of colonial gossip. Wahnschaffe had more 
serious worries. The matter was presented and deferred every few months, until it was 
permanently filed away when Puttkamer died in January 1 917. 
Was the Puttkamer Case more than a unique historical episode? Did it have a greater historical 
weight than any of the numerous cases in which the Disziplinarhof punished minor postal officials 
much more severely, which appear to gain historical stature only through their unproportionately 
high numerical weight?1 1  
Was it Puttkamer' s elevated rank which placed this case in a different category? Probably not, 
because I also saw the case of his denouncer, Oskar Poeplau, who was dismissed by the 
Disziplinarhof in 1906, as also being historically important, although he was only a lowly clerk. 
Why did I view the Poeplau Case in this light? Because I saw Poeplau as representative of a 
type-the whistleblower-and because I was prepared to accept that Poeplau' s  treatment was 
typical of the manner in which persons belonging to this type were treated in Wilhelmine 
Germany. Did Puttkamer represent another type? Had he behaved the way he did, and been treated 
the way he was, because he was a Prussian nobleman with excellent connections? While his social 
status was an important factor, it was not decisive, because Puttkamer had not been in trouble 
because he was a Prussian nobleman but because he was a colonial governor. Was there a type 
"colonial governor", or, for that matter, a type "postman"? Had Puttkamer' s  behaviour been 
typical of what German colonial governors did and had his treatment been typical of how German 
colonial governors were treated? Did German postmen typically misappropriate postal articles in 
their care? Were postmen who received disciplinary punishments typically punished because they 
had committed this particular offence?12 
Had I merely tricked myself by seeing Poeplau as a typical whistleblower because 
whistleblowing was something whistleblowers did by definition? Poeplau could only be described 
as a whistleblower because he had actually blown the whistle. By contrast he could be described 
as a "Geheimer Sekretariatsassistent" because he held this position, irrespective of what he 
actually did or did not do. It was his "duty-statement" which defined what he was typically 
supposed to do--and whistleblowing was certainly not part of his official duties . A Geheimer 
Sekretariatsassistent did not typically blow the whistle, just as postmen did not typically 
misappropriate postal articles. Postmen typically delivered postal articles. Even if postmen 
frequently misappropriated postal articles, they displayed a distinctly untypical behaviour each 
time they did so. 
What about governors? Did German colonial governors typically have native mistresses, even 
if it could be shown that most of them actually had? Did they typically have judicial powers? If 
they had, was it typical that they misused these powers, even if it could be shown that this was 
statistically probable? In what sense, if any, could the manner in which Puttkamer governed the 
Cameroons be said to be typical of the manner in which German colonial governors governed their 
colonies? 
By the same token, in what sense had the treatment of Poeplau been typical of the treatment 
of whistleblowers? Although Poeplau had denounced Puttkamer in 1 904, no disciplinary action 
had been taken against this "notorious informer" until Erzberger had used the information 
provided by him in his campaign in the Reichstag. 'Similarly no disciplinary action was taken 
against Kiem, the denouncer of Brandeis, although he had been recalled from the Marshall Islands 
1 1  Of the 53 cases decided by the Disziplinarkammer in Potsdam between 1 902 and 19 14  as many as 30 involved postal 
officials (see BAP15.0l/5657). I did not pursue the questions this raised. 
12 While postal officials were punished most frequently by the Disziplinarkammer Potsdam for misappropriation and 
fraud, others were punished for their sexual behaviour or were formally dismissed from the service simply because their 
whereabouts were unknown. Still others were disciplined because they owed money, and in one case one of the reasons 
given for a disciplinary punishment was "public support for the social-democratic party". 
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when his relations with Brandeis had become unworkable. In other words, the Poeplau Case, too, 
had been unique rather than typical. 
Yet it was historically illuminating in a way in which the disciplinary proceedings against 
postmen were not. Why?-not because it was narratively more attractive, but because it sent 
signals of general significance: it said something about the historical stage on which not only 
Poeplau in this particular instance but all historical actors involved in the exercise of German 
colonial rule were performing at the time . Although it was not typical, this case was telling beyond 
itself as a unique event. 
The situation was the same with the Puttkamer Case, but it sent a much wider range of signals. 
However, these signals were pointers rather than pictures. They were hinting at something instead 
of displaying it. They offered suggestions, not facts. This did not diminish their importance, but 
made it difficult to handle them historiographically; for while I had greater faith in the capacity 
of facts to speak for themselves than Carr (see above: 38), I was less confident that facts were also 
capable of hinting, if they were merely reported, without being interpreted by a reporter who was 
able to base his interpretation on a much larger collection of facts than he could possibly report, 
and whose interpretation involved responses to a perceived general atmosphere which were often 
impossible to substantiate. 
How was I supposed to handle the signals the Puttkamer Case was sending to me? To 
disregard them because they were not historical facts distorted the historical record as I saw it 
because they were there, albeit as mere suggestions. Yet to spell them out also distorted the 
historical record because it made them more 'factual' than they were. 
The way the Puttkamer Case had been treated suggested to me a scenario in which a reform 
of Germany's colonial administration had been set in train well before Demburg appeared on the 
scene, and in which the administrative head of the chancellery, Lobell, had played a key part; a 
scenario in which Demburg had not been the star but a second-class actor who had been hired 
because he "1as able to oppose the Kolonialgegner more effectively than the Erbprinz. precisely 
because he was the same kind of uncouth upstart as Erzberger; a scenario in which even the 
occasional thunderbolts hurled by the emperor could be incorporated constructively into the plot, 
because no-one, including the chancellor, could afford to ignore them. There were pointers to 
manipulation everywhere, tiny manifestations of "the big game" which involved everybody and 
in which every player, from Poeplau to the emperor, was also a pawn; a game which required 
every player to reassess continuously whether any other player was a threat, an asset or a liability, 
whether he could be dropped or had to be crushed or, at least, taught a lesson. 
Puttkamer himself had not been a threat to anybody, but nor had he been much of a liability, 
let alone an asset, once the game had passed beyond its "colonial scandal" phase. On the contrary, 
he began to look embarrassingly like Maria Ecke, although there was a world of difference 
between a bonvivant, who was a gentleman, and a demi-mondaine, who was anything but a lady. 
The Puttkamer Case was no longer a festering sore which had to be removed "fe"o et ignf'; it was 
an unappetising left-over best disposed of by lawyers who knew what to do with such garbage. 
As a court case, the Puttkamer Case became painfully trivial. What made it historically 
significant was not what happened on this judicial stage, or what Puttkamer had or had not done 
in the Cameroons, or after his recall to Germany, but the glimpses it offered of what had gone on 
behind the scenes. But these glimpses were like fleeting footsteps across a meadow which bent 
the blades of grass aside for a moment and not the plastercasts of prints of heavy boots in the mud 
which I had displayed. To be sure, I could have tried to give more substance to my speculations 
by investigating the appointment of Demberg, or the plans which had been developed for the 
reform of the colonial administration before his appointment, but this would not have solved the 
problem, because this information too would have contained similar hints. Much of the history of 
German colonial rule, and some of its most interesting aspects, were bound to remain elusive, not 
254 THE TOWER OF BABEL 
just because people like Lobell were unlikely ever to put all their cards on the table, but because 
they themselves did not know all the cards they were playing and why they were playing them. 
To leave out the elusive bits was not the answer, but to pursue the Puttkamer Case further was 
unlikely to help me find one. My examination of the historical record of the exercise of the 
disciplinary powers over Germany's  colonial servants had taken me as far as I could go. It was 
time to make a fresh start. 
Why not switch attention from the disciplinary stick to the carrot of medals the emperor had 
dangled in front of those who exercised his "Schutzgewalt" in Germany's colonies? What about 
using the Kolonialdenkmunze (see above: 69) as a case study?-a medal which the emperor had 
established for the sole purpose of honouring those who had participated in the killing of his 
recalcitrant colonial subjects? 
m 
Although the existence of this Kolonialdenkmunze had puzzled me, I had no intention of 
examining its history until I noticed that the naval office had devoted an entire series of files to 
it (RM3/3664-66). When I decided to satisfy my curiosity I found to my surprise that the medal 
had not only been conceived in response to the putting down of the Ponape Rebellion, but that its 
history had, all along, been intimately linked with that of German New Guinea. 
The story began in another naval file, kept by the naval cabinet (RM 2/1 3 10). The naval 
establishment had expressed its concern to the emperor about the long list of Prussian decorations 
the commander of the naval forces in Ponape had proposed after the putting down of the rebellion. 
As it included as many as 37 for his officers and 105 for his men, the emperor had shared the 
concern. He therefore proposed that the list for Prussian decorations be drastically culled but that 
all naval participants be given a new Reich medal, as had been done after a rebellion in German 
Southwest Africa had been put down some years earlier by the Schutztruppe. • 
Things got underway when the chancellor requested the naval office to begin discussions with 
the colonial office about such a medal. The colonial office was enthusiastic. Whereas the naval 
office had proposed that the medal be given to "all officers, officials and enlisted men of the army, 
the navy and the Schutztruppe", the colonial office suggested that it should not only be given to 
all Germans who had participated in a qualifying event, but also to foreign nationals who had 
volunteered-and that a smaller version of it be distributed to "coloured participants'', that is to 
say to natives serving in the Schutztruppe or the colonial police forces . 13 
In the end the discussions involved also the foreign office, the ministry of finance, the war 
office, the ministry of the interior and even the office of the postmaster general. They raised a host 
of questions, but as the circle of potential recipients kept on expanding, the cost of the medal 
became the main stumbling block. It was generally accepted that the medal would at least be 
granted to participants in all important military activities in the German colonies, starting with 
those of the navy in West Africa in December 1 884. 14 The compilation of the Naval List was a 
simple matter because the naval office decided to include only events which had been recognised 
as campaigns under the pension legislation, but the list for the Schutztruppe got longer and longer 
and the Police List still had to be compiled by the governors of the various colonies, who could 
13 It was also in favour of continuing the already existing "Southwest Africa Medal", side by side with a new general 
colonial medal. It even anticipated the creation of additional special medals for prolonged colonial wars engulfmg the 
entire ci vii population. 
14 The medal could also be granted for military operations aimed at protecting German interests outside the German 
colonies. This shows that it was essentially also the protection of German interests within the colonies that mattered, rather 
than the protection of law and order in these territories. 
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afford to be generous because for them the question of increased pension entitlements did not 
arise.15 
When the euphoria had reached its peak, the colonial office estimated that about 14,000 medals 
would be needed: 8,000 for the navy and 3,000 each for the white and coloured colonial forces, 
including the police. Who was going to pay for them, and in a hurry, since the emperor was keen 
to start distributing the medal at his next birthday, 27 January 1912? As it was a colonial medal 
the naval office argued that the money should come out of the colonial office's  budget, but the 
colonial office refused, because the navy would receive the lion's  share of the medals-and the 
ministry of finance was reluctant to allocate money from the emperor's  discretionary fund. 
When the matter dragged on into 1912, the emperor poured cold water on the whole scheme 
because he felt that the large number of medals now being talked about would deflate their value, 
so that they should, at least for now, only be given to participants in the putting down of the 
Ponape Rebellion. This greatly worried the colonial office and naval office, because the medal 
plans had leaked out and had created strong expectations which it would be dangerous to 
disappoint. On 27 March 1912 a joint approach was therefore made to the chancellor, pleading 
with him to persuade the emperor to go ahead as planned. To make this easier, the estimate of the 
number of medals required was revised. The colonial office made the greatest sacrifice, primarily 
by no longer seeking a retrospective issue of the medal to "coloured participants". But it also 
halved the estimated number of medals required for the white members of its forces, whereas the 
navy only reduced its estimate by 25 per cent, so that the total number of medals required still 
added up to 7,500. 
The centre piece of the campaign, however, was an emotional plea on behalf of the "old 
colonial fighters" (alte Kolonialkrieger) who deserved special thanks from the Fatherland. It was 
successful, the emperor graciously giving a green light on 22 April 1912, although he suggested 
detailed modifications of the design of the medal which, naturally, carried his own likeness. The 
official deed was signed on 13  June 1912. It was promptly published in the colonial and naval 
gazettes, together with implementation regulations. They included lists of the qualifying operations 
of the navy and the Schutztruppe, whereas the Police List had still not been completed. 
Now the dance could begin. For the naval office it started with an application, dated 17  July 
19 12, that the Kolonialdenkmunze also be granted to naval personnel who had participated in the 
military actions of SMSS Carola and Hyane in 1 882/83 on the Hermit Islands, which later became 
part of German New Guinea. This particular application was given short shrift, because the deed 
excluded all engagements before December 1 884. But it was the first of many, and the stream 
gathered momentum when the Police List was published in April 1913 ,  because it included several 
operations, mostly also in German New Guinea, in which the navy had participated. 16 
The first to use this new angle was a former commander of SMS Planet, captain Dominik, who 
was then serving in the nautical section of the naval office, when he sought permission from the 
director of his section, vice-admiral Grapow, to apply for the Kolonialdenkmunze for those of his 
men who had taken part, side by side with the police, in the punishment of the "rebellious 
mountain villages" on the Rai Coast of Kaiser Wilhelmsland in November 1910. Grapow not only 
supported this application but added one of his own, as the commander of SMS Cormoran, when 
it participated, also side by side with the police, in the punishment of the natives of the St Matthias 
Group, also in German New Guinea, in July 1 901 .  
The administrative section of the naval office was impressed by the equal treatment argument 
these applications advanced. However, it believed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
15 I did not explore the financial implications the granting of a Kolonialdenkmiinze could have, but I noticed that they 
were well appreciated by ordinary naval personnel: one group of applicants expressly offered to forgo any additional 
pension entitlements, if they could only have the medal. 
1 6  For a translation of the German New Guinea section of this list see above: 70. 
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establish with the help of the existing naval records who had actually participated in military 
operations which, in some cases, had taken place almost 30 years earlier. At any rate, it was 
essential to carry through the allocation of the medal in accordance with the existing Naval List 
first of all, although the position could be reconsidered once it had become clearer how many 
additional applications from naval personnel could be expected in relation to operations shown 
in the other lists . 
In preparation for this eventuality the naval office asked the colonial office for which of the 
operations on the Police List its records showed naval involvement, so that equal treatment could 
be achieved by seeking imperial approval for granting the Kolonialdenkmunze to navy personnel 
in such cases. On the other hand, the letter made it abundantly clear that the naval office did not 
approve of the Police List, which had been compiled without consulting it. Instead of following 
the naval example of including only major military campaigns it incorporated "minor police 
actions", which did not merit the granting of any medals. Since the colonial office had obtained 
imperial approval for this unfortunate move, the navy had little choice but to follow suit, although 
this could have regrettable further consequences because "minor police actions" the navy had 
carried out on its own might now also have to be rewarded with a medal. As far as the future was 
concerned, the naval office hoped that the colonial office would only apply for the inclusion of 
major military campaigns in its lists. It certainly expected to be consulted before any operation 
involving the navy was included. 
Instead the acting head of the colonial office, Conze, countered with a supplementary list of 
his own. It not only covered the participation of the Schutztruppe in operations already shown on 
the Police List but also added some 20 additional operations to the Schutztruppe List. The naval 
office protested and the colonial office, where Solf was again in command, readily gave in: he had 
no intention of pursuing the matter of a supplementary Schutztruppe List. But now the naval office 
wanted to know whether this meant that members of the Schutztruppe who had participated in 
engagements already on the Police List would not receive a medal either. Perhaps because Conze 
was again responsible for the answer, the colonial office insisted that where such a participation 
was proven members of the Schutztruppe were "of course" entitled to receive the medal. 
Thereupon the administrative section of the naval office sought a formal decision by its head, 
Tirpitz. It argued that the navy should, after all, stick to its guns, and refuse to allocate medals to 
naval personnel for any operations not already included in the Naval List. 17 Tirpitz accepted this 
view, and on 3 March 1914 vice-admiral Grapow was informed that his application on behalf of 
SMS Cormoran, and the application of captain Dominik on behalf of SMS Planet, had been 
rejected. Some weeks later the naval staff and the commanders of the North Sea and Baltic 
stations were also informed of this decision. 18 
This was not the end of the matter. On 15 May 1914  the naval staff sent the naval office a 
report of SMS Cormoran on a recent punitive expedition in Bougainville which had pleased the 
emperor so much that he had written "Bravo ! Propose medals !" in the margin. The naval staff 
interpreted that as a call for Kolonialdenkmunzen. The naval office found this problematic because 
the punitive expedition, which had been carried out together with the local police force, did not 
qualify as a major military campaign. It therefore drafted a letter to the naval staff, suggesting that 
it should apply instead for a Prussian medal for the officer in charge of the landing force and some 
of his men. It had intended to attach a copy of its correspondence with the naval staff to a letter 
to the colonial office, asking about its views concerning medals for the district officer and his 
17 The Naval List was also amended when the putting down of the "Dahome Rebellion" in 1 893 was retrospectively 
recognised as a "campaign". 
1 8  Apart from Grapow only two other applicants received personal rejection notices because their applications had been 
made with support from high places. Both of them related to another military operation in German New Guinea, in this 
case the punishment following the attack on a survey party of SMS Moewe on Aly Island, off Kaiser Wilhelmsland, in 
1 897. 
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native policemen. But it changed its mind when it remembered that it had earlier insisted that a 
consultation with the colonial office was the appropriate first step in such a case. It therefore sent 
instead a self-contained letter to the colonial office and informed the naval staff that it had 
initiated negotiations with the colonial office about an appropriate treatment of the medal question. 
However, its message to the colonial office was unambiguous: no KolonialdenkmUnzen ! 
The colonial office signalled its agreement above the signature of Solf' s new deputy, Gleim: 
of course the expedition did not qualify as a campaign so that the KolonialdenkmUnze was 
inappropriate. It had no intention of applying for medals for its personnel because such an 
expedition was child's play for an experienced native police force used to the climate. On the 
other hand, the efforts of the landing forces of SMS Cormoran had to be valued more highly 
because they were not used to operating on land in the tropics. Medals for some of the naval 
participants could therefore well be justified. 
Although a shower of Prussian medals may have descended on SMS Cormoran, she did not 
sail towards a glorious future when she left Bougainville. Her body was scuttled in September 
1914  in Tsingtau where it was being overhauled in the naval dockyard when World War I broke 
out. Her name and crew were transferred to a Russian freighter brought in by SMS Emden as a 
prize. The new Cormoran spent most of its short life in Guam, before it was blown up by its crew 
in April 1917,  when the United States entered the war. Seven men died in the process (see the 
'biography' of SMS Cormoran in Hildebrandt, Rohr, Steinmetz, 1979-83). This was more than 
the navy had lost during any of its military operations in German New Guinea, or in putting down 
the Ponape Rebellion. 
How many such operations had there been? Considering the naval office' s pessimistic 
assessment of the state of naval records in 1913 ,  when it had turned to the colonial office for help 
in ascertaining in which of the military operations on the Police List the navy had been involved, 
it was unlikely that I would be able to find a precise answer. But perhaps the naval office had been 
too pessimistic? 
The colonial office had responded to its call for help with the confession that its own records 
did not permit it to answer the naval office's  enquiry either. But the latter had also sought 
information from the naval staff and the navy's  North Sea and Baltic stations. 
According to the records of the naval staff, the navy had been involved in two engagements 
included in the Police List for the African colonies and in four listed for German New Guinea: the 
punishment of Tinputz and Datoel in 1899; the punishment of the natives of St Matthias in 1901 ; 
the putting down of the "Baining Rebellion" in 1904; and the punishment of the rebellious 
mountain villages on the Rai Coast in 1910.  But while the naval staff was able to supply the names 
of the participating officers, it could, in most cases, only give the number of the participating crew 
members. 
The records of the North Sea station showed, in addition, that SMS Seeadler had been 
involved in a punitive expedition in the Admiralty Islands in 1900. While it had a lot to say about 
the putting down of the Ponape Rebellion, it too was unable to provide the names of the crew 
members who had participated in any of the earlier military operations. The records of the Baltic 
station contributed a sixth operation: the participation of SMS Moewe in the punishment of the 
Kabin natives in 1900. However, they did not allow a confirmation of the involvement of SMS 
Bussard in the destruction of the pirate villages of Madine and Salapiu in 1 897 or that of SMS 
Condor in the suppression of a rebellion in the Witu Group in 1903 . Instead they suggested that 
three further military operations of SMS Moewe in 1899 and 1900, which were not shown in the 
Police List, were also worthy of qualifying for a KolonialdenkmUnze-including one for which 
its exchanged crew, travelling back to Germany on the mail steamer Stettin, had been requisitioned 
by Assessor Boether in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Yet the Baltic station too had to admit that it had 
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been impossible to reconstruct the membership of the various landing forces from the available 
records. 
This was not surprising, since some or all of the relevant ship files of SMSS Bussard, Falke 
and Moewe had been pulped or sold as waste paper. In the case of SMS Hyane her commander 
had even taken it upon himself to order the destruction of old ship files at sea. Besides, the Baltic 
station had been unable to find any of the logs of SMSS Albatross and Moewe after 1 895, and the 
existing logs of SMS Bussard for 1 897 and SMS Condor for 1903 did not contain detailed entries 
for the two military operations in question. 
In view of this historiographically deplorable state of affairs it was doubly impressive how 
much information high-ranking insiders like vice-admiral Grapow could pull out of their feathered 
hats when the need arose-and his campaign for "equal" treatment of the military operation of 
SMS Cormoran in the St Matthias Group in 1 901 turned out to be particularly rewarding. 
IV 
Grapow started his campaign on 27 May 1913 .  He bluntly asked that the punishment of the St 
Matthias natives in July 1901 be gazetted as qualifying naval personnel for a Kolonialdenkmiinze. 
His main argument was that it had been, from beginning to end, a naval operation, in contrast to 
the usual scenario, where the colonial government sought naval assistance. 
Although he must have known that the tide was running against him, Grapow was unwilling 
to accept this. Instead he demanded, on 22 July 1913 ,  that not only the members of the landing 
force but the entire crew of SMS Cormoran be given the medal-just as had happened in the case 
of the putting down of the Ponape Rebellion-because the support of the actions by the marines 
and the police from the sea had been instrumental in securing the success of the operation, which 
had not been any less dangerous because-in contrast to the Ponape Rebellion-casualties among 
those under his command had been avoided. By the same token, the heavy casualties suffered by 
the enemy, 8 1  killed, were ample proof that this had not been a "minor police action". 
In his final bid, on 3 1 October 1913, Grapow elaborated the parallels between the operations 
of SMS Cormoran in 1901 and the putting down of the Ponape Rebellion. Grapow began by 
pointing out the remarkable topographical similarities between the two groups of islands. Whereas 
the main island in the St Matthias group was somewhat larger than Ponape, Eloane was slightly 
smaller than its Ponapean counterpart, the island of Dschokadsch. However, both small islands 
featured a natural "citadel", although it consisted of a limestone outcrop in the centre of Eloane 
while Dschokadsch could boast a spectacular cliff fortress.  On the other hand, the punishment of 
the St Matthias natives had been an even purer naval operation than the putting down of the 
Ponape Rebellion. It had been ordered by the emperor in response to a report by the naval staff, 
even though the governor had not asked for naval assistance in a punitive expedition. The colonial 
department too had not called for punitive measures by the navy but only for a strong naval 
presence in the Bismarck Archipelago. It was doubtful under these circumstances whether the 
colonial office had been entitled to include this operation in its Police List at all . Its proper place, 
it was implied, would have been in the Naval List-and with even better justification than the 
putting down of the Ponape Rebellion when the navy had become active at the request of the 
colonial administration. 
My ears pricked up when I read that governor Bennigsen had not called for a punitive 
expedition. While I did not see him as the enthusiastic wager of "bloody campaigns against 
recalcitrant New Guineans" portrayed by Hempenstall (see above: 95), I would have nonetheless 
expected him to have responded with punitive measures to an attack on a "scientific expedition", 
during which two Germans were killed. Since Grapow had enclosed the full text of his 1901  
report, including all its appendices, in  his final bid, I did not have to look far for information. 
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On 10 April 1901 Bennigsen had sent a cable to the colonial department, informing it that 
Bruno Mencke and his companion Caro had been killed by natives on St Matthias. "Please inform 
relatives. Report will follow." 
The evidence taken from three survivors of the "Mencke Expedition", including Topitan, a 
former Tolai policeman who had been in charge of the expedition's  military escort, had been 
essentially the same. The expedition had set up camp on the main island. A vigorous trade in 
ethnographica had developed with the natives. A minor clash had occurred between them and 
Topitan and his men when the Germans had gone off on the yacht for a day. But there had been 
no casualties and trade had resumed the next day. On the evening before the attack, Caro had 
given instructions for all rifles to be cleaned the next morning. While this was happening the 
guards had reported that the natives were coming to fight. When Caro was woken up with this 
news, he had looked out of his tent, decided that the natives had no hostile intentions, ordered that 
they be given some trade, and gone back to bed. A few minutes later he was dead, Mencke was 
mortally wounded, two members of the escort had been killed and several others injured. Topitan 
claimed the 14 kanakas had been killed and that three more were shot dead when the escort had 
unsuccessfully tried to retrieve the body of Caro. 
In his report Bennigsen blamed Mencke and Caro for what had happened. They had neither 
talked to him about their plans to visit St Matthias nor with the Hernsheim firm, which had opened 
a trading station in the group some months previously. He had predicted disaster as soon as he had 
learned about the intended visit after his return from the Island Territory, since he knew the 
character of the St Matthias natives and the recklessness of Mencke and Caro. It was sheer luck 
that more members of the expedition had not been killed during the attack, which had been a 
serious blow to the peaceful development he had initiated during his visits to the group in 1899 
and 1 900. Since no-one knew where the attackers had come from, and since the Hernsheim traders 
did not feel endangered, he did not intend to send a punitive expedition-for which he had, in any 
case, no vessel at his disposal. He would, however, dispatch district officer Boluminski with a few 
policemen to gather reliable information when Hernsheim' s Mascotte made her next voyage to the 
group. 
In the event Bennigsen sent the imperial judge Stuckhardt together with Boluminski. 
Stuckhardt found everything quiet but learned little because no-one, including the traders and their 
native employees, could understand the natives' language. Stuckhardt also considered a punitive 
expedition to be impractical because the natives could easily avoid their pursuers in the pathless 
interior of the large island. 19 Bennigsen agreed and reiterated in a second report to Berlin that a 
punitive expedition was undesirable as well as pointless. 
The colonial department had received neither of these reports when it approached the naval 
staff. The naval staff probably requested imperial orders for a punitive expedition on the basis of 
metropolitan press reports calling for an "exemplary punishment of this horrible deed" (see, for 
example, DKZ, 1 90 1 :  226). At any rate, Grapow was instructed by cable on 1 June 190 1  to carry 
it out. 
Impatient because he was delayed in Sydney for three weeks for technical reasons, Grapow 
sent a written requisition to Bennigsen, asking the governor to support this expedition by placing 
the police troop in Herbertshohe at his disposal. According to Grapow, Bennigsen did so "very 
willingly". While this is unlikely, Bennigsen certainly knew better than to try to dissuade Grapow 
from carrying out a punitive expedition ordered by the emperor. He even chartered Hernsheim's 
19 Stuckhardt also referred to an acute shortage of drinking water in the group, which he saw demonstrated by the fact 
that the natives were at present only interested in exchanging their produce for empty bottles. I found his conclusion, that 
these valuable bottles were used to store water-instead of being broken and used in the manufacture of tools and 
weapons-far from convincing. 
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Mascotte to ferry district officer Boluminski, police sergeant Soelle and 59 native policemen to 
St Matthias. 
When SMS Cormoran arrived in the group on 6 July 1901 ,  Grapow was told by the trader 
Wohlers that his partner Schlehan had fled after a party of their labourers had been attacked while 
collecting trepang near one of the smaller islands, the attackers taking with them the bodies of the 
eight men they had killed.20 The Cormoran had her own first encounter with the natives before 
she had cast anchor. Instead of running away at the sight of the warship they had gathered on the 
beaches making defiant gestures with their spears. When two large canoes left the island where 
the trading station was situated and headed towards Eloaue, Grapow launched the steam pinnace 
and a jolly-boat to cut them off, but they reached the shallow water above the reef before the naval 
vessels caught up with them. There the natives waited, joined by a third canoe, which had first 
steered straight at the pinnace, threatening to attack it. This was too much for Grapow. He ordered 
a blast from the revolving cannon. It made the natives jump into the sea. Although the fire was 
continued they managed to push their canoes to the beach. Grapow now ordered the jolly-boat to 
follow with the Maxim gun. The natives ran into the bush, but reappeared as soon as the jolly-boat 
began towing the three captured canoes to the pinnace. Grapow believed that none of the natives 
had been killed and was not sure whether any had been wounded. The next day the combined 
forces invaded Eloaue. Boluminski returned with two women and two children as prisoners and 
reported that his police force had shot dead 26 men. The landing force of SMS Cormoran had not 
seen a single native. 
On 8 July the camp site of the Mencke Expedition was inspected. Although Grapow had 
formed the view that it too had been attacked by people from the off-shore islands, in particular 
Eloaue, he ordered a reconnaissance of the main island. The native policemen who were sent out 
to do the job reported that they had seen neither natives nor houses or gardens, even though they 
claimed to have crossed the island. 
After this effort followed a day of rest. Boluminski used it to interrogate the native members 
of the Mencke Expedition who had stayed behind at the trading station. Since their evidence 
confirmed that the inhabitants of Eloaue had been responsible for the first attack, and since the 
latter had the audacity to again stand on the beaches shaking their spears, despite the first punitive 
expedition, Grapow ordered a repeat. 
It was to be prepared by a naval bombardment centring on "the citadel" in the middle of the 
island, which had not been taken four days earlier. It was planned to comb the island from one end 
to the other-the marines covering the coastline, the police the interior-but this plan had to be 
abandoned when the section of the police force under Soelle met resistance before that under 
Boluminski had reached its intended starting point. When he heard the shots Boluminski ordered 
his men to advance straight to the citadel. When he arrived some time later, he found that the 
natives had withdrawn into caves in the limestone outcrop. In order to prevent a bloodbath among 
"the innocent women and children" he ordered the firing to stop. However, by then 54 natives had 
already been killed, according to the "usually reliable" reports of the policemen. Five women and 
seven children had been taken prisoner, but not a single adult male, although Grapow had offered 
a reward of 20 Marks for each of them. even if they were wounded. Since one of the marines had 
also had the opportunity to use his rifle-with fatal result-the total official death toll among the 
St Matthias Islanders had been 8 1 .  
When this massive punishment was reported in the Gennan press the reaction was mixed. A 
strong negative response came from the "Protestant Africa Association" (Evangelischer Afrika-
20 According to Grapow, Wohlers had attributed this attack to the natives' resenting the interference with a scarce 
resource which they themselves regarded as a delicacy. This also surprised me; but then I knew nothing about the 
traditional cuisine in this group-perhaps steamed sea-cucumbers, washed down with rainwater stored in empty beer 
bottles, had indeed been its ultimate climax. 
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Verein). It sent a petition to the colonial department calling for the enactment of an ordinance 
which provided: ( 1 )  that a case be thoroughly investigated before punitive action against natives 
was taken; (2) that no punitive action be taken against natives who had responded in self-defence 
to illegal acts by Europeans; and (3) that no punitive action against guilty natives be more severe 
than absolutely necessary.21 
The petition was based on the annual report for 1900, which had stated that it had so far been 
impossible to establish which of the tribes had been responsible for the attack on the Mencke 
Expedition, and on an artide in the Kolnische Zeitu�g, which had highlighted the "unbelievable 
carelessness" of Mencke and his companions, as well as the ruthless destruction of a number of 
coconut palms near the camp site. 
In its reply the colonial department pointed out that the annual report had been submitted 
before the government in HerbertshOhe had received the reports on the punitive expedition 
showing that those responsible for the attack on the Mencke Expedition had in fact been identified 
before punitive action had been taken.22 It did not admit, of course, that the annual report also 
reflected the position taken by Bennigsen, who had not favoured a punitive expedition. It played 
down the importance of the destruction of the palms, and the carelessness of Mencke and his 
companions. Instead it attributed the attack to the "notorious savagery" of the natives. It even used 
Bennigsen as a witness, since he had previously stated that his visits to St Matthias in 1 899 and 
1900 had convinced him that the bloody attacks on two vessels of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in 
1 896 and 1898 had been due to the "insatiable avarice" and the "inexpugnable distrust" of the 
natives- without mentioning, however, that Bennigsen had also stated that his visits had 
nonetheless initiated a peaceful development which Mencke had rudely interrupted. 
The theme of native savagery was coupled with another leitmotif: unless the government was 
prepared to expose the life and property of white pioneers to the cruelties of the natives, the 
punishment of outrages such as this had to be accepted as its sombre duty. Regrettably it could not 
apply the principles of the orderly administration of justice followed in civilised states, because 
the individuals responsible for such outrages could often not be identified, let alone be peacefully 
arrested. Since the natives would interpret inaction as a sign of impotence on the part of the whites 
and hence as an invitation to commit new outrages, there was no alternative but to punish entire 
tribes. It was impossible to stipulate in advance what such a punishment should consist of and how 
it was to be effected, so that it had to be left to the official in charge to determine the appropriate 
measures in each case. A thoroughgoing improvement of this unfortunate situation could only be 
brought about through a gradual strengthening of the influence of the colonial government. The 
transformation of northern New Ireland, after a permanent government station had been opened, 
demonstrated what could be achieved. Where a decade ago violent acts against white traders and 
the plundering of their stations had been the order of the day, peaceful commerce now reigned 
supreme. 
v 
How did the punitive expedition carried out by SMS Cormoran fit into this rhetorical 
construction? There was no point in examining whether the attack on the Mencke Expedition had 
been caused by the "insatiable avarice" and the "inexpungable distrust" of the natives, by the 
"unbelievable carelessness" of Mencke and Caro or, for that matter, by their destruction of scarce 
economic resources, because the relevant information was not available and also had not been 
available at the time. Apart from the attackers no-one knew why the attack had taken place. On 
21 Together with the reply of the colonial department, and some editorial comments, this petition was published in Die 
deutschen Kolonien, 1902: 145-49. 
22 The reply was drafted by Rose. 
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the other hand, the reasons for the attack had been immaterial for the decision to carry out a 
punitive expedition. It had been the mere fact that natives had dared to make an armed attack on 
the expedition during which two whites were killed that had triggered the punitive response, 
although the fact that the two whites had been Germans, and perhaps also the fact that one of them 
had been a wealthy industrialist who may well have been a personal acquaintance of senior naval 
officers and even the emperor, had probably also been contributing factors. 
What about the other side of the picture? Had the punitive expedition been necessary? Had the 
measures been appropriate under the circumstances? Had the official in charge been in control of 
their execution? 
' 
How could this expedition be classified as necessary if governor Bennigsen had decided that 
punitive measures were undesirable and pointless? What had the punishment consisted of? If it 
had been the killing of 8 1  men-not to mention the capture of seven women and 12  children and 
the destruction of numerous houses and canoes-it had been manifestively excessive, especially 
taking into account that Grapow had only been ordered to punish the attack on the Mencke 
Expedition and not the subsequent attack on the Hernsheim labourers as well.23 Nor had Grapow, 
or Boluminski and Soelle, determined how many natives were to be killed. On the contrary, the 
casualty figures given in Grapow' s report consisted of the "usually reliable" information provided 
by the native policemen, since they had been out of sight of their German superiors when most of 
the killings had occurred and no official body count had been carried out afterwards. During the 
reconnaissance of the main island the native policemen had even been left entirely to their own 
devices. Did they cross the island, as they reported, or had they spent the day sleeping in the shade 
after marching inland for a few minutes? Had the number of natives killed on Eloaue, in fact, been 
only a small fraction of the official figure? Conversely, had a much larger number been killed or 
wounded, including many women and children ?24 
On the other hand, once it had been decided that punishment was called for, a military 
operation had probably been the only practical way of inflicting it. But this decision had not been 
the only option. The German authorities always had the choice of doing nothing; and there was 
little evidence to show that inaction encouraged natives to commit new outrages, or that a drastic 
punishment deterred them from using further violence. On the contrary, the 1902 annual report 
stated that "temporary punitive measures" were not only worthless but harmful and that the 
application of military force was helpful only if it was followed by the establishment of permanent 
government stations. 
But all these considerations were beside the point. The punitive expedition had not been an 
attempt to inflict an appropriate punishment for a particular crime. Rather, the attack on the 
Mencke Expedition was seen as a declaration of war. The aim was to vanquish "the enemy" 
militarily. Consequently the acts of defiance on the part of the St Matthias natives, especially after 
the first campaign againstEloane, had probably been more important in shaping Grapow' s military 
responses than their previous outrages. It was ironic therefore that the main military aim of the 
second campaign, the storming of the citadel, was not accomplished, albeit for laudable 
humanitarian reasons. 
23 Where had Grapow's authority to "exact retribution for this new act of violence"-as the annual report for 1901 puts 
it (see Sack & Clark, 1 979: 223)--come from? 
24 Grapow had hoped at the time that the casualty figures reported by the native policemen had been exaggerated, 
although he had been assured by Bennigsen, as well as Boluminski and Soelle, that what they said about such matters 
could be relied upon and although a high casualty figure was likely since the policemen had fired from protected positions 
at the warriors as they stormed out of their limestone caves to attack. On the other hand, Grapow was disinclined to believe 
their reports that the interior of the main island was uninhabited, because numerous fire signals had flared up at different 
points whenever the navy had made a move. Besides, even if the native policemen were all the excellent shots Grapow 
acknowledged them to be, the accuracy of a casualty list which consisted exclusively of dead adult males seems highly 
questionable. 
A NEVER-ENDING STORY 263 
What outcome had Grapow envisaged? What was supposed to have happened after the 
combined forces had driven the natives together in the citadel? Had Grapow expected a formal, 
unconditional surrender? Had he intended to take the entire adult male population prisoner? What 
had he planned to do with them? How would he have communicated his plans, whatever they 
were, to people whose language no-one else could speak?25 
Did it matter historically why the Mencke Expedition had been attacked? Did it matter how 
many casualties the military operations had caused? Would I have gained a better understanding 
of colonial rule in German New Guinea if l had found enough information to give a blow by blow 
account of this episode? Conversely, was the entire episode, taken by itself, historically 
insignificant, no matter what had actually happened? Or did it send signals of general relevance, 
like the Puttkamer Case? Was it perhaps even typical of the manner in which punitive expeditions 
were conducted in German New Guinea? 
According to Grapow this punitive expedition had been unique in that it had been ordered by 
the emperor personally, whereas the decision whether or not to carry out such an expedition was 
usually made by the colonial government, which could or could not ask for naval assistance. Had 
this punitive expedition nonetheless been typical in the sense that once the navy became involved 
in a punitive expedition, its commanding officer always took charge and always treated it as an 
essentially military operation? Had the navy been in command of all the military operations 
included in the Police List in which naval personnel had been involved? Had all punitive 
expeditions in which the navy had participated been carried out with the aim of achieving a 
military victory, or did the navy usually first try to arrest those who were personally responsible 
for acts of violence? Did punitive expeditions in which the navy participated usually involve naval 
landing forces or did the navy typically restrict itself to lending logistic support and to assisting 
the police with its fire power from the sea? 
Were punitive expeditions carried out by the police force on its own also typically conducted 
as military operations? Was it common to send native policemen out by themselves, as happened 
with the reconnaissance of the main island, although it was likely that they would encounter 
hostile natives? Was it common for native policemen to be permitted to open fire when none of 
their white superiors was present? Was it common to offer native policemen a monetary reward 
for natives whom they took prisoner, instead of killing them? Conversely, did native policemen 
usually stop firing when their white superiors ordered them to do so? Did native policemen as a 
rule obey their orders not to shoot at women and children? Did punitive expeditions usually result 
in casualties of the same order as this one? 
Had there been something which could be classified as a typical punitive expedition? Was 
"punitive expedition" no more than a verbal label which could be applied to very different events? 
Had Berghausen been right when calling punitive expeditions "so-called" (see above: 226)? 
Conversely, had Hempenstall been wrong when calling the uniqueness of events "so-called"? To 
be sure, Hempenstall was right when claiming that different human actions could have "common 
elements" (see 1 978:  ix), but did this make them "amenable to generalisation" (see ibid.)? It was 
certainly possible, and could be instructive, to compare different human actions in order to 
ascertain what elements they had in common and which elements distinguished them from each 
other, but in what sense could the results of such comparisons be generalised? Could they produce 
more than a more or less sophisticated typology into which particular actions could be fitted, thus 
25 Most likely, he had wanted to take a substantial number of adult males as hostages back to HerbertsMhe, as did 
happen with the women and children prisoners who were subsequently handed over to the Catholic mission. 1bis measure, 
according to Grapow in his report, had worked well in the past in New Ireland, New Hanover and the Admiralty Islands, 
and "prisoners and labourers[ !]"  from all these islands were currently working in HerbertsMhe and other places. The idea 
was that these people would, after their return, inform their relatives about their positive experiences with the whites and 
thereby make them more cooperative. In this particular case Grapow also hoped that it would be possible to learn more 
about "the murderous deed" once it was possible to understand what the women had to say about them. 
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making them amenable to quite specific quantitative assessments, showing frequency changes 
across space and time, which, in turn, could reveal specific patterns of change? Was the writing 
of history essentially such a retrospective modelling exercise, even though "abstract models" did, 
according to Hempenstall, "at least in history . . .  not have a life of their own which will reduce 
human actions through time and over several societies to a predictive formula" (see ibid.)? But if 
this statement was true, how did the historical "interpretation and explaining" of past events differ 
from such a modelling exercise, and how could it be combined with a narrative approach to 
history? 
Was it possible to write a history of resistance in all its manifestations in the German Pacific, 
or, for that matter, a history of punitive expeditions in German New Guinea, in the form of a 
single, coherent narrative? Conversely, did history consist of an accumulation of unconnected 
stories about a myriad of unique events. Was the only way of writing a factual history of punitive 
expeditions in German New Guinea to tell the stories of as many punitive expeditions as possible 
as accurately as possible? Had some of the many punitive expeditions been more typical than 
others? Had some of them been historically more significant than others? Conversely, had all of 
them been historically insignificant? Had at least the Ponape Rebellion, as the most dramatic event 
in the history of German colonial rule in the Island Territory, changed the general structure of this 
rule? Did a detailed account of this rebellion, or of any other instance of the use of military force, 
contribute more to an understanding of German colonial rule than that of any, or some, of the far 
more numerous peaceful episodes in which its exercise also manifested itself? 
VI 
In February 1907 Henry Nanpei-Hempenstall' s  leading Micronesian actor-wrote a letter, in 
English, to "Doctor Hahl, Most respected Sir". After thanking the governor for a postcard which 
had arrived on the birthday of "Our good Emperor William", Nanpei described the effects of "that 
terrific typhoon". Fortunately no lives had been lost, but the people, "especially the poor and 
indigent classes", had suffered most acutely and continued to do so because the typhoon had 
destroyed all the yams on the island. Nanpei therefore begged Hahl to send him different varieties 
of yams from "his and surrounding islands" for the planting of new gardens. "If Dr Hahl will 
kindly aid and assist us in that way, Your humble servant will ever pay. My wife and family joins 
with me in sending their kindest regards . . . .  " 
Hahl responded by asking his Tolai subjects to bring in yams. He instructed Herr Wiegmann 
to store them in a dry locked place, after covering the concrete floor with mats or boards, and to 
give Tolai who delivered yams orders for payment to the cash office. Two weeks later Hahl 
questioned Wiegmann as to why chief Turlom had not been given an order for payment when he 
had delivered yams the previous day. He also instructed Wiegmann to collect a basket of yams To 
Voa and To Baikan had brought to the governor's  residence and enquired how many yams had 
been collected so far. Three hundred and thirty eight and a half kilograms, Wiegmann replied, 
promptly and in copperplate, which were sprouting vigorously, so that they had to be sent to 
Ponape as soon as possible. Since there was no opportunity to ship the yams for another six 
weeks, Hahl ordered Wiegmann to pack the tubers sprouting too vigorously into little boxes 
(emphasis in the original) and send them to two of the "Baining settlers", Ebbecke and Backhaus, 
with the message that they were coming free of charge (see AA, GI, Item 8).26 
The historical record did not tell me whether Henry Nanpei ever received planting yams from 
Hahl, but it gave some indication of what might have happened to the yams sent to Ebbecke and 
Backhaus. In response to a complaint by Ebbecke to the colonial office that he had been forced 
26 The establishment of a colony of small farmers, primarily Germans from Queensland, in the Baining Mountains in 
the northwest of the Gazelle Peninsula was one of Hahl's pet projects. 
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to leave Gennan New Guinea at great financial loss because Hahl had made it impossible for him 
to hire native labourers, Hahl quoted a comment by Backhaus, whom he had confronted during 
a tour of inspection, when he had noticed that Backhaus was feeding good taro and sweet 
potatoes-and perhaps also good yams?-to his pigs but bad pumpkin to his Melanesian 
labourers. "That' s good [enough] to eat for these scoundrels" (das istfar die Luders zum Fressen 
gut), Backhaus had muttered defiantly (see RKA 3 1 29). 
What was I going to do with the many thousands of episodes like these, most of which would 
have gone unrecorded, which were as much part of the picture of Gennan colonial rule as the 
Ponape Rebellion? 
Did Hahl and Nanpei regularly exchange postcards or letters or had this exchange been 
unique? Had Nanpei been the only Micronesian or Melanesian with whom Hahl had been in 
correspondence? Were the yams to be sent to Nanpei personally, bypassing the district office in 
Ponape, or to the latter for distribution to deserving Ponapeans? Was it typical of the way Hahl 
governed the colony that he handled the matter personally, instead of referring it to the district 
commissioner in Herbertshohe? Why did To Voa and To Baikan deliver the yams to the 
governor' s  residence and not, like most of the other Tolai, to the district office? How did Hahl 
know that Turlom had not been given an order for payment by Wiegmann? Had Turlom come to 
the governor to complain? Was Hahl regularly approached personally by his native subjects-or 
by a small and identifiable group among them? Did Hahl' s German subordinates, in particular the 
district commissioners in Herbertshohe, resent his interference in their responsibilities? Would 
Hahl have responded to a request like that from Nanpei in 1914 as he had in 1907? Did minor 
episodes such as these provide more instructive illustrations of the exercise of German colonial 
rule than Grapow's  report about the punitive expedition in the St Matthias Group? Did the 
historical record include similarly instructive stories which illustrated Gennan colonial rule seen 
from a native perspective? 
The story which came most vividly to my mind in this context was one relating to the punitive 
measures following the Varzin Murders in 1902 which I had been told by Nason Tigat of 
Turagunan in 1975 .27 Fortunately I had recorded an English version in my field notes since I had 
in the meantime forgotten most of the details.  
I will tell you a story about an old man, called Tatarna, who brought the lotu28 to Turagunan. In the year 
1902 they killed a European woman, Mrs Wolff, near Toma. The kiap in Kokopo got all the people from 
Kinigunan, 29 put them into police uniforms and they went to fight the people in Paparatava and 
Tamanairik. They had a big fight which extended as far as Kunakunai and Tamtavul. There they shot a 
man and his brother' s  wife. Their names were To Manarurn and la V aluban. Then they met To Vatading 
and his two sons, To Kulap and To Mamaduk, and shot at them. When the police began to shoot, To 
Vatading took his sons ' hands and danced around, dodging all bullets. They could not shoot them 
because he used his malan magic and they escaped. 
The policemen then walked through a kunai field and reached a place called Tapipi, near the pool 
Namgir. They went to the water and saw Tatama, who was working in his garden. They shot him and he 
died. They hid his body in the reeds growing around the pool and left. When they had left Tatama got 
up again and went along a gully and up a slope to his pal baining.30 When he arrived he went to sleep. 
After a while the policemen came and saw him sitting in front of his house. He called them and said they 
should sit down and have a rest. He offered them kulau [young coconuts for drinking] and betel and 
bananas to cook. Some of them took the food and ate it, but the others were frightened. They said: "How 
27 Nason Tigat was a Tolai gentleman of the Old School to whom I owe many special thanks . 
28 "Lotu" stands for "Christianity", especially its Methodist version. 
29 The name Kinigunan is used here to denote the area around Kokopo rather than a particular place. 
30 A pal baining is a house built in the Baining style, round, with a pointed roof. I was told that it had just so happened 
that Tatama had chosen this style and that it had no special significance. 
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can we take this food, this is the man we have just killed." The first group said: "No, no, that is not he, 
that is only his brother." But the others repeated: "No, we will not eat because this is the man we killed." 
When the policemen were ready to go, they said these words to Tatama: "We are going to Kunakunai 
to get kaur [bamboo] ."31  When Tatama heard these words, he thought the policemen wanted to go to 
Kunakunai to kill his brother-in-law, To Kaur, who was an important and rich man . So he followed them, 
but in such a way that they could not see him. This is the end of the story, about the old man Tatama and 
about what happened to him. 
When I looked at my field notes for the text of this story I also found a second Tatama story which 
nicely supplemented the first. 
I am now going to tell another story about Tatama. He was very old and often gave balabalaguan feasts, 
because he was very rich. 
One day he stole a dog, whose name was Lolowat. The dog belonged to To Vapuringa and To Ukur. 
He ate the dog and buried its bones underneath the fire place in his pal baining. 
They took Tatama to court in Tingenavudu in Turagunan. 32 The luluai was called To Laulc. They 
asked him whether he had killed the dog, but Tatama denied it. But some of the people did not believe 
him. They went to his pal baining and found the dog' s  bones under the fire place. They gathered the 
bones and went back to Tingenavudu. They lifted up the bones for everyone to see and said: "We went 
to his house and dug a hole and we found these bones, but when we asked him in court he said 
"no"-this thief. Here are the bones which prove that he ate the dog." 
Tatama was sitting on a log. When one of his relatives, To Varto, the lualua of Vunalavlavia 
vunatarai, heard this, he got angry. He got up and kicked Tatama off the log. Whereupon the owners of 
the dog grabbed him and pulled him around Tingenavudu. Then they picked him up and threw him into 
the air, and when he came down, they picked him up and threw him again. Then they got a gun and hit 
him with the butt-but the butt split. Then they got hold of his head and twisted it around so that he 
looked backwards. But the old man got up again and blood bubbled out of his mouth. Still, he went to 
Nangananga and past it and straight to Kuradui to Mrs Pakistan.33 To Laulc took the other people and 
went to Kokopo to see the kiap. He sent the police to Turagunan. They got Tatama and he was sent to 
jail in Kavieng. When he finished his time in jail, he came back to Turagunan. This is the end of the 
story. 
Both stories were told as fact rather than fiction. They were traditional Tolai history, but they 
were oral history for which written historical records were immaterial. Seen from an academic 
perspective they were phantom history, even if they were factually accurate in the sense of being 
in accordance with a critical reading of the historical record. Were these stories factual in that 
sense and was this question relevant? Leaving the scientifically impossible statements aside, did 
it add to their value as traditional history if the other statements could be confirmed with the help 
of the written records? Would it invalidate them if they could be disproved ?-if, for example, the 
registers of the Methodist mission showed that Tatama of Turagunan had died before the V arzin 
Murders had taken place. Was there any point in examining the factuality of these stories? Were 
they concerned with particular events and particular people? 
The number of details included in them suggested they were. Moreover, unlike the details in 
the narratives of modem historians, the details in these stories were themselves historically 
significant. It was they which sent the messages these stories were meant to convey-but only for 
their "traditional" audience, the people of Turagunan. The geographical details provided allowed 
this audience to follow the movements of the historical actors through physical space in the Here 
3 1  Here kaur probably referred to lengths of bamboo filled with drinking water. 
32 Tingenavudu is the name of the residence (gunan) of To I.auk which was situated within the Turagunan district 
(paparagunan). 
33 This is a modem Tolai version of the name "Parkinson". It probably sounded rather like "Pakitan" earlier because the 
Blanche Bay dialect does not include an "s", until the name of the country "Pakistan" became known. 
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and Now. They anchored the past in the present and turned history into a map which consisted of 
the names of places rather than of lines on a piece of paper. A Turagunan audience could 
accompany "the policemen from Kinigunan" through the Kunai field to Tapipi and the pool 
Namgir, along a gully and up a slope to the Tatama's pal baining and then follow Tatama towards 
Kunakunai and beyond the borders of Turagunan, where the story ended in space as well as in 
time. 
Similarly, by naming Tatama and other local historical actors, including the dog Lolowat, the 
stories became anchored in historical time. But these details too were not the ones that gave these 
stories their traditional historical significance. The historical messages of these stories consisted 
of different signals whose meaning was immediately apparent to a Turagunan audience, but which 
had fallen on deaf ears in an outsider like me, who could only try to decipher them analytically 
with the help of the written record I had fortunately prepared at the time. 
This analysis revealed that each of these stories painted an incomplete but astonishingly rich 
picture of traditional Tolai culture. Thus it was no coincidence that To Kaur was, according to the 
story, the brother-in-law of Tatama. Nor was it a coincidence that la V aluban was identified as the 
wife ofTo Manarum's brother rather than To Manarum as la Valuban' s  "brother-in-law", because 
the social relations between a man and his wife's brother and those between a woman and her 
husband's  brother were vastly different. It also made cultural sense that To Vatading used his 
magic to protect his two sons, although they belonged to the other moiety, rather than his sister's 
sons, who were members of his own vunatarai. It also indicated that the two boys were still 
children, who properly lived with their father rather than with their mother's brother on the land 
identified with their vunatarai. 
But both stories were primarily about Tatama' s magical powers. The Varzin Murders, just as 
the discovery of the bones of the dog Lolowat, merely provided the occasion for a display of these 
powers. But although these powers were wielded by Tatama as a unique human being, the point 
of both stories was that such powers generally played a central role in the traditional Tolai 
universe. 
What made these stories especially interesting from a modem perspective was that the 
historical stage described was no longer purely traditional but included a variety of colonial 
factors, although no whites were physically present on the stage described. There was the 
anonymous kiap in Kokopo and "Mrs Pakistan" in Kuradui, but people from Turagunan went 
there to see them. They did not come to Turagunan. Instead they sent their black agents to act for 
them For these stories it was "the Kinigunan people", albeit dressed in police uniforms, who 
fought the people in Paparatava and Tamanairik, not the kiap, and it was a group of native 
policemen, not a German official, who came to Turagunan to arrest Tatama. 
Similarly, the second story presented To Lauk as the luluai of the Turagunan people and not 
as an agent of the kiap in Kokopo. He was not a foreign imposition but part of the local scene, just 
as the lotu was part of the local scene. But whereas the lotu had been brought to Turagunan by 
Tatama, the stories did not claim that anyone had brought "the government" to Turagunan. In 
contrast to "the lotu "', "the government" figured in these stories as an external power of a 
different order which the Tolai had not made their own. Hence To Lauk was not part of the 
government but rather the link of the Turagunan people with the government. 
Internally To Lauk still operated in a traditional manner. He made no attempt to prevent 
Tatama's lualua, or the owners of the dog Lolowat, from taking the law into their own hands. It 
was only when the traditional way of dealing with Tatama did not work that the Turagunan people, 
led by To Lauk, turned to the kiap in Kokopo, who promptly obliged by sending Tatama to jail in 
Kaewieng, where he obediently stayed instead of using his magical powers to escape. 
Nor did he use these powers to defend himself against his maltreatment by his lualua and 
Lolowat's owners, or to avenge himself on them Indeed, Tatama did nothing heroic in either 
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story. On the contrary, even when he followed the policemen-presumably using his magical 
powers to make himself invisible- he acted under a comic rather than tragic misapprehension. 
Seen from a modern perspective both stories were pointless. Their tone was matter of fact yet 
the scene they describe was decidedly weird. Instead of presenting the punitive measures after the 
V arzin Murders as a horrifying experience, they showed small groups of Kinigunan people in 
police uniforms aimlessly wandering around shooting people when they felt like it, but sitting 
down to eat and drink with others. Why did these policemen hide the body of Tatama in the reeds 
after they had shot him? Why did the policemen who believed that the man who was offering them 
food and drink was the same man they had killed a short while ago refuse to accept his offer? Was 
it frightening to them that Tatama had come back to life but natural that To Vatading had been 
able to dodge their bullets? Why did the policemen who believed that Tatama was the brother of 
the man they had killed before not kill him also? Why did Tatama call them to his house? Had he 
wanted to frighten them? If he did, why did he not tell those who took him for his brother that they 
were wrong and that he was indeed the same man they had killed before? 
Why had Tatama's lualua and the owners ofLolowat not been frightened ofTatama's magical 
powers when they had attacked him? Why was Tatama presented as being rich and powerful but, 
at the same time, as too stupid or careless to cover his tracks when stealing a dog, and as so weak 
that he could be kicked around without making any effort to defend himself? Why did Tatama go 
to "Mrs Pakistan" after his ordeal? Was he seeking medical help? Were his own powers waning? 
Were there quite different reasons for bringing "Mrs Pakistan" into the picture? Were Tolai oral 
traditions simply not interested in explaining, let alone evaluating, the actions they described, not 
because they regarded human behaviour as erratic but because for them all human actions had a 
typical, structural meaning, irrespective of motives or purposes of the particular persons 
performing them? Were these stories not historical narratives but illustrations of historical 
structures in operation which did not have to make narrative sense? Was the historically 
significant information not contained in the description of the actions of people but in the 
narratively irrelevant details mentioned along the way? Did a narrative streamlining of these 
stories-like the following-destroy their value as oral traditions as effectively as the narrative 
streamlining of the historical record destroyed modern historiography as an academic enterprise? 
Tatama of Turagunan was shot at Palnabaining, turned into a chicken and then back into a man and 
thereby scared the police away (Neumann, 1992: 29). 
Was this not only phantom history but also no longer a genuine form of Tolai traditions? While 
it made more narrative sense than the detailed version I was told it was historically empty-and 
no amount of "interpretation" could change that because all the information which mattered 
traditionally had been omitted. The narrator of "my" version of the Tatama stories knew that the 
details he included were not decorations but the historical meat of these stories--or, rather, that 
these stories were merely vehicles which allowed him to reinforce the structures within which he 
and his traditional audience were leading their lives. He was lending them support by talking about 
them, but could, at the same time, adjust them. He was shaping the present with his stories, rather 
than trying to reconstruct what had actually happened in the past. 
A traditional Tolai historian had no choice but to phantomise history when performing this 
task. Indeed a phantomisation of history was the purpose of the exercise. It was through a 
phantomisation of the past that the traditional structures of Tolai society were operated and 
maintained. But these structures were quite different from those of modern state 
governments-and so were the historical records they produced of their operation. Each set called 
for a different approach to history. Just as it was impossible to write a factual history of traditional 
Tolai society based on Tolai oral traditions, it was pointless to try to capture the history of German 
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colonial rule in the Tolai area in the form of stories which were designed like Tolai oral traditions. 
The Tatama stories could not tell me anything worth knowing about the structure and the operation 
of German colonial government. By contrast they made valuable statements about the structure 
and operation of traditional Tolai society. But they were immediately intelligible only to members 
of that society because these stories were concerned with affirmation rather than information. 
Moreover, while the general messages were factual, the events in which they were encoded were 
not, although they purported to be descriptions of unique events. These stories were surrealistic 
in the sense that they achieved realism at the level of typicalness by sacrificing realism at tlie level 
of uniqueness. 
To be sure, Tolai oral traditions were phantom history, but they differed greatly from the 
phantom histories offered by modem narrative historians. They were a sociopolitical technology. 
They recorded history for the purpose of shaping the present, whereas the latter purported to be 
the product of the processing of an already existing historical record which was concerned with 
a better intellectual understanding of the past. True, both sacrificed factuality and both used a 
narrative form, but Tolai oral traditions used it because telling stories about the past was the only 
method of recording history traditionally available. Moreover, although these traditional stories 
did sacrifice factuality, they did not do so in order to make history more narratable than it had 
actually been. On the contrary, genuine Tolai oral traditions made the stories they told narratively 
less attractive than they could have been in order to reaffirm and manipulate the sociopolitical 
structures which actually existed in traditional Tolai society. 
By contrast, modem western narrative historians phantomised history because they wanted to 
give the past retrospectively a narrative meaning which it did not have when the events described 
took place. Modem narrative historians did not engage in a narrative phantomisation of history 
because they wanted to come to grips with the sociopolitical structures which had existed in the 
past but precisely because they refused to do so. Nor did they have the excuse of having no choice. 
At least when dealing with the history of modem territorial governments they had a written 
historical record of the structures as well as the activities of these governments at their disposal 
which they could have processed in accordance with normal academic standards. Nor did they 
sacrifice factuality because they were, in fact, more concerned with shaping the sociopolitical 
structures in the present, they sacrificed factuality simply because they were not prepared to 
sacrifice narrative as the only 'proper' form of history. Modem narrative history was not designed 
as a sociopolitical technology. But neither did it serve the intellectual purposes it claimed to serve. 
Yet, it was for this very reason that it was functional in sociopolitical terms in the modem western 
context. It too was meant to present phantom history. It was its function to provide a smokescreen 
behind which the modern western sociopolitical structures could operate without undue 
interference by those who were affected by them. 
Put differently, in the case of Tolai oral traditions the phantomisation of history was a means 
to an end, in the case of modem narrative history it was an end in itself. Modem narrative history 
did not use information about the past to shape the present, rather it covered the existing historical 
record with layers of phantom histories which prevented the general public from using the 
information the historical record contained to shape the present. Whereas Tolai oral traditions 
empowered individuals by providing them with information they could use as weapons in 
competitive politics, modem narrative history assisted in the political disempowerment of human 
beings as individuals. Seen from an external point of view, it was an exercise in the dissemination 
of strategic misinformation. 
Who benefited from the modern phantomisation of the history of the Ponape Rebellion or of 
the Blanche Bay Uprising? What distinguished what his Ponapean informants told Bascom from 
what he and subsequent narrative historians did with this information? Had Salisbury's informants 
been interested in the history of the Blanche Bay Uprising or only in the part To Bobo had played 
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in these events? Similarly, had they been interested in the history of the government chiefs in the 
northeastern Gazelle Peninsula or only in telling Salisbury how To Bobo had personally 
manipulated the modern powers of the colonial government? 
Since Tolai oral traditions were incapable of transmitting the same kind of structural 
infonnation about the organisation of colonial and post-colonial governments as about their 
traditional sociopolitical organisation, the stories about To Bobo's  actions on the colonial stage 
did not enable their Tolai audience to operate politically more effectively in the post-colonial 
context. They merely made it feel better about the past and allowed it to cling to the illusion that 
the traditional way of doing things had continued to be effective and would continue to be for ever 
and ever. 
But the Tolai and other Pacific Islanders fared even worse if they abandoned their traditional 
approach to history and adopted instead the modern narrative alternative. Even the most 
counterhegemonial modern phantom histories did nothing to liberate them from their colonial past. 
Instead they promoted the idea that knowledge about history could provide no more than a 
psychologically satisfying form of entertainment and that the future, while unpredictable, was, at 
the same time, in a mysterious way reassuringly inevitable because "Good" would always triumph, 
at least eventually. 
But there was another alternative. It did not make history the kind of sociopolitical technology 
that oral traditions offered, but it could provide at least some realistic infonnation about the 
structure and the operations of modern forms of government, because they produced a historical 
record of their operation which did not exist in the traditional context. However, the adoption of 
this third alternative called for an acceptance of the fact that the comfortable middle level of 
generality which the narrative approach to history tried to capture did not exist: Instead it 
recognised that human history had always consisted of various structural frameworks of human 
actions, which were as such non-narratable, and of a multitude of repetitive human actions which 
were historically significant only because they illustrate the operation of these frameworks. 
The historiographical advantage of bureaucratic governments was that they produced historical 
records which made not only their own nonnative and organisational structures explicit but also 
recorded the particular instances of the exercise of governmental powers. Historians who were 
prepared to take these historical records seriously therefore had their task mapped out for them. 
In the case of German New Guinea the task was less daunting than it might have been because the 
history of the government of this colony was not the history of the operation of a largely static, 
established normative and organisational framework but the history of its development. Moreover, 
this framework was the product of human actions, although their historical significance lay in their 
structural effects rather than in their actual performance. In addition, even at the end of German 
colonial rule this framework left considerable room for administrative discretion at all levels, for 
the exercise of which a systematic structural and quantitative approach was unsuitable, so that 
some kind of narrative supplement was required. 
Finally, there was the question of the completeness and the reliability of the surviving 
governmental records. No matter which approach historians adopted, if they were committed to 
factuality they could only go as far as these records permitted them to go. From what I had seen 
of the government records of German New Guinea, this was probably not very far. Nonetheless 
an attempt to explore the history of colonial rule in this colony from a structural perspective was 
worth making. Even if it yielded no more than a collage of fragments, this collage made a more 
valuable contribution to an understanding of that history than what a conventional, action-centred 
approach had to offer because the need to create an artificial narrative coherence compelled 
historians to present ahistorical phantom history. 
Put differently, Andersen' s  fairy tale, of which these phantom narratives had reminded me, 
also depicted phantom history. In fact, it was the little boy, rather than the emperor, who had 
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become a victim of his own delusions. The emperor was only naked in Wonderland because the 
normative and quasi-normative garments he was wearing were made invisible by the tinted glasses 
of cultivated ignorance the little boy was sporting as part of his historian's uniform. In the realm 
of factual history they were not only visible but the stuff the history of modern governments was 
primarily made of. In other words the only way of coming to grips with that history was to start 
feeling their texture, no matter how foreign this sensation was going to be to anyone brought up 
in the belief that history consists of tasty and easily digestible narrative omelettes. 
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The Emperor 's New Clothes 

Introduction 
I 
When the acquisition of colonial territory by Germany got underway in 1 884 there was no tried legal choreography which could be adapted by a troop of experienced dancers to the 
peculiarities of new stages. Instead a handful of novices were trying to fill a legal vacuum in 
response to a multitude of pressures which did not allow them to give conceptual clarity a high 
priority or to consider carefully the systemic implications of what they were doing. While this 
makes the measures taken all the more interesting historically, it requires patience on the part of 
the observer who is not faced with the implementation of a master-plan but with a process of 
piecemeal tinkering, full of ambiguities, inconsistencies and unintended consequences, which was 
often overtaken by events and, at the end of German colonial rule, was still far from being at least 
fundamentally completed, although it had by then produced a vast body of legal documents. 
At the start even the language of German colonial law had to be invented, in particular the 
terms "Schutzgebiet'' (protected territory) and "Schutzgewalt " (protecting power). These terms 
were meant to convey that the territories Germany acquired were neither "colonies" (Kolonien) 
nor "protectorates" (Protektorate ). This reflected Bismarck's plan not to acquire colonies for the 
Reich but to limit its involvement to the "protection" (Schutz) of German companies which would 
administer these territories as commercial enterprises. This is what was supposed to distinguish 
the Schutzgebiete from conventional Protektorate, where the protecting power protected the local 
population and its government from external forces, as well as from conventional Kolonien, where 
the colonial power assumed full and direct governmental responsibilities. 1 
Although it soon became clear that the involvement of the Reich could not be so limited in all 
the territories Germany acquired, not only was the now inappropriate terminology retained, but 
also the substantive legal arrangements which had been shaped by the colonial scheme of things 
Bismarck had envisaged. This state of affairs offered lawyers ample room for academic 
discussions but placed German officials on the spot in an awkward position because they were 
only given vague ideas about what they were expected to do which they could easily misinterpret 
and thereby get into serious trouble. 
Since this study is concerned with the historical development of German colonial law rather 
than with its doctrinal elaboration, the surprisingly rich contemporary legal literature (see the 
bibliography in Schack, 1923) will be disregarded, because it views German colonial law from a 
jurisprudential perspective. It is appropriate, however, to illustrate the differences between such 
a jurisprudential and a historical approach. 
II 
In his account of the doctrinal development of German colonial law Schack devoted over a 
hundred pages to a discussion of the legal nature of the acquisition of the Schutzgebiete. He 
distinguished three types of acquisition: unilateral occupation; cession by a recognised member 
of the international community of nations;  and an acquisition involving treaties with parties not 
so recognised. According to Schack each of the three main parts of German New Guinea 
represented a different type of acquisition: Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Bismarck Archipelago and 
the northern Solomons-the Old Protectorate-were unilaterally occupied, the Carolines, Palau 
I This did not mean that protection of "the natives" was immaterial, but it was a secondary consideration. On the other 
hand, it included the obligation to protect the natives also from illegal governmental activities by the companies which 
had taken on governmental responsibilities. 
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and the northern Marianas-the Island Territory-were ceded by Spain and the acquisition of the 
Marshall Islands belonged in the third category, because their occupation had been preceded by 
a "protection treaty" (Schutzvenrag) with Marshallese chiefs. 
Schack's treatment of the Marshall Islands case ( 1923 : 376-78) indicates how sophisticated the 
legal analysis had become. But it also demonstrates on what a shaky factual basis it was carried 
out. Schack had not seen the text of the "protection treaty" which had been concluded in the 
Marshall Islands, as it had never been published. Nor had he seen the text of the documents by 
which the Neu Guinea Kompagnie purported to have acquired land before the hoisting of the 
German flag, or of the "treaties" imperial commissioner Oertzen had concluded in their support 
or, for that matter, the proclamations read by naval commanders when the German flag was 
hoisted. This did not stop him from asserting that treaties of an international law character had 
"obviously" not been concluded in Melanesia (ibid. :  92), that the land acquisitions of the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie had merely been ofa private law nature (ibid. :  370), or that they even had had 
no legal significance whatever (ibid. : 371).2 In other words, we are entering the jurisprudential 
counterpart of the Wonderland of narrative history, but one where a disdain of historical facts can 
be expressed openly. Schack simply left open what provisions the protection treaty with the 
Marshallese chiefs had made, because any restraints they might have placed on the powers of the 
Reich, so he claimed, had become immaterial when they had been subsequently disregarded by 
tb.e German authorities without objections by the chiefs (ibid. :  378). 
Historically such a "be this as it may" (wie dem auch sei) approach is unsatisfactory, quite 
apart from the fact that Schack had no way of knowing whether the chiefs in the Marshall Islands 
had never objected to interferences with their rights under the treaty by the German authorities.3 
But its justification is also legally doubtful since Schack' s discussion shows that the legal meaning 
of concepts like Schutzg ebiet and Schutzgewalt was itself shaped by historical practice rather than 
legal theory.4 There is no question that German New Guinea was historically a Schutzgebiet, no 
matter how lawyers at the time defined the legal meaning of this term. Hence it is historically 
immaterial if lawyers could show that, according to their normative criteria, much of German New 
Guinea was technically still a "sphere of interest" (lnteressensphiire) instead of a Schutzgebiet at 
tb.e end of German colonial rule. 
This also puts the question of the translation of German legal terms into context. How does 
one translate "Schutzgebiet" into English? Should one opt for a cautious literal translation, that 
is to say "protected area"?-or for its closest technical legal English counterpart, namely "colonial 
protectorate", although the technical meaning of the two terms is by no means identical? Should 
one settle for one of the more familiar terms from which the term "Schutzgebiet" tried to 
distinguish itself?-perhaps for "colony" because the Schutzgebiete became legally more and 
more like colonies and because the German authorities often used this term, for example, by 
calling the counterpart of the British colonial office Kolonialamt and not Schutzgebietsamt. Or 
should one reflect the ambiguity of the term Schutzgebiet by using both the terms "colony" and 
"protectorate" interchangeably, depending on which of them sounded better in a particular 
context? 
2 Nonetheless Schack claimed that the ground for the acquisition of the northern Solomons by Germany in 1 886 had 
again been prepared by similar land acquisitions by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie (ibid.: 376). By contrast the historical 
record shows that the company pushed for an annexation of these islands precisely because it was worried by large-scale 
land acquisitions by non-German interests. 
3 Schack probably wasted his time because the treaty was subject to approval by the German government which was 
apparently not given so that it never became legally binding. 
4 1bis is not to say that legal theory had no historical impact. Moreover, the historical role of jurisprudence changed 
considerably when German colonial courts entered the stage and German metropolitan courts started to deal with colonial 
cases, since their decisions had a greater political weight than academic discussions. 
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What about terms like "Vertrag" or "Mort!' which have a direct counterpart in everyday 
English-"contract" and "murder"-but a somewhat different technical meaning in German and 
English law? The crux is that it is impossible to translate technical legal terms accurately into 
another language because they acquire their meaning as part of a legal system so that it always 
needs to be explained by reference to that system and also to the legal system which goes with the 
language into which the term is to be translated. In order to appreciate the technical meaning of 
the English term "contract" in German law the reader has not only to be told what characterises 
a "Vertrag" in German law but also what distinguishes it from a "contract" as part of the English 
legal system. 
Seen in this light it may be an advantage to write and read a history of German colonial law 
in English because it has to be written in a language which describes its historical shell rather than 
its jurisprudential intestines. But, by paying attention to the historical circumstances such a 
description also presents a picture giving a better understanding of the legal aspect of the 
acquisition of the Schutzgebiete than a discussion of the legal differences between a Schutzgebiet, 
a Kolonie and a Protektorat, or of the question whether a "Schutzvertrag" of the kind which was 
"presumably" concluded in the Marshall Islands should legally be interpreted as part of 
international law, constitutional law or private law, in which Schack engaged. 
As regards the question of translating legal terms the choice of particular words is of minor 
importance. Since explanations are required whenever their technical meaning matters, linguistic 
convenience can generally serve as the guiding star. Thus I have not hesitated to translate 
"Schutzgebietsgesetz" as "Protectorates Act" and to already apply this label to the 1886 version 
of this act, although its official German title was "Gesetz betreffend die Rechtsverhiiltnisse in den 
deutschen Schutzgebieten". A clumsy literal translation, "statute concerning the legal conditions 
in the German protected areas", does not indicate its subject more clearly, because the term 
"Rechtsverhiiltnisse " , literally ''legal conditions", cannot be adequately translated. 5 
m 
Germany started the acquisition of colonial territory in the Pacific cautiously. The proclamations 
read by captain Schering of SMS Elisabeth when the German flag was hoisted in the then "New 
Britain Archipelago" in November 1884 not only restricted imperial protection to land acquired, 
or in the process of being acquired ( !), by German individuals and firms but also stated that it was 
merely intended to grant this protection, subject to duly acquired rights of third parties. 
When Germany notified other powers of these moves in December 1 884 the imperial 
protection of the land acquisitions by German nationals, which was said to have been supported 
by the conclusion of treaties with the chiefs, was presented as having already been granted.6 By 
April 1 885, when the inland boundary between the German and British "protectorates", as in the 
English version, or "Besitzungen" (possessions), as in the German version, were defined by an 
exchange of notes, it had grown into a fully-fledged territorial claim. This was confirmed when 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was granted an imperial charter a month later. It stated that the 
emperor had assumed the "ultimate sovereignty" ( Oberhoheit) over two geographically defined 
areas and that he was granting the company the rights of "local sovereignty" (Landeshoheit) which 
corresponded to its undertaking to establish and maintain "institutions of government" (staatliche 
5 It denotes, in this context, the general legal framework within which specific "legal relationships" (which are also 
Rechtsverhiiltnisse ) come about, whether by means of a contract or in some other way. The term therefore also covers, 
for example, the legal position in which a person accused of a crime finds himself. 
6 For a more detailed account of the annexation of the Old Protectorate see Sack 1987. It may, however, be useful to point 
out in this context that the forms provided to Otto Finsch for his land acquisitions purported to include the acquisition of 
rights of sovereignty, whereas the treaties concluded by the imperial commissioner stopped well short of purporting to 
acquire such rights. 
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Einrichtungen). In other words, the charter was based on the view that the emperor had acquired 
full territorial sovereignty over the areas in question through its unilateral assumption, regardless 
of the German land acquisitions and the treaties which had been concluded with Melanesian 
chiefs. 
When the German foreign office asked the admiralty to place the Carolines and the Palau 
Group in Micronesia under imperial protection in July 1 885, it stressed that this protection would 
extend to the entire groups, so that the naval proclamations should define the areas which were 
"taken into possession" ( ! )  in terms of their geographical latitude and longitude. But the 
instructions stated that it would be desirable if at least the chiefs on the larger islands would 
recognise "German protection" (das deutsche Schutzverhiiltnis) in the form of a brief treaty or "by 
some other means". 
Lieutenant Hofmeier, commander of SMS Iltis, hoisted the German flag on Yap on 25 August 
1885, although a Spanish expedition on a similar mission had already arrived. He also got four 
chiefs to sign a document in which they recognised "German protection and ultimate sovereignty" 
(das deutsche Protections- und Oberhoheits-Recht) and denied the existence of older Spanish 
rights . The two leading chiefs in the Palau Group had been unwilling to commit themselves in this 
manner. But Hofmeier had hoisted the German flag regardless on 23 August 1 885, proclaiming 
all islands belonging to the group to be a German "Schutzgebiet". 
A month later the two "kings" signed a more elaborate treaty prepared by captain Pliiddemann 
of SMS Albatross. Article 1 stated that the emperor was assuming "the ultimate sovereignty and 
the powers of protection" (die Oberhoheit und Schutzherrschaft) over all lands under the rule of 
the undersigned king. Article 2 promised the king and his subjects, at home as well as abroad, the 
same protection by the Reich as German nationals. 7 Article 3 foreshadowed the sending out by the 
emperor of officials who would maintain law and order, to whom the king promised his support 
as well as that of his subjects. In Article 4 the king promised to protect all German nationals and 
"protected persons" (Schutzgenossen) who were granted full commercial freedom. Article 5 
declared that the German flag was henceforth the flag of all the lands under the rule of the king, 
and article 6 that the treaty, although it would come into force immediately, was nonetheless 
subject to the approval of the German government. To be on the safe side, Pliiddemann hoisted 
the German flag again on 21 September 1 885, confirming that the Palau Group had been placed 
under the ultimate sovereignty and protection of the Reich. Yet all these efforts were in vain. As 
a result of Papal arbitration, Germany recognised Spanish sovereignty over the Carolines and 
Palau in an agreement signed in December 1 885. 
By contrast the acquisition of the Marshall Islands proceeded smoothly. It was set in train by 
a cable to SMS Nautilus, then in Nagasaki, in August 1 885. Captain Rottger was instructed to 
proclaim all islands between 4° and 13° N. Latitude and 1 64° and 175° E. Longitude-as well as 
the Brown Group8-to be a German Schutzgebiet. The recognition of German protection by the 
chiefs was said to be desirable, but not essential if it was too time-consuming. Still, the 
expenditure of 500 Marks was approved for presents for this purpose. 
Instead of drafting a short treaty recognising German protection, Rottger and the "acting 
consul" (Konsulatsverweser), Hemsheim, prepared a solemn document in German and 
7 This is one of several indications that these treaties were still seen as closely akin to classical treaties of protection which 
gave the indigenous population of the territories in question the status of"Schutzgenossen" who therefore also came under 
German consular jurisdiction-but the historical development quickly headed in another direction. 
8 This is the remote Eniwetok atoll which was seen as not being quite part of the group. 
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Marshallese.9 It was signed by "king" Kabua and four other chiefs10 on 15 October 1 885, the day 
the German flag was hoisted. In article 1 Kabua and the chiefs asked the emperor for his 
protection and the emperor granted it, but the purpose of the exercise was identified as enabling 
Kabua and the chiefs to protect the legitimate trade in their islands and to preserve their 
independence ( !). Accordingly Kabua and the chiefs promised in article 2 not to cede any part of 
their territory to, or to conclude treaties with, other foreign powers without the approval of the 
emperor. In article 3 they promised to protect German nationals and protected persons in the 
Marshall Islands and never to grant other nations greater protection or concessions than German 
nationals. Article 4 limited the legislative powers of Kabua and the chiefs, who promised not to 
enact laws applicable to German nationals without the emperor's approval. In article 5 the emperor 
promised not to burden the free trade in the Marshall Islands in any way. In article 6 the parties 
reserved the right to make additional agreements concerning subject matter not covered in the 
treaty. Although it was to come into effect immediately, article 7 stipulated that it was subject to 
the approval of the German government. Since this was not at all the kind of treaty the German 
government had had in mind-although it had apparently not spelled out what that was-this 
approval was never given and the text of this treaty was never published. 1 1  
When the foreign office approached the admiralty o n  19  June 1 886 to make arrangements for 
the acquisition of the northern Solomons it emphasised that it did not appear necessary to conclude 
treaties with local natives before proclaiming these islands a German Schutzgebiet (see RKA 
2642). The instructions to captain Wietersheim, the commander of SMS Adler, generally left little 
to his imagination when drafting the text of the proclamation he read on 28 October 1 886 in 
Bambatani on Choiseul Island. 12 By order and in the name of the emperor he assumed protection 
over all islands of the Solomon Group north of the line of demarcation of the respective spheres 
of influence agreed upon between Germany and Britain in April 1 886. 13 
When Nauru was acquired the procedures had been further simplified. Sitting in his office in 
the Marshall Islands, hundreds of kilometres away, imperial commissioner Sonnenschein notified 
the public on 1 6  April 1 888 that he declared Nauru "herewith" to be a German Schutzgebiet 
placed under the administration of the Schutzgebiet of the Marshall Islands. No treaties, no 
hoisting of the flag. 14 Instead Sonnenschein followed his notification with a police ordinance 
declaring the importation of firearms, ammunition and explosives to Nauru to be an offence 
punishable with a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment of up to three months, although he decreed 
that this ordinance would only come into force on Nauru after it had been made public on this 
island. 15 
9 It is likely that the man in question was Franz Hemsheim. It appears that Franz Hemsheim left the Pacific in 1 880 and 
handed in his commission as German consul (see Suchan-Gallow, 1 940: 1 1 8) but that he returned at some later date and 
acted as consul in 1 885 during the absence of his brother Eduard who had taken over from him as consul in 1 880 (see 
Hemsheim, 1983: 96). 
10  The treaty was subsequently also signed by more than a dozen other chiefs. 
1 1  I had some difficulty in finding its text. It was not filed with the copy of ROttger' s report sent by the admiralty to the 
foreign office (see RKA 2954). The text summarised here is included in a naval file dealing with the activities of SMS 
Nautilus (RM 1/2635). 
12  Nonetheless Wietersheim was later criticised by the admiralty because he had purported to act in the name of Wilhelm 
I not only in his capacity as emperor of the Reich but also in his capacity as king of Prussia, which had been inappropriate. 
13 The existence of this document simplified the task of the person drafting these instructions considerably but at the 
same time significantly limited his freedom of action. 
14 Sonnenschein was instructed by the foreign office that the hoisting of the German flag could be postponed until the 
next visit of a naval vessel. It was eventually hoisted by SMS Eber on 2 October 1 88 8  as a sign that the island had been 
(!) placed under the direct protection of the Reich. 
15 The German Mark only became the official currency of the Marshall Islands in July 1 888. 
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This leaves the acquisition of the Island Territory some ten years later. According to article 1 
of the Hispano-German treaty of 30 June 1899 this was a straightforward case. 
Spain cedes to Gennany the full local sovereignty [Landeshoheit] over the Carolines together with the 
Palaus, and the Marianas, except Guam, and the ownership [Eigentum] of these islands against a 
monetary compensation which has been fixed at 25 million Pesetas. 16 
A decree issued by the emperor on 18 July referred to this treaty but went on to state that he 
"herewith" took this island territory in the name of the Reich under his imperial protection. The 
cession by Spain was thus legally left hanging in the air and the emperor purported to establish 
German sovereignty ex novo by this unilateral assumption. 
Now it could be argued that the cession by Spain belonged to the sphere of international law 
whereas the emperor' s  decree belonged to that of German public law, but this does not solve the 
puzzles this decree poses since it also stated that imperial protection would only start when the 
territory had been handed over to imperial officials. 
This handing over took place on 1 3  October 1 899 in Ponape. Germany was represented by the 
governor of German New Guinea, Rudolf von Bennigsen. He opened the ceremony by reciting 
the decree of 1 8  July "by which the Island Territory is [ !] placed under imperial protection". Then 
a Spanish warship fired a salute and the Spanish flag was lowered. Now Bennigsen ordered the 
German flag to be raised as a sign that "the country" ( das lAnd) was "taken into possession [ !]" .  
The raising o f  the German flag was accompanied by a combined German and Spanish naval 
salute. 
When and how was German sovereignty over the Island Territory acquired? By the treaty of 
cession of 30 June 1899, by the imperial decree of 1 8  July 1 899, or when Bennigsen took it "into 
possession" on 13  October 1 899? 
The ceremony in Ponape was not designed as a transfer of powers but as an act of 
relinquishment, symbolised by the lowering of the Spanish flag, followed by an act of assumption, 
symbolised by the raising of the German flag. 17 Yet the emperor began to exercise German 
sovereignty well before October 1 899. He regulated the "legal conditions" already on 1 8  July 
1 899 in the form of two imperial ordinances, which makes legal sense only if the Island Territory 
had become a German Schutzgebiet at the latest by virtue of the imperial decree of the same day.18 
The ceremony in October, and the delay in the assumption of the Schutzgewalt, were legally a 
charade. But it made good political sense: for what was the Schutzgewalt worth as long as Spanish 
officials continued to exercise the powers of government at the local level? Historically it 
demonstrated that the emperor did not see himself as a successor of the king of Spain. For him 
the position of the Island Territory was no different from the Old Protectorate or the Marshall 
Islands. It was not taken over as a going colonial concern but as a territory which was 
constitutionally terra nullius. Hence the imperial ordinances of 1 8  July 1 899 did not repeal the 
existing Spanish colonial law before introducing German colonial law in its place. The Island 
Territory was perceived as a legal vacuum in which the emperor could exercise the Schutzgewalt 
as he saw fit or, to be more precise, within the limits set for his discretion by German law. In this 
regard the position had changed considerably since the first moves towards the acquisition of 
German colonial territory in the Pacific in 1884, and it is this position we must now examine. 
16 The combination of the transfer of "local sovereignty" and "ownership" was by then already a dated formula meant 
to express that complete sovereignty had been transferred. 
17 It is plain that this ceremony did not amount to an actual occupation of the Island Territory. 
1 8  While the imperial decree was not issued under the Protectorates Act, the imperial ordinances were. That is to say the 
decree was meant to bring the Island Territory under this act whereas the emperor then exercised his powers under this 
act when issuing the ordinances. But if this is so, it is only all the more absurd for the same decree to state that the territory 
had not yet come under imperial protection. 
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IV 
At that time German colonial law had not yet come into existence. Nor did the constitution of the 
Reich provide a firm basis for its development, since the acquisition of colonial territories by the 
Reich had not been envisaged. But it was not the acquisition of such territories for which the legal 
position was uncertain. According to article 1 1  the emperor was the international representative 
of the Reich and therefore entitled to acquire colonial territories on its behalf. The question was 
whether he was constitutionally empowered to govern such territories, whether the constitution 
vested this power wholly or partly in other organs of the Reich, or whether their government took 
place outside the constitution, so that it was a question of which of the organs of the Reich would 
take the political initiative of filling this legal vacuum. 
Even in the last case, however, these colonial territories were not situated in a complete legal 
vacuum. Any expenditure by the Reich in relation to them came under the control of its legislature 
in accordance with articles 69 and 72 of the constitution. On the other hand only the emperor 
could appoint German consuls in these territories under article 56, and he was also responsible 
for providing German nationals in these territories with the protection of the Reich to which they 
were entitled under article 3, provided they were "external territories" (Ausland). 
In addition the legal position of these territories was shaped by the international obligations 
into which the Reich had entered. The most important document in this regard was the general 
act of the Congo Conference, signed in Berlin in February 1 885. Although it did not directly 
apply to the Pacific, it formulated principles of international law relating to the government of all 
colonial territories . The signatory powers recognised in article 35 "the obligation to insure the 
establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them . . .  sufficient to protect existing 
rights . . .  ". They also bound themselves in article 6 "to watch over the preservation of the native 
tribes and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well­
being . . . . " It was therefore plain that the Reich had to do something about the government of the· 
colonial territories it acquired-and there was a precedent to consider, namely the arrangements 
made for the government of Alsace-Lorraine after it had been ceded by France in the Frankfurt 
peace treaty of 10 May 1 87 1 .  
These arrangements had taken the form of a statute of the Reich, the Unification Act of 9 June 
1 87 1 .  It incorporated Alsace-Lorraine into the Reich and declared that "the powers of the state" 
(die Staatsgewalt) were exercised by the emperor, but that the constitution of the Reich would 
come into force in Alsace-Lorraine on 1 January 1 873. The date was postponed by a year, but 
from then on the legal position of Alsace-Lorraine was increasingly normalised, although it never 
became a state in the federation constituting the Reich. 19 Instead it remained a "province" under 
the direct control of the Reich, in which the emperor acted as the "local sovereign" (Landesherr). 
But Alsace-Lorraine acquired its own "parliament" (Landtag) and government, headed by a 
Statthalter who was directly responsible to the emperor rather than to the chancellor of the Reich. 
The laws of the Reich applied in Alsace-Lorraine, and its inhabitants were German citizens with 
the same rights and duties as other Germans.  
When Bismarck announced his plans for the government of colonial territories the Reich 
would acquire in the Reichstag in June 1884, he left no doubt that he had no intention of 
following the Alsace-Lorraine precedent. Germany did not want overseas provinces governed by 
bureaucrats and soldiers. The German colonial territories were to be administered by private 
German firms as commercial enterprises at their financial risk. The involvement of the Reich was 
to be kept to a minimum: military protection short of standing garrisons-which meant visiting 
warships-and an administration of justice for Europeans to be carried out by a kind of consul 
19 From 191 1 on Alsace-Lorraine was represented in the federal council but the relevant amendment to the constitution 
(article 6a) made clear that it only "counted" (gilt) as a ''federated state" (Bundesstaat) in this particular context. 
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as the local representative of the Reich. The entire scheme was based on the view that the emperor 
was free to make any arrangements he chose for the government of colonial territories, as long 
as they did not involve financial commitment on the part of the Reich. 
In the case of German New Guinea, Bismarck' s  plans were realised with the granting of an 
imperial charter of protection to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie on 17 May 1 885. The charter 
reflected the principles laid down in the general act of the Congo Conference. It obliged the 
company to maintain institutions of government which would promote peaceful relations with the 
natives and their "civilisation" ( Civilisierung). It foreshadowed that measures would be taken by 
the German government for the protection of the natives as well as of any duly acquired property 
rights of foreigners. The arrangements corresponded to those for a conventional protectorate in 
that the German government was responsible for the foreign affairs of the territory, but they 
differed from that model because the organisation of the administration of justice also remained 
a responsibility of the emperor, although its costs had to be borne by the company. 
Whereas the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was keen to take on the government of the colonial 
territories the emperor acquired in Melanesia, the German firms operating in other territories so 
acquired were less enthusiastic . This applied most strongly to the firms active in West Africa. 
Already in October 1 884 their West-Africa Syndicate proposed that the Reich take on full 
governmental responsibility; that the local colonial government be placed under a governor; and 
that he be supported by a legally trained secretary who was to be put in charge of the 
administration of justice in relation to natives as well as Europeans (see RKA 4738). 
It took until June 1 885 before the foreign office accepted that at least preparations for an 
orderly administration of justice in Germany' s  colonial territories had to be made and that the 
contentious legal questions this raised had to be faced. They arose because the foreign office took 
the view that it was neither possible nor desirable to sidestep them altogether by declaring these 
territories to be "consular judicial districts" (Konsulargerichtsbezirke) under the Consular 
Jurisdiction Act. It therefore sought expert advice from the ministry of justice, setting out the 
various problems it saw (see ibid.).  The assessment of the ministry of justice differed in several 
respects from that of the foreign office, but it agreed that a short act by the legislature of the Reich 
was necessary to give the administration of justice in Germany's colonial territories an 
incontestable legal basis, even though it concurred with Bismarck's view that the emperor was 
entitled to govern these territories on his own authority, as long as this did not involve financial 
commitments on the part of the Reich. 
After some hesitation Bismarck conceded the need for such a move and submitted on 6 
November 1 885 a minimalist bill to the federal council. It provided that the exercise of the 
"judicial jurisdiction" ( Gerichtsbarkeit) in the German Schutzgebiete, as well as the participation 
of German authorities and the civil and criminal law to be applied in its exercise, would be 
regulated by imperial ordinances, but that these ordinances would be submitted to the federal 
council and the Reichstag for information. 
The federal council did not directly challenge the assumption implicit in this bill that the 
emperor was entitled to govern Germany's colonial territories on his own, but it insisted that, in 
line with the initial arrangements for the government of Alsace-Lorraine, the ordinances the 
emperor enacted by virtue of this bill required its approval. 
Before the bill was passed with this amendment by the federal council, Bismarck and the 
foreign office were starting to have doubts about it. Bismarck tlhought that it might have gone 
unnecessarily far by acknowledging that the emperor needed the authorisation of the legislature 
of the Reich to regulate not only the participation of the German authorities in the administration 
of justice in Germany's colonial territories, but also the exercise of the judicial jurisdiction within 
these territories . The foreign office, on the other hand, was less certain that the emperor was 
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legally entitled to govern these territories on his own, because he had stressed in a speech from 
the throne that the ultimate sovereignty was vested in the Reich and not in him as the emperor. 
Bismarck was not impressed. Of course the ultimate sovereignty was vested in the Reich and 
not in the emperor personally, but the emperor was ex officio the sole representative of the Reich 
outside its borders. For Bismarck the crucial question was not whether or not the emperor acted 
as an organ of the Reich when governing these colonial territories, but whether or not they were 
constitutionally foreign territories. He answered this question emphatically in the affirmative, 
although he was not particularly concerned about making concessions to the federal council. He 
therefore did not insist that the bill before it be replaced by a counterproposal prepared by the 
Prussian ministry of justice. Nor did he have much difficulty with its amendment by the federal 
council. The fate of the amended bill in the Reichstag, to which Bismarck presented it on 12 
January 1 886, was a different matter. 
As was to be expected the bill was extensively debated and a number of amendments were 
proposed. The outcome was clear as soon as the majority in the commission to which it was 
referred accepted that the position it would take would be informed by practical considerations 
and that they required that the government of Germany's colonial territories by and large be left 
to the emperor for many years to come, irrespective of their disputed constitutional status. 
Conditions in them differed so widely and were changing so rapidly that only an essentially 
dictatorial government with broad discretionary powers was capable of responding with the 
necessary flexibility. 
While much time in the plenary sessions was spent on presenting different interpretations of 
the constitution, the ultimate version of the bill was worked out by a small sub-commission in 
cooperation with officials from the foreign office and the ministry of justice. An amendment 
proposed by a member of the full commission, Dr Meyer-Jena, in February 1 886 indicated the 
two main goals its majority was trying to achieve. Firstly, it wanted an act which dealt not only 
with the administration of justice but generally with the legal position of and in Germany's 
colonial territories. Hence it added an opening paragraph to the bill which declared, in line with 
the arrangements for Alsace-Lorraine, that the "powers of protection" (Schutzgewalt) in these 
territories were exercised by the emperor. Secondly, it was not satisfied with the assurance in the 
explanations to the bill that the emperor merely intended to adapt the Consular Jurisdiction Act 
to the conditions in these territories. In particular, it was not prepared to give the emperor 
legislative discretion in the fields of civil, criminal and procedural law. It therefore proposed that 
imperial ordinances in these fields required the approval of the Reichstag as well as the federal 
council, but that this approval was unnecessary if they merely introduced the Consular 
Jurisdiction Act adapted to the conditions in these territories. 
Instead of adopting this cumbersome approach the sub-commission decided that it was 
preferable if the act introduced the Consular Jurisdiction Act but defined specific areas where the 
emperor could enact ordinances which departed from it. 
When the amendments drafted by the subcommittee along these lines were adopted with a two 
thirds majority by the full commission, their acceptance by the Reichstag was assured. 
Nonetheless the basic constitutional questions the bill raised were again debated in the plenum, 
although it was clear that the legal uncertainties they reflected could only be removed by an 
amendment of the constitution, which no-one was game to propose. The debate was therefore 
largely rhetorical since the underlying constitutional questions remained open, whatever form the 
act was going to take, and they remained controversial until the end of German colonial rule. 
Did article 1 1  of the constitution vest all powers of the Reich outside its borders exclusively 
in the emperor, as Bismarck claimed? Conversely, did it follow from article 4, which declared 
"colonisation" (Kolonisation), alongside the emigration to non-German countries, to be a 
responsibility of the Reich, that its powers in Germany's colonial territories were to be exercised 
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by its legislature, including the Reichstag, as the Centre party argued?20 Did it follow from article 
7 that the powers of the Reich were vested in the federal council, unless they were expressly 
allocated to another organ of the Reich by the constitution, so that it was, in the absence of such 
a provision, responsible for the government of Germany's colonial territories? Or was the 
constitution irrelevant in this context because it applied only within the territory of the Reich as 
defined in article 1 ?  
The amended bill glossed over these questions i n  a form which was politically acceptable to 
the emperor and his government as well as to the majority in the Reichstag. The final sticking 
point was the approval of the federal council, since the Reichstag amendments had removed its 
power to approve or disapprove imperial ordinances which it would have acquired under its own 
amendment of the original government bill. In the end the federal council came to the party, 
although it made some gestures which asserted its underlying constitutional right to be involved 
in all aspects of their government. Bismarck too was pleased with the outcome and the emperor 
proclaimed the Protectorates Act on 17  April 1 886. It determined the basic structure of German 
colonial law until the end of German colonial rule. 
Section 1 provided that the emperor exercised the Schutzgewalt in the Schutzgebiete in the 
name of the Reich, without defining what Schutzgebiete were or what the Schutzgewalt consisted 
of. By focusing on its exercise it also left open the question in whom this power was vested. It 
could therefore be interpreted as confirming the view that the emperor was exercising powers he 
already possessed as well as the view that these powers were, exclusively or partly, vested in other 
organs of the Reich, but that these organs had delegated their exercise to the emperor. Although 
the latter interpretation would appear to be more natural in view of the limitations placed on the 
emperor's discretion in the following sections, they could also be explained as an agreement by 
the emperor to a limitation of his previously unlimited powers. 
The most important limitation was contained in section 2, according to which the provisions 
made in the Consular Jurisdiction Act concerning the civil, criminal and procedural law also 
applied in Germany's colonial territories, unless the act provided to the contrary. 
Section 2 brought the first modification by replacing the consul with an official authorised to 
exercise the judicial jurisdiction, and the consular court with the court of the Schutzgebiet. This 
made clear that the administration of justice in the Schutzgebiete was not an exercise of consular 
jurisdiction. The Consular Jurisdiction Act applied neither directly nor "correspondingly" 
(entsprechentf), instead certain parts were transplanted into a different environment. Thus it was 
neither necessary nor possible to declare a Schutzgebiet a consular judicial district under that act. 
Section 3 restored the emperor's discretion in some key areas. Whereas the Consular Jurisdiction 
Act restricted the jurisdiction to German nationals and protected persons, No. 1 empowered the 
emperor to place other persons also under it. This reflected the view that the jurisdiction in 
Germany's colonies, in contrast to the consular jurisdiction, was of a territorial rather than 
personal nature, but it also showed that it was not intended to place all their inhabitants 
immediately under the jurisdiction of the colonial courts. 
No. 2 took the legislative powers given to consuls by the Consular Jurisdiction Act as its 
starting point. They were regarded as too small in the colonial context because the highest penalty 
a consul could stipulate was a fine of 150 Marks. No. 2 therefore gave the emperor discretion to 
empower colonial officials whom the chancellor had authorised to exercise the judicial 
jurisdiction to enact police regulations stipulating penalties of up to three months imprisonment. 
But by following this path it denied the emperor the power to supplement the metropolitan 
criminal law himself or to authorise an official who did not have judicial powers to do so. Nor 
20 It consequently also argued that the financial controls of the legislature under articles 69 and 72 applied to these 
territories. It even claimed that the emperor's charters of protection were, in accordance with article 1 1 ,  subsection 3 and 
article 4, No. 1 ,  legally valid only after they had been approved by the Reichstag. 
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was it made clear whether these police regulations had a territorial application or whether they 
applied only to those persons who had been placed under the jurisdiction of the colonial courts. 
No. 3 gave the emperor discretion to extend the jurisdiction of these courts in criminal matters. 
The Consular Jurisdiction Act had excluded the most serious crimes from consular jurisdiction. 
Under No. 3 the emperor could transfer this jurisdiction to the colonial courts, but only if he 
increased the procedural guarantees in favour of accused persons in a specified manner. 
No. 4 gave the emperor discretion to depart from the appeal procedures laid down in the 
Consular Jurisdiction Act. Firstly, he could replace the Reichsgericht as the court of appeal by 
the Hanseatic Supreme Court in civil matters. Secondly, he could replace metropolitan courts of 
appeal in civil and criminal matters by a court in the Schutzgebiet in cases in which natives were 
involved as defendants or accused. 
No. 5 permitted the emperor to simplify the provision which applied under the Consular 
Jurisdiction Act in relation to summonses, costs and the execution of judicial decisions in civil 
matters. 
Finally, section 4 singled out the personal status law for special treatment. This move was 
based on the view that the metropolitan civil law introduced under section 2 would have included 
the Personal Status Act of the Reich of 1 875, which was regarded as inappropriate for colonial 
conditions. Section 4 therefore introduced instead the simpler 1 870 Personal Status Act for 
Germans Abroad. 
The question is whether this move had been necessary. Was the personal status law, which 
dealt with the registration of births, deaths and marriages, part of the civil law, so that it fell under 
section 2, or was it administrative law so that the emperor could have enacted an even simpler and 
more appropriate imperial ordinance regulating this field under section 1 ?  Where was the line 
between civil and administrative law, and indeed criminal law, to be drawn? Was all legislation 
including penal provisions part of the criminal law? Was the law of commerce, in so far as it fell 
under the "Handelsgesetzbuch" (commercial code), civil law and, in so far as it fell under the 
"Gewerbeordnung" (industrial code), administrative law? Was it necessary to go through 
metropolitan legislation section by section to determine which laws applied in Germany's colonial 
territories as civil or criminal law under section 2 and which were of an administrative nature and 
therefore did not apply, so that the emperor was free to regulate the subject matter they covered 
as he saw fit? 
Although this "substantive" dividing line was decidedly awkward, it remained crucial for the 
development of German colonial law until the end of German colonial rule. The same applied to 
a second, equally awkward, "personal" dividing line the Protectorates Act had drawn. By 
referring to the Consular Jurisdiction Act its section 2 introduced the civil, criminal and 
procedural law which applied under this act in Germany's colonial territories only for German 
nationals and protected persons. It was up to the emperor under section 3, No. 1 to place other 
persons under this jurisdiction, but he was legally free not to do so and to regulate instead the 
civil, criminal and procedural law applying to these persons in a different form.21 
With the help of these two dividing lines it is possible to visualise the history of German 
colonial law as a changing map. At the beginning it showed the emperor floating in an ocean of 
discretion. Then the Protectorates Act created a "Rule of Law" island in the northwestem comer 
of the map. It removed the civil, criminal and procedural law of German nationals and protected 
persons from his legislative discretion. The Protectorates Act also gave the emperor discretion to 
enlarge this island in an easterly direction by moving the personal dividing line to include 
additional categories of persons. On the other hand, he was given discretion to reduce its size by 
moving the substantive dividing line at certain points further north and to regulate the civil, 
criminal and procedural law in departure from the metropolitan law which would have applied 
21 Section 4 made a similar provision for the personal status law, which applied directly only to German nationals. 
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under the Consular Jurisdiction Act. However, these modified shores of the island were "soft" 
in the sense that they could again be altered by a subsequent imperial ordinance, whereas a change 
of the "hard" core area required an amendment of the Protectorates Act by the legislature of the 
Reich. 
The emperor could also bind his own administrative discretion by creating soft Rule of Law 
islands in other parts of the map, either by enacting administrative laws south of the substantive 
dividing line or by enacting civil, criminal or procedural law for persons not placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Consular Jurisdiction Act east of the personal dividing line. 
Finally, the legislature of the Reich could create new Rule of Law islands in other areas which 
firmly limited the emperor's discretion, for example by regulating the exercise of his financial 
powers in Germany's  colonial territory-as happened with the Colonial Budgets Act in 1 892. 
This basic structure made it impossible to develop a colonial civil, criminal and procedural 
law which applied uniformly to all of Germany's colonial subjects, since uniformity could only 
be achieved by placing the entire population under the metropolitan law introduced in accordance 
with the Consular Jurisdiction Act. This pushed colonial law to focus on the field of 
administrative law where it could respond to local conditions. It also encouraged it generally to 
concern itself with the exercise of governmental powers rather than with the rights and duties of 
Germany's colonial subjects. It tended to consist of procedural rules telling government officials 
what they were authorised to do, and how they were supposed to do it. This, in turn, blurred the 
distinction between ordinances which created judicially enforceable rights and duties for colonial 
subjects and administrative instructions which only limited the executive discretion of colonial 
officials internally. 
The adoption of the consular jurisdiction model also discouraged a division of governmental 
powers, since the consul exercised legislative and executive as well as judicial powers. The 
official whom the chancellor of the Reich authorised to exercise the judicial jurisdiction therefore 
became the key figure in all aspects of colonial government-an arrangement which was hardly 
in line with Bismarck's plan to leave the government of Germany' s  colonial territories as much 
as possible to private companies. 
Yet the adoption of the consular jurisdiction model had not been forced on the German 
government by the Reichstag but had come about precisely because Bismarck had tried to 
minimise its involvement. Indeed, it was the commission of the Reichstag which was concerned 
to find out how the chartered companies fitted into the picture, since no reference to them was 
made in the government bill. It was informed by the chancellor that the companies in question 
required no special consideration, because the German Colonial Company for Southwest Africa 
had not been given a charter, and the German East Africa Company and the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie, which had, had not yet acquired the status of legal persons under German law. 
It soon turned out, however, that not just the position of the chartered companies demanded 
legislative recognition but that the scheme was also flawed in other respects. On 7 July 1 887 the 
Protectorates Act was amended at the initiative of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie because it found 
the introduced metropolitan land law to be impractical. Hence the emperor was empowered to 
regulate the law of immoveable property in departure from these provisions. 
This was merely a prelude to a general revision a year later. It left the fundamental provisions 
in sections 1 ,  2, 3 No. l ,  and 4 untouched, but streamlined the authorisation of the emperor to 
regulate the administration of justice in departure of the Consular Jurisdiction Act. In particular, 
it permitted him to establish courts of appeal not only for natives but for all persons subject to the 
jurisdiction under the Consular Jurisdiction Act in the Schutzgebiete . 
It also provided for the acquisition of German nationality by colonial subjects, including 
natives (section 6), and even for the right of "the natives of the Schutzgebiete" to fly the German 
flag on their vessels (section 7). It further added three new sections dealing with the internal 
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organisation of German colonial companies, whether or not they were granted a charter. But the 
most important changes related to the legal position of the emperor and the chancellor of the 
Reich. 
No. 3 of the revised section 3 gave the emperor the power to enact ordinances providing 
penalties of up to one year imprisonment in all matters not covered by the German Criminal Code. 
Section 1 1 ,  subsection 1 empowered the chancellor to issue all orders necessary to implement the 
act-an inconspicuous but in practice surprisingly broad power. Instead of only being authorised 
to empower the official whom he had authorised to exercise judicial jurisdiction also to enact 
police regulations, he was now himself authorised to enact such regulations, as well as other 
regulations concerning the administration of Germany ' s  colonial territories (subsection 2). 
Subsection 3 authorised him to delegate this power to chartered companies and to colonial 
officials, whether or not they had been authorised to exercise the judicial jurisdiction. Finally, the 
chancellor was authorised to empower colonial officials to carry out consular functions other than 
the judicial functions under section 2 and those of a registrar of births, deaths and marriages 
(Standesamt) under section 4. Among them those of the Seemannsamt, concerned with the control 
of German merchant vessels and their crews, were of special importance in the colonial context. 
In this case, as in the case of the Standesamt, the 1888 revision of the Protectorates Act also broke 
the nexus between these powers and the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. The chancellor could 
choose which officials he wanted to authorise with the exercise of these various powers. Yet by 
the time the "official authorised to exercise judicial jurisdiction" had lost his key role, the basic 
framework of the colonial law in German New Guinea had already taken shape. 
Although German New Guinea was governed by a private company as a commercial 
enterprise it was leading the way in promoting the Rule of Law, rather than lagging behind those 
colonies which had been placed under a direct imperial administration. On the other hand the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie was not prepared to sacrifice the advantages of alternative approaches to 
colonial government altogether. On the contrary, it increasingly appreciated their advantages, and 
the position did not change dramatically when the Reich took over in 1 899. It may be helpful 
under these circumstances to carry out another case study to illustrate why, even at the end of 
German colonial rule, the Rule of Law remained, in form as well as in substance, an enterprise 
which still had a long way to go. 
v 
When administrator Schleinitz enacted the first fully-fledged piece of colonial legislation in 
German New Guinea on 13 January 1 887, making it an offence to carry out certain commercial 
activities without his permission, he probably did not appreciate that he was performing a master­
stroke. Although designed as a police regulation, the ordinance was not primarily concerned with 
protecting the public from the dangers of an imminent commercial anarchy. Rather, it was 
intended as a fiscal measure because the permission to carry out these commercial activities could 
be made subject to conditions, such as the payment of a fee, thereby turning the permission into 
a licence. 
The same fiscal aim could have been reached by taxing these activities-and a commercial 
tax was indeed introduced a year later-but a "licensing approach" had other advantages over a 
"taxation approach". It put the government in the position of a giver rather than a taker. It 
transformed the performance of commercial activities into a privilege granted by the government, 
for which it could not only charge a tax-like fee but which it could also deny, or which it could 
make subject to whatever other conditions it saw fit. 
By offering economic privileges to its subjects, instead of imposing legal duties on them, the 
government gained for itself first of all an admirable degree of administrative flexibility. It also 
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secured a valuable economic monopoly because it could, if it wished, exclude all others from 
engaging in these activities and thus reserve them for itself. Furthermore, if the government chose 
to share this de facto monopoly, or to transfer it to a single applicant, it acted as a private 
property-owning entity rather than as a public authority. It did not have to rely on its public 
powers to legislate but could make use of its private freedom to contract, for which due process 
or natural justice considerations were, in principle, irrelevant. 
The licensing approach could also be used to turn genuine prohibitions in the public interest 
into a fiscal tool by providing for special exemptions, which could then be treated as privileges 
and sold at a price. Conversely, where prohibitions primarily served the purpose of establishing 
an economic monopoly, the conditions attached to licences could be employed to protect public 
interests as well, for example by preventing the over-exploitation of resources. Finally, the 
licensing approach gave the government a powerful administrative weapon. The withdrawal of 
licences was an effective alternative to criminal prosecutions for offences committed in the course 
of a licensed activity. Even the threat to do so could persuade people who depended economically 
on these licences to do almost anything, including leaving the colony "voluntarily" after selling 
their assets, thereby saving the government from having to go through formal deportation 
procedures when their behaviour became unacceptable. 
With the ad vantage of hindsight it is easy to see how this licensing approach could grow into 
an alternative and distinctly colonial form of government based on the discretionary management 
of privileges rather than on the legislative imposition of legal duties and their judicial 
enforcement. Perhaps unwittingly, Schleinitz had opened the door to an administrator' s  paradise 
where governments which are able to give are indeed more blessed than those which are limited 
to receiving. 
While metropolitan civil law had been introduced into German New Guinea, at least for 
German nationals and protected persons, by the Protectorates Act, the metropolitan principle of 
"freedom of commerce" ( Gewerbefreiheit), as part of administrative law, had not been introduced, 
and the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had no intention of limiting itself by its voluntary adoption. The 
1887 ordinance leaves no doubt that its administrator regarded himself as entitled to regulate all 
commercial activities in the colony, but it recognised one restriction: private property, including 
that of German New Guinea' s indigenous population, was to be respected.22 The question is, how 
broadly was this notion perceived? 
The ordinance did not squarely face this question. Instead it stipulated that a number of 
specified commercial activities henceforth required governmental permission, namely: 
1 .  the fishing of pearls, pearl shell and trepang; 
2. the mining of ores, precious stones and combustible materials ; 
3. the obtaining of guano and other fertilisers; 
4. the exploitation of stands of coconut palms for copra-in so far as they were not in the 
possession of natives or otherwise privately owned; 
5. commercial fishing in coastal waters; and 
6. the commercial cutting of timber on land which was not privately owned.23 
This list indicates what private property the company was willing to respect: it did not include 
fishing rights, mineral rights or timber rights, but was effectively restricted to rights to land. As 
far as the land rights of natives were concerned it was assumed that they were so limited that most 
of the forests, and even many stands of coconut palms, were legally ownerless. The list also 
22 By conttast the public rights of the natives were not recognised or at least seen as having been extinguished by the 
acquisition of German sovereignty. 
23 The ordinance was quickly amended to clarify two points: on the one hand, the purchase of items listed under 1 to 4 
from natives who had obtained them for commercial purposes also required permission; on the other hand, no permission 
was required for the purchase from natives of coconuts which came from their own stands of palms. 
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implied that the company intended to claim a de facto monopoly of all economically significant 
commercial activities, apart from agriculture and the copra trade with natives. 
The crucial part of the ordinance was section 3. It stated that the conditions for pennission to 
carry out the specified commercial activities would be determined in each case by the 
administrator.24 This meant that he retained unlimited discretion in this regard so that the 
ordinance did not have to spell out how this power was going to be exercised. 
Two years later the administrative power to make certain commercial activities subject to 
governmental permission was openly treated as an economic asset. It was expressly referred to 
as such in the 1889 agreement between the company and the Reich whereby the government of 
German New Guinea was temporarily entrusted to imperial officials. It was also counted among 
the economic privileges the company ceded to the Reich in the 1898 agreement that tenninated 
its rule. 
The 1887 ordinance not only survived the assumption of full administrative responsibility by 
the Reich; it was also promptly introduced into the Island Territory. It was amended in 1902 for 
the Old Protectorate by adding the exploitation of rubber-producing plants-not growing on 
privately owned land-to the list. When it was re-enacted in 1903 the governor even claimed the 
power to make the conduct of any form of trade, including the copra trade in designated areas, 
subject to his permission. This opened the way for a grant of geographically restricted but 
comprehensive trading monopolies. The 1903 ordinance stayed in force until the end of German 
rule. It still gave the governor full discretion as to which conditions he would attach to the 
required permission. This did not prevent him from publicising general conditions. But even if he 
did, he could still vary them in individual cases because such general conditions gave applicants 
no legal rights. 
On the same day Schleinitz enacted his Commerce Ordinance, he re-enacted part of a "public 
notice" ( Offentliche Bekanntmachung) which had been issued by imperial commissioner Oertzen 
in 1 885. It had prohibited the supply of arms, ammunition, explosives and liquor to natives and 
the exportation of natives as labourers from the colony, but without providing for penalties in 
cases of breach. To add these penal teeth was the immediate purpose of the re-enactment. 
The 1 885 public notice had also included a third prohibition which did not require this added 
strength because it was legally self-executing. Although it did not say so, it was meant to protect 
a land acquisition monopoly the company had been granted in its charter. This could be achieved 
by announcing that only previously established bona .fide claims to land would be legally 
recognised, whereas new land acquisitions would be legally invalid if they were made without the 
approval of the German authorities. 
Even though the first of these prohibitions did not seem to offer a promising target for a 
licensing approach, the next shot fired by the administrator was aimed in this direction. In January 
1888 he proclaimed a curiously constructed amendment. It stipulated that the penalties for a 
breach of the prohibition on supplying natives with the prohibited items would not be applied if 
certain conditions were met. Chief among them was a special permission granted by the official 
in charge of the district in which the native in question resided. This permission had to be applied 
for, not by that native, but by the non-native who wanted to supply him, who had to state why the 
permission was desirable for him, rather than for the native whom he wanted to supply.25 
The amendment did not give the official unlimited discretion. To begin with, he could only 
permit the supply to a "member of a foreign coloured tribe" and not to an indigenous native.26 
24 The administrator was authorised to delegate this power to other officials. 
25 The amendment did not spell out what acceptable reasons were, but it is easy to think of likely cases, for example: 
to enable planters to employ natives to fish with dynamite so as to secure a supply of cheap protein for their labourers. 
26 The term "native" was legally defined for German New Guinea so as to include "members of foreign coloured tribes" 
as part of the implementation of the Protectorates Act . 
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Furthermore, the permission could only be given in writing, had to relate to a particular person 
and be limited to a single calendar year. On the other hand, the official could refuse permission 
without having to give reasons, and he could cancel it at any time, if it had been abused. He could 
also limit the permission to the supply of one, or some, of the prohibited types of items. But he 
could not vary the fee the applicant had to pay: it was set at 30 Marks for full permission and at 
20 Marks for limited permission. 
That the amendment stopped short of formally legalising the supply of these items to natives, 
even with governmental permission, suggests that its draftsman felt uneasy. This is understandable 
because this was indeed a prohibition in the public interest. To supply natives with such dangerous 
items was highly undesirable, although practical considerations could require some reluctant 
exceptions . 
The second prohibition belonged in a different category, especially since an amendment in 
December 1 887 had extended it to include the "exportation" of natives as labourers from one part 
of the colony to another. This was plainly an economically useful activity, although there were 
good reasons for bringing it under governmental control. The original 1 885 prohibition had 
already been concerned with control rather than prevention. It had also adopted a licensing 
approach by making an exception from the general prohibition in favour of German enterprises 
outside the colony. They were permitted to continue to export natives as labourers from German 
New Guinea, but only from areas where they had previously recruited and only under the control 
of German officials. 
The 1887 amendment technically expanded this exception by treating the transport of natives 
as labourers from one part of the colony to another as another privileged exemption from the 
general export prohibition. This gave the ordinance an odd shape because the measure was, in 
fact, intended to introduce a control of the internal labour market. However, this was a small price 
to pay, since an open introduction of this control would have clashed with another principle 
enshrined in German metropolitan law: the "freedom of contract" (Vertragsfreiheit) which, in 
contrast to the freedom of commerce, had been introduced into German New Guinea as part of 
the civil law by the Protectorates Act. While it was up to the company to reject the freedom of 
commerce for its colony and to establish a de facto monopoly which it could utilise by the issuing 
of commercial licences,  it could not exclude the entire field of labour law from the civil law 
governed by the freedom of contract. It could not generally prohibit the employment of natives 
as labourers within the colony so that it could then issue employment licences as privileged 
exemptions which it could make subject to discretionary conditions. Instead it had to approach 
the control of the internal labour market gingerly, and the existing export prohibition provided a 
convenient tail by which it could start wagging this dog.  
By pretending that the transportation of natives as labourers from one part of the colony to 
another was a form of export this activity could be formally brought under the prohibition which 
made it an offence to export natives as labourers unless special permission had been granted, and 
only in accordance with the controls introduced by the government. 
These controls were set out in an "Ordinance concerning the Recruitment and the Exportation 
of Natives as Labourers" of 15  August 1 888.  As its title indicates, this ordinance centred no 
longer on the exportation oflabourers, or on their internal transportation, but on their recruitment, 
although the ordinance shied away from focusing openly on their employment. Moreover, the 
ordinance still applied only to the recruitment of native labourers who were transported across the 
sea. The hiring of native labourers for local employment remained outside its scope. This was not 
just a consequence of the exportation tail wagging the recruitment dog but had practical reasons 
because the labour depots, to which all recruits had to be shipped before they could be transferred 
to their places of employment, were the places where the governmental controls of the recruitment 
process were to be carried out. 
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The main control instrument was recruiting licences, which only the administrator could grant. 
The ordinance left him little room for discretion. He had to grant permission when certain 
conditions were met, which related primarily to the suitability of the vessel used for recruiting 
purposes. It had to specify the number of labourers who could be recruited and the area or areas 
in which this could be done. Permission could only be denied for areas where recruitment was 
likely to lead to conflict with natives, and it could only be withdrawn if its holder, or his helpers, 
had maltreated natives. 
Although the ordinance dealt primarily with the recruiting process, it regulated indirectly the 
main employment conditions, such as the maximum length of the employment period and the daily 
working hours, by prescribing the content of the "employment contract" the recruit had to sign. 27 
But addressees of the ordinance were the recruiters and not the employers of native labourers, let 
alone the labourers. It was designed as a recruiting ordinance and not as a labour ordinance and 
made no attempt to establish administrative controls of the relations between an employer and his 
native labourers, although it foreshadowed that the government would determine the conditions 
under which the labour depots would allocate native labourers to private employers-another 
privilege which had to be earned. 
As already mentioned, the third of the 1 885 prohibitions had the purpose of protecting the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie's  land acquisition monopoly. This created a different constellation because 
this monopoly was the equivalent of the licence in the other cases. Here a prohibition was not the 
crucial first step which enabled the government to take a licensing approach but merely a 
protective supplement. Nonetheless the treatment of this land acquisition monopoly is instructive, 
because it demonstrates that the entire scheme of having colonies governed by chartered 
companies was a utilisation of the licensing approach at a higher level. It put the company again 
in the position of a giver who could, as far as the monopoly went, administer the central area of 
land in the form of privilege management. 
But a legal difficulty arose which was similar to that in the field of labour law. How could the 
company' s  land acquisition monopoly be reconciled with the freedom of contract principle the 
Protectorates Act had introduced in the colony? Here the question had to be faced squarely. The 
answer was an amendment of the Protectorates Act, authorising the emperor to regulate the field 
of land law in departure from the German metropolitan law. This happened promptly in the case 
of German New Guinea, for which an "Imperial Ordinance concerning the Acquisition and 
Charging of Land" was enacted in July 1887. 
It introduced, in principle, metropolitan German land law, but stipulated that it did not apply 
to the acquisition of ownerless land, or to native land, and authorised the company to determine 
the principles in accordance with which its land acquisition monopoly was to be exercised. This 
too was a kind of licence, namely a licence to regulate by means of an internal administrative 
instruction a matter which was normally governed by legislation addressed to the general public. 
While a legislative approach imposed duties on members of the public, it also gave them rights 
which they could enforce in courts of law. This was not to apply here, since land acquired by the 
company in the exercise of its monopoly was not to be registered by virtue of the private contracts 
it had concluded with natives or of the private deeds of occupation by which it had appropriated 
ownerless land, but on the basis of a final certificate issued by the administrator in his public 
capacity. 
Having thus sorted matters out to its satisfaction, in February 1 888 the company issued 
"General Conditions for the Transfer of Land to Settlers", which were the counterpart of the 
conditions attached to its commercial licences. Even though the company was the owner of the 
27 Although the ordinance did refer to the employment contract, the form attached to it was carefully phrased as a mere 
declaration of intent on the part of the recruit to enter into an employment contract with an employer at a later date, thus 
distancing the recruitment process more clearly from the employment relation. 
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land, the transfer was construed as an administrative process. It began with an application by an 
interested party. It was considered by the administrator who could reject the application without 
having to give reasons.28 
The conditions attached to the transfer of land demonstrate that the company believed that it 
was operating in a seller's market. It made the transfer of rights by a lessee to third parties subject 
to governmental permission; it excluded minerals and other valuable substances from the lessee' s 
or owner's right of disposal; it retained a strip 50 metres wide along the banks of navigable rivers 
and along the sea-shore; and it reserved for itself the right to resume other land for public purposes 
against compensation limited to the actual and immediate loss. It even required "settlers" to submit 
( ! ) to all regulations it would enact for the employment of natives as labourers.29 
Within less than two years the licensing approach had established itself in the key areas of the 
colony's economic life. It governed much of the access to land, labour and commerce. To be sure, 
it had not quite taken over, but what remained outside its sway began to look like beleaguered 
enclaves rather than the norm. A settler who had acquired land before the beginning of company 
rule, who could rely on locally hired labour, and who was satisfied to stick to agriculture or to 
buying copra from natives, was still largely immune, but even he needed a licence before he could 
offer his native mistress a glass of wine without having to fear prosecution. 
On 1 April 1 899 the company's land acquisition monopoly devolved on the Fiskus of German 
New Guinea, but the general conditions for the transfer of land the company had issued were 
regarded as having lapsed, so that the governor could now exercise his own discretion. 
Things started to move when in 1902 an imperial land ordinance for all German colonies 
repealed the 1 887 Land Ordinance for German New Guinea. This ordinance was ambiguous as 
to the fate of the land acquisition monopoly of the Fisk.us of German New Guinea. It authorised 
the chancellor of the Reich to determine the conditions for the acquisition of ownerless land and 
to prohibit the acquisition of land rights from natives, or to make their acquisition, as well as the 
transfer of such rights, subject to government permission, or to special conditions. On the other 
hand, it provided that the existing, colony-specific laws governing these matters remained in force 
until they were specifically repealed. 
It took until 1904 before the governor of German New Guinea implemented this ordinance for 
his colony, but it looks as if he then intended to make a fresh start. He proclaimed that the Fiskus 
had the exclusive right to acquire and dispose of ownerless land and to acquire land rights from 
natives,  but without a reference to the monopoly it had inherited from the company in 1 899. Yet, 
if this exclusive right was based on the 1902 ordinance, it was no longer an economic monopoly 
but an expression of political authority, so that it could be used to restrict the freedom of contract 
in relation to native land rights only "if and insofar as this appears necessary in the public 
interest". While this ordinance made the acquisition of land rights from natives subject to 
permission by the government, it did not authorise the Fiskus to acquire land rights for economic 
28 Although the General Conditions stated that the application formed together with its confirmation the contract between 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and the applicant, the terminology used stressed the administrative nature of the process. They 
spoke of an "application" (Antrag), instead of an "offer'' (Angebot), and of a "confirmation" (Bestiitigung), rather than 
an "acceptance" (Annahme ) , and added that the "confirmation" included a ''permission" (Erlaubnis) for the applicant to 
take the land into possession. 
29 This attempt by the company to use its land acquisition monopoly to gain control over the employment of native 
labourers could only work in relation to those "settlers" (Ansiedler) who bought or leased their land from the company. 
Settlers who had acquired land before its monopoly had.come into force or who subsequently acquired land from these 
old settlers remained immune. While this loophole in the company's land monopoly mattered little in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, 
it was potentially of great practical importance in the Bismarck Archipelago where large areas of prime land were claimed. 
It was left to the imperial government to sort out these claims. However none of the old settlers made an attempt to 
compete with the company, and later the Fisk.us, as a supplier of agricultural land to new settlers. It is also worth stressing 
that the company assumed that this control involved an act of submission on the part of the settler because this appears 
to acknowledge that a unilateral imposition of this control was beyond its governmental powers. 
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reasons. Moreover, the governor departed from a licensing approach in that he stipulated in his 
implementation regulations that land required to assure the subsistence of natives, in particular 
dwelling places, garden land and stands of palms, was excluded from any acquisition, thereby 
giving natives enforceable rights in this regard.30 On the other hand, he gave himself discretion 
to authorise non-officials to acquire ownerless land and native land rights on behalf of the Fiskus. 
He also reserved the right to regulate the details of the acquisition of such rights, and of their 
transfer, as he saw fit, either by issuing general conditions or on a case by case basis. 
Such general conditions were soon published. By 1912  they had grown into a comprehensive 
document which was of far greater practical importance for the use of land in German New 
Guinea than the 1 902 Land Ordinance. Yet it did not contain law in the formal sense. On the 
contrary, the document stressed that the principles it proclaimed were not legally enforceable and 
that the government was free to alter them at any time, or to vary them by special conditions in 
individual cases . 
A comparison of the 1912 general conditions with those issued by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie 
in 1 888 shows how much the situation had changed. While the 1 888 version read like the brochure 
of a property developer, the 1912  version was not so much concerned with the utilisation of an 
economic asset as with the politically most desirable use of land in German New Guinea. Who 
was going to get land and for what purposes was more important than maximising revenue. 
Improvement conditions were a central feature. The government was not interested in selling or 
leasing land which would lie idle; it had to be developed economically with reasonable speed. It 
wanted to spell out these policies, informing interested parties where they stood, but it did not 
want to tie itself down too tightly-and the balance between certainty and discretion kept 
changing. 
The 1912 version spelled out that companies already owning more than 2,000 hectares of land 
would usually only be granted more land if at least three quarters of that land had been cultivated, 
and that they would only under exceptional circumstances be granted more than a total of 5,000 
hectares, whereas this condition was dropped in its 1914 update. On the other hand, the 1914 
version was more specific with regard to native reserves.  It  stipulated that, where at all possible, 
at least one hectare of garden land per head of population had to be allowed for, while the 1912 
version had stated that the size depended on the local conditions. Generally speaking, however, 
the pendulum was swinging in the direction of more discretion at the margins while the core 
procedures became increasingly strict. 
A second general difference is that the later versions left out more and more subject matter. 
In 1 888 the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had found it necessary to spell out what rights it wanted to 
retain, on the assumption that the private ownership of land in German New Guinea was all­
embracing. Hence the specific exclusion of mineral rights. This exclusion clause was still part of 
the 1904 version of the general conditions, but it was dropped in 1912, although that version still 
insisted that the sea-shore remained the property of the government, which too was regarded as 
superfluous in 1914.31  
This streamlining was possible because the matters in question had in the meantime been 
regulated by legislation. The mineral rights provide a good illustration. The 1 888 conditions 
assumed that the private ownership of land included mineral rights, although they were regarded 
as special in the sense that the 1 887 Commerce Ordinance assumed that even mining activities of 
an owner on his own land could be made subject to governmental permission, while this was 
30 Land acquired by the Fiskus was also no longer registered by virtue of a certificate issued by the governor, so that it 
would appear that the validity of any acquisition could now have been legally challenged. 
31 The 1914  version stopped short of assuming that the sea-shore in German New Guinea was ipso iure incapable of 
being privately owned. But it did exclude the transfer of any land used for public purposes categorically from a transfer 
into private ownership, whereas in the 19 12  version such a transfer had only been excluded in principle. 
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regarded as inappropriate in the case of commercial timber cutting on privately owned land. A 
mining ordinance the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had enacted in 1897 had left the question of the 
ownership of mineral rights open, although it extended the licensing approach to the prospecting 
for precious stones and minerals,  whereas the Commerce Ordinance had only been concerned with 
their mining. 
By contrast, the 1 906 imperial mining ordinance stated bluntly that a long list of precious and 
common minerals were excluded from the right of disposal of the owner of the land on or in which 
they were located. Although it introduced the metropolitan "freedom to mine" (Bergbaufreiheit) 
in the German colonies, its concluding provisions opened a door to a licensing approach. Firstly, 
they preserved existing mining privileges. Secondly, they authorised the chancellor of the Reich 
to grant exclusive mining and prospecting privileges which could override the provisions of the 
ordinance, just as the existing privileges were confirmed irrespective of whether they were in 
accordance with its provisions. Thirdly, they authorised the chancellor to make the prospecting 
for minerals subject to a prospecting licence. 
What happened in German New Guinea to the freedom to mine after the enactment of this 
ordinance is instructive. On 7 February 1908 the colonial office cancelled a concession which had 
been granted in 1 901  to a Huon Gulf Syndicate sponsored by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, only 
to replace it, on the same day, with an exclusive prospecting and mining right of the Fiskus for the 
same section of Kaiser Wilhelmsland. In 1909 it established a mining monopoly of the Fiskus in 
the Purdy Islands, where the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had previously, although not very 
successfully, mined guano. In 19 10  two decrees established a monopoly to prospect for and mine 
organic and inorganic phosphates in the whole of Kaiser Wilhelmsland and in the northwesterly 
islands of the Bismarck Archipelago. In 1912 a monopoly of the Fiskus to prospect for and to 
extract oil in the western section of Kaiser Wilhelmsland was established. It was extended in 1914 
to include the whole of Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
In the Island Territory the first move was the establishment of a phosphate monopoly for the 
Fiskus in 1 1  specified islands west of the Marshall Islands, in February 1907. A month later a coal 
mining monopoly for the entire Island Territory followed. In 1908 the colonial office decided to 
stop messing around and declared a complete mining monopoly for the Fiskus for the whole of 
the Island Territory, although this decree, like all its siblings, preserved the duly acquired rights 
of third parties. 
What about labour? The labour law enacted during the period of company rule was soon 
replaced, but without being dramatically altered in its substance. However, some of the 
modifications introduced by the 1 901  Recruiting Ordinance were significant. For example, the 
rejection of an application for a recruiting licence now required a formal notification stating 
reasons. On the other hand, a recruiting vessel henceforth needed to be licensed in the sense that 
it could only be used for recruiting after the governor had certified its suitability in writing. 
The 1 901  Recruiting Ordinance also began to regulate the employment of recruited labourers 
more directly, albeit still cautiously. An employer had the duty to inform the authorities twice a 
year about changes in his labour force and committed an offence if he did not. In his 
implementation regulations the governor went further. They enabled the government to impose 
unspecified conditions on employers, as well as recruiters, the fulfilment of which it supervised. 
Still, the main limitation of the 1 888 Recruitment Ordinance remained: the 1901  ordinance only 
applied to indigenous natives and only if they were transported across the sea from the place of 
their recruitment to their place of employment. It took until 1907 before the governor tried to gain 
some official control over the employment of other natives by amending a disciplinary ordinance 
which, in 1900, had replaced an 1 888 ordinance of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. 
This ordinance provided for official disciplinary punishments, including corporal punishments, 
which could be imposed on all coloured labourers, including those in private employment. But 
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whereas the 1888 ordinance had required that these punishments be imposed and executed by 
officials, the 1900 version gave the governor a licensing option: he could authorise other persons, 
including private employers, to do so. These disciplinary licences became common, especially on 
outlying plantations, and were regarded as an important economic asset. The 1 907 amendment of 
the 1900 Disciplinary Ordinance made use of this fact by restricting the disciplinary punishment 
of coloured labourers to those who had been recruited in accordance with the 1 901  Recruitment 
Ordinance. But it made an exception: the disciplinary punishment of other coloured labourers was 
permissible if the employer submitted a copy of the employment contract to the authorities . By 
itself this did not give the authorities the power to control the employer in the fulfilment of his 
contractual obligations, but the whole measure makes sense only if the employer thereby subjected 
himself to some governmental supervision. Put bluntly, the amendment offered a deal along the 
following lines : we will allow you to beat your labourers if you allow us to make sure that they 
are otherwise properly treated. 
In 1909 a revision of the 1901  Recruitment Ordinance put the control of the employment of 
native labourers on a firm legislative basis . Like its predecessors, it made only the recruitment of 
labourers across the sea subject to government permission. But its non-recruitment provisions also 
applied correspondingly to locally recruited labourers, unless the authorities made a discretionary 
exception. The crucial step was taken in section 13 .  It placed the entire employment relationship 
under governmental supervision. Moreover, the 1909 Recruitment Ordinance directly prescribed 
the main content of the employment contract and permitted modifications only if they did not run 
counter to the legislative requirements. 
Although the employment of natives as labourers as such still did not require a licence, the 
administrative control of the native labour market was now complete, since a 1 908 "Ordinance 
concerning the Immigration and Importation of Non-indigenous Natives" had achieved the same 
result for coloured labourers imported from abroad. 
No licence was required to import foreign natives as labourers, but the importer had to notify 
the authorities within three days of their arrival and to submit two copies of the employment 
contract. The government was responsible for the supervision of the entire employment 
relationship, but section 4, the counterpart of section 13  of the 1909 Recruitment Ordinance, went 
still further. It empowered the authorities to carry out inspections at any time, or to have them 
carried out by suitable experts or commissions, and to order remedial action if conditions were 
unsatisfactory. 
Since it was an offence to employ imported native labourers who did not hold a certificate 
from the government, a separate licence was unnecessary. The importation certificate constituted 
a de facto employment licence, like the recruitment certificate in the case of internally recruited 
labourers. The implementation regulations leave no doubt that the government felt entitled to 
attach special conditions to these importation certificates. Nonetheless, commerce remained the 
heartland of the licensing approach, so that it is appropriate to round off this case study with 
another illustration taken from that field. 
The 1 887 Commerce Ordinance had covered most of the important primary industries except 
agriculture, namely fishing, mining and forestry. But it said nothing about another potentially 
lucrative industry, namely hunting, although the presence of valuable birds-of-paradise in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland was well known. Indeed, administrator Schleinitz had referred to these birds in a 
police ordinance, issued in July 1 887. It was primarily concerned with regulating the use of 
firearms in the capital, Finschhafen, but it prohibited, in passing, the hunting of female and 
moulting male birds-of-paradise for the entire district of this station. This was a purely protective 
measure since the hunting of the commercially valuable male birds during the time they carried 
their ornamental plumes remained unimpeded. To hunt them was, at the time, seen as an 
economically insignificant hobby. 
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In November 1 891 ,  imperial commissioner Rose made hunting these birds also subject to 
government permission. His ordinance distinguished between hobby hunters and professionals, 
in particular those who employed natives to hunt for them. Whereas a hobby hunter could obtain 
a licence to hunt in a specified area for one year for a modest fee of 20 Marks, the conditions 
attached to a commercial hunting licence could be determined on a case by case basis. This 
ordinance was repealed a year later, but it was replaced by a similar ordinance which increased 
the regular licence fee to 100 Marks per annum. A 1 907 amendment lifted the regular fee to 160 
Marks, but otherwise the 1892 ordinance remained in force until the end of German rule, although 
the hunting of birds-of-paradise became big business after 1910. 
This demonstrates one of the main attractions of a licensing approach: all desirable adjustments 
could be made without lifting the legislative pen. After an activity has been made subject to 
discretionary governmental permission, it can be fully controlled administratively and no-one, 
apart from the individual licensees, has to be told anything. In practice, procedures became largely 
standardised. This is not surprising, since the three authorised local administrations in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland between them issued over a hundred licences per annum after 19 10  and the ground 
covered by them was remarkably wide. The licensing approach had been used to extend the scope 
of the 1 892 ordinance so as to include other "ornamental" birds. It had also been used to limit the 
hunting season to a period from 16 May to 3 1  October and to create three large reserves, covering 
together several thousand square kilometres, in which hunting was prohibited. The legal hunting 
of birds-of-paradise could even be brought to a complete halt simply by stopping the issuing of 
hunting licences. It was therefore largely a matter of governmental convenience to announce the 
decision that no such licences would be issued for 1914 in the form of a public notice inserted in 
the government gazette. 32 
The licensing approach certainly had administrative advantages. But this did not assure its 
future, because there were forces at work which favoured a greater emphasis on a legislative 
approach. They made themselves felt in 1907 when the colonial office considered whether it could 
use the 1903 re-enactment of the 1 887 Commerce Ordinance as a basis for granting a company 
an exclusive pearl and pearl shell fishing licence for a particular part of German New Guinea. 
Even though this ordinance had been used routinely by the governor in this manner, the legal 
experts in Berlin now agreed that this had, strictly speaking, been illegal, because the freedom of 
commerce could only be restricted in the public interest. The 1 903 ordinance could not properly 
be employed as a fiscal tool, since this would interfere with yet another principle enshrined in 
German metropolitan law: the "freedom to appropriate ownerless objects" (Aneignungsfreiheit) 
which, as part of the civil law, applied in the colonies by virtue of the Protectorates Act. 
Consequently, the granting of a pearl fishing monopoly in German New Guinea required an 
amendment of the Protectorates Act authorising the emperor to depart from that principle, and an 
imperial ordinance permitting the establishment of exclusive rights for the Fiskus, which could 
then, and only then, be utilised by issuing exclusive licences to interested parties. That is to say, 
a licensing approach was not ruled out, but the legal procedure for adopting it was far more 
demanding than had been previously assumed. Moreover, the different purposes for which a 
licensing approach could be chosen now had to be kept legally apart. The colonial state could not 
combine its fiscal interests with a protection of public interests-and it was recognised that such 
a lack of discrimination could be challenged in court. 
The critical examination of the 1903 Commerce Ordinance had opened what many regarded 
as a Pandora's  box. There was no choice but to sort out eventually the legal mess the rough and 
ready application of the licensing approach had created, but there was no point in rocking the boat 
in public. It was better to go about this business gradually and quietly. This particular matter 
32 By contrast, a closed season for the hunting of crown pigeons and cassowaries-which did not require a licence-had 
to be introduced by a formal ordinance dated 2 December 1 9 1 3 .  
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therefore dragged on until the end of 1913 ,  when the governor, who had not been a party to these 
discussions, offered a pearl and pearl shell fishing monopoly for another part of the colony to the 
highest bidder. The legal section of the colonial office was in favour of instructing him to 
withdraw this offer forthwith, and of giving him a lecture about the legal position, but it was 
outvoted by the pragmatists. They argued that the colonial office should not make life difficult for 
the governor, who had merely followed an established practice which had been accepted without 
complaint. Until the governor could be offered a legally acceptable way of pursuing his laudable 
fiscal aims, it was better to "let sleeping dogs lie" (quieta non movere) (see RKA 5416). 
The dogs were still asleep at the end of German rule, which was by then only months away, 
but the barking noises they were making in their dreams could not have been disregarded much 
longer. The days of the licensing approach to colonial government were numbered. Moreover, the 
entrenchment of administrative discretion, one of the main advantages of the licensing approach, 
was a two-edged sword, since it also increased the personal responsibility of the officials who 
used it . 
This brings us back to the central difference between a licensing approach, as a management 
of economic privileges, and a legislative approach, with its focus on the imposition and 
enforcement of legal rights and duties.  The underlying message of the 1 887 Commerce Ordinance 
had been this: the government of this colony is not here because it wants to govern the people who 
live in this territory but because it owns the place; it therefore has theright and the duty to manage 
its economic resources in its own interest. Even the recognition of the private property rights of 
its subjects by the government amounted to the granting of a privilege. The extension of the 
exclusive mining rights of the colonial state right until the end of German rule is a good indication 
that nothing changed after the colony came under the full and direct control of the Reich. As far 
as resource management was concerned, the licensing approach had firmly established itself, 
although an increasingly bureaucratic form of government was replacing the discretionary vagaries 
of the early pioneering days. 
VI 
The history of colonial government in German New Guinea can generally be characterised as a 
movement towards the Rule of Law, but this movement was primarily concerned with an 
expansion of the powers of government and the organisation of their exercise, rather than with the 
protection of the rights of individuals. It gradually transformed the discretionary Schutzgewalt of 
the emperor into a state organisation designed not to govern people but to develop the Schutzgebiet 
economically. It was indeed a territorial form of government which managed the resources within 
the territory under its rule, including its inhabitants as a human resource. But, in contrast to other 
resources this human resource could be made part of the state organisation. People could be 
treated as functionaries of the state as well as subjects. Seen from an organisational perspective, 
voters in state elections are as much part of the state organisation as warders and their prisoners 
in a government jail. People become part of the machinery of the state when their birth is 
registered and they are officially eliminated with the registration of their death. Not only judges 
and counsels but also the parties in a civil case, and the accused in a criminal trial, are part of the 
administration of justice. They are not mere recipients but play an essential role. They all 
participate in activities which have been organised by the state and have to be performed in 
accordance with the rules it has laid down. The most important of these rules are concerned with 
powers rather than with rights and duties ; and they can create new powers rather than merely 
regulate the exercise of existing ones. Although these rules are constitutive in that they create facts 
rather than obligations, they are usually expressed in a normative language. This makes sense 
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because it is not the words themselves that create these facts. They are expressions of 
sociopolitical powers which can operate without being verbalised. 
Nonetheless, their verbalisation makes an important difference, especially if it takes a written 
form; it makes the operation of these powers visible and gives them a permanent existence; it 
provides a historical record of their exercise or, more precisely, their purported exercise, so that 
this historical record has in so far indeed a quasi-normative character because it cannot tell us by 
itself whether the sociopolitical facts these words were meant to create actually came into being. 
Take for example the statement: "the Island Territory . . .  forms for the time being a part of the 
Schutzgebiet of German New Guinea". Seen in isolation these are mere words which may be 
historically empty. But the picture changes if we know that this statement is part of a document 
signed by the German emperor; that this document refers to the Protectorates Act, according to 
which the emperor was empowered to exercise the Schutzgewalt in the Schutzgebiete; and that the 
document had been countersigned by Count Posadowsky, acting on behalf of the chancellor of the 
Reich, so that it appears to have met the requirement of article 17  of its constitution. While it is, 
of course, possible that the printed version of the document we are considering is a forgery, that 
my translation is defective or that Count Posadowsky was not authorised to deputise for the 
chancellor of the Reich, it appears to be reasonably safe to conclude that this document stated a 
historical fact and that the Island Territory did become a part of German New Guinea at a certain 
date. However, the main historical significance of this document is not that it provides a written 
record of this particular exercise of the emperor' s  powers, but that it shows how the exercise of 
these powers was generally structured. 
Historiographically speaking, the advantage of the movement towards the Rule of Law is that 
more and more of these structures and structural changes were verbalised and recorded in writing 
because organisation was treated as if it was a normative enterprise, as if creating actual regularity 
was a form of normative regulation. Unfortunately these structures are not always as explicit as 
in this instance. But even in the marginal areas where the incorporation of people into the 
organisation of government was only just beginning, signals of the emerging new structures were 
recorded. 
The treatment of native labour provides a good example. It is indicative of the approach 
adopted by the German authorities that natives who were not employed by Europeans were 
officially called "free" natives, with the clear implication that native labourers were "unfree". This 
did not mean that they were seen as slaves, in contrast to non-native employees who were seen as 
free. On the contrary, a native who lived in a slave-like relationship of dependence on another 
native was also free in this sense, whereas a non-native employee, including a senior government 
official, was unfree. What made natives not employed by non-natives free was that they remained 
outside the colonial sphere. Within this sphere no-one was free and the freedom of everybody was 
increasingly curtailed as governmental controls became more extensive and effective. 
As we have seen governmental controls in the field of native labour were primarily imposed 
on recruiters and employers of native labourers and not on the labourers themselves. It was the 
freedom of the former that was limited and it was the power of the government that grew. The 
recruitment of native labour, like the acquisition of native land, was seen as a governmental task. 
No-one, apart from the government, was free, let alone legally entitled to engage in these 
activities, although the government could licence private individuals to carry them out as a 
privilege. 
Already the 1 888 Disciplinary Ordinance of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had treated the 
disciplining of these labourers as a governmental task, and when the 1 900 Disciplinary Ordinance 
created the possibility of licensing private individuals to exercise these disciplinary powers the 
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implication was that these persons acted as functionaries of the government when exercising them, 
although the legal consequences of this position were not fully appreciated at the time. 
The 1909 revision of the Recruitment Ordinance went further. By placing the entire 
employment relationship under governmental supervision, it began to transform the contractual 
relationship between an individual employer and his labourer into a triangular administrative 
arrangement. Since an employer who did not carry out his duties under the ordinance committed 
an offence, a labourer could now report him to the authorities instead of having to take him to 
court for a breach of contract. It was natural to move in the same direction for breaches of contract 
by labourers and to treat in particular their "desertion" as an offence. The planters in German New 
Guinea acted well within the spirit of these developments when they called upon the government 
to introduce a compulsory "labour service" for natives, as a colonial counterpart of the military 
service in metropolitan Germany. Such a service would have replaced individual and voluntary 
employment contracts altogether. It would have made labourers as well as their employers servants 
of the state and turned commercial production into a governmental activity, albeit one which 
continued to be funded by private capital and the commercial aspects of which continued to be 
managed privately with the aim of producing private profits. 
This development was in line with Bismarck's view that Germany's colonies should be treated 
as economic enterprises. But Bismarck had been mistaken in his belief that such an approach 
would prevent bureaucratic forms of government. Instead of running German New Guinea in an 
informal, patriarchal fashion, like a large feudal estate, as Bismarck had imagined, the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie's chairman of directors, Adolph von Hansemann, tried to manage it like his bank, the 
Disconto Gesellschaft, and that meant in accordance with detailed instructions, based on a steady 
flow of detailed information, in particular accounts and other forms of quantified information. The 
simple fact is that bureaucracy is not a public sector phenomenon which comes about when 
governments are made accountable to popularly elected parliaments, but that it is a hierarchically 
controllable form of management which is just as likely to be adopted by private capitalists. 
Let us see how the Neu Guinea Kompagnie tackled the task of governing German New Guinea 
and what shape the legal and organisational framework of government took during the period of 
company rule, and compare this framework with that of the Marshall Islands before their 
incorporation into the Island Territory in 1906 which ended the financial responsibility for their 
government by the J aluit Gesellschaft. 
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Chapter 1 :  The Shapes of "Company Rule " 
I 
German New Guinea's first constitution was the imperial charter granted to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie on 17 May 1885. It distinguished between the ultimate sovereignty, which was 
retained by the emperor, and the local sovereignty, the exercise of which was entrusted to the 
company. Instead of defining the rights included in the ultimate and local sovereignty the charter 
made a series of more or less specific provisions. On the one hand the company was granted the 
rights of local sovereignty "corresponding" to its obligation to maintain institutions of 
government. On the other hand the emperor reserved for himself not only the right to conduct the 
relations of the colony with foreign governments but also the right to organise the administration 
of justice within it. The emperor was entitled to make orders to implement and supplement the 
charter which foreshadowed the enactment of regulations protecting the natives and the rights to 
land non-natives had duly acquired before the charter had granted the company a land acquisition 
monopoly. In addition, all the company's  governmental activities were placed under the emperor' s  
"ultimate supervision" ( Oberaufsicht), while imperial officials and officers were ordered to protect 
and support it in all its "lawful" (gesetzlichen) undertakings. 
The entire charter was conditional as the Neu Guinea Kompagnie did not yet legally exist when 
it was issued. It was given a year to complete its organisation in accordance with German law. It 
only just made it. Its articles of association were agreed upon in March 1 886. They were approved 
on 12 May 1 886, and the company was granted the rights of a legal person on the same day. 
The company had already been active in other respects during that period. One of its first 
moves was the publication of its own journal, the Nachrichtenfar und uber Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
und den Bismarck Archipel, the first issue of which appeared in June 1885. Its second issue 
announced that an expedition had left Berlin on 29 June 1885 to establish stations in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland, and on 10 August 1885 Adolph van Hansemann signed instructions for the 
"administrator" (lAndeshauptmann) who was to be sent out as the company's  local representative 
(see RKA 2408). 
Although these instructions stated that they were only laying down general principles and that 
the administrator was to be given as much freedom as possible in putting them into practice, they 
added up to over 30 printed pages. They covered all aspects of government and some rather 
peripheral matters. ' According to this document the company assumed that an imperial official 
would be stationed in German New Guinea to supervise its governmental activities. They were, 
for the time being, to be limited to four fields : (1)  the protection of white settlers, their property 
and their coloured employees; (2) the control of shipping and commerce; (3) the establishment of 
peaceful relations with the natives and their protection from acts of violence and exploitation; and 
(4) the imposition of certain levies to cover the costs of the administration. 
The instructions defined more precise principles for each of these fields. For example, the 
administrator was encouraged to initially open only one harbour to foreign vessels and to permit 
traders not employed by the company to operate only in places where they could be supervised by 
company officials. But the bulk of the text dealt with the practical tasks of the economic opening 
1 For example, section 33 decreed that all employees had to hand over artefacts they acquired to the company, unless it 
renounced its claim. This apparently minor matter was sufficiently important for the company's first choice as 
administrator, another retired naval officer, to decline the,offer when the company refused to remove a clause to this effect 
from his contract. 
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up of the colony and the civilising of its inhabitants. Since the company was happy to leave the 
latter primarily to the Christian missions-for the treatment of which separate principles were 
being drafted-the instructions focused on the former. The ground for the economic opening-up 
of the country was to be prepared by a scientific expedition. It had the task of compiling, in the 
first instance, an inventory of Kaiser Wilhelmsland in terms of its geography, geology, biology, 
climatology and ethnography. It was to operate largely independently of the administrator under 
its own set of instructions. Its projected routes demonstrate Hansemann' s boundless optimism. It 
was to explore the whole area by following a river up to the border with British New Guinea 
before travelling some distance along the watershed, which was assumed to coincide largely with 
this border, and return to the coast on a different route for a period of recreation-after which it 
would repeat the exercise until the entire terrain had been covered. 
The first duty of the administrator was to establish a network of stations along the coast of 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland, whereas a decision as to where and when stations would be established in 
the Bismarck Archipelago was to be made in Berlin. While the instructions stressed that the 
network of stations in Kaiser Wilhelmsland was to be extended gradually, in line with the 
manpower and financial resources available, Hansemann envisaged initially three of them: one at 
Finschhafen in the east, one at or near Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in the centre, and one further 
west. Hansemann also knew what buildings these stations would consist of: one or more dwellings 
for the company employees and their labourers, stables for animals and stores for provisions and 
tradegoods, and, later, a church or a chapel and a school for native children in which the 
missionaries would act as teachers. 
The instructions emphasised the fundamental importance of communications. Each auxiliary 
station in the interior had to be connected to one of the main stations at the coast by all-weather 
tracks, but it was also desirable to connect inland stations and coastal stations with each other in 
a similar manner, although communication by sea between the latter would remain the best option 
for a considerable time. 
An even more important task for the administrator was the exercise of the company's  land 
acquisition monopoly. Hansemann was not concerned about existing land claims by non-natives. 
There were none in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the only substantial claims in the Bismarck 
Archipelago were those of the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft in the Duke of 
Yorks, those of the Hernsheim firm in northern New Ireland and the disputed claims of "a certain 
Farrell"-the partner of the future "Queen Emma"-in the Blanche Bay area of New Britain. Nor 
was he concerned about the land rights of natives, since they had, according to the available 
information, no notion of private ownership of land and only claimed those areas which they were 
. actually using for houses and gardens. But the situation was complicated by the fact that the 
natives were consequently also unfamiliar with the concept of a sale of land. Under these 
circumstances the setting aside of native reserves had to be considered when large areas of land 
were acquired which could be used in case of population increases. Land actually in use by natives 
at the time of an acquisition was always to be excluded. It also had to be carefully explained to 
natives transferring land that they lost all rights to it and that they could not transfer it a second 
time, whereas the company could dispose of it as it saw fit. 
Just as setting aside native reserves was on the cards from the start, so was the appointment 
of "government chiefs". The avoidance of violence was to be the basic principle of native 
administration. The use of force was only permitted in cases of self-defence or where it was 
absolutely necessary to set a warning example. The aim was to win the natives over peacefully to 
"human [ ! ]  culture" (menschliche Kultur). They were not to be oppressed or robbed, let alone 
exterminated. This required, apart from a knowledge of their physical conditions and their 
customs, a large measure of patience and benevolence on the part of the company's  employees. 
It was the duty of the administrator to promote and supervise the observance of this principle, 
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from which it followed, in particular, that natives could not be forced to work or to part with any 
of their possessions. The social organisation of the natives was to be preserved and the powers of 
their chiefs were to be respected, although cruel and barbarous fonns of their exercise were to be 
discouraged. This applied, however, only to friendly chiefs, whose position was to be 
acknowledged in an appropriate manner, such as by awarding them a staff of office. 
Hansemann had a high opinion of the opportunity offered by barter trade as a means of 
establishing friendly relations . Such occasions were to be used to explain the company' s whole 
political program: that its intentions were entirely peaceful; that it only wished to improve the lot 
of its native subj ects ; that the natives should henceforth refrain from taking revenge on whites who 
had wronged them and from feuding among themselves; and that they should report any trouble 
to the next station which would punish white offenders and settle their internal disputes 
peacefully.2 
By the time the company' s  articles of association were agreed upon in March 1886, the 
Protectorates Act had already taken shape. But just as this act ignored the role of chartered 
companies, the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's articles of association ignored the consequences the 
Protectorates Act was going to have. Instead they placed themselves squarely on the imperial 
charter. Section 1 defined the purpose of the company accordingly. Apart from stipulating that the 
company' s  "overseas representatives" had to be German nationals, only the definition of the 
powers of the company's Berlin-based board of directors showed indirectly what shape the local 
administration was going to take. 
1 .  The board of directors decided the annual budget of the local administration. It was also 
responsible for the hiring and firing of the administrator and all employees who received an annual 
salary of over 5,000 Marks or were employed for more than three years. 
2. It was responsible for defining the powers of the administrator, for issuing general instructions 
for the central administration of the colony, for the running of the company' s  vessel and for the 
conduct of scientific expeditions. 
3. Even if funds for the purchase of vessels, the establishment of stations, or for expeditions had 
been provided in the budget, their actual expenditure had to be approved by the board in each case. 
4. The board decided the principles in accordance with which the company' s  rights of local 
sovereignty and its land acquisition monopoly were to be exercised. 
5. It defined the limits within which the company would itself engage in commercial activities. 
6. It exercised the legislative powers flowing from the company's  rights of local sovereignty, in 
so far as they required the approval of the German government. 
In short, there was little room for discretion on the part of the managing directors, let alone the 
company' s administrator. 
When its first administrator, Georg von Schleinitz, arrived in German New Guinea the 
Protectorates Act had become the keystone for the exercise of governmental powers in all German 
colonies. It had been implemented for German New Guinea by an imperial ordinance of 5 June 
1 886. This ordinance provided that the Consular Jurisdiction Act would come into force on I 
September 1 886 (section 1 ). It made the jurisdiction of the colonial courts in principle territorial 
but made one negative, personal exception. It excluded "natives" from this jurisdiction, unless 
they were specifically placed under it, and authorised the chancellor of the Reich, after hearing 
the company, to define who counted as a native under the ordinance and how far natives would 
be placed under this jurisdiction (section 2). 
2 Hansemann also proclaimed that natives with whom peaceful relations had been established were to be treated as 
"protected persons" . It is not clear what this was supposed to mean, since the administration of justice was an imperial 
prerogative and the German government had not yet committed itself as to how the administration of justice in relation 
to natives would be handled. 
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Section 3 authorised the chancellor to give the official whom he had authorised to exercise this 
jurisdiction the power to enact police regulations. Sections 4 to 9 made procedural provisions. 
Inter alia they established the consular court in Apia as German New Guinea' s  court of appeal 
in civil matters, whereas the Reichsgericht remained its court of appeal in criminal matters. 
Section 10 introduced the 1 870 Personal Status Act for Germans Abroad also as from 1 September 
1 886 but exempted "natives" categorically from its application. 
Both the exercise of the jurisdiction under the Consular Jurisdiction Act and the application 
of the 1870 Personal Status Act produced voluminous implementation regulations which I shall 
disregard. However, I should stress that the arrangements were such that the official authorised 
to exercise this jurisdiction was also responsible for the investigation and prosecution of criminal 
offences, and for the execution of judgements in criminal and civil matters. 
The legal position of "natives" was regulated in a decree of 1 November 1886. It defined this 
term as including members of other coloured tribes as well as members of tribes indigenous to 
German New Guinea, without placing natives in any way under the jurisdiction of the colonial 
courts. 
On 24 June 1 886 the chancellor had already authorised Schleinitz to exercise jurisdiction 
under the Consular Jurisdiction Act with the power to enact police regulations. In addition he had 
entrusted him with the judicial administration by placing other officials empowered to exercise 
this jurisdiction under his supervision and by empowering him to allocate judicial business to them 
on a geographical or substantive basis. All these powers were personal and not attached to the 
office of administrator. In addition, the decree made clear that Schleinitz was exercising these 
powers under the supervision of the Reich and that this supervision could be exercised by 
commissioners posted to German New Guinea as well as by the authorities based in Germany.3 
On the same day that Schleinitz received his powers from the chancellor, he was given 
additional powers by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie as part of the first exercise of its legislative 
powers. The main purpose of the ordinance of 24 June 1886 was the establishment of an official 
gazette, the Verordnungsblatt far das Schutzgebiet der Neu Guinea Kompagnie, in which the 
ordinances the company enacted in exercise of its local sovereignty would be published, although 
they normally only came into force after they had been publicly displayed on a designated board 
in the office building in the central station in Finschhafen (section 1) .4 
Section 2 empowered the administrator-ex officio-to exercise the company's  legislative 
powers in urgent cases, but he had to inform the board of directors immediately if he did. Such 
ordinances, as well as police regulations the administrator enacted in exercise of his powers under 
the Protectorates Act, also normally came into force only after they had been publicly displayed 
in Finschhafen. 
Schleinitz had acquired none of these powers when he left Germany in April 1 886. Indeed he 
only obtained them after he arrived in Finschhafen on 10 June 1 886. By that time all three main 
stations projected for Kaiser Wilhelmsland had been founded, and the Scientific Expedition had 
arrived. Moreover, the company had decided to send a somewhat elevated "Stationsdirektor" to 
the Bismarck Archipelago. Even the personal status matters were taken care of in Berlin. In July 
1 886 the chancellor appointed the managers of the stations in Finschhafen, Richard Mentzel, and 
Hatzfeldhafen, Fritz Grabowsky, as registrars of births, deaths and marriages for their respective 
districts. In November the company' s  board of directors determined the fees which they were to 
charge for their efforts.5 
3 An imperial commissioner had been posted since 1884 in what was to become the Bismarck Archipelago, mainly to 
supervise German vessels involved in the labour trade. 
4 Relevant legislation was also published in its general journal. 
5 The company issued detailed instructions to the registrars. They were not published in its gazette since they were not 
regarded as being of general interest. By contrast they were later published in the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung (see 
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However, in February 1 887, Schleinitz made a brave foray into this field in the form of a 
police regulation which was to ensure that the Personal Status Act would be applied in accordance 
with local conditions.6  The ordinance was drafted by Assessor Georg Schmiele, who had arrived 
in Finschhafen on 20 September 1 886 and became the administrator's  legal adviser. Schmiele had 
been authorised by the chancellor on 14 July to exercise the jurisdiction under the Consular 
Jurisdiction Act under Schleinitz' s  supervision (NKWL 1 8 86: 77-78). Schleinitz first decided to 
base Schmiele in Finschhafen and to make him responsible for the exercise of the full jurisdiction 
in the whole of German New Guinea (NKWL 1 887:3) ,  but he divided the colony shortly 
afterwards into two judicial districts and sent Schmiele to the Bismarck Archipelago (NKWL 1 887: 
78). This was Schleinitz' s  only significant contribution to the emerging legal and organisational 
framework of government in 1 886.7 
The main legislative target during 1 887 was land. The process began with an amendment of 
the Protectorates Act on 7 July. It cleared the way for an imperial ordinance which, in the case of 
German New Guinea, was enacted less than two weeks later. The various measures taken in 
implementation of this ordinance culminated in February 1 888 in the publication of general 
conditions the Neu Guinea Kompagnie issued for the transfer of land to settlers to whom it now 
felt ready to open its colony. 
The imperial ordinance introduced in principle German or, to be more precise, Prussian land 
law, but excluded native land and the acquisition of ownerless land from its application. Instead 
it authorised the Neu Guinea Kompagnie to issue instructions for the exercise of its land 
acquisition monopoly. They were duly issued and expressed the same laudable sentiments as the 
company's  18 85 instructions to its administrator but were hardly practical. Its board of directors 
and the German authorities were probably not totally unaware that this was so as the ordinance 
made compliance with these instructions legally largely irrelevant; land acquired by the company 
was registered by virtue of an official certificate of its administrator which excluded a judicial 
examination of the legal validity of the acquisition. 8 
The central goal of this ordinance was the introduction of a system of land registration for non­
nati ve land, which would henceforth form the basis for the transfer and the charging of such land. 
It also left room for the enactment of laws which restricted rights to registered land for the purpose 
of protecting the natives or "some other public [ !] interest". 
The administrator displayed considerable legislative vigour in 1887. The first manifestations 
were the Commerce Ordinance and the re-enactment of the provisional prohibitions of imperial 
commissioner Oertzen already discussed. As we have seen, the prohibition on exporting natives 
as labourers from German New Guinea became the hook from which the entire regulation of the 
recruitment and the employment of natives as labourers within the colony was suspended. The first 
step was taken in July 1 887 by an ordinance dealing with labour-depots, in which new recruits 
were temporarily housed, whereas the treatment of the broader issues was not finalised until after 
Schleinitz had left the colony. Instead he regulated, also in July 1 887, the use of firearms in 
Finschhafen and enacted a police regulation dealing with the disorderly behaviour of ships' crews 
on shore. 
vol. 1 :  494-508). The instructions are pedantic but show no sign that the conditions existing in German New Guinea at 
the time were seriously taken into account. 
6 These conditions required, in particular, that a clergyman who carried out a church wedding without having satisfied 
himself that a secular wedding had already taken place committed a criminal offence punishable with a fine of up to 1 ,000 
Marks or with imprisonment of up to three months (see NK.WL 1 887: 7&-:78) 
7 The grant of a second imperial charter to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie for the northern Solomons on 1 3  December 1 886 
caused considerable legislative activity. But it can be disregarded as it was only concerned with the legal incorporation 
of this new territory into the existing arrangements. 
8 This was different in the case of the old land claims, although their treatment also put the company in an unusually 
strong legal position. 
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Of more general importance was a registration ordinance of 1 8  August. It applied to all non­
natives who spent more than two weeks in German New Guinea. Such persons had to register their 
arrival, their departure and any change of residence with the authorities.  The register was to be 
coordinated with the register of births, deaths and marriages so that a complete record of 
movements among the non-native population would be produced. 
The most daring move by Schleinitz during 1887 concerned the administration of justice in 
relation to natives which, under the Protectorates Act as well as the imperial charter, had remained 
a responsibility of the emperor. Using his urgency powers under the company' s  1 886 ordinance 
Schleinitz enacted on 27 September 1 887 an "Ordinance concerning the Settlement of Property 
Disputes among the Members of Coloured Tribes in the Protectorate of the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie". It applied primarily to natives employed by non-natives, as well as to the "members 
of their families" (Familienangehiirige), but also to members of indigenous tribes which had 
placed themselves collectively under the authority of the government or whose members placed 
particular disputes voluntarily before it. This cumbersome approach reflected the uncertainty about 
the powers the company could exercise in relation to its native subjects.9 
The ordinance emphasised that it was taking an administrative rather than judicial approach 
by calling the institution it established an "arbitration office" (Schiedsamt) rather than a court, and 
by placing these offices under the station managers rather than under officials authorised to 
exercise the jurisdiction under the Consular Jurisdiction Act. The administrator was given wide 
discretion concerning the organisation of these offices and the supervision of their activities. 
The official in charge first had to try to settle disputes by mediation. If this failed he had to call 
in one or three coloured assessors, preferably leading members of the same tribes as the parties. 
Although the decision was made by the official alone, he was expected to decide in accordance 
with the opinions expressed by his assessors, especially on issues of custom, unless significant 
legal or equitable considerations required him to depart from them. While this was far from 
precise, the ordinance was strict about the records which were to be kept of these proceedings, 
stipulating even the periods of time for which they had to be preserved. 
In 1 888 this first round of legislative activity reached its climax. Its centrepiece was a revision 
of the Protectorates Act. It led to substantial amendments of the imperial ordinance regulating the 
exercise of the jurisdiction under the Consular Jurisdiction Act and the implementation regulations 
thereto. The result was that German New Guinea acquired a self-contained j udicial system in 
which the administrator functioned, now ex officio, as chief justice and chairman of the court of 
the second instance. 
The administrator retained the power to enact police regulations but the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie was given the same powers in a decree by the chancellor of 3 August which referred 
more broadly to "police and other administrative regulations" (emphasis added). This general 
authorisation had been preceded by a specific authorisation, dated 7 June 1 88 8 .  It had empowered 
the company to include penal provisions in a planned customs ordinance. The ordinance was 
enacted by its board of directors on 30 June 1 888. It introduced a substantial import duty on 
alcoholic beverages, for example 10 Pfennigs for a bottle of beer, and a modest export duty on 
copra of 4 Marks per tonne. It restricted the import and export of these items to harbours which 
the administrator had opened for international traffic and prohibited the import of opium, except 
for medicinal purposes, and of arms , ammunition and explosives, except for personal use by non­
natives. On the same day the company enacted an ordinance introducing a modest commercial 
tax and income taxes of, respectively, up to 600 Marks and up to two per cent per annum. 
9 The ordinance built on a curious document attributed to station director Weisser in the Bismarck Archipelago, according 
to which the inhabitants of Mioko Island in the Duke of York Group, where the company's station was situated, undertook 
to bring all disputes which they could not settle among themselves before him for his final decision, to abandon their 
barbaric and criminal customs and to bring those who continued to follow them to the station for punishment (see NKWL, 
1 887: 1 89). 
THE SHAPES OF "COMPANY RULE" 309 
A second legislative focus in 1 888 was the administration of justice in relation to natives. Here 
the starting point was an imperial ordinance of 7 July. It transferred the judicial jurisdiction over 
natives for ten years to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, without affecting the powers of the chancellor 
to place natives under the Consular Jurisdiction Act. 
On 21 October 1 888 the company enacted a native penal ordinance. It established "station 
courts" (Stationsgerichte) with an exclusively criminal jurisdiction and limited the prosecution of 
natives to actions which constituted serious offences (Verbrechen und Vergehen) under German 
metropolitan law, or which were breaches of police regulations enacted "for natives" under section 
1 1  of the Protectorates Act. Moreover, it gave the chairmen of the station courts discretion not to 
prosecute. The bulk of the ordinance dealt with the procedures these courts had to follow and with 
the punishments they could impose. They ranged from fines to the death penalty but excluded 
corporal punishment. Like the courts for non-natives, the station courts were responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal offences and for the execution of their 
decisions. 
The following day the company enacted an ordinance concerning the maintenance of discipline 
among coloured labourers. In contrast to the judicial punishments under the Penal Ordinance the 
disciplinary punishments did include corporal punishments. But they could only be imposed on 
healthy males as a last resort, were not allowed to exceed ten strokes and could only be carried out 
once a week. All punishments could only be imposed by the station managers as public officials 
and not by any private employer. The administrator was authorised to implement these ordinances 
and acting administrator Kraetke enacted detailed regulations for the implementation of both of 
them in January 1 889. 10 
Kraetke's  first ordinance, enacted on 15 May 1 888, made it an offence to interfere with the 
free traffic on public roads and tracks traversing private land and with the free access to public 
market places situated on it. The closure or relocation of such roads, tracks or market places was 
only permissible with the approval of the station manager in whose district they were situated, but 
permission could also be given if the proposed changes only unduly affected private rather than 
public interests. 1 1  
Kraetke' s most important legislative contribution was an ordinance concerning the recruitment 
and exportation of natives as labourers. It was enacted on 1 5  August 1 888  and remained the 
backbone of labour law in German New Guinea throughout the period of company rule. 
This ordinance completed the first system of colonial law. It covered the administration of 
justice in relation to non-natives and natives, and the personal status law of the former, including 
their registration. Moreover, as cannot be stressed too often, the Protectorates Act, as implemented 
in German New Guinea, also introduced, in principle, the entire substantive German civil and 
criminal law for German New Guinea's  non-native population. 
The most important exception in the field of civil law was the area of land law where an 
imperial ordinance made special provisions for the exercise of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s land 
acquisition monopoly. By contrast, the labour law was not tackled by a modification of 
metropolitan civil law but in the form of police regulations. In the field of commerce the German 
Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) applied, whereas the Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung) 
was seen as administrative and did not apply. Instead a commerce ordinance brought most 
commercially promising activities, apart from agriculture and the copra trade, under the control 
of the government in a major departure from the metropolitan "freedom of commerce" principle. 
10 It is fitting that it was during the reign of Kraetke, a high postal official on loan to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, that 
German New Guinea became part of the Universal Postal Union, although this was not the result of his personal 
preoccupation but in line with article 10 of the general act of the Congo Conference which obliged colonial powers to 
globalise the postal system as soon as possible. 
1 1  The ordinance applied to the whole of German New Guinea but was especially aimed at the northeastern Gazelle 
Peninsula and designed to give penal teeth to the warnings Schmiele had issued in his circular in 1 886 (see above: 1 88). 
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Taxes had been introduced and a customs ordinance had been enacted, which also had far­
reaching implications for the control of commercial shipping. 
On the other hand, no attempt had been made to legislate directly for German New Guinea's 
native population. Even the Native Penal Ordinance was not addressed to them but defined the 
powers of the station courts and regulated their exercise. Similarly the Disciplinary Ordinance was 
not addressed to coloured labourers but gave the company' s  station managers public disciplinary 
powers. 12 Generally, natives figured in the colonial legislation not as carriers of rights and duties 
but as objects of governmental protection and controls which were concerned with public interests 
rather than their private rights or duties. Indeed, it is unclear whether the protective legislation 
applied at all to natives. There is no doubt that only the supply of arms, ammunition, explosives 
and liquor to natives had been prohibited but not the possession of these items by natives-but 
did the prohibition also cover the supply of these items by one native to another or was it 
exclusively addressed to non-natives? More broadly, did the legislative powers under section 3 
of the 1 886 Protectorates Act extend only to persons placed under the Consular Jurisdiction Act, 
so that it excluded natives as long as they had not been placed under this judicial jurisdiction, so 
that only the emperor had legislative powers in relation to natives under section 1 of the act? 
The 1 888 revision of the Protectorates Act clarified the position by separating the legislative 
from the judicial powers and giving them a distinctly territorial character. The revision had 
generally given the system of colonial government a firmer structure, which, in the case of Gennan 
New Guinea, was also shaped by the imperial .charter and the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's  articles 
of association. 
At the top of the governmental hierarchy stood the emperor who could exercise the full 
legislative, executive and judicial powers, subject to the limitations imposed on him by the 
Protectorates Act. The powers of the emperor included the power to delegate the exercise of his 
powers. The most obvious choice for a delegation was the chancellor of the Reich. But the 
chancellor also held powers he had acquired in different ways. The Protectorates Act gave him 
several such independent powers, the most important of which was the power to enact police and 
other administrative regulations and to delegate these powers to colonial officials and chartered 
companies. 
As regards German New Guinea the emperor delegated the exercise of the rights of local 
sovereignty to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in its charter with the limitations defined in that 
document. However the company's  articles of association placed it under the direct supervision 
of the chancellor of the Reich. The scope of the chancellor' s supervisory powers were wide 
indeed. Not only had he to ensure that the company conducted its affairs in accordance with the 
law and its articles of association, he also had to approve all ordinances the company enacted in 
exercise of its rights of local sovereignty-in apparent contrast to the legislative powers delegated 
to it under the Protectorates Act-as well as the principles it formulated for the exercise of its 
land acquisition monopoly. In addition the appointment of the administrator required his approval 
and he could demand his dismissal. In other words, it was the chancellor, rather than the emperor 
or the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, who was effectively in charge of the government of German New 
Guinea. 13 
The next level of government was the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and, in particular, its board of 
directors, which derived its powers partly from the emperor, via its charter, and partly from the 
chancellor, via a delegation of legislative powers under the Protectorates Act. The administrator 
1 2  The ordinance concerning property disputes among natives, which also had a procedural character, was, as far as I can 
see, never put into practice. 
1 3  The emperor also accepted from the start that his colonial ordinances, like the legislation of the Reich under article 
1 7  of the constitution, required the countersignature of the chancellor who thereby became politically responsible for their 
substance and implementation. 
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represented the fourth level of government. He derived his executive powers primarily from the 
company, his legislative powers partly from the company and partly from the chancellor, and his 
judicial powers exclusively from the chancellor-and we must remember that the judicial powers 
under the Protectorates Act included important executive functions. 
There was also a much less well defined fifth level of government. As far as its executive 
functions were concerned it was under the control of the administrator, subject to the limitations 
of his powers in relation to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s board of directors, which did not permit 
him, for example, to open new stations. By contrast, the managers of existing stations were placed 
under him. They also derived their executive powers from him, partly as a result of an explicit 
legislative delegation. However, local officials could also derive powers directly from the 
chancellor of the Reich. This was first of all the case with the judicial powers under the 
Protectorates Act. But registrars of births, deaths and marriages and officials exercising consular 
powers also required a personal authorisation by the chancellor. Moreover, all these officials were 
directly responsible to the chancellor, rather than the administrator or the company's board of 
directors, for the exercise of these powers. 
These unwieldy arrangements were simplified in practice by concentrating a multitude of 
functions in the hands of the same official. Thus the administrator placed the station courts under 
the officials authorised by the chancellor to exercise the judicial jurisdiction in relation to non­
natives, and the chancellor usually appointed the company's  station managers as the registrars of 
births, deaths and marriages for their districts. Moreover, the chancellor placed additional judicial 
officers under the administrator and made him, ex officio, the chief justice, so that a separate 
personal authorisation was no longer required. 14 
As regards the legislative framework, room for administrative discretion at all levels was 
rapidly shrinking, with the exception of the field of native administration. On the other hand, the 
government of German New Guinea was perceived as a government of colonial enclaves, although 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had every intention of rapidly increasing the size and the number of 
these enclaves, at least in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, with the help of new settlers who, it believed, 
would rush to its colony as soon as it was opened to them. When the expected flood turned out 
to be a trickle the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had to devise a new strategic plan. It involved a major 
change in the organisation of government. On 23 May 1 889 it signed an agreement with the Reich 
by which the government in the colony was placed in the hands of imperial officials. 
Since the agreement was modelled on one concluded a year earlier between the Reich and the 
counterpart of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in the Marshall Islands, the Jaluit Gesellschaft, it is 
convenient to consider the legal developments in that colony before returning to German New 
Guinea. 
II 
The colonial law of the Marshall Islands was to a large extent based on that of German New 
Guinea. The Protectorates Act was introduced in almost identical terms, beginning with an 
imperial ordinance of 13 September 1 886, the counterpart of the German New Guinea Ordinance 
of 5 June 1 886.15 Even the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance was re-enacted 
for the Marshall Islands by the chancellor of the Reich on 10 March 1 890. But local differences 
also asserted themselves from the start. 
14 This did not represent a significant reduction of the chancellor's powers because the appointment of an administrator 
was itself subject to his approval under the company's  articles of association. 
15 That is to say the metropolitan German. civil, criminal and procedural law applied in principle also to non-natives in 
the Marshall Islands. 
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In German New Guinea the initial focus was on land, in the Marshall Islands it was on trade. 
The local exercise of legislative powers began with an extension of the consular control over 
German merchant vessels to non-German vessels by an ordinance proclaimed by vice-consul 
Knappe on 2 June 1 886. A day later Knappe prohibited the supply of arms, ammunition, 
explosives and liquor to natives. It followed the 1 885 prohibitions of imperial commissioner 
Oertzen for German New Guinea, but with several significant modifications. Firstly, Knappe's  
prohibition took the form of an ordinance which included a penal clause, namely fines of  up to 
50 Dollars. Secondly, it distinguished between "the natives of the Marshall Islands" and "other 
coloured persons". Thirdly, it singled out the sale of such items, in contrast to their exchange for 
local produce and other forms of supply, suggesting the Marshallese had already adopted a cash 
economy at the time. Fourthly, it exempted beer from the prohibition, an indication that its 
consumption by Marshallese had become widespread and economically significant. Finally, 
Knappe supplemented the penal provisions with procedural rules. They were elaborated in an 
administrative instruction but repealed on 8 January 1887 because they were inconsistent with the 
Protectorates Act, which had come into force in the Marshall Islands on 1 December 1 886, three 
months after German New Guinea. 
On that date Knappe, now as imperial commissioner, reminded his subjects that the acquisition 
of land from natives, by purchase, exchange, gift or any other form of legal transaction, had been 
prohibited by the commander of SMS Nautilus when the German flag was hoisted in October 
1 885.  He confirmed that this prohibition would remain in place for the time being, so that no non­
native could legally acquire land from natives in the Marshall Islands. 
The ordinance invited non-natives to register their previously established land claims before 
1 July 1 888.  However, the casual wording of the ordinance, which did not even identify the crucial 
date (or dates?) of the Nautilus prohibition, and the fact that Knappe could extend the registration 
period in individual cases for an unspecified time, shows that he hardly regarded these claims as 
a burning issue. 
That the opening up of the Marshall Islands to settlers was not on the government agenda was 
made clear in two ordinances enacted by imperial commissioner Sonnenschein on 28 June 1888. 
The first implemented the agreement between the Reich and the Jaluit Gesellschaft-to be 
discussed later-which had granted the company, inter alia, a monopoly over the acquisition of 
ownerless land. Sonnenschein therefore formally outlawed the acquisition of ownerless land by 
others, making it a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment or a fine of up to 5 ,000 Marks. 
He also made it a criminal offence, with the same penalty, to acquire land, or rights to land or to 
the use of land, from natives. 16 
When imperial commissioner Schmidt tried to liberalise the position by permitting the 
acquisition of land with governmental approval five years later, his ordinance was disallowed by 
the chancellor. The general prohibition remained in place until 1905, when it was replaced with 
a land acquisition monopoly of the Fiskus, in line with the position in German New Guinea, as 
part of the measures which led to the end of the Marshall Islands as a separate colony. 
It took until 1 893 before the labour question was addressed in legislative form, and then only 
indirectly by prohibiting the exportation of natives from the Marshall Islands for any purpose. The 
next relevant legislative act on the public record is a 1902 ordinance concerning the recruitment 
and importation of coloured labourers. It was primarily a public health measure which decreed that 
only healthy coloured persons could be recruited as labourers in the Marshall Islands, or be 
brought as labourers to the group from elsewhere. The employment contracts with such labourers 
were made subject to the approval of the administrator. A contract had to be preceded by a 
1 6  In 1 890 this prohibition was extended to include the establishment of trading stations on native land, even if it did not 
involve the granting of rights to the land in question. 
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medical examination of the labourer at the administrative headquarters in Jaluit, and this 
examination had to be repeated at the end of the contract. 
The ordinance did not indicate that approval of the employment of a native could be denied 
on other than health grounds. It did not regulate the employment conditions in any way. Instead 
it made provisions for cases where a labourer died during his employment. In that event the 
employer had to make a written report to the authorities, specifying date and cause of death. The 
report had to be accompanied by the labourer's belongings and his outstanding wages so that his 
estate could be handed over to his relatives by the government. 
The employer had to pay a fee of 5 Marks for the medical examination of each labourer. This 
fee covered the examination of the employment contract and the entry of the labourer in a special 
register. This "Stammrolle" was the administrative heart of the matter: each labourer was entered 
into it under a separate number and copies of all employment contracts were attached to it, so that 
the government could control whether the required medical examination at the end of the contract 
had been carried out or whether the death of the labourer during his employment had been 
reported. 
In fact administrator lrmer had already enacted another labour ordinance in 1 895. It had made 
it an offence for a native to leave the service of a non-native before his employment contract had 
run its course, and also an offence for Marshallese chiefs to prevent natives from fulfilling their 
duties under an employment contract. This ordinance was apparently regarded as legally too 
adventurous to be suitable for publication in Germany. It is also unlikely that many Marshallese 
were punished under it. Rather, it looks like a political gesture, warning the chiefs publicly not to 
interfere with employment contracts with non-natives into which their subjects had entered. 
An ordinance concerning the planting of coconut palms which Irmer had enacted the previous 
year was clearly such a political gesture. It exhorted the Marshallese and their chiefs, soil 
conditions permitting, to plant more palms than hitherto, making it a specific duty to plant three 
young palms, or three nuts of the largest variety, if an old palm had to be removed. Land owners 
and chiefs were obliged to inform the administrator annually, before 1 April, of how many new 
plantings had been made, but the ordinance did not bother to provide punishments for non­
compliance. 
The imperial commissioners, and later administrators, 17 also enacted less rhetorical police 
regulations . In May 1887 Knappe issued a multi-purpose police ordinance for the island of 
Jabwor, the seat of his headquarters in the Jaluit Atoll. It made the opening of public bars subject 
to his permission and prohibited gambling in these establishments. It made public drunkenness and 
fishing with dynamite offences. It obliged the owners of pigs to fence them in and the owners of 
land to keep the beach and the public path clean, in particular to clean them every Saturday 
evening, a breach being punishable, in this case, with a fine of between 25 Cents and 10 Dollars. 
Imperial commissioner Biermann extended this ordinance in 1890 to Nauru. In 1 894 Irmer 
added a prohibition for Jabwor on igniting sizeable fireworks without special permission. He later 
strengthened the public cleanliness provisions of Knappe's  ordinance. The new provisions 
stipulated how dead animals, kitchen refuse, empty tins, boxes and bottles, as well as stones, 
timber and the like had to be disposed of. They also instructed the police sergeant and his men to 
control compliance with this ordinance strictly and to report all breaches to the administrator. 
All these regulations were enacted with scant regard to, or understanding of, the legal 
framework within which the local authorities were meant to operate. Thus Biermann apparently 
discovered in 1 890 that Knappe had not been entitled to deal with gambling in public bars in the 
17  The title "Kaiserlicher Kommissaf' was changed to "lAndeshauptmann" in 1 893 . The change was brought about by 
a decree which also applied to German Southwest Africa and Togo. It would appear that the title change acknowledged 
that what had been regarded as a "temporary" (kommissarische) form of government had become pennanent. It certainly 
had nothing to do with the beginning or end of "company rule". 
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form of a police regulation because the matter was already covered by the German Criminal Code. 
At any rate, he repealed the offending section and replaced it by a new penal clause which referred 
to section 285 of the code. But this move hardly solved the legal difficulty, since that section dealt 
with professional gamblers rather than with innkeepers who permitted gambling in their 
establishments, as Knappe's  ordinance did. 
Side by side with such fumbling were instances of bush lawyering. For instance a suggestion 
was made to use the monopoly of the Jaluit Gesellschaft to acquire ownerless land as a means of 
allowing it to get around the general prohibition to acquire land from natives: the company would 
pay natives to relinquish their title to a piece of land it wanted to acquire and then take the now 
ownerless land into possession in exercise of its monopoly. 
The colonial department rejected this particular suggestion, but it usually did not bother to put 
local legislation under the legal microscope. Its attitude is well illustrated by the response to a 
"public notice" concerning the administration of justice issued by Biermann on 10 July 1 890. It 
presented itself as a kind of local constitution centring on the imperial commissioner as a quasi­
monarch, yet it purported to be no more than a summary of the legal position which had been 
created by two imperial ordinances of 7 and 26 February 1 890 and the implementation regulations 
thereto issued by the chancellor. The administrative section of the colonial department found 
Biermann's  scheme "functional" (zweckmiissig) whereas the legal section noted that the manner 
in which he intended to exercise the administration of justice in relation to non-natives breached 
binding legal provisions at several points. However, it did not examine the idiosyncratic manner 
in which Biermann intended to exercise the administration of justice in relation to natives. 
Biermann's  notice stated that the imperial ordinance had authorised him to exercise the 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over natives in the whole colony and to delegate this power. He used 
the latter power to establish a civil and criminal court for natives in Nauru which was to be chaired 
by the district officer, who had to hear criminal cases together with assessors "when this was 
required by law". An appeal against decisions of this court to the imperial commissioner was 
permissible in civil cases, and the imperial commissioner could reduce or remit punishments it had 
imposed in criminal cases. The imperial commissioner could also deal with civil and criminal 
cases in Nauru himself until the court had made a decision. If he did there was no longer room for 
an appeal in civil cases or for a reduction or remission of punishments in criminal cases. However, 
this only brought the position into line with the rest of the colony where the decisions of the 
imperial commissioner were final and where he apparently also did not require the participation 
of assessors in criminal cases. 
Biermann justified these arrangements in his report to the colonial department (RKA 4787) 
by pointing out that the Marshallese expected the imperial commissioner to exercise the 
jurisdiction over them personally. The colonial department raised no objections. Yet these 
arrangements were irreconcilable with the Native Penal Ordinance the chancellor of the Reich had 
enacted on 1 March 1890, because it presupposed that the criminal jurisdiction would not be 
exercised by the imperial commissioner, who was to exercise the power of mercy and had to 
confirm death sentences, and because it made the participation of assessors mandatory in certain 
cases, irrespective of who was chairing the court. 
On the other hand, the colonial department decree of 7 May 1 890 had left it to Biermann to 
decide whether or not to make the Native Penal Ordinance public locally, although without 
indicating what legal consequences a negative decision would have. 18 But then this decree was 
generally remarkably vague. All it said about the exercise of the civil jurisdiction was that if 
Biermann was approached by a native, or a non-native wanting to take action against a native, he 
1 8  Did this mean that the ordinance did not come into force unless it had been made public in the Marshall Islands, 
although it stated that it would become effective on 1 October 1 890, and that it perhaps never became effective because 
it was never locally proclaimed? 
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should continue to deal with such matters informally, taking native customs into account-which 
Biermann took as an authorisation for the arrangements he made in his notice for Nauru. 
The final section of this notice shows that the legal position in the Marshall Islands had long 
been peculiar in other respects. It stated that the arrangements made for the administration of 
justice did not affect the existing provisions for the punishment of breaches of the administrative 
ordinances enacted by the imperial commissioner. This referred to an 1 886 imperial ordinance 
giving him the power to impose unspecified summary punishments, although such punishments 
were not permissible for breaches of police ordinances enacted under the 1 886 Protectorates Act. 
Indeed they would appear to be irreconcilable with this act, especially after its 1 888 revision had 
clarified that the legislative powers which could be exercised under it included not only police 
ordinances but also other ordinances concerning the administration 19 
Biermann and his predecessors, Knappe, Sonnenschein and Schmidt, his successors, lrmer and 
Brandeis, as well as some of their deputies, enacted a large number of such ordinances. The first 
was a premature effort by Knappe on 2 June 1 886, before his appointment as imperial 
commissioner, which required non-German vessels in the Marshall Islands to report to "the 
representative of the imperial government" in Jaluit. On 26 January 1 887 followed a harbour 
ordinance for Jaluit. An 1888 ordinance stipulated that all vessels coming to the Marshall Islands 
had to report to that harbour before proceeding to other parts of the colony. In March 1 887 
Knappe required all "foreigners", defined as "whites and half-whites", to register with the 
authorities. In 1889 an ordinance dealing with impecunious foreigners followed. A quarantine 
ordinance was enacted in 1891 .  It was repeatedly supplemented to combat the spread of venereal 
diseases and leprosy before being replaced by a more detailed quarantine ordinance in 1901 .  An 
1 888 ordinance regulated the collection of money for mission purposes. In 1 893 the installation 
of mission teachers was made dependent on the permission of the imperial commissioner. 
All these ordinances included penal clauses. In the last case the penalty could consist of a 
prison sentence of six months-which far exceeded the legislative powers of imperial 
commissioner Schmidt under the Protectorates Act. 
Schmidt's main contribution to the colonial law of the Marshall Islands was a prohibition to 
fly the "so-called Marshall flag" as the national flag on any vessel. A year after this display of the 
stick, the Marshallese were offered a carrot. This was made possible by the belated 
implementation of an 1893 imperial ordinance permitting local authorities to grant natives of the 
Schutzgebiete the right to carry the German flag. Administrator Irmer exercised this power in a 
solemn ordinance dated 1 March 1895. It restricted the right to fly the German flag to vessels 
belonging to natives who were "protected persons", owned land in the Marshall Islands, were of 
good character and had never been punished for piracy. The owners of the vessel had to undertake 
to leave the waters of the colony without governmental permission only in an emergency. Its 
captain and the majority of its crew had to be Marshallese. If all these requirements were met, 
after inscribing the name of the vessel and its home port, Jaluit, in coloured Roman letters on its 
stem, the owners could acquire a flag certificate, for which a fee of 24 Marks was payable. I do 
not know how many Marshallese vessels availed themselves of this opportunity, but legislation 
in another field, especially dear to the heart of the local authorities, suggests that several would 
have been eligible. 
On 25 January 1 887 Knappe prohibited giving credit of more than 50 Dollars to natives 
without his permission. He decreed that he had to be informed of existing debts of more than 50 
Dollars before 1 July 1887. Claims resulting from old debts not so notified, and new debts of more 
than 50 Dollars, would not be "protected"; that is to say they were not legally enforceable. There 
were no penal provisions. They came with a second ordinance of 14 August 1 887. It prohibited 
19 The 1886 ordinance had also given the imperial commissioner the unusual authority to legislate in customs and 
taxation matters. It finally attracted attention in 1905 which led to a repeal of this ordinance. 
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giving any credit to natives but made an exception for natives employed as traders. They could 
be granted credit if this had been permitted by the imperial commissioner. On the other hand, the 
ordinance clarified that the general prohibition applied not only to local natives but also to 
members of other coloured tribes, unless exceptions were made for individuals or categories of 
persons. 
An amendment of 7 March 1 899 added a second exception: permission to give natives credit 
could be granted in cases of "emergency" (Notfiille ) . The examples given show that the draftsman 
did not have ordinary emergencies in mind. He was not thinking of natives obtaining credit to feed 
starving children after some natural disaster, but of a native shipowner who did not have enough 
cash to provision his ship for the next voyage or to pay on the spot for major repairs. 
Even Marshallese shipowners entitled to fly the German flag were deemed to need special 
protection. They were not only not permitted to buy a new ship on credit but a 1 889 ordinance 
made all contracts entered into by natives which were worth more than 2,000 Marks subject to 
prior approval by the imperial commissioner. That is to say permission was required even if a 
Marshallese wanted to pay in cash for a ship or other items costing more than that amount. 
Contracts concluded without permission were not just unenforceable, the non-native party could 
be punished with a fine or up to three months imprisonment. 
But it is not only the paternalism of these ordinances that should be noted. It is also important 
that the Marshallese made purchases of this magnitude sufficiently often to call for an ordinance 
of this kind. No wonder therefore that they were soon made to pay taxes, in contrast to the natives 
in German New Guinea who paid no direct taxes during the entire period of company rule. 
A tax ordinance was proclaimed on 28 June 1 888.  It introduced personal taxes for natives and 
non-natives. Every male non-native over 16  years of age had to pay an annual tax of 20 Marks. 
Natives had to pay their tax collectively. The colony was divided into tax districts. They had to 
pay specified amounts ranging between 400 and 2000 Marks, adding up to a total of 12,000 
Marks. The tax was collected by a chief selected by the imperial commissioner for each district, 
who was given a one third share for his trouble. In 1 890 the personal tax for natives became a 
copra tax, with a grand total of 1 80,000 kilograms. Although this represented the equivalent of 
14,400 Marks, this did not mean that the tax was increased, rather Nauru had been added to the 
colony and contributed an extra 30,000 kilograms as the then largest copra producer.20 
The personal tax for non-natives remained unchanged, although members of mission societies 
were now exempt. Instead the 1 898 ordinance introduced a tax for coconut plantations owned by 
non-natives. There were apparently only two of very different sizes, since one had to pay an 
annual tax of 1 ,000 Marks whereas the other only paid 125 Marks. 
The main target of taxation in the Marshall Islands, however, was trade. The story began in 
December 1 887, when imperial commissioner Sonnenschein introduced a licensing system for 
foreign trading vessels, that is to say vessels which did not trade on behalf of individuals or firms 
resident in the Marshall Islands. The ordinance was designed as a police ordinance aimed at 
controlling illegal trade. A vessel could be denied a licence if its cargo or other circumstances 
suggested that trade carried out by it would breach existing laws, for example, by supplying 
natives with firearms or liquor. But the ordinance also introduced a fee of 250 Dollars for a three 
months trading permit which clearly served fiscal purposes. 
At that time local traders were not subject to a commercial tax. Such a tax was introduced, 
together with the personal taxes already discussed, in June 1 888. Foreign trading vessels were 
included in this new ordinance, now without any pretence that this measure was concerned with 
the control of illegal trade, and the 1 887 ordinance was repealed. 
20 The 1 898 replacement of this ordinance reflects the different rates of economic development in different parts of the 
colony. The grand total remained the same but the share of Nauru decreased from 30,000 to 15,000 kilograms whereas 
that of Ebon, for example, grew from 25,000 to 30,000 kilograms. 
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The 1 8  8 8 ordinance taxed resident finns at a rate of 6,000 Marks per annum i f  they had a 
turnover of more than 500,000 Marks and at half that rate if the turnover was smaller. Individual 
traders were taxed 40 Marks annually in the Marshall Islands and five times as much in Nauru. 
Public bars had to pay a tax of 800 Marks annually and foreign trading vessels were charged 1 ,000 
Marks for each "voyage". Licences were no longer required but tax evasion carried a penalty of 
up to 6,000 Marks, whereas the maximum penalty under the 1887 ordinance had been 500 Dollars, 
the equivalent of 2,000 Marks. An 1 889 amendment increased the commercial tax for resident 
finns to 9,000 and 6,000 Marks respectively and that for traders to 100 Marks. The rates for 
foreign trading vessels remained the same. In 1895 the tax for the large commercial firms was 
again raised, namely to 1 5,000 Marks. 
In 1 900 came the turn for foreign trading vessels. Administrator Brandeis increased the basic 
rate from 1 ,000 to 2,250 Marks for each voyage. A voyage was now limited to a maximum of 30 
days, each extra day attracting an additional fee of 75 Marks. The rate was doubled in the case of 
steamships, including vessels with auxiliary motors .21 In 1 904 the tax for foreign trading vessels 
was doubled to, respectively, 4,500 and 9,000 Marks per 30 day voyage. But Brandeis also raised 
the tax for resident finns to 30,000 and 12,000 Marks respectively. A year later his budgetary 
riches evaporated. An ordinance of 14 September 1905 scrapped the tax for individual traders, 
reduced the commercial tax for resident finns to a uniform rate of 6,000 Marks per annum, and 
that for foreign trading vessels to 2,000 Marks per annum, irrespective of the number and duration 
of their voyages .  Only the tax for public bars remained unchanged at 800 Marks. 
As could be expected, these dramatic changes did not serve fiscal purposes; rather, they were 
part of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to protect the Jaluit Gesellschaft from commercial 
competition. But in order to appreciate this aspect of the story we have to return to the beginning 
of German colonial rule in the Marshall Islands. 
III 
Bismarck had expected that the Jaluit Gesellschaft, which merged the interests of the Deutsche 
Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft and the Hernsheim firm in Micronesia, would take on the 
responsibility of governing the Marshall Islands under an imperial charter. However, the company 
was reluctant. After the Protectorates Act had become law, the emperor had therefore no choice 
but to set up an imperial administration. Its legislative basis was an imperial ordinance of 1 3  
September 1 886.  It implemented that act for the Marshall Islands i n  line with the arrangements 
made for German New Guinea, except that an imperial commissioner took the place of the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie' s  administrator. 
The legislative powers of the imperial commissioner were broadened by an imperial ordinance 
of 15 October 1 886. It authorised him to enact ordinances concerning the general administration 
of the Marshall Islands as well as customs and taxation matters, in addition to enacting police 
regulations under section 3 of the 1886 Protectorates Act. The imperial commissioner was thereby 
given legislative powers which parallelled those held by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie under its 
imperial charter. Indeed, in contrast to the company, he did not need the approval of the chancellor 
of the Reich when exercising these powers, although he had to submit his ordinances to the 
chancellor, who had the power to repeal them.22 
21 In 1 901  the commercial tax for resident traders on Nauru was reorganised. Instead of each trader having to pay 200 
Marks a total amount for all trading stations was fixed at 1 ,800 Marks and the administrator was given discretion as to 
how he distributed this burden among the traders each year. 
22 In contrast to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie the emperor did not establish a gazette for the Marshall Islands. Instead he 
decreed that these ordinances would be proclaimed "in accordance with local practice" (in ortsublicher Weise). However 
Knappe made detailed proclamation provisions in an ordinance in August 1887. It stipulated that the German text of all 
"public notices, in particular all ordinances" would usually be accompanied by an English translation and, where 
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Although the imperial commissioner was given such extensive powers, the negotiations with 
the Jaluit Gesellschaft continued. They led to an agreement of 21  January 1 888 .  It obliged the 
company to cover the costs of the government of the Marshall Islands in exchange for three 
exclusive "privileges" (Privilegien) : 
1 .  the right to take ownerless land into possession; 
2. the right to fish for pearl shell-although natives were entitled to continue to fish for it in "the 
traditional manner"; and 
3 .  the right to exploit existing guano deposits-subject to the duly acquired rights of third parties. 
The agreement provided that the government of the colony was to be carried out by an 
imperial commissioner, supported by a secretary, who would appoint additional officials, at the 
suggestion of the representative of the company and subject to the approval of the chancellor of 
the Reich. 
The basis of the financial management was an annual budget agreed upon between the German 
government and the company. Section 5 detailed the company' s financial obligations. It had to 
refund negative discrepancies between the actual expenditure and revenue but was entitled to 
pocket surpluses. However, the aim was to raise sufficient taxes and fees to cover the budgeted 
expenditure, and to increase taxes if this proved impossible (section 6). 
Section 7 provided that the Jaluit Gesellschaft had to be heard before imperial ordinances 
affecting the government of · the Marshall Islands were enacted. Section 8 provided that the 
imperial commissioner would act "as far as possible" in agreement with the local representative 
of the company when issuing local administrative regulations and orders . 
While this agreement did not give the J aluit Gesellschaft direct governmental powers, the fact 
that it became financially responsible for the government of the Marshall Islands was sufficient 
to remove them from the financial controls of the German metropolitan legislature under the 1 892 
Colonial Budgets Act. As it had been one of Bismarck' s main aims to exclude control of 
Germany's colonial finances by the Reichstag, the 1 888 agreement was a very acceptable solution. 
The chancellery therefore had no difficulty in granting the company significant economic 
privileges in exchange and also a significant influence on how the government of the colony was 
conducted. After all, Germany's colonies were meant to be commercial enterprises whose success 
was to be measured in terms of the profits made by the German commercial interests. It was 
therefore a national duty of the imperial commissioner to support the J aluit Gesellschaft in its 
commercial activities, just as it was natural for the company to carry the financial responsibility 
for the colonial government as part of its commercial risks. It was a mutually advantageous 
relationship. If it left imperial officials on the spot in an awkward position, because they had to 
balance the commercial interests of the company with other governmental concerns, this too was 
how it should be. This was what they were paid for, and it was irrelevant in this context that they 
were paid out of funds provided by the company.23 
This state of affairs is reflected in the termination clause of the agreement. Whereas the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft was entitled to terminate the agreement after two years by giving a year' s notice, the 
German government, apart from the case of the company not fulfilling its contractual obligations, 
could only terminate the agreement for-unspecified-political reasons. In other words, while the 
company could terminate the agreement if it considered this to be economically desirable, the 
German government bound itself indefinitely. Yet instead of being relieved when British pressures 
on behalf of the company's  main commercial competitor, the Australian firm of Burns, Philp & 
appropriate, a translation into the language of the natives. 
23 To call this arrangement "company rule" contributes nothing to its historical understanding. Legally speaking this label 
is clearly unjustified. The Jaluit Gesellschaft was not a chartered company. It never exercised rights of local sovereignty 
like the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. It was the German government which ruled the Marshall Islands, and it was the 
chancellor of the Reich who was directly politically responsible for the exercise of this rule. 
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Co., provided i t  with an opportunity to terminate th e  agreement i n  1905, i t  did s o  most 
reluctantly.24 Although the Jaluit Gesellschaft lost its exclusive right to fish for pearl shells and 
to occupy ownerless land, the chancellor of the Reich confirmed its most valuable privilege, the 
guano monopoly, for another 94 years. And he did so under most generous conditions. The 
company had to pay an annual fee of 25,000 Marks in advance-less than it had had to pay for 
the salary of the imperial commissioner and his secretary under the 1 888 agreement-plus a fee 
of half a Mark for each tonne of phosphate over 50,000 tonnes shipped from Nauru in any one 
year. It was also assured that no other fees, duties or taxes would be levied on the production and 
export of phosphate. It was exempted from any import duties for materials used in the mining 
process as well as food imported for its personnel employed in this process.25 
So much for the fate of the Jaluit Gesellschaft. That of the Marshall Islands was given less 
consideration by the German government. A brief imperial ordinance of 1 8  January 1906 
incorporated them from 1 April 1906 into the Island Territory. The chancellor of the Reich could 
have used his implementation powers to soften this blow, but he apparently did not feel a need to 
do so, at least not in the form of published implementation regulations. The Marshall Islands were 
gradually absorbed into German New Guinea and little of their own legislative framework 
remained by the end of German colonial rule. 
Now back to German New Guinea and the 1 889 agreement between the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie and the Reich. 
IV 
Although modelled on the 1 888 agreement with the Jaluit Gesellschaft, it was a more complex 
document. The financial arrangements were basically the same, but several factors required 
modifications. First there was the question of what was to happen to the company' s  political rights 
under its charter. The �greement settled for the following answer: from the time the imperial 
commissioner took over the administration until the termination of the agreement the company's 
rights of local sovereignty were said to "rest" (ruhen). In other words, the imperial commissioner 
did not exercise the rights of the company as its agent but rather the emperor's Schutzgewalt. 
Next the company's  economic privileges had to be dealt with. As regards its land acquisition 
monopoly, the agreement provided that it remained unaffected. In addition the company reserved 
for itself three of the de facto monopolies created by the 1 887 Commerce Ordinance: ( 1 )  the right 
to fish for pearls and pearl shells, (2) the right to mine for ores, precious stones and combustible 
materials, and (3) the right to exploit deposits of guano and other fertilisers. The commercial 
exploitation of other natural resources, in particular timber and trepang, was to be regulated in 
agreement with the company. 
A third focus of the company's  concern was labour. It recognised the right of the imperial 
commissioner to supervise the recruitment and employment of natives as labourers but insisted 
that any legislative activity in this field required its agreement and that the existing privileges of 
other German firms concerning the exportation of natives as labourers would not be expanded 
without its approval. 
Finally, the disparity in size between German New Guinea and the Marshall Islands made a 
difference. German New Guinea was to be governed by three rather than two imperial officials. 
The two junior ones, a secretary and a chancellor, corresponded in terms of their remuneration to 
the secretary and the imperial commissioner in the Marshall Islands, but the imperial 
24 One of the arguments used was that the fees imposed on foreign trading vessels contravened the 1 886 declaration 
concerning the freedom of trade in the German and British "spheres of influence" in the Western Pacific. 
25 A 1 907 supplement to the concession stipulated that it would not be adversely affected by the 1906 imperial mining 
ordinance. 
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commissioner in German New Guinea was to be a more senior official on twice the salary of his 
counterpart in the Marshall Islands. 
While it was taken for granted that the seat of the administration in the Marshall Islands would 
be in Jaluit and that only one administrative outpost would be established in Nauru,26 the range 
of possibilities in German New Guinea was much greater. Although there would have been good 
reasons to base the imperial commissioner in the Bismarck Archipelago rather than at the 
company' s  headquarters in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the agreement provided that the company had 
a say in determining the seat of the imperial officials. It also had a say in the appointment of 
additional local officials; and the agreement provided that in places where a full-time local official 
was not required, preference would be given to entrusting governmental powers to its employees 
who then had to exercise these powers in accordance with the instructions of the imperial 
commissioner. 
Neither the powers of the imperial commissioner nor those of his subordinates were defined 
in the agreement. It also said nothing about the manner in which the company would manage its 
own affairs in German New Guinea.27 The company was first off the mark in clarifying the 
situation. The day after the agreement with the Reich had been signed it issued detailed 
instructions which replaced its 1 885 instructions to its administrator. 
This document offers a striking illustration of the developments which had taken place during 
the four intervening years. Whereas the 1 885 instructions only had the imperial charter as their 
guiding star, much of what the 1 889 instruction had to say could be said by reference to the 
legislative framework which had been put into place in the meantime. 
The main purpose of the document was to define the remaining functions of the company in 
German New Guinea which were to be exercised by a general manager. He was to represent the 
interests of the company vis-a-vis the imperial officials in all matters relating to local sovereignty; 
to exercise the company's land acquisition monopoly; and to manage its commercial activities in 
accordance with the instructions of its board of directors. 
As neither the imperial charter nor the 1 889 agreement spelt out what the rights of local 
sovereignty consisted of, the instructions came up with their own definition, according to which 
they included: 
1 .  the administration o f  justice in relation to natives and non-natives; 
2. the collection of local revenue, in particular customs duties and taxes; 
3. the control of shipping; 
4. the supervision of the missions and any educational institutions; and 
5.  police matters. 
Within this field of "state administration" (staatliche Verwaltung) the general manager had to play 
a double role: on the one hand he had to represent the interests of the company where the 1 889 
·agreement had given it a say in the enactment of local legislation and the appointment of local 
officials, on the other hand he was responsible for carrying out the company' s  obligations under 
this agreement to provide the imperial officials with free accommodation, free transport and so 
on. 
The instructions confirmed that control of the recruitment and employment of natives as 
labourers was the responsibility of the imperial commissioner and that its station managers 
required special authorisation if they were to continue to exercise police powers under the relevant 
legislation. 
26 When the 1 888 agreement with the Jaluit Gesellschaft was signed the annexation of Nauru had already been decided 
on but not yet been put into effect. 
27 The powers of the imperial commissioner were less than those of his colleague in the Marshall Islands. He was 
certainly not independent of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. 
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By contrast the instructions assumed that the exercise of the land acquisition monopoly was 
exclusively the responsibility of the general manager, to the extent that he, rather than the imperial 
commissioner, would issue the certificate on the basis of which land acquired by the company was 
to be registered.28 The instructions attached special importance to this point because the local 
administration had so far failed to acquire substantial reserves of land for the company. The 
general manager was therefore instructed to show greater vigour and to employ the company's 
surveyor primarily to occupy tracts of ownerless land which were suitable for plantations. At the 
same time, the general manager was reminded that it was not the company's  intention to drive the 
natives off the land and that consideration should be given to the setting aside of native reserves.29 
Although the 1 889 instructions stressed that the general manager had wide discretionary 
powers and that the company relied on his good sense for their exercise, they sketched a precise 
blueprint of what the board of directors expected to happen. Efforts were to be concentrated on 
the economic development of the three existing plantation stations in Hatzfeldhafen, 
Constantinhafen and Stephansort, whereas it was to be the main function of the company's sole 
station in the Bismarck Archipelago to supply these three stations in Kaiser Wilhelmsland with 
labourers. The central station in Finschhafen would be retained for the time being, and would 
become the seat of the imperial commissioner, but unless large areas of suitable plantation land 
were found in its vicinity, it would be abandoned in due course and the central station moved to, 
or into the vicinity of, one of the plantation stations. No new stations were planned and also no 
further scientific expeditions, at least until the plantation stations became profitable. 
The instructions concerning the station in the Bismarck Archipelago illustrate the extent of the 
detail with which the board of directors tried to direct affairs from Berlin. The station was to be 
moved from the Duke of Yorks to a suitable spot at Blanche Bay. The directors hoped to win the 
local expert, Herr Parkinson, as station manager or, as a second choice, Herr Vallender. Should 
both gentlemen be unwilling, the company employee Winter (see above: 193 ff.) would probably 
be a suitable alternative. In any case, the board had already started negotiations with the firm of 
Rabone, Feez & Co. in Sydney to acquire a schooner suitable for recruiting purposes, since the 
matter was urgent and all resources had to be mobilised to meet the recruitment target of 600 
labourers set in the 1 889/90 budget. 
The emperor made his move almost a year later but he was much briefer. The operative part 
of the ordinance of 6 May 1 890 consisted of a single sentence. It transferred all judicial and 
administrative powers of the former administrator to the imperial commissioner, although Fritz 
Rose had by then been governing for about six months, albeit in an acting capacity.30 
One of Rose's  first administrative measures was the creation of local police authorities headed 
by a "chief of police" (Polizeivorsteher). He was to take over the governmental functions of the 
company's  station managers, but some police functions were transferred back to the latter. A 
decree of Rose, dated 4 December 1890, listed the resulting distribution of powers at the local 
level by reference to various legislative enactments. The principle was simple: the station 
managers were given police powers in relation to coloured labourers, including disciplinary 
powers., whereas the police chiefs were given the rest, including the registration of non-natives and 
the power to approve the supply of arms , ammunition, explosives and liquor to foreign natives. 
As was to be expected, Rose's  legislative activity was limited. It was mainly concerned with 
a fine tuning of the labour law which specifically required the approval of the company under the 
28 I doubt whether this interpretation would have stood up in court-although the 1 889 agreement stated that the 
company's  land acquisition monopoly remained unaffected-but I did not try to find out how the registration of the 
company's  land acquisitions during the reign of Rose was actually handled, or if any registrations took place. 
29 The instructions generally reiterated the principles concerning relations with German New Guinea's native population 
that had already been expressed in the 1 885 instructions to the administrator. 
30 It took the chancellor of the Reich another two weeks before he authorised the imperial commissioner, with effect from 
1 October 1 890, to exercise powers in shipping matters . 
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1 889 agreement. The Labour Ordinance, as well as the Disciplinary Ordinance, were repeatedly 
amended and an ordinance concerning the medical control of labourers was added in November 
1891 .  
An amendment of the Customs Ordinance in  December 1 891  was linked to the large-scale 
importation of Asian labourers. Rose cancelled the blanket prohibition on the importation of 
opium and replaced it with an import monopoly for the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, which had to pay 
a fee of 40 Marks for each kilogram of opium imported. It was then distributed by dealers who 
had to be licensed by the imperial commissioner. He also determined the retail price they could 
charge. The supply of opium to local natives and non-natives was prohibited and carried a penalty 
of up to three months imprisonment. 
Rose had already enacted a harbour ordinance in December 1 889. A quarantine ordinance 
followed in September 1891 .  While these were overdue housekeeping measures, an ordinance 
regulating the hunting of birds-of-paradise of 1 1  November 1891  broke new ground, although it 
too was little more than a supplement to the 1887 Commerce Ordinance. 
For a variety of reasons the arrangements under the 1 889 agreement proved unsatisfactory and 
it was terminated by the company almost as soon as it could. An imperial ordinance of 15 June 
1 892 restored the previous state of affairs by transferring the judicial and administrative powers 
of the imperial commissioner back to the company' s administrator. The transfer took effect on 1 
September 1 892 as announced ih a decree by the chancellor of the Reich on 22 September.31 
During the remaining half a dozen years of company rule only a small and mixed bag of 
legislation was added to the existing pile. In an optimistic mood the company introduced its own 
currency into German New Guinea in August 1894. During the same month it felt the need to 
regulate the trade by foreign vessels . It is doubtful that many licences under this ordinance were 
issued-or many prospecting licences, let alone mining licences, under a mining ordinance which 
the company enacted in 1 897 as its final legislative endeavour. 
At the local level the fine tuning of existing legislation continued under administrator 
Schmiele. After his departure at the beginning of 1895 only the specialised and localised concerns 
of the imperial judge in the Bismarck Archipelago, Albert Hahl, set the legislative wheels in 
motion. 
In September 1 897 Hahl used his legislative pen as acting administrator to make it an offence 
to provide boats exclusively manned by natives with firearms or ammunition for their protection. 
However, this ordinance only applied to northern New Ireland and New Hanover. It used a bizarre 
fiction by stipulating that recruited labourers who did not come from those areas did not count as 
natives under the ordinance. Since the supply of firearms and ammunition to all natives anywhere 
in German New Guinea had already been made an offence at the beginning of German colonial 
rule, this ordinance suggests that the enforcement of this general prohibition had hardly been taken 
seriously so far and that this practice would continue outside this particular area. 
A year later Hahl left two draft ordinances behind as a parting gift. They had to be issued by 
acting administrator Skopnik, because the imperial judge had no legislative powers of his own. 
The first, dated 2 December 1 898,  prohibited fishing with dynamite in Blanche Bay and the Duke 
of Yorks. It was itself something of a time bomb, as it was to come into force eight months after 
it had been displayed on the official noticeboard in Stephansort, that is to say well after the end 
of company rule.32 The second ordinance, dated 5 December 1 898, was to come into force 
prompt! y on 1 January 1 899. It made it for the time being an offence to collect trepang in the Duke 
3 1  More than a year later it was realised that the imperial commissioner's consular powers also had to be transferred to 
the administrator. 
32 Perhaps Skopnik thought that it would take that Jong before the locals in the Bismarck Archipelago would learn what 
a nasty surprise had been pinned to a notice board in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Perhaps he was told before he enacted his 
second ordinance that it was local practice to display such ordinances on the notice board of the imperial court in 
HerbertshOhe as well. At any rate he no longer gave specific proclamation instructions in that ordinance. 
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of Yorks or to trade with trepang collected in this area-not exactly a triumphant finale to the 
exercise of legislative powers during the period of company rule. 
But other, more important developments had occurred since the 1889 agreement had been 
terminated. To begin with, on 1 September 1892, German New Guinea had not quite returned to 
the position it had been in before 1 November 1889. The administration of justice in the Bismarck 
Archipelago remained the responsibility of an imperial official to whom the administrative 
functions of the company's station manager were also transferred in 1 895. At that time the 
company had already started negotiations about a permanent transfer of all its governmental 
responsibilities to the Reich, and an agreement to that effect was signed on 1 3  March 1 896. 
For the company and the German government, it represented a natural progression from the 
1889 agreement. The company would surrender all political rights under its charter and be 
compensated for its investments · in the development of the colony by retaining its economic 
privileges for 75 years, but only for Kaiser Wilhelmsland and part of New Britain. The Gazelle 
Peninsula, as well as the rest of the Bismarck Archipelago and the northern Solomons, were 
excluded. On the other hand, the company was given a 20 year labour recruiting monopoly for 
the same area, some say in labour matters generally and significant tax concessions. However, the 
company was not only to hand over certain buildings and equipment currently used for 
government purposes free of charge but was also obliged to transfer land for public purposes free 
of charge and to instruct its employees to carry out governmental functions free of charge in places 
where no imperial officials were stationed. In addition the German government was given another 
option: it could terminate all rights of the company under this agreement at any time against a 
payment of 4,000,000 Marks.33 But the Reichstag refused to approve the agreement and 
negotiations dragged on for another two years before a revised agreement was reached and 
subsequently approved by the Reichstag, although it was by no means dramatically different. 
Essentially it settled for the cash compensation option included in the 1 896 agreement. The 
company was to receive "capital" (ein Kapital) of 4,000,000 Marks, which could be paid in ten 
annual instalments, each of which had to be spent within four years on economic enterprises in 
German New Guinea. In view of this monetary compensation the company renounced its land 
acquisition monopoly and all other economic privileges in favour of the Reich. 
However, it was to be given preferential treatment in three areas. Firstly, since the company 
had still not used its land acquisition monopoly to build up strategic reserves of land, it was given 
the right to acquire an additional 50,000 hectares without payment to the Reich, but only in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland, and only for three years. 34 Secondly, it was promised mining privileges in the Ramu 
basin, which was being explored by an expedition the company had sent out at considerable 
expense. Thirdly, it was promised measures which would make it easier for it to obtain natives as 
labourers in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, who were needed for the economic development of its 
landholdings. Otherwise the 1898 agreement was basically identical with the 1 896 version which 
would have allowed the Reich to buy out the company without any of the special concessions it 
was now granted. This would have ended the administrative nightmare which had taken shape in 
German New Guinea two years earlier, but in 1896 the majority in the Reichstag had not been in 
the mood to support major concessions or payments to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, which had 
33 The clauses summarised here were naturally more complex. The agreement also contained several additional clauses, 
for example one which obliged the company, at the request of the government, to offer land it was not using itself to the 
highest bidder and to accept the imposition of improvement conditions on land it acquired. 
34 These strict limitations had been the result of the only amendment of the agreement on which the Reichstag had 
insisted. The original version had given the company ten years and permitted it also to select land in New Britain, without 
excluding the Gazelle Peninsula as the 1 896 agreement had done. This amendment was a blow to the company, since it 
was engaged in a major expansion in the Gazelle Peninsula and because it knew from experience that the acquisition of 
large areas of land was a difficult process which could not be rushed. 
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become the living symbol for the failure of Bismarck's misconceived scheme to let the German 
colonies be governed by chartered companies, without proper parliamentary controls. 
How much or how little was going to change when the 1 898 agreement was implemented? The 
process began with an imperial ordinance of 27 March 1 899 which was to come into force on 1 
April, together with the agreement. It provided that the Reich would take over the local 
sovereignty in German New Guinea on that date and that the charters of the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie would become ineffective. 35 It did not abolish the special rights and privileges the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie had acquired but transferred them to the Fiskus of the colony. It did so by 
reference to the 1 892 Colonial Budgets Act, thereby acknowledging that the financial affairs of 
German New Guinea were from now on under the control of the metropolitan German legislature. 
The chancellor was given special powers in relation to mining law-which were necessary to grant 
the mining privileges the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had been promised-and generally authorised 
to implement the ordinance. 
The implementation decree of 1 April 1 899 shows how broad these implementation powers 
were, as it created the rudiments of the new framework of government for the colony. Firstly it 
transferred all judicial and administrative powers of the company's  administrator to an imperial 
governor. Secondly, it authorised the governor to enact police and other administrative regulations, 
although the chancellor retained the right to amend and repeal them. Thirdly, it provided that 
where existing legislation required actions on the part of organs of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, 
their place would now be taken by "the imperial officials". 
The decree did not indicate what imperial officials, apart from the governor, would be posted 
to German New Guinea, where the seat of the governor was going to be, or how and by whom the 
rights of local sovereignty, which had previously been exercised by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, 
would henceforth be exercised. Nor was there, legally speaking, any need to do so. All these 
matters fell, in principle, within the discretionary powers of the emperor under the Protectorates 
Act. From now on, however, these powers were not only limited by existing legislation but also 
by the financial controls of the legislature of the Reich under the Colonial Budgets Act. In other 
words, the annual budgets became the central instrument with which the organisation as well as 
the activities of the imperial government would be shaped. 
On the other hand, the budgets were not only formally part of the legislative framework, since 
they took the form of statutes, they also had to respond to the other parts of the legislative 
framework within which the imperial government operated. Like the emperor and his government, 
the Reichstag was not above the law when dealing with the financial affairs of German New 
Guinea. Hence it would be a mistake to change tack at this point and to focus on an exploration 
of the financial framework for governmental action in this colony. The budgets and the other 
financial control mechanisms were certainly important factors in the history of colonial rule in 
German New Guinea but the part they performed was nonetheless secondary whereas the legal 
framework played a primary role. Perhaps even more importantly, the information these financial 
records contain has no historically meaningful structure. That a certain amount of money is to be 
spent for a certain purpose becomes historically significant only because it reflects other structures 
which are of a non-financial nature, in particular political priorities. But the financial records do 
not spell out these structures. They have to be analytically extracted from it in so far as this is 
possible. 
This is what distinguishes financial information from that contained in normative and quasi­
normative regulations. Taken by itself it does not add up to anything historically worthwhile. It 
offers a vast number of fragments of information but no picture, whereas the legal framework 
does, however incomplete and ineffective as a means of controlling governmental powers it may 
35 The ordinance also repealed an ordinance of 1 5  October 1 897 which had confirmed the temporary transfer of the 
judicial jurisdiction over natives to the company in 1 887 "for the time being". 
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be. So let us stick to the latter and see how far this will take us into the history of German New 
Guinea after the end of "company rule" when it not only consisted of what now became "the Old 
Protectorate" (das Alte Schutzgebiet) in Melanesia but also incorporated the "Island Territory" 
(lnselgebiet) in Micronesia. Indeed this new German colonial territory is the more appropriate first 
target, since it gave the emperor another opportunity for making a fresh start, whereas the imperial 
government in the Old Protectorate inherited the existing legislative framework which, as we have 
seen, already covered much of the ocean of his discretion with smaller or larger legal islands of 
varying degrees of firmness. 
Chapter 2: Imperial and Parliamentary Control 
I 
On 1 8  July 1 899 the emperor decreed that the Island Territory would come under his imperial protection when it had been handed over to the German authorities in Micronesia. On the 
same day he enacted two ordinances. The first introduced the Consular Jurisdiction Act as from 
1 January 1901 and the Personal Status Act as from 1 January 1900. The second authorised the 
chancellor of the Reich to regulate provisionally the fields of law covered by the Consular 
Jurisdiction Act, declared the Island Territory to be a part of German New Guinea, for the time 
being, and gave the chancellor the usual implementation powers. 1 
The chancellor issued an implementation decree on 24 July but delegated his temporary powers 
to the governor of German New Guinea. The implementation decree placed the Island Territory 
administratively under the governor and divided it into three administrative districts : the Eastern 
Carolines, the Western Carolines, including the Palau Group, and the Marianas, excluding Guam, 
which had been annexed by the United States. The Eastern Carolines were placed under a vice­
governor, the two other districts under district commissioners (Bezirksamtmiinner) who were all 
given equal consular powers. The decree authorised the two district commissioners to enact police 
and other administrative regulations for their districts. The governor, and the vice-governor as his 
representative, were empowered to enact such regulations for the entire Island Territory. In 
addition the governor was empowered to repeal or amend regulations enacted by the vice-governor 
or the district commissioners. 
Governor Bennigsen' s ordinance of 26 September 1 899 combined the two legislative powers 
he had been given: the continuing power to enact police and other administrative regulations and 
the temporary power to regulate those fields of law which, as from 1 January 1901 ,  would be 
covered by the Consular Jurisdiction Act, that is to say, the administration of justice and the civil 
and criminal law applying to non-natives. 
The first five sections of the governor's  ordinance elaborated the administrative provisions in 
the chancellor' s  implementation decree. The next five sections dealt with the administration of 
justice. They were unusual in that natives and non-natives were placed under the jurisdiction of 
the same colonial courts, with the prq_viso that in "native matters" the courts were not bound by 
the strict procedures of German law; that they had to take the customary law of the natives into 
account in criminal cases and that, where appropriate, they were to give the German criminal law 
only "corresponding application". The ordinance also stipulated that the existing civil law of the 
Island Territory-that is to say the Spanish colonial law-would continue to apply, although the 
courts were authorised to base their decisions on the German Civil Code in cases of doubt. 
Section 1 1  introduced the 1 887 Commerce Ordinance of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in the 
Island Territory, with the result that most important commercial activities-apart from agriculture 
and the copra trade-required a licence from the local administrative authorities. 
Sections 12 to 14 dealt with the acquisition of land by non-natives and with their existing land 
claims. As regards the acquisition of native and ownerless land the ordinance followed the 
example of the Old Protectorate rather than that of the Marshall Islands. Instead of issuing a 
general prohibition Bennigsen established a land acquisition monopoly of the government. He 
empowered the heads of the local administrations to sell up to 800 hectares of land so acquired 
1 This temporary incorporation was designed to show that the Island Territory was not seen as a separate colony. Yet it 
made the Island Territory neither legally nor financially part of German New Guinea. It was given its own budget and the 
existing colonial law of the Old Protectorate did not apply. It is not surprising that this ambiguous status created 
considerable confusion. 
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to private individuals and companies and reserved for himself the right to approve the transfer of 
larger areas. 
On 1 October Bennigsen supplemented this ordinance with administrative instructions. They 
essentially treated the Island Territory as a normal part of German New Guinea. In particular, they 
assumed that the local administrations would report to the governor and that they would soon 
come under the same budget as the Old Protectorate. 
As regards the native administration, Bennigsen instructed the local authorities to be energetic 
but cautious and to use their punitive powers only as a last resort. Nonetheless, he envisaged the 
need for punitive expeditions and insisted that they should be carried out speedily so that "the 
tribes or villages" weve in no doubt as to why they were being punished. He stressed that all 
means, especially regular instruction of the police soldiers, were to be used to ensure that women 
and children would be spared during such expeditions. 
Bennigsen recommended the appointment of government chiefs to assist the Gennan officials 
in the administration of justice and other administrative tasks but warned against the appointment 
of persons with insufficient traditional standing who would be powerless despite the "state 
authority" given to them and would therefore undermine the power of the colonial government 
instead of extending it. 
The instructions also supplemented the ordinance as regards the exercise of judicial powers 
in relation to natives by stipulating that family and inheritance disputes were, "if at all possible", 
to be decided in accordance with custom. 
In relation to the introduced Cottmlerce Ordinance the instructions paid special attention to the 
fishing of pearl shells and trepang. Bennigsen had high hopes for the former but was concerned 
about an over-exploitation of the latter resource. He therefore recommended modest fees for pearl 
shell licences but high ones, reaching 100 Marks per tonne, in the case of trepang. 
However, the transfer of land to non-natives was the central issue for Bennigsen. Although 
care was to be taken to leave the natives enough land for their traditional agricultural practices, 
he saw the Island Territory essentially as a plantation colony based on small and middle-sized land 
holdings which were subject to strict improvement conditions. Bennigsen was not in favour of 
monopolistic companies and determined to prevent land speculation in any form. He saw 
individually operating traders as the backbone of the colony's economy who would gradually turn 
into planters by cultivating land around their stations. Such people were to be sold land at an 
especially low price on the condition that they would cultivate all of it as soon as possible. 
Finally the instructions dealt with the exercise of their legislative powers by the local 
authorities. They were to be exercised sparingly, so that the administration could not be criticised 
for interfering unnecessarily in the activities of private interests . Apart from the need to enact 
harbour and quarantine ordinances, in Bennigsen' s  view only two fields of government could 
possibly require legislative attention in the short term at the local level: firstly, the registration of 
foreigners and their treatment if they were impecunious; and, secondly, the indebting of natives 
by giving them credit or selling them valuable objects which they could not afford. 
Generally, the instructions stressed that while the September ordinance had a provisional 
character, the local authorities should proceed on the assumption that the development of the 
Island Territory would in the long run move in the direction it was pointing in, namely towards 
a full incorporation into German New Guinea. 
Bennigsen enacted several special ordinances. On 12  and 14 October 1 899 he regulated the 
trading by foreign vessels, on 17 October he issued the familiar prohibition on supplying natives 
with arms , ammunition, explosives and liquor, and on 4 November he formally repealed all 
existing Spanish administrative regulations and instructions. 
His most ambitious move was the enactment of a labour recruiting ordinance dated 15 October 
1899. It was to apply to the Island Territory as well as to the Old Protectorate, where it was to 
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replace the earlier company legislation. However, it was repealed for the Island Territory a few 
months later.2 This was not the only instance where his legislative activity got Bennigsen into 
trouble. On 20 January 1 900 the chancellor of the Reich enacted an ordinance which, following 
the Marshall Islands model, prohibited all acquisitions ofland from natives in the Island Territory 
and repealed all provisions contravening this prohibition, without specifying that this meant 
section 12 of Bennigsen' s  September ordinance which had created a land acquisition monopoly 
for the government.3 
Vice-governor Hahl speedily carried through most of the legislative program outlined in 
Bennigsen's  instructions for the Eastern Carolines. In November 1 899 he enacted a harbour 
ordinance for Ponape. In April 1900 he regulated the registration of foreigners, the giving of credit 
to natives and the sale of valuable objects to them. Whereas this second ordinance was modelled 
on the relevant Marshall Islands legislation, Hahl followed the example he had been instrumental 
in setting in the Old Protectorate by prohibiting the fishing of trepang on the reefs surrounding 
Po nape. 
The district commissioner in the Western Carolines, Senfft, used his legislative powers 
differently. He neither enacted a harbour ordinance nor a foreigners' registration ordinance, nor 
a credit ordinance for natives. Instead he proclaimed an ordinance dealing with impecunious 
foreigners in June 1 900, after responding in March to a cyclone by prohibiting the sale of coconuts 
for the production of copra. This prohibition was repealed in 1902 but reintroduced in 1906, when 
it remained once more in force for two years.4 
Cyclones were not the only threat to copra production to which Senfft responded legislatively. 
In June 1900 he enacted an ordinance combating the spread of a plague of scale insects 
(Schildliiuse) which affected coconut palms. It was reinforced by another ordinance in July 1908 
and supplemented by a separate ordinance for Palau in December of that year. But problems with 
plant diseases continued. A 1913  ordinance by district commissioner Kersting prohibited the 
export of all tree and root crops, as well as of baskets made from palm leaves or fibres from Yap 
and the Piilau Group to other parts of German New Guinea. The last legislative act of the district 
office was a "public notice" of 13 July 1914. It prohibited the export of eggs and fowls from Yap 
where the chicken population too had been hit by an epidemic. Owners were instructed to fence 
in their fowls, failing which they had to face the penalties provided in section 328 of the German 
Criminal Code, which extended to two years imprisonment. 
The local legislation in the Western Carolines presents an altogether depressing picture. The 
only achievement reflected by it was the opening of the Tageren Canal which had been cut through 
a narrow neck of land on Yap. It was open to vessels with a draught of less than one metre and 
equipped with barriers at either end. They were operated by special canal police, and only local 
natives, government officials and members of the Catholic mission had free passage. All others, 
except children under ten years of age accompanied by adults, required a pass. This was issued 
by the district office for a fee of 50 Pfennigs per person-according to Senfft' s Ordinance of 3 
February 1902. 
Two days later Senfft made all forms of trading by resident individuals and firms subject to 
a licence, although the purchase of coconuts for the production of copra, its most important 
manifestation, was, at the time, still illegal. This was followed on 1 8  February by a curious 
2 Neither the text of Bennigsen's 1 899 ordinance nor that of the repealing ordinance of 25 April 1 900 was published. 
Moreover the latter ordinance was ignored when the 1 899 ordinance was also replaced for the Old Protectorate by a new 
ordinance of 3 1  July ] 90 1 .  This ordinance was published and purported to repeal the 1 899 ordinance also for the Island 
Territory, although it confirmed the repeal of older legislation by that ordinance. 
3 The monopoly extended to the acquisition of ownerless land which was not covered by the chancellor's ordinance. 
4 In contrast to the second ordinance, the first did not state expressly that this prohibition was also meant to cover the 
production of copra by natives. 
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ordinance dealing with the retail trade in alcoholic beverages and the bar trade. 5 Both were made 
subject to licences. But the fact that a publican's  licence could be obtained for 120 Marks per 
annum-whereas publicans in the Marshall Islands paid a commercial tax of 800 Marks per 
annum-shows that this form of trade was not expected to boom in Yap either. When Senfft 
enacted a revised version in 1903, he further reduced the fee to 100 Marks. 
During Senfft's leave, the government doctor as his deputy introduced a dog tax, but only for 
"die Kolonie", the main settlement on Yap, the borders of which he subsequently had to define 
in a separate ordinance. He also enacted an ordinance prohibiting the import of used clothes for 
sale to natives because of the risk of spreading contagious diseases. 
Senfft reached the climax of his career as a legislator in a rambling labour ordinance of 2 July 
1903. It stopped short of introducing recruiting licences or medical controls of the recruits, or of 
stipulating employment conditions, but emphatically prohibited the exportation of natives for the 
purpose of their public display. 
By contrast, district commissioner Fritz engaged in a hectic legislative campaign in the 
Marianas which produced more than a dozen ordinances in the course of 1900. On 9 January he 
prohibited the importation of foreign coins, with the exception of minted gold, six months before 
Bennigsen declared the German Mark to be the official currency of the Island Territory. 6 On 16 
January Fritz supplemented the liquor and firearms prohibitions issued by Bennigsen the previous 
year by two separate ordinances. His liquor ordinance was primarily concerned with the local palm 
wine, tuba, the production and consumption of which he now also prohibited, although "heads of 
households" could apply for permission to tap two palms to collect their juice as a sweetener, or 
for the production of vinegar and yeast. Surprisingly Fritz presented this ordinance as an 
amendment of existing Spanish regulations although Bennigsen had repealed them in bulk two 
months earlier. The ordinance shows that Fritz had retained the Spanish administrative 
organisation as well, since it instructed the "village magistrates and overseers" to supervise 
compliance with its provisions and to report any breaches. How peaceful and settled the Marianas 
were is demonstrated by Fritz' s firearms ordinance, under which any reliable person, including 
natives, could obtain an annual licence to carry a hunting rifle. The maximum penalty for a breach 
of this ordinance was a fine of just 20 Marks. 
On 17 January Fritz turned his attention to taxation matters. He decreed that the commercial 
tax the Spanish authorities had introduced in 1 890 was to remain in force for the time being. A 
second ordinance fine-tuned the existing Spanish provisions for a head tax: 3 Marks annually for 
males between 15  and 50 and corvee labour of, respectively, 12 and 20 days annually for married 
and unmarried males in the same age group. This ordinance too did not distinguish between 
"natives" and "non-natives" but between "inhabitants of the Island Territory" and "foreigners". 
It also applied to all foreigners who stayed in the Island Territory for more than three months, 
regardless of the colour of their skin. 7 
On 2 March Fritz notified the public that compulsory schooling for children between the ages 
of 6 and 12, and 15  for those who had not yet learned to read, would resume on 1 April 1900. 
Parents were liable to pay a fine of ten Pfennigs for each lesson their child failed to attend without 
a valid excuse. 
Next came the environment. An ordinance of 1 3  June prohibited the lighting of grass fires and 
the felling of ifil trees, the most valuable but already over-exploited forestry resource. 
5 It stipulated, for example, that fruit juices and lemonades did not count as "spirituous liquor" (geistige Getrlinke). 
6 Fritz combined this prohibition with a warning that the local treasury would no longer accept the worn Spanish silver 
coins called moneda borrosa, and none of the old Spanish copper coins. 
7 The ordinance made various exceptions from the duty to pay the head tax and to perform corvee labour which could 
generally be replaced by a payment of 50 Pfennigs per day. A third ordinance of 7 February continued a slaughter tax the 
Spanish authorities had introduced. 
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An ordinance of 17  June 1900 dealt with the cost of medical treatment provided by the 
government. It was to be free for the poor and those unfit to work, including their families. On 5 
July Fritz stipulated that every birth, death and marriage had to be reported to the government 
within three days, again without distinguishing between natives and non-natives. Two days later 
the registration of cattle was made compulsory. On 3 October he decreed that it was not permitted 
to let pigs run free during the "corn and potato season", from September to December, and 
introduced a simplified procedure for claiming compensation for damages caused by any domestic 
animals throughout the year. On the same day he published a list of public religious holidays, 
assuring his subjects that they were also entitled to attend church services on other special 
religious occasions, although they had to return to work afterwards. The final act of this initial 
legislative burst was a credit ordinance of 25 October 1900 which copied that enacted by Hahl for 
the Eastern Carolines in April. 
From then on Fritz only made occasional forays into the legislative field. In 1901  he declared 
the hunting of deer and wild cattle to be the exclusive right of the district office. In 1902 he 
introduced a dog tax. In 1903 he made it compulsory for owners of suitable land to plant at least 
one quarter of a hectare with food crops annually, and in 1906 he regulated the hunting of turtles 
and the collecting of turtle eggs. 
It took until 1905 before Fritz turned his attention to trade. On 23 April he introduced a system 
of licences, borrowed from Senfft's earlier ordinance. It replaced the Spanish commercial tax 
confirmed in 1 900. On 25 October he supplemented this ordinance with a second one which 
categorically prohibited the trade in the Marianas by ships not owned by an individual or firm 
resident in the district. It also repealed Bennigsen' s 1 899 ordinance for the Marianas although a 
district commissioner was not empowered to repeal a gubernatorial enactment. Not surprisingly, 
Fritz had to repeal this second ordinance on 5 January 1906, before it had come into force, which 
was to have been on 1 April of that year. 
Less than a year later a decree of the chancellor of the Reich placed the Marianas under the 
district commissioner for the Western Carolines as part of a general reform of the Island 
Territory's  administration. 
Whereas the Marianas had been transformed during several hundred years of intense Spanish 
colonisation, and the 1 5  years of Spanish colonial administration in the Western Carolines appear 
to have had little impact, there had recently been fierce military opposition in the Eastern 
Carolines,. or, rather, on Ponape. Moreover, the Eastern Carolines were in some respects more 
oriented towards the east, in particular the Marshall Islands, than towards the Philippines and Asia 
as was the case with the western section of the Island Territory. This orientation was also reflected 
in the mission field. The Protestant Boston mission dominated the east, the Catholic Capuchine 
mission the west, whereas they vigorously competed with each other on Ponape. Similarly, the 
Jaluit Gesellschaft saw the Eastern Carolines as a natural extension of its commercial domain, 
while it was less concerned with the Western Carolines and had no interest in the Marianas. Vice­
govemor Hahl was therefore facing a task which was rather different from that of either of his 
colleagues. 
In 1900 he began to tackle the first of his special problems: the large arsenal of firearms on 
Ponape which had been used with great effect against the Spanish colonial government. The 
supply of the natives with new firearms had already been prohibited by Bennigsen in 1899, and 
Hahl knew that it would be premature to outlaw their possession by natives. But he felt strong 
enough to control their importation. He had to do so in the form of a special ordinance because 
a general customs ordinance prohibiting the importation of arms, ammunition and explosives 
except for personal use by non-natives, as in the Old Protectorate, had still not been enacted for 
the Island Territory. An ordinance of 19 November 1 900 therefore prohibited the importation of 
all arms, ammunition and explosives into the Eastern Carolines. However, the ordinance left room 
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for exemptions for which substantial fees had to be paid, ranging from 3 Pfennigs for an empty 
cartridge to 25 Marks for a rifle. 8 
Hahl' s  successor, Berg, made the next move in this field in 1 905. Since the local firms had 
enough muzzle-loading "pigeon guns" in stock to supply the market for many years to come, he 
announced that further permission to import firearms for sale would not be granted. A year later 
Berg decreed that stocks of pigeon guns, and of ammunition for them, which exceeded five guns, 
ten kilograms of powder, 50 kilograms of shot and 1 ,000 percussion caps per store, had to be 
deposited in the government warehouse, free of charge but at their owner' s risk. 
An ordinance of the same day, 27 April 1 906, introduced a system of registration for all 
firearms not belonging to the government or stored by it. Each of them had to be officially 
stamped and entered in a government register. The owner could apply for a permit for their use, 
for which a fee of 3 Marks was payable. Persons already in the possession of firearms had to 
register them within six months, although a user's permit would be issued free of charge in such 
cases. The subsequent transfer of firearms, by sale, exchange, gift or in any other way, was 
permissible only with governmental approval. "Whites and natives" breaching the ordinance could 
be punished with imprisonment of up to three months, or fines of up to 1 ,000 Marks, or both, and 
the firearms in question could be confiscated. 
As regards trade, Bennigsen had already prepared the ground by introducing the Commerce 
Ordinance of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie into the Island Territory. He had also enacted an 
ordinance which made any form of trade by foreign vessels subject to a licence, for which an 
annual fee of between 150 and 1 ,000 Marks was payable. But two aspects of this 1 899 ordinance 
were regarded as unsatisfactory, so that it was amended in August 1 900. Whereas Bennigsen had 
defined a "foreign vessel" as one which did not sail in the service of a person or a firm resident 
in the Island Territory, the Old Protectorate or the Marshall Islands, treating them in this regard 
as equal parts of his domain, the revised version counted vessels belonging in the second and third 
category as foreign vessels. In addition it doubled the licence fees. They now stood at 300 to 2,000 
Marks per annum, bringing them closer to the commercial tax for foreign trading vessels in the 
Marshall Islands. Hahl supplemented these two ordinances in March 1 901 with a third which dealt 
specifically with trade in the low coral atolls of the Eastern Carolines. It made the establishment 
of trading stations subject to his written permission and prohibited any form of itinerant trade, in 
particular by visiting trading vessels . 
This ordinance prepared the ground for an exclusive 30 year concession the chancellor of the 
Reich granted to the J aluit Gesellschaft in July 190 1 .  It gave the company the right, subject to duly 
acquired rights of third parties, to utilise all islands in the Eastern Carolines, with the exception 
of Kusai, Ponape, including Ants and Pakin, and the Greenwich Islands, by means of trading and 
plantation enterprises. The concession expressly excluded theright to exploit guano and phosphate 
deposits and did not grant the company rights to land or rights to acquire land. Instead it was to 
encourage the natives to plant up unused parts of their islands with coconut palms by supplying 
them with seeds, tools and food. In return they were obliged to sell nuts from these new plantings 
at the going price to the company. It had to pay the Fiskus an annual fee of 6,000 Marks which 
was to rise by 500 Marks for each 50 tonnes of copra it exported when its total export of copra 
from the Eastern Carolines exceeded 600 tonnes per annum. Alternatively the company could be 
asked to pay a share of the net profits it made from all its operations in the Eastern Carolines. On 
the other hand, it did not have to pay any taxes and customs duties for its activities under the 
concession for ten years, and such taxes and duties could later only be imposed after the company 
had been consulted. The chancellor could cancel the concession after ten years, if he considered 
that the company had not satisfactorily carried out its obligations. 
8 The prohibition indeed covered all kinds of arms: a permit for the importation of side-arms attracted a fee of 1 0  Marks 
a piece. 
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In August 1904 Hahl, now as governor of German New Guinea, enacted an ordinance 
regulating the trade in Ponape, including Ants and Pakin, and Kusai which followed that enacted 
by Senfft for the Western Carolines in 1902 by introducing the same licensing system and the 
same fees. On 7 September 1 905 acting vice-governor Berg declared Hahl 's  1904 ordinance to 
be applicable to all islands in the Eastern Carolines, that is to say also to the low coral atolls, and 
repealed Hahl's 1901 ordinance which had made special provisions for them. Berg had made 
additional provisions in section 2 and section 3b of his ordinance but repealed them with 
immediate effect in an ordinance of 1 3  November 1905. The situation became even more 
mysterious when an ordinance of 27 March 1906 repealed both these earlier ordinances and 
replaced them with a fourth ordinance which repealed section 1 of the September ordinance but 
confirmed that the repeal of Hahl' s 1901 ordinance remained in force. 
The published legislative record does not tell us what the reasons for these manoeuvres were 
and what the offending sections 2 and 3b of Berg's September ordinances had stipulated. But it 
requires little imagination to work out the answer to the second question. These provisions had 
apparently been identical to those made by Fritz in his Saipan ordinance of 21 October 1905, 
which he too had to repeal. In this case, however, the published record let the cat out of the bag, 
since a footnote to the repealing ordinance in the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung (vol. 10:  2) 
reproduced the text of the offending ordinance. In other words, Berg too had probably prohibited 
trade by all foreign ships in the Eastern Carolines and had repealed Bennigsen' s 1 899 ordinance 
for his district. On the other hand, it also emerges that Fritz did not have to repeal his ordinances 
because he had dared to repeal a gubernatorial ordinance, as I had assumed, but because the Island 
Territory had become embroiled in political developments which led to the termination of the 1 888 
agreement between the J aluit Gesellschaft and the German government on which the arrangements 
for the government of the Marshall Islands were based. 
They also led to a premature termination of the concession the company had been granted for 
the Eastern Carolines in 190 1 .  Formally the chancellor withdrew this concession as late as January 
1907, but he did so with retrospective effect as from 1 October 1905. This decree was never 
published. On the contrary, when the governor in German New Guinea was sent a copy, he was 
instructed to refrain from informing the public of its contents (see AA, G 1 ,  Item 209)-another 
illustration that this legislative survey can only show us surface changes but not capture the 
political dynamics producing them. 
The most important surface changes affecting the administrative organisation of the Island 
Territory followed two weeks after Fritz had repealed his politically unacceptable prohibition of 
trade by foreign vessels in the Marianas. An imperial ordinance of 1 8  January 1 906 united the 
Marshall Islands as from 1 April 1906 with the Island Territory. This was followed, on 27 
February 1907, by a decree of the chancellor of the Reich which placed the Marianas under the 
district commissioner in the Western Carolines and abolished the position of vice-governor, 
placing the Eastern Caro lines instead also under a district commissioner. On the other hand, it not 
only confirmed the powers of the governor of German New Guinea but strengthened them by 
empowering him to create new government stations in the Island Territory and to determine their 
geographical and substantive competences. These stations, however, had to be placed under one 
of the district commissioners and could not be made directly responsible to the governor.9 
The beginning of the 1907 budget year thus marked the start of a new phase in the history of 
German New Guinea. But before examining it, I have to round off this survey of the position in 
the Island Territory and catch up with developments in the Old Protectorate. As regards the local 
legislative activity in the Island Territory, little needs to be added, although a 1 906 labour 
ordinance for the Eastern Carolines should be mentioned. It combined elements of the labour 
9 The decree also pointed out that the governor could only exercise his power to establish new stations within his 
budgetary limitations. 
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ordinances in the Old Protectorate and the Western Carolines but owed most to that of the 
Marshall Islands. This is not surprising because acting vice-governor Berg was, at the time, also 
acting administrator of the Marshall Islands and it was hoped that the Eastern Carolines would 
supply most of the labour force for the phosphate mine on Nauru. The ordinance therefore dealt 
primarily with the exportation of natives from the Eastern Carolines as a transportation of 
labourers across the sea. It was only allowed with the written permission of the vice-governor and 
only within the Island Territory of which the Marshall Islands had now become part. As in the 
Marshall Island ordinance, 10 medical control was a special concern but employment conditions 
also received attention. 
On the other hand, the general legislative developments in the field of colonial law which had 
been set in train when German rule in the Island Territory had just started were of considerable 
importance. 
II 
While Bennigsen was planning the future of a unified German New Guinea, including the 
Marshall Islands as well as the Island Territory, in Germany the Protectorates Act and the 
Consular Jurisdiction Act were undergoing a major revision, although this was more concerned 
with clarifying the existing position than with substantive changes. As a result the new version of 
the Consular Jurisdiction Act, proclaimed on 7 April 1900, grew from 5 1  to 80 sections. As 
regards its application in the German colonies the potentially most important provisions were 
contained in section 20. They demonstrate that the act had generally acquired a more colonial 
flavour by introducing an "appropriateness" clause. Section 20 stipulated that the civil and 
criminal metropolitan law, which was supposed to apply according to section 19, did not apply 
if it presupposed the existence of "institutions and conditions" which did not exist in particular 
consular districts. Instead the emperor was empowered to make alternative provisions in the field 
of civil law-but not criminal law-by way of imperial ordinances. Sections 21 and 22 gave the 
emperor special discretionary powers concerning the law of real and intellectual property. 
The Protectorates Act was subjected to so many particular amendments, which were 
proclaimed on 25 July 1900, that the chancellor of the Reich was authorised to publish a new 
consolidated text. There were no fundamental changes but the reforms of the Consular Jurisdiction 
Act were largely carried through, in particular as far as the new legislative powers of the emperor 
were concerned. Thus sections 20 to 22 were declared to be also correspondingly applicable in 
the colonies. 
The 1900 version of the Protectorates Act retained a dual system of justice-but now in an 
overt form. Instead of empowering the emperor to place other persons than German nationals and 
protected persons under the colonial jurisdiction, it stipulated in section 4: 
Natives are subject to the jurisdiction under section 2 and to the provisions identified in section 3 only 
in so far as this is decreed by an imperial ordinance. 
Instead the emperor was given a reverse discretion: he could give other parts of the population the 
legal status of natives and thereby exclude them from the jurisdiction of the regular colonial 
courts . 1 1  
An imperial ordinance of 9 November 1900 implemented the revised Protectorates Act. It 
stipulated that it would come into force in all German colonies on 1 January 1901 .  Rather than 
10 Like all other local legislation it had not been affected by this incorporation. 
1 1  Instead of utilising this discretion-for example by giving Turks the legal status of natives-the emperor decreed in 
his implementation ordinance that Japanese did not count as members of coloued tribes. 
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implementing the act separately for each colony, as had been done previously, all colony-specific 
implementation legislation, including that for the Old Protectorate and the Marshall Islands, was 
repealed. For the Island Territory the ordinance provided that the laws identified in sections 2 to 
7 of the Protectorates Act would also come into force on 1 January 1901 .  In other words, the 
administration of justice in relation to non-natives,  as well as the civil and criminal law applying 
to them, was uniform for all German colonies, including the Island Territory, as from that date. 
Other colony-specific imperial legislation, for example the imperial land ordinance for the Old 
Protectorate, was to remain in force until it was replaced-as it was, in this case, by a general 
imperial land ordinance in 1902. 
There was no need for a formal repeal of Bennigsen's 1 899 ordinance in so far as it had 
regulated matters now covered by the Consular Jurisdiction Act because it had automatically 
ceased to be effective to this extent on 1 January 1 90 1 . 12 According to the excerpts published in 
the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung (vol. 6: 221)  this meant that, apart from the organisational 
provisions in sections 1 and 6, only the introduction of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s  Commerce 
Ordinance in section 1 1  and the introduction of a register for land claims by non-natives 
survived. 13 
The most important consequence of this state of affairs was that the administration of justice 
in relation to natives had no legislative basis as from 1 January 1901 .  Furthermore, since the 
provisional legislative powers had lapsed, which the emperor had given to the chancellor of the 
Reich, and which the latter had delegated to Bennigsen, no-one, apart from the emperor himself, 
held such powers. The emperor was, of course, free to re-delegate these powers but he did not do 
so, so that the administration of justice in relation to natives became purely a matter of 
administrative practice. 14 
As regards the acquisition of land an ordinance by the chancellor of the Reich had repealed 
the relevant section of Bennigsen' s ordinance on 20 January 1900, replacing it with a prohibition 
on the acquisition of land or land rights from natives. This prohibition was in turn repealed on 2 
July 1 90 l .  15 It was replaced by a land acquisition monopoly of the Fiskus in line with that existing 
in the Old Protectorate. This new state of affairs was not affected by the general imperial land 
ordinance a year later, although it repealed, in principle, the colony-specific land legislation 
applying to the Old Protectorate and the Marshall Islands. 16 
On 14 February 1 903 another relevant imperial ordinance was enacted. It concerned the 
expropriation of land, a field where legislative provisions had not previously existed in the Old 
Protectorate, the Marshall Islands or the Island Territory. The Mining Ordinance of 27 February 
1906 was another general imperial ordinance dealing with civil law. It repealed all previous 
colony-specific legislation-of which there had been none in the Island Territory-and formed 
the basis of a series of decrees which created a complete mining monopoly of the Fiskus in the 
Island Territory. 
1 2  However, the emperor did formally repeal his 1 899 ordinance concerning "the legal conditions" in the Island Territory. 
In his implementation ordinance he placed the Island Territory formally under the supreme court in HerbertshOhe. 
13 It hardly needs saying that Bennigsen's administrative instructions relating to other matters also lost their force. 
14 Under the revised Protectorates Act local natives in the Island Territory were not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
regular colonial courts. It would have required an imperial ordinance to place them under this jurisdiction. The position 
of foreign natives was different. While the implementation ordinance generally gave members of foreign coloured tribes 
the legal status of natives it authorised the governors to make exceptions, but only with the approval of the chancellor. 
15 It is no coincidence that this is the same date on which the Jaluit Gesellschaft was granted its concession for the coral 
atolls in the Eastern Carolines. The prohibition had been stipulated. because it was assumed that the concession might 
involve a land acquisition monopoly by the company. Since this did not eventuate it had become unnecessary. 
16 Acting vice-governor Berg exercised the powers given to him in this ordinance by establishing in 1 903 the three 
administrative districts as land registration districts and by recognising the provisional land registers started under 
Bennigsen's  1 899 ordinance as "land registers" in the meaning of the 1 902 imperial land ordinance. 
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A decree by the chancellor of 27 September 1903 dealt with the legislative powers of the 
authorities in the German colonies, as well as with their powers in consular and shipping matters. 
It expressly confirmed the legislative powers of the vice-governor and the two district 
commissioners in the Island Territory under previous legislation. 
By contrast a decree of 24 December 1 903 which established "advisory councils" 
(Gouvemementsrate) in most German colonies did not apply to the Marshall Islands. It was also 
at best of indirect relevance for the Island Territory. Since it did not have its own governor, it did 
not acquire its own advisory council either. 17 
The most significant move in the field of administrative law was an imperial ordinance 
concerning the coercive and penal powers of the colonial authorities. But its administrative 
procedures, including appeal procedures, applied to natives only in so far as this was specifically 
decreed by the governor of the colony in question-and the implementation regulations of 
governor Hahl of 10 September 1908 made no such provision for the Island Territory or the Old 
Protectorate. 
I shall discuss this ordinance further in another context (see below: 414), but I should already 
draw attention to its final section 36. It began inconspicuously enough by stipulating that the 
ordinance would come into force on 1 October 1905 and by repealing, inter alia, an imperial 
ordinance for the Marshall Islands which had empowered the imperial commissioner in 1 886 to 
enact legislation concerning the general administration, as well as customs and taxation matters . 
But the new ordinance went on to state that all regulations concerning administrative procedures, 
especially in customs and taxation matters, would remain in force until they were repealed by the 
authority which had issued them. Moreover, it decreed that the chancellor continued to be 
authorised to regulate administrative procedures in departure from this ordinance. 
The wording of the section concealed rather than displayed its significance. Firstly, it 
authorised the chancellor to legislate in customs and taxation matters-in case this authority was 
not included in the general legislative powers vested in him by the Protectorates Act. 18 Secondly, 
it repealed the two early pieces of legislation by which the emperor had transferred these specific 
powers expressly to local authorities in the Marshall Islands and Southwest Africa. Thirdly, it 
retrospectively validated the relevant regulations authorities in other colonies had enacted without 
having been expressly authorised by the emperor to do so. 
The same saving device was used in an imperial ordinance of 3 June 1 908, so that it may be 
appropriate to examine this ordinance at this point, although, in terms of its timing, it belongs in 
the third phase of German New Guinea's history. Section 1 empowered the chancellor of the 
Reich to regulate, within the limits set for him by Reich statutes and imperial ordinances: ( 1 )  the 
administrative organisation and (2) the law applying to natives and the administration of justice 
in relation to natives, including cases involving non-natives. Section 2 authorised him to delegate 
these powers to the governors. Section 3 confirmed retrospectively the validity of all regulations 
regarding matters falling under section 2 which had been enacted by the chancellor, the governors, 
administrators, imperial commissioners or their deputies. Section 4 repealed, inter alia, the 
imperial ordinance of 26 February 1 890 which had authorised the chancellor to regulate the 
administration of justice in relation to natives in the Marshall Islands. There was neither a need 
17 It is unclear how far the governor was required and entitled to bring matters relating specifically to the Island Territory 
before the advisory council in HerbertshOhe. On the other hand Hahl had also set up advisory "district councils" 
(Bezirksriite) on his own initiative which operated in a more informal manner. It is unlikely, however, that such (a) 
council(s) played a significant part in the Island Territory whereas it was beginning to make its mark in the Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen district, although little information is available. 
1 8  In an ordinance of 7 November 1 902 the emperor authorised the chancellor to enact legislation which made persons 
or companies liable to pay the fines etc. in customs matters which their employees incurred-a move which would have 
been unnecessary if it could be taken for granted that the chancellor already held the necessary legislative powers under 
the Protectorates Act. 
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for such repeals in the case of the Island Territory because Bennigsen' s  relevant powers had 
lapsed on 1 January 1 90 1 ,  nor in the Old Protectorate, because in 1 899 the emperor had repealed 
the ordinance transferring the judicial jurisdiction over natives in the Old Protectorate to the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie. Since this was not followed by another imperial delegation of powers any 
legislative activity in this field by the governor, or any local authority, in the Old Protectorate after 
1 April 1 899, and in the Island Territory after 1 January 1 901 ,  had been legally invalid, until it was 
retrospectively saved by the 1 908 imperial ordinance. 19 However, the saving clause had no 
practical importance for the Island Territory because no attempt had been made after 1 January 
1901 to deal legislatively with the administration of native justice.20 
This was only one of several major gaps in its legislative framework. The customs ordinance 
Bennigsen had foreshadowed in 1 899 had still not been enacted in 1 906, and only district 
commissioner Fritz in the Marianas had made forays into the field of taxation.21 Similarly, after 
Bennigsen's  1 899 labour ordinance was repealed for the Island Territory, no attempt was made 
to deal with the labour question comprehensively and by way of legislation which applied to all 
its districts. Generally, after Bennigsen' s  initial attempts the field was largely left to the local 
authorities who responded to the different conditions at the district level, so that by 1906 the 
legislative framework of the Island Territory presented an extraordinarily colourful picture.22 
m 
In the Old Protectorate the extensive legislative framework which had been put into place under 
"company rule" had remained in force. Bennigsen had a low opinion of this inheritance and 
wanted to embark on a major reform which would create a new body of laws that would apply to 
the Island Territory as well as the Old Protectorate. 
His first legislative measures were of a public health nature. On 10 August 1 899 he responded 
to an outbreak of sickness among the cattle by prohibiting the importation of cattle from Australia 
and British New Guinea. A week later he amended the 1 89 1  Quarantine Ordinance by adding 
dysentery to the list of sicknesses requiring quarantine measures. 
He probably enacted his next ordinance with less enthusiasm. It confirmed the validity of the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s 1 897 Mining Ordinance but stipulated that the mining privileges the 
company had acquired under the 1 898 agreement remained in force and that the government could 
also in other special cases depart from that ordinance. Bennigsen' s heart was certainly behind the 
ordinance of 15  October 1 899 concerning the recruitment of natives as labourers which was to 
apply to the Island Territory as well as the Old Protectorate. However, the colonial department 
opposed these premature unification attempts and Bennigsen' s next legislative effort, an ordinance 
concerning the maintenance of discipline among coloured labourers, which replaced an 1 888 
company ordinance, took this opposition into account by limiting its application expressly to 
"Kaiser Wilhelrnsland and the Bismarck Archipelago". In subsequent ordinances a different 
formula was chosen: they were said to apply to "German New Guinea, excluding the Island 
Territory". 
19 It is by no means certain that the emperor had the power to accomplish such a retrospective feat. 
20 The legal validity of the 1 890 Native Penal Ordinance for the Marshall Islands was beyond doubt. 
21 However, the borderline between the fees for commercial licences and commercial taxes was fluid. The transformation 
of the former into the latter in the Marshall Islands required no more than a cosmetic operation. Similarly, Fritz abolished 
the old Spanish commercial tax when he introduced commercial licences, thus acknowledging that they served the same 
purpose. 
22 There were four different sets of local legislation, since those for the Marshall Islands and the Marianas remained in 
force. 
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The first ordinance adopting this formula prohibited the purchase of whole coconuts from 
natives so as to encourage them to make their own copra.23 It was supplemented by a second 
prohibition which outlawed the export of diwarra shell money from the north coast of New 
Britain to other parts of German New Guinea, from 1 April 1 90 1 ,  and, as from 1 January 1 902, 
the use of diwarra, tambu and tapsoka shell money in all commercial transactions. This 
prohibition was further supplemented on 26 June 1 90 1 .  This third ordinance was not only, at least 
implicitly, addressed to non-natives but expressly also to foreign natives employed by them, as 
well as to local natives engaged in trade. All three categories of persons were not permitted, as 
from 1 April 1 902, to give or to accept any form of shell money as a payment or to use it as a 
medium of exchange.24 
This was Bennigsen' s last legislative act. The next ordinance, a recruitment ordinance for the 
Old Protectorate, was signed by Hahl as acting governor. Yet Bennigsen had one minor legislative 
triumph: his quarantine ordinance of 29 March 1 901  also applied to the Island Territory, and it 
remained in force until 19 1 2. 
After watching Bennigsen' s experience, Hahl was reluctant to make legislative moves as acting 
governor. It was his deputy, Knake, who amended the 1 887 Commerce Ordinance of the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie, on 4 August 1902, by adding the collection of rubber from plants which were 
not privately owned to the list of commercial activities requiring government permission, and 
replaced it, on 14 March 1903, by a new ordinance which added inn and bar-keeping to this list 
and stipulated that the governor could proclaim certain geographical areas in which all forms of 
trade, including the copra trade, required his permission. 25 
The position began to change when Hahl returned in April 1 903, after an absence of almost 
a year, as the governor of German New Guinea. His first move was modest. On 5 December he 
enacted an ordinance for German New Guinea, excluding the Island Territory, which prohibited 
the importation of, and the trade with, used clothes, materials and bedding. Two months later he 
stuck his neck out further by enacting an ordinance concerning the immigration and importation 
of Chinese to the Old Protectorate. While the importation of Chinese who had entered a contract 
of employment required the approval of the authorities, Chinese were free to immigrate on their 
own, although they had to register with the authorities upon arrival. Hahl' s  implementation 
regulations show how much he valued the presence of Chinese in German New Guinea. They 
instructed the local authorities to treat Chinese residents, who had to register within two months, 
with kindness. The new law had to be explained to them, and well-known and reliable individuals 
did not have to appear in person at the office to effect registration. 
A few days later Hahl made his only legislative attempt to regulate directly the civil law 
applying to natives. An ordinance of 5 February 1904 introduced an official form of marriage and 
divorce for natives. It also made provisions for the punishment of adultery and bigamy, although 
both were already punishable under the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance as serious offences under 
the German Criminal Code. However, the application of the ordinance was restricted to members 
of the tribes indigenous to the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of Yorks, that is to 
23 The ordinance was still cast in the old mould in that it made only the purchase of nuts from natives, but not their sale 
by natives, an offence. Consequently an exception was made for nuts which were to be planted or eaten. In other words, 
the purpose of the ordinance was to create a united front of traders refusing to buy whole nuts whereas natives were free 
to try selling such nuts without fear of punishment. 
24 It could, of course, be argued that the first ordinance made the purchase of coconuts from natives by natives also an 
offence-unless the nuts were to be planted and eaten-but this consequence would appear to be unintended. 
25 This ordinance repealed not just the 1 887 ordinance for the Old Protectorate but also the section of Bennigsen' s 1 899 
ordinance which had introduced it into the Island Territory. This would seem to make sense only if it was assumed that 
this new ordinance applied in that territory as well. On the other hand, it referred expressly to the decree of the chancellor 
of the Reich which had given the governor legislative powers in relation to the Old Protectorate, so that they did not 
authorise a repeal of legislation applying in the Island Territory. 
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say today's Tolai. Members of these tribes could enter into an official marriage by making a 
declaration before members of their families or a clergyman of their denomination. Such a 
marriage could only be divorced by a decision of the district commissioner against which an 
appeal lay to the governor. The ordinance identified seven valid reasons for a divorce, including 
a surprisingly modem one: a serious breach of marital duties which damaged the marital relations 
to such an extent that the other spouse could not be expected to continue the marriage. 26 This is 
not the place to examine this intriguing ordinance in detail, but a closer look at its penal provisions 
is called for because they had to be clarified in an administrative instruction a few months later.27 
Under the German Criminal Code bigamy was punishable with up to five years imprisonment 
with hard labour, if a married person entered into a second marriage before his or her first 
marriage had been terminated by divorce or annulment. But the offence of bigamy could also be 
committed by an unmarried person entering into marriage with a partner whom he or she knew to 
be married. According to the ordinance a Tolai could only be punished for bigamy if she or he had 
become a Christian before entering a bigamous marriage.28 The maximum punishment was set at 
six months imprisonment and the authorities were given discretion not to prosecute such an 
offence. By contrast the maximum punishment for adultery was the same as under the German 
Criminal Code, namely also six months imprisonment. On the other hand,. punishment for adultery 
under the ordinance was neither dependent on an application by the injured spouse nor did it have 
to be preceded by a divorce on the grounds of adultery, as was required by the German Criminal 
Code. According to the text of the ordinance, prosecution of adultery was mandatory. 
The instructions of 20 July 1904 suggest that both provisions had created problems. In cases 
of bigamy they had apparently arisen when punishment had been sought although a Christian 
native had entered into a second marriage before the ordinance had come into force. The 
instructions therefore stipulated that "the judge" should admonish the accused in such cases but 
prosecute them only if they continued both marriages, or if they subsequently entered into another 
bigamous marriage. 
The adultery provision had also created problems in cases of a polygamous nature because men 
had been accused of adultery on the grounds of having taken a second wife after separating from 
their first, but without a valid termination of their first marriage. For these cases the instructions 
again distinguished between those where the separation had taken place before the ordinance had 
come into force and those where it had taken place subsequently. For the first group of cases "the 
judge" was instructed to examine whether the separation had been a valid divorce in accordance 
with custom, so that sexual intercourse with the second wife had not been adulterous. They were 
further instructed to treat at least those separations as valid divorces where one of the reasons for 
a divorce under the ordinance had existed. 
In addition the instructions declared the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance to be correspondingly 
applicable in all cases covered by the ordinance. This meant, in particular, that "the judge" was 
now also given the discretion not to prosecute cases of adultery, if he decided that to do so was 
inappropriate under the circumstances.29 
Hahl' s  next move also concerned natives but in a less sensitive context. On 1 8  June 1 904 he 
enacted a native credit ordinance. It was based on that in the Marshall Islands but differed from 
26 This reflected the view adopted in the German Civil Code. 
27 It was sufficiently unusual to be subjected to an extended legal analysis at the time (see Hoffmann, 1 905). 
28 A heathen entering into a bigamous marriage with a Christian did not commit an offence. But what about an unmarried 
Christian who entered into what was a second marriage for his or her heathen spouse? At this, and many other points, the 
ordinance is a remarkably sloppy piece of draftsmanship. 
29 For a phantom history of this ordinance see Hiery, 1 997; for its implications in a particular case Sack, 1 997; and for 
some relevant quantitative information, above: 143. 
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it in that it was primarily concerned with natives as traders rather than customers. 30 Granting credit 
to natives was duly prohibited and existing claims against them had to be registered in order to 
remain enforceable. The ordinance also made the familiar exception for credit granted to natives 
who stood in a continuing commercial relationship with a "businessman" (Kaufmann), but the rest 
of the ordinance went considerably further than its Marshall Islands counterpart. Firstly, it obliged 
businessmen in the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands to register local natives whom 
they employed as "sub-traders" ( Unterhiindler). Secondly, it decreed that all contracts with natives 
involving the continuing supply of copra had to be concluded in writing and in German. However 
it made several exceptions: for contracts with natives for whom a credit permission had been 
granted; for contracts with natives in the Bismarck Archipelago in the Solomon Islands who had 
been registered as sub-traders; and for contracts with natives who paid commercial tax. In all other 
cases a contract obliging a native to supply copra on a continuing basis required the approval of 
the local authorities, for which a fee of one per cent of the value of the contract was payable. 
In other words, the ordinance was less concerned with the granting of credit than with the 
introduction of a system of registered native sub-traders in the Bismarck Archipelago and the 
Solomon Islands, for whom an annual licence had to be obtained. This provided the authorities 
with a simple control mechanism Nonetheless, it was restricted to local natives because the 
preferred option for foreign natives, in particular Chinese, was apparently an arrangement obliging 
them to pay commercial tax. 
On 2 June 1904 Hahl repealed an 1 892 ordinance concerning the importation and distribution 
of opium in Kaiser Wilhelmsland where Chinese coolies were no longer employed in large 
numbers. It was replaced by an ordinance which applied to the whole of the Old Protectorate and 
permitted the governor to make exceptions from the general import prohibition in the 1888 
Customs Ordinance under conditions to be determined case by case. The prohibition on supplying 
local natives with opium was retained. If supply of opium was necessary to attract Chinese 
immigrants to the Bismarck Archipelago Hahl was now in a position to cater for this demand. 
This ordinance was only a prelude to the enactment of a new customs tariff in September. It 
abolished the modest export duty on copra of 4 Marks per tonne but substantially increased the 
import duties on liquor. It also introduced an import duty on tobacco which fell most heavily on 
the shoulders of native consumers, since it amounted to only 2 Marks per thousand cigarettes but 
to 3 Marks per kilogram of trade tobacco. 
In December 1904 Hahl returned to the oldest layer of German colonial law: the prohibition 
on supplying natives with arms, ammunition, explosives and liquor. He enacted three separate 
ordinances replacing the 1 887 ordinance by Schleinitz. 
The first ordinance, of 1 December 1904, was based on the mistaken assumption that the 1 884 
Explosives Act of the Reich applied in German New Guinea. It therefore included no penal 
provisions of its own.31 It made the production and importation of explosives by anyone subject 
to permission by the governor, and their possession to permission by the local authorities. It 
prohibited the supply of explosives to natives, although the local authorities could grant 
permission in special cases . It required an application by the person who wanted to supply, as well 
as by the native who wanted to be supplied. The applications had to identify the reasons which 
made the permission desirable. The permission was discretionary and could be combined with 
special conditions. It had to be given in writing and identify the native who could be supplied as 
well as the person, firm or company entitled to supply him The permission was limited to one 
year. It cost the native applicant a fee of 20 Marks. 
30 The ordinance made no attempt to control contracts involving valuable objects entered into with natives in the Old 
Protectorate, presumably because there was, at the time, no practical need to do so. 
3 1  Its successor, a 1 9 1 2  explosives ordinance, was designed as an independent police regulation which contained its own 
penal provision. 
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The firearms and ammunition ordinance enacted two weeks later retained the general 
prohibition on supplying natives with firearms and ammunition, however the prohibition now also 
applied to the possession of firearms and ammunition by natives. Special permissions were still 
possible. The procedure to be followed was the same as in the case of an explosives licence, but 
the system of fees was more complex. 
A person, firm or company applying for permission to supply a native, the "Schiessjunge ", 
with a gun and ammunition for hunting, had to pay an annual fee of 10 Marks. An "association 
of persons" (Personengemeinschaft) applying for such permissions for their members could be 
charged a lump sum not exceeding 50 Marks. 32 The "hunting boy" paid no fee. By contrast, other 
natives who applied for special permission had to pay an annual fee of 20 Marks for each gun, as 
well as a fee of 1 Mark for each ten cartridges, whereas their non-native co-applicant did not have 
to pay a fee. 
The liquor ordinance of the same date limited the supply prohibition to local natives. It did not 
make the possession or consumption ofliquor by natives as such an offence, although liquor found 
in their possession could be confiscated, unless it could be shown to have been acquired in 
accordance with the ordinance. The supply of liquor to foreign natives still required special 
permission but, in contrast to the supply with firearms and ammunition, it was no longer necessary 
to demonstrate why permission was desirable for special reasons. The procedures for obtaining 
permission, however, were the same. Each native applicant had to pay an annual fee of 20 Marks, 
whereas suppliers only had to pay a fee for the first application to supply a native with liquor 
which they made in the course of a particular year. 33 
In December 1 904 Hahl extended the 1 898 prohibition on fishing with dynamite in the coastal 
waters of the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of York Group, which he had initiated 
as imperial judge, to the entire Old Protectorate. Unlike Bennigsen, when he had prohibited the 
trade in whole coconuts in 1900, Hahl was realistic enough to allow for special exemptions. In 
January 1905 ships travelling in the waters of the Old Protectorate were exempted, irrespective of 
their location. In November 1905 followed an exemption for Astrolabe Bay and for the Witu and 
Siassi Islands. In December Bougainville and the Western Gazelle Peninsula were exempted. In 
1 906 two additional parts of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, as well as the Admiralty Islands, the islands 
north and east of New Ireland and an area in southern New Britain were added to the list. 
However, the blanket exemption for ships was cancelled in 1 908, although ships were still 
permitted to fish with dynamite in the specifically exempted geographical areas. Yet, a 1 9 1 1 public 
notice by the district commissioner in Rabaul shows that even in the core areas of the Bismarck 
Archipelago the prohibition had not been routinely enforced. It warned that fishing with dynamite 
in prohibited areas would no longer be tolerated and that all offenders would henceforth be 
prosecuted. 34 
On paper it looks as if Hahl ultimately succeeded. A public notice of 17 April 1 9 1 3  cancelled 
all previous exemptions from the prohibition, but it is doubtful that this brought the practice to an 
end, since fish so obtained was regarded as a vital source of cheap protein for native labourers. 
32 This mass discount primarily favoured mission societies. 
33 Volume I chapter 6 illustrates how these legislative measures were reflected in the administrative activities of the 
government. My interpretation of the administrative records would certainly have required less narrative imagination if 
I had taken the legislative framework into account. 
34 Bennigsen' s prohibition had a similar fate. In 1906 it was suspended for Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Witu Islands and 
the islands west of the Admiralty Group. A suspension for the latter group followed in 1 907. In 1 909 the prohibition was 
suspended for the Solomons and New Ireland, including surrounding islands. In 1 9 1 0  the district office in Rabaul had to 
warn the public that the prohibition was still in force in the Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of Yorks. It also requested 
the firms and plantations to inform their Chinese and native sub-traders accordingly, since all breaches would now be 
punished. 
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The year 1905 began with a reform of the taxation law. An ordinance of 26 January repealed 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's  1 888 Tax Ordinance. It dropped the income tax but retained a 
modest commercial tax. 35 In August an ordinance concerning the immigration of impecunious non­
natives was enacted. It established a duty of employers to refund the public purse the expense of 
maintaining and deporting a former employee unable or unwilling to find a new job. 
Even quieter at the legislative front was the year 1906. There were a few minor amendments, 
in particular of the customs and labour legislation, but the only new initiative was the enactment 
of a building ordinance for Simpson Harbour, where the new capital, Rabaul, was beginning to 
take shape. The lack of legislative activity suggests that the reform of the colonial law inherited 
by the imperial administration had by now been completed as far as practical in the current 
situation. It also reflects the fact that governor Hahl was again on home leave and engaged in 
discussions about the future of his colony with the new central colonial administration under 
Demburg.36 It was therefore left to his deputy, Krauss, to implement the 1 906 imperial mining 
ordinance for German New Guinea. It is significant that these implementation regulations also 
applied to the Island Territory without raising objections in Berlin, whereas Hahl's  1904 
implementation regulations to the 1902 imperial land ordinance had only applied to the Old 
Protectorate. Times were certainly changing and the local unification of the colonial law of the Old 
Protectorate and the Island Territory was one of the most important tasks ahead. 
IV 
Hahl' s first unification moves were modest. On 28 June 1907 he issued a public notice announcing 
that the Native Disciplinary Ordinance of the Old Protectorate would henceforth also be applied 
in the Island Territory. By contrast the introduction into the Island Territory of the ordinance 
concerning the immigration of impecunious non-natives for the Old Protectorate took the form of 
a formal ordinance, dated 14 October 1907. Whereas the introduction of the first ordinance filled 
a legislative vacuum in the Island Territory, the second involved the repeal of several pieces of 
local legislation-in this case an 1 889 ordinance for the Marshall Islands and a 1900 ordinance 
for the Western Carolines. 
The breakthrough was a customs ordinance for "German New Guinea, including the Island 
Territory", of 10 June 1908. It repealed the 1 888 customs ordinance for the Old Protectorate and 
various pieces of supplementary legislation, including the 1904 ordinance concerning the 
importation of opium. It also repealed a 1906 Marshall Islands Ordinance dealing with the same 
matter, whereas the importation of opium in the rest of the Islands had hitherto been legally 
unrestricted. 
The new Customs Ordinance followed the example of the 1 888  Customs Ordinance by 
prohibiting the importation of opium, except for medicinal purposes. However it provided for 
special written exemptions. While they could only be issued by the governor, or an authority 
especially empowered by him, in the Old Protectorate they could also be granted by the heads of 
the local administrations in the Island Territory. The Customs Ordinance adopted the same 
arrangement for the importation of firearms, ammunition and explosives. In line with the existing 
position in the Old Protectorate, it was prohibited, unless they were for the personal use of non­
nati ves . 37 
35 It ranged from 40 to 4,000 Marks per annum. 
36 Hahl arrived in Germany during the last days of the reign of Hohenlohe-Langenburg. 
37 The relevant local legislation was not repealed in this case. The ordinance also did not take the additional step of 
prohibiting the importation of alcoholic beverages in principle. Instead their supply to natives was treated as a separate 
issue. 
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However, the main significance of the new ordinance was the introduction of customs duties 
into the Island Territory, where they had so far not been levied,38 and the reintroduction of an 
export duty on copra, which had been dropped in the Old Protectorate in 1904, now at a rate of 10 
rather than 4 Marks per tonne. The ordinance also introduced export duties on trepang and other 
marine products and on ornamental bird skins and feathers . In addition, it introduced a general 
import duty of ten per cent and increased the special import duties on liquor and tobacco, bringing 
about a more equitable distribution by doubling the duties on cigarettes while leaving that for trade 
tobacco untouched.39 
In November 1 908 uniform ordinances for the registration of non-natives and the immigration 
and importation of foreign natives were enacted. The first ordinance held no surprises. The second 
extended the arrangements Hahl had introduced for the immigration and importation of Chinese 
in the Old Protectorate to all non-indigenous natives in the whole of German New Guinea. This 
ordinance was followed in March 1909 by a uniform ordinance concerning the recruitment and 
exportation of natives as labourers. It expanded the application of an elaborated version of the 
1901 Old Protectorate ordinance to the Island Territory, but specifically prohibited the recruitment 
of natives in the Old Protectorate for service in the Island Territory.40 
In May 1909 a uniform credit ordinance for natives was enacted. It differed from the earlier 
unification efforts in that it was modelled on the existing Island Territory legislation rather than 
extending the Old Protectorate legislation to it. But the ordinance went too far in that direction, 
so that an amendment had to reintroduce the special arrangement for native sub-traders in the 
Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands. 
The ordinance declared invalid all contracts between non-natives and natives creating 
obligations for the latter which had to be fulfilled at a future date. It made the conclusion of such 
contracts by non-natives an offence. It permitted the local authorities to make exceptions from this 
general prohibition, in particular where natives entered into continuing business relations with non­
natives. All such contracts had to be concluded in writing and in German. The same applied to 
contracts between non-natives and natives involving objects with a value of more than 500 Marks, 
although the legal consequences of defective contracts of this kind were not spelled out.41 
In October 1 909 the law relating to the supply of arms and ammunition to natives was 
reformed and unified. The new ordinance started with a general prohibition of the possession of 
firearms and ammunition by natives, although it was supplemented by a supply prohibition, from 
which the local authorities could grant exemptions along the lines of the 1904 ordinance for the 
Old Protectorate. 42 
By contrast the new liquor ordinance, also dated 1 October 1909, still started with a supply 
prohibition. But it was restricted to members of tribes indigenous to the Bismarck Archipelago, 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the German Solomons. The supply of liquor to foreign natives and to 
38 I am disregarding a short-lived and never published Marshall Islands ordinance which had apparently imposed a duty 
on the export of copra. 
39 In 1 909 the import duty for cigarettes was increased to 10 Marks per 1 ,000. On the other hand the import duties on 
liquor were reduced. The fine-tuning of the customs tariff continued until the end of German rule. The most dramatic 
changes related to ornamental bird feathers and skins. That on bird-of-paradise skins increased from 2 Marks a piece in 
1908 to 20 Marks a piece in 1 9 1 3 .  In 1 9 1 4, when the hunting of these particular birds was stopped altogether, egret 
feathers attracted an export duty of 1 ,000 Marks per kilogram. 
40 This was primarily a public health measure intended to prevent the spread of malaria in the Island Territory. Since this 
provision also applied to native policemen it would seem that it also should have excluded the posting of Melanesian 
policemen to the Island Territory-quite apart from the fact that malaria could also be spread by Micronesians who 
returned to the Island Territory after being infected with malaria while serving in the Old Protectorate. 
41 On a literal interpretation, the ordinance did not apply to contracts entered into by persons who had the legal status 
of natives, so that Chinese would have been legally free to give local natives credit, a result which was hardly intended. 
42 The ordinance clarified that the stipulated fee did not affect the duty to pay import duties for the items in question. 
It also repealed special import restrictions introduced earlier for the Palau Group and Nauru. 
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those indigenous to the Island Territory was no longer formally prohibited, although it was still 
made subject to government permission. In this context too the rules for the Island Territory were 
further relaxed. The local authorities could grant exceptions for special occasions; and they could 
do so orally, without a fee, and only on the application of the natives concerned, whereas an 
application by a non-native wishing to supply was otherwise still required.43 
October 1909 was followed by an extended lull until a uniform harbour ordinance was 
introduced on 23 January 1 9 1 1 .  It established a repeals record by replacing as many as 22 pieces 
of local legislation. 44 
In 1 9 1 2  the unification efforts intensified. On 1 8  January a uniform ordinance concerning the 
immigration of impecunious non-natives was enacted. A uniform explosives ordinance of 1 March 
1 9 1 2  dealt generally with the importation, production and use of explosives and relegated the 
special provisions in relation to natives, which were still made, to the implementation regulations. 
Then followed three uniform public health ordinances: a quarantine ordinance (7 March 1912), 
an ordinance concerning sick domestic animals ( 1 2  May 1 9 1 2) and an ordinance concerning the 
importation of animals (20 May 1912).  While they hold no surprises as regards their substance, 
the penal provisions contain a procedural innovation. They stipulated that the "normal" penalties 
did not apply to natives or persons of equal status. Instead they were to be punished in accordance 
with the penal provisions which had been enacted for them, that is to say the 1 888 Native Penal 
Ordinance.45 
A curious pseudo-unification exercise was carried out in October 1912. It took the form of a 
slaughter and dog tax ordinance by the governor. It repealed all existing local legislation, but 
introduced such taxes only for the two main islands in the Marianas. Whereas this ordinance leaves 
no doubt that the tax in Saipan and Rota was the only dog and slaughter tax that existed in German 
New Guinea, the effects of the 1913  "public notice" cancelling all exemptions from the 1 904 
ordinance prohibiting fishing with dynamite are less clear. Although the ordinance did not apply 
to the Island Territory, the notice stipulated that, as from 1 January 1914,  fishing with dynamite 
"in the entire colony" (im ganzen Schutzgebiet) was prohibited and would be punished.46 
The last local unification measure to come into effect before the end of German colonial rule 
was an ordinance concerning native money of 30 May 1 9 1 3 .  It repealed the provisions made by 
Bennigsen for the Old Protectorate in 1 900 and 190 1 .  Instead it made it generally an offence for 
non-natives and non-indigenous natives to give to natives, or to receive from natives, native money 
or imitations( ! )  of native money. It extended this prohibition to indigenous natives who traded for 
non-natives or non-indigenous natives or who carried on their own businesses, but only for their 
commercial transactions. It even prohibited non-natives and non-indigenous natives transporting 
objects across the sea within the colony which were used as native money in "inland areas".47 
43 A 1 9 1 2  amendment even permitted the local authorities in the Island Territory to make permanent exceptions to the 
supply prohibition. 
44 It is not clear whether the 191 1 Roads Ordinance was meant to apply to the Island Territory, since it only repealed an 
1 888 ordinance for the Old Protectorate but not the relevant local legislation in the Island Territory. 
45 The text of the document does not indicate why this new formula was adopted. Two different, but nonetheless 
supplementary, reasons are possible. The first is that it was now regarded as illegal to apply the penalties designed for non­
natives to natives. The second is that it was regarded as administratively more convenient to apply the same range of 
penal11ies to natives in all cases. This range differed from that for non-natives. For example, natives could only be 
imprisoned for up to five years whereas non-natives could be imprisoned for life. Natives could also be punished with 
compulsory labour without imprisonment, a punishment which was not available fornon-natives. It should also be pointed 
out that this new regime was hanging in the air in the Island Territory where the Native Penal Ordinance did not apply. 
46 Did Hahl intend to use the "public notice" as a means of also introducing the ordinance in the Island Territory? Or did 
"im ganzen Schutzgebief' only mean "in the whole of the Old Protectorate"? 
4 7 The penal provisions of this ordinance adopted and elaborated the new formula for native offenders and persons of 
equal status. They stated that those penal measures would be applied to them which "had been declared permissible in the 
general provisions concerning the administration of justice in relation to natives". 
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It was left to the governor to decree what counted as "native money". He did so in the form of 
a public notice in November 1913 .  It distinguished between shell money, shells used as money, 
glass, porcelain and stone money and the teeth of dogs, flying foxes, pigs and possums used as 
money in different parts of German New Guinea.48 
The last unification measure, due to apply as from 1 October 1914, returned to the pattern 
followed by Hahl in 1907. It introduced the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance of the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie as amended into the Island Territory without any attempt to revise it or to adapt it to 
local conditions. The relevant ordinance of 24 July 1914 also repealed the 1890 Native Penal 
Ordinance for the Marshall Islands. While this was to be expected, the ordinance was unusual 
because it was enacted by the chancellor of the Reich and not the governor of German New 
Guinea. This illustrates that there is another general issue which I have so far disregarded: a 
process of centralisation and decentralisation which affected all German colonies and took place 
alongside the local unification process just discussed. But before examining this process a brief 
look at those fields of law where the unification of the local legislation was regarded as impractical 
is necessary. 
v 
By 1914 the colonial law in most of the key areas had been unified for all German colonies. 49 This 
applied first of all to the administration of justice in relation to non-natives and to the substantive 
civil and general criminal law to which they were subjected. Imperial ordinances had unified the 
colonial land and mining law, for which departures from the introduced metropolitan civil law 
were permissible. An imperial expropriation ordinance had even entered the field of administrative 
law in 1903 . But the most important imperial legislative measure in this field was the 1905 
ordinance regulating the use of coercive and penal powers by the colonial authorities. On the other 
hand, it was essentially only a procedural code stipulating how these powers could be legitimately 
used, instead of specifying when they could be employed. In addition, the ordinance applied, in 
principle, only to the relations between the colonial governments and their non-native subjects. 
A 1903 decree by the chancellor unified the exercise of legislative and consular powers in the 
German colonies, and a 1914 decree empowered all governors to organise the administration in 
their colonies. It was based on a 1908 imperial ordinance which also authorised the chancellor to 
regulate the administration of justice in relation to natives and the substantive civil and criminal 
law applying to them. 
The list of metropolitan legislation creating uniform colonial law in specific areas also grew. 
The 1 892 Colonial Budgets Act did so for colonial finance. A series of legislative measures, 
starting with an 1 887 act concerning the employment conditions of imperial officials in the 
colonies and culminating in the 1910  Colonial Service Act, did the same for that field. The 
imperial ordinance implementing the 1900 revision of the Protectorates Act introduced the 
metropolitan intellectual property regime in all German colonies, and so it went on. An ordinance 
of the chancellor of 1905 unified the currency law and a 1 906 imperial ordinance created a 
monopoly of the Reich in the field of telecommunications. In 1 9 1 2  a decree by the chancellor 
introduced uniform laws for the print media. A 1913 act dealt with military service in the colonies, 
although it was concerned with the performance of their military service by German nationals 
48 In addition Hahl used the definition of ''native money" as an administratively convenient device for delaying the 
coming into force of the full ordinance in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Admiralty Islands by a year. He decreed that dogs' 
teeth would "count" as native money in these two areas only as from 1 April 1 9 1 5 .  
4 9  Kiautschou, which was administered by the navy, was often treated as a special case and some other exceptions, 
especially for Southwest Africa, were also made. 
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residing in the colonies, rather than introducing a compulsory military service for all of Germany's 
colonial subjects.50 
By and large, the metropolitan authorities left the field of substantive administrative law, 
including customs and taxation matters, to the local authorities. It was here where the governor of 
German New Guinea concentrated his unification efforts . With the exception of the area of 
taxation he was largely successful. 
The only tax levied in the Old Protectorate in 1906 was a commercial tax, which had to be paid 
by traders, craftsmen, innkeepers and barkeepers operating as individuals or companies, whereas 
the income tax introduced by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had been abolished. Natives paid no tax, 
unless they operated businesses which attracted the commercial tax, until an ordinance of 1 8  
March 1 907 introduced a general head tax of 5 Marks per annum. It was limited to able-bodied 
males, provided they lived in communities the local authorities had declared to be taxable. Natives 
who worked for more than ten months in the course of a tax year for a non-native, or for a native 
paying commercial tax, did not have to pay head tax. Conversely, all natives paying head tax were 
exempt from having to perform "corvee labour" (Fronarbeit).51 
When the Marshall Islands were incorporated into the Island Territory commercial firms had 
to pay a commercial tax. Individual traders no longer had to pay commercial taxes, whereas the 
tax for public inns and bars, even if run by individuals, was retained. Visiting trading vessels also 
had to pay a commercial tax. All male non-natives over 16 years of age had to pay a personal tax 
and the Marshallese a collective copra tax. In January 1907 the district commissioner reformed the 
personal tax for "non-Marshallese". The new ordinance distinguished between ( 1 )  natives who 
were to be regarded as Marshallese, (2) "whites and races of equivalent status" and (3) "others". 
It did not affect the collective copra tax of Marshallese. The personal tax for whites and persons 
of equal status was doubled to 40 Marks per annum. "Others" only had to pay 20 Marks. Members 
of mission societies and their pupils and Chinese coolies for whom a recruiting fee had been paid 
were exempted altogether.52 
In the Marianas the old Spanish commercial tax had been replaced by commercial licences. In 
principle, every male resident, native or non-native, had to pay a personal tax and to perform 
corvee labour, although this could be replaced by a further cash payment. Disregarding a dog tax 
in "die Kolonie", no taxes were levied in the Western Carolines, although a system of commercial 
licences was introduced in 1 902. There were also no taxes in the Eastern Carolines but a system 
of commercial licences based on that in the Western Carolines. 
Apart from a short-lived and unpublicised export duty on copra in the Marshall Islands, no 
export or import duties had been imposed in German Micronesia, whereas import duties were the 
most important source of local revenue in the Old Protectorate. This changed with the enactment 
of the unified Customs Ordinance in April 1908. In June Hahl introduced a uniform personal tax 
of 40 Marks for non-natives, restricted to males over 16 years of age, in the Island Territory. All 
local tax legislation was repealed, but only in so far as it related to non-natives. 
On 7 October 1910 Hahl enacted a comprehensive tax ordinance for natives in the Island 
Territory. It distinguished between local and foreign natives. The latter had to pay a head tax of 
40 Marks per annum, the former an amount corresponding to the average wages for 15 days for 
native labourers in the district. The personal tax was in principle limited to males over 1 6  years 
of age, but the local authorities could levy the tax on adult females who owned property. Members 
50 The most extensive legislative activity related to the colonial service. A 1 907 circular decree gives an indication of 
how broad and detailed the concerns were: it prohibited unmarried government employees keeping native girls in any 
capacity in their houses and instructed governors to ensure that the employment of mature native women as domestic 
servants did not cause offence, and to impose strict disciplinary punishments if these instructions were not followed. 
5 1  The ordinance did not exempt natives who did not have to pay head tax from performing corvee labour. 
52 In 1 909 the district commissioner also imposed a dog tax in the Marshall Islands. 
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of the police force, fathers of more than four non-adult children and foreign natives for whom a 
recruiting fee had been paid were exempt. The local authorities could also exempt adult males who 
were unable to work and owned no property. The governor, and with his approval the local 
authorities, could even exempt entire geographical areas or classes of persons, or reduce their 
taxes. On the other hand the local authorities could increase taxes for particular areas or classes 
of persons with the approval of the governor, but only up to the rate of 40 Marks per annum 
payable by foreign natives. 
Further complications arose because local natives could also be required to pay tax in the form 
of labour or natural produce. It was, in principle, up to the local authority to determine which form 
the taxation was going to take, but once a payment in cash had been introduced, local authorities 
could only revert to other forms of taxation in "very special cases", and with the approval of the 
governor. Moreover, all local natives were entitled to pay their taxes in cash instead of having to 
perform tax labour. By contrast, taxes in the form of produce were imposed collectively on the 
native inhabitants of particular areas, but the value of the produce could not exceed the amount the 
taxable individuals would have had to pay in cash. The local authorities were entitled to delegate 
the collection of taxes from local natives to recognised chiefs for their districts, who could be paid 
up to 50 per cent of the value of the tax or the produce collected or the tax labour performed.53 
The new level of sophistication is well illustrated by the definition of "local native" in the 
implementation regulations. It included not only the members of tribes indigenous to the Island 
Territory but also natives who had permanently settled there and who, in particular through 
intermarriage, had "adopted the customs and the way of life of these local tribes". 
The implementation regulations demonstrate that the Marshall Islands were the main stumbling 
block on the unification path. They decreed that the taxes on local natives would, for the time 
being, continue to be levied in accordance with the administrator' s  1 898 ordinance. But Hahl 
already took the next step in an amendment in April 191 1 .  It introduced a cash head tax of 15 
Marks per annum in Nauru and revised the volume of the tax copra the various parts of the 
Marshall Islands had to deliver.54 
This tax copra represented a substantial amount of money, namely 27,600 Marks. But it was 
disappointingly low in relation to the population figures, compared with the expected yield of the 
head tax in Nauru, which the 1914 budget estimated to be 6,000 Marks. This was three times more 
than a continuation of the copra tax would have produced. However, the new cash tax was not only 
paid by Nauruans but also by imported local natives working in the phosphate mine, since the 
Island Territory ordinance did not exempt natives who were employed by non-natives from the 
head tax.55 
This applied to the entire Island Territory, but local conditions differed significantly. The 
implementation regulations therefore authorised the local authorities to enact further differing 
regulations for their districts. They reflected, for example, the different average daily wages for 
native labourers. They varied within the Western Carolines district between 40 Pfennigs in the 
coral atolls and 1 Mark in the Marianas, with the consequence that the head tax also varied 
between 6 and 15  Marks. 
While it was up to the local authorities in the Old Protectorate to declare certain areas to be 
taxable, the Island Territory ordinance made the entire adult male native population automatically 
53 In the Old Protectorate only up to ten per cent co11ld be paid. The higher rate in the Island Territory was intended to 
compensate chiefs for traditional tributes they no longer received. It is surprising therefore that the ordinance also 
permitted the appointment of tax-collectors who were not chiefs but could receive the same share of the taxes they 
collected. 
54 It amounted to an overall increase of almost 40 per cent but substantially altered the local burdens. For example, it 
halved the contribution Mille had to make but tripled that of Aur, Maloelab, Wotje, Ailuk and Udjerik. 
55 By contrast foreign natives working as labourers were specifically exempt, provided a recruiting fee had been paid for 
them. 
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taxable, unless special exemptions were made. On the other hand, while the head tax ordinance 
in the Old Protectorate made no provisions regarding tax labour, the Island Territory ordinance 
treated tax labour as a permanent alternative to a cash tax. Further, the head tax in the Old 
Protectorate only targeted local natives, whereas it applied in the Island Territory to foreign natives 
as well. 
In practice the situation in the Island Territory was even more colourful. Local implementation 
regulations exempted ( 1 )  the Dschokadsch people, who had been banished to Palau after the 
Ponape Rebellion, from any tax; (2) tied the rate of tax payable by native labourers in the 
phosphate mine on Angaur in the Palau Group to their rates of pay; (3) fixed the tax on some 
islands in the Truk Group as low as 3 Marks; and (4) exempted some cyclone-affected islands 
altogether. For the entire Eastern Carolines the district commissioner declared not only mission 
teachers and students to be tax exempt, but also all labourers employed by non-natives.56 On the 
other hand, the district officer in the Marianas complained that some wealthy Chamorros were tax 
exempt because they had more than four children, whereas the government doctor on Yap 
suggested that three rather than four children should be sufficient to earn their father a tax 
exemption because he hoped that this would help to reverse the population decline. 
Under these circumstances uniform legislation was too blunt an instrument. A feeling grew that 
it would be preferable to replace formal implementation regulations altogether with informal 
administrative instructions. In this field too the pendulum was still swinging and an ideal solution, 
which combined a core of uniform certainty with a large degree of discretionary flexibility at the 
margins, had not yet been found. 
VI 
Although the Protectorates Act centralised the Schutzgewalt in principle in the hands of the 
emperor, it had already begun to decentralise the exercise of this bundle of powers by allocating 
some of them directly to the chancellor of the Reich and indirectly to the officials whom the latter 
authorised to exercise the judicial jurisdiction. In the case of German New Guinea, the emperor 
dramatically accelerated this decentralisation process by first transferring the powers of local 
sovereignty, apart from the administration of justice, to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in its charter 
and then by also transferring the judicial jurisdiction over natives to the company. By contrast, 
while the emperor delegated wider legislative powers to the imperial commissioner in the Marshall 
Islands than even the chancellor possessed at the time, he transferred the power to regulate the 
judicial jurisdiction in relation to natives to the chancellor of the Reich rather than the imperial 
commissioner. 
In addition, the chancellor delegated consular and other special powers to the heads of the 
colonial governments in German New Guinea and the Marshall Islands, and the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie delegated some of its powers to its administrator. However, although it stressed its 
intention to give him wide discretion, it reserved, in fact, most important decisions for its board 
of directors. By contrast the chancellor of the Reich gave the company's  first administrator the 
personal authority to allocate judicial powers among the judicial officers who were subordinated 
to him as he saw fit. 
The heads of the colonial governments also had some discretion to delegate their executive 
powers to their subordinates, although these delegations were rarely expressed in legislative form 
during the first phase of German colonial rule which ended, in the case of German New Guinea, 
with the termination of the company' s  charters in 1 899. 
56 He almost certainly exceeded his legislative powers in doing so. 
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The imperial ordinance and the implementation decree of the chancellor establishing the new 
imperial administration had little to say about the administrative organisation of the colony and the 
distribution of powers at the local level. The ordinance gave the chancellor unlimited powers to 
implement it, but he merely transferred the existing judicial and administrative powers of the 
company's  administrator to the governor and stipulated that imperial officials would take the place 
of the company officials. 
The arrangements in the Island Territory differed in two important respects. On the one hand 
the governor of German New Guinea acquired dictatorial powers to deal for a limited period even 
with matters which would subsequently come under the Consular Jurisdiction Act. On the other 
hand, the chancellor created the basic administrative organisation of the Island Territory by 
dividing it into three administrative districts and by giving the heads of each legislative powers 
which were normally only given to the governor of a colony. 
The incorporation of the Marshall Islands into the Island Territory took the form of an imperial 
ordinance. It abolished the supreme court in Jaluit and replaced it by the supreme court of German 
New Guinea. It also gave the chancellor the usual implementation powers, including the authority 
to delegate them to the governor. None of the relevant measures were published. However, it is 
clear that whereas the local administration was initially carried out by the acting vice-governor as 
acting administrator, the Marshall Islands were soon turned into a fourth district, even though the 
acting vice-governor continued to remain responsible for some time, but now in the capacity of 
acting district commissioner rather than administrator. 
The administrative reorganisation of the Island Territory in 1907 bypassed the governor of 
German New Guinea. It was the chancellor of the Reich who placed the Marianas under the 
district commissioner for the Western Carolines and abolished the position of vice-governor. But 
he confirmed the responsibility of the governor for the overall administration of the Island 
Territory and empowered him to establish new government stations. The governor, however, was 
given no choice but to place them under one of the existing district offices and no authority to 
establish new district offices in the Island Territory or to abolish existing ones. 
At that time the powers the governor could exercise in the Old Protectorate in this regard had 
not been formalised and the administrative powers of governors, as well as their subordinates, 
generally remained vague. This had begun to change with a decree of the chancellor of 27 
September 1 903 concerning the exercise of consular powers, powers in shipping matters and the 
powers to enact police and other administrative regulations in all German colonies. The decree 
delegated the consular powers and those in shipping matters to the district judges, the legislative 
powers to the governors and the administrator of the Marshall Islands, but also to the vice­
governor and the two district commissioners in the Island Territory. It did not delegate legislative 
powers to a local administration in any other German colony; on the contrary, it denied the 
governors of Togo and Samoa, and the administrator in the Marshall Islands, the power to sub­
delegate their legislative powers. 
The next important step was the 1 908 imperial ordinance concerning the organisation of the 
administration and the administration of native justice already repeatedly referred to. As regards 
the administrative organisation of the colonies it delegated the emperor' s powers to the chancellor 
with the authority to sub-delegate. 
In the case of German New Guinea the chancellor used these powers in a decree of 15  May 
1909. It authorised the governor to establish, move and abolish administrative offices within the 
colony. But neither this decree, nor a general decree of the chancellor of 5 July 1914 replacing it, 
repealed the more limited authority the governor had been given in relation to the Island Territory 
in 1 907. Yet it was the governor, rather than the chancellor, who on 17 February 19 1 1 downgraded 
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the district office in Jaluit to a government station which he subordinated, together with the 
government station in Nauru, to the district office in Ponape. 57 
On the other hand it was the chancellor who closed, on 17 January 191 1 ,  the district court in 
Jaluit and placed its judicial district under the district court in Ponape, just as it had been the 
chancellor who had closed the district court in Saipan in 1907 and had placed its district under the 
district court in Yap. It was generally still the chancellor, rather than the chief justice of German 
New Guinea, who determined the organisation of the administration of justice in relation to non­
natives. His fundamental decree in this field was dated 21  December 1909. It authorised the 
district commissioners "at the time" in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, Yap, Ponape and Jaluit to 
exercise the jurisdiction of the first instance in their respective districts. For the Bismarck 
Archipelago, including the Solomon Islands, a different arrangement was made. It acquired a 
"designated" (hauptamtlicher) judicial official who was personally authorised by the chancellor. 
A decree of the chancellor of 10 May 1910 regulated the question of "substitution" 
(Stellvenretung), also by reference to offices held at the time. The district judges in the Island 
Territory could substitute for each other. The district judge in the Bismarck Archipelago could 
substitute for the district judge in Kaiser Wilhelmsland but, in addition to the latter, the district 
commissioner in Herbertshohe/Rabaul could substitute for the district judge for the Bismarck 
Archipelago. 
This was a neat system, but it could only work smoothly if all the posts in question were filled, 
and this was rarely the case. However the system was made more flexible because a decree of the 
chancellor of 25 December 1900 had authorised governors to appoint "extraordinary substitutes" 
(ausserordentliche Stellvenreter) in addition to the regular substitutes whom he appointed. The 
same decree also empowered district judges to authorise "suitable persons" to act for them, either 
in particular cases or on a permanent basis. An amendment to this decree of 8 May 1908 widened 
these powers to include all judicial activities not requiring the participation of "assessors" 
(Beisitzer), apart from the recording of last wills, the appointment of assessors and the admission 
of persons as legal counsels. Hence much of the administration of justice in relation to non-natives 
could be carried out by more junior government officials, in particular by the district officers 
within their administrative districts. In this manner the exercise of judicial powers in relation to 
non-natives in German New Guinea had to a large extent been decentralised, even in the Bismarck 
Archipelago and the Solomons, where the designated judicial official also had delegated far­
reaching judicial powers to the local administrative authorities . 
The historiographical advantage of an increasing formalisation of these governmental processes 
is that more and more of these moves were made in writing and publicised. While no details about 
the establishment of the first government station in Kaewieng were published, 58 when the second 
government station in the Old Protectorate was opened in Narnatanai in 1 904, Hahl issued a public 
notice defining at least the geographical limits of its district which was subsequently published in 
the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung (vol. 8: 103). The public notice relating to the opening of the 
government station in Eitape in 1907 (ibid. ,  vol. 10: 3 18-19) also defined the substantive 
competences of the district officer. He was given full jurisdiction over the natives in his district 
and general police powers in relation to non-natives. In particular, he had to take measures 
necessary to protect their life and property and to avert threatening dangers. He also had to carry 
out the duties of an auxiliary organ of the public prosecutor and to administer the 1 887 Foreigners 
Registration Ordinance. 
57 This suggests that it was also the governor, rather than the chancellor, who downgraded the office of "administrator'' 
in the Marshall Islands to that of "district commissioner'' .  
58 It is not clear when "the station" actually started to operate as a station. The historical record also does not show when 
the imperial courts in the Bismarck Archipelago and Kaiser Wilhelmsland became district offices. Nor were the 
administrative districts of these offices officially defined, although subsequent transfers of parts of their districts were 
published. 
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On 20 August 1909 Hahl proclaimed an ordinance which was published in the Amtsblatt as 
well as in the Kolonialblatt and the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung. It first closed the government 
station in Simpson Harbour and added its district to that of the district office in HerbertshOhe. It 
then moved the district office from Herbertshohe to Simpson Harbour and gave it the official title 
"Kaiserliches Bezirksamt Rabaul". Finally, it established a police post in Herbertshohe which was 
placed under the district office in Rabaul and authorised the district commissioner to issue 
instructions for its operation.59 
The instructions by the district commissioner were also published in the Amtsblatt ( 1909: 
1 1 8-20). They defined the district of the police post by reference to ·�udicial districts", which had 
grown out of the practice of the station court, namely HerbertshOhe, Toma and N analar. The police 
post was to be manned by a police sergeant and 1 5  native policemen under two corporals. In 
addition to general police powers, the police sergeant was given disciplinary powers over all 
coloured labourers in his district. He also functioned as harbour master and customs official. Apart 
from his disciplinary powers, he was only given general supervisory powers in labour matters. All 
formalities, including all medical examinations, were to be carried out in Rabaul. He was 
responsible for the maintenance of the government buildings, boats and harbour facilities in his 
district and for the proper management of the materials under his control. His powers in native 
matters were limited. The civil and criminal jurisdiction was reserved for the district commissioner 
who would exercise it during regular "court days" (Gerichtstage). By contrast, the importance of 
the responsibilities of the police post in relation to the upkeep of public roads and bridges was 
strongly emphasised. Their good condition had to be regularly checked and special attention paid 
to ensuring that all those obliged to do so fulfilled their duty of keeping public roads clean. To be 
sure, none of this is narratively exciting but it shows how the police sergeant and his men were 
expected to spend their time, and that the maintenance of law and order was supposed to be the 
least of their worries. 
By March 1910  the district office had to respond to pressures by the plantations around 
Herbertshohe to give the police post greater powers in labour matters. The district commissioner 
resisted, although he made some concessions (see AB 1910: 54). In a public notice of 7 July 1910 
he conceded further ground. The unusual decision announced a year later to authorise the secretary 
of the district office to carry out the functions of the district commissioner in the district of the 
police post in Herbertshohe (see ibid. ,  191 1 :  171 )  also reflected the fact that it simply could not 
function as a police post. At any rate, it was upgraded to a station in 19 13  (see ibid. ,  19 13 :  159). 
But the instructions concerning the changes in its competences were not published this time, 
perhaps because it had been decided that it was better not to tell the public too much about these 
internal instructions. 
According to the chancellor' s  1903 decree the governor of German New Guinea could delegate 
his legislative powers for certain parts of his colony to other officials. Hahl first tried this by 
authorising district commissioner Stuckhardt personally on 4 October 1904 to enact police and 
other administrative regulations for Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Stuckhardt used this power on the same 
day to prohibit the employment of coloured persons as recruiters, unless they were accompanied 
by a white person. But no further legislative activity followed, and this personal authority lapsed 
when Stuckhardt left his post in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in 1906. 
It took until 191 1 before Hahl made his next move by delegating limited legislative powers ex 
officio to the district commissioners in Rabaul and Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. The restrictions were 
that they could only enact regulations for parts of their districts and that they could only impose 
penalties of up to two weeks imprisonment. On 10 March 1914 Hahl delegated the same legislative 
59 In addition it amended the implementation regulations to the 1 908 Customs Ordinance in accordance with these 
changes, inter alia authorising the police post in Herbertshtihe to deal with the customs clearance of postal articles arriving 
in Herbertshtihe. This was, in fact, one of its most important tasks at the time. 
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powers to the district commissioner in Kaewieng. Apparently only the district commissioner in 
Rabaul had cause for exercising these powers. 
Whereas the 1 906 building ordinance for Simpson Harbour/Rabaul still had to be enacted by 
the governor, it was the district commissioner who regulated the traffic on public roads in the 
Gazelle Peninsula. His ordinance of 10 October 1 9 1 3  applied not only to horsemen and animal 
carts but also to motor cars and bicycles, for both of which an amendment soon after introduced 
a speed limit of 1 5  kilometres per hour within settlements and 40 outside them. 
While this ordinance was based on the legislative powers delegated to the district commissioner 
by the governor' s  decree of 27 July 191 1 ,  his decree regulating the responsibilities for the 
maintenance of public roads in the town of Rabaul was based on a specific authority given to all 
local authorities in the 1 9 1 1 Roads Ordinance. In contrast to the traffic ordinance this decree 
therefore contained no penal provisions, as they were already included in the Roads Ordinance. 
Similarly a decree of 12  August 191 1 regulating where different kinds of vessels should anchor 
in Rabaul harbour was based on a specific authority for local authorities in the 191 1 Harbour 
Ordinance. It too did not and could not stipulate penalties. 
How civilised the Gazelle Peninsula had become is indicated by an ordinance of the district 
commissioner of 1 2  February 1914. It made the commercial presentation of lectures and the 
commercial display of "illuminated pictures" (Lichtbilder) subject to permission by the district 
office, unless they served "higher artistic or scientific purposes". A "public notice" of 1 1  May 
1914 was of greater practical importance. It stipulated that all local natives employed as domestic 
servants in Rabaul by "whites, coloured persons of equal legal status and Chinese and Malays" had 
to be brought to the native hospital every month for a medical examination, namely males on every 
last Tuesday of the month at 2 p.m. and females on every last Thursday of the month at 2 p.m. In 
order to be able to ensure that the examinations took place employers had to report the names of 
their domestic servants every year before 1 July to the district office which issued them with a 
"control book" (Kontrollbuch) for each one of them. It had to be presented at every examination. 
The "public notice" stated that all contraventions and omissions would be punished in accordance 
with section 23 of the 1909 Labour Ordinance which provided penalties of up to three months 
imprisonment. 
This notice demonstrates the degree of bureaucratisation that had been accomplished in some 
areas, but its critical examination also reveals that even senior colonial officials had still not 
mastered the legislative framework within which they were supposed to operate. Section 1 3  of the 
1909 Labour Ordinance, to which it referred, indeed made the local authorities responsible for the 
supervision of the employment of native labourers, but it did not empower them to create new 
duties for employers, the non-fulfilment of which attracted the penalties stipulated in the 
ordinance. The district commissioner could have used his own legislative powers under the 
governor's  19 1 1 decree to create such a duty, but he could not do so in the form of a "public 
notice", which could only inform the public about the existing legal position. An alteration of this 
position, as was clearly intended here, could only be brought about by an amendment of the 
Labour Ordinance-to which the district commissioner was not entitled-Qr by a separate police 
ordinance designed as a public health measure. But such an ordinance had to stipulate its own 
penalties which had to stay within the limited penal powers given to the district commissioner; that 
is to say they could not exceed imprisonment of two weeks. In short, the "public notice" was 
legally defective in every respect.6() 
60 There is no reason to believe that the district commissioner knew, but did not care, that his ''public notice" was legally 
defective. He clearly assumed that it was legally proper to introduce this administratively desirable measure the way he 
did. More importantly, he was also confident that he had the actual administrative capacity to enforce it. Otherwise the 
whole exercise would have been pointless since a voluntary compliance rate of, say, 50 per cent would have served little 
useful purpose. 
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It is understandable under these circumstances that the central colonial administration in Berlin 
observed the legislative activity in the colonies throughout with considerable unease. A 1901 
circular decree of the colonial department had made local legislation subject to its approval and 
instructed all local authorities to use their legislative powers as sparingly as possible. A circular 
decree in 1908 confirmed these instructions. It also gave the local authorities a lecture about the 
form in which their legislative powers had to be exercised. But a decree of 1 8  February 1912  gave 
governors greater legislative independence. The 1901 decree was repealed and they were 
authorised to enact local legislation on their own responsibility.61 However, the colonial office 
stressed that it expected neither the substance nor the form of local legislation would give rise to 
complaints and reminded the local authorities that all legislative acts still had to be submitted for 
its information as soon as possible after their enactment. 
The last circular decree in this matter of 1 July 1914 shows that these expectations were 
disappointed. In recent times, it said, local authorities had generally been lax about submitting 
enacted legislation and several submitted enactments had been seriously defective in form or 
substance. The performance of Togo had been especially bad so that the colonial office was 
considering a repeal of its 1912  decree at least temporarily for Togo. But then the drafting of its 
decree was legally also far from perfect. 
Taken at face value it had limited the authority to enact local legislation without the prior 
approval of the colonial office to ordinances which had been "approved" by the advisory council 
(nach vorheriger Zustimmung [!] des Gouvernementsrats). Yet the 1903 decree which had 
established these councils only required the governors to submit draft ordinances to them for 
"discussion" (zur Beratung) and stated that they were not bound by the results of these 
discussions, even if a vote had been taken. Did the 1912  decree nonetheless mean to say that the 
governors had to submit all draft ordinances which had not found the approval of their advisory 
councils to the colonial office before proclaiming them, or had it meant to say "nach erfolgter 
Beratung" (following discussion) instead of "nach vorheriger Zustimmung"? 
This particular legal uncertainty made no difference to the history of colonial rule in German 
New Guinea, just as it made no difference whether or not the "public notice" of the district 
commissioner in Rabaul of 1 1 May 1914 was legally valid. On the other hand, taken together the 
developments in the legislative field and the tensions they reflected between the forces pushing 
for greater uniformity as well as for greater differentiation, for more centralisation as well as for 
more decentralisation, for a stricter Rule of Law as well as for more administrative discretion, are 
of considerable historical interest. A final cluster of legislative measures taken after the start of 
World War I may illustrate what stage this development had reached. 
A public notice of the governor of 6 August 1914 declared German New Guinea to be in a state 
of war. It established a separate military force which was distinguished from the civil police force 
by differences in uniform, in particular green rather than white bands around both arms. It also 
moved the seat of government from Rabaul to Toma. Another public notice laid down the 
principles in accordance with which the government would requisition goods and services during 
the state of war. But the government went much further. A decree of the government of 7 August 
1914  divided the Rabaul district into two districts : Rabaul Town and Neu Pommem (New Britain), 
each under a district commissioner. It also divided the legislative powers which had been delegated 
to the district commissioner in Rabaul between the two new district commissioners. 
The district commissioner for Neu Pommern used his powers to enact on 9 August 1914 what 
was probably the last piece of legislation by a local German authority, namely an ordinance which 
made the hunting of deer in the hinterland of Herbertshohe subject to his permission. 
61  This time an exception was made for legislation which was of greater political significance or had direct budgetary 
implications. 
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The ordinance described in detail the basis of the legislative powers the district commissioner 
had exercised: sections 5 and 6 of the decree of the chancellor of the Reich of 27 September 1903 , 
in connection with section 1 of the decree of the governor of 27 July 191 1 and section 2 of the 
decree of the governor of 7 August 1914. It also included the places where these decrees had been 
published, in the last case the same page of the Amtsblatt on which the ordinance was printed. 
Nonetheless, the ordinance was formally defective because the chancellor's decree of the of 15  
May 1909, the foundation of  the governor's decree, had been repealed in Berlin on  15 July 1914, 
although the ordinance repealing it had again given the governor the same powers. 
Legally defective ornot, this ordinance is historically an intriguing document. What had moved 
the district commissioner to deal with this marginal matter at a time when enemy warships could 
appear over the horizon at any minute? The ordinance does not look like an emergency measure, 
designed to keep the Herbertsht:ihe hinterland free of wandering deer hunters in case of hostilities. 
Rather, it looks like a political gesture designed to demonstrate that it was business as usual in Neu 
Pommern as far as the district commissioner was concerned, because war would only briefly 
interrupt orderly administrative routine before ending with a triumphant victory of the German 
and Austrian forces. However, this is merely my interpretation. Legislative texts rarely tell us why 
and for what purpose they were enacted. They show the changing structures of German colonial 
rule and an overall shrinking of the blank spaces where administrative discretion was holding 
sway. But although the pattern they display is already unmanageably complex, the picture is still 
vastly incomplete. Just how incomplete it is becomes apparent as soon as one starts looking 
beneath the legislative surface, as the following case study will demonstrate. 
Chapter 3: Natives and the Rule of Law 
I 
If we rely on the published standard sources for German New Guinea' s  legal history, the Deutsche Kolonial-Gesetzgebung, the Nachrichten, the Kolonialblatt and the Amtsblatt, the 
story of the regulation of the administration of native justice can be quickly told. 
In 1 888 the emperor transferred this jurisdiction to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. The company 
promptly enacted a Native Penal Ordinance. It remained in force until the end of German colonial 
rule. It was also to have come into force in the Island Territory in October 1914. There it would 
have replaced an 1 890 native penal ordinance for the Marshall Islands which was almost identical 
with it whereas the fact that no other enactments were repealed shows that the administration of 
criminal justice in relation to natives in the other parts of the Island Territory was not regulated 
by legislation at the time. The company's  1888 Native Penal Ordinance was formally amended 
twice: in 1 899, when shooting was introduced as an alternative to hanging as a legitimate form of 
execution, and in 1908 when the competent official was given discretion to determine in 
accordance with the circumstances of each case whether a native could and should be prosecuted. 
According to these sources no attempt was made to regulate the exercise of the civil jurisdiction 
over natives, and the 1904 Marriage Ordinance had been the only effort to deal by way of 
legislation with the substantive civil law applying to natives. 
As we have already seen this is only part of the story. In 1 887 an ordinance concerning 
property disputes among natives in the Old Protectorate had been enacted; in 1 890 the exercise of 
the entire civil and criminal jurisdiction over natives in the Marshall Islands and Nauru had been 
regulated in a public notice; and governor Bennigsen had done the same for a transitional period 
in the Island Territory as part of an 1 899 ordinance. 1 
It has also been pointed out that the 1 887 ordinance and the 1 890 public notice, as well as the 
1 899 amendment to the Native Penal Ordinance and the 1904 Marriage Ordinance, were probably 
all legally invalid when they were enacted, although they were saved by a 1908 imperial ordinance. 
By contrast Bennigsen's  temporary powers had been astonishingly wide. They certainly covered 
the legislative measures he took for the exercise of the judicial jurisdiction in relation to natives 
in the Island Territory. Yet these general enactments did not stop vice-governor Hahl from going 
his own way on Ponape. In a report to the colonial department of 8 March 1900 he announced that 
he had regulated the administration of native justice in "a kind of treaty" with the chiefs. He had 
refrained from giving the arrangements the form of an ordinance because he first wanted to see 
whether they would prove themselves in practice (see RKA 3000) .2 
When Bennigsen read this report he told Hahl in no uncertain terms that he would have had 
no authority to enact an ordinance of this kind; that such an ordinance was unnecessary in view 
of his 1 899 ordinance; that the matter was unsuitable for regulation for a single district; and that 
he should in future pay better attention to the legislative framework within which he operated (see 
AA Gl/l , Item 121 ) .  
This was not how the colonial department saw the position. I t  regarded the powers of  the 
governor as far more limited than Bennigsen believed them to be and rather liked Hahl' s informal 
approach of treating, at least in native matters, formal legislative intervention as a last resort. This 
does not mean that Hahl intended to continue governing his native subjects indefinitely by means 
of "kinds of treaties with their chiefs". Nor does it mean that he intended to replace a consensual 
1 The first two enactments were not published in any of the standard sources and the "transitional" provisions of 
Bennigsen's ordinance were excluded from the version published in the Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung. 
2 A heavily edited version ofthi s  report was published in DKB 1 900: 544-46. 
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with a confrontationalist approach as soon as his means of power permitted him to do so. Rather, 
it means that Hahl viewed the establishment of the Rule of Law as a lengthy process which was 
best approached administratively and given a legislative form only after appropriate solutions had 
been found and tested. For Hahl order was a precondition of justice, rather than a consequence, 
and an orderly administration the key to any ordered polity. 
Hahl found himself in a different position when he no longer administered a single district but 
became responsible for the government of a colony which, in geographical terms, was as large as 
the Australian continent and was divided into a growing number of local administrations. To use 
his own administrative discretion was one thing, to rely on the exercise of discretionary powers 
by his subordinates quite another. For Hahl the task of governing became increasingly a task of 
governing his officials rather than his subjects . 
Seen from this perspective it made little difference whether the exercise of governmental 
powers was regulated by way of administrative instructions which told officials what to do, or by 
way of legislative enactments which determined indirectly what they could do by defining the 
rights and duties of those whom they governed. Administratively speaking rights and duties do not 
exist for their own sake but as limitations and extensions of governmental powers. Hence it makes 
no difference either whether the government informs the public about the legal position in the form 
of a legislative enactment or a public notice. Legislative enactments, administrative instructions 
and public notices present themselves as alternatives between which governments can choose on 
the basis of administrative convenience without having to pay much attention to the legal 
differences between them. 
At least this was the position Hahl adopted, although he did so instinctively rather than 
consciously. He took it for granted that it was, to a large extent, up to him which alternative he 
chose, depending on how important and permanent he regarded a measure to be and whom he did 
or did not want to inform about it. Moreover, Hahl usually responded to particular cases rather 
than trying to create a systematic regulatory framework. Temporary and informal administrative 
instructions were therefore in most instances the appropriate first response which could be given 
a more general and lasting legislative form, once they had proved themselves. Regulation was a 
political, not a jurisprudential process. It was shaped by a variety of competing factors, and Hahl 
probably watched with mixed feelings legal considerations coming to play an increasingly 
important part. 
II 
On 2 November 1903, a few months after he had returned from home leave as governor of German 
New Guinea, Hahl sent an angry circular decree to the local administrations in the Old 
Protectorate.3 He complained that officials misunderstood the role of the government chiefs; 
regarded their participation in administrative and judicial matters as unwanted; treated them with 
contempt; and relied instead on native policemen to communicate orders to natives-with 
decidedly harmful effects. Apart from admonishing his subordinates to use existing institutions 
constructively, he issued specific instructions relating to the summons and arrest of coloured 
labourers and other natives. Coloured labourers were to be summoned through their employer. 
They were only to be approached directly in matters of urgency, or after a summons through their 
employer had been unsuccessful. By contrast, all arrests of labourers were to be made directly, 
although, if possible, the employer was to be informed at the same time . In the case of other 
natives the services of government chiefs always had to be used to carry out arrests as well as 
summonses. 
3 Excerpts from this decree were published in Die Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung, vol. 7: 230-23 1 .  
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Whereas Hahl left it to the discretion of the official in charge to punish government chiefs for 
disobedience, he asked for information about uncooperative employers so that he could, if 
necessary, create the required coercive powers in relation to them by means of an ordinance. But 
Hahl also added a penal provision to his decree. It declared section 24 of the Native Penal 
Ordinance, which dealt with the refusal of native witnesses to give evidence, to be applicable to 
witnesses generally, so that it now also covered the non-appearance and other contemptuous 
behaviour of witnesses-including, according to the wording of the decree, the contemptuous 
behaviour of non-native witnesses. 
Less than three weeks later Hahl went considerably further.4 A circular decree of 20 November 
1 903 introduced administrative penal procedures as a supplement to the judicial procedures under 
the Native Penal Ordinance, since the latter were restricted to behaviour constituting a serious 
offence (Verbrechen or Vergehen) under German criminal law. Hahl 's starting point was that this 
restriction did not limit the penal powers of the government altogether. On the contrary, the police 
powers given to the heads of the local administrations obliged them to take action in all cases 
where punishment appeared to be required, in particular in relation to "misdemeanours" 
(Obertretungen) for which judicial punishment under the Native Penal Ordinance was generally 
ruled out. 
The decree distinguished between misdemeanours affecting the relations between natives and 
misdemeanours of natives directed against Europeans and their interests . Whereas it was to be left 
to the government chiefs to deal with the former, the latter were to be punished by the local 
administrations. The penalties as well as the "factual elements justifying a punishment" 
(Straftatbestand) were to be based on a corresponding application of the German Criminal Code 
and the "Prussian Penal Police Code'', unless special laws applied under section 2 of the Native 
Penal Ordinance-namely police regulations addressed to natives. 
Even new criminal offences could be gradually developed in this manner. This had been 
recognised in the draft of a native marriage ordinance which stipulated, in accordance with native 
custom, that adultery be punished regardless of whether the marriage had been divorced as a result 
of the adultery, as the German Criminal Code required. 
According to the decree, imprisonment, forced labour, fines and warnings, but not corporal 
punishments, were permissible punishments in these administrative procedures. They were to be 
conducted in line with the procedural provisions of the Native Penal Ordinance.  This meant, 
according to the decree, that a public hearing had to be conducted during which the accused had 
to be heard and evidence for the accusation had to be taken, although an "oral punishment order" 
(mundliche Strafverfagung) was permissible in minor cases, if the accused admitted guilt. 
Nonetheless, all these administrative punishments had to be included in the penal statistics for 
natives (AA63/83 ,  Item B60) . 
When a copy of this decree was sent to Berlin two years later, in response to a reminder by the 
colonial department that not only legislative enactments but also all general administrative 
instructions had to be submitted for information, it raised misgivings because the imposition of 
such administrative punishments in the Marshall Islands was beginning to create serious trouble 
for the colonial department. But as the Brandeis Case (see above: 6 1  ff.) had not yet grown into 
a public colonial scandal, the reaction to Hahl' s decree took a remarkably mild form. The governor 
was told that the police powers on which he had relied were coercive powers to be used for the 
maintenance of law and order, rather than penal powers.5 In particular, his attention was drawn to 
the 1905 imperial ordinance concerning the coercive and penal powers of the administration under 
4 On 1 8  November 1 903 Hahl defined the compulsory services German New Guinea' s  native population bad to render 
to the government-again in the form of an administrative instruction (see above: 90 ff.). 
5 Even at the end of German colonial rule officials bad difficulty in grasping this distinction-just as the distinction 
between criminal and disciplinary punishments remained confused. 
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which administrative penal orders addressed to non-natives had to be preceded by a warning. Since 
natives were less aware of the rights and wrongs of their actions, it was necessary that they too be 
given a warning, whenever possible, before punishments of the kind provided in the decree were 
imposed. After pointing out that the "Prussian Penal Police Code", to which the (Bavarian) 
governor had referred, did not exist, it was suggested that Hahl might want to revise his decree and 
to send a copy of the new draft to Berlin before issuing it. 
Hahl was absent when this response arrived and his deputy opted for a minimal approach. He 
merely instructed local administrations, if at all possible, to warn natives that they would be 
punished if they repeated certain actions before imposing administrative punishments. After his 
return, Hahl repealed his entire 1903 decree on 16 January 1908, because he wrongly believed that 
the 1 905 imperial ordinance also covered the use of the coercive and penal powers in relation to 
natives. Instead he authorised the station courts to take judicial action in all cases where this was 
necessary to maintain law and order. 
A month later Hahl submitted a report by the district commissioner in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen 
to the colonial office which argued that the abolition of administrative punishments had created 
considerable practical difficulties in Kaiser Wilhelmsland where the native population had by no 
means been fully "subjugated" (unterworfen). Administrative punishments had been primarily used 
in response to breaches of the public peace by entire villages, the abduction of women, infanticide, 
blood feuds, sorcery and the refusal to carry out the legitimate orders of the administration. In most 
of these cases it was impossible to take judicial action against particular individuals, either 
because it was impractical to arrest them, or because all inhabitants of a village had been more or 
less involved in the criminal act. If the judge took his duties seriously, and considered only the 
evidence for the guilt of particular individuals, formal procedures under the Native Penal 
Ordinance would in every case result in an acquittal. An administrative punishment of entire 
villages was the only practical option, and the administration had to be given discretion to impose 
collective punishments which went beyond those provided in the 1905 imperial ordinance. In 
relation to all "mountain tamuls" this was essential because it was impossible to communicate with 
them in a form that was adequate for the conduct of formal court proceedings. 
Since the district commissioner had also expressed the view that the authority to take judicial 
action in all cases in which law and order had been disturbed contravened the "not yet repealed" 
section 2 of the Native Penal Ordinance, Hahl assured him that he was nonetheless covered by the 
decree of 16  January 1908 if he took discretionary judicial action. But Hahl acknowledged to the 
colonial office that the abolition of administrative punishments was likely to cause difficulties of 
the kind described which should be taken into account in the reform of the criminal law for the 
natives in all the German colonies on which the colonial office was working. 6 
The colonial office was not prepared to wait until this general reformhad been completed-and 
it never was. Instead it took up the reference of the district commissioner to the "not yet repealed" 
section 2 of the Native Penal Ordinance. It repealed the section, together with its counterpart in 
the 1 890 Native Penal Ordinance for the Marshall Islands, in an ordinance of 28 October 1 908. 
The crucial move, however, was an amendment of section 3 .  It replaced the normal, negative 
discretion not to prosecute-which also existed in metropolitan Germany-with an extraordinary, 
positive discretion to prosecute any behaviour the competent official regarded as requiring 
punishment. This was a direct breach of the "nulla poena sine lege" principle enshrined in the 
German Criminal Code, according to which an act could only be punished if all acts of this kind 
had been declared to be punishable by law before this particular act had been performed. But then 
the German Criminal Code did not apply to German New Guinea' s native population and section 
2 of the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance, which had recognised this principle, had now been 
repealed. Besides, this move brought the legal position in German New Guinea into line with that 
6 The first draft of an imperial ordinance in this field was sent to the governors for comment in 1 906. 
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in Germany' s  African colonies, where the same positive discretion to prosecute natives had been 
established by a decree of the chancellor of the Reich in 1 896. 
As a result the governor withdrew his 1908 decree in a circular decree of 30 January 1909. 
Attached to this repealing decree were excerpts from the decree of the colonial office explaining 
the situation. The amendment of the Native Penal Ordinance had made Hahl' s  1 908 decree 
superfluous. The decree had also been wrong in stating that the 1905 imperial ordinance applied 
to natives . This would only have been the case if the governor had specifically placed them under 
this ordinance, whereas his recently enacted implementation regulations included no such 
provision. The decree of the colonial office also responded to the report of the district 
commissioner in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, pointing out that some of the punitive actions he had 
referred to, in particular the use of force against entire villages for breaches of the public peace, 
neither had a judicial nor an administrative character but were military in nature so that their 
legitimacy had to be judged in accordance with political considerations governing the conduct of 
wars. 
These explanations were of little help to local officials who were rarely confronted with war­
like rebellions but often had to deal with cases where a normal judicial approach was nonetheless 
impractical, since the positive discretion to prosecute which they had now been given only solved 
the first of a series of problems. Still, the response of the colonial office in this case had been 
considerably more accommodating than the stance it had taken a year earlier in relation to the 
Marshall Islands, when it had bluntly repealed a decree which the colonial department had issued 
in 1903. This decree had confirmed the existence of discretionary administrative penal powers in 
relation to natives, including the imposition of corporal punishments, although they could only be 
exercised if this was necessary to maintain law and order. The repealing decree had categorically 
stated: 
It follows from section 2 of the Native Penal Ordinance . . . that punishment of actions is only permissible 
if they have been declared to be punishable by statute or a legally valid [rechtsgiiltige] ordinance when 
they were performed. Corporal punishments, in particular, can neither be imposed for serious criminal 
offences nor for breaches of the police regulations identified in section 2, subsection 2. 
While this decree too had been superseded by the 1 908 amendment of the two Native Penal 
Ordinances, this amendment had no effect in the rest of the Island Territory where neither of them 
applied. The position of the local authorities there was fundamentally different. On the one hand, 
they were not bound by the procedural and penal provisions of these ordinances when punishing 
natives, so that there existed, for example, no specific legislative obstacle to the imposition of 
corporal punishments. On the other hand, it was doubtful, in the absence of a clear authorisation, 
whether the local authorities were legally entitled to exercise any penal powers in relation to 
natives . 
This state of affairs first created concern when the question arose whether a death sentence 
imposed on a native in the Island Territory could be executed without a confirmation by the 
governor, as was required under the Native Penal Ordinance in the Old Protectorate. The governor 
reported on 1 1 September 1905 to the colonial department. He suggested introducing the Native 
Penal Ordinance in the Island Territory, but empowering the local authorities, because of their 
remoteness, to confirm death sentences, and to exercise the powers of mercy which the ordinance 
also vested in the governor. 
The legal section of the colonial department agreed with the governor that the Native Penal 
Ordinance of the Old Protectorate did not apply in the Island Territory, where the administration 
of justice in relation to natives had developed as a "purely administrative activity" (reine 
Verwaltungstatigkeit). But it was not concerned with the confirmation of death sentences, or a 
delegation of the powers of mercy, but with the question as to whether the governor, or even the 
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chancellor of the Reich, had legal powers over the life and death of natives in Germany's 
colonies-apart from emergencies such as rebellions-unless they had been expressly authorised 
by the emperor. 
The outcome of its considerations was less dramatic than this suggests because such powers 
for the chancellor were derived from the authority he had been given to regulate the administration 
of the Island Territory in the imperial ordinance of 1 8  July 1 899. By contrast, the authority of the 
governor under this ordinance to regulate the administration of justice in relation to natives had 
lapsed on 1 January 1901 . The legal section was opposed to giving the governor such far-reaching 
powers again because this had not been done for any of the other German colonies where these 
powers had instead been vested by imperial ordinances in the chancellor of the Reich. But it was 
happy for the Native Penal Ordinance to be introduced instead in the Island Territory by means 
of an ordinance by the chancellor. 
The consequences of the lack of a legislative framework for the administration of justice in the 
Island Territory are well illustrated by the murder of Rultan in 1906. Rultan hailed from Yap but 
was at the time of his death a prisoner in the "penal colony" (Strajkolonie) on Saipan, as were his 
murderers, Nirailokus from Palau and Tomedat also from Yap. Both were sentenced to death on 
4 February 1 907. The judgement in their case has survived because the district commissioner sent 
a copy to the governor as he had been confronted by the "sad necessity" (traurige Notwendigkeit) 
to carry out the death sentence the day after it had been imposed, having received and rejected a 
plea for mercy. The case was heard by the district court, although it had no jurisdiction over 
natives . But station courts, which had been established under the Native Penal Ordinance in the 
Old Protectorate, did not exist in the Island Territory, and the district commissioner had apparently 
regarded it as inappropriate to deal with such a serious matter administratively.7 The case had 
occupied most of the local officials : the district commissioner as chairman of the court, his 
secretary as clerk, the teacher as prosecutor and the medical assistant as defence counsel. In 
addition, the teacher had previously acted as investigating judge during an absence of the district 
commissioner,8 and the medical assistant had officially certified the death of the executed 
murderers, after earlier officially certifying the cause of death of their victim. 
While the district commissioner had no doubt that he was legally entitled to impose death 
sentences on natives, he had been most concerned to satisfy the formalities. He had therefore used 
a visit by the acting governor to Yap in December 1906-where he also acted as district 
commissioner for the Western Carolines at the time-to obtain in advance the approval for an 
immediate execution, if it proved necessary to impose a death sentence in this case. As he proudly 
reported, he had thereby taken care of the problem that the colonial office had so far not approved 
the governor's  request to authorise the local administrations in the Island Territory to grant 
pardons and confirm death sentences. 
When the governor reported to the colonial office on 14 May 1907 that he had given the 
immediate execution of the death sentence his retrospective blessing, he again pointed out that it 
was urgent to give the administration of native justice in the Island Territory a firm legislative 
basis. However, the colonial office preferred to say nothing about the legality of this particular 
death sentence and its execution and again postponed a decision about the general issue (RKA 
5488:  167-68). 
This persisting legal uncertainty also had advantages. Whereas administrative punishments 
were coming under increasing scrutiny in the Marshall Islands and the Old Protectorate, the 
7 District commissioner Kersting found himself in the same position after the Ponape Rebellion. But instead of trying 
the "rebels" in the district court he created a special judicial body for the occasion over which he presided as district 
commissioner rather than as district judge. It is not surprising that this peculiar scenario encouraged narrative historians 
to produce a colourful array of phantoms. 
8 The teacher, rather than the secretary, had been an obvious choice for this task because he happened to be "legally 
qualified", in contrast to the latter-or the district commissioner. 
360 THE EMPEROR' S NEW CLOTHES 
colonial office took no notice of the fact that such punishments were also routinely imposed in the 
Island Territory. For example, one ofRultan' s murderers had not only several judicial punishments 
to his credit, he had also been administratively banished from Yap for two years. Were such 
administrative banishments legitimate in the Island Territory because the local authorities were not 
legally limited to the penalties provided in the Native Penal Ordinances in the Old Protectorate and 
the Marshall Islands? Did the same apply to corporal punishments, which were formally 
recognised as judicial punishments in Germany's African colonies, although they were outlawed 
as such in the Old Protectorate and the Marshall Islands? 
It appears that the colonial department preferred to ignore this question-at least the corporal 
punishments listed in the penal statistics for the Western Carolines in 1902 and 1 903 did not raise 
an official eyebrow. The situation had changed when the question of the legality of corporal 
punishments was again raised in a response by Hahl to a 1907 instruction of the district office in 
Jaluit. It had ordered the government station in Nauru to punish Chinese coolies employed in the 
phosphate mine with fines or compulsory labour, if they went on strike again "without any reason" 
(ohne jeglichen Grund). Hahl accepted that the situation on Nauru was serious but found it 
inappropriate that the issue of the exercise of disciplinary powers over coloured labourers in the 
Island Territory had been tackled in such a specialised and localised instruction. He therefore 
issued a "public notice" on 27 June 1 907 which declared the Disciplinary Ordinance of the Old 
Protectorate to be generally applicable in the Island Territory. He also invited the district office 
in Jaluit to report whether special regulations for the Chinese coolies in Nauru were required, as 
a 1903 amendment to this ordinance had specifically ruled out corporal punishments of Chinese. 
When Hahl reported these measures to the colonial office he was taken to task in a decree of 
3 1  October 1907 . It firstly pointed out that the instruction of the district office had been invalid 
because it had no disciplinary powers over coloured labourers; secondly, that Hahl had not been 
authorised to introduce the Disciplinary Ordinance into the Island Territory, quite apart from the 
fact that it had been wrong to call this legislative act a "public notice"; and, thirdly, that the 
Disciplinary Ordinance was itself invalid because the governor of German New Guinea had never 
been authorised to regulate the exercise of the jurisdiction in relation to natives in the Old 
Protectorate. However, in view of the fact that the Disciplinary Ordinance had been applied there 
for a considerable time without complaints, and because a general revision of the criminal law 
applying to natives in the German colonies was under consideration, the colonial office would not 
pursue these issues. 
This decision to tolerate the legally invalid introduction of a legally invalid ordinance into the 
Island Territory for the time being was less reckless than it appeared because at the time the secret 
weapon of the colonial office was already under construction: an imperial ordinance which would 
retrospectively validate all local legislative enactments relating to the administration of native 
justice and native law in the German colonies, including the Disciplinary Ordinance of the Old 
Protectorate and Hahl ' s  introduction of it in the Island Territory. 
The ordinance in question was signed by the emperor on 3 June 1908. Its wording hardly 
advertises its legal scope. Rather than disclosing that it was giving legally doubtful local legislation 
a belated imperial blessing, it stated that local legislation would remain in force. But this is only 
one of many understatements. For example, who would have thought that the authority of the 
chancellor to regulate "the law of the natives and the exercise of the judicial jurisdiction over them, 
including cases involving non-natives" contained the power to enact laws regulating the relations 
between non-native employers and their native labourers and even to appoint special officials in 
place of the regular courts to deal with disputes arising out of them? Yet this is what the colonial 
office claimed in its explanatory decree. It did acknowledge that the situation was not 
straightforward because the ministry of justice had insisted that cases in which a native took legal 
action against a non-native had to be dealt with by the regular courts under the Protectorates Act 
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but it claimed to have found a way to avoid this result: the district judge could delegate his judicial 
powers to such a special official under a decree of 8 May 1908 concerning the exercise of the 
jurisdiction in relation to non-natives ! 
So far, so good-but while the ordinance authorised the chancellor to regulate the civil law 
applying to natives, it did not authorise him to regulate the civil law applying to non-natives, so 
that colonial regulations which departed from the metropolitan civil law governing 
employer/employee relations introduced by the Protectorates Act were in so far still legally invalid. 
Nor could they be saved by another imperial ordinance. Any departure from the introduced civil 
law for non-natives required an amendment of the Protectorates Act to open the way for an 
imperial ordinance which paralleled the imperial land or mining ordinances.9 But in 1908 the 
colonial office still did not appreciate the legal position as clearly as it did five years later after a 
critical examination of German New Guinea' s  1903 Commerce Ordinance (see above: 296 f.) .  
However, it  had always subscribed to the motto "let sleeping dogs lie", and apparently no-one had 
so far challenged the validity of colonial labour regulations because they had encroached upon a 
field of law governed by the Protectorates Act. 
Still, the colonial office at least drew attention to the fact that the colonial labour regulations 
were not purely administrative in nature but they also dealt with the civil law applying to natives, 
although it did not point out that the same applied to a number of other police regulations, for 
example the various credit ordinances. However, a look at the labour regulations is sufficient to 
illustrate what that implied. 
A general instruction by the governor in implementation of the 1909 Labour Ordinance 
stipulated that the local authorities should mediate in disputes arising out of the contractual 
relations between labourers and employers "before formal legal proceedings are instituted" (ehe 
die Einleitung des Rechtsweges herbeigefahrt wirtf). It also stressed that it was the purpose of the 
official control of employment relations to further the well-being of the labourer as well as to assist 
the employer in carrying out his "duties" and enforcing his "rights''. On the other hand, a "public 
notice" of the district commissioner in Rabaul of 29 April 1910 denied coloured labourers "the 
right" to refuse an offer of their employer to transport them back to their place of recruitment after 
their contract had run its course, even when the labourer intended to enter immediately into an 
employment contract with another employer, because the former employer had "a right" to insist 
that the labourer first return home with his wages before committing himself again (AB, 19 10: 77). 10 
But the effects of labour regulations could reach much further. For example, a "public notice" 
issued by Hahl on 25 June 1909 pronounced directly on the family law of the natives. It responded 
to an increase in the number of cases where married women were recruited with their agreement, 
but without the agreement of, and even after a protest by, their husbands. According to Hahl these 
recruitments were legally invalid because a woman required the approval of her husband in order 
to enter into an employment contract. The local authorities would therefore refuse to approve the 
employment contract in such cases and return the women to their husbands. He also stated that 
while the women and their relatives then had to return any payments made to them at the time of 
9 Both imperial ordinances affected the civil law applying to natives, for example by wiping out-with some interesting 
exceptions-any mineral rights natives held under custom. 
10 Section 21 of the Labour Ordinance did deny the labourer ''the right" to refuse a timely offer to be returned free of 
charge, so that the ''public notice" in so far did no more than restate the existing legal position. However, section 21 leaves 
little doubt that the duty it imposed on employers to transport their labourers home was imposed on them in the interests 
of labourers, rather than in recognition of the employers' right to insist on such a return before labourers entered a new 
contract. I would interpret the denial of a right of refusal as a reflection of the fear that permitting labourers to stay behind 
voluntarily would create an unemployed proletariat near plantation centres which was bound to create all kinds of trouble. 
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their recruitment, the husbands were not obliged to refund any recruitment costs (AB, 1 909: 88). 1 1  
What was the basis of  Hahl's claim that native women legally needed the approval of  their 
husbands before they could enter an employment contract? It was certainly not the 1909 Labour 
Ordinance. Did Hahl believe that it was part of the customary law in all parts of German New 
Guinea? Although he probably did, it is unlikely that he would have been prepared to accept that 
the recruitment of women without their husbands' consent was legally valid if they came from an 
area where such a customary requirement could be shown not to exist. His "public notice" makes 
sense only if it is seen as a legislative act. But as such it was defective, not only because it should 
have been identified as an amendment of the Labour Ordinance but also because Hahl needed the 
approval of the chancellor of the Reich under the 1 908 ordinance for an amendment affecting the 
civil law of natives in German New Guinea. But then this "public notice" was not part of a general 
program to reform the family law of German New Guinea' s native population. Rather, its aim was 
to send a specific signal to recruiters and employers that the recruitment and employment of 
married women was politically unwanted because it was in the public interest that they bore 
children and looked after their families at home. Ascribing to native husbands a legal right to 
demand their return, at considerable expense to the employer, was an administratively convenient 
way of giving teeth to this policy-just as it was politically helpful to warn relatives of such 
women that they would have to hand back their share of the recruitment money if a woman let 
herself be recruited without her husband's  approval. 
Hahl' s  approach to legislative regulation, at least in native matters, was generally that of an 
administrator rather than a lawyer. This is well illustrated by his response to a proposal by the 
district commissioner in HerbertshOhe in 1909 to repeal the implementation regulations to the 1 888 
Native Penal Ordinance, which he had just discovered, should they still be in force, as they were 
either impractical or merely stated the obvious. Hahl referred the matter to a subordinate who 
reported that neither a copy of these 20-year-old regulations nor any indication of their repeal 
could be found in the governor' s files. But he recommended against repealing them now as this 
would only create "another trivial ordinance". Instead the current practice of ignoring these 
regulations should be continued. 12 Hahl' s  approval of these unorthodox views can only partly be 
explained by his belief that these regulations, as well as the Native Penal Ordinance, would soon 
be superseded by a general ordinance dealing with the criminal law applying to natives in all 
German colonies; for he implicitly approved the practice of ignoring any legislation which was 
regarded as inappropriate. Nor did he take steps to ensure that the files of the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie's administrators which were apparently still in Kaiser Wilhelmsland would, after ten 
years of imperial government, be finally shipped to his office where they could and should have 
been used as a basis for a variety of governmental decisions. 13 
Had he done so, someone might also have discovered the 1 887 ordinance concerning property 
disputes among natives which had been validated by the 1 908 imperial ordinance and thus formally 
applied as well. On the other hand it is understandable in that case that the ordinance had been 
forgotten, as the "arbitration offices" for which it provided had apparently never been established, 
whereas the station courts had operated continuously and should have applied the implementation 
regulations to the Native Penal Ordinance. 
1 1  Hahl made an exception for cases where it could be proven that the woman was justified in refusing to continue the 
marriage. This was probably an oblique reference to the reasons for divorce laid down in the 1904 Marriage Ordinance. 
But the ordinance applied only to Tolai whereas this public notice applied to the whole of German New Guinea. 
1 2  The subordinate in question happened to be Ernst Berghausen. 
13 Hahl's deputy Knake, for example, would have been in a much better position in his confrontation with lieutenant 
commander Seiferling if he had been able to consult the administrator' s files relating to the navy's search powers (see 
above: 130 ff.). 
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How then had civil disputes among natives and civil actions brought against natives by non­
natives been handled?14 In a report to the colonial office dated 1 January 1914 Hahl described the 
position as follows: neither the substantive civil law of the natives nor the procedures for the 
treatment of civil disputes among them had been legally regulated. In principle such disputes were 
decided by the government stations or district offices in the first instance. In cases brought against 
Chinese a right of appeal to the governor had been recognised or, rather, appeals had been 
admitted on a case by case basis. In more important cases, in particular disputes between foreign 
natives, the procedural rules for the district courts had been "correspondingly" applied. Minor 
matters-which apparently included all disputes between local natives-were decided "orally" in 
public hearings, and no written records were kept. But this was merely practice. No general 
administrative instructions had been issued, although opinions in "the files" explained what this 
practice involved. 
An inspection of these files demonstrates that Hahl was feeding the colonial office 
conveniently oversimplified phantom history. This applies at least to the practice in the 
HerbertshOhe/Rabaul district-but it was probably the only part of German New Guinea where 
such disputes constituted a significant governmental task. 15 Until the appointment of a "full-time" 
district judge for the Bismarck Archipelago in 1909, civil disputes involving Chinese had been 
regularly dealt with by the district court, which was chaired by the district commissioner. This 
practice was abandoned when the district commissioner subsequently put such a case before the 
governor for a decision as to whether he could refer it formally to the district court. This gave the 
governor no choice but to pronounce formally that the district court had no jurisdiction over 
Chinese. The district commissioner, in turn, had no choice but to accept this decision, although he 
protested bitterly when the acting governor decided a year later that administrative appeals to the 
governor against decisions of the district office in civil matters involving natives were not 
permissible either. He justified his application to postpone a final decision until Hahl's return by 
pointing out that Hahl had not only always acted as a "second instance" (zweite Instanz) in civil 
matters, but that Hahl had also examined decisions of the station court on an application by a 
convicted native-in the "exercise of his administrative control powers" (im 
Dienstaufsichtswege)-although these decisions were final under the Native Penal Ordinance. 
Since Hahl was aware of all this, he obviously had no intention of giving an account of how 
civil justice in relation to natives in German New Guinea had actually been administered. Instead 
he wanted to provide a suitable background for the two aims he pursued with his report: firstly, 
to persuade the colonial office finally to agree to an introduction of the Native Penal Ordinance 
in the Island Territory and, secondly, to place Chinese legally under the jurisdiction of the district 
courts. 16 
Attached to the report was the draft of an ordinance concerning appeals by natives in criminal 
as well as civil matters which Hahl had been instructed to prepare by the colonial office. 17 He had 
done so against his better judgement because he favoured a solution which placed Chinese under 
the district courts but denied other natives a formal right of appeal. He preferred an ex officio 
review of judicial decisions by the local administrations because he was concerned that non-
14 Civil actions brought by natives against non-natives came under the jurisdiction of the district courts. 
15 It is also unlikely that Hahl was well informed about the practices followed by the other local administrations. 
16 To do so did not mean that Chinese were generally recognised as non-natives, since the Protectorates Act also 
permitted the placement of natives, or certain categories of natives, under the jurisdiction of the regular colonial courts 
for particular purposes. Hence it would have been legally possible to place Chinese under the civil jurisdiction of these 
courts, yet leaving them under the criminal jurisdiction of the station courts. 
17 It inter alia proposed the repeal of section 39 of the Native Penal Ordinance which made all decisions of the station 
courts legally final. 
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natives would manipulate natives in the exercise of a right of appeal with the intention of 
undermining the authority of the local administrations. 18  
This illustrates again how complex the situation had become and how much simpler it is to give 
an overview of the exercise of governmental powers when administrative discretion and changing 
local administrative practices are replaced by a firm and uniform legislative framework. On the 
other hand, the anecdotal evidence presented here confirms that even in the field of native 
administration forces were at work which favoured an expansion of the Rule of Law. However, 
these forces were concerned with making the exercise of governmental powers more controllable 
rather than with improving the protection of the rights of individuals. 
This only becomes visible if we go beneath the legislative surface and inspect the legal 
underbelly of colonial government instead of engaging in a narrative interpretation of particular 
measures. Thus it is narratively tempting to conclude that Hahl introduced the Disciplinary 
Ordinance of the Old Protectorate into the Island Territory because he wanted to give local 
authorities the power to impose corporal punishments on coloured labourers. Yet we have seen that 
Hahl's  reasons for this move were quite different, and that this introduction even ruled out the 
corporal punishment of the Chinese coolies whose strike actions on Nauru had started the ball 
rolling. Hahl had moved because he believed that if the exercise of the disciplinary powers of the 
government in relation to its native subjects in the Island Territory was to be regulated, it had to 
be done in a manner which defined what the local authorities were permitted to do and what 
procedures they had to follow. The introduction of the Disciplinary Ordinance, which was working 
satisfactorily in the Old Protectorate, was the simplest way of achieving it, although there might 
have to be a repeal of the 1903 amendment, excluding the corporal punishment of Chinese, if 
conditions on Nauru required such a punishment. 19 
However, the corporal punishment of Chinese, or other coloured labourers,  was only a 
marginal issue. Legally the central point is that the introduction of the Disciplinary Ordinance did 
not give the local authorities in the Island Territory new powers but limited discretionary powers 
they already held. To be sure, the lawyers in the colonial office were shocked when they realised 
that these discretionary powers were used to sentence natives to death and questioned whether 
such an extreme use was legally permissible. But this does not mean that they believed that the 
local authorities were not entitled to exercise any penal powers unless they had been expressly 
authorised to do so. Although it is far from clear how these penal powers had been acquired, there 
is no doubt that some plausible legal explanation would have been found if their existence had 
been challenged.20 
The story behind the 1908 amendment of the Native Penal Ordinance contains a similar twist. 
At first glance it looks as if this amendment was concerned with broadening the penal powers of 
the station courts . However, by giving them the positive discretion to punish any kind of offensive 
behaviour judicially, the amendment denied the local authorities at the same time any 
supplementary administrative penal powers. Moreover it made clear that natives could be punished 
for criminal behaviour only in accordance with the procedures laid down in the ordinance and that 
only the punishments provided in it could be imposed on them. 
1 8  Although the report did not spell this out, Hahl was especially concerned with the manipulation of local natives by 
missionaries trying to use the appeal process for their own purposes, as had happened earlier in the case of the Maniage 
Ordinance. 
1 9  Hahl presumably considered that enough time had elapsed since Wolff s mass beatings to make such a move politically 
acceptable (see above: 132 ff.) .  
20 The most convenient explanation was the claim that such a power had been developed as "Gewohnheitsrecht" through 
continuous and generally accepted administrative practice. This explanation was available in the Gennan context because 
Gewohnheitsrecht did not have to exist "since time immemorial" in order to be legally valid. Indeed a few years could be 
sufficient to bring it into existence. 
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It is worth pointing out in this context that his administrative corporal punishments had got 
Brandeis into trouble in the Marshall Islands some years earlier precisely because they had 
breached the 1 890 Native Penal Ordinance. They had not been regarded as illegal because the local 
authorities lacked a legal power to impose corporal punishments, unless they were expressly 
authorised to impose them, but because the Native Penal Ordinance had limited the pre-existing 
discretionary penal powers by excluding corporal punishments from the list of legally permissible 
criminal punishments. 
It is also indicative that Rose, when defending Brandeis in the Reichstag, instead of referring 
to discretionary penal powers outside this ordinance, referred to the Disciplinary Ordinance of the 
Old Protectorate which expressly authorised officials to impose disciplinary corporal punishments 
on coloured labourers. Similarly, Erzberger did not deny or criticise that Brandeis had 
discretionary penal powers but rather attacked the decree of the colonial department which had 
confirmed and indeed limited them, because in his view this internal administrative instruction had 
tried to override a publicly proclaimed ordinance (see above: 64). 
What matters in this context is not whether Erzberger or Rose, or any of the other historical 
actors, understood, or at least tried to understand, the legal position, but that discretionary 
governmental powers made everybody feel instinctively uneasy. Administrative discretion had no 
legitimate place in the operation of a modem government. It was a survival from a primitive, pre­
modem past, which had to be exterminated as soon as possible. 
Administrative discretion is indeed a mixed blessing, for those who govern as well as for those 
who are being governed, not so much beause it diminishes the rights of the latter or increases the 
responsibilities of the fonner, but because it acknowledges that the exercise of some governmental 
powers is beyond any fonn of effective control. It was the wish to control governmental powers, 
in the sense of making their exercise predictable, that was the main driving force behind the 
movement towards the Rule of Law in German New Guinea. However, the idea of protection of 
private rights became intertwined with the idea of control of public powers because the control 
idea by itself does not form an adequate basis for a functioning legal system. 
This becomes clearer if we consider the nulla poena sine Lege principle as a means of 
controlling the power of governments to punish their subjects. The process of making this principle 
operational begins by turning it into a prohibition addressed to the government rather than its 
subjects. Under this principle governments act illegally if they punish subjects for actions which 
have not been declared to be illegal before they were performed. In other words the principle is 
a secondary, procedural prohibition. It builds on a multitude of substantive prohibitions addressed 
to subjects. This makes it in a curiously negative sense conditional. Instead of stating that the 
government is entitled to punish any behaviour it has declared to be illegal, it declares punishments 
which do not. meet this requirement to be illegal. This negative fonn is intentional because the 
principle is perceived as limiting penal powers the government already possesses instead of 
conferring penal powers on it. While this turns the principle into a control device, it also confirms 
the secondary character of this control: it presupposes the existence of governmental penal powers 
but limits them indirectly by requiring governments to issue specific prohibitions-and as many 
as they like-before exercising them. However, these primary prohibitions are also negative: they 
too are a power-limiting device. In this scenario subjects can do whatever they like without having 
to fear that they will be punished by the government, unless an action they want to perform has 
been specifically prohibited. 
The licensing approach (see above: 287 ff.) is an attempt to utilise such prohibitions in a 
positive manner by permitting exemptions which are treated as privileges the government can 
manage as it sees fit. The combination of a prohibition with an exemption approach is used to 
create room for the exercise of a positive administrative discretion. But a prohibition approach can 
also be used to give subjects special protection, and it was used for this purpose in German New 
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Guinea. The aim of protecting the native population was pursued by the government by addressing 
prohibitions to its non-native subjects, by making it an offence for them to supply natives with 
liquor, to buy land from them or to provide them with credit and so on. 
It is important to note that this prohibition approach left the natives in a legal limbo. Although 
these prohibitions affected their rights-to receive liquor and so on-these rights were ignored, 
instead of being limited by corresponding prohibitions. It was not an offence for natives to sell 
land to non-natives, but nor could they take a non-native to court for his failure to perform a 
contractual duty to give them credit. The entire question of legal rights and duties was side-stepped 
by declaring private arrangements which breached these prohibitions to be legally invalid. 
This demonstrates that a prohibitions approach and a rights approach are two fundamentally 
different legal technologies . It also shows that while the government took it for granted that its 
powers pre-dated the colonial law it enacted, the rights it recognised as being held by its subjects 
were seen as a creation of the legal system it established. The government placed the rights of 
individuals which the colonial law recognised under its protection but, at the same time, legally 
invalidated any rights which were not so recognised. There were no legal rights-or 
duties-outside the system of colonial law. As far as the colonial law was concerned, persons were 
legal persons only as holders of legally recognised rights and duties. People without such rights 
or duties did not exist as legal persons, although they were subject to the powers of government 
as belonging in a legal category of "subjects". This category could be divided into various 
subcategories, with or without reference to legal rights or duties all persons with this particular 
legal status could legally enforce or could be legally forced to perform. 
In the case of the crucial legal category of "native" a reference to particular category-specific 
legal rights or duties was not made. "Natives" neither acquired special legal rights, for example 
the right to be provided with adequate land for subsistence purposes, nor were special legal duties 
imposed on them, for example the legal duty to perform corvee labour. According to the manner 
in which the colonial law applying to "natives" was designed, natives could no more be judicially 
punished for refusing to perform corvee labour than they could be judicially punished for selling 
land to a non-native. Indeed, the essential legal characteristic of "natives" was that they were not 
placed under the jurisdiction of the regular colonial courts.21 
On the other hand, the place of "natives" within the system of colonial government was seen 
as abnormal and the exercise of governmental powers in relation to them was increasingly 
regulated, at least by administrative instructions addressed to government officials. However, 
while the internal control of the exercise of governmental powers by the imposition of 
administrative duties on officials is efficient, it does not allow the legal system to function as a 
self-contained operation. In order to achieve this end vague sociopolitical powers have to be 
translated into clearly defined legal rights with corresponding legal duties. This calls for a 
complete transformation of the prohibitions approach. Whereas the latter sees the world as a place 
where governments, as well as their subjects, can do whatever they like as long as it is not 
prohibited, a rights approach sees it as a place where governments and their subjects cannot 
demand from others that they do anything, unless they have a legal right to make this demand. 
This transformation of pre-legal powers into legal rights does not merely control their exercise, 
it first of all requires their creation as legal rights. Sociopolitical powers become part of a legal 
system only if and in so far as they are recognised by it as legal entitlements. This recognition is 
also necessary in the case of governmental powers. They too exist legally only if they have been 
conferred on officials by the legal system Otherwise they remain alegal. Even if they have not 
2 1  The 1907 Head Tax Ordinance stopped short of declaring the non-payment of this tax to be an offence. But then the 
1905 Conunercial Tax Ordinance, which applied primarily to non-natives, was similarly constructed, although it permitted 
the collection of an additional penal tax in cases of non-payment. The 1908 Customs Ordinance, on the other hand, 
included normal, judicially enforceable penal provisions. 
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been declared to be illegal their exercise is legally not quite proper. In order to be legally above 
board the power of the state to take away the property of its subjects, for example, has to be 
transformed into the right to expropriate them in legally defined circumstances and against a 
legally defined compensation, which the expropriated person has a legal right to demand. 
The implications of a rights approach for the exercise of criminal penal powers are even more 
marked. While a rights approach does not deny the existence of penal powers it makes their 
exercise by particular officials problematic: unless he has been given a specific legal authority to 
exercise these powers an official who puts a person into prison or administers a corporal 
punishment runs the risk of being punished for an illegal deprivation of liberty or assault. 
Moreover, it becomes natural to see any governmental action which interferes with the rights of 
subjects as penal, so that for example the legislative imposition of taxes, rather than only a 
punishment for failing to pay them, is regarded as an exercise of the penal powers of government. 
In short, the nulla poena sine lege principle is a manifestation of a much broader principle, 
according to which governments can only lawfully interfere with the rights of their subjects after 
they have been legally authorised to do so, so that the exercise of alegal forms of administrative 
discretion becomes illegal. 
On the other hand, seen from a governmental perspective, the primary purpose of these 
legislative acts remains the allocation of legally defined governmental powers, rather than the 
creation of legal rights and duties. Yet although this allocation of powers is constitutive, a rights 
approach makes it natural to express it in normative language, as if the purpose of the exercise was 
merely a legal limitation of their exercise. 
This is not as dishonest as it appears because law as a system is essentially an attempt to make 
sociopolitical powers controllable by translating them into legal relationships between legal 
persons. By itself this translation is no more than a play with words, but once it is put into 
operation it becomes increasingly real. As an operation law becomes a distinct world which 
evolves in accordance with its own systemic logic. It becomes more effective in its practical 
operation by becoming theoretically more coherent, that is to say more rational in its own terms. 
To be sure, the legal system does not operate independently but it has a strong inherent tendency 
to transform or reject elements which do not fit because they are legally dysfunctional, even 
though they may reflect powerful political forces. In the history of colonial law in German New 
Guinea the treatment of the issue of "race" offers an instructive illustration of this process, 
precisely because it was not directly addressed although it loomed large in the background and 
grew rather than diminished in political importance. 
m 
Although the 1 886 Protectorates Act permitted the emperor to establish a dual system of justice 
in the German colonies, it did not do so by reference to racial criteria. Instead it introduced the 
Consular Jurisdiction Act for "German nationals and protected persons" and gave the emperor 
discretion to place other persons under this jurisdiction. By contrast, the imperial implementation 
ordinance for German New Guinea gave the term "native" a negative key role. It stipulated that 
all persons, except natives, were placed under the regular colonial jurisdiction whereas "natives" 
only came under it in so far as this had been especially ordered. The chancellor of the Reich was 
authorised to make this decision and to define the meaning of the term "native". It was his decree 
which gave the dual system of justice in German New Guinea a racial basis by defining the term 
"native" so as to include not only the colony's  indigenous population-"natives" in contrast to 
"foreigners"-but also "the members of other coloured tribes".22 
22 The decree presented this definition as a reflection of the conditions currently existing in German New Guinea. These 
conditions were not identified, but there is little doubt that the decree had the uncivilised state of the local natives in mind 
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The Protectorates Act and its implementation legislation made similar arrangements concerning 
the personal status law. The emperor was given discretion to apply the Personal Status Act to 
persons who were not German nationals .  He used this discretion to extend it to all persons who 
were not "natives" as defined by the chancellor. The difference was that the chancellor was in this 
context given no discretion to place natives under the act. On the other hand the 1 888 revision of 
the Protectorates Act moved in the opposite direction by permitting the chancellor to grant German 
nationality to "natives", as well as to "foreigners" (Auslander) living in the colonies.23 
The Neu Guinea Kompagnie acknowledged this new position in the Native Penal Ordinance. 
The "natives of the protectorate and the members of other coloured tribes who have been given 
equal status" were placed under the jurisdiction of the station courts, unless they had acquired 
"German nationality by their naturalisation and are therefore placed under the regular jurisdiction". 
The legal criterion of "nationality" overrode the racial criterion of "nativeness". 
But the legal position was not as straightforward as this suggests . It was clear that all "non­
natives"-a term which had not yet become part of the official vocabulary-were governed by the 
Personal Status Act so that they could only enter into a legally recognised marriage in German 
New Guinea in the form provided by this act, namely its registration by a registrar of births, deaths 
and marriages. What was unclear was whether natives were excluded from entering into a legally 
recognised marriage in this form, so that legally recognised mixed marriages were also ruled out. 
This, in tum, had a direct effect on the legal status of the children of sexual unions between natives 
and non-natives. Children from a legally recognised marriage acquired the legal status of their 
father under German law, whereas illegitimate children acquired the legal status of their mother. 
The legitimate children of a German father and a native woman therefore acquired German 
nationality by birth, as did the illegitimate children of a German mother and a native father. 
Conversely, the illegitimate children of a German father and a native woman, as well as the 
legitimate children of a German mother and a native husband, were legally "natives". 
But the question also arose as to whether a mixed marriage which had been concluded outside 
German New Guinea in a form which was legally recognised at the place of marriage was legally 
recognised in German New Guinea, and whether "natives" who had acquired a foreign nationality 
in accordance with the laws of other countries counted legally as "non-natives" in German New 
Guinea. Was a Negro who held US citizenship nonetheless legally a "native" in German New 
Guinea? On the other hand, was the illegitimate child of a native woman resident in German New 
Guinea legally a "non-native", if she had given birth to the child during a visit to a country which 
applied the principle of ius soli, so that the child acquired its citizenship by the mere fact of its 
birth in that country? 
Before exploring this labyrinth a little further, a look at the consequences of the 1900 revision 
of the Protectorates Act for the legal position of natives is called for. Although the outcome in 
1 886 and 1 900 was basically the same, the change in approach is remarkable. The primary aim in 
1 886 had been the establishment of a civilised system of justice for German nationals residing in 
the German colonies which the emperor could extend to other persons .  In 1900 the jurisdiction was 
perceived as being essentially territorial. It covered the entire population, except natives, unless 
specific exceptions from this rule were made for them. 
The term "native" was not defined in the new arrangement, but it was plainly understood in a 
geographical sense: it encompassed the indigenous population of the German colonies, and no-one 
else. On the other hand, the emperor was given a negative discretion to exclude "non-natives" in 
as well as the fact that "members of other coloured tribes" would only be imported into the colony as lowly labourers. 
According to a view expressed at the time, the special legal status ofnatives would automatically come to an end with their 
conversion to Christianity. 
23 This was not as radical as might appear because it had "always" been legally possible to naturalise natives residing 
in Germany, who counted in the metropolitan context as normal foreigners. 
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this sense from the regular jurisdiction. The Protectorates Act defined this discretion in non-racial 
terms-"other sections of the population"-so that any distinguishing characteristic could have 
been chosen. But the imperial implementation ordinance returned to the previous practice by again 
singling out "the members of other coloured tribes" which were now identified as "foreign". 
However, this "section of the population" was no longer classified as a species of "native"; its 
members were not regarded as being in fact natives, they only had the same legal status as natives. 
The ordinance was even more cautious in formulating the basis for a preferential treatment of 
Japanese. It neither committed itself to saying that Japanese were not members of a foreign 
coloured tribe, nor that they had the legal status of non-natives. They were only said not to count 
as members of foreign coloured tribes, so that they did not have the legal status of natives. 
The entire arrangement was ostensibly based on a distinction between the indigenous and the 
non-indigenous population of the German colonies; although the subsidiary reference to the 
existence of other coloured tribes24 beyond their borders gave an indication that skin colour played 
an important role. But terms like "whites", "Europeans" or "Caucasians" were still not used in the 
text, and German nationals were not given a special legal status . They were legally an un­
distinguished part of the normal population, in contrast to the natives-for it was the latter who 
were treated as a special case. 
The legal recognition that members of foreign coloured tribes were not natives but were merely 
given the same legal status and, more precisely, the same legal status in relation to the 
Protectorates Act, had considerable practical importance, since other colonial legislation referring 
to natives did not automatically apply to persons of equal status. This was clear in cases where the 
legislation itself distinguished between "natives" and "other coloured persons", as in the imperial 
land and mining ordinances. But there is also little doubt, for example, that when the imperial 
expropriation ordinance made special provisions for the expropriation of land in favour of 
"natives", it only meant indigenous natives and not also "other coloured persons". 25 Similarly, the 
1907 Native Head Tax Ordinance for the Old Protectorate only covered "natives" and not also 
persons of equal status. Such persons were also not placed under the authority of government 
chiefs. Nor did they have to render the compulsory services the government could demand from 
"natives", according to Hahl' s  1903 administrative instruction. 
A legal differentiation between indigenous natives and other coloured persons-or local and 
foreign natives-already began with the special treatment the latter could be give in relation to the 
liquor and firearms prohibition. In later years even distinctions between different classes of 
indigenous natives-natives of the Old Protectorate and the Island Territory-were made in that 
context. By contrast the 1 888 ordinance concerning the maintenance of discipline among coloured 
labourers initially did not distinguish between indigenous and other coloured labourers. But a 
series of amendments created quite bizarre legal distinctions. In December 1 889 imperial 
commissioner Rose ruled out the corporal punishment of labourers who had been recruited in the 
Dutch East Indies.26 Three months later he introduced a fine of up to 30 Marks as an alternative 
disciplinary punishment for these labourers. In February 1 893 administrator Schmiele put 
labourers recruited in the Straits Settlements on the same footing, provided they were of "Malay 
or Indonesian origin". A year later he introduced disciplinary fines of up to 30 Marks for Chinese 
coolies, but without exempting them from corporal punishments. 
24 By implication even the possibility of the existence of white "tribes" was ruled out. Conversely it was indirectly made 
clear that it was not his or her place of birth which made a person a native, rather only a person who was a member of a 
coloured indigenous tribe was a native. 
25 For example, the ordinance could not be legally used as a basis for the creation of native reserves for Chinese on 
expropriated land. 
26 He made an exception from this exception by permitting disciplinary corporal punishment of such persons while they 
were serving prison sentences for serious offences. This shows that Rose then already-as in 1 906 (see above: 65)-saw 
corporal punishment as an instrument of prison discipline in a different light. 
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In other words, it looks as if after February 1 894 indigenous coloured labourers could be 
beaten but not fined, Malay labourers could be fined but not beaten and Chinese labourers could 
be beaten as well as fined. But this still does not capture the absurd subtlety of the scheme; for 
while Chinese labourers recruited in the Straits Settlements could be beaten, Chinese recruited in 
the Dutch East Indies apparently could not. 
Bennigsen's  1900 Disciplinary Ordinance, which permitted corporal punishments for all 
coloured labourers, quickly had to be amended by reintroducing the exception for coloured 
labourers from the Dutch East Indies . A 1903 amendment also outlawed the disciplinary corporal 
punishment of Chinese labourers . A draft labour ordinance (see AA 63/83, Item B 201/3) which 
would also have replaced this disciplinary ordinance in 1915 ,  no longer made these exceptions 
because the entire ordinance applied only to indigenous native labourers for whom corporal 
punishments were still regarded as a natural part of life. 
This draft ordinance shows how the legal position of natives in the colonial scheme of things 
was generally viewed just before the end of German colonial rule. Its full title, "Ordinance of the 
Governor of German New Guinea concerning the Emigration and Exportation of Natives, the 
Recruitment and Employment of Natives as Labourers and the Maintenance of Discipline among 
Native Labourers", gives an idea of the breadth of its scope.27 
Its first section states that only natives indigenous to the colony were natives for the purpose 
of the ordinance. This served the practical need of excluding "members of foreign coloured tribes", 
but was useless as a definition of "native" as a technical legal term. This was probably intentional 
because the draft suggests that its authors wanted to avoid such a definition and preferred to 
maintain some fluid uncertainty. 
This is reflected in the changing terminology used for persons or bodies other than native 
labourers, with whom the draft ordinance was concerned. The central terms in this context were 
"employer" (Arbeitgeber) and "enterprise" (Betrieb or Untemehmen). In most cases they were 
used without reference to the legal status of the employer or enterprise. The draft ordinance 
applied, in principle, to all employers, regardless of whether they were natives or non-natives. But 
in some instances the legal status of a person or enterprise was regarded as important, and a variety 
of terms was used to identify this status. 
The term "non-native" (Nicht-Eingeborener) was used only once. Usually reference was made 
instead to "European" (Europaer). "Europeans" were contrasted with "non-Europeans" and with 
persons who had the legal status of "Europeans". The term "white" was only used to contrast 
"white" with "coloured" medical assistants .28 In addition, the draft ordinance singled out 
"European enterprises", in implied contrast to non-European enterprises, and restricted the 
privilege of taking native servants abroad to Europeans who were resident in the colony-in 
implied contrast to European visitors. 
Leaving these peculiarities aside, we therefore find three pairs of contrasting terms with 
overlapping meanings : ( 1 )  natives and non-natives ; (2) Europeans and non-Europeans and (3) 
persons with the legal status of Europeans and persons with the legal status of natives. Put more 
concretely, the draft ordinance distinguished a hierarchy of four "classes" of colonial subjects. 
Indigenous natives, that is to say Melanesians and Micronesians, were at the bottom. Next came 
the non-Europeans with the legal status of natives, that is to say Chinese and members of "other 
foreign coloured tribes". Then came the non-natives with the legal status of Europeans, that is to 
say Japanese. The top of the pyramid was occupied by "true" Europeans. 
27 It was the keystone of a comprehensive legislative reform program which was to supplement an administrative reform 
program in support of an economic development program which was to have made German New Guinea financially self­
sufficient after another five years of substantially increased Reich subsidies. 
28 There is even a reference to "German", but only in relation to vessels sailing under the German flag, in contrast to those 
sailing under foreign flags. 
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This was merely the hierarchical differentiation which was of practical importance in the field 
of labour law. All told the position was considerably more complex, since Micronesians were in 
some respects given a legally privileged position as compared with Melanesians, and since Hahl 
favoured reforms which would have given Chinese at least in some respects the legal status of 
Europeans. In addition, we need to take the criterion of "nationality" into account: did a native 
who acquired German nationality by naturalisation become legally a European or only a person 
with the legal status of a European? Conversely, was a "white" American, Asian, African or 
Australian legally a "European"? 
What were the practical consequences of these terminological distinctions in the field of labour 
law? Everybody, it appears, was entitled to employ "natives" as labourers under the draft 
ordinance and was then governed by its provisions. However, not every employer was entitled to 
recruit "natives" as labourers . An employer could only recruit if he held a recruiting licence, and 
while he could then recruit personally-apparently regardless of his own legal status-he could 
only employ "Europeans or persons who had the legal status of Europeans" as recruiting agents. 
That is to say, only Japanese, but not Chinese, could be employed as recruiting agents. On the 
other hand, the draft ordinance made an exception for the "organised" parts of German New 
Guinea. There also a "non-European"-that is to say anyone, including an indigenous 
native-could be authorised to recruit, provided the applicant accepted liability for illegal acts 
performed by this agent. On the other hand, only a true European could certify the correctness of 
entries in the "wages book" (Lohnbuch), which every labourer had to be given. 
Whereas the draft ordinance applied in principle to all employers, it did not apply to all native 
labourers, although the definition of "recruitment" was extraordinarily wide, namely "any activity 
aimed at obtaining natives as labourers for the performance of services of any kind", apart from 
"police and military services'', for which a separate ordinance was in the pipeline. In addition, all 
"casual labourers" and "piece-workers" who lived no more than 40 kilometres from their place of 
work and were only employed for shorter periods-respectively up to six and three months-were 
exempted. The employment of domestic servants could also be removed from certain parts of the 
ordinance on the application of the employer. 
The most interesting exception related to natives who were employed in "elevated positions" 
(in gehobener Stellung). They could make an application that the entire ordinance did not apply 
to them, with the result that they were no longer subject to disciplinary punishments but also no 
longer given governmental protection. Instead they had to negotiate their own employment 
conditions and had to enforce any claims against their employers as private individuals the same 
as "Europeans".29 
The draft ordinance prohibited the recruitment of the majority of the native population. 
Prohibited was the recruitment of children, the elderly and unmarried women. Hahl now also 
included, and toughened, his administrative restrictions in relation to the recruitment of married 
women. The approval of their husbands was formally made a requirement under colonial law and 
married women could only be recruited together with their husbands for employment in the same 
enterprise and at the same place. The recruitment of all "enrolled" students, including those who 
were male and no longer children, was prohibited.30 In addition the draft ordinance made it an 
offence to recruit any native who was already employed, provided the recruiter knew or should 
have known that this was the case . 
Finally, it was prohibited to recruit the "native organs of the administration", namely the 
"chiefs" and their "tultuls" (messengers) as well as the "Heiltultuls" who had been trained as 
29 It is not clear why this special treatment of natives in "elevated positions" was restricted to those employed in 
"European enterprises". Did the government not trust non-European employers, or did non-European enterprises not 
employ natives in "elevated positions" at the time? Or had the draftsman merely followed his instincts which told him that 
only "Europeans" were "natural" employers of natives? 
30 This prohibition had to be read in connection with a draft native education ordinance which had also been prepared. 
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medical assistants and posted in native communities. 31 This gives a good indication of the central 
importance of the labour market in German New Guinea. It is not surprising therefore that the draft 
ordinance also gave formal legislative recognition to the general structure of the administration 
which had in the meantime evolved through administrative practice. Apart from the district offices, 
there were now three classes of government stations. Stations of the first and second class operated 
largely independently, under the direct control of the governor, whereas government stations of 
the third class were placed under a district office. However, the district commissioners were 
authorised to delegate all their supervisory powers in labour matters to these stations . On the other 
hand, the governor could bypass the district offices by appointing special "labour commissioners" 
in their districts who were under his direct control. 
The supervisory powers in labour matters were extensive. Although the employment was still 
a contractual one, into which a native entered voluntarily, all its aspects were covered by detailed 
legislative provisions. Every employment contract had to be approved by the authorities. It was 
declared to be legally void if it had been entered into by a native who was employed by a "non­
native" ,32 and the valid employment contract of a married native woman came automatically to an 
end with her divorce.33 
The ordinance did not permit the labourer or his employer to terminate a fixed term contract 
prematurely by giving notice. But whereas an employer could dismiss a labourer for several, 
identified reasons, which were similar to those for a divorce, a labourer was not given 
corresponding rights . Instead it was up to the administrative authorities to order the discharge of 
a labourer, and it could do so not only if a labourer had been maltreated, or become medically 
incapable of carrying out his contractual duties, but also if he was required at home as the only 
provider for his family or relatives .34 
How far the employment of a native labourer had been removed from a normal contractual 
relationship is shown by the fact that the draft ordinance made it formally a criminal offence for 
a native labourer to escape from his contractual obligations by repeatedly running away. The 
offence carried a penalty of up to one year imprisonment. But a labourer could only be punished 
at the request of his employer and a criminal punishment was excluded if the labourer had already 
received a disciplinary punishment.35 A native labourer could also be sent to prison for a year if 
he entered into a second employment contract and concealed the fact that he was already employed 
at that time. 
Employers, prospective employers and a wide range of other persons could also be punished 
under the ordinance. Its penal provisions referred to over 50 sections, a breach of which 
constituted an offence. According to seriousness, the punishment was either imprisonment of up 
3 1  These recruitment prohibitions apparently did not apply to the hiring of casual labourers and piece-workers. But while 
it may have been intended to permit the local hiring of casual, female domestic servants, it seems strange, for example, 
that planters should also have been free to hire a "Heiltultuf' from a neighbouring village as a casual medical assistant 
to look after his labourers, thereby depriving the village of his services. 
32 This may well have been another drafting flaw, since it could hardly have been intended to treat an employment 
contract as legally valid if the native labourer was already employed by a Chinese. On the other hand, the draftsman may 
have used the term ''non-native" in a sense which not only included European employers and those who had the legal 
status of a European but also employers who had the legal status of natives, but were not natives in the meaning of this 
ordinance. However, even if this was the intended meaning, the provision was discriminatory because an existing . 
employment contract with another indigenous native did not invalidate a second contract. 
33 The legal justification was probably that the woman was now unmarried so that her recruitment would have been 
prohibited. It was also politically desirable that divorced women returned to their villages, remarried and bore children. 
34 In this case a certificate by the local authority in his home area was required. 
35 This treatment-aimed at preventing double punishment of the same act-would appear to be in breach of the 
disciplinary punishment provisions of the ordinance, since according to them a disciplinary punishment was not 
permissible for actions which constituted a criminal offence. But then the wording used there ("gegen ein Strafgesetz 
verstossf') may have been used in a sense which excluded breaches of ''police and other administrative regulations". 
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to two weeks or a fine of up to 150 Marks or both, or a fine of up to 2,000 Marks and 
imprisonment of up to three months or both. These comparatively mild punishments36 applied only 
to Europeans and persons with the legal status of Europeans. Natives and persons of equal status 
were to be punished in accordance with the penal provisions applying to them, that is to say under 
the Native Penal Ordinance, which far exceeded the one year imprisonment provided for in the 
labour ordinance for native labourers . 
In order to get the full picture we also need to consider the most radical part of this ordinance: 
the provision relating to the "emigration" and "exportation" of natives. Section 5 categorically 
prohibited the emigration of natives from German New Guinea. Section 6 made the movement of 
a native from one district of German New Guinea to another-which was classified as an internal 
form of emigration-subject to the approval of both the local administrations in the district the 
native wanted to leave and that to which he wanted to move. Section 7 prohibited the exportation 
of natives from German New Guinea with two very specific exceptions.37 
The first point to be made is that a native who "emigrated" in breach of sections 5 or 6 did not 
commit an offence, whereas a non-native or native who induced a native to emigrate did commit 
an offence. Similarly, while a native labourer could only receive a criminal punishment if he 
deserted repeatedly, anyone-non-native or native-who gave shelter to a native deserter, even 
after a first desertion, committed an offence, if he knew or should have known that this person was 
a deserter. Similarly, while a native labourer could only receive a criminal punishment if he had 
actually entered into a second employment contract and had concealed the fact that he was already 
employed, the mere attempt to induce a native labourer to breach his employment contract 
constituted an offence. 
In short, the ordinance was even tougher in relation to the rest of German New Guinea's 
population than it was in relation to native labourers. To be sure, "foreigners" were free to leave 
German New Guinea if they did not like this strict regime, whereas indigenous natives were not. 
On the other hand, foreigners, including German nationals, could be deported from German New 
Guinea whereas indigenous natives could not. In this sense German New Guinea' s  indigenous 
natives were legally recognised as the colony's only true inhabitants who had a birthright to be 
there which even the emperor could not extinguish. 38 
German New Guinea was legally a weird place. But it was actually weird and not in a narrative 
phantom fashion. This does not mean that there were no legal phantoms. The colonial law of 
German New Guinea was full of them: Europeans who were not Europeans, natives who were not 
natives and so on. But these phantoms are historically real. They are part of the history of German 
colonial rule, and not the result of a subsequent narrative oversimplification. On the contrary, they 
can only be shown for what they really were, namely phantoms, if they are closely examined. 
For example, the chancellor of the Reich did not try to define in 1 886 who was a "native" in 
German New Guinea but who legally counted as such for the purposes of the Protectorates Act. 
The aim was to give a legally desirable, normative definition rather than a factually accurate 
description. Seen in this light it made sense to stipulate that this category consisted primarily of 
the members of the tribes indigenous to the colony and to assume that its indigenous population 
was actually organised into what could be loosely called "tribes". It also made sense to stick to the 
purportedly descriptive concept of "tribe" when extending the definition of "native"-for the time 
being !-to include coloured labourers who were imported to the colony from abroad and to 
classify them as the "members of other coloured tribes", because they were non-white persons who 
36 The governor had no legislative autority to stipulate prison sentences of more than three months for persons who had 
been placed under the Protectorates Act. 
37 The privilege of German finns in Samoa to export Melanesian labourers was no longer recognised. 
38 It was legally possible for natives to relinquish this privileged status by acquiring German, or some other nationality 
because they thereby became legally non-natives and subject to deportation. 
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were not recruited as citizens of states recognised as such by the international community-for if 
they were, they did not count legally as "natives", but were foreign nationals who were, in 
principle, legally treated like German nationals. In other words, what indigenous and foreign 
natives had in common was that they were non-white, stateless persons. 
But it was more convenient to choose what sounded like a simple positive definition instead 
of spelling this out. Yet, if its wording was taken seriously this definition created considerable 
problems. Firstly, the concept of a "coloured tribe" is absurd because colour is not an attribute 
tribes as sociopolitical bodies can have. But the definition did not want to say "coloured members 
of foreign tribes". Instead it reflected the idea that humankind was somehow geographically 
divided into a white world which was organised in the form of states and a coloured world which 
was not organised in the form of states but, for want of a better word, in the form of "tribes".39 
The definition could afford to be vague as to the meaning of "foreign coloured tribes", but 
could it also ignore the question as to who counted as a member of an indigenous tribe? If this 
question was taken seriously it could only be the "traditional" law of these tribes which provided 
the answer. The colonial law could, of course, accept that members of indigenous tribes who had 
become citizens of "white" states did not count legally as natives, even if they were, under 
traditional law, still regarded as members of an indigenous tribe; and it did so expressly in the case 
of all natives who had acquired German nationality by their naturalisation. It could also ignore the 
legal effects of a non-native becoming a member of an indigenous tribe under traditional law. A 
German trader who was accepted as a member of such a tribe did not thereby become legally a 
native. But what, for example, about a coloured trader from the southern Solomons or a coloured 
mission teacher from Polynesia? Did they become "indigenous" natives by being adopted into a 
local tribe? 
Conversely, what about indigenous natives who were expelled from their tribes, and therefore 
did not fall under the legal definition of a "native'', unless the entire definition, apart from the 
reference to colour, is treated as meaningless? What about the children of a German trader and a 
native woman belonging to a patrilineal society with whom he had entered into a customary 
marriage which was not recognised by colonial law? Did they too fall legally between two stools, 
because under traditional law they were not members of the tribe of their native mother but of their 
non-native father, whereas they were not recognised as German nationals under colonial law? 
The sirnp)e fact is that the dual system of justice the Protectorates Act introduced could legally 
only work smoothly as long as "non-natives" and "natives" lived side by side as two clearly 
distinct groups which did not interact with each other, which, in practice, was neither possible nor 
desirable. 
Mixed marriages and "mixed persons" (Mischlinge) were not the only sources of legal 
problems, the entire field of mixed jurisdiction was a legal minefield that was never cleared and 
which could not be cleared because a race-based duality made no legal sense since it was 
fundamentally irrational. 
Yet there were powerful political forces at work which prevented colonial law from eliminating 
this jurisprudentially dysfunctional distinction altogether. As a result the colonial authorities 
muddled along. An imperial draft ordinance concerning "mixed marriages and mixed race 
persons", and a second ordinance concerning "the legal status of natives", which were supposed 
to solve these problems, were never enacted, although they had been under discussion for several 
years. Nor did the colonial office approve the draft of an ordinance concerning mixed-race persons 
which had been prepared by governor Hahl for German New Guinea. Its scope was modest, 
because it only dealt with the illegitimate mixed-race children of native mothers, since a regulation 
39 The term ''native states" was later occasionally used in official documents as an alternative. However, legally the term 
"state" was also a normative concept. It was shaped by the pecularities of international public law, according to which 
political entities were only "states" if they were recognised by the international community which happened to be largely 
identical with the "white" world. 
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of the legal position of the illegitimate mixed-race children of non-native mothers was beyond his 
legislative powers40 and the colonial office did not want Hahl to draft colony-specific regulations 
for the treatment of mixed marriages. 
It had been Hahl' s  main concern to establish a legal obligation for non-native fathers of 
illegitimate mixed-race children to pay for their maintenance because he wanted to ensure that 
these children would receive an education that gave them an "elevated position", even though they 
retained the legal status of natives. The draft ordinance therefore provided for the appointment of 
non-native guardians; made it obligatory to send such children to school when they reached six 
years of age; and obliged their fathers to pay maintenance for which a security not exceeding 1 ,500 
Marks could be demanded at birth.41 The governor was given discretion to grant such a child the 
legal status of a non-native and a non-native family name, although that of the child's  father could 
only be used with his approval. 
A simple and sensible piece of legislation, one would think, but its reception in the colonial 
office was decidedly hostile. Not only were several specific legal flaws eagerly discovered, but 
some officials openly disagreed with Hahl's aim of giving mixed-race people an "elevated 
position". According to them it was far better to keep them at the level of their native mothers and 
to calculate the maintenance accordingly.42 
As regards mixed marriages, Hahl was less committed. When the government station in Saipan 
raised in 1908 the question as to whether the registrar could marry a native with a non-native, Hahl 
took the legally simplistic view that the 1 870 Personal Status Act applied to natives only if this had 
been stipulated by an imperial ordinance. Since such an ordinance had not been enacted the 
registrar was not authorised to marry natives with whites, or Japanese who had been given the 
same legal status. Hahl was obviously relieved that the legal aspect of the matter was apparently 
so simple, because it saved him from having to say anything about the political controversies 
surrounding mixed marriages which had caused the colonial office to oppose them in principle 
(RKA 5430). Yet the fact that the colonial office rejected such marriages only for political reasons 
should have warned Hahl that the legal position was not as straightforward as he believed. But 
when he sent it a copy of his decree, the colonial office did not bother to inform him of a 1906 
expert opinion by the ministry of justice, according to which an application of the 1 870 Personal 
Status Act to mixed marriages was not only permissible but mandatory. It provided the only form 
in which a non-native could get legally married in German colonies, and marriages between natives 
and non-natives, which could, without doubt, be validly concluded in metropolitan Germany, had 
not been expressly declared to be illegal in the colonies (RKA 5417). 43 
40 According to Hahl there were several children who fell into this category. At least if their mothers were German 
nationals, they were Gennan nationals and therefore had the legal status ofnon-natives. The number of mixed-race persons 
in German New Guinea was not large. On I January 1914 it amounted officially to 102, of whom 83 were under 15  years 
ofage, but the number had increased by about ten per cent since January 19 13  (AB, 19 14: 159). It is worth noting that this 
figure included only persons one of whose parents was "European". Mixed-race persons, both of whose parents were 
"coloured", were not counted. In their case the question as to whether they were legally "non-natives" generally did not 
arise, although the classification of the child of a naturalised indigenous native with a non-naturalised indigenous native 
raised interesting questions. Was such a racially pure child nonetheless legally a mixed-race person on account of the 
nationality of one of its parents? But then the term "Mischling" was also not a technical legal term. 
41 This was sufficient to pay for the education of the child in one of the boarding schools run by the missions. 
42 This led the most sympathetic official, Hahl' s former deputy, Krauss, to comment that the entire ordinance was then 
superfluous, since the child would in any case be given the same kind ofnative food and native care as other children by 
its mother and her relatives. 
43 Such metropolitan mixed marriages were also legally recognised in German New Guinea. In other words the 
Protectorates Act meant what it said about the personal status law of natives, but this was not what it appeared to be. It 
meant no more than that the Personal Status Act did not apply to natives. It did not introduce a civil marriage before the 
registrar as the only legal form of marriage for natives. It probably also meant that one native could not marry another 
native in that form because the act did not apply to either party. But it did not mean that a non-native could not marry a 
native in this form. Nor did it say that a marriage entered into by natives in another form was legally invalid. It was silent 
376 THE EMPEROR' S NEW CLOTHES 
Rose, who had handled the matter in the colonial department in 1906, expressed the view that 
he had never doubted that colonial registrars could legally marry natives with non-natives, and that 
a change of the law was required in order to prevent this. But he postponed any action in "this 
difficult matter". When it was presented to the head of the new colonial office, Dernburg, a year 
later he was less hesitant. He decided to issue forthwith an administrative instruction that no 
further mixed marriages were to be registered in German colonies . After further discussions he 
changed his mind. Instead of rushing off a circular decree to all governors-the legal validity of 
which his advisers described as "doubtful"-the matter was put on hold until it could be dealt with 
as part of the planned general revision of the Protectorates Act, which never took place (RKA 
5417).44 
One of the most interesting earlier cases in this category also involved Rose who gave a 
reassuring expert opinion in his capacity as German consul in Samoa. The case had arisen in the 
Marshall Islands in 1 897 and involved the children of a German trader and a Marshallese woman 
to whom he had been married by a missionary before the Marshall Islands had come under German 
rule. This marriage had been recognised as legally valid so that the children had acquired German 
nationality. What concerned acting administrator Senfft was not the legal status of these children 
but that of their children, and of the children of all mixed-race persons with the legal status of non­
natives. These people usually married Marshallese and followed the way of life of other 
Marshallese, but their legal status as non-natives could still be inherited by their children who were 
quite indistinguishable from other Marshallese. Indeed, according to Senfft only one of the first­
generation mixed-race persons had the energy and ambition to lift himself to a higher level than 
other members of "his race". 
In Rose' s view Senfft was unnecessarily worried because mixed-race persons who married 
Marshallese would do so in accordance with custom rather than bothering to have their marriages 
officially registered. Hence these marriages were not legally recognised, so that mixed-race fathers 
did not pass on their nationality to children from such marriages . On the other hand, such 
customary marriages could not be said to be without any legal effects. Thus children from those 
marriages could not be regarded as being altogether illegitimate. In particular they were not 
illegitimate children in the meaning of section 3 of the 1 870 German Citizenship Act, so that 
mixed-race mothers also did not pass on their German nationality to children born in such a 
customary marriage. 
Rose adopted a similarly flexible approach in relation to a subsidiary concern expressed by 
Senfft. In Senfft' s view mixed-race persons in the Marshall Islands who had the legal status of 
non-natives were severely disadvantaged because they were legally not permitted to acquire land 
rights from Marshallese, even by gift or inheritance from their Marshallese relatives. Could this 
problem not be solved, Rose suggested, by adopting the view that a person who was a "non-native" 
under the Protectorates Act could nonetheless be a "native" as far as the land acquisition 
prohibition in the Marshall Islands was concerned? Rose could even point to a Samoan precedent; 
on both these questions. 
44 To say that the legal effects of an administrative instruction prohibiting the registration of mixed marriages were 
"doubtful" was a polite understatement. If one accepted the view of the ministry of justice, such an instruction was itself 
illegal and therefore invalid. Solf issued a similar instruction a few years later, although only in relation to his former 
bailiwick, Samoa-yet it had been the conditions in Samoa that had enabled his advisers to persuade Dernburg in 1908 
not to attempt to prohibit mixed marriages by administrative fiat. In a decree of 17 January 1 9 1 2  (RKA 5417) Solf laid 
down general guidelines for the administrative treatment of mixed marriages and mixed-race persons in Samoa. They 
instructed the local authorities ( l )  to register no further mixed marriages; (2) to treat the children of existing mixed 
marriages as "whites", if the marriage had been regarded as legitimate; (3) to treat the illegitimate children of whites as 
whites provided they had been entered into the official "list of mixed-race persons" (Mischlingsliste ); and ( 4) to treat all 
mixed-race persons born after these guidelines had been made public as natives. In addition the authorities were instructed 
to revise the Mischlingsliste from time to time, to remove the names of"unworthy" persons but to grant natives who spoke 
fluent German and had received a European education on their application the legal status of whites. 
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the Supreme Court there had classified the same woman as an "American subject" under article 
ill of the General Act of the Samoa Conference which defined its jurisdiction, but as a "native" 
under its article IV, section 1 ,  which prohibited the alienation of land by native Samoans to 
citizens of foreign countries (see RKA 5430). 
A different question arose in 1912  when five mixed-race persons in the Eastern Carolines 
applied to be taxed at the non-native rate of 40 Marks per annum, although it had been explained 
to them that they would not acquire the legal status of non-natives by doing so. Their application 
was approved by Hahl as a special tax rate for natives, because they were all employed in "elevated 
positions by a European enterprise", although his deputy, Osswald, had expressed doubts as to 
whether this was legally permissible because the native tax ordinance permitted special tax rates 
only for entire categories of natives and it was unlikely that the payment of a head tax of 40 Marks 
could be imposed on all mixed-race persons in the Island Territory who had the legal status of 
natives (see AA, G2, Item H34). 
Legal difficulties also arose in the treatment of mixed-race persons who had the legal status of 
German nationals . In 1912  the commander of SMS Cormoran informed Hahl confidentially that 
he had received several applications by such persons to be permitted to perform their national 
service on board his ship. He had rejected them because he regarded the presence of coloured 
servicemen on his ship as undesirable, in particular in view of the racial attitudes prevailing in 
Australia. As a result mixed-race persons wearing the uniform of the imperial navy would be 
treated as "inferior" by the public when the Cormoran visited Australian harbours, thus creating 
a quite intolerable situation.45 
Hahl tried to find a workable compromise. He instructed the government station in Jaluit to tell 
mixed-race German nationals that they would probably not be required to perform their national 
service at all because it was likely that they would all be allocated to "the reserve" by the 
authorities in Germany.46 
How did the planned imperial ordinances (see RKA 54 1 8) expect to solve these problems? The 
"mixed marriages and mixed-race persons" ordinance used the term "native" in the geographical 
sense it had been given in the revised Protectorates Act and settled essentially for a modified 
licensing approach. Instead of generally prohibiting mixed marriages, it placed them under the 
Personal Status Act, but required in each case a discretionary permission of the governor, who had 
to hear his advisory council before granting it. By entering a mixed marriage the native spouse 
became subject to the civil, criminal and procedural law introduced by the Protectorates Act, and 
thus acquired in so far the legal status of a non-native.47 
The ordinance also applied to "members of foreign coloured tribes" who had been given the 
legal status of natives by the imperial ordinance implementing the Protectorates Act and to 
descendants of mixed marriages. However, it did not affect international treaties which gave 
foreign natives the legal status of non-natives, so that a marriage entered into by such a person with 
another non-native did not count as a mixed marriage under the ordinance. 
While entering into a mixed marriage without the governor' s  permission was not a criminal 
offence for the persons entering into it, the official who registered such a marriage was subject to 
a fine of up to 600 Marks.48 It was this threat of a criminal punishment hanging over the registrar 
45 The commander had gone out of his way to accommodate such applications by white German nationals. He had used 
the excuse of lack of space to reject those of the "Mischlinge" . It is likely that the racial attitudes prevailing in Australia 
served as a welcome excuse for the commander for not having to disclose his own views or that of his crew. 
46 As was to be expected this instruction was criticised by the War Office in Berlin as contradicting the National Service 
Act, according to which each such case had to be decided on its merits (see RKA 3 1 08). 
47 This was an indirect way of saying that a native spouse did not become a German citizen even if the non-native 
husband was a German national. 
48 A person conducting the religious celebration of a mixed marriage which had not been registered by the civil 
authorities was subject to imprisonment of up to three months. 
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that gave teeth to the ordinance, because a mixed marriage which was registered without the 
governor' s permission was nonetheless legally valid.49 
The legally more ambitious second ordinance tried to avoid the difficulties of giving a legal 
definition of "native" by inventing a colonial counterpart of the legal concept of "nationality" 
(Staatsangehorigkeit), namely a "SchutzgebietsangehOrigkeit"-a kind of "coloniality". 
The "Schutzgebietsangehorigkeit" was treated as a privilege which could be gained as well as 
lost. It could be acquired by birth, marriage or admission. It was acquired by birth by the legitimate 
children of male "Gennan ( !) natives"so and by the illegitimate children of female "German 
natives".s 1  It was acquired by a "native ( ! )  marriage" of a "stateless" ( ! )  woman to a "German 
native". It could be acquired by admission by a "foreign ( ! )  native" who had become a resident in 
a Gennan colony if the governor gave his discretionary approval to an application to this effect.s2 
But the admission became legally effective only after the applicant had been issued with an 
admission certificate.s3 
The "Schutzgebietsangehorigkeit" was lost by the acquisition of the Gennan or a foreign 
nationality by a female "Gennan native" who entered into a legally valid marriage with a German 
or a foreign national, or into a "native marriage" with a "member" (Angehoriger) of another 
German or foreign colony, or by dismissal. The ordinance did not define the circumstances under 
which a SchutzgebietsangehOriger could be dismissed, but left it to the chancellor of the Reich to 
regulate this question and to enact more specific regulations concerning the issue of dismissal and 
admission certificates.s4 It is clear, however, that these regulations would have given governors 
wide discretion and that, in particular, a legal challenge to a dismissal would have been excluded.ss 
In the end it would therefore have been up to the governor to determine who was and who was not 
a "Schutzgebietsangehoriger". On the other hand, a native had a hard time to reject this privilege 
as any native who had his pennanent residence in a Gennan colony counted as a "German native" 
unless he was able to prove the contrary. 
Although the draft ordinance avoided any reference to skin colour,s6 it did not abandon the 
distinction between white and coloured persons in substance since only "natives" could become 
"Schutzgebietsangeh0rige".s7 But it did implicitly acknowledge that it was impossible to give a 
legally workable definition of "native" and that the best way of handling the issue was to create 
49 An unregistered mixed marriage was legally invalid, and children from such a marriage were legally illegitimate, even 
if the marriage had been permitted by the governor. 
50 The term "German native" is not defined. The context suggests that it meant a native who was a "member" of the 
German colony in which the child was born-but the drafting is far from clear. It certainly did not mean a native who had 
acquired German nationality. 
5 1  Although this is not expressly stated, it is clear that the draft ordinance recognised "native marriages" as legally valid 
in the sense that children from such a marriage were regarded as "legitimate". 
52 A "foreign native" who was employed by the government counted automatically as a "Schutzgebietsangehoriger'', 
if his employment contract had been signed or approved by the governor. 
53 The admission included, unless otherwise stated, the wife and the children of the applicant-but the former only in 
so far as she was "stateless" and the latter only in so far as the applicant still exercised parental powers over them. 
54 It also did not state what the consequences of such a "dismissal" were. Was a native who had lost his or her 
Schutzgebietsangehorigkeit to be deported or did his or her deportation become at least legally permissible? 
55 The ordinance did stipulate that the non-issue of a certificate of "SchutzgebietsangehOrigkeit" by a governor could 
not be legally challenged. 
56 The only possible but hardly intended exception was the case of a stateless non-native woman who on the face of the 
ordinance automatically acquired the Schutzgebietsangehorigkeit by a "native marriage" with a "German native". 
57 In contrast to the other imperial ordinances, this one-after a revision of its text-was consistent in this regard. But 
the removal of the term "coloured" was a mechanical exercise which led to the absurd result that in the unlikely case that 
a white foundling was discovered in a German colony it counted legally as the child of a German native until the opposite 
was proven. But even this result was consistent, because it was not physical appearance but the purity of the blood which 
made a person white or coloured, so that even one drop of coloured blood made a person non-white. 
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a non-racial legal facade and to give the governors administrative discretion to deal with the 
question case by case58 and "unter Ausschluss des Rechtsweges'', that is to say without giving the 
individuals affected a right to challenge a gubernatorial decision concerning their 
Schutzgebietsangehorigkeit in a court of law. 
As long as a dual system of justice for natives and non-natives was continued for political 
reasons, it was legally impossible to implement the Rule of Law in relation to the native population 
of the German colonies, although the bureaucratic aspect of this rule could and would have been 
increasingly introduced by way of administrative instructions which permitted the administrative 
hierarchy to control the actions of officials at a lower level. 
This, however, is only one side of the coin. The other side is that this dual system of justice 
provided the colonial authorities with an excuse for also dealing administratively with non-natives, 
at least in their relations with "natives", and for treating them as non-citizens, who were not even 
SchutzgebietsangehOrige. An abandonment of the dual system would have undermined the entire 
licensing approach of discretionary privilege management. It was indeed better to let sleeping dogs 
lie as long as possible, in the hope that by the time they woke up people had come to realise that 
the idea of citizenship, for non-natives as well as natives, was but a romantic dream, that 
government had to be understood as resource management in the interest of territorial economic 
development, and that it was therefore essentially guided by financial considerations. In this 
scheme of things law in the conventional, jurisprudential sense was merely a concession to human 
weakness. Hence the crucial importance of the financial controls of governmental actions in the 
colonial context-and it is to these controls that we must now turn our attention. 
58 The draft ordinance was only concerned with the acquisition and the loss of the "Schutzgebietsangehorigkeit". Unlike 
Hahl' s draft ordinance, it did not give the governor discretion to grant "Schutzgebietsangehorige" the legal status of a non­
native. 
Chapter 4: Holding the Purse-strings 
I 
The 1 892 Colonial Budgets Act did not apply to those German colonies whose governmental expenditure was underwritten by commercial firms. Hence the 1888  agreement between the 
German government and the J aluit Gesellschaft removed the Marshall Islands from the financial 
controls of the metropolitan legislature under the act, as did the imperial charters issued to the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie, as well as its 1889 agreement with the German government. The act therefore 
never applied to the Marshall Islands as a separate colony. It applied to the Old Protectorate only 
as from the 1 899 budget year, whereas it applied to the Island Territory from the beginning of 
German colonial rule during the same budget year. 
This did not mean that income and expenditure relating to the Marshall Islands and the Old 
Protectorate before 1899 were never included in budgets which were under parliamentary control. 
Indeed the most dramatic exercise of these controls occurred when the Reichstag rejected a budget 
proposal implementing the 1896 agreement between the German government and the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie which would have brought the company's  financial responsibility for governmental 
expenditure to an end. The personnel costs of the imperial officials in the Marshall Islands under 
the 1888 agreement with the Jaluit Gesellschaft, and in the Old Protectorate under the 1 889 
agreement with the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, as well as those for the imperial judge posted in the 
Bismarck Archipelago after 1 892, were all shown in the budget of the foreign office, as was a 
refund of this expenditure by the companies . But the budgets of these colonies during these 
periods were a matter between the German government and these companies in which the 
Reichstag had no say. 
The position was similar to that in the Marshall Islands before the 1 888 agreement when the 
salaries of the imperial officials there were treated as part of the costs of the consular and 
diplomatic service of the Reich. The same had been the case with the costs of posting imperial 
commissioner Oertzen to the Bismarck Archipelago in 1 884, who, like vice-consul Knappe in the 
Marshall Islands, was also administratively part of the consulate-general in Samoa. 
The much larger expenditure of the Reich on shipping subsidies in the Pacific, and on 
stationing naval vessels there, also ran through the budgets of the Reich-here through those of 
the postmaster general and the naval office-and budget proposals relating to shipping subsidies 
and other public support schemes were key events in Germany' s  colonial history in the Pacific, 
beginning with the Samoa Proposal in 1 880 prompted by the financial difficulties of the 
Godeffroy firm. 
Even in the case of the Old Protectorate, however, the Colonial Budgets Act did not introduce 
financial control mechanisms where none had previously existed. On the contrary, they not only 
existed, but were structurally very similar. 1 Nonetheless the situation changed fundamentally in 
political terms when the chancellor of the Reich became accountable to the legislature for the 
financial aspect of the government of German New Guinea-and it is this new situation that this 
chapter examines .2 
1 The company's administrators were supposed to govern in accordance with budgets set by the board of directors which 
was financially accountable to the company' s  shareholders to whom it had to present audited accounts in order to obtain 
a formal release. 
2 Only small fragments of the financial records of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie have survived and they are too stylised 
to disclose concrete information of general historical significance. 
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II 
The Colonial Budgets Act was modelled on the financial control provisions in the constitution of 
the Reich. What made it unusual was that it did not limit the control of the metropolitan legislature 
to the expenditure of funds provided by the Reich to the colonies. It also controlled the 
expenditure of locally derived revenue, even if colonial budgets required no subsidisation by the 
Reich. Yet the metropolitan legislature had no matching legislative powers. It could neither impose 
taxes, fees or duties in the colonies, nor could it disallow their imposition by the colonial 
executive. Nor did the Reich become financially liable for obligations arising out of the 
government of a colony whose finances the legislature controlled. Instead the act stipulated that 
each of them formed a distinct financial entity.3 
The parliamentary control of the colonial finances consisted of three phases. The first was an 
annual budget. It took the form of an act of parliament and had to include all income and 
expenditure of the colonies. The second phase was the presentation of summary accounts to 
parliament. They had to be presented within two years of the end of the budget year in question 
and identify any extra-budgetary expenditure, since it required retrospective parliamentary 
approval. Finally, the chancellor of the Reich had to obtain a formal release from parliament for 
the manner in which the income of the colonies had been used. To this end he had to present 
expenditure accounts on an annual basis, although no time-limit for their presentation was set. 
The Colonial Budgets Act did not expressly require an auditing of the colonial accounts, but 
took it for granted that it would take place in line with the provisions in the constitution. After the 
second control phase had been completed with the retrospective approval of any extra-budgetary 
expenditure, another act of parliament referred the colonial accounts, together with those of the 
Reich and the Reich-territory Alsace-Lorraine, to the Prussian audit office. It dealt with them in 
its capacity as the audit office of the Reich but in accordance with the relevant Prussian rules and 
regulations which thereby acquired a considerable influence on the financial management of the 
German colonies. 
In order to understand how this financial control mechanism worked, we need to appreciate 
what it could and could not achieve. Although the budgets were quasi-normative documents, it 
was neither practical nor desirable to enforce them by punishing officials for non-compliance. The 
budgets set targets which were supposed to be adhered to if the predictions on which they were 
based proved to be correct. On the other hand, officials on the spot were expected to respond to 
unforeseen events, if it was their legal or administrative duty to do so. For example, they had to 
deal with the aftermath of a cyclone or with a military emergency and could not excuse inaction 
by pointing out that the budget had not provided them with the necessary funds. A whole host of 
less dramatic events could make adherence to the budget also impractical. Although officials had 
to enforce the law when collecting revenue, they could not be blamed if copra exports in the 
course of a year were lower than had been estimated, with a corresponding decrease in the actual 
customs receipt. Nor could they be blamed if a jump in the price of imported rice led to an 
overspending of the vote out of which the food for native labourers and policemen was paid. 
The executive arm of government had to be given a considerable degree of discretion in the 
field of financial management. A full implementation of the Rule of Law would have been 
dysfunctional. In the end parliament had no choice but to approve extra-budgetary expenditure and 
to grant the chancellor of the Reich a formal release. The Colonial Budgets Act did not and could 
not include penal provisions. It had to be left to the executive and the courts to take punitive action 
under the general criminal or disciplinary law and to weed out corrupt or incompetent officials. 
All the parliamentary controls of financial management could hope to achieve was a full 
explanation of what had happened and a gradual improvement of financial practices. The main 
3 The act also placed the borrowing of funds from external sources under the control of parliament. 
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weapon of parliament in this regard was its power to approve or disapprove subsequent budget 
proposals. But it had to be careful in using this weapon as a penal device, that is to say by cutting 
budget allocations as punishment for non-compliance with previous budgets, because as a result 
of its financial control powers parliament shared the political responsibility for the well-being of 
the colonies . 
The effectiveness of the financial controls exercised by parliament depended to a large extent 
on the itemisation of the budgets. Although the allocation of a lump sum for the annual 
administrative expenditure set an upper limit, it gave parliament no scope for a prospective or 
retrospective control of how the funds were to be spent or had been spent. The only question that 
arose under these circumstances was whether or not this upper limit had been exceeded. 
Seen from the perspective of the executive, such lump sum budgets appear to be ideal since 
they give it maximum freedom. But they also weaken its position in relation to parliament because 
the latter is more likely to approve additional funds for specified projects than to place its blind 
trust in the wisdom of the executive. Moreover, the executive has strong reasons for wanting to 
control the management of public finance internally. The central colonial administration in Berlin 
was perhaps even less inclined to give heads of the local executives full discretion in financial 
matters than the Reichstag-and so it went all the way down the administrative hierarchy. But in 
this context too the advantages of tight financial controls had to be weighed against the desirability 
of administrative discretion. 
In addition, the costs of financial controls were themselves an issue. How much money was 
to be spent on the unproductive task of controlling how money was spent on other governmental 
tasks? The preparation of specified budget proposals and the keeping and auditing of specified 
accounts was an expensive business.  Was it justified to devote, say, a quarter of the funds 
allocated to a colonial government to making sure that the other three quarters were spent 
properly? Or were these financial controls so central to a modem form of government that these 
questions became irrelevant? 
Another crucial factor in the exercise of financial controls was time. Ideally parliament should 
have been presented with the audited accounts of the previous budget year before it was asked to 
approve the budget proposal for the next year. In practice this was impossible and the Colonial 
Budgets Act allowed for delays of up to two years before the summary accounts had to be 
submitted and set no time limit for the presentation of the audited accounts. If we take further into 
consideration that the preparation of the next budget proposal had to begin at local level shortly 
after the beginning of the current budget year and that a budget had to be approved by parliament 
before the beginning of the budget year, if it was to serve as the basis of actual government 
spending from its first day, an extraordinarily complex scenario emerges in which a whole series 
of budget proposals, budgets, summary accounts and audited accounts-as well as budget 
supplements and supplementary budgets-affected each other in any given year, so that a hefty 
dose of accounting magic was needed to manage the consequences. Perhaps it is best to illustrate 
the parliamentary aspect of this scenario by using the 1901 budget for the Old Protectorate as an 
example. 
m 
The budget proposal for the Old Protectorate for 1901 was submitted to the Reichstag on 20 
November 1 900. In examining it the Reichstag could use the corresponding figures in the 1900 
budget which were listed in it as a historical comparison, and the preliminary accounts for the 
1 899 budget year which were appended to it. 4 The budget proposal was approved without changes 
4 Also available to it were the annual report covering the 1900 budget year and the even more up-to-date information 
concerning events in the Old Protectorate that had been published in the German press. 
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and became law on 22 March 1901 ,  just in time for the beginning of the budget year on 1 April 
1 90 1 .  
While the preliminary accounts for 1901 were appended to the 1903 budget proposals, the final 
accounts were submitted to the Reichstag in December 1903. They were dealt with by its accounts 
commission together with the final accounts for 1900, although the latter had already been 
submitted a year earlier. The accounts commission reported to the Reichstag on 30 April 1904. 5 
It recommended that the Reichstag approve the extra-budgetary expenditure shown,6 but called 
for a resolution requesting the chancellor of the Reich to ensure that colonial governments 
observed their budgetary limitations more strictly, and for a second resolution requesting him to 
provide specific additional information relating, inter alia, to the extra-budgetary expenditure in 
the Old Protectorate in 1901 .  
It took the chancellor until 20 January 1905 to respond to the second resolution. He provided 
an impressive amount of detail concerning other German colonies but asked for more time as 
regards the Old Protectorate because the expected report by its government had still not arrived. 
It arrived shortly afterwards and was passed on to the Reichstag on 10 February 1905. 
Since the extra-budgetary expenditure had been approved, no action could be taken at this 
stage. The Reichstag had to wait for another five years before reconsidering the 1901  accounts of 
the Old Protectorate, together with the comments by the audit office, in order to decide whether 
to grant the chancellor his formal release. The comments of the audits office were dated 28 
January 1910. This meant that the audit office could take the final accounts up to 1907 and the 
budgets up to 1909 into account when commenting on the 1901 accounts. It also knew that the 
preliminary accounts had been abolished in 1908 because of their notorious unreliability whereas 
the responsibility for the preparation of the final accounts, which had so far been put together in 
Berlin, was about to be transferred to the various colonies. In other words by 1910  colonial 
accounting practices were finally approaching normal metropolitan standards. 
The 1901  preliminary accounts for the Old Protectorate indicate just how abnormal they had 
earlier been. They calmly admitted that only the expenditure figures for the first quarter of the 
budget year had been received in Berlin when they were prepared, so that final accounts might 
look somewhat different.7 By the same token, the fact that during the course of 1910  the audited 
accounts of 1902, 1903 and 1904 could also be submitted to the Reichstag demonstrates that the 
combined accounting capacity of the colonial office and the local colonial administrations had by 
now sufficiently improved for the audit office to get on with its job. Yet it never advanced beyond 
the auditing of the final accounts for 1909, 8 so that it had no opportunity to comment on the final 
accounts for the last full four years of colonial rule in German New Guinea. 
So much for the time factor. Now a closer look at the content of the 1901 budget and accounts, 
and at their treatment by the Reichstag and the audit office. The 1901 budget proposal for the Old 
Protectorate was approved by the Reichstag without changes. It balanced in round figures at 
8 10,000 rather than at 923,000 Marks as in 1900, so that the Reich subsidy could be cut by 
1 39  ,OOO Marks compared with the previous year. Nonetheless the recurrent budgetary allocations 
were increased by a total of 67 ,OOO Marks. But the non-recurrent vote was cut from 250,000 
Marks to 69,000 Marks, that is to say by almost 75 per cent. A cut of this magnitude had been 
possible because the 1900 budget had included an allocation of 1 30,000 Marks for the purchase 
5 Its report covered not only the Old Protectorate but also the final accounts of other German colonies. 
6 In the case of the Old Protectorate it amounted in 1 901  to 88,000 Marks, or about 20 per cent of the budget, if we 
disregard the payment of the 400,000 Marks to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie under the 1 898 agreement. 
7 This turned out to be an understatement as the overspending of less than 200 Marks shown in the preliminary accounts 
grew to over 50,000 Marks in the final accounts. But the preliminary accounts could also be overly pessimistic. Those for 
1 904 showed an overspending of 80,000 Marks whereas according to the final accounts 8,000 Marks had remained 
unspent-a difference which represented around I 0 per cent of the entire budget. 
8 Its comments were dated 1 1  February 1915 .  
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of a government steamer. In other words, it was the fact that funds for a single item were not 
required again in 1901 that accounted for the reduction in the size of the budget and of the Reich 
subsidy. 
This reduction did not mean, however, that the funds available in 1901  were smaller than in 
1900. On the contrary, whereas the final accounts for 1 901  accounted for funds totalling 
1 ,028,000 Marks-compared with a budget of 8 10,000 Marks-those for 1900 accounted for 
993,000 Marks, compared with a budget of 923,000 Marks. 
This difference came about because the 1 30,000 Marks allocated for the purchase of a steamer 
in 1900 were not spent during that year. Instead, together with an unspent allocation of 70,000 
Marks made for the same purpose in 1 899, they were transferred to the 1901  accounts . However, 
these "savings"-the equivalent of about 50 per cent of the 1901 budget, if we disregard the 
payment of 400,000 Marks to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie under the 1 898 agreement-were not 
spent in 1901 either but transferred with additional savings to the accounts for 1902. 
The treatment of the "reserve fund" had a similar magical quality. In the 1901  budget 4,925 
Marks had been allocated under this heading to cover "unforeseen expenditure". However, 
according to the final accounts, the fund grew instead by about 6,000 Marks, because it was also 
used to process extra-budgetary income. In 1901  it was first boosted by extra-budgetary income 
to 54,000 Marks, but after the total extra-budgetary expenditure had been debited against it, it was 
still left in the red to the tune of around 57 ,OOO Marks. The beauty of the arrangements at the time 
was that this deficit did not have to be covered in subsequent budgets of the Old Protectorate. 
Instead it burdened the 1 904 budget of the foreign office. As a result the reserve fund of the Old 
Protectorate in 1901 even made a profit of 6,000 Marks, because there had been genuine savings9 
of27,000 Marks whereas the necessary extra-budgetary expenditure had only been 2 1 ,000 Marks. 
Notwithstanding this increase in the reserve fund, the Reichstag had considered and approved 
about 88,000 Marks in extra-budgetary expenditure identified in the final accounts. They related 
to the overspending of three votes. 
The vote for "auxiliary coloured personnel" had been overspent by around 1 0,000 Marks 
because the budget had not provided for "permanent" labourers for the two district offices and the 
government station. 10 In addition, the lack of a government steamer, which was also to have been 
used for recruiting purposes, had produced unexpectedly high recruiting costs because other 
vessels had to be hired in its place. 
The overspending of the "building" vote by about 23,000 Marks was justified with the 
construction of houses for these additional coloured labourers and artisans. The explanations for 
the overspending of the omnibus vote for recurrent "material and mixed expenditure" by almost 
55,000 Marks were more involved. They showed that five sub-votes had been overspent by a total 
of about 80,000 Marks. But this had been partly compensated for by an underspending of other 
sub-votes to the tune of about 25,000 Marks. The accounts commission was satisfied with the 
explanation of the overspending of three of the sub-votes, and only sought additional information 
from the chancellor for the overspending of the other two. 
The first sub-vote related to "travel expenses", for which 1 8,000 Marks had been allocated but 
on which about 44,000 Marks had been spent. The final accounts had explained this overspending 
primarily by reference to frequent staff changes. The chancellor' s  first response, of 12  March 
1904, elaborated. Sending out six new officials from Germany had by itself cost 1 ,000 Marks 
more than the budgetary allocation of 1 8,000 Marks. Repatriating officials for health reasons had 
cost another 9,000 Marks. A "change in the person of the governor" had resulted in the payment 
9 These were unspent budget allocations which were not transferred to subsequent years because the purpose of an 
allocation for a specific purpose had already been achieved. 
10 A note attached to the 1901 budget proposal indicates that the wages of government labourers were previously paid 
out of the "material and mixed expenditure" and even the "non-recurrent expenditure" vote. 
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of 2,000 Marks to Bennigsen for removal costs and also necessitated travel by other officials. 1 1  
Only 14,000 Marks had been spent for normal expenditure under this heading. Even this 
expenditure had been inflated because several "expeditions" had caused unusually high expenses 
for the transport of "coloured personnel" which, somewhat surprisingly, had been debited against 
this vote rather than the "expedition vote" (see below: 426 ff.). 12 
These expeditions also served as a justification for a 35,000 Marks overexpenditure of the 
20,000 Marks maintenance sub-vote. This was largely an act of desperation because the relevant 
details were not available in Berlin at the time. The colonial department could only come up with 
an incomplete list of actual expenditure. It included 15,000 Marks for water-tanks as the largest 
item but also fell 15 ,000 Marks short of accounting for the total extra-budgetary expenditure of 
55,000 Marks. 
No wonder that the Reichstag wanted more information. The report from Herbertshohe began 
by stressing that the new imperial government had not been in a position to estimate administrative 
requirements with any degree of accuracy when the budget proposal for 1 901  had been prepared 
after only a few months in office. In order to cope with the influx of new officials the existing 
buildings-some of which had also been in need of expensive repairs-had to be enlarged and 
equipped with additional furniture. Most of the overexpenditure of 55,000 Marks had accumulated 
in this manner. As regards the water-tanks, the figure of 15,000 Marks had been a clerical error. 
In fact only 1 ,500 Marks had been spent for this purpose. The only unusual expenditure calling 
for an explanation was 12,000 Marks spent on "horses and carriages". The extension of the native 
administration into the interior of the Gazelle Peninsula and along the east cost of northern New 
Ireland had involved frequent travelling over long distances. It had therefore been necessary to 
supply horses to the officials carrying out these duties. In order to to become independent of 
expensive imports, a quality stallion had been purchased who "in the meantime" had sired seven 
foals. 
In the light of these touchingly naive explanations, it is understandable that the audit office 
treated an audit of these early accounts as a lost cause. Its only criticism of the accounts of the Old 
Protectorate related to the "material expenditure" during the first quarter of 1 90 1 .  Items worth 
around 44,000 Marks had been purchased, but the receipts relating to these purchases could no 
longer be identified because the records kept at the time had been far from complete. However, 
measures had now been taken to ensure that proper accounting procedures would be followed in 
the future, that is to say from 1910 onwards. 
The audit office was relieved that three general questions relating to the budgets and accounts 
of all colonies which it had raised earlier had also been settled. The first related to the nature of 
the Reich subsidy: was it an unconditional grant or merely intended to cover the gap between the 
estimated local revenue and the approved expenditure, so that a reduction of the actual gap in the 
accounts had to be shown as a saving in subsequent budgets instead of the unspent portion of the 
subsidy becoming an asset of which the colonial executive could freely dispose? As is to be 
expected, the latter view had become generally accepted. Secondly, there was the question of the 
treatment of the reserve funds. It had just been answered in a drastic manner by abolishing them 
altogether in the 1909 budget. But the audit office felt obliged to identify the amounts which had 
been hidden in the reserve funds in earlier years, instead of being openly shown as extra-budgetary 
1 1  This referred primarily to the move of vice-governor Hahl from Ponape to HerbertshOhe and sending out of a 
replacement for him to Ponape. 
1 2  It could, of course, have been pointed out that neither the sending out ofofficials, or their repatriation, nor the carrying 
out of expeditions was unusual. But the point is rather that the budgetary allocation was so small that it could only be 
adhered to under ideal circumstances. It is worth mentioning, however, that the explanations did not say what the "normal" 
expenditure had consisted of. Were the costs of sending out and repatriating one official each and those of staging one 
expedition treated as "normal"? 
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income and expenditure. 13 The third point was directly concerned with the budgetary significance 
of the "explanations" given in the budget proposals, but it raised the whole question of the 
itemisation of budgets and the related distinction between two kinds of extra-budgetary 
expenditure, namely expenditure made without a budgetary allocation covering it and expenditure 
in excess of such an allocation (ausseretatsmlissig and iiberetatsmtissig). 14 
This distinction has important political implications. If a budget is seen as an administrative 
program reflecting political priorities, measures taken outside it are departures from that program 
and only legitimate in response to unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances. Moreover, 
expenditure in response to such extraordinary occurrences remains expenditure outside the budget, 
even if it is of a kind which is formally covered by a budgetary allocation: for example, a 
budgetary allocation for "buildings" is not expected to be spent on rebuilding large numbers of 
houses destroyed by a cyclone. On the other hand, a government which exceeds a budgetary 
allocation by expending funds on measures the desirability or inevitability of which it should have 
foreseen, cannot expect to be provided with additional funds to cover such expenditure. Instead 
it has to use money saved elsewhere, and, indeed, save money elsewhere, to cover this kind of 
unauthorised expenditure. Exceeding the budget is therefore politically more problematic than 
spending outside it. Governments spending outside the budget typically have no choice, those 
which exceed a budgetary allocation typically do. By the same token, the executive arm of 
government must be given some discretion to make choices within the budgetary framework 
because circumstances change in quite ordinary ways and are most effectively, also most cost­
effectively, responded to in a reasonably flexible manner. The question is again where to draw the 
line-and this is where the itemisation of budgets comes in. 
On the expenditure side, the budgets for the Old Protectorate for 1 899 and 1900 were both 
formally one-line budgets, providing respectively 732,000 Marks and 923,500 Marks to pay for 
"administrative expenditure". But the budget proposal provided more detailed explanations 
justifying, in particular, the increase of almost 200 ,OOO Marks in funds sought in 1900. In the 1901 
budget proposal these explanations were, to some extent, incorporated in the budget. Its 
expenditure side was divided into two "chapters"-recurrent and non-recurrent expenditure-the 
first of which was subdivided into nine "titles". But there were still additional explanations. For 
example, the budget proposal sought an allocation of 69 ,OOO Marks for non-recurrent expenditure. 
This heading covered the construction of buildings and their furnishing, as well as the construction 
of harbour facilities and roads and the purchase of land for public purposes. The explanations 
itemised the intended expenditure of some of these funds: 25,000 Marks had been earmarked for 
an office building and 6,000 Marks for a house for the government doctor. 
The question was whether the colonial government was bound by these explanations, and 
whether it could profit from them. It certainly wanted to do the latter by transferring unspent 
earmarked funds to the next budget year-in the 1901 budget the 6,000 Marks set aside for but 
not spent on a house for the government doctor. Could it also have gone the other way, for 
instance by spending the 6,000 Marks instead on a swimming pool for the governor, without 
having to tell the Reichstag that this had happened? 
The Colonial Budgets Act did not spell out how itemised the accounts had to be, although it 
required the identification of extra-budgetary expenditure for which retrospective parliamentary 
approval had to be obtained. But it did not say an overspending at what budgetary level 
necessitated such an approval. Was approval unnecessary as long as the total expenditure did not 
exceed the total budgetary allocation? Could underspending the non-recurrent expenditure vote 
compensate for overspending the recurrent expenditure vote? Did the accounts have to show that 
1 3  In the case of the Old Protectorate they amounted to over 20,000 Marks in 1 90 1 .  
14 Th.i s  distinction i s  immaterial for a budget consisting of a lump sum allocation, because i t  covers everything s o  that 
it can only be exceeded, whereas no governmental expenditure outside this allocation is possible. 
L 
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the office building for which 25,000 Marks had been earmarked in the explanations of the 1901 
budget proposal had in fact cost 26,328 .06 Marks because the additional 1 ,328.06 Marks spent 
constituted an extra-budgetary expenditure under the act which required parliamentary approval? 
Judging by the final accounts for 1901  the executive assumed at the time that it was accountable 
only down to the level of the titles into which the budget had been formally subdivided and that 
only overspending at that level required parliamentary approval. Thus they show an extra­
budgetary expenditure of around 23,000 Marks of the non-recurrent expenditure chapter which 
was not subdivided into titles. But they do not account for the total of around 86,000 Marks spent 
under this heading. In other words we are not told how much the office building had actually cost, 
or whether it had been built at all. Indeed the accounts do not even specify how the extra­
budgetary expenditure had been used. They only show it as a total with the explanation that it had 
been spent on houses for coloured artisans and labourers. 
The explanations for overspending the vote for "material and mixed expenditure" were more 
forthcoming. They did respond to the explanations of this title in the budget proposal. The latter 
had divided the total allocation of around 143,000 Marks sought into nine headings. The 
explanations in the accounts stated that expenditure under four of these headings had been lower 
than anticipated and said nothing about how these funds had been spent. They gave the total extra­
budgetary expenditure under each of the other five headings, but then deducted the savings under 
the first group of headings from the total, because only the rest technically required the 
retrospective approval of parliament. 
A weird world but one which at least in this case was not manipulated by using the internal 
compensation process selectively. 15 The colonial department was prepared to put its cards on the 
table. The problem was that it did not know all that much about what was going on in the German 
colonies. Still, the information provided in the accounts was sufficient to indicate to the Reichstag 
that it was worth questioning the expenditure, and the officials in the colonial department were 
probably as surprised as members of the Reichstag when they learned in 1904 that the government 
in the Old Protectorate had spent 60 per cent of the 20,000 Marks allocated in 1901 for a multitude 
of purposes, including the maintenance of buildings and the repair of equipment, on the purchase 
of horses. 16 
It was only by occasionally demanding detailed information of this kind that the parliamentary 
control of the public finances of the colonies could be made effective. The chances of doing so 
could be increased by pushing for more itemised budgets and accounts and, in particular, by 
insisting, if the executive chose to provide additional explanations of its budget proposals, that it 
had to stick to them when it came to the expenditure of funds approved on this basis and to 
prepare its accounts by reference to them. 
A comparison between the budget proposals for 1901  and 1914 illustrates how far their 
itemisation had progressed. In 1 901  the budget consisted effectively of ten titles, nine for recurrent 
and one for non-recurrent expenditure. By 19 14 the number of titles had increased to 26, including 
seven for non-recurrent expenditure. Instead of providing a lump sum under this heading, as in 
1 901 ,  separate funds were allocated for buildings ;  for roads, bridges and maritime installations; 
for the purchase of marine vessels; for installations in support of agriculture; for equipment issued 
to new native policemen. There were even separate titles for combating epidemics and the 
promotion of land surveys. Moreover, most of these titles were further subdivided into 
"numbers"-six in the case of the vote for "other material and mixed expenditure". Nonetheless 
1 5  For example the savings could have been used to cancel out the over-spending under three of the five headings, so that 
only the overspending of the other two had to be admitted. 
16 The surprise would have been even greater for those who had done their homework and remembered that the annual 
report for 1 899-rather than 190 I-had stated: "The government has installed two Australian brood mares and a medium­
sized Batak stallion on Nusa Island for stud purposes, and recently increased the breeding stock by purchasing a good 
Australian stallion, which is for the time being to remain in HerbertshOhe" (Sack & Clark, 1979: 1 89). 
388 THE EMPEROR' S NEW CLOTHES 
additional explanations were still provided in the budget proposals. For example, the 1914 
explanations of  the "installations in  support of agriculture" title specified that 33 ,000 Marks were 
intended for an experimental station for coconut palms, 50,000 Marks for an agricultural 
laboratory and 20,000 Marks for improvement to the livestock breeding station, with further 
subheadings in each case. 
But there were some titles that had resisted the itemisation trend. The most important of them 
was the vote for the "auxiliary coloured personnel". The 1914 budget still allocated one lump sum 
for this purpose, although detailed explanations were provided. Yet it remained impossible to 
control the expenditure under this title effectively because over and underspending for different 
purposes identified in the explanations could cancel each other out, so that only an overspending 
of the entire title required parliamentary approval. 
How did this increased itemisation affect the accounts? The last budget year for which final 
accounts were submitted to parliament was 1912. Whereas the recurrent expenditure part of the 
budget was already as itemised as in 19 14, the non-recurrent expenditure was only divided into 
two titles, namely the "purchase of marine vessels" and "buildings, including their furnishing, and 
other public works". Although separate figures were given, not only for each title but for each 
number in the accounts, the position remained that only the overspending of an entire title required 
parliamentary approval. On the other hand, even though the 19 12  accounts closed with an 
underspending of the budget of over 340,000 Marks they identified a total of 196,000 Marks in 
overspendings of particular titles requiring approval. 
These overspendings were now not only "explained" (erliiutert) but "justified" (begrundet). 
While these justifications look suitably impressive the accounts tell us nothing of historical 
interest about the manner in which the much larger amount of 2,8 10,501 .42 Marks had been spent 
within the budget, since the confirmation that this amount had in fact been spent did not confirm 
that it had been spent in accordance with the budget proposal and the explanations thereto. There 
was still ample scope for departures which only came to light when an entire title had been 
overspent, because only in this case more or less informative explanations were required. 17 
The colonial office clearly did not relish its position when it had to explain why the allocation 
for "extra-ordinary white auxiliary personnel and substitutions" in 1912  had been overspent by 
about 62,000 Marks, or more than 50 per cent. It was glad that the allocation for "ordinary 
auxiliary personnel" had been underspent by about 2 1 ,000 Marks since it formed part of the same 
title so that technically only an overspending of about 41 ,000 Marks had to be justified. It also 
pointed out that this overspending had to be seen in connection with the salary vote for permanent 
white personnel which had been underspent by about another 26,000 Marks. The combined salary 
votes had therefore only been overspent by about 16,000 Marks, or less than two per cent, which, 
in its view, represented an excellent result. 
But these moves only prepared the ground for the claim that the overspending of the "auxiliary 
personnel" vote had been due to the fact that insufficient provisions for "substitutions" had been 
made-which were used to fill positions whose regular occupants were on leave. The inadequate 
formula used in the 19 12  budget-one sixth of regular salaries-had been increased in the 19 13  
budget to one fifth and in the 19 14  budget even further to the halfway mark between one fifth and 
one quarter. Had the 1914 formula already been applied in 1912, the allocation for extraordinary 
auxiliary personnel for that year would have been about 4 1 ,000 Marks higher so that the 
overspending of about 4 1 ,000 Marks would not have occurred at all. 
17 Seen from a parliamentary perspective the financial control mechanism therefore operated a bit like a lottery-and 
the executive naturally resisted an itemisation of the most strategic titles most strongly because their increase offered the 
best opportunity for preparing the ground for a permanent increase in other expenditure. For example, once a new 
government vessel had been acquired it was clear that it had to be maintained and required a crew on a continuing basis, 
and each increase in staff automatically caused additional expenditure for housing, equipment, travel and so on. 
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All of this is,  of course, sheer accounting magic.  It tells us nothing about what had actually 
happened. We learn neither how much had actually been spent in 1912  on substitutions, nor which 
of the positions for which funds had been allocated had remained unfilled and for how long. But 
the smoke-screen which the colonial office offered in place of factual infonnation apparently did 
the trick. 18 
IV 
Now that we have a better idea of how the parliamentary controls worked, we are ready to look 
at the impact they had. The first question we need to address is to what extent parliament altered 
the budget proposals. The answer is rather different from what one might have expected as the 
figures suggest that alterations were rare as well as limited. 19 In the case of the Island Territory 
the budgets only differ twice, in 1 906 and 1907, from the proposals and the figures were on both 
occasions higher rather than lower. A "supplement" to the budget (Nachtrag zum Haushalt) in 
1906 approved an extra 25,000 Marks for the repair of cyclone damage. A "supplementary 
budget" (Nachtragshaushalt) in 1907 approved the same amount for the same purpose.20 
However, in 1907 the budget proposal was also cut by 10,000 Marks, because the Reichstag 
disapproved of a project to survey native land in the Marianas. 
In the case of the Old Protectorate the first budget cut occurred in 1 906. It targeted a pet 
project of Hahl: a colony of small settlers in the Baining mountains of the Gazelle Peninsula for 
which a subsidy of 10,000 Marks had been sought.21 The next budget cut, by a total of over 80,000 
Marks in 1909, was of a different nature. It focused on a cut of the non-recurrent expenditure of 
50,000 Marks, but several titles of the recurrent expenditure were also affected. However, the 
explanations of the 1910 budget proposal show that the cuts had again been aimed at a single 
target, namely a new government station in Moro be. It was only approved at the level of a "police 
post", so that fewer buildings, as well as a substantially smaller staff were required. By contrast 
18 I am not suggesting that the formulae used did not provide a reasonable guide for the purpose of working out budget 
estimates, but they had no legitimate place in the accounts. They were employed as a convenient phantom alternative to 
actual expenditure figures which might have given rise to uncomfortable further questions. 
19 ln this case the exercise is simple. It merely requires a comparison between the budget proposals and the budget figures 
included in the budget proposals for the following year. 
20 It was comparatively simple to "supplement" a budget before it had been formally enacted into law, whereas a 
"supplementary budget" was a separate mini-budget which required the same treatment as the main budget. It was 
therefore especially tempting for the executive to disclose expenditure which had been made outside the budget only in 
the accounts-which left the Reichstag little choice but to approve it retrospectively. However, it risked irritating the 
Reichstag each time it did so, especially if the unforeseen event occurred comparatively early in the budget year and was 
of some magnitude. Moreover, only if a formal budgetary allocation had been made could unspent funds be properly 
transferred to the next budget year. 
21 It is worth pursuing the consequences of this cut, since the project was underway when it was made and funds had 
already been spent. How were they treated in accounting terms? The most suitable vote was that for agricultural 
experiments and the survey of land. 1n 1 905 it had been endowed with 10,500 Marks, of which less than 200 Marks had 
been spent. 1n the final accounts for 1906 the same alloc�tion is shown as having been overspent by over 1 ,500 Marks. 
This required an explanation. It stated that the overspending had been due to the supply of seeds and seedlings to 1 2  
settlers with whom the government had entered into written contracts (so that it was legally obliged to produce the goods). 
It also attributed an overspending of the "auxiliary coloured personnel" vote partly to the fact that these settlers had been 
supplied with labourers paid by the government, although they had undertaken to refund their wages at a later stage. 1n 
1907 someone apparently came to Hahl' s rescue and made substantial payments on behalf of these settlers which were 
credited to this vote and resulted in a surplus of over 9,000 Marks. How large these payments had been is not stated. 
Taking into account that less than 200 Marks of normal expenditure is shown in 1 905 and less than 2,000 Marks in 1 908 
it is likely that they had been considerably higher than 10,000 Marks and that the actual expenditure by the government 
on the settler scheme in 1906 had probably been more than the special allocation of 10, OOO Marks which the Reichstag 
had rejected. 1n short, we again do not learn what had actually happened, although it is clear that some private source had 
paid the bill. 
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the budget for 19 13  was about 1 10,000 Marks higher than the initial proposal. This was largely 
due to the fact that an experimental agricultural station in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and a native 
hospital in Kieta-with building costs of over 50,000 Marks and a substantial consequential 
increase of recurrent expenditure-had been added. 
Seen in this light it can hardly be said that the Reichstag had dictated what the government in 
German New Guinea was financially capable of doing. By and large it got the funds which had 
been proposed to parliament. This does not mean, however, that the financial control powers of 
parliament had no impact, since the budget proposals already took into account what budgetary 
allocations parliament was likely to approve. There was no point in making unrealistically high 
budget proposals since it was clear that they would be carefully and critically examined. 
But what ultimately mattered was not how much money had been allocated to the colonial 
government, and for what purposes, but how much money had actually been spent and on what. 
As from the 1905 budget year the final accounts included summaries showing the extra-budgetary 
expenditure of all the German colonies. They show that the Old Protectorate, and later German 
New Guinea, consistently overspent its budget between 1 905 and 1912. While the total 
overspending usually amounted to less than ten per cent of the budget, three years-1905, 1908 
and 191 1-stand out with overspendings of respectively 1 8, 25 and 21 per cent.22 On the other 
hand, much of the extra-budgetary expenditure was compensated for by extra-budgetary income 
and savings. The summary also took into account extra-budgetary expenditure which had been 
necessary to comply with legal requirements, or was caused by the automatic incremental 
increases in the salaries of officials. What was left is described as the "eigentlichen 
Verwaltungsausgabeuberschreitungen", that is to say extra-budgetary expenditure due to 
discretionary decisions. 
The difference could be substantial: for example, while the actual and the "discretionary" 
extra-budgetary expenditure in 1905 and 191 1 were similar (respectively 216,000 and 213,000 
Marks and 460,000 and 448,000 Marks), in 1908 the discretionary extra-budgetary expenditure 
was "nil" as compared with an actual overspending of 1 25,000 Marks. But as a closer look at the 
1 9 1 1 budget year may illustrate, all these figures have to be treated with caution. 
According to the 191 1 budget proposal, German New Guinea expected a total income of 
2,183,000 Marks. It was to be made up of 1 ,379,000 Marks in local revenue and a Reich subsidy 
of 760,000 Marks. In addition there was a small bonus of 44,000 Marks: savings from the 1908 
final accounts.23 
The final accounts showed these figures but added savings of 255,000 Marks from the 1910 
budget year, for which they also had to account. Moreover, the local revenue had been over 
400,000 Marks higher than the budget estimates . Yet the final accounts reduced the actual income 
by transferring 240,000 Marks of the 1910 savings to the 1 9 1 3  budget, so that only 1 5,000 Marks 
were treated as additional income in 191 1 .24 
As a result of these manoeuvres the final accounts included three different sets of figures. The 
total expected income according to the budget of 2, 1 83,000 Marks; a "Gesamtsolf', which added 
to it the full savings from 1910  and amounted to 2,438,000 Marks; and the actual total income, 
which used the local revenue raised, rather than the budget estimates, but only included the 15,000 
Marks of the 1910 savings spent in 191 1 ,  so that the total amount accounted for was 2,595,000 
Marks . Of this total 74,000 Marks was left in the kitty but savings of 61 ,000 Marks were 
22 As could be expected non-recurrent expenditure was the main culprit in all three exceptional years. In 1905 the 
allocation was overspent by 29 per cent, in 1908 by 62 per cent and in 1 9 1 1 by as much as 70 per cent. However, in all 
three years the overspending of the recurrent expenditure vote was also unusually high. 
23 All savings had been made in the Island Territory since the final accounts for the Old Protectorate for 1908 had not 
been completed when the 19 1 1 budget proposals were submitted. 
24 A further 8,000 Marks were required to rectify various smaller accounting defects. 
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transferred to the 19 12  budget. This left an actual saving of 13,000 Marks which was added as a 
non-recurrent income to the budget for 1914.25 None of these sets of figures show the amount of 
money that had actually been available to be spent in German New Guinea in 191 1 or the amount 
of money which had actually been spent. This does not mean that this accounting magic was 
dishonest or unusual. However, it has to be taken into consideration when using these figures as 
sources of historical information. To take them as statements of fact is bound to produce phantom 
history. They all relate to a distinct financial realm and are real only if they are understood in their 
own terms. Yet they can also be historically illuminating. 
It is surely more than coincidence, for example, that each of the three years in which the extra­
budgetary expenditure was unusually high was followed by a dramatic increase in the Reich 
subsidy. In 1 906 the subsidy was increased from 452,000 to 759,000 Marks, with the result that 
the extra-budgetary expenditure dropped from 18  to seven per cent. In 1909 the subsidy was 
increased from 742,000 to 923,000 Marks and the extra-budgetary expenditure dropped from 25 
to again seven per cent. In 1912 an increase in the subsidy from 760,000 to 1 ,208,000 Marks 
resulted in a drop of the extra-budgetary expenditure from 21  to once more seven per cent. On the 
other hand, no-one knew what the actual expenditure figures for 1 905, 1908 and 19 1 1 would look 
like when the budget proposals for the following years were submitted. Rather, the subsidy 
increases were in each case the result of substantially increased budget proposals. Whereas the 
1905 budget was only 1 60,000 Marks bigger than that for 1904, the 1906 budget was 329,000 
Marks bigger than that for 1905, and while the budget only increased by 21 ,000 and 8,000 Marks 
in 1907 and 1 908, it jumped by 285,000 Marks in 1909. The subsequent changes in German New 
Guinea' s  financial fortunes were even more dramatic: the budget proposal for 1910  shrank by 
252,000 Marks and that for 191 1 by another 1 1 8,000 Marks, so that the jump in 1912  by 580,000 
Marks effectively lifted the budget only by 210,000 Marks above the 1 909 level. 
The crucial point, however, is that these changes were included in the budget proposals. They 
were not the work of the Reichstag. Since it is unlikely that the stagnation after 1906 and the cuts 
after 1 909 were due to an initiative by the government in German New Guinea, it looks as if it was 
to a large extent the central colonial administration in Berlin that determined the size of the funds 
available for German New Guinea. 
But before turning to these internal controls of the colonial finances we have to consider the 
third phase of the parliamentary control process. Could the Reichstag rely on the final accounts 
presented, when it was asked to give extra-budgetary expenditure its retrospective approval, or 
were they phantom documents which were hiding a morass of incompetence and corruption? 
As the budgets for 1 899 and 1900 were still lump sum affairs the auditing of the accounts of 
German New Guinea only seriously started with the first itemised accounts for 1 90 1  already 
discussed. The report of the audit office on the final accounts for 1 902 again only noted generally 
that expenditure had been hidden in the reserve fund and criticised the public works expenditure 
still not having been itemised. Nor did it specifically comment on the final accounts for 1903 . 
The report for 1 904 noted discrepancies between the hospital accounts kept by the "central 
cash office" (Hauptkasse) and the hospital administration which had so far not been explained. 
The report for 1 905 showed that an official from the audit office had been sent to German New 
Guinea, where he had uncovered a large number of defects, especially in relation to the accounts 
for the purchase of materials which were so inadequate that their auditing was pointless. But new 
regulations had been issued, so that an auditing of the material expenditure accounts as from the 
1909 budget year would be a different matter. 
The report for 1 906 returned to the specific queries raised in connection with the hospital 
accounts. Investigations in German New Guinea had revealed that patients had not paid hospital 
25 The income shown in the 1914  budget had been 8,000 Marks higher. It had been based on preliminary figures which 
had proved to be defective-an error which would have had to be corrected in the final accounts for 1 914. 
392 THE EMPEROR' S NEW CLOTHES 
bills amounting to about 1 ,200 Marks in the course of 1904 and 1 905. The governor attributed this 
to the Hauptkasse and explained it by a serious shortage of staff, as a result of which the person 
in charge of its accounts had changed six times in 1 904 and twice in 1 905 and 1 906. To hold these 
officials personally responsible for their oversights would be unfair under these circumstances and 
it would serve little practical purpose since several of them had left the colonial service. To pursue 
claims against the patients would be just as futile. Most of them had in the meantime left German 
New Guinea, quite apart from the effects of the statute of limitations on these dated claims. The 
governor had recommended that the matter be dropped to which the colonial office, as well as the 
audit office, had agreed. The creation of the position of a full-time head of the accounts section 
in the 191 1 budget would ensure that the situation would improve. 
The audit office also pointed out that the final accounts for 1906 were defective because they 
had omitted tax payments totalling 145 Marks which had apparently been received. The next 
report solved this particular riddle. A payment of 25 Marks had, in fact, not been made, because 
a court had decided that it was not payable. The remaining 1 20 Marks had been embezzled by a 
minor official who had subsequently been sentenced to prison and sacked. 
The 1907 final accounts were also found by the audit office to be flawed. The travel expenses 
of a teacher posted to the Marianas had been debited against the accounts of the Old Protectorate, 
rather than those of the Island Territory. This mistake had been rectified, but there were still 
unanswered questions relating to receipts of 45 Marks and expenditure totalling about 1 ,500 
Marks. These outstanding matters had been cleared up by the time the audit office submitted its 
report for 1908, but more serious problems had arisen in connection with the final accounts for 
that year because several of the relevant registers and whole bundles of receipts had been lost 
during the move of the government from Herbertshohe to Rabaul. Moreover, expenditure had 
repeatedly been wrongly accounted for under recurrent rather than non-recurrent expenditure or 
vice versa. In one case correct accounting would probably result in the over-expenditure of one 
title of the 1 908 budget by up to 22,000 Marks which had so far not been approved by the 
Reichstag. 
Although German New Guinea's  final accounts were still far from perfect, and although it is 
impossible to say how much accounting practices did improve after 1 909, it is of considerable 
historical significance that the reports of the audit office covering the earlier years only identified 
a single and minor instance of a misuse of public funds. It should be pointed out, however, that 
this does not mean that no other cases of this kind had come to its notice. The reason why this 
particular case was mentioned is that tax payments of 145 Marks had not been accounted for at 
all. The audit office had no cause to comment on the misuse of funds, provided it was 
appropriately dealt with in accounting terms. 
On the other hand, it must be remembered that accountability was the most important and 
perhaps the only legitimate goal of the entire financial control mechanism: it was meant to impel 
officials to explain and justify their plans and actions. Parliaments misuse their financial control 
powers if they try to tell officials what to do and punish them for not following their budgetary 
marching orders by cutting their funds in subsequent years. Parliaments are supposed to use their 
general legislative powers for this purpose, and to leave it to the courts to enforce these laws. But 
the position of the German metropolitan legislature in relation to the German colonies was unusual 
because it did not hold these general legislative powers. Still, although the Reichstag made it clear 
from time to time that it disapproved of particular pieces of colonial legislation-for example the 
reintroduction of an export duty on copra by the 1908 Customs Ordinance-by and large it 
resisted the temptation to use its financial control powers to tell the executive what to do instead 
of making it more accountable for what it did. 26 There is no question that officials in German New 
26 It did not punish the executive for imposing the export duty on copra by cutting its 1 909 budget On the contrary, it 
approved a substantially larger budget requiring a substantially larger subsidy. 
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Guinea were made more accountable as the years went by with the result that they had to spend 
more and more time on financial matters. It is not clear, however, how far this development was 
due to the part played by the Reichstag. It would certainly not have progressed as far as it did if 
these financial controls had not been at least as important for the colonial executive, especially for 
the central colonial administration in Berlin, for which budgets and accounts were not just a means 
of making local officials accountable but a means of telling them what to do and of assessing their 
performance, with direct consequences for their position within the colonial service. 
v 
The problem with examining the internal aspect of financial management is that the relevant 
documents are not part of the public record. Neither the local budget proposals nor the 
"management plans" (Winschaftsplane), which distributed the funds provided in the budget, let 
alone the local accounts, were published, and much of the unpublished material is no longer 
available. However, due to the special way in which the finances of the Island Territory were 
handled, records for this part of German New Guinea are unusually rich. 
Ideally, the financial management process in the German colonies took the following form. 
Shortly after the start of a budget year the various local administrations and special services 
formulated their proposals for the coming budget year by justifying any variations they proposed 
from the current budget. These proposals were revised and combined by the governor into a single 
budget proposal which was then submitted to his advisory council for discussion. The governor, 
however, was no more bound by the views it expressed than by the proposals made by these local 
bodies. Nor was the colonial office bound by the governor's budget proposals. On the other hand, 
it too was not solely responsible for the final budget proposal submitted to parliament. It shared 
this responsibility with the ministry of finance which had to ensure that the proper financial 
procedures were followed. 
Under normal circumstances it was the responsibility of the governor to allocate the funds 
parliament approved to the various local bodies. The accounting process moved in the opposite 
direction through these stages, although the accounts were not discussed by the advisory council. 
In the case of the Island Territory the process was different. Here the district offices, and even 
some government stations, submitted their proposals directly to the colonial office which also 
prepared the management plan. However, in later years the governor became increasingly involved 
in the budget preparation, so that an unusually large amount of written information was 
produced.27 
One surviving example is the 1 906 management plan (AA G255n29). It was signed by the 
heads of the ministry of finance and the colonial department in July 1906, that is to say more than 
three months after the beginning of the budget year. It divided the funds allocated in the budget 
among the four districts, with the exception of about 75,000 Marks which were to be spent by the 
colonial department on behalf of the Island Territory. It also listed the names and salaries of all 
white officials on its payroll. Otherwise it was no more itemised than the budget proposal and 
usually did not add to the explanations provided. However, in this case the explanations in the 
management plan differed in one point from those in the budget proposals. This reflected the 
changes a budget supplement had brought about in the manner in which the repair of cyclone 
damage in the Marianas was to be financed. 
The explanations to the 1906 budget proposal dealt with two 1905 cyclones : one which had 
devastated Ponape in April, the other Saipan in August. The colonial department had planned to 
deal with the financial aftermath of the first cyclone by authorising an expenditure of up to 50,000 
Marks outside the budget, instead of submitting a supplementary budget providing for these funds. 
27 Unfortunately only some of this information is still available. 
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The ministry of finance agreed with several provisos to this approach: firstly, the colonial 
department had to obtain the approval of the chancellor of the Reich; secondly, the extra­
budgetary expenditure had to be explained in the 1906 budget proposal; and, thirdly, the pill had 
to be sweetened for the Reichstag by using savings of almost 20,000 Marks in the 1 903 accounts 
to reduce the extra-budgetary expenditure in the accounts for 1905 instead of showing them as an 
extra-budgetary income in the 1906 budget proposal, as the colonial department had intended. The 
colonial department obliged and explained in its 1906 budget proposal that although a total of 
about 86,000 Marks were required for buildings on Ponape only additional funds of about 37 ,OOO 
Marks were sought in 1906 because up to 30,000 Marks would be treated as an extra-budgetary 
expenditure in 1905 and the savings shown in the 1903 accounts would be used to cover the rest 
(RKA 3003). 
The colonial department wanted to deal with the Saipan cyclone in a similar fashion. It 
authorised the expenditure of up to 30,000 Marks outside the 1 905 budget and sought another 
12,000 Marks in the 1906 budget. While the Reichstag was prepared to accept the handling of the 
Ponape cyclone, it apparently believed that the colonial department had gone too far in relation 
to the Saipan cyclone. It increased the 1906 building vote, but only by 25,000 rather than 42,000 
Marks. 
This was at least how it looked to me because the explanations to the amended budget proposal 
no longer referred to the authority of the district commissioner to spend up to 30,000 Marks 
outside the 1905 budget. But I subsequently discovered that there had been two cyclones in the 
Marianas in 1905 : one in August and an even more destructive one in November. In other words, 
the Reichstag had not interfered with the authority of the district commissioner to spend 30,000 
Marks outside the 1 905 budget to deal with the August cyclone and it had approved an additional 
25,000, rather than 12,000 Marks, in the 1 906 budget to deal with the November cyclone. 
While this made sense,28 the treatment of the expenditure of these funds in the accounts was 
decidedly unorthodox. They show that the district commissioner had spent only 1 3 ,000 Marks 
outside the budget in 1 905 to repair cyclone damage. The remaining 1 7  ,OOO Marks were treated 
as a saving which was transferred to the 1906 accounts. However, the 1 906 building funds of the 
Marianas were also underspent by 2,000 Marks, so that this amount, together with other savings, 
was transferred to the 1907 building funds of the Marshall Islands . Although the authority to 
spend outside the 1905 budget to repair cyclone damage in the Marianas and a boost to the normal 
building program in the Marshall Islands in 1907 were quite different matters, the audit office did 
not object. 
The 1 906 management plan itself contains an illustration of a more ordinary but therefore 
probably also more common way of manipulating the expenditure of budgetary allocations. 
According to the 1906 budget, funds for 1 9  regular auxiliary positions for colonial officials in the 
Island Territory had been approved. 29 They included a district commissioner, a government doctor, 
a secretary and a police sergeant in J aluit and a district officer in Nauru. The total funds approved 
for the Island Territory under this heading amounted to 120,400 Marks. According to the 
management plan the salaries of the officials identified added up to precisely that amount. But it 
only listed 1 8  positions because that of the district commissioner in the Marshall Islands remained 
unfilled-and it could not have been filled because no budgetary funds for this purpose were 
available. According to the final accounts the total salary bill for regular auxiliary personnel in 
1 906 had been 121 ,363 .680 Marks. But as the budget had also provided 21 ,000 Marks for 
28 In retrospect it was obvious that my initial interpretation had been misguided. The structure of the system of financial 
controls gave the Reichstag no power to force the colonial department to withdraw the authority to spend 30,000 Marks 
outside the budget which it had given to the district commissioner; it could only refuse to approve the extra-budgetary 
expenditure made in its exercise when dealing with the 1 905 accounts. 
29 None of the positions in the Island Territory were treated as permanent at the time. 
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extraordinary auxiliary personnel and substitutions, the whole title had been underspent by over 
20,000 Marks, so that funds for a district commissioner in Jaluit would have been available. The 
account figures show that the actual expenditure under the latter heading had been 
minimal-which is only possible if none of the officials listed had gone on leave, or if no 
substitutes had been employed for those who did.30 But as the accounts do not tell us how the 
funds were actually spent, it is also possible that several of the officials identified in the 
management plan had died or resigned in the course of the year, so that the actual staffing position 
may have been quite different from that shown in the management plan. 
A comparison with the budget for 1 905 shows that the management plan differed even more 
pointedly from the budget than has so far emerged. The 1 906 budget had sought an increase of 
41 ,000 Marks of the regular auxiliary personnel vote. It was solely justified by the staff required 
in the Marshall Islands which were to become part of the Island Territory. But instead of 
allocating funds totalling 4 1 ,000 Marks to the Marshall Islands the management plan allocated a 
mere 26,000 Marks. In other words the Marshall Islands received only about two thirds of the 
funds due to them, because the rest was needed to cover the salaries of officials already employed 
in the other districts. But how could this be when the 1905 budget allocation of about 100,000 
Marks for these districts had only been overspent by a few hundred Marks? Had there been a 
massive salary increase in 1906? Or had the Island Territory only managed to stick so close to its 
budget allocation in 1 905 because one or more of the funded positions had in fact remained 
unfilled? Were the budgets routinely manipulated in this manner? Were there other manipulation 
devices which could be used at the local level? Were, for example, the funds allocated for non­
itemised building projects treated as a piggy bank, the contents of which were used for any number 
of purposes because it remained outside any meaningful parliamentary controls? In short, were 
the management plans still part of a financial phantom world? 
They certainly were. But they were, at the same time, an important bureaucratic control 
instrument. They also illustrate how the executive responded to financial control by parliament. 
Moreover, the two aspects were related: they both had to do with the forces working for more 
regulation and for more discretion which operated in different ways at different levels as a 
political process concerned with power rather than money. 
Let us now approach this process from the other end by considering what happened to the 
budget proposals of the local administrations in the Island Territory after its budget had been 
combined with that of the Old Protectorate in 1910. 
VI 
This combination did not mean that the governor became responsible for working out a single 
budget proposal for the whole of German New Guinea. On the contrary, the local administrations 
in the Island Territory submitted their separate budget proposals for 1 9 1 0  directly to the colonial 
office and were instructed to follow the same procedure for the 1 9 1 1 budget. 31 
The district office in Jaluit jumped the gun by sending preliminary proposals for the 191 1 
budget to the colonial office more than six months early, in September 1909. As the colonial 
office read these proposals, they requested funds for the construction of a new hospital because 
the acting district commissioner, secretary Merz, had moved into the existing hospital building 
since he regarded the accommodation allocated to him to be inadequate for a married official. The 
colonial office was furious: funds for a hospital for Europeans had been approved in the 1906 
budget. It was out of the question to seek funds for the same purpose again in 191 1 .  Merz was to 
30 One of the district commissioners (Senfft) did go on leave in 1 906 but his job was shouldered, as an additional load, 
by one of his colleagues (Fritz). 
3 1  The information relating to the 191 1 budget is taken from AA G2, Item 7. 
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move back to his quarters immediately and to make sure that the European hospital became 
operational as soon as possible, using the funds which had been approved for its equipment in the 
1 909 budget. By the time these instructions arrived in Jaluit, Merz had mailed his formal 1 9 1 1 
budget proposals and sent a copy to the governor in Rabaul. He could therefore only hasten to 
inform the colonial office that he was about to vacate the hospital and ask to make the necessary 
adjustments to his proposals in Berlin. 
Shortly after receiving the Jaluit proposals the governor also received a copy of the 1 9 1 1  
budget proposals of district commissioner Boeder for the Eastern Carolines .  By contrast district 
commissioner Fritz sent the original of his budget proposals for the Western Carolines and the 
Marianas to the governor so that they had to be transmitted by him to the colonial office.32 This 
gave acting governor Osswald the opportunity to argue cautiously for a greater involvement in the 
budget preparations: although this had perhaps initially not been intended, closer contacts had 
developed between the government and the local administrations in the Island Territory. As a 
result the government had to share increasingly the responsibility for particular administrative 
measures, especially if they had significant financial consequences and hence affected the budgets 
for the various districts. With a continuation of these developments it was becoming more 
imperative to take a position in relation to the local budget proposals although Osswald would, 
in this case, restrict himself to a few general comments. 
Osswald approved the proposals for the Marianas and had few problems with those for the 
Western Carolines33 But, apart from pointing out that Boeder had forgotten to request funds for 
a government doctor in the Truk Group--the need for whom apparently all parties accepted-he 
was concerned about Boeder' s extravagant non-recurrent expenditure proposals: 80,000 Marks 
for a steam pinnace and 50,000 Marks for the construction of roads. In Osswald's view, the 
purchase of such an expensive vessel could not be justified, and with the manpower at his disposal 
Boeder could not possibly build roads costing 50,000 Marks in a single year. If these proposals 
had been based on military considerations, a much less expensive increase in the size of the local 
police force was preferable. But Osswald was careful not to apply directly for a corresponding 
amendment of the proposal and stressed instead that he had invited the district commissioner to 
provide additional information. 
Since acting district commissioner Merz had not formally requested funds for a slightly 
cheaper sea-going vessel for the Marshall Islands, but had only suggested in his covering report 
that it would be desirable if the colonial office would include them in the budget, Osswald said 
nothing about this issue. He focused instead on Merz's hospital plans. He supported the idea of 
a new hospital, although he considered the project to be less urgent than the posting of a 
government doctor to Truk. As regards the size of the proposed expenditure, which he clearly 
regarded as too high, he could not comment because he did not have the necessary information. 
Generally, he gave the impression that additional expenditure in the Marshall Islands should wait 
until it had increased its local revenue significantly-and Merz had foreshadowed that he would 
be able to double the yield of the copra tax as soon as he was given a suitable vessel. 
How were these local budget proposals treated by the colonial office? Acting district 
commissioner Merz did surprisingly well. The mood in Berlin had changed when it was realised 
that the new hospital had been intended for natives and not as a replacement for the European 
hospital Merz had taken over as his residence. The colonial office adopted a cheaper version of 
a native hospital and even proposed the addition of a verandah to the secretary's  quarters because 
they indeed only offered very cramped accommodation. 
32 Although the Marianas had been placed under the district office in Yap separate budget proposals were still prepared 
for them. The government station in Nauru also submitted its own budget proposals. 
33 His comments are nonetheless of general historical interest because they show that a transfer of the district office from 
Yap to Palau was under discussion at the time. 
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Osswald was successful in getting funds for a government doctor in Truk, since the colonial 
office was confident that the Reichstag would be generous in approving funds for an improvement 
of medical services. The great loser was Boeder: he did not get his steam pinnace, the road 
building funds he had sought were halved to the 1910 level of 25,000 Marks and the size of his 
police force was not increased either.34 
But Boeder had a minor success in June 1910 when he sought funds for new station buildings 
on Truk because, in the opinion of the government doctor, inadequate housing had been 
responsible for both police sergeants and probably also the wife of the district officer contracting 
typhoid fever. The funds were approved by cable, although as an expenditure outside the 1910 
budget, and not as the increase in the building vote for 191 1 Boeder had sought. As the colonial 
office virtuously pronounced, it was impossible to provide funds in the 191 1 budget to cover costs 
already incurred in 19 10. However, by the time this decree, dated 5 September 1910, arrived in 
Ponape, Boeder was probably already dead and the Ponape Rebellion had started. 
The Ponape Rebellion had a far-reaching impact on the government of German New Guinea. 
Although Hahl would probably have in any case undertaken an extended tour of inspection of the 
Island Territory, after returning from his long home leave, it took on a different flavour. Hahl was 
now finnly resolved to incorporate the Island Territory fully into his domain instead of being 
satisfied with a minimal long-distance control, combined with occasional visits. This changed 
stance is reflected in his report on the 1912  budget proposals for the Island Territory dated 8 July 
1 9 1 1 .35 
My trip through the Island Territory gave me the opportunity to familiarise myself thoroughly with the 
budgets of the various local administrations. 
As regards the proposals for the Marianas and Western Carolines . . .  I refer to my separate reports which 
should arrive with the same mail. 
The proposal for the Eastern Carolines was drawn up in my presence and has been approved by me in 
every detail . . .  
In relation to the proposal for Jaluit the following comments should be made . . .  
While these comments only dealt with minor points, Hahl's  conclusions are of considerable 
interest. 
I request that the colonial office, as from 1912, no longer distributes the funds locally . . .  but only divides 
them between New Guinea, the Eastern and the Western Carolines, leaving it to the two district offices 
[in the Island Territory] to distribute the funds to the government stations. This corresponds with the 
direction the administrative organisation has taken. 
A determination in Berlin of the amounts due to the various stations binds the responsible district 
commissioner, robs him of the necessary flexibility, and is therefore undesirable. 
Hahl suggested that the colonial office should allocate the funds for 19 12  as in previous years, but 
only in the form of guidelines, rather than binding instructions. However, budget proposals for 
1 9 1 3  should only be submitted "from here and from Yap and Ponape". 
In the longer term, first a combination of the funds for the Eastern and Western Carolines [that is to say 
for the whole of the Island Territory] , and ultimately a transfer to the governor of the full powers to 
distribute the budgetary allocations internally, will have to be considered. 
34 An increase in the size of the local police force in 191 1 would have been too late to affect the developments leading 
up to the Ponape Rebellion. It is also uncertain if an earlier increase would have made much difference. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that the cut of the road building funds was a signal that Boeder was not supposed to push too hard in 
this field. 
35 The information relating to the 1 9 1 2  budget is taken from AA G2, Item Z13 .  
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In other words, Hahl was aiming for a single budget proposal for German New Guinea submitted 
by the governor and a single management plan prepared by him.36 
That this was indeed his aim is borne out by the administrative reorganisation he suggested in 
other reports at the time. All three government stations in the area currently under the 
responsibility of the district office in Yap, namely Saipan, Korror and Angaur, were to be 
downgraded, thus also diminishing the importance of the district office. In the eastern district the 
station in Nauru was also to be downgraded. By contrast the government station in Truk was to 
be upgraded by giving it administrative responsibility for the entire "central" Carolines. The status 
of the government station in the Marshall Islands, which had just lost their own district office, was 
to remain unchanged. This was to prepare the ground for a subsequent downgrading of the district 
offices in Yap and Ponape to government stations at the same level as Jaluit and Truk. However, 
Hahl insisted that he was keeping an open mind and that the position would be reviewed in the 
light of further experiences and in consultation with the officials involved.37 
While Hahl had no strong feelings about what he found in the Western Carolines he was 
shocked by the picture of decline and neglect he saw in the Marianas. He pleaded with the colonial 
office to approve at least the 16,000 Marks which were urgently required to improve medical 
services. Another major concern was the state of the uninhabited island of Tinian whose 
population of wild cattle, deer, pigs and goats had dwindled through the mismanagement of the 
local company to which it had been let. The lease had been terminated, but since the company had 
no money it was pointless to sue for compensation. Similarly, the Pagan Company had run down 
the plantations it had leased. It had also done little to utilise the uninhabited islands at the northern 
end of the group for which it had been given an exclusive concession. Both agreements with that 
company had therefore been terminated. Hahl had also threatened the lessees of another plantation 
with a termination of their lease if they did not improve their performance. The only remaining 
larger agricultural lease conveniently ran out in 1 9 1 2  and would not be renewed. While the large 
areas would be re-let to more efficient enterprises, five miniature government plantations of 
between two and 20 hectares were to be turned into model farms where the natives could learn 
how to manage their own holdings more productively. To this end they could no longer be used 
as places where people worked off their taxes . The government station had been instructed to 
insist, in line with the 1910 Taxation Ordinance, that all taxes be paid in cash and to employ 
instead a small number of paid skilled labourers . It had also been told to stop fiddling with the 
roads and to concentrate on improving the water supply. The four cushy jobs for the unpopular 
Chamorro supervisors in the Caroline Islander settlements on Saipan were to be abolished, 
whereas the salaries of the four assistant native teachers were to be increased as a first step 
towards a gradual upgrading of the government school. 
The only direct response to Hahl' s various comments was a reprimand by the colonial office. 38 
It related to Hahl' s termination of the Tinian lease. Although the colonial office accepted that it 
had been substantially justified, it insisted that, apart from emergencies, all measures which 
diminished the budgetary income of the colony required its prior approval. 39 Since German New 
Guinea still required a large subsidy, any such reductions were at the Reich' s  expense and 
therefore interfered with the budget powers of its legislature. 
36 Hahl' s report does not give the impression that he intended to limit himself to issuing general guidelines to the local 
administrations after his aim had been reached. 
37 As the law stood at the time, Hahl was not authorised to close down district offices in the Island Territory or to remove 
government stations from their responsibility. 
38 The decree merely mentioned in passing that they had arrived too late to be taken into account when formulating the 
final budget proposal submitted to parliament. 
39 It added that the same applied to the repeal of ordinances in the course of a budget year which produced an income 
that had been included in the budget-a reference to Hahl's  planned abolition of a dog tax, the collection of which 
involved a greater effort than its yields were worth. 
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On 27 February 1912  the governor's  office40 informed the local administrations in the Island 
Territory that the previous procedures still applied to the budget proposals for 1913  because the 
colonial office had not yet responded to the reform proposals made by Hahl in July 191 1 .  The 
district offices and stations in Yap, Saipan, Ponape, Jaluit and Nauru each had to prepare separate 
budget proposals and send them directly to the colonial office with copies to the governor. 
By May the governor's office had only received the budget proposals from Yap and Nauru. 
Those for the Western Carolines and Palau were highly optimistic. They estimated that the 
phosphate levy paid by the mine on Angaur would yield 125,000 Marks rather than the 75,000 
Marks included in the 1912  budget and doubled the estimate for import duties to 60,000 Marks 
because the district office believed that the newly established Western Carolines Company would 
have a major impact on the economic development of the district in 1913 .  All told it expected a 
local revenue of over 250,000 Marks, almost 100,000 Marks more than the 1912  budget estimates. 
On the expenditure side the proposal was more than modest, climaxing in a "nil" demand under 
the non-recurrent expenditure vote. The most daring request was for an administrative assistant 
for secretary Baumert who effectively ran the district office because district commissioner 
Kersting was also in charge of the Eastern Carolines, where he was based, as they occupied most 
of his attentions.41 The Nauru proposals were more subdued. The phosphate exports were 
estimated not to exceed 1 20,000 tonnes, yielding a phosphate levy of just 60,000 Marks. 
Nonetheless, district officer W amecke expected a large surplus with a local expenditure of about 
33,000 Marks against 121 ,000 Marks of local revenue. 
The office of the governor regarded W amecke' s predictions as too pessimistic and suggested 
that the phosphate levy in Nauru could be safely set at 70,000 Marks. By contrast, it regarded the 
hopes Baumert had placed on the Western Carolines Company as unrealistic. It therefore 
recommended that his estimate of receipts from import duties be halved to 30,000 Marks. Its 
comments on his expenditure proposals were more significant. In addition to formally abolishing 
the post of a district commissioner for the Western Carolines42 it proposed that the district officer 
in Korror be replaced by a government doctor who would also take on the administrative 
responsibilities. 
None of these suggestions for the Island Territory were taken up by the colonial office. The 
district commissioner position for the Western Carolines was retained, the Palau Group did not 
get a government doctor, and for the phosphate levy the 1912  figures were again used in the 1913  
budget proposal. This was largely due to the fact that the proposal was preoccupied with a two­
year development program for the Old Protectorate which was explained in a long memorandum. 
According to the explanations of the 1 9 14 budget proposal the need for a similar program for 
the Island Territory had been considered but found to be impractical. But for 1914 some additional 
funds for that territory were sought. They included the post of a government doctor for Palau and 
also implemented the plan to put him in charge of the government station in Korror. However, the 
estimated revenue from the phosphate levy was still only increased by a modest 25,000 Marks. 
More importantly, the suggestion to abolish the post of district commissioner for the Western 
Carolines, which was a key element in Hahl's  plans for an administrative reorganisation of the 
Island Territory, was not taken up in the 19 14 budget proposals either. 
Hahl fared even worse with his plans for the Old Protectorate which he had set out in a 
memorandum in September 1 9 1 1 (see RKA 6520) on which he had based his budget proposal for 
1913 .  The memorandum appended to the colonial office proposal for that year was a very different 
document. Since governors were not given an opportunity to comment on the colonial office's 
40 I t  appears that Hahl had handed over much of  the budget preparations for the Island Territory to  his deputy. 
41 This state of affairs is reflected by the fact that Kersting' s entire salary was funded in the budget of the Eastern 
Caro lines. 
42 The post was still included in the budget although it was shown as being unfilled. 
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proposals before they were submitted to the Reichstag, Hahl had to wait until the colonial office 
raised questions about the 1914 budget in a decree of 8 November 1912  before he could voice his 
frustration. 
While some of his specific proposals had been accepted, his general plan had been 
fundamentally altered. The central idea of giving priority to the "opening-up" (Erschliessung) of 
the colony by extending the network of government stations had been rejected. Instead the colonial 
office had chosen to focus on an improvement of agricultural services. Although Hahl appreciated 
the increase in the funds available for this purpose he still firmly believed that his choice of 
priorities had been the right one. Despite an instruction not to pursue the matter he therefore 
regarded it as his duty to put his proposals forward again in the hope that he would eventually be 
able to convince the authorities in Berlin. He did so with the full support of the unofficial 
members of the advisory council who, during the discussion of the 1914 budget proposals, had 
insisted that the measures designed to open up the colony should under no circumstances be 
deferred again. 43 
The decree of the colonial office to which Hahl responded had been especially concerned with 
an improvement of German New Guinea's financial management. In this field, Hahl believed, the 
colonial office had also chosen the wrong priorities. Instead of asking for a "director of finance" 
as the colonial office expected, Hahl therefore announced that he would again be asking for a head 
of the accounts section in his budget proposal. He probably enjoyed pointing out that it would, in 
any case, be futile to ask for a director of finance at this stage because the ministry of finance had 
indicated that it would only support the creation of such a post after German New Guinea had 
assumed full responsibility for its accounts. Yet so far the colonial office had not even granted his 
request to consolidate the accounts of the Island Territory with those of the Old Protectorate. It 
was prudent to wait until this step had been successfully taken before transferring even greater 
financial responsibilities to the colony. This, however, depended on an adequate number of 
experienced accountants whom the colonial office had so far denied him. To provide posts for 
such people at the middle level of the colonial service was at present more helpful than funding 
the post of a director of finance. Once a strengthened accounting section had prepared the ground 
a senior official would be most welcome because he could then also play a part in the reform of 
the customs service and the management of government supplies which, Hahl hoped, would get 
underway during the 1 9 1 5  budget year. 
Hahl was not as unsuccessful in achieving his goals as these grumblings suggest. Funds for 
a government station on the lower Sepik were approved in the 19 13  budget and another station 
at the mouth of the Markham was funded in 19 14, when German New Guinea also acquired a 
head of its account section. But Hahl's  ambitions were far greater. They were spelled out in 
another long memorandum which was to be appended to the 1 9 1 5  budget proposal (AA 63/83, 
Box 138/5) .  It sketched a second development program covering three budget years and requiring 
Reich subsidies of over 7 ,000,000 Marks. It focused with even greater determination than Hahl' s 
earlier memorandum on the "opening-up" of the Old Protectorate. Eight new government stations 
were planned: four in Kaiser Wilhelmsland-two inland stations on the upper Markham River and 
the middle Ramu and two coastal stations at Vanimo and Wewak-and four in the Bismarck 
Archipelago-one each in northern and southern New Britain, one in southern Bougainville and 
one in New Hanover. No new stations were planned for the Island Territory. Instead Hahl again 
43 An examination of this difference of opinion is difficult because the governor's files on the 1 9 1 3  and 1914  budget 
proposals are no longer available. The copy of Hahl's report summarised above survived because it was put on a file 
dealing with native taxes (AA G2, Item 434) because it also dealt with tax issues. I would have liked to search the files 
of the colonial office for additional information but the costs were prohibitive and Hahl' s report gave a sufficient although 
clearly incomplete idea of what had gone on. 
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proposed a downgrading of the district office in Yap to a government station which was to be 
placed directly under the governor rather than the district office in the Eastern Carolines.44 
Whether Hahl ' s development program would have been welcomed by the colonial office is 
another matter. It is unlikely that Hahl expected that it would be implemented as rapidly as he had 
proposed. On the other hand, there is no question that "the opening up" of the interior of Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland and the other large islands was going to happen. Moreover, the Reichstag at least 
would have been in a favourable mood. Copra prices were high, phosphate production was 
booming, large-scale mining of gold in eastern Kaiser Wilhelmsland was about to get underway 
and the reported discovery of oil in the west had so delighted the Reichstag that it would have 
been willing to allocate substantial funds for the exploration of this new resource in the 1914 
budget. 
But such spectacular confidence boosters would hardly have been necessary. just as setbacks, 
such as the temporary ban on the hunting of birds-of-paradise, would have made no dramatic 
difference. Leaving global factors out of account, German New Guinea's  economic future on the 
eve of Hahl' s  departure in April 1914  looked decidedly rosy. Besides, given the arrangement that 
had been made for its government the growth of the colonial state in this colony, its external 
expansion and internal bureaucratisation was indeed inevitable (see above: 221 ff.) .  
This does not mean that it  did not matter what the various historical actors did or did not do: 
it takes a great deal of effort and some luck to make even the inevitable happen at a particular 
time; but it is a lot easier to swim with the tide than try to stem it. Although the colonial office 
played the key role, it too could not dictate developments. On the contrary, it failed each time it 
tried to slow down government expenditure. Nor was the personality of the individuals 
representing the institutions of government immaterial. The history of colonial rule in German 
New Guinea would not have been the same if Hahl had not become governor and had not served 
in this capacity as long as he did. But Hahl, like everybody else, had to reckon not only with 
external factors but also with the internal constraints imposed by the system of government he 
helped create and which was gaining strength the more structured it became. With each year of 
colonial rule the Emperor' s  New Clothes became more tangible, gradually hardening into a suit 
of armour which protected those wearing it but at the same time restricted their freedom of 
movement. 
When colonial secretary Dern burg proclaimed that Germany's  governors were free to govern 
their colonies as they saw fit, albeit within the existing legislation and financial frameworks, he 
was not joking. He was as genuine as his banker colleague Adolph von Hansemann had been 20 
years earlier when he had pronounced that the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's  administrator was to be 
given the widest possible discretion, naturally within the limits of the law, their budgets and the 
instructions issued to them. The difference was that the colonial law was then in its infancy and 
that the administrative capacity for operating a bureaucratic system of government was still 
lacking. Indeed throughout the period of its rule the company did not even manage to ensure that 
its land acquisition monopoly was exercised as vigorously as it expected. 
The financial records which German colonial rule produced illustrate the slow process of the 
actual bureaucratisation of government in the colony. But they present a curiously deformed 
picture presenting prospective and retrospective vistas rather than depicting the actual state of 
affairs. Moreover, these records are concerned with the financial control of governmental 
activities and not with these activities themselves. This means that they only record the financial 
information systematically while the non-financial information they contain remains anecdotal. 
44 The 1915  budget proposal did include the position of a director of finance. It also indicates that Hahl had been given 
approval to combine the 1 9 1 3  accounts for the Island Territory with those for the Old Protectorate into a single 
consolidated account. 
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Nonetheless this information is historically valuable, in particular in relation to the 
discretionary exercise of governmental powers for which financial controls were of crucial 
importance; and while the Rule of Law was generally expanding, the process by which the 
colonial government grew as an operation remained essentially discretionary. It was impractical 
to prescribe in the form of genuine normative laws which roads or buildings had to be constructed, 
or how many officials of specified kinds it had to employ in any given year. Such matters were 
not suitable targets for normativeregulation whereas financial controls were appropriate. Yet what 
happened in this field was a vital part of the exercise of all governmental powers. It is impossible 
to appreciate the history of German colonial rule without considering the personal and material 
resources that could be employed and, as might be expected, the financial records in this particular 
field are richer and more systematic than elsewhere. 
Although a description of the changing administrative capacity of the colonial government still 
does not tell us what it actually did, it shows what it could do in factual rather than normative 
terms. It is a form of quantitative history, but one which is not concerned with how often various 
types of governmental actions were performed at various times in various parts of German New 
Guinea. Instead it quantifies the capacity to perform these actions. 
It is plain that a history of, say, the medical service is seriously defective if it does not inform 
its readers about the number of doctors the government employed, about the kinds of hospitals 
available to them, about the opportunity they were given to visit native villages and so on. It is 
equally clear, however, that it is in the end the actions which the medical personnel carried out that 
count historically. Without also coming to grips with the external aspect of colonial rule, with the 
effects of the exercise of governmental powers on those who were being governed, a history of 
this rule remains unsatisfactory. The question is whether it is possible to supplement an account 
of the normative and organisational framework of government-and of its changing administrative 
capacity-with an action-centred narrative depicting the external aspect of German colonial rule 
without compromising the commitment to factuality that must be the cornerstone of any academic 
form of historiography. 
It is time for another case study, and the history of "the police" as the most tangible instrument 
of power of the colonial government in relation to its subjects is an obvious target. To set the 
scene I shall again begin with a preliminary overview extracted from the annual reports. 
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Chapter 5: A "Systematic " Appro ach 
I 
The first annual report of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie refers to "police functions" to be entrusted to its station managers but focused on the need to establish an armed native police 
force as a "material instrument of power"vis-a-vis those natives "who have not yet actually been 
brought under the new State authority": 
the Board of Directors has equipped the stations and ships with arms for their protection. But the small 
number of officials and employees at the stations is not adequate to repel an attack or to avenge one . . . .  
The protection . . .  the German Government has promised . . .  would also have to be called on to repel attacks 
by the natives. But so far no measures calculated to meet this contingency have been taken. In fact the 
only naval ships which have been present in the Protectorate-and then only occasionally and for short 
periods-are not suitable for this purpose in any but exceptional cases (Sack and Clark, 1979: 1 1) .  
Although such an instrument of power was also required "for the enforcement of police and 
judicial measures", its central role was the protection of the first colonial enclaves, which non­
natives occupied together with their native employees, from the natives living outside them and 
to punish these natives for acts of transgression. 
The picture of the natives as outsiders lent strength to the company's  argument that it was part 
of the duties of the Reich to provide this protection through the imperial navy. In this scheme of 
things the natives were an external rather than an internal threat, so that dealing with it was 
primarily a responsibility of the Reich. The company could only be expected to make a 
contribution. Even the contribution it was prepared to make was conditional. It was offered on the 
assumption that the rank and file of the police force would be recruited from among the local 
native population, whereas the company was unwilling to maintain an expensive mercenary force 
hired abroad. Still, it announced the appointment of "an officer and several non-commissioned 
officers who will proceed to the Protectorate taking with them the equipment for fifty men" (ibid. :  
12) .  
The next annual report stated that "Lieutenant (ret.) Steinhauser" and two former non­
commissioned officers were training an unspecified number of natives from the Bismarck 
Archipelago, who had been supplied with light-weight uniforms, in the use of the "converted 
Chasseport carbine" with promising but slow results (ibid. :  28). 
According to the annual reports it took until 1891  before the armed police force went into 
action during several punitive expeditions near Hatzfeldhafen under imperial commissioner Rose, 
with the additional assistance of a warship but without "taking or punishing the culprits" (ibid. :  
60). This indicates that the company hardly regarded its native police force with pride but rather 
treated it as an unproductive investment which had to be kept as small as possible. It was even 
prepared to close down its station in Hatzfeldhafen in the face of native opposition rather than 
crushing it with superior military might. 
In the company' s  1 889 agreement with the German government the native police force lost its 
military commander and had its strength cut to 36 men who "could be employed as labourers by 
the company when they are not required by the Protectorate Administration for police duty or boat 
duty" (ibid. :  41  ). The reference to "boat duty" shows that even the official role of the native police 
force was not limited to providing military services. Nor did this force-together with the imperial 
navy-have a monopoly in the field. It is plain, for example, that during the Blanche Bay 
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Uprising in 1 893 administrator Schmiele relied on a large number of more or less armed native 
plantation labourers. 1 
The company saw the part to be played by its native police force as reactive and defensive. It 
therefore disapproved of an expedition in 1 894 which Herr Steusloff, an acting administrative 
official, had found it necessary to undertake for the purpose of punishing a chief in the north of 
the Gazelle Peninsula who was alleged to have committed acts of violence against other natives, 
even though they had not interrupted the peaceful relations between the colonists and the natives 
which had been "restored after the disturbances of the summer of 1 893" (ibid. :  94). Acts of 
violence natives committed against other natives were no reason for punitive measures. In so far 
as the use of military force was unavoidable, the company continued to rely on the assistance of 
the imperial navy, and said as little as possible about military activities in its annual reports. 
The first reported punitive expedition after the end of company rule still fitted this mould. It 
was carried out jointly by the imperial judge for the Bismarck Archipelago with a section of the 
native police force and SMS Mowe and directed against natives on Bougainville who had seized 
the cutter Sea Ghost, killing its European captain and a coloured crew member during the previous 
year. However, the concerns now went further. Where it "adversely affected trade and the 
recruitment of labour" the administration was called upon to stop natives fighting each other. 
Moreover, after peaceful relations with and among the natives had been established, these natives 
were to be "involved in the political administration and the administration of justice by appointing 
chiefs with limited police powers and judicial authority" (ibid. : 171) .  
While a transfer of  police powers to government chiefs reduced the duties of  the police force 
in "pacified" areas, the range of activities it had to perform increased in other ways. Native 
policemen acted as overseers when natives were requisitioned to build roads. They also supervised 
natives sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour, who were apparently also mainly employed 
on roadworks (ibid. : 177). Nonetheless, governor von Bennigsen regarded the armed police force 
primarily as a paramilitary force with a distinctly mercenary character. 
In the selection of members of the police troop care is taken to see that as many tribes as possible are 
represented and that no single tribe predominates, and in this way the risk of mutiny, a possible danger 
in every mercenary force, is eliminated. However it would be still better if the maj or part of the troop 
were made up of East African Negroes, as the local police troopers cannot be retained in the service 
permanently, and when they return to their home districts trained in the use of arms, they can do a great 
deal of mischief with a rifle and ammunition should they manage to get hold of them. At the present time 
there are few rifles and little ammunition in the hands of the natives, and these will probably gradually 
be confiscated (ibid. : 194- 195). 
Fortunately, in Bennigsen's  view, Melanesians were characterised "by a high degree of 
cowardice", so that in the absence of large united tribes, "any necessary military expeditions can 
be carried out by a police troop gradually increasing in size to match the number of stations and 
supported from the sea in emergencies by the Imperial Navy" (ibid. :  1 94). 
The increase in the number of stations began in 1900 in northern New Ireland: "considerable 
quantities of firearms and ammunition, originally stolen from Europeans, were confiscated, in 
most cases without bloodshed, and a prohibition was issued against carrying arms" (ibid. :  210) .  
The success of this station under the legendary Franz Boluminski in pacifying its district, which 
had been the target of punitive expeditions for almost 20 years, was especially pleasing because 
the imperial government was generally having second thoughts about the usefulness of such 
expeditions.  
l He could not possibly have divided his native police force-by now 48 men, of  whom 24 were stationed in the 
Bismarck Archipelago (ibid.: 95)-into two parties able to "outflank" what are called "several hostile tribes" (ibid.: 75). 
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Regrettably, because there is practically no communication between the individual groups of islands and 
tribes on account of the distances and the language differences, a successfully completed punitive 
expedition does not have a far-reaching effect . . . . [P]ractically every . . .  tribe has to be made to feel the 
power of the Administration before it can be induced to desist from robbery, murder and cannibalism. 
In addition it is extraordinarily difficult to make a real impression on the natives in the bush. Only a 
coloured force experienced in jungle warfare, under the command of . . .  Europeans well acquainted with 
the bush and the ways of the natives can undertake expeditions . . .  with prospects of success (ibid. :  2 1 1) .  
Instead of announcing the arrival of a large number of African askari, the 1900 report stated 
that only local natives were employed in the police troop; that it was easy to obtain suitable natives 
for this purpose; and that the "older police boys tend to remain in the service after expiry of their 
contract or return to Government service after a brief stay in their home district" (ibid. :  21 1-12). 
Apart from announcing the completion of the construction of police barracks and a house for a 
police sergeant in northern New Ireland (ibid. :  225), and from referring to more punitive 
expeditions, the 1901  report mentioned a temporary "police post" in the Admiralty Islands (ibid. :  
223) .  A more permanent police post was established in Toma after the V arzin Murders. I t  was 
expected "to ensure peaceful conditions both for the expanding plantations and also among the 
belligerent natives themselves" (ibid. :  236). 
A reference to the recurrence "of the very bitter feuds between the mountain tribes and the 
coastal tribes" in southern New Ireland which "immediately had a very adverse effect on the 
recruitment of labour" (ibid.) foreshadowed the establishment of at least a police post there. 
[E]xperience has shown that temporary punitive measures against excesses committed by the natives are 
worthless, in fact harmful, in that the latter always tend to avenge the losses inflicted on the next comers. 
The application of military force is useful only when the advantage gained by intimidating the natives 
is followed up by a permanent Government station which suppresses the feuds of the natives, gradually 
reconciles the warring factions, and guarantees the security of both person and property simply by its 
presence (ibid.) .  
On the other hand, the police post in Toma was to be used as a base for a small "expeditionary 
troop" (ibid. :  244). This mobile unit was first deployed to punish the natives of the Witu Islands 
who had attacked a trading station and seized a steamboat. Here too an "occupation force" was 
left behind. It was to maintain "the security of the station until the situation has been fully 
clarified" (ibid. :  244). A "temporary occupation force" was also stationed in the Admiralty 
Islands, although it had so far not been completely successful in subduing these "volatile and 
belligerent islanders". "This area, if it is to be properly opened up, requires the establishment of 
a permanent station well equipped with means of transport by sea" (ibid.). 
However, the next government station was established in southern New Ireland, where the 
imposition of government control was "in some cases associated with fighting and bloodshed 
involving the troop in Namatanai" (ibid. :  25 1) .  The Admiralty Islands received only another 
fleeting visit by the expeditionary troop, which was also active in the Witu Islands, as well as in 
the northern Solomons. In 1 905 a government station for the northern Solomons was opened in 
Kieta. Its police troop had to intervene "at least twice" with military force, in one case because the 
natives stubbornly refused to surrender a man accused of attempted murder and inciting rebellion 
(ibid. :  256). 
Although the 1906 report again stressed that for the pacification of the Admiralty Islands and 
the preservation of its people "the constant presence of police troops is an urgent necessity" (ibid. : 
265), the government station opened during that year was situated in western Kaiser 
Wilhelrnsland. It had already brought about "a complete reversal of the native situation". Several 
refractory tribes were successfully punished and the natives were requisitioned in gratifying 
numbers for public works (ibid. :  266). 
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The annual report for 1 907 contained a detailed review of the situation, with a special 
emphasis on Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
In the central section of the Friedrich Wilhelmshafen District the effective sphere of influence of the 
Administration covers a zone bounded in the west by Cape Croisilles and in the east by Cape Rigny, and 
extending inland with a radius of about 10- 15  km. Apart from this area, the Administration maintains 
only a coastal police force2 to protect the natives living along the coast from attacks from the interior. The 
Administration has not yet established itself on a firm, permanent footing in the interior itself. There was 
much unrest among the natives in the year covered by the Report. These disturbances never involved 
attacks against whites but consisted only of fights among the natives themselves and were in every case 
of a purely local character. These must be expected to continue in the future so long as the absence of 
even the most primitive means of communication makes it impossible for the Administration to extend 
its sphere of influence (ibid. : 276) . 
The unrest among the natives was not restricted to the hinterland of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. It 
also made itself felt in the Bogia-Monumbo area, further west, where all the tribes practised head­
hunting: 
In point of fact they did not menace the European settlements in the year covered by the Report, but they 
advanced to the immediate vicinity of these settlements and attacked the coastal natives living close to 
the mission stations. The guilty tribes were given a severe drubbing. But, judging by previous experience, 
the effect will last only so long as renewed encroachments appear likely to be visited with a repetition 
of the punishment. The Catholic Mission regards the prospects of success for their work in those areas 
as doubtful without the protection of a strong Government station. On the other side of Potsdamhafen 
[Monumbo] to the north-west as far as the boundary of the district, there is no effective control whatever. 
In particular the powerful tribes in the two river basins of the Ramu and Kaiserin Augusta Rivers [Sepik] 
are neither open for recruiting nor under missionary influence or accessible to Government agents (ibid. :  
277). 
Matters were even worse in the Eitape district, west of the Sepik, where the natives "acknowledge 
no authority". 
In these circumstances it was very difficult for the Station to gain any influence or to achieve recognition 
of its authority. It was openly challenged to fight and the troop was exposed to ridicule. Armed 
intervention was necessary: in the hinterland of Eitape against the mountain villages of Siaute, Peest, 
Marock and Eitjerap; to the west of the station, against Maloll (on three occasions); to the east of the 
station against Karssau, Muschu, Kerassin and the mountain village of Mangere. 
This intervention by the station apparently made a great impression on the natives and prepared the 
way for peaceful contact between the two sides. Since the appointment of chiefs a certain degree of 
obedience to the instructions issued by the station has been observed, and the feuds have declined in 
number (ibid. : 277-78). 
The switch from punitive expeditions to a pro-active expansion of government control was 
general, with a curious exception for the Admiralty Islands, where it took until 1 9 1 1 before a 
government station was established. It too was soon forced to take armed action against one 
"mountain tribe" which not only attacked the coastal people but also harassed the station. Its chief 
was arrested but escaped from the primitive prison despite his chains; however, an "outbreak of 
dysentery then put an end to all hostilities for the time being" (ibid. :  337). 
2 The German term "Kiistenpolizef' is difficult to translate. It refers to "the policing" of the coast, rather than to a "coastal 
police force" which performed this task. 
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The main event in 191 1 for the history of the police force was the arrival of an officer-more 
than 20 years after the departure of lieutenant Steinhauser-who was to take charge of the 
expeditionary troop as its full-time military commander. 
After adequate training . . .  the troop, when not required for military purposes, is to engage . .  . in practical 
exploration, gradually advancing into unknown tracts of country, reconnoitring tracks and making contact 
with natives. Due to the shortage of training personnel and the absence of adequate reserves for the troop 
itself, it was not able to make an advance into the bush until the first few months of the 1912  financial 
year (ibid.). 
In 1912  the expeditionary troop was stationed for five months near the mouth of the Ramu, the 
so-called KagamExpedition. An extensive terrain was mapped and the local tribes were pacified 
(ibid. :  354). Next the troop was sent to the Baining Mountains in response to an attack by one tribe 
on another during which ''[a]bout thirty-two persons . . .  [were] said to have been killed and partly 
consumed". It "not only succeeded in punishing the aggressors but in occupying the country as 
far as the central massif of the Sinewit and preparing it for administrative control" (ibid. : 355). 
The Administration intends to employ the expeditionary troop to pacify South Bougainville, as this is 
absolutely essential for the successful development of the numerous newly established ventures on that 
island. There are similar plans for the Ramu region and the Markham Valley, in order to open up the 
approaches to the populous interior (ibid.). 
Instead of being sent to southern Bougainville in 1913 ,  the expeditionary troop was dispatched 
to southern New Ireland to crush a rebellion which had followed an attack on an expedition 
investigating its forestry resources.3 This massive intervention did not please district officer 
Bruckner. He had already taken punitive action the day after the attack 
when three of the nine [captured] rifles . . .  were retaken as well as a large part of the stolen equipment 
. . . .  Eight of the natives fell but the Station troop suffered no casualties. 
The expeditionary troop then took over further punitive measures against the rebels .  The only results 
of their intervention reported to the Station have been the shooting of many more natives (Sack & Clark, 
1 980: 56). 
Bruckner saw that the intervention of the expeditionary troop was an over-reaction which would 
seriously set back the peaceful development of his district. 
· In  the organised areas the relations between the Administration and settlers on the one hand and the 
natives on the other hand have been good, and there were no disturbances of any kind. The organised 
areas were visited in the course of numerous patrols, the organisation was consolidated and the 
inhabitants were counted or in some cases re-counted. The collection of the head-tax did not give rise 
to any difficulties . . . .  
The first steps towards the extension of the native organisation to the mountains in the southern part 
of the district were taken . . .  by traversing the island on two occasions. Contact was successfully 
established everywhere with the natives, who also served as carriers without any show of reluctance. The 
natives were told to expect a second visit, and that chiefs and tultul would be appointed. In answer to 
their inquiry they were also told that there were no plans to levy taxes on them for the present. Further 
progress in the development of these areas was recently cut short by the attack by the mountain people 
on Oberforster Deininger' s  expedition (ibid. : 55-56). 
3 During the attack the expedition leader was wounded and five members of the police escort and four carriers were killed. 
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In addition to exploratory, census and tax patrols, the local police troop was also involved in 
the station's road building activities, which mainly consisted of the completion of the "Namatanai­
Matandeduk road as a vehicular road with permanent bridges" (ibid. :  57) . Policemen also 
accompanied the government doctor on his patrols to supervise the native "medical assistants" 
(Heiltultu[) who had been appointed in 85 localities (ibid. : 59). In addition, visiting expeditions, 
like that of Deininger, were supplied with a police escort, as a matter of course, although it was 
not necessarily provided by the local government station. 
In other words, the range of functions of the native police force was as wide as that of the 
entire administration. But this was beginning to change, because a general process of 
governmental specialisation had begun. By the same token, a feeling of living in an abnormal 
environment, where unrest could at any minute turn into open rebellion, persisted. Those 
exercising colonial rule in German New Guinea perceived their rule as a foreign imposition which 
continued to rely, not only ultimately but in its daily practice, on the force of arms. There was still 
a need for a constant display of the police force as a "material instrument of power", even when 
collecting taxes, carrying out medical surveys or compiling inventories of natural resources. It is 
unlikely therefore that armed police units attached to the various local administrations would have 
disappeared in the then foreseeable future and that all military activities would have been left to 
the expeditionary troop. 
Even an involvement of the imperial navy which went far beyond "assistance in emergencies" 
was again on the cards. Because of the deployment of the expeditionary troop in New Ireland the 
pacification of southern Bougainville was tackled by a joint six-day expedition of the Kieta police 
troop and the landing force of SMS Cormoran. The naval report on this expedition was so 
enthusiastically received by the emperor that a closer cooperation between the native police force 
in German New Guinea and the imperial navy was bound to have developed had not war 
intervened. 
II 
The annual reports on the Marshall Islands as a separate colony offer no information about a 
police force. This suggests that its role during the almost 20 years before their incorporation into 
the Island Territory was insignificant. Little appears to have changed afterwards because 
subsequent annual reports only mention that in 1 909 barracks for "the coloured police troop" on 
Nauru were built. By contrast, when the Eastern and Western Carolines and the northern Marianas 
came under German colonial rule in 1899, all three districts were supplied with a substantial 
number of armed Malay policemen imported from the Dutch East Indies .  
According to the first annual report for the Western Carolines, three o f  these Malay policemen 
had proved so unsuitable that they could only be employed as agricultural labourers. Instead eight 
local natives were recruited. Three of them were close relatives of high chiefs on Yap and another 
the son of "the Negro Gibbons" in Palau. Apart from military training they were instructed in 
carpentry, masonry and agriculture. This experiment proved so successful that, with the exception 
of two particularly able men, all Malays were sent home in 1 902. The police troop now consisted 
of 32 local natives under a Malay corporal and was "completely adequate", an assessment borne 
out by the silence on that score in subsequent annual reports. 
The only information about the police in the Marianas appears in the annual report for 1 900 
under the heading "schools and missions"( !) .  Nine of the 1 2  Malay policemen had been "sent back 
to Ponape", in accordance with their own wishes which, "due to their inferiority", coincided with 
the interests of the administration. The thoroughly peaceful character of the population made it 
unlikely that the police force would ever be needed for its "original", presumably military, 
purpose. Instead the district commissioner introduced a kind of national service. Men who had 
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completed their service in the police force-which numbered 43 at the time-were replaced from 
among those who had turned 1 8  during the previous year and were medically fit. Particularly 
suitable individuals were to remain with the troop for a longer period to form a pool from which 
the officials of the "community administration" would be selected. Although the two hours of 
daily training the men received were insufficient to turn them into proper soldiers, it taught them 
to be punctual, to follow orders and to cooperate with each other. Service in the troop also fostered 
a sense of comradeship between the Chamorros and the Caroline Islanders living on Saipan who 
had otherwise little to do with each other. 
By contrast the annual report for the Eastern Carolines for 1 900 stressed the need to maintain 
a small military force because the easily excitable and well-armed population of Ponape required 
constant vigilance. Here too the situation improved, so that the next annual report announced that 
the police force could be safely halved when 35 Malays completed their contracts a few months 
later. In 1905, when the disarmament of the natives in the Eastern Carolines was thought to have 
been largely completed, it was decided to renew only the contracts of the very best Malay 
policemen and to replace the others by natives from the outer islands in the district. Relatives of 
chiefs were again preferred. The aim was to educate in the police force suitable successors and 
assistants for the current chiefs who could inform their fellow-countrymen about the goals of the 
government and the laws applying to them. Once more the experience with these policemen was 
so encouraging that a police force entirely recruited within the district was foreshadowed a year 
later. 
The situation changed when a reform of the traditional sociopolitical system on Ponape was 
begun. As the local "means of power" were insufficient to prevent the outbreak of open hostilities, 
assistance was sought. It arrived in September 1908 in the form of SMS Cormoran with 100 
Melanesian policemen. The fear of the Ponapeans that their island would be flooded with these 
"notorious cannibals" quietened the atmosphere and allowed the government to take all measures 
necessary to assure lasting peace. The "Melanesian Troop" could therefore be employed in the 
construction of roads, one of which, some 20 kilometres long, ran across the island from "die 
Kolonie" to the district of Kiti and allowed the police force to reach this restless area within six 
hours. The large increase in the local police force required the construction of additional buildings 
and a safer rifle-range. The new police compound consisted of three barracks, houses for two 
German police sergeants and utility buildings, including an arms and ammunition depot. 
Nonetheless, it was hoped that it would soon be possible to reduce the local police force to its 
"peace strength" of about 50 men. 
This apparently happened in 1909, although the situation could still not be regarded as 
satisfactory, so that the reforms had to be pursued cautiously because the "means of power" to 
impose them by force were no longer available. Instead the Ponape Rebellion broke out the 
following year. It was crushed by five warships and 222 native policemen, 172 of whom were sent 
as a reinforcement from the Old Protectorate. 
III 
After this climax the annual reports tell us no more about the history of the police force in the 
Island Territory. The information they contain is generally insufficient for presenting even the 
most general overview of the history of "the police" in German New Guinea. Still it reveals some 
remarkable features of this history. 
Firstly, the annual reports suggest a striking difference between the Old Protectorate and the 
Island Territory, in particular the Marshall Islands, where, it would seem, the need for a material 
instrument of power was never acutely felt. While the Neu Guinea Kompagnie also sent out its 
first administrator without such an instrument, it soon had to provide him with one in the form of 
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locally recruited native policemen. By contrast the local administrations in the Island Territories 
a dozen years later were from the start supplied with a substantial number of imported Malays. On 
the other hand, when the Malay Experiment in the Island Territory failed, the locally recruited 
units, especially in the Marianas, had a distinctly non-military character. Instead they were used 
to train a new local elite, whereas native policemen in the Old Protectorate were regarded as a 
source of danger. Yet, when it came to the crunch on Ponape police reinforcements were sent in 
from the Old Protectorate rather than from other parts of the Island Territory.4 
The first milestone in the history of the native police force in the Old Protectorate was the 
arrival of lieutenant Steinhauser as its full-time military commander. But the life of the native 
police as a specialised paramilitary troop was short. It soon became a part-time force whose 
members also worked as ordinary labourers and served under the command of administrative 
officials who were expected to keep its military activities to a minimum and to rely as much as 
possible on support from the navy. 
Military activity increased during the first years of direct imperial control and led to the 
establishment of a mobile police unit. But it took until 1 9 1 1-that is to say until after the Ponape 
Rebellion-before it again acquired a full-time military commander. At the same time the imperial 
administration moved from reactive punitive expeditions to proactive pacification, which 
eventually became the primary task of the expeditionary troop. However, the move initially 
reduced the importance of the mobile unit because the establishment and the maintenance of 
public peace became the responsibility of a growing number of permanent government stations, 
each of which was supplied with its own armed police unit. The move also decreased the reliance 
on the navy. It no longer figures as a provider of military assistance in the annual reports, apart 
from the case of the Ponape Rebellion, until the involvement of a landing party in the pacification 
of southern Bougainville in 1914.5 
While pacification continued to be of central importance in most districts, the activities of the 
native police force widened in areas which had been pacified. Native policemen not only provided 
military services but were involved in the construction of roads, the collection of taxes and the 
running of the prisons . They apparently also escorted officials whenever they left their bases, 
irrespective of what tasks they performed. 
Judging by the annual reports the three most important milestones in the history of the native 
police force in the Old Protectorate in terms of its activities were its first major engagement near 
Hatzfeldhafen in 1 89 1 ,  a large punitive expedition in the Admiralty Islands in 1900 and, in 1912, 
the Kagam Expedition of the expeditionary troop under its new military commander.6 
The annual reports do not provide enough information to paint a picture of any of these events 
as unique historical episodes. The information also is inadequate as far as an overview is 
concerned. The annual reports offer bits of information about the strength, the training and the 
duties of the native police force, but it is impossible to know to what extent even these bits of 
information are representative. Did the native police force in the Marianas in 1914 look basically 
the same as described in 1900? Were the native policemen in the Western Carolines still mainly 
4 The annual reports suggest that the native police force in Nauru played a significantly different part from that of the 
rest of the Island Territory. The same presumably applied when the opening of a phosphate mine on Angaur in the Palau 
Group was followed by the establishment of a government station on that small island. 
S This does not mean that no such assistance was given by the navy; it merely means that it was not regarded as 
sufficiently important to call for an acknowledgement in the annual reports. On the other hand, it is worth noting how 
potent the effects of a marginal imperial comment like "bravo, propose medals" could be. 
6 By contrast, the annual reports present the putting down of the Ponape Rebellion as a naval operation in which the 
native police force merely played an auxiliary part. During the preceding unrest it was mainly engaged in the construction 
of roads and no military force at all was employed. Similarly, neither of the Madang Conspiracies, in 1904 and 1912, 
caused a major military response by the police force. 
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sons of  high chiefs who were trained in  carpentry, masonry and agriculture at the end of  German 
rule? 
The annual reports do not even make clear whether the native police force was "the police" 
in German New Guinea. Was the supervision of public works, the collection of taxes and the 
running of prisons "police work"? What were the "police functions" of the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie' s  station managers mentioned in its first annual report, or the "police powers" of 
government chiefs referred to in the first annual report of the imperial government? It is time to 
examine what the legislative framework has to say about these questions. 
IV 
"Police powers" were part of the Schutzgewalt of the Reich, which the Protectorates Act vested 
in the emperor. The act did not define these powers. It regulated their exercise expressly only in 
so far as it authorised the emperor to authorise officials whom the chancellor of the Reich 
empowered to exercise the judicial jurisdiction also to enact "police regulations". A revision of 
the act in 1 8  88 changed this arrangement by authorising the chancellor of the Reich to enact such 
police regulations-as well as "other regulations concerning the administration"-and to delegate 
this legislative power to any colonial officials, irrespective of their judicial powers, and to 
chartered companies, like the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. This suggests that police powers were not 
purely executive, but that they were nonetheless a special form of a general administrative power. 
The Protectorates Act also had indirect consequences for the exercise of the police powers. It 
introduced the metropolitan Criminal Procedures Code in the German colonies, whose section 163 
provided that "the offices and officials of the police and security service" (die BehOrden und 
Beamten des Polizei- und Sicherheitsdienstes) had the right and the duty to investigate all 
suspected criminal behaviour. However, these offices and officials did not exercise their own 
powers when investigating such behaviour but acted as "auxiliary organs" (Hilfsorgane) of the 
"public prosecutor's office" (Staatsanwaltschaft). 
In the colonies the position was different. The Criminal Procedures Code applied in 
accordance with the Consular Jurisdiction Act which did not provide for the participation of a 
public prosecutor's  office. Instead it vested the power to investigate suspected criminal behaviour 
in the consul who, in the colonies, was replaced by the Protectorates Act by the official authorised 
to exercise the judicial jurisdiction. 7 In other words, the investigation of suspected criminal 
behaviour was a function of the colonial courts rather than of "the police". 
Although the Protectorates Act did not specifically oblige the emperor to establish a police and 
security service, it was clear that he had to provide the officials authorised to exercise the judicial 
jurisdiction with some material instrument of power to investigate suspected criminal behaviour, 
and that this instrument would then act as an auxiliary organ of these officials. However, the 
subordination of this instrument to the colonial courts only applied to the administration of 
criminal justice under the Protectorates Act. As far as natives were concerned the emperor' s 
powers were, even for the administration of criminal justice, not limited by that act. He could 
therefore transfer the entire exercise of the judicial jurisdiction over natives to the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie, as he did in 1 888 .  The company's Native Penal Ordinance followed the example of 
the Consular Jurisdiction Act by making the investigation of suspected criminal behaviour of 
natives the responsibility of the person in charge of the station courts, but it said nothing about the 
involvement of auxiliary "police" organs . On the other hand, the company's  charter makes sense 
7 The Protectorates Act authorised the emperor, in departure from the Consular Jurisdiction Act, to provide for the 
participation of a public prosecutor's  office in the colonies. It took until 1 897 before that happened and then in a form 
which restricted this participation to the actual trials and, in particular, appeals procedures but did not include the 
investigation of suspected criminal behaviour. 
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only if the rights of local sovereignty transferred to it included at least some police powers. But 
the company weakened its position by insisting that the promise of imperial protection extended 
to dangers posed by natives who had not yet come under the "new State authority", since this 
acknowledged that the emperor had retained some police powers in relation to natives. By the 
same token, the company took it for granted that the police powers it had received entitled it to 
establish an armed police force. 
The 1 886 version of the Protectorates Act complicated matters further by treating the 
legislative aspect of the police powers as an extension of the judicial powers which had not been 
transferred to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. This changed after its 1 888 revision because the 
chancellor of the Reich used his new powers to authorise the company to enact police regulations 
and other regulations concerning the administration by a decree of 3 August 1 888 . 8  
The position in the Marshall Islands was even more confusing. The imperial commissioner had 
been empowered to enact police regulations on the basis of an imperial ordinance of 1 3  September 
1 886. 9 But an imperial ordinance of 15  October 1 886 had also authorised him to enact regulations 
concerning "the general administration" and "customs and taxation matters". In addition a 1902 
decree by the chancellor of the Reich empowered the (now) administrator to enact "police and 
- other administrative regulations". This decree was replaced in 1 903 by a decree which dealt with 
the legislative powers of the authorities in all German colonies. However, the imperial ordinance 
of October 1 886 was not repealed, thus suggesting that it retained a distinct relevance. 
Just how confused the situation was is indicated by the fact that the 1903 decree also repealed 
a decree of the chancellor which had authorised the imperial commissioner in German New 
Guinea in 1 890 to exercise consular powers, even though his office had ceased to exist ten years 
earlier. But the powers of the governor of German New Guinea were also uncertain. He was 
empowered by a decree of the chancellor of 1 April 1 899 to enact "police and other administrative 
regulations" which was based not on the Protectorates Act but on a colony-specific imperial 
ordinance of 27 March 1 899. Nonetheless, he used this authority in 1904 as a basis for replacing 
the customs tariff which the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had enacted in exercise of its local 
sovereignty although he had neither inherited these powers nor been authorised by an imperial 
ordinance, like the imperial commissioner in the Marshall Islands, to legislate in customs and 
taxation matters-quite apart from the fact that the 1 899 decree had been repealed by the 
chancellor' s  1903 decree. 
The uncertainty about the legislative powers of governors in financial matters was addressed 
in the concluding sections of the 1905 imperial ordinance concerning the coercive and penal 
powers of the administrative authorities. But they confused the relations between the various 
powers making up the Schutzgewalt even further. Were police powers and the power to impose 
customs duties and taxes different forms of a general administrative power, or were they non­
administrative powers? Was an official authorised to enact police and other administrative 
regulations thereby also empowered to legislate in customs and taxation matters? Was an official 
authorised to regulate these matters also empowered to include penal provisions or was this an 
exercise of police powers? Were police powers essentially penal powers? 
At first glance the 1905 imperial ordinance suggests that this was so. It only directly referred 
to "police" in connection with the introduction of summary punishments provided for in the 
Criminal Procedures Code, which had so far been generally unavailable in the colonies. 10 The 
8 Two months earlier, the chancellor had to give the company a specific authority to prescribe criminal penalties in a 
planned customs ordinance, although this ordinance was based on the taxation powers the company had been granted in 
its imperial charter. 
9 The ordinance made the authority subject to special decree to this effect by the chancellor of the Reich. 
1 0  The Marshall Islands may have been an exception. The 1 886 imperial ordinance mentioned above took it for granted 
that the imperial commissioner could issue summary penal orders to enforce administrative regulations and regulations 
in customs and taxation matters he enacted, although it said nothing about the penalties he could impose. However, he 
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ordinance distinguished between "police penal orders" (polizeiliche Strafverfagungen) and 
"administrative penal orders" (Strajbescheide der VerwaltungsbehOrden), but, in contrast to the 
Criminal Procedures Code, it did not refer to "police authorities" (PolizeibehOrden). Instead it 
provided that any authority empowered by the chancellor of the Reich or, with his approval, by 
the governor, could issue police penal orders . However, the addressee was entitled to demand a 
judicial hearing of his case. In other words, it was the purpose of these summary police 
punishments to ease the workload of the courts. Their imposition was no more an exercise of 
genuine police powers than the investigation of suspected criminal behaviour by the police as an 
auxiliary organ of the courts. 
What then were these mysterious police powers? Perhaps what the ordinance has to say about 
the "coercive powers" of the colonial authorities can help us further. Section 8 of the ordinance 
stipulated that the competent administrative authorities were entitled-but only entitled-to 
enforce orders which they had issued in "the lawful exercise of governmental powers" (in 
rechtmassiger Ausubung der obrigkeitlichen Gewalt). The ordinance took it for granted that the 
governors, as well as the emperor and the chancellor of the Reich, could issue and enforce such 
orders. It merely empowered the chancellor and, with his approval, the governors, to delegate this 
power to any "suitable" subordinate authority and laid down the procedures which then applied 
to its exercise. They included a written request to perform, . or to refrain from performing, certain 
actions and a subsequent written order that this request, if not complied with, would be enforced. 1 1  
The means of  enforcement were restricted to fines of  up to 300 Marks. 12 However, i f  these 
elaborate procedures were "impractical" (undurchfahrbar), "immediate coercion" (unmittelbarer 
Zwang) could be used.13 
The ordinance expressly ruled out the use of these procedures as a means of preventing the 
commission of a criminal offence. This did not merely acknowledge that it would have been 
absurd to issue a person suspected of planning a criminal offence with a written request to refrain 
from carrying it out, but also indicated that crime prevention was not the reason why the 
administration was endowed with coercive powers. However, the discretion given in the ordinance 
to the chancellor and the governors at strategic points was so unusually wide that it was plainly 
intended that it would be supplemented by more specific implementation regulations. 
The most important result of the 1908 implementation regulations for German New Guinea 
was negative: they did not direct that the imperial ordinance applied in any way to any of the 
natives living in German New Guinea, so that the exercise of coercive powers in relation to them 
remained a matter of administrative discretion. 14 This did not affect specific legislation in force 
or subsequently enacted, for example the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance. But neither did it prevent 
the colonial government from following the procedures laid down in the imperial ordinance as a 
matter of administrative practice. Nor did it mean that the substantive principles on which the 
ordinance was based were irrelevant for the relations between the colonial government and its 
native subjects-and it is against this background that the positive provisions of the 
implementation regulations must be seen. 
could not punish non-natives summarily for offences under the German Criminal Code. 
1 1  Both the initial request and the subsequent enforcement order were subject to an administrative appeal. 
12 The authorities also had the option of performing the requested action at the expense of the person from whom it had 
been requested. 
1 3  The use of immediate coercion was also subject to an administrative appeal. 
14 The regulations replaced a 1907 version which was never published. The replacement closely followed a model 
prepared by the colonial office. It is not improbable that the first set had been flawed because Hahl had misunderstood 
the scope of the ordinance. But the colonial office was also interested in ensuring that the implementation regulations in 
this crucial area were largely the same in all German colonies. However, this is merely my interpretation since I did not 
have the opportunity to trace the 1907 regulations which may well tell a different story, if their text is still available. 
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They authorised all district offices and government stations to issue and enforce orders of a 
"police nature", thus making the local administrations, rather than any specialised institution, the 
"police authorities". The implementation regulations also went close to defining what orders of 
a "police nature" were because they stipulated that such orders included all orders which fell 
under section 10, part II, title 17 of the Prussian General Code (Preussisches Allgemeines 
Landrecht) . 
It was not the purpose of this reference to introduce this definition formally into the colonial 
law of German New Guinea; rather it indicated that this definition expressed principles which 
were already part of it. Put differently, the definition in the Prussian General Code was taken to 
also define what "the police"'could or could not do in German New Guinea in relation to natives 
as well as non-natives. 
According to this definition it was the task of the police to take all measures necessary (1)  to 
preserve public peace, safety and order and (2) to avert impending dangers from the public or any 
of its members. An interpretation of this definition by the colonial department15 acknowledged that 
the averting of impending dangers was the central duty of "the police", but it then used the first 
part of the definition to widen the scope of the police powers by insisting that the term "order" not 
only referred to an actual state of affairs but also to the entire public legal order, irrespective of 
whether it was concerned with averting dangers from the public or with the advancement of its 
welfare. 
Although this did not make the advancement of public welfare a function of the police­
which it had been regarded as during an earlier period of German history-the underlying 
distinction between the introduction of welfare measures as a task of the legislature and their 
implementation as a task of the executive was much less important in the colonies because no 
corresponding division of powers had been introduced. On the contrary, all governors had been 
empowered to enact "other administrative" as well as "police" regulations so that they were also 
responsible for the legislative advancement of public welfare. Nonetheless, the implementation 
regulations distinguished between governmental orders which were of a "police nature" and those 
which were not. The fact that only fines of up to 50 Marks could be imposed to enforce the latter, 
as well as the fact that only district offices were authorised to issue them, 16 suggests that they were 
concerned with matters which were regarded as neither particularly urgent nor weighty. 
While this interpretation acknowledged that the implementation of welfare legislation could 
be a part of the tasks of the police, it focused on its primary security function-but with another 
twist. It stressed that the police was called upon to protect the public legal order but not the private 
rights of individuals. However, since the criminal law was part of the public legal order, the 
prevention of crimes became indirectly part of the responsibility of the police because crimes were 
at the same time an attack on the public legal order. The police could also be called upon to protect 
the rights of individuals from non-criminal dangers, if the individual in question was incapable 
of averting a threatening danger himself. Special legislation could even make the police directy 
responsible for the protection of the rights of individuals in particular fields. The example given, 
the Prussian Gesindeordnung-a law dealing with the employment of domestic and agricultural 
labour-was of far-reaching significance in the colonies since it implied that colonial legislation 
could place the entire field of native labour under the control of the police. 
This did not mean that the police exercised police powers when it carried out tasks conferred 
on it by such special legislation, just as it did not exercise police powers when it investigated 
suspected criminal behaviour or imposed summary punishments. On the other hand, the 
implementation regulations made clear that although its formal procedures could not be used for 
the purpose of preventing criminal offences, this did not affect the powers of the police to take 
1 5  Excerpts from the relevant circular decree were appended to the implementation regulations. 
16 They had to be issued by the governor in districts for which government stations were responsible. 
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"immediate action" to tenninate unlawful states of affairs, or to prevent them from arising or 
continuing. This neatly captured the notion that the police was concerned with "states of affairs" 
(Zustande), rather than with the behaviour of people, so that any state of affairs which was 
unlawful called for police action, even if it did not constitute an actual danger. Indeed, it appears 
to have been a central purpose of the implementation regulations to reassure the local police 
authorities that they retained ample scope for taking "immediate action", whenever they 
encountered a danger to the public. 
There is also no doubt that "the public" comprised the entire population of their districts, 
regardless of race, colour or nationality. Nor did it make any difference by whom or what a danger 
had been caused: fires caused by lightning were as much a public danger as fires lit by a person. 
It mattered even less whether the person lighting a fire was a native or a non-native. Conversely, 
once the fire was out, it no longer posed a public danger, regardless of how it had started. Yet seen 
from another angle, the idea of ••the public" was highly problematic in the colonial context. Who 
was the public the police was supposed to protect from dangers, and what were the dangers which 
called for its protection? Was the police called upon to protect German New Guinea' s  indigenous 
population from dangers caused by its colonisation? Was it called upon to protect the foreign 
agents of this colonisation process, including Chinese traders, Malay clerks or Polynesian mission 
teachers, from dangers caused by native opposition to this process? Or both? Or neither? 
It made sense under these circumstances to stress that public safety had to be understood as 
the absence of dangers to "the state", as well as to "civil society". It was natural, in the colonial 
context, to focus on "the state order" (die staatliche Ordnung) rather than on a more or less 
homogenous civil society, which did not yet exist. But this focus only solved part of the problem, 
because this state order too still had to be created rather than merely protected. Even at the end of 
German colonial rule "public peace, security and order" had not been brought about in many parts 
of the colony. In large areas the pacification of its indigenous population-a precondition for the 
kind of policing the Prussian General Code had in mind-had not even begun. It is therefore 
doubtful whether any of the measures taken by the colonial authorities in relation to the 
indigenous population before its pacification can be regarded as an exercise of police powers. 
Historically it matters little whether the police powers in German New Guinea were wider than 
in Prussia or whether some or even all of the measures taken by the authorities in relation to 
natives were legally not of a police nature. At least historically a neat division between "peace" 
and "war" does not exist. The pacification of an area did not mean the establishment of a "state 
order" which could henceforth be protected in a peaceful manner. Nor was the colonial 
government in a constant state of war with the inhabitants of unpacified areas. Pacification was 
a process which took place in a twilight zone between war and peace and continued long after the 
use of military force had ceased. 17 
What is historically important is that the implementation regulations did not separate the police 
organisationally from the organs of the general administration. On the contrary, when the 
expeditionary troop acquired a full-time commander, it did not become a police authority. Nor 
would it have been practical to make a specialised armed police force responsible for the exercise 
of the full range of police powers. By the same token, not all governmental activities were an 
exercise of police powers. The district offices and government stations in German New Guinea 
were police authorities but they were not just police authorities. 
Nor were they the only police authorities. Police powers could also be delegated to specialised 
organs of the administration. Thus the implementation regulations empowered the mining 
authorities to use coercion to enforce orders concerning the "mining police" (Bergpolizei) . There 
1 7  This is well illustrated by the fact that it was still regarded as necessary to maintain a substantial armed native police 
force in Herbertsh6he a dozen years after the military response to the V arzin Murders-and even that response can hardly 
be described as a war since it did not meet with any organised military resistance. 
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were almost as many forms of the police as there were fields of governmental activity . 18 There was 
a "health police" ( Gesundheitspolizei), a "building police" (Baupolizei), a "commercial police" 
( Gewerbepolizei) and so on. The police was at work wherever a governmental activity involved 
the policing of something. But this policing task was not necessarily carried out by policemen. 
"The police" was not a body of people but a function of government which came into play 
wherever dangers to the public arose. German New Guinea was in this sense a police state, but 
not the kind of "police state" this term suggests today. While building inspections, for example, 
were an exercise of police powers, the native police force was not part of "the police" in this 
vague legal sense. 19 
Indeed the native police force does not rate a single mention in the imperial ordinance or the 
implementation regulations. It is remarkable, however, that also no other legislative provisions 
relating specifically to the native police force were made, although a relevant draft ordinance was 
in the pipeline in 1914 .  As the law stood at the end of German rule, the recruitment and 
employment of native policemen was governed by the general labour law for natives. This also 
applied to their disciplinary treatment. Native policemen were placed under the general 
disciplinary legislation for coloured labourers. There were no special, legally defined disciplinary 
or criminal offences for native policemen.20 
This raises the question as to whether native policemen in German New Guinea were 
nonetheless legally "officials". Were they part of the "police and security service" in the meaning 
of the German Criminal Procedures Code? Were they authorised to arrest non-natives and to 
search their premises? Were they officials under the German Criminal Code who could be 
criminally punished for taking bribes, but to resist whom in the exercise of their official duties 
constituted a criminal offence? Did a native policeman act lawfully when shooting a native during 
a punitive expedition? Conversely, did a native act in legitimate self-defence when spearing a 
native policeman during a punitive expedition?21 
18 It may come as a surprise, in view of the special authorisation in the 1908 implementation regulations, that the 1906 
implementation regulations to the imperial mining ordinance had already made the district offices responsible for the 
"police supervision" (polizeiliche Aufsicht) of prospecting and mining activities. Nonetheless, this special authority was 
not altogether superfluous. It acquired practical importance if this responsibility was transferred to a separate "mining 
authority" because it gave this authority the power to enforce its own orders instead of having to ask the general "police 
authority" for assistance. 
19 The fact that the circular decree was issued and that excerpts from it were appended to the implementation regulations 
shows that the confusing picture of"the police" presented in the text is not the result of a simple translation problem which 
I could have solved by beginning this account with a discussion of the interpretation by the colonial office of the definition 
of this term in the Prussian General Code. Although it may well be that this definition had indeed been part of the colonial 
law of German New Guinea since the Protectorates Act came into force in 1 886, historically it was not the basis on which 
officials exercised governmental powers, not because they decided to ignore it but because they did not understand the 
legal position. It had to be explained to them more than 20 years later. This is historically the point, not that the definition 
of "die Polizez"' in the Prussian General Code is different from the meaning conventionally attached to the English term 
"police" today. Moreover, the meaning of the German term "Polizef' as used at the time was not only ambiguous, it was 
also changing, and these changes reflected fundamental changes in the form and functions of government, not just in 
German New Guinea. The history of "the police" in this colony is part of this historical process. It can only be appreciated 
for what it was, if it is seen in this context. I would have walked straight into the traps of phantom history had I tried to 
simplify matters by purporting that "the police" was identical with the native police force and that this force was the kind 
of specialised law-enforcement agency we expect when we hear the term "police" . 
20 Non-native officials commanding native policemen were legally treated in the same manner. They too were placed 
under the general colonial service legislation, although the 1 9 1 0  Colonial Service Act empowered the emperor to make 
special regulations for "police officials" -which did not happen in the case of German New Guinea. The Colonial Service 
Act also did not apply to "officials" who were "natives", although it authorised the emperor to bring them under the 
act-an authority which he again did not exercise for German New Guinea. 
21 Did the supply of firearms to native policemen constitute an offence, unless the law prohibiting the supply of firearms 
to natives made a special exemption? As far as I can see, such an exemption was only made for the Marianas in a public 
notice of 1 6  January 1 900 by district commissioner Fritz. But it was repealed by a governor's ordinance of 1 October 
1 909. This ordinance took it for granted that such an exemption was superfluous, although it declared the possession of 
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There i s  no point in  entering this legal labyrinth. What matters i s  that there was no colonial 
legislation which dealt expressly with these questions.22 Yet, the native police force in German 
New Guinea did not operate in a complete legal vacuum. There is no question, for instance, that 
the Native Penal Ordinance ruled out punitive expeditions as a punishment for criminal offences 
committed by natives . Nonetheless, military measures against natives were lawful as a form of 
immediate coercion, if they were necessary to avert a continuing danger from the public, or to 
uphold the existing public legal order, quite apart from "a state of war" where, as the colonial 
office pointed out, "normal" legal considerations no longer applied. 
There remained ample room for administrative discretion in the exercise of police powers in 
German New Guinea, in particular in relation to natives. The colonial authorities did not follow 
the example of their British and Australian counterparts by enacting a flood of "native 
regulations" which defined specific legal duties for natives and thereby also limited the legal 
powers of the government in relation to them. After a brief legalistic phase, during which 
administrator Schleinitz even proposed a legislative framework for the employment of military 
force against natives (see Sack, 1977: 266-68), the German authorities settled for a pragmatic 
approach. The emerging administrative practice was only guided by more or less general 
instructions which were administratively binding but had no legal effects. Nor indeed was an 
attempt made to give the exercise of police powers in relation to non-natives a general legislative 
basis . 
In view of the diffuseness of police powers in the German system of government this is not 
surprising. 23 "The police" in German New Guinea was not the specialised law-enforcement agency 
one might have· expected. On the contrary, the prevention, detection and punishment of criminal 
behaviour were not genuine police tasks. Instead it was the primary responsibility of the police to 
maintain and restore public order. Nor was the police a hands-on executive organ. Rather, it 
performed its tasks normally by issuing administrative orders; and it enforced these orders by 
imposing administrative fines, although "immediate coercion" remained as a last resort. 
"Police work" consisted essentially of ordering members of the public to do, or refrain from 
doing, something. Even under this bureaucratic system of policing, however, police work 
ultimately involved some physical action beyond the issuing of orders, if only the delivery of 
written orders to their addressees, and the native police force was at the end of the line. It was 
indeed the government's  "material instrument of power". But it could be employed to carry out 
a wide range of tasks which often had nothing to do with the exercise of police powers. 
It is therefore impractical to write a history of the native police force in terms of the actions 
its members performed as soldiers, supervisors of road gangs, boat crews, prison warders and so 
on. But "the police" in the meaning of the Prussian General Code is an even less suitable subject 
for a historical study as "policing" was a function of government in fields as diverse as public 
health and mining. But although the native police force was a maid of all work it was an 
identifiable body of people who wore uniforms, carried arms, lived in barracks and received 
military training. There is thus some hope of reconstructing the history of this force as an 
organisation, even though it was as merely a creature of administrative practice instead of being 
firearms by all natives to be illegal. 
22 In this case the exception mentioned in the previous footnote indeed confirms the rule. It was a curiosity rather than 
a normal exercise of legislative powers-just as Hahl' s fee for permission to import side arms into the Eastern Carolines 
looks more like a curiosity than an attempt to deal with an actual problem. 
23 The 1 905 imperial ordinance did not regulate the exercise of police powers. Instead it dealt with the penal and coercive 
powers of the administrative authorities. While coercive powers, in contrast to penal powers, could be a part of genuine 
police powers, they were not identical with them. On the one hand there were non-coercive exercises of police powers; 
on the other hand not all forms of legitimate coercion by the government were an exercise of police powers. In short, we 
still do not know exactly what police powers were. 
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formally constituted by legislation. A consideration of Hahl' s planned conscription ordinance may 
illustrate the practical implications of this seemingly purely theoretical difference. 
Hahl ' s main reason for proposing this ordinance was difficulties in recruiting a sufficient 
number of native policemen on a voluntary basis. They were partly due to a growing demand for 
plantation labourers24 and partly to the fact that service in the police force had become a less 
popular option for natives willing to accept paid employment. Hahl's  push for a compulsory 
service in the police force put him in an awkward position because he was opposed to the 
introduction of a compulsory general "labour service" (Arbeitsdienst), for which the planters' 
lobby was campaigning. Hence he had to stress the differences between the two proposals. The 
most obvious way of doing this was to present service in the police force as armed service in the 
interests of the public good in contrast to "labour service" designed to benefit the private interests 
of employers . This put him on a strong footing because the colonial office readily accepted that, 
apart from paying taxes, the provision of armed services was the most important duty of every 
subject of a modem state. But the colonial office feared that a measure likely to create the 
impression that German New Guinea was in the process of creating a large colonial army would 
be attacked in the Reichstag, as well as by the colony's Australian neighbour. It therefore 
suggested that Hahl should avoid any reference to an "armed" service and use instead the term 
"police service". This, however, was likely to bring him into conflict with the planters' lobby since 
it had little choice but to accept that service of a military nature was treated differently but good 
reason to complain if conscripted policemen were used to supervise labouring tasks or even to 
carry out such tasks. In other words, the introduction of compulsory "police service" called for 
a specialised police force which was exclusively concerned with maintaining or restoring public 
peace. 
There were also other reasons for separating the police service from other forms of government 
employment, if it was made compulsory, whereas Hahl had simply proposed a corresponding 
application of the general labour law for natives to them. Moreover, at least some of these specific 
regulations had to apply to voluntary policemen as well-and there is no indication that Hahl 
intended to rely exclusively on conscription to obtain new recruits. This was particularly relevant 
for the treatment of policemen who ran away: were conscripts legally "deserters" whereas 
volunteers only breached their private employment contracts? Conversely, did conscripts legally 
do nothing wrong by running away because they had no contractual obligations, until "desertion" 
had been made a criminal offence, as the colonial office believed?25 And this is only the start. 
Did the government have to release conscripts who were medically unfit for service as 
policemen, instead of being able to employ them as labourers, office boys or prison warders? Did 
officials enlisting consc:-ipts have to be accompanied by a doctor to carry out a thorough medical 
examination on the spot? Could it be left to the discretion of individual officials to decide how 
many "natives between the ages of 16 and 30" they conscripted at a particular place at a particular 
time?26 Was it acceptable to deal with these matters in the form of administrative instructions or 
did they too require, at least in the long run, legislative regulation? 
24 According to Hahl' s covering report the number of plantation labourers had almost doubled from just over 8,000 to 
just under 1 5,000 between 1910  and 1 9 1 3  (RKA 3 1 08). 
25 There was no compelling legal reason for making the desertion by conscripted policemen or the dodging of their 
conscription by natives a specific offence since the 1 908 amendment of the Native Penal Ordinance had given the station 
courts the power to prosecute any kind of behaviour they regarded as punishable. But this makes the position taken by 
the colonial office historically all the more remarkable, because it shows that its officials instinctively continued to apply 
the "nulla poena sine Lege" principle this amendment had abandoned. By 1 9 1 4  it was taken for granted, at least by 
German colonial officials in Berlin, that this principle also had to apply in the colonies because colonial administration 
was beginning to be seen as a normal exercise of gove=ental powers, of which this principle was a natural part. 
26 Did this gender-neutral language mean that females could also be conscripted? For example, could the wives of 
conscripted policemen be conscripted to accompany them? 
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This is precisely how the Rule of Law expands. It is the inner logic of a legal system which 
supplies a large part of the energy driving the process forward, irrespective of what legislators 
want to do. In this case neither Hahl nor the colonial office had thought through these 
consequences. The colonial office merely acknowledged that the governor was legally empowered 
under section 15  of the Protectorates Act to enact such an ordinance. But it questioned whether 
the time for its enactment had come. Since a thorough knowledge of local conditions was required 
to make this judgement, the decision was left to Hahl. However, enough warning lights were lit 
up to indicate that he would be well advised to hasten slowly-which he did, by not enacting the 
ordinance before his departure. 
Yet, the conscription of police recruits had begun on a trial basis long before Hahl had sent 
his draft to the colonial office. While this particular move was probably illegal, the scope of 
administrative discretion in the field of native administration was generally still so wide that the 
legislative framework offers little help in writing a history of the native police force. But there is 
another source of systematic information. Although the organisation and activities of this force 
were not legally defined, they had always been shaped by the availability of funds, the allocation 
and expenditure of which had, since 1 899, been under the control of the Reichstag. The question 
is therefore: how much can the budget proposals and the accounts submitted to this body tell us 
about the history of the native police force during the period of imperial administration? 
v 
The 1 899 budget for the Old Protectorate provided for a native police force of 90 men. They were 
to cost 30,000 Marks, or about 330 Marks per head. The force was divided into three local units. 
They were to be placed under the command of the governor, an imperial chancellor and the district 
officer of a projected government station in northern New Ireland (Kaewieng). The governor and 
the imperial chancellor were each supported by a police sergeant who, like their superiors, also 
had to fulfil other administrative functions. 
The 1 900 budget changed the organisation at the top by replacing the imperial chancellor by 
two district commissioners, one for Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the other for the Bismarck 
Archipelago.27 The district officer and the two police sergeants remained. The number of native 
policemen was increased to 100, but the costs of employing them were reduced to 200 Marks per 
head, that is to say by almost 40 per cent. 
In 1 901  the district officer in Kaewieng was also given the assistance of a police sergeant. The 
total number of native policemen was increased to 126, but now at the cost of 250 Marks per head. 
Of these 24 were posted in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, 24 in Kaewieng and 78 in Herbertshohe. 
There was an increase in the native police force in 1902 by another 20 men. Fifty were to form 
a mobile police unit at the disposal of the governor, and 24 were kept in reserve for temporary 
police posts. The two district offices and the government station were each allocated a local unit 
of 24 men. The number of police sergeants was not increased. The budget proposal foreshadowed 
that any temporary police posts might have to be placed under the command of private individuals. 
In 1903 the native police force was increased to 210 men-at a reduced cost of 210 Marks per 
head-because repeated absences of "the troop" had created unrest in the Gazelle Peninsula. The 
allocation of the additional 64 men was not specified. It is likely, however, that 24 were earmarked 
for each of the planned two new government stations in southern New Ireland (Namatanai) and 
27 The initial form of organisation was modelled on the 1 889 agreement with the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. But that had 
been a mechanical application of a historical precedent. It soon became obvious that the governor could not also carry the 
responsibility for the local administration of either Kaiser Wilhelmsland or the Bismarck Archipelago, quite apart from 
his additional responsibilities for the Island Territory. 
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the Admiralty Islands and that the rest was to boost the combined forces stationed in 
Herbertshtihe. 28 
While the budget allocations remained unchanged in 1904, in 1905 two further government 
stations were opened: in Simpson Harbour on the Gazelle Peninsula and in Kieta in the northern 
Solomons. From the start both stations were allocated a police sergeant in addition to a district 
officer. But in view of the size of the district and the warlike character of its inhabitants, Kieta was 
allocated 50 native policemen whereas peaceful Simpson Harbour was only allotted 22. 
The 1 906 budget provided for a government station in western Kaiser Wilhelmsland (Eitape ). 
It too was to be staffed by a district officer, a police sergeant and 50 men. The local units in 
Kaewieng and Namatanai were increased by 20 men. The mobile unit gained 55 men. The district 
office in Herbertshohe was given a second police sergeant who was to be "primarily" responsible 
for the mobile unit, and for training new recruits. 
During the next two years the budget allocations remained unchanged. In 1 909 funds for a 
government station in eastern Kaiser Wilhelmsland (Morobe) were sought. It was to be staffed by 
the now standard allocation of a district officer, a police sergeant and 50 men; however, only a 
police sergeant and 30 men were approved by the Reichstag. 
In order to ensure the safety of the station and the opening up of its gold-rich hinterland, funds 
for an additional 20 men and a district officer for Morobe were again applied for in 1 910, and this 
time granted. The 1910  budget also provided for a second police sergeant in Simpson Harbour. 
He was to be responsible for a special "core unit" (Stammtruppe) that was to supply local units 
and the mobile unit with trained replacements . 
Although a government station in the Admiralty Islands (Manus) was to be established in 
1 9 1 1 ,  the budget proposal did not seek an increase in the numerical strength of the native police 
force over the previous year. The explanation is that the funds had only been sufficient to maintain 
a police force of 477, rather than the 527 men approved, because the estimated costs of 2 15  Marks 
per head had turned out to be 1 5  Marks too low. For 191 1 an extra 1 1 ,5000 Marks for 50 
policemen for Manus were sought, while the strength of the native police force for the rest of the 
Old Protectorate was to be kept at its actual 1910  level of 477 men. 
The most important change for the police force in the 191 1 budget was the creation of the post 
of a full-time commander at the level of first lieutenant. He was to be in charge of training the 
entire police force of German New Guinea, including the Island Territory, but, in particular, the 
mobile unit, the "expeditionary troop". 
The 1912  budget proposal applied for 70 additional native policemen for Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen. It was also to gain a second police sergeant. In addition two police sergeants, to 
be kept at the disposal of the governor, were applied for-the need to establish temporary police 
posts serving as a justification for all these increases. 
A memorandum attached to the 1913  budget proposal shows the distribution of the 597 native 
policemen serving in the Old Protectorate in 1912. All district offices and government stations 
were allocated 50 men. The expeditionary troop consisted of 120 men. Another 70 men earmarked 
for expeditions and temporary police posts were stationed in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. However, 
50 of these men were to be allocated to a new government station on the lower Sepik (Angoram), 
so that the district office would be left with only 70 men, of whom 20 to 30 were most of the time 
away on patrol. As the 1 9 1 2  Madang Conspiracy had shown that the remaining strength of about 
40 was insufficient, at least ten additional policemen were required-who would lift the strength 
of the local unit to the magical figure of 50. Thirteen additional policemen were needed for the 
police post in Herbertshohe.29 Although its district was fully pacified, the allocation of seven 
28 As the government station in the Admiralty Islands was not established until much later, the men eannarked for it were 
probably used to increase the local unit in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen which was not formally strengthened until 1913 .  
29  The district office had moved to Rabaul. 
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policemen was too low, especially since some of the men were always out of action for medical 
reasons. Even in Herbertshohe it was still necessary to demonstrate constantly the might of the 
government, so that an allocation of 20 men was the very minimum. 
The 1913  budget proposal established firmer ground for the development of a distinct police 
service. Its core establishment was still modest. It consisted of an inspector of police and one 
police sergeant. However, the service acquired eight positions under the "permanently required 
auxiliary personnel" vote. Of these that of an armourer and one police sergeant were new, whereas 
the other six police sergeant positions had previously been allocated to local administrations. 
The 1914 budget proposal sought an upgrading of the post of the inspector of police to the 
rank of captain and added five police sergeants to the establishment. Only three of the posts were 
earmarked for the expeditionary troop. The other two were allocated to two new government 
stations : Burgberg (Lae), at the mouth of the Markham River and Angorarn-for which, "due to 
an oversight", such a post had not been included in the 1913  proposal . 
Since Burgberg also required 50 policemen the total budgetary strength of the native police 
force in the Old Protectorate at the end of German rule was 670, compared with 90 fifteen years 
earlier. The number of police sergeants had increased from two to almost 30. On the other hand, 
the 16 posts allocated to local administrations were still classified as "harbour masters, police 
sergeants and customs collectors". Together with "office assistants" and "medical assistants" this 
category formed the lowest level of the colonial service hierarchy. The "police service" still did 
not offer a career structure: a police sergeant seeking promotion had to leave the service and 
become a "district officer, grade III", an "administrative assistant, grade II" or a "technician". 
VI 
In 1 899 the Island Territory was provided with 39,000 Marks per annum for a native police force, 
compared with 30,000 Marks for the Old Protectorate. In 1 902 the allocation was reduced to 
35, 160 Marks "in the light of the actual expenditure". In 1903 it was reduced to 30,260 Marks, 
although the funds were now also used to pay for a coloured district officer in Palau, "the Negro 
Gibbons". A reduction to 28,460 Marks followed in 1904 because of "the peaceful conditions". 
In 1905 a further 1 ,000 Marks were cut, because Gibbons had been replaced by a German official 
whose salary was paid out of another vote and because the district offices in the Western 
Carolines and the Marianas had further reduced the strength of their local units. 
1906 saw an increase to 33, 100 Marks, due to the incorporation of the Marshall Islands. The 
budget allocation sought for 1907 remained unchanged. When the phosphate mining on Nauru got 
into full swing in 1908 the local police unit was increased by 12 men and the district officer was 
given the support of a police sergeant. However the cost of these increases was refunded by the 
phosphate company.30 On the other hand, due to increasing living costs in the Western Carolines, 
the wages paid to native policemen had to be increased. Their previous wages of 8 Marks per 
month no longer allowed them to make savings so that their performance suffered. 
The total personnel costs for the native police force in the Island Territory now stood at 48,840 
Marks. In 1909 there was a reduction to 44,210  Marks, even though an additional government 
station was established in the Truk Group. Unlike new government stations in the Old 
Protectorate, it was apparently allocated neither a police sergeant nor a substantial local police 
unit-"apparently" because the budget proposals for the Island Territory are generally short on 
details concerning the police force, in line with its comparatively unimportant role.31 
30 According to the annual reports barracks for this enlarged local unit were only built during the 1 909 budget year. 
3 1  The station in Truk was established without budgetary allocations having been made for the purpose. But as this move 
did not lead to an overspending of the budget which had to be identified in the accounts for approval by the Reichstag, 
it does not show up in the financial records. 
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This changed when its budget was combined in 1910  with that of the Old Protectorate where 
the police force had always figured prominently. As a result we learn not only that, due to further 
rises in the living costs, the wages of the policemen in the Western Carolines were again 
increased, but also that the native police force in the Island Territory now had a total budgetary 
strength of 143 men. Of these 50 were stationed in the Eastern Carolines, 36 in the Western 
Carolines, 30 in the Marianas, and 27 in the Marshall Islands. 
A substantial increase in the strength of the police force in the Western Carolines followed in 
19 1 1 .  This was due to the beginning of phosphate mining on the island of Angaur in the Palau 
Group, where for this reason a second government station was established. The local police unit 
was now 66, 33 of whom were attached to the district office in Yap, 1 8  to the government station 
in Korror, and 15  to the new government station on Angaur. The native police force in the 
Marianas was treated as a separate local unit, although they were no longer a separate 
administrative district. The policemen there were apparently still locally recruited, although it is 
not clear whether the unit continued to operate according to the plan presented in the annual report 
for 1 900. At any rate, its strength had shrunk from 43 to 30 men. 
In 19 12  the budgetary strength of the local police unit for the Eastern Carolines was increased 
from 50 to 92 in a belated response to the Ponape Rebellion. Five policemen were added to the 
unit in Angaur. This brought its strength to 20, compared with 2 1  policemen on Nauru. The most 
dramatic change took place in the Marshall Islands. The expensive local police unit of six 
Marshallese was replaced by 1 8  Melanesians at no added cost. The district officer was also given 
the support of a police sergeant for whom a duty statement was provided: he was to be responsible 
for training the local police unit, for prison supervision, for public building projects and for 
allocating materials from the government store. Orders for materials remained a responsibility of 
the district officer, who was apparently primarily engaged in travelling through his far-flung 
district, presumably with a police escort, to collect taxes. The 1 9 1 2  budget proposal indicated that 
the local police unit in the Eastern Carolines was not only to be increased in size but that locally 
recruited policemen would be permanently replaced by Melanesians, as in the Marshall Islands. 32 
The 19 13  budget proposal increased the strength of the local police unit in the Eastern 
Carolines to 122, in the light of experiences during the "unrests" on Ponape. These dominated the 
picture so strongly that the number of policemen stationed in the Truk Group is still not identified. 
The 1914 budget proposal sought no additional funds for the native police force of the Island 
Territory. Its total strength was 262 men, compared with 670 in the Old Protectorate. But it was 
considerably more expensive, with average costs at over 330, rather than 250, Marks per head per 
annum. This was due to higher living and recruitment costs. The cost of feeding a native 
policeman in the Old Protectorate was 1 30 Marks per annum, whereas it amounted to over 1 80 
Marks in Angaur, the most expensive location. The average monthly wages were uniformly 
estimated at 10  Marks. 
Yet all these estimates only give a rough indication, and some of the figures begin to look 
distinctly peculiar when they are examined. The budget proposal for 19 12  sought an increase in 
the strength of the local police unit for the Eastern Carolines from 50 to 92 men. The explanations 
estimated the total cost of these men to be around 37,000 Marks, or about 400 Marks per head. 
This high figure was partly due to recruitment and transportation costs, which were given as 7 ,360 
Marks per annum. It is not clear how this figure was calculated, but it seems to be more than a 
coincidence that 7 ,360 divided by 92 gives a round figure of 80 Marks per head per year. On the 
other hand this calculation makes no sense in the following year when the total strength had 
increased to 122 men, although the same estimate for recruitment and transportation costs was 
used. The figure for wages and food in 1 9 1 2  was even more precise, namely 29,594 Marks. It 
32 The police unit on Nauru, whose main task it was to keep the mine workers in check, also consisted of Melanesians. 
I do not know whether this applied to the police unit stationed in Angaur as well. 
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produces a markedly uneven figure when divided by 92, namely a fraction more than 321 .67 
Marks. Yet if the exercise is repeated with the 1913  figures, namely 39,389 Marks for 122 men, 
the result is remarkably similar, namely a fraction more than 322.86 Marks. 
The mixture of precision and guesswork this suggests is puzzling. The budget proposals by the 
district office in Ponape for the two years in question-which happen to have survived (AA, G2, 
Z13 and Z14)-do solve this puzzle. But they also show that the actual situation was far more 
complex than the budgets indicate. Its 1912 budget proposal corresponds to the final proposal 
presented to the Reichstag in that it sought funds for a native police force of 92 men, but we now 
learn that 12 of these men were stationed on Truk, where they also had to perform services as 
labourers and boat crews.just like the native police force in the Old Protectorate 20 years earlier.33 
As regards the 80 men stationed in Ponape, the proposal shows that quite a hierarchy had 
developed. There were 70 ordinary "soldiers" (Soldaten), who received wages of 12 ( !) Marks per 
month, six "corporals" (Gefreite), who received 14 Marks per month, three "sergeants" 
(Unteroffiziere), who received 16  Marks per month, and one "sergeant major" (Feldwebel), who 
received 20 Marks per month. Provisions were also made for 40 "women"-the wives of 
policemen-who each received 100 Marks per year. 
The costs for food were calculated at 50 Pfennigs per day on Ponape--compared with 30 
Pfennigs on Truk, where the wages for the 1 1  policemen and the one sergeant were the same as 
on Ponape but no provision was made for "women". The recruiting costs were indeed estimated 
by the district office to be 80 Marks per head, but it allowed, in addition, for 128 Marks for the 
transport from Rabaul to Po nape and back. Moreover, it based its calculations on an exchange of 
only 20 men per year. Instead it sought funds for "leave trips" (Urlaubsreisen) for policemen who 
signed up for another three years but first wanted to spend some time at home. The figure of 3 ,200 
Marks for this purpose suggests 25 return trips per year and compares with a saving of 2,000 
Marks in recruiting costs. Although this meant a combined annual turnover of almost 50 per cent, 
the colonial office accepted these figures, since they add up to the 7 ,360 Marks shown in the final 
proposal.34 
The 1913  budget proposal of the district office is even more revealing. It shows that the actual 
strength of the police force stationed in Po nape in 1912, and indeed in 1 9 1 1 ,  had been 1 10 men 
rather than the 80 and 50 (including Truk) for whom the relevant budgets had provided. The 1913  
budget proposal merely normalised a state of  affairs which had existed for two years by officially 
allocating 122 men to the Eastern Carolines, namely 1 10 for Ponape and 1 2  for Truk. This 
strength was necessary because it was clear in 1912 that the reduction of the size of the police 
force in Ponape from 1 10 to 80, which had seemed feasible in 1 9 1 1 ,  was out of the question even 
in 1913 .  The reason given was that, due to a rapid turnover, the police force always consisted of 
about 50 per cent of raw recruits35 who were useless for military purposes. Moreover, they 
required additional training which could not be provided because a suitable white "troop-sergeant" 
(Truppenunteroffizier) was lacking and the officials who had taken on this task had many other 
functions to carry out. Only after a suitable troop-sergeant had been posted to Ponape and the 
police force had been well trained could it safely be reduced to 80 men. 
There is a story behind these comments. Provision for a troop-sergeant had been made in the 
1912  budget. However, by May 1912, when the 1913  proposal was prepared, no suitable person 
had been found. Instead, the second police sergeant, who had been sent to Ponape, had to be 
33 The 1 9 1 2  proposal was signed by the district commissioner on 8 June 191 1 .  This is a timely reminder that the budget 
preparations took well over a year. It explains why the 191 1 budget proposal could not respond to the Ponape Rebellion 
although it had taken place during the 1910  budget year. The district office had submitted its proposal long before the 
rebellion started. 
34 By contrast it disallowed the 4,000 Marks sought for the 40 "women"--or included the funds elsewhere. 
35 Although this figure seems unrealistically high, it was at least consistent. 
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employed as an administrative assistant because he was incapable of conducting the military 
training of the local police unit. 
While this little story offers a welcome glimpse of "how it has really been", it is disappointing 
that the local budget proposals do not explain how it was possible that its strength in 191 1 and 
19 12  was so much larger than the budgets permitted. However, we still have to address a much 
bigger question: how were the immediate financial consequences of the Ponape Rebellion and the 
earlier unrest handled?-to which the government responded according to the annual reports by 
sending reinforcements of respectively 172 and 100 men from the Old Protectorate. Were only the 
costs of transporting these policemen to Ponape-and back to their normal posts-attributed to 
the events in Ponape or also their wages for the periods in question and perhaps even other 
subsidiary costs? 
This leads to an even broader question: what do the financial records tell us about the actual 
operations of the native police force, as opposed to its organisation, on which I have so far 
concentrated by focusing on the personnel costs? What can we learn by looking at other votes? 
Does the "public works" vote tell us when and where police barracks were built, what materials 
were used, what the sanitary and cooking facilities looked like, or whether police compounds in 
German New Guinea were, as a matter of course, surrounded by barbed-wire fences or other 
defensive installations? 
The "police equipment" vote could be equally instructive. How were German New Guinea's  
policemen clothed and armed? Were they issued with obsolete, second-hand rifles or  with modem 
arms , including hand grenades, machine guns and field-artillery? How much live ammunition did 
the police force use, say in the northern Solomons in 1908 or on Nauru in 19 13?  What did the 
military equipment of the government vessels look like? Did every steam pinnace carry a 
revolving cannon? Could the government steamer fire torpedoes? Did the governor keep a supply 
of land mines or tear gas? Did the police force maintain accommodation for horses, mules and 
dogs, a fleet of carts or cars and river launches and landing craft? There is even a vote which 
relates directly to the activities of the police force, namely the "expeditions" vote, and it is the 
history of this vote that I now want to examine. 
VII 
In the 1900 budget proposal for the Old Protectorate 20,000 Marks were earmarked for 
"expeditions and stations", with the curt explanation that this corresponded to administrative 
requirements. In 1901  the same amount was sought. In 1 902 it was reduced to 10,000 Marks 
because funds for the establishment and maintenance of stations were now included in the public 
works vote and 1 0,000 Marks per annum were sufficient for expeditions. The expedition vote 
remained the same until 19 10, when the budget of the Old Protectorate was combined with that 
of the Island Territory. 
In the budget proposals for the Island Territory the "expeditions and stations" vote appeared 
in 1 901  with an amount of 10,000 Marks and the explanation that its far flung districts made it 
especially important to provide officials with funds to travel, to become more thoroughly 
acquainted with the area for which they were responsible. This suggests that this vote, although 
modelled on that of the Old Protectorate, had little to do with punitive expeditions. As in the Old 
Protectorate the vote was split in 1902 and only 5,000 Marks were provided for expeditions. The 
amount remained the same in 1 903 . It was reduced to 3,200 Marks in 1 904, with the explanation 
that the generally peaceful conditions indicated that less demands would be made on these funds. 
They were further cut to 2,500 Marks in 1 906, because the requirements of the district office in 
Yap had decreased. In 1 909 the vote was reduced to 1 ,500 Marks, in view "of the actual 
expenditure during the previous years". 
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The first combined budget proposal for 1910 changed nothing. It sought total funds of 1 1 ,500 
Marks: 10,000 for the Old Protectorate and 1 ,500 for the Island Territory. In 191 1 there was again 
no change. The same applied to 19 12, 19 13  and 1914, all without explanation. 
What about the actual expenditure? According to the final accounts for the Old Protectorate 
the expenditure was on target in 190 1 ,  although the explanations under another heading referred 
to "repeated expeditions" which had caused some extra-budgetary expenditure. By contrast, the 
expedition vote for 1902 was underspent by almost 90 per cent: 1 , 1 84.20 rather than 10,000 
Marks. In 1903 8,299.05 Marks remained unspent. Although the vote was again underspent in 
1904 by 7,486. 1 8  Marks, the overspending of the police equipment vote by more than 100 per cent 
was justified by reference to "various expeditions". In 1905 only 106.05 Marks of the expedition 
vote was spent, even though the police equipment vote was again overspent by more than 10,000 
Marks. In 1906 the expenditure increased to 1 ,503.30 Marks, while the police equipment vote 
showed some savings. The situation was reversed in 1907, when over half of the expedition vote 
was spent, whereas about four fifths of the "police equipment" vote of more than 20,000 Marks 
remained untouched. In 1908 expenditure under the expeditions vote increased to just over 7 ,OOO 
Marks, but dropped to under 4,000 Marks in 1909. 
How did the Island Territory perform? The final accounts for 1901  suggest that the 
expeditions and stations vote was substantially underspent, although the actual expenditure is not 
given. In 1902 only 1 , 1 24.62 Marks of the expeditions vote of 5,000 Marks was spent. The 
expenditure increased to 1 ,700. 10  Marks the following year and to 2, 152.01 Marks in 1904 but 
dropped to less than 400 Marks in 1 905 . It doubled in 1906, only to drop to an all time low of 
133 .99 Marks in 1907. The increase to almost 1 ,900 Marks in 1908 is not explained. In 1909, 
when the funds were cut to 1 ,500 Marks, by reference to "the actual expenditure during previous 
years", the expenditure was still over 1 , 1 00 Marks. 
In 1910  less than 5,000 Marks of the combined "expedition" vote for the Old Protectorate and 
the Island Territory were spent. The actual expenditure increased by about 50 per cent in 191 1 but 
was still below the budgetary allocation. This changed in the final accounts for 1 9 1 2-the last 
accounts presented to the Reichstag-when the expedition vote was overspent for the first time 
-by well over 50 per cent: 1 8,740.8 1  Marks compared with the budget allocation of 1 1 ,500 
Marks. 
This overexpenditure required an explanation to the metropolitan legislature. By reference to 
the annual report for that year, the explanations blamed repeated "punitive expeditions", especially 
the Kagam Expedition, which had lasted five months. They also clarified that the salaries and 
wages of the members of these expeditions had been debited against other votes and that only 
expenditure which did not fall under any other vote had been debited here, in particular 
equipment, provisions and trade goods, passages and freight and "other expenditure" to the tune 
of "approximately" 940 Marks and 8 1  Pfennigs. But we are not told whether this was a new 
accounting practice-which appears likely-or whether the same guidelines had been used in 
preparing previous accounts. 
Generally speaking, however, we can now say with confidence that, as far as the expeditions 
vote is concerned, the budget allocations are useless as an indicator of the actual state of affairs. 
The final accounts also give little away, and what they say is difficult to reconcile with the 
fluctuating levels of activity suggested by the annual reports. This has partly to do with the 
uncertainty concerning the kind of expenditure debited against this vote but also with the fact that 
the vote remained consistently underspent until 1912, so that no explanations were required. 
On the other hand, the need for explanations in cases of overexpenditure suggests that it may 
be worthwhile to look elsewhere in the final accounts for signs of major police activities, such as 
those connected with the unrest on Ponape in 1908 and the Ponape Rebellion in 19 10, as it seems 
odd that the final accounts for the Island Territory for 1908 show an underexpenditure of the 
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expeditions vote of about 600 Marks and that the combined expeditions vote in 1910 was 
underspent by almost 7,000 Marks. 
The extra expenditure caused by the unrest in Ponape in 1908 is indeed shown in the final 
accounts of that year, but it was treated as an ordinary overexpenditure of existing votes. The cost 
of reinforcing the local native police unit by 100 men is given as the reason for an overexpenditure 
of the "auxiliary coloured personnel" vote by more than 12,000 Marks, and the cost of employing 
two additional white police sergeants, about 3,800 Marks, is shown as part of an overexpenditure 
of the "auxiliary white personnel" vote. Also shown as an overexpenditure of this vote caused by 
the unrest are the costs of employing a surveyor and a road-builder, at about 2,300 Marks. The 
major item, however, was the over 21 ,000 Marks spent on the construction of roads. Only they 
were shown as expenditure "outside the budget" under the non-recurrent expenditure vote. 
In 1 909 the unrest on Ponape again caused extra-budgetary expenditure. An additional police 
sergeant was employed at the cost of 2,400 Marks, and the cost of maintaining a native police unit 
of 1 50 men for part of the year led to an overspending of the "auxiliary coloured personnel" vote 
by around 5,000 Marks. Moreover, we are told that this amount would have been much higher but 
for savings in the other districts of the Island Territory. The increase in the size of the police force 
on Ponape also produced an overexpenditure of over 2,000 Marks in the police equipment vote. 
In addition, a number of Ponapeans were temporarily banished from their island during the unrest 
and their transport back to Ponape cost about 2,500 Marks in 1 909. The surveyor also stayed on 
at a cost of 7,500 Marks. Finally, extra-budgetary expenditure of about 6,500 Marks, which should 
have been shown in the final accounts for 1908, turned up in the final accounts for 1 9 1 0  and 1 9 1 1 ,  
so that the total abnormal cost of the unrest on Ponape before the 1910 rebellion amounted to at 
least 75,000 Marks. 
Putting down the Ponape Rebellion was more expensive. A total of around 1 25 ,000 Marks was 
debited against the accounts of German New Guinea, and this does not include the vastly higher 
costs incurred by the navy. The entire amount was shown this time as expenditure "outside the 
budget" under the single heading "caused by the unrests ( ! ] on Ponape", namely about 92,000, 
28 ,000 and 5,000 Marks respectively in 1910, 1 9 1 1 and 1912. 
Various tailor-made subheadings were used. The final accounts for 1910  show that 1 ,652.28 
Marks were spent on telegrams and almost 22,000 Marks on equipment and arms. The second 
largest amount, over 9,000 Marks, shown for 1 9 1 1 related to the transportation to Palau of the 
Ponapeans who were banished after the rebellion but also to the transportation of police 
reinforcements back to the Old Protectorate. On the other hand, the phosphate company on 
Angaur paid "compensation" of 6,500 Marks for "Ponapean prisoners" allocated to it as labourers, 
which is shown as extra-budgetary income. Almost the entire relevant extra-budgetary expenditure 
of about 5,000 Marks in 1912 was spent on food for the banished Ponapeans, who were also 
supplied with 170 Marks worth of seeds and seedlings to plant the land they had been given on 
Palau. 
On the other hand, we are told nothing about the actual strength of the police force on Ponape 
in 1 9 1 2  because the normal personnel costs of the native police force were treated throughout as 
part of an undifferentiated "auxiliary coloured personnel" vote. Extra-budgetary expenditure for 
the police force on Po nape could therefore not only be compensated for by savings for other police 
units but also by any savings for coloured labourers, artisans and office staff, without having to 
be identified and explained in the final accounts. This may well have happened in 1 9 1 2, when the 
auxiliary coloured personnel vote for German New Guinea was underspent by a small amount: 
1 ,45 1 .32 Marks compared with an allocation of almost 340,000 Marks. 
It is only because the Ponape Rebellion, in contrast to the 1908 unrest, was accounted for 
outside the budget, rather than as having caused an overspending of existing votes, that we are 
provided with figures. But the categories used are still insufficiently differentiated for our 
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purposes. Thus the 19 10  figures do not distinguish between the wages paid to the police 
reinforcements and money spent on the Ponapean "auxiliaries", who defended "die Kolonie" until 
their arrival. Simi�arly, the 191 1 figures do not distinguish between the costs of transporting police 
reinforcements back to the Old Protectorate and the costs of transporting the banished Ponapeans 
to Palau. It is therefore impossible to compare the wages paid to the police reinforcements in 19 1 1 
with those paid to them in 1910, or to compare the costs of about 1 3 ,000 Marks of transporting 
police reinforcements to Ponape in 1910 with those of transporting them back to their posts in 
191 1 ,  although it is clear that much less was spent on the return transport since the total spent 
under the "transport" heading in 191 1 was only about 9,300 Marks. This would tie in with the 
claim that about 60 policemen stayed on in Ponape. On the other hand, the expenditure shown for 
the wages for the police reinforcement in 1 9 1 1 would only have been sufficient to pay for the 
yearly wages of less than 30 rather than 60 policemen, quite apart from the wages which had been 
paid to returning policemen under this heading. 
The auxiliary coloured personnel vote for 191 1 does not help us further, although it was 
overspent by almost 1 8 ,000 Marks, because the explanations do not refer to any unplanned 
increase in the strength of any local police unit. On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt the 
district commissioner when he stated in his 1913  budget proposal that the local police unit had, 
in fact, consisted of 1 10 men throughout 19 1 1 and into 1 9 12.36 
There is little point in trying to ascertain details of the actual expenditure under the expeditions 
vote. By contrast the ritual nature of the allocations under this heading is significant because it 
suggests that neither the German government nor the Reichstag were concerned about the amounts 
spent on expeditions of the native police force until the unrest in Ponape in 1908. It is also 
significant that the financial consequences of this unrest were not treated as expenditure under the 
expeditions vote. To be sure, it would have made little sense to treat the sending of police 
reinforcements from the Old Protectorate to Ponape as an expedition of its police force as long 
as the Island Territory was a separate budgetary entity. But this was different for the Ponape 
Rebellion-and it must be remembered that the final accounts for 19 10  were presented to the 
Reichstag in 1913 ,  when the creation of a unified police service for the whole of German New 
Guinea was well under way. 
Seen in this light the first overspending of the expeditions vote shown in the final accounts for 
1912 was the most important event in the financial history of the native police force, and it was 
the costs of the Kagam Expedition which focused belated attention on expenditure under this 
heading. We are not told how much of the total expenditure of almost 19,000 Marks was due to 
that particular expedition, or how much the salaries and wages of the native policemen and their 
white superiors during its five months duration had amounted to. If we consider, however, that the 
budgetary strength of the expeditionary troop was 120 men and that the Kagam Expedition is said 
to have lasted five months, compared with police reinforcements of 172 men sent to put down the 
Ponape Rebellion, which only took a few weeks-it is likely that the Kagam Expedition was the 
most expensive episode in the history of German New Guinea' s  police force. Even more 
importantly, this expedition was not staged in response to a singular, catastrophic event. Instead 
it was the first instance of the manner in which the expeditionary troop was to be routinely 
deployed in the future, so that a substantial increase in the expenditure under the expeditions vote 
was to be expected. 
36 The most likely explanation is that the wages of the 60 extra-budgetary policemen, who were drawn from the existing 
police units in the Old Protectorate, were debited against the funds set aside for those units, since they had stayed on with 
the approval of the governor. 
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VIII 
Although much of the information which can be extracted from the budgets and accounts remains 
inconclusive, it makes a valuable contribution to a history of the native police force in German 
New Guinea, provided it is understood in its own terms. Thus it would be naYve to conclude from 
the budgets that the expeditionary troop actually operated on 1 April 1914 with its budgetary 
strength of one captain, one armourer, six police sergeants and 120 native policemen. On the other 
hand, the information concerning the changes in the size of the local police unit on Ponape 
suggests that the budgets eventually caught up with reality, although the expeditions vote shows 
that some votes could remain ritual for extended periods of time. 
The information can therefore not be incorporated into a historical narrative as if it consisted 
of statements of fact. It would be misleading to collate, for instance, the information relating to 
the strength and the distribution of the native police force in the budget proposals in the form of 
a table, even if it was accompanied by a footnote pointing out that it merely included estimates. 
An explanation of the nature of this information is an essential part of the exercise so that it must 
be incorporated in the text, even if this makes it narratively indigestible. Indeed, the main value 
of this information is that it demonstrates that history is already a multi-dimensional reality when 
it actually happens. A factual account of history must reflect that it is produced by a complex 
interaction between these different layers which is characterised by various kinds of uncertainty. 
It is not only the historian who does not know the actual strength of all the local police units in 
German New Guinea on 1 April 19 14, neither did any of the historical actors on stage on that day. 
No-one knows how "it has really been", neither at the time nor in retrospect, and nothing is more 
ahistorical than the attempt to create false certainties.37 
Nonetheless the budgets and accounts corroborate in their own ways the main features of the 
history of the native police force indicated by the annual reports . The 1 908 unrest on Ponape, the 
subsequent rebellion and, in particular, the Kagam Expedition were also financially milestones in 
this history, whereas, for example, the two Madang Conspiracies were not. Even the punitive 
measures after the V arzin Murders were not such a milestone. Rather, the importance of this event 
for the history of the police force lay in the subsequent establishment of a police post which was 
to serve as a base for a distinct mobile police unit. The budgets and accounts also confirm the 
peaceful and marginal role of the police force in the Island Territory and the Marshall Islands until 
the unrest in Ponape. In addition, they demonstrate what a major impact the large-scale mining 
operations, first on Nauru and then on Angaur, had on the police force-and that the replacement 
of the six expensive Marshallese policemen in Jaluit by 1 8  Melanesians indeed prepared the 
ground for a general shift of policy towards this group, whereas the retention of the Micronesian 
police units in the Western Carolines, Palau and the Marianas lends weight to the claim in the 
annual reports that no corresponding changes were as yet planned for these areas. 
Perhaps most importantly, the budgetary treatment of the native police force parallelled its 
legislative treatment. Just as native policemen were governed by the general labour law, their 
wages were paid out of the general auxiliary coloured personnel vote. Although the police 
equipment vote had long acknowledged that the native police force was special, it was only the 
37 Even the precise strength of the police reinforcements sent to Ponape to put down the rebellion is uncertain. Acting 
governor Osswald reported that he had taken 90 men with him at the end of November 1 9 1 0  and that a further 70 men 
were sent in January 191 1 .  This adds up to 160-rather than the 172 shown in the annual reports. Captain Vollerthun 
reported that the total strength of the native police force on Ponape had been 223 men, that is to say one man more than 
the reinforcements of 172 men plus the strength of the local unit of 50 men given in the annual reports. While the precise 
figure is historically immaterial, it is significant that the eagnerness to give precise figures, dates or other facts is rarely 
matched by the reliability of the information used by those giving them. Why this reluctance to settle for realistic 
approximations instead of creating precise phantoms? Partly, I suggest, because they are narratively unattractive but 
mainly because their use is seen as a sign of incompetence of government officials as well as historians; both are supposed 
to know what they are talking about instead of engaging in guesswork, however educated. 
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creation of the post of a military commander of the expeditionary troop in the 1 9 1 1 budget that 
signalled that a distinct police service was about to come into being which, in time, would also 
have acquired its own coloured personnel vote, like the one which had already existed for many 
years for the "flotilla". 
Such a distinct vote would have produced a great deal more information about the history of 
the native police force than the financial records had hitherto provided-just as Hahl's  
conscription ordinance would have led to the development of a distinct legal structure for the 
force. As matters stood at the end of German colonial rule the information provided by the 
financial records remains anecdotal. 
For example, it appears that quite a hierarchy had already developed within the force as a 
matter of administrative practice, at least on Ponape with its unusually large local police unit. But 
it is unclear whether the arrangements on Ponape represented a generally recognised ranking 
system or merely a graded wage scale which the district commissioner had adopted for his own 
purposes and for the time being. 
Was the one "sergeant major" responsible for the entire unit and the military superior of the 
three "sergeants"? Were two of the six "corporals" placed under each of the "sergeants"? Was 
each of the "corporals" in charge of a platoon of "soldiers"? What would have happened to this 
hierarchy, and to the men occupying elevated positions within it, when the local police unit was 
again reduced to its "peace strength" of about 50 men? Would the sergeant major have been 
demoted? Would he have been transferred, in this capacity, to the expeditionary troop? Or would 
he have been permitted to serve out his contract as a sergeant major but not offered another 
contract, at least not at that level? 
What about the "police women"? Were they employed as ordinary government labourers, or 
was it their primary task to clean the police barracks, to cook for the men and to maintain food 
gardens for them? Was the ratio of about 50 per cent of married policemen typical for the whole 
of German New Guinea? Could the district commissioner have offered married quarters for 40 
families, at least some of them including children? Did he intend to pay the fare for the wives and 
children of married policemen when they went on home leave before starting a new three year 
contract? Or was the entire budget proposal an idealised facade behind which the district 
commissioner muddled along, making ad hoe decisions as he went? 
It would be unrealistic to expect the financial records to answer these questions. They were 
not designed to tell their readers how the government was organised and how it operated. Their 
task was to provide a steady flow of categorised statements about how much it was supposed to 
spend (or earn) under each category and about how much it had actually spent (or earned). All 
other information was incidental. 
Considering this, it is surprising how informative these financial records can be about non­
financial matters. But what does one do with these fragments of information? It is, for example, 
historically significant that the phosphate company on Angaur paid compensation of 6,500 Marks 
during the 191 1 budget year to the government for work performed by Ponapeans who had been 
banished after the rebellion. But this fact becomes historically meaningful only if it is seen in 
context-and it can be placed in different contexts. 
It is most tempting to see it as part of the history of the aftermath of the Ponape Rebellion. But 
what counts in this context is not that this payment was made but that it shows that banished 
Ponapeans indeed worked in the phosphate mine on Angaur in 191 1 ,  but apparently no longer in 
1912  when no such payment was recorded. But the information is disappointingly vague. It does 
not even tell us how many banished Ponapeans worked on Angaur, and for what period, let alone 
what they did and under what conditions.38 
38 Were they employed in the actual mining operations or on other tasks? Were they locked up in a prison during the 
night and worked under a police guard during the day? Were they fed and clothed by the government or the company? 
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On the other hand, the mere fact of the payment is a significant instance of how the colonial 
government actually operated. It not only banished people but hired them out to a private company 
to raise revenue. In this context the first question to arise is whether this procedure was typical. 
A satisfactory answer again calls for more information, but of a different kind. On what basis were 
these Ponapeans sent to Angaur to work? Had each of them been judicially sentenced to a fixed 
term of prison with hard labour? Had their banishment been a police measure aimed at protecting 
the public from a continuing danger? Had all fit adult males been sent to Angaur to work for their 
keep and for that of their women, children and parents? 
If the first was the case, the next question is whether it had been common in German New 
Guinea to hire out prison inmates to private individuals or companies. In the second case the 
question is rather whether it had been common to banish whole tribes administratively, whether 
standard procedures for their treatment had evolved and whether the treatment of the Dschokadsch 
tribe had been in line with these procedures. 
Both scenarios-and there are other possibilities-also raise the question of the legality of the 
measures taken. Was it legally permissible in German New Guinea to hire out prison inmates? 
Was there a native prison ordinance which dealt with this question? Was the permanent 
banishment of entire tribes legally permissible as an administrative measure? Was it permissible 
to compel persons who had been administratively banished to work for the financial benefit of the 
government? Or was the aftermath of the Ponape Rebellion treated as so extraordinary that normal 
legal considerations did not apply even after the state of war had ended? 
The difficulty here is that legislation in this field was almost totally lacking in the Island 
Territory at the time. There was no native prison ordinance or, for that matter, a native penal 
ordinance (apart from the Marshall Islands) and the 1905 imperial ordinance concerning the 
coercive and penal powers of the administration also did not apply to natives in the Island 
Territory. Administrative discretion was still king, although various general legal principles had 
to be taken into account in its exercise. However, a firm legislative framework into which 
fragments of information like this one could be fitted was absent. We have therefore no choice but 
to adopt an action-centred approach. But for such an approach the budgets and accounts offer little 
assistance. They were not interested in what people actually did. Like the police under the Prussian 
General Code they were concerned not with the behaviour of people but with states of affairs. For 
them the act of the payment of the 6,500 Marks by the phosphate company was immaterial. What 
counted was that as a result of such an act the government received an extra-budgetary income of 
6,500 Marks which had to be accounted for. 
This is why the financial records are more forthcoming as regards the organisation of 
government: it was a state of affairs with direct and continuing financial consequences. It was 
important for the budgets and accounts to know how many native policemen there were in German 
New Guinea if funds for the native police force were applied for by reference to their number, 
whereas it was irrelevant who they were and what actions they performed. 
A hierarchical structure within the native police force became relevant only if it was 
incorporated as a formal wage scale in the budget proposals like that for the non-native colonial 
service. But here again the budgets and accounts were interested in posts rather than people, and 
in the number of posts rather than in the actions those occupying them performed. Yet, the 
cumulative financial effects of these actions could become relevant, but as quantities of money 
and not as quantities of actions. This is the crucial difference between the financial records and 
action-centred quantitative records. The financial records are essentially impersonal and concerned 
with results not processes . What counts for them is how much money is in a particular kitty at the 
end of a relevant period, not how many payments are made, and by whom and when. 
Had they performed compulsory labour elsewhere before they were sent to Angaur and continued to do so after they left? 
How many of them died while working on Angaur? 
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What counted in our example is that the district office on Yap derived an extra-budgetary 
income of 6,500 Marks during the 19 1 1 budget year. That this income happened to consist of a 
single payment by a phosphate company for a particular purpose was for accounting purposes 
irrelevant, just as it was irrelevant who the people (or companies) were who paid customs duties 
in the course of that year and how many payments they made. What mattered was again only the 
total amount which had to be accounted for. Individual payments were merely recorded if that was 
necessary to perform this accounting task. 
The scheme was the very opposite of that which produced, for example, the court statistics .  
Their ostensible purpose was not to account for a total number of court cases but for the activities 
of the courts in the course of the year. But although the court statistics were quantitative and 
impersonal as far as the parties of the particular cases were concerned, they focused nonetheless 
on these cases and accounted for their fate at the hands of the courts. Their purpose was not so 
much to quantify the volume of work the courts performed but to quantify different categories of 
cases that came before them. Consequently these categories do not indicate whether the processing 
of cases falling under them by the courts was typically more or less laborious. In contrast to the 
financial accounts, however, the court statistics tried to kill two birds with one stone. They were 
also court-centred-and they had little choice because the courts were the key players in the 
administration of justice. But they were also meant to provide a picture of the state of civil society. 
What mattered for them was that no bankruptcy case had come before the courts, rather than that 
no such cases had occupied their time, or that the number of applications for the registration of 
land had grown dramatically over the last few years, rather than that these applications now 
accounted for a much larger proportion of court time than hitherto. Yet the court statistics too were 
concerned with states of affairs. They were interested in levels of activity rather than in particular 
actions. Modem governments generally focus on states of affairs and on maintaining or altering 
them. 
This preoccupation also affects the governmental records which deal in a narrative form with 
particular events. Government officials do not write history when reporting about particular 
events, rather they want to make history by doing so. Their reports serve administrative purposes. 
They have their eye on the future and not on the past. They manipulate history by processing 
information about the past in accordance with the practical purposes they want to achieve. 
This does not mean that such reports are always counterfactual or that factuality is irrelevant 
for them. Nor does it mean that such a purposive processing of information about the past is 
unusual or illegitimate. Everybody has to do it. But there are different purposes and what is a 
legitimate purpose for a government official may not be for an academic historian. Thus I would 
argue that the processing of information about the past for the purpose of producing a convincing 
narrative is not a legitimate academic purpose, at least not a legitimate primary purpose. For 
academic historiographers the commitment to factuality has to come first-and that goes 
considerably further than making sure that the specific statements of fact included in a historical 
narrative are in accordance with a critical reading of the historical record. Nor is it a legitimate 
primary goal for academic historians to influence the future by their accounts of the past. For them 
the commitment to contribute to a better understanding of the past has to come first. Government 
officials are in a different position. It is their task to shape the future. They do not do their job if 
they focus on gaining a better understanding of the past, unless it enables them to make 
administratively more appropriate decisions about the future. It is also not their task to assemble 
as much information about particular events in the past as possible, and to subject it to a critical 
analysis, at least not for its own sake. They justify decisions and argue cases and they do so in 
response to the existing general structures within which they operate. The records which they 
produce are shaped by these structures, even when they try to reshape them. Modem governments 
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are primarily concerned with how they operate internally and not with the external effects they are 
causing by their actions. 
This is reflected by the records they produce and should also inform the task of historians of 
modem government. The history of colonial rule in German New Guinea is the history of the 
colonial government as an operation, not the history of the exercise of governmental powers in 
relation to its subjects. It is the history of the various mechanisms which were put in place to 
control-and this is to say to manage rather than merely to restrict-its operation. The more 
elaborate and effective these control mechanisms became, the less historically significant the 
external effects of the operation became. Government gradually turned into a self-contained 
system preoccupied with running itself and, in particular, with enlarging its operational capacity 
· and with making its utilisation more controllable. 
To be sure, the system of government still depended on external inputs and produced external 
outputs, but they were not the purpose of the exercise. Government became an end in itself, for 
which its external effects merely served as a legitimation. Their description can therefore 
contribute little to an understanding of the history of colonial rule, just as a description of the 
roads a car has travelled, or of the petrol it has consumed, contributes little to an understanding 
of the operation of the motor that is driving its wheels. 
Of course, it is disappointing that as a result of their structure the financial records offer little 
systematic information about the activities of the native police force. It is also plain that the life 
of a historian of this force would be easier if it had been given from the start a firm legislative 
framework. On the other hand, the fact that it was not a legally and financially distinct institution 
makes the history of the native police force narratively more rewarding. It does not display an 
established body of men performing pre-defined, repetitive operations but the taking shape of such 
a body through the development of administrative practices by means of particular human actions. 
The history of the native police is an action-centred history. But it is less concerned with what 
acts were performed than with what external effects they caused, with how they were performed 
and with the more lasting internal adjustments they brought about, or tried to bring about-and 
the historical record reflects this state of affairs . 
The history of the native police force unfolds in a piecemeal fashion. It needs to be pieced 
together from a wide range of sources, which provide different kinds of anecdotal information. 
The challenge is to bring this anecdotal information together to form a general picture. However, 
in the performance of this task a narrative approach is unlikely to be more helpful than a 
systematic approach. The history of the native police force plainly is not a single story. If the 
multitude of stories of which it consists has any kind of coherence it must be of a non-narrative 
kind. Let us find out. 
Chapter 6: An Anecdotal Approach 
I 
The most obvious specialised source of information is a series of headquarters files concerning the "police troop" in German New Guinea (RKA 2669-72 and 2674-75). The chronologically 
oldest file deals with the troop in "the Protectorate of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie" (RKA 2670). 
It begins encouragingly enough with an 1 885 proposal by imperial commissioner Oertzen for the 
establishment of a "police executive". 1 After a two year gap, this is followed by a letter from the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie informing the chancellor of the Reich about the planned establishment 
of an armed native police force. However, the company also had two specific reasons for 
approaching the chancellor: it was seeking his assistance in obtaining 50 rifles for the force, and 
the secondment of lieutenant Steinhauser, its intended commander, from the Prussian army. After 
these logistic matters had been sorted out no material was added to the file until imperial 
commissioner Rose applied for 25 new rifles in 1 890. Apart from a discussion of an increase in 
the size of the force and the stationing of a unit in northern New Ireland in 1 891 ,  the documents 
are exclusively concerned with the supply of equipment, in particular rifles and ammunition, until 
reports were received in Berlin about the general state of the native police force which was to be 
taken over by the Reich at the end of company rule in 1 899. 
File RKA 2669 continues this series until June 1940 ( ! ).2 As the supply of military equipment 
for a police force under full imperial control no longer required special attention, it begins with 
a report on punitive expeditions in the Gazelle Peninsula in December 1 899. But no further reports 
of this kind were added to this file.3 From then on it deals primarily with events concerning the 
police force which had unusual budgetary implications,4 although several other extraordinary 
episodes are also covered.5 
File 2671 is concerned with the police force in the Island Territory between 1 899 and 1904. 
It focuses on the recruitment of Malay policemen in the Dutch East Indies and the financial 
aspects of their employment. When Malay policemen were phased out, interest waned. The next 
file-2672-includes nine folios, compared with 174 in the previous file. Although its cover 
states that it only covers the period until 1910 no new file was started. 
1 Its primary function was to be the protection of the lives and the property of the settlers in the Bismarck Archipelago. 
It was to consist of an elite force of 14 carefully selected German ex-soldiers under an equally carefully selected officer 
who was to be given judicial powers, in particular in relation to the native population of the archipelago. The officer and 
seven men, with responsibility for the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula, were to be stationed on Matupi, two men on Mioko, 
in the Duke of Yorks, and five men in Nusa in northern New Ireland. Oertzen did not consider the possibility of a native 
police force, although he took it for granted that the German policemen would be supplied with native boat crews. He also 
took it for granted that they would be given military assistance by the navy which would otherwise focus on survey work. 
It hardly needs saying that the Neu Guinea Kompagnie rejected this expensive proposal designed to benefit the existing 
settlers in the archipelago rather than its own plans for the development of Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
2 Some items concerning the "tradition" of German New Guinea' s  police force were added after the end of German 
colonial rule. 
3 The report was probably filed in this series because a covering letter commented generally on the shooting of native 
women and children by police. The file also contains notes referring to reports of two other punitive expeditions in 1 899 
and 1900 which were filed elsewhere. After that even such notes were no longer added. 
4 For example, the file includes two 1 9 1 0  requests for the funding of two police posts in the Huon Golf. Permission to 
spend outside the budget for this purpose was granted but not used, inter alia because the police force was preoccupied 
with the Ponape Rebellion. 
5 For an example, see below: 437 . 
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There is no headquarters file for the police force in the Marshall Islands as a separate colony. 6 
File 2674, which covers the period between May 1907 and June 1914, is exclusively concerned 
with Nauru and, in particular, with the financial arrangements for the refund of the costs of the 
local police unit by the phosphate company. By June 1914  this file had grown to 20 1 folios and 
a new file was started. It closes on folio ten with a note, dated 30 March 1 9 15, that a matter 
concerning the costs of the "police supervision" in 1913  in Nauru had been settled. 
A government file in German New Guinea for the native police force in the Island Territory 
(AA Gl/1 57) is similar to its Berlin counterpart. It too deals almost exclusively with the 
recruitment and the conditions of Malay policemen. A corresponding file for the police force in 
the Old Protectorate, if it was kept, has not survived. The only surviving police file of a local 
administration covers orders concerning the police force received by the government 
station/district office in Kaewieng between 1908 and 1914. It provides a sequence of glimpses of 
the broader picture. Generally speaking, however, the historical record again offers only 
unconnected bits of information. But they are more rounded and cover a wider spectrum than 
those included in the financial records. As the following sample shows, such anecdotal 
information can turn up anywhere and illustrates very different aspects of the history of the native 
police force. 
II 
The reports of the Rhenish Mission for 1 9 1 2  published a letter written by police sergeant Jahn 
under instructions from the commander of the expeditionary troop to missionary Hanke in Bongu. 
It had enclosed several letters from native policemen to their relatives at home, which Hanke was 
requested to transmit to their addressees. Hanke published a "free translation" of one of these 
policemen' s  letters. This is how it went: 
I am Sinade. This is my letter. Oh Kabes and Ken and all you Bongu people listen: to be a policeman is 
not an easy life. When Toja and Ken visited us, we had plenty of rice to eat and were well nourished, but 
now we look poorly. One man has died, but a man from Bogadjim and not one ofus Bongu people. Oh 
Kabes and Ken, you men and women from Bongu, may you all be well, we are miserable. The village 
Rabaul is in a bad country. Perhaps you, tultul [chief] , or you, Gai Toja, can visit us sometime. Oh come 
soon and bring taro with you, we are hungry. Oh my brother Kabes and Ken, you eat taro and its broth; 
you eat coconuts, but I go hungry. Oh Kabes, the two ofus made a garden at Tulumdi and now you alone 
are eating the taro and I am hungry. But this is alright, my brother Kabes, eat it! Kabes and Ken, what 
is uncle Nohe doing, and mother Goi, and Bonge, Papaim and Sabaku? Are they all well? Has perhaps 
one of them died? I am thinking of them the whole time. Kabes and Ken look after my young coconut 
palms. Keep them clean and do not let my seed yams rot (Rheinische Missionsberichte, 19 12:  248-49). 
This is more than a touching personal document. It shows that natives in German New Guinea 
were beginning to communicate with each other in writing as Hanke discovered when Bongu 
people came to him to buy paper, envelopes and pencils for their reply to the first letter they had 
received from one of the seven young men who had been recruited from Bongu to the police force 
in Rabaul in 1 9 1 1 .  It also tells us that natives were visiting each other over long distances, 
presumably using the postal steamer as a means of transportation. Sinade was not just pipe­
dreaming when he asked for such a visit: Toja and Ken had already visited the Bongu policemen 
in Rabaul. Nor were the Bongu policemen the only letter writers. Missionary Diehl reported from 
neighbouring Bogadjim that a lively correspondence had developed between the ten young men 
whom district commissioner Scholz had sent to Rabaul to be trained as policemen and their 
relations at home: hardly a steamer arrived without bringing several letters from them (ibid. :  19 1  ). 
6 File RKA 2673 deals with the police force in Samoa. 
AN ANECDOTAL APPROACH 437 
Is it significant that this new fashion was apparently introduced by policemen serving in the 
expeditionary troop, rather than by any of the men who had been recruited over many years as 
labourers from Bongu and Bogadjim? Did only native policemen write letters, or only former 
pupils of the Rhenish Mission?7 Was it unusual that natives asked their white superiors to send 
their letters for them? Did the commander of the expeditionary troop know that Sinade complained 
in his letter about going hungry? Was this letter typical of the letters sent by policemen in Rabaul 
to Bongu and Bogadjim and, perhaps, other places? Were attempts made to censor these letters? 
Did Sinade and his friends complain to their superiors about a lack of food? Had there been a 
temporary shortage of food, or were native policemen in German New Guinea typically given 
inadequate rations? So many questions and so few answers. But what is the point of writing 
history if such questions are not raised and the information posing them is not presented? 
The next illustration comes from a file concerning the powers of native officials in relation to 
non-natives in the German colonies which the colonial department had started after a complaint 
by the Colonial Society (RKA 5377). On 13  January 1904 Hahl responded to a circular decree that 
only native policemen and government chiefs exercised governmental functions in German New 
Guinea, but that they had not been given powers in relation to non-natives. There was no official 
interaction of any kind between government chiefs and non-natives because their authority was 
limited to the exercise of minor police and judicial powers in relation to the native inhabitants of 
their districts. Native policemen also had no independent powers over non-natives. They merely 
acted as messengers of German officials who issued them with specific orders in each case. Hahl 
saw no need to give native officials independent powers in the foreseeable future. If the behaviour 
of a particular European forced a German official to call on the assistance of coloured auxiliary 
personnel, it had to be left to his "sense of tact" (Taktgefahl) as to how to handle such a situation. 
The prestige of Europeans depended entirely on their behaviour as individuals and could not be 
upheld by governmental regulations . 
Good stuff, but was it an authoritative interpretation of the legal position or a political 
statement by Hahl? If it was the former, had the legal position been the same in 1 894 and was it 
still the same in 1914? On the other hand, even if it was the latter, Hahl' s  statement is still of 
considerable, albeit anecdotal, historical interest. 
In 1905 documents concerning an incident reported by father Dicks to the authorities in 
Herbertshohe were sent to the colonial department. It made notes on their content before returning 
them to German New Guinea. According to these notes8 Dicks had complained that the native 
corporals in HerbertshOhe were giving their men indecent orders when they performed their drills 
badly by lining them up behind each other and issuing the command "pusspuss" (copulate in 
Pidgin). The district office had taken evidence from five German officials and corporal Gowa. It 
showed that Gowa had ordered his men to perform knee bends as pack drill and that none of the 
German witnesses had seen anything indecent in these exercises. It was unclear, however, whether 
the expression "pusspuss" had been used, whether it had been used as a joking reference to this 
form of exercise by the men under Gowa' s command, or whether he had used it as a 
command-which Gowa had denied, stating emphatically that he gave all his commands in 
German . 
Is this inconclusive anecdote historically significant? Was it typical of German New Guinea, 
or at least of HerbertshOhe in 1905, that the military drill of the native police force was conducted 
by native corporals rather than Germans officials, or was Gowa an exception? Was, generally 
speaking, German or Pidgin or some other language used to give commands to native policemen, 
for example Malay in the Island Territory? Was the native police force a hotbed of 
7 Were literate natives only prepared to enlist in the police force but not as plantation labourers, or were only natives 
serving in the expeditionary force given the opportunity to write letters home? 
8 They were filed in RKA 2669, whereas the returned documents did not survive. 
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homosexuality? Was it typical of missionaries, or of Catholic missionaries, or of Sacred Heart 
missionaries, or of father Dicks to complain to the authorities about matters which one might have 
thought were none of their business? Is this anecdote historically significant not because of what 
had happened, or is said to have happened, but because such a trifling matter was reported to the 
colonial department? Had its historical significance to do with the relations between the Sacred 
Heart mission and the colonial government rather than with the native police force? Or is it 
significant because it shows in a flash that native policemen in German New Guinea were three­
dimensional human beings? 
When governor Hahl learned, also in 1905, that district officer Boluminski in Kaewieng was 
paying his senior police corporal Tomutu monthly wages of 40 Marks-twice the highest 
permissible rate-he instructed Boluminski to reduce them forthwith and to sack Tomutu if he was 
not prepared to accept this reduction to prevent similar claims by other long-serving corporals. On 
the other hand, he pointed out that it was possible to pay Tomutu special rewards for special 
efforts, provided funds allocated for this purpose were available. 
As far as the overpayment of Tomutu is concerned this was clearly an untypical case. Tomutu 
was probably the only native policeman in German New Guinea who ever received a monthly 
wage of 40 Marks. Yet it was probably typical of Boluminski that he had paid Tomutu the salary 
he personally regarded appropriate, just as the manner of handling this case was probably typical 
of Hahl. 
It was probably also typical of Hahl that he took this opportunity to remind Boluminski that 
it was important for the good name of the government as an employer to ensure that its employees 
were not charged inflated prices for tradegoods when they were paid out; that he enclosed a copy 
of the current price list of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in HerbertshOhe as a guideline for what was 
to be regarded as reasonable; and that he sent a copy of his order, and its enclosure, to the colonial 
department and, quite possibly, also to the other district offices and government stations, at least 
in the Old Protectorate. 9 
This pricelist again provides one of these historically illuminating flashes, in terms of the items 
it does and does not contain, as well as by illustrating the buying power of the wages of native 
policemen and their wives. The 4 Marks a "police woman" was supposed to earn per month in 
1905 could buy her a cotton dress and a bottle of perfume or four ten-inch bushknives, whereas 
shoes or sandals were not on offer. Yet this pricelist also remains anecdotal evidence, until it has 
been established how the range and the price of tradegoods changed during the period of German 
colonial rule in relation to the wages paid to native policemen and their wives. 10 
9 The copy I sighted was sent to Berlin where it was filed in RKA 2669. The same file contains a 1 906 list by Hahl of 
the equipment required by each native policeman. It supported an increase in the police equipment vote in his 1 907 budget 
proposal from 60 to 80 Marks per head per year. The list is interesting because it suggests that financial matters were still 
treated with a remarkable degree of casualness. Thus Hahl gave a round figure of 85 Marks for the costs of the initial 
equipment of a policeman in his covering letter-a rifle "M/88" or a carbine at a cost of 43 Marks was the major 
item-whereas the figures in the list add up to over 86 Marks, although one item is not priced and another, shown among 
the items which had to be replaced every year, is not listed at all. Moreover, different prices for a third item are given in 
the initial equipment and the replacement section-which adds up to almost 23 Marks, rather than the round figure of 20 
Marks given in Hahl's covering letter. While it is amusing that native policemen apparently went through two caps and 
three canteens but only one pair of trousers per year, and remarkable that sending a contingent of native policemen to 
German East Africa was sufficient to deplete the accumulated police equipment reserves, a less entertaining aspect of this 
list is of greater historical significance: Hahl obviously found it perfectly reasonable to increase the budgetary allowance 
for equipping a native policeman by as much as one third, although apparently nothing had changed. The most likely 
explanation is that the costs had never been properly calculated before. Hahl' s 1 906 effort can also hardly be characterised 
in these terms. It rather looks as if Hahl responded to the experience that 60 Marks had not been enough in a manner that 
appeared to satisfy bureaucratic requirements. 
10 In 1 9 1 3  the district office in Ponape budgeted for an annual wage of ''police women" of 1 00 Marks-more than twice 
the 1905 rate-whereas its most senior native policeman was still on 20 Marks per month. 
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In May 1 906 acting governor Krauss regarded a "decision" (Entscheidung) district 
commissioner Stuckhardt had reported from Friedrich Wilhelmshafen to be sufficiently important 
to be passed on to the colonial department. It referred it for comments to governor Hahl who was 
in Berlin on home leave at the time. 
The decision concerned a matter which had started three years earlier when six native 
policemen from Potsdarnhafen had deserted. Stuckhardt had ordered the people from Siar and 
Ragetta to pursue them. They had returned with five of the deserters who claimed that the sixth, 
Daumugu, had been killed and eaten by the Erempi. About to go on home leave, Stuckhardt 
instructed his deputy to investigate. Although the Erempi denied the accusation, a punitive 
expedition was carried out, after the management of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had complained 
that the Erempi were also responsible for the disappearance of several of its runaway labourers. 
According to "the registration" (Registratur) about ten Erempi were shot dead during the 
expedition. 
In January 1906 father Vormann reported from Potsdamhafen that Daumugu was alive and 
well in his village. Vormann requested that Daumugu, who had avoided him during all this time, 
and the other five ex-policemen who had by then also returned to their villages, be punished for 
telling such lies . They were duly arrested and Stuckhardt had punished them each administratively 
with two years of hard labour to be served in Friedrich Wilhelmslafen. 
While Stuckhardt had taken into account that the lies of the ex-policemen had not been the 
only reason for a punitive expedition during which human lives had been lost, Hahl based his 
comments on the assumption that the Erempi had been innocent. Yet, like Stuckhardt, he was more 
concerned with the punishment of the six ex-policemen. Hahl defended Stuckhardt's  
administrative punishment because he had "obviously" regarded their judicial punishment to be 
legally impossible; because it was established practice to remove dangerous elements temporarily 
from their home areas in this manner; and because there was no practical alternative to these 
banishments. 
This worried the immediately concerned official in the colonial department, the former 
imperial commissioner Rose, not because he found such administrative punishments 
objectionable, but because he feared more attacks in the Reichstag, like those which had recently 
been directed against such punishments by administrator Brandeis in the Marshall Islands. He 
therefore asked Hahl to consider whether the penal practices in relation to natives in German New 
Guinea had to be generally reviewed. 
What about the punitive expedition against the Erempi? Stuckhardt' s  deputy apparently had 
made no attempt to investigate the complaints of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie against them. On the 
other hand, the punitive expedition had been triggered not so much by these new accusations as 
by "derisive messages" the Erempi had sent to the district office after the first visit to their village 
during which they had denied that they had killed and eaten Daumagu. Similarly, Stuckhardt took 
action when he had learned that Daumagu was still alive not because he or his comrades 
represented any danger in 1 906 but because the latter had successfully led him up the garden path 
three years earlier. 1 1  
It i s  unlikely that Hahl spent sleepless nights after forming the view that the Erempi had been 
innocent victims of a punitive expedition. He certainly did not suggest that they should be 
compensated for their suffering. Does that mean that Hahl, or Stuckhardt. Krauss and Rose, or 
German colonial officials generally, did not care whether the targets of punitive expeditions had 
committed the deeds of which they were accused, or that they had become hardened because they 
frequently found out after the event that a punitive expedition had not been justified? Conversely, 
1 1  It is worth mentioning that Stuckhardt could easily have judicially punished them for falsely accusing the Erempi of 
having committed a serious crime by reference to section 164 of the German Criminal Code (Falsche Anschuldigung) 
which deals precisely with cases of this kind. 
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had Krauss reported this case to Berlin because this had been the first instance of a punitive 
expedition having turned out to be a mistake? Or had he too only been concerned with 
Stuckhardt's administrative punishment of the ex-policemen? Why had Stuckhardt reported his 
decision to Herbertshohe when he, according to Hahl, had followed a well-established practice 
by punishing the men the way he did, unless the mistaken punitive expedition had been of major 
concern for him? 
In January 1910  the station court in HerbertshOhe sentenced two native policemen, Manulja 
and Tamali, to two years imprisonment with hard labour for manslaughter and a third, Zipol, to 
three years because they had shot several native women during an expedition, the reasons for and 
the location of which are not identified. The three men, all from New Hanover-according to the 
station court renowned for the brutality of its inhabitants-had disregarded the orders of the 
German official in charge that policemen who first reached a village were not to enter until the rest 
of the troop had caught up and that they were to shoot only after he had called the names of the 
men who were supposed to fire. Instead Zipol had entered the village as soon as he had reached 
it and had shot one woman. Manulja and Tamali had followed his example and shot down other 
women. Zipol claimed that he had started firing only after a native man had thrown a spear at him 
and that he had wounded the man with his first shot, but neither spears nor traces of blood left 
behind by a wounded man had been found. 
The station court decided that the three policemen had not acted in self-defence but had 
followed their "wild instincts" in killing the defenceless women. Since the principle not to shoot 
women had to be strictly followed, and since incidents like this one were likely to undermine the 
natives' confidence in the justice of the government, a severe penalty for such a gross breach of 
discipline had been called for (AA63/83,  B23 1) .  
It looks as if we are finally on firm ground with this case, since it makes several points of 
general significance: firstly, that there existed by 1910 a well-established principle according to 
which native policemen in German New Guinea were not allowed to shoot women under any 
circumstances; secondly, that shooting women therefore demanded a severe, criminal punishment; 
and, thirdly, that such cases were exceptional. But looking closer, this case too raises more 
questions than it answers. Would the three policemen also have been prosecuted if they had shot 
dead native men under the same circumstances? Would they have been acquitted if Zipol had been 
attacked before opening fire? Would any action have been taken against them if they had shot the 
women during an attack on the village ordered by the German official in charge? Did the case only 
end the way it did because the official came across three of his men, who had disregarded his 
specific orders, while they were standing, their rifles smoking, next to the corpses of several 
women in the centre of the village? In other words, was the principle not to shoot women qualified 
in various ways, for example, because it stood alongside another principle according to which 
native policemen were not permitted to shoot anyone, unless they acted in self-defence or had 
been ordered by the German official in charge to open fire? 
It is easy to believe that such extreme cases were rare, but what does it tell us, apart from 
demonstrating that native policemen were sent to prison in one such case? Is it significant that the 
court perceived the case primarily as a breach of discipline, rather than an ordinary crime? While 
two or three years imprisonment was a tough response to such a breach, it was hardly a severe 
punishment for killing several defenceless women-whose number is not identified in the 
judgement-especially if we compare this sentence with a sentence of four years imprisonment 
with hard labour the court imposed a month later on a native civilian, Tawono from Kambaira, for 
an assault causing death. 
We need a great deal more information about the manner in which disciplinary and criminal 
offences of native policemen were handled by different officials, at different times and in different 
parts of German New Guinea, before we can assess the historical significance of this case. This, 
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however, is easier said than done. It is indicative that I learned about this case, the only conviction 
of native policemen for committing manslaughter on duty of which I am aware, not from the case 
file of the station court in HerbertshOhe-which no longer exists-but because the three 
policemen were sent to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen to serve their sentences and excerpts from the 
judgement were put on the prison administration file there, which happens to be still available. 
The information about the imprisonment of Tawono comes from the same source, but in that case 
only the "operative provision" (Tenor) of the judgement was sent, so that the circumstances of his 
case are unknown, since it hardly needs saying that the case file of the station court also no longer 
exists. 
As the state of the surviving historical record generally rules out a systematic approach to the 
assessment of anecdotal information of the kind reported in this section I want to explore in the 
next section whether the inspection of a chronological cluster of cases set in the same geographical 
area can take us a step further. 
m 
On 8 April 1 899 acting governor Schnee reported on a punitive expedition against "Anapapar", 
inland of Kabaira on the Gazelle Peninsula, which he had carried out as imperial judge shortly 
before the end of company rule. The immediate reason had been an attack by the Anapapar on the 
Kabaira people, during which three of the latter were killed. Schnee also took into account that 
"in the course of the years" 14 Europeans had been killed in the Kabaira area, some of them 
apparently by the Anapapar, that a trading station had only recently been reopened, that the Sacred 
Heart Mission as well as the Neu Guinea Kompagnie were becoming active around Kabaira; and 
that the prestige of the administration would suffer in the eyes of the natives if such an attack 
relatively close to its headquarters remained unpunished. 
On 1 5  February 1 899 Schnee set out with police sergeant Schuberth and 21 native policemen 
to Kabaira. Since the Anapapar had sent word that they were expecting him and his men and 
would kill them all, he saw no point in entering into negotiations and marched straight inland. 
After five hours the first Anapapar gardens were reached. The sounds of distant signal drums were 
heard and the movements of invisible bodies in the high kunai grass on both sides of the track 
noted. Schnee positioned his troop on a small hill which offered better visibility in at least one 
direction. Surprisingly it was from that direction that the warriors approached, shouting, dancing 
and shaking their spears. Rifle fire soon turned their attack into headless flight, speeded up by a 
counter-attack by Schuberth and a few policemen. After burning down some of the scattered 
houses Schnee marched his men back to Kabaira. 
The result was seven dead Anapapar and no casualties among the troop. According to Schnee, 
the personal courage of the policemen from Buka and New Ireland had been admirable whereas 
their discipline had left much to be desired. Those from the Gazelle Peninsula, on the other hand, 
had almost all behaved in a cowardly fashion. 12 
Schnee was pleased with the outcome. The Anapapar had remained quiet and their chief had 
even visited the trading station in Kabaira to purchase goods. Schnee hoped that peaceful relations 
with the Anapapar could be re-established soon. Since his predecessor Hahl had stopped the 
fighting among the natives around Mt V arzin during the previous year, peace in the entire section 
of the Gazelle Peninsula in which Europeans were interested had been secured (RKA 2987). 
1 2  These judgements, or prejudices, about the respective qualities and shortcomings of different "tribes"-whether it 
be Africans compared withPacificlslanders, Melanesians comparedwith Micronesians orTolai compared with Buka-are 
one of the themes which run through colonial history, not only in German New Guinea. Yet they were not necessarily an 
expression of racism, at least not in a "black and white" sense. Many German officials would have expressed similar 
preferences when it came to comparing Bavarians and Prussians, let alone Germans with Russians or Italians. 
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Although fights between the Tolai in Tamanairiki and the Taulil in the Kerawat Valley some 
months later did not affect European interests, Schnee sent his "experienced" secretary, Steusloff, 
to restore the peace. 13 In addition to his colleague Warnecke and 20 policemen, Steusloff was 
accompanied by chief Tomataria from Vunamami and ten of his men when he left Herbertshohe 
on 4 December 1 899. In Paparatava he was joined by chief Tokitang and some of his people. 
When the expedition reached Tamanairiki in the afternoon, it was deserted. But Tokitang who, in 
contrast to other Tolai, maintained friendly relations with the Taulil, was well informed about 
what had happened. After a Tolai from Taolapitok (= Rapitok?) had surprised and killed a pig­
hunting Taulil, people from this district, as well as from Naoma and Tamanamabu, had gone to 
fight the Taulil. The Taulil had ambushed them, killing-and eating-five and wounding another 
ten. 
Since it had started raining soon after the expedition had reached Tamanairiki, it stayed 
overnight and left for Taulil the next morning, having sent one of Tokitang's  men ahead as a 
messenger to inform the Taulil that they had nothing to fear from the police. After a march of 
more than two hours the expedition stopped at a Taulil hut. It was about to continue when the 
Taulil chief Tideck appeared. He had never seen a European and shook visibly when questioned, 
Tokitang and Tomataria acting as interpreters. He confirmed Tokitang' s story but denied that the 
Taulil had eaten any of the Tolai they had killed. The Taulil only wanted to live in peace but the 
Tolai had forced them to abandon their settlements in the fertile valley and to withdraw into the 
mountains on the other side. 
Steusloff admonished Tideck to keep the peace, promised him the protection of the 
administration, and the expedition started its march back in pouring rain. In Tamanairiki it split 
up. Steusloff and half the policemen spent the night at the mission station St J osephstal, W amecke 
went with the other half to the trading station in Paparatawa. 
Steusloff had sent messengers to "the three hostile districts", demanding that each pay a fine 
of 50 fathoms of shell money for fighting the Taulil, otherwise the police troop would take action 
against them. As the messengers returned with a flat refusal, Steusloff marched the next morning 
to Toalapitok and Tamanamabu and sent Warnecke with part of the troop to Naoma, ordering the 
policemen only to shoot if they were attacked and never to shoot women and children. Whereas 
Steusloff' s party only burnt down a few deserted huts, four of the policemen in W amecke' s party 
shot a man and a woman on the way to Naoma, claiming that they had not recognised the woman 
as a woman because of bad light and dense vegetation. 
Schnee commented on the regrettable killing of this woman in his covering letter to Steusloff' s 
report. Despite all efforts such incidents continued to happen because the native policemen 
became so excited during military operations that they shot at everything that moved, j ust as they 
would have done during traditional fights amongst each other. Schnee assured the colonial 
department that the administration took the greatest care to prevent the killing of women and 
children (RKA 2669) . 
The report does not suggest that the policemen were punished in this case but the surviving 
files of the station court in Herbertshohe show that Schnee punished his native policemen on other 
occasions. On 21 March 1 899, still under company rule, secretary Warnecke noted that the 
"police-boy" Toreren from Vunamami, who had been accused of raping two native women, had 
run away. But he had later returned, accompanied by Tokiago, with five fathoms of shell money 
as compensation. Toreren believed that this would settle the matter, although he was prepared to 
consider making a larger compensation payment. Instead W amecke punished him with ten strokes 
for having run away and remanded him in custody pending trial. Toreren escaped from prison with 
1 3  The reference to Steusloff' s "experience" suggests that Schnee felt that he had to justify his not taking personal 
command. Steusloff had indeed relevant experience as he had conducted the 1 894 punitive expedition about which the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie complained in the annual reports. 
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his handcuffs during the same evening. Warnecke instructed the chief in Vunamami to arrest 
Toreren as soon as he turned up and paid Tokian one of the five fathoms of shell money as a 
reward for delivering this message. 
By 15 April Toreren was back in custody and on trial. He denied having had sexual intercourse 
with Buko, but readily admitted having "used" Inwiare, together with "the little boy" Tomadip. 14 
They had held the girl down and had "used" her, although she did not want to. Buko confirmed 
that Toreren did not have sex with her; he had suggested that they should "do something together" 
but had gone away when she had declined. As lnwiare confirmed Toreren's  confession, Schnee 
sentenced him to one year imprisonment with hard labour for rape (AA 653/83,  B41) .  
In August 1 899 Schnee sentenced the police soldier Meli to six months imprisonment with 
hard labour for stealing a lamp from a native hut on Massikonapuka near Weberhafen, a penalty 
which was unusually high for a minor theft because Meli had stolen the lamp in the course of an 
expedition during which only peaceful negotiations with the natives were conducted (see ibid.) .  
Meli must have behaved well in prison because Schnee ordered his release four months later on 
27 December-or was it because there was a desperate shortage of native policemen?15 
Two years later the network of government chiefs had reached Anapapar, now called 
Napapar. 16 On 22 March 1902 chiefTowawana appeared in the office of acting governor Hahl and 
reported that Topagatie from Tambang in his district had killed Jawakila some eight days ago for 
unknown reasons. Could 20 policemen please be sent to arrest the murderer? Hahl ordered that 
20 men should march the following morning and referred the matter to the imperial district judge 
Wolff for action. 
On 25 March 1902 police sergeant Soelle sent a note to Wolff: 
Topagatie has not been brought in; the troop was attacked and had to open fire. Corporal Kamio stated 
that between six and ten natives were killed. One roll of tabu [shell money] was brought back. 
No further information on this episode is contained in the brown folder in AA 63/83, Box 29, 
which includes only this item. Was it typical to send out as many as 20 policemen under the 
command of a native corporal? Was it usual to send such a large police contingent to arrest a 
suspected murderer? Was the incident investigated and any action taken? Probably not, since it 
was quickly overtaken by a bigger event, namely the murder of Mrs Wolff and her child near Mt 
V arzin on 3 April 1 902, which demonstrated forcefully that Paparatawa and Tamanairiki had not 
yet been successfully pacified. 
Much has been written about the V arzin Murders and the subsequent punitive 
measures-which may have also cost chief Towawana of Napapar his life-but rather than 
clarifying the events these writings have buried them, like the Ponape Rebellion under multiple 
layers of phantom history. 17 I have no intention of exploring this luxuriant phantom grove. Nor 
do I want to follow the chain of events backwards to the attempts by Hahl in 1 897 to come to a 
peaceful arrangement with To Wagira of Tamanairiki, the fiercest opponent of colonial rule 
among the inland Tolai and one of the "ringleaders" behind the Varzin Murders (see Hahl, 1980: 
3 1) .  There is no point in doing so, because there is no compelling narrative trail which would link 
14 The classification of Toreren as a "police boy" rather than as a "police soldier" suggests that he too was a teenager 
rather than a mature man. 
15  Schnee had good reason to boost the police force as much as possible, since he left on 10 January 1 900 to carry out 
a large punitive expedition to the Admiralty Islands. 
16 The "A" is the definite article in Tolai. To treat it as part of the name is just as wrong as treating the "A" as part of the 
title "lualua"-but who cares and who can be expected to know these details which have certainly no historical 
significance? 
17 For a "postmodem" attempt to deal with this episode see Neumann, 1 992, chapter 1 ,  where the "accidental" shooting 
of the luluai of Napapar is also mentioned. 
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these events, even though they took place within five years of each other inside a geographical 
area extending over less than 20 square kilometres.  Yet they are embedded in the same historical 
matrix. The problem is that history does not fly like an arrow through astronomical time but 
spreads out like mist through historical space. 
It may be more instructive to inspect this horizontal spread instead of trying to dig a deeper 
chronological shaft. There is a good opportunity for testing this possibility since the report of 
police sergeant Soelle just discussed is not the only one of its kind which has survived. A bundle 
of 33 of his reports is still available (AA G254/126). Most of them relate to the six-months period 
between 1 April and 30 September 1902. 
IV 
A report of 1 April 1 902, two days before the V arzin Murders, features the soldier Tonoko from 
Takekel in the Napapar area. He had run away out of fear of being punished for having pushed 
a cleaning rag too far down the barrel of his rifle so that it had become inoperative. Wolff ordered 
Soelle the same day to get the man back. Soelle reported a week later that Tonoko had not been 
found. On 29 May Tonoko was brought in and Soelle requested his punishment. An official by 
the name of Schultz ordered a punishment of ten strokes which was carried out by one Buddeus. 
When Soelle reported this punishment on 25 June Wolff decreed that the matter could now be 
filed. 
The next report is dated 24 April, when things were returning to normal after the V arzin 
Murders. The soldier Tokumbarue and the labourer Towakine, both also from Takekel, had been 
given six days leave on 14 April but had not yet returned. 18 Soelle reported on 25 June that the 
employment of Towakine had been terminated by Hahl on 5 May19 and that an attempt to get 
Tokumbarue back had to be abandoned because he had been too ill to walk. Wolff ordered Soelle 
to make another attempt. He had to issue a reminder on 1 1  August before Soelle reported three 
days later that the man had now been returned so that the matter could be filed. But Soelle had 
already made a related report on 27 June when another policeman, Towogone, had returned late 
from leave and reported that Towakine and Tokumbarue were ill and that yet another policeman, 
Torue, had overstayed his leave at Kerawien. Soelle had requested the punishment of Towogone 
and Torue. Since Torue was not available, Wolff could deal only with Towogone, who was given 
ten strokes and demoted to labourer. 
The majority of the subsequent reports also related to policemen-or their wives-and the 
aftermath of the V arzin Murders continued to figure prominently. On 21  June Soelle reported that 
the policeman Kowak and his wife Maka had turned up in Herbertshohe because they had been 
"thrown out" by Herr Costantini, who was in charge of the new police post in Toma. Soelle had 
sent a replacement for Kowak, and Wolff dealt with Kowak and Maka in a manner which is not 
identified. On 30 June Soelle reported that the natives Torapile and Tolavakie from Nauma had 
disappeared. Wolff's order of 8 July sheds some light on this mysterious matter. Three natives 
from Nauma had apparently been employed as auxiliary policemen after the Varzin Murders.20 
They had absented themselves from Herbertshohe but had turned up at the police post in Toma 
where Costantini was happy to employ them as labourers. As Wolff approved, he ordered Soelle 
to cross them off the list of policemen and add them to the labourers' list. 
1 8  By mid-April the military operations had been completed, although the two main ringleaders, To Wagira and To 
Kilang, were still at large. 
19 Despite his blackwater fever Hahl was obviously sufficiently well to deal with such routine matters. 
20 This was an interesting move because Nauma is probably identical with "Naoma" which adjoined Tamanairiki. 
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On 4 September Costantini sent the soldier Lesiat because he had been beaten by the soldier 
Sioni with a piece of wood. Soelle requested the punishment of Sioni. It is not clear whether this 
happened, but Soelle was ordered by Wolff to arrange for Sioni' s transfer to Herbertshohe. 
Now to the "police women". Soelle reported on 20 July that Takasakei and on 22 July that 
Uagar had been released from prison, without indicating for how long and for what reason they 
had been imprisoned. In the case of Uagar this is shown in another report of 6 August: she had 
served five days for adultery-without deterrent effect, because barely two weeks later she had 
again committed adultery, with an office boy in Buddeus' s  kitchen. It earned her partner in crime 
ten strokes and her nine days imprisonment, eight of them on half rations. 
Uagar had competition. Tinkomey, the wife of the soldier Zimula, committed adultery with the 
houseboy of the government doctor on 4 August. This earned her five days imprisonment and him 
ten strokes.21 Tinkomey was again reported for adultery in September-this time with the soldier 
Aigius. Both were acquitted by Wolff because they denied the accusation and the only witness 
produced, "the tamul Lile'',22 stated that he had nothing to say.23 
Another report shows that native policemen were routinely used as supervisors of native 
labourers. On 1 8  August Soelle reported the labourer Batan for not following the orders of 
corporal Martin. Instead he had abused him "you kalabus [prison]-man, wat you leik etc." and 
threatened him with a shovel. When Soelle had sent for B atan, he ran away but was found hiding 
under a stack of building timber two hours later. Soelle put him temporarily in prison and asked 
for strict punishment. Wolff obliged by ordering three days imprisonment and ten strokes. He was 
less impressed when the policemen sent out to bring back the labourer Towagaganie, who had run 
away four weeks earlier, returned with another man from his place as "a hostage". He curtly 
decreed: "the native is to be released". 
Although none of these reports is by itself illuminating, the incidents reported are just as 
important for the history of the native police force as punitive expeditions-and each of them is 
just as unique. Was sexual promiscuity nonetheless also typical of the behaviour of "police 
women" in German New Guinea, or at least for their behaviour in Herbertshohe between April 
and September 1 902? Was it typical of policemen to bring back hostages if they could not find a 
deserter--or had this idea occurred to one of them for the first time in this case? Did Wolff want 
to terminate an established practice of which he personally disapproved, or were there special 
circumstances which had made him decide that it had been inappropriate to follow it in this case? 
Was it a common term of abuse in 1 902 to call a native policeman a "kalabus-man"? Did native 
labourers frequently refuse to obey orders given to them by native policemen? Was Uagar sent to 
prison for six months by the station court for yet another case of adultery in October? Were the 
prisons full of native policemen who had been judicially punished for excesses committed during 
the punitive measures following the V arzin Murders? Was the mix of cases reported by Soelle for 
this six months period representative? Does the bundle include all the reports made by Soelle 
during this period or, to be more precise, all reports relating to disciplinary matters concerning 
"coloured auxiliary personnel"? Were labourers employed by the government routinely beaten 
every night for laziness without any individual reports being filed? 
21 In this case both punishments were expressly classified as disciplinary, rather than criminal, punishments by Wolff. 
22 The term "tamuf' indicates that Lile came from Kaiser Wilhemsland and that a reference to this apparently still unusual 
fact was more important than to identify whether he was serving as a policeman or as a labourer. 
23 Police sergeant Soelle also reported Chinese government employees on two occasions. The locksmith Ah Song and 
the carpenter Li Ah Fock were each fined 5 Marks because they had left their work to pay a visit to the postal steamer 
Stettin (whose crew probably included several Chinese). The case of the carpenter Ah Lorn was more serious. He was 
not only sacked without pay for the last two weeks because of his "colossal laziness and impertinence", but Wolff also 
asked the local finns not to employ him as a trader because it was important for disciplinary reasons that he leave the 
colony-which he did a month later. 
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The exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction over natives in the Herbertshbhe/Rabaul district 
between 1 899 and 1914 is one of the comparatively best documented aspects of German colonial 
rule, but who would want to read a systematic study of the relevant records and who would be 
prepared to carry out such a study in the knowledge that the available information is too 
voluminous and varied to be handled narratively but also too incomplete to be handled 
quantitatively? Yet can we afford to disregard this information, and is the incorporation of a 
colourful but unrepresentative sample into a phantom narrative not worse? Perhaps an organic 
rather than systematic approach to the history of the native police force will prove to be more 
satisfactory. 
v 
On 7 March 1 900 governor Bennigsen informed the colonial department that he had enacted an 
ordinance offering wives of native policemen a premium of 30 Marks for their first child, of 60 
Marks for the second child, of 90 Marks for the third child and so on. This measure was prompted 
by the fact that police women had an unusually small number of children. Only two of the 13 
women in Herbertshohe had a child which, Bennigsen believed, was due to "artificial pregnancy 
prevention techniques".24 An increase in the number of native children was generally of prime 
importance in German New Guinea, whose population was either stagnant or decreasing, but it 
was of special importance in the police force, because policemen with children were likely to 
remain in the force, where their families were well provided for, whereas single men usually 
wanted to return home after serving out their first contract. This did not only mean a loss of 
trained men but, because of their military training, these men represented a permanent danger for 
Europeans living near their villages. The overall costs of the scheme would be minimal although 
the amounts were large enough to encourage police women to have more children. The scheme 
could easily be funded as "gifts to natives" under the "mixed expenditure" vote.25 
The colonial department agreed that a population increase was desirable but regarded 
Bennigsen's  legislative intervention as inappropriate and likely to cause problems with the audit 
office. It stopped short of disallowing Bennigsen's  ordinance, and of instructing him to recover 
premiums already paid, but suggested that he should himself repeal it at the next opportunity.26 
A month later, Bennigsen sounded a different note in a report to Berlin. It proposed the 
recruitment of 50 policemen-and 20 to 30 young women-in German East Africa, preferably 
W aniamwesi. 27 The main reason given was that it was "probably impossible" to form a permanent 
police troop drawn from local natives because they were so strongly attached to their home areas. 
Despite the excellent conditions and treatment, they always wanted to go back, at least for some 
time, after completing their contracts . This applied in particular to men from Buka and New 
Ireland who were most suitable, whereas the natives of the Gazelle Peninsula made bad soldiers 
and lacked personal courage. Furthermore, to form a troop consisting exclusively of Buka and 
New Irelanders was inadvisable because experienced policemen who returned home represented 
24 If we assume that the number of ''police women" in HerbertsMhe had increased to 20 by 1902, Soelle' s reports would 
indicate that 20 per cent of them received a disciplinary punishment for adultery during a six months period. This is 
certainly a significant figure but it does not mean that every "police woman" in German New Guinea "statistically" 
committed adultery 1 .2 times during a three year contract. 
25 Bennigsen saw no need to extend the scheme to the Island Territory at that stage because it was as yet uncertain how 
suitable the Malay policemen stationed there would prove to be. 
26 Bennigsen was in no hurry so it was left to Hahl to report on 17 March 1 902 that this had finally been done (RKA 
2988). 
27 It is not clear why Bennigsen only wanted to recruit half as many women as men, since this would appear to be a sure 
way of inviting trouble. 
AN ANECDOTAL APPROACH 447 
a danger to Europeans living nearby, as well as to their traditional native enemies. 28 As the Ehlers­
Piering/Hagen case had shown29 even long serving Buka policemen were unreliable. Besides, it 
was known that Buka, and also New lrelanders, were prone to run amok, as had happened quite 
recently when the Buka boy Barossa had killed the naval purser Below during a period of 
temporary insanity (see below). 
Bennigsen was not concerned about the situation in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Some good Malays 
had just been recruited for the police troop there, who could form the core of an adequate native 
police force. As regards the Island Territory the outcome of "the Malay experiment" still had to 
be awaited. For the Bismarck Archipelago a Malay police troop was out of the question because 
Malays were too expensive as ordinary soldiers and also could not withstand the strain of the 
repeated expeditions which the police troop had to carry out in this area. The same considerations 
ruled out the importation of policemen from Samoa. The four Caroline Islanders currently serving 
in Herbertshohe were suffering badly from fever, presumably because malaria was not endemic 
in Micronesia, so that the Island Territory also could not supply the police force with suitable 
recruits.30 
Bennigsen had therefore settled for the East African alternative. It presented no practical 
problems. The district office in Bagamayo could easily recruit the required men and women from 
among the thousands of people who came from the interior. Nor would the transport costs be 
prohibitive, in particular if a special arrangement was negotiated with North German Lloyd. If the 
experiment succeeded, the importation of East Africans for private employers could make an 
important contribution to solving the labour shortage in the thinly populated colony. The recruits 
had to be told that they would move permanently to German New Guinea. It would be best if they 
could be accompanied by a Swahili-speaking German police sergeant who would stay with them. 
Otherwise a German-speaking native interpreter had to be sent, since Bennigsen was the only 
person in German New Guinea who could make himself understood in Swahili. Bennigsen was 
clearly moved by a sense of urgency, since he requested to be informed by cable if his proposal 
was acceptable, so that he could plan local recruitment for his police force accordingly. 
The colonial department did not like this proposal either but took it up with the governor of 
German East Africa. Since it characterised Bennigsen' s proposal as no more promising than an 
earlier proposal to recruit Pacific Islanders for the police force in German East Africa, it was 
probably surprised to receive a cable from Daressalaam stating that 50 well-trained askari, some 
of them with families, were ready to go to Herbertshohe but could not be kept on hold indefinitely: 
"Cable wages and conditions and make arrangements with steamer from there". 
The colonial department responded by rushing a cable to Daressalaam: "Soldiers' wages in 
HerbertshOhe unknown here. Stop negotiations." In a decree to Bennigsen this response was 
justified with financial considerations, but he was also asked to comment on the dangers presented 
by a police troop in which the Africans were more highly paid than their Melanesian counterparts, 
since such a wage inequality had been one of the factors that had caused a police mutiny in the 
Cameroons some years earlier. A decree to Daressalaam made it even clearer that Berlin did not 
favour the proposal. Here the main point was an expert opinion according to which it was 
"unthinkable" that Africans were prepared to migrate permanently to the Pacific. The governor 
28 Not long afterwards, Schnee sentenced one such man, Gamella from Mandine in New Ireland, to five years 
imprisonment with hard labour (see AA 63/83, Item B42). 
29 The explorer Otto Ehlers and police sergeant Piering, who was in charge of his police escort, were killed by members 
of their escort during their attempted north-south crossing of New Guinea. Two Buka imprisoned for the crime escaped 
and one of them shot acting administrator Hagen during an attempt to recapture them in 1 897. 
30 Nonetheless experimentation with Micronesian policemen serving in the Old Protectorate was continued before the 
Melanesianisation of the police force in the Island Territory began. 
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was therefore requested to thoroughly examine again whether the askari had fully understood that 
this was what was in store for them and whether they would accept such a fate in the long run.31 
The government in Daressalaam took a neutral position: the experiment had a good chance of 
succeeding but, like all experiments, it was not without risks. Bennigsen responded in December 
1 900. He still defended his proposal, stressing the general economic benefits of a migration from 
East Africa, but also stated that, after a better acquaintance with the "local human material", he 
believed that it would be possible to form a reasonably reliable police force with indigenous 
natives that would be sufficient for a gradual pacification of the colony and the maintenance of 
public order in it. Still, it would be desirable to have a small core of 20 to 30 Africans who would 
fit in well with the local members of the troop. Although at least Rose supported the experiment, 
the matter quietly petered out and was filed away by the colonial department on 28 February 1901 . 
The killing of the naval purser Below a few days after the enactment of Bennigsen's child 
endowment ordinance probably had something to do with the sudden push for the importation of 
East African policemen. On 12 March 1900, Bennigsen had invited a party from SMS Moewe, his 
deputy Schnee, Dr Fuhrmann and the Kolbes and Parkinsons, for dinner. Afterwards the men sat 
down to play cards. At 1 0.40 p.m. a shot was fired through an open verandah door into the back 
of Below, who was sitting in front of it, killing him almost instantly. Fifteen minutes later another 
shot was heard and Barossa was found, mortally wounded, in the garden. It was believed that he 
had been a victim of the same assassin until Bennigsen' s Chinese cook handed in a hunting rifle 
belonging to the governor and reported that Barossa, who worked as a houseboy for Bennigsen, 
had shot himself after shooting Below-so went the naval report prepared by the investigating 
officer, first lieutenant Madelung (RM 3/3 1 14). 
A subsequent report by the Moewe' s  commander, captain Dunbar, added another dimension 
to this incident. Two Catholic missionaries had spread the "totally baseless" rumour that Barossa 
had killed Below because Below had "seduced" his wife. Investigations by the imperial judge 
Schnee had confirmed Below' s innocence and the slanderous intent of the two missionaries.32 
Dunbar intended to take them to court if this was legally possible. In the meantime he had ordered 
his crew not to attend the Catholic church in Herbertshohe (ibid.) .33 
According to Schnee's  evidence, it had been Bennigsen's first reaction that he, rather than 
Below, had been the intended target. Schnee had rejected this interpretation because it was 
impossible that such an excellent shot as Barossa could, even in a state of abnormal excitement, 
have missed his target at a distance of only about three paces. He had concluded instead that 
Barossa must have been either drunk or mad. Since his corpse had not smelled of liquor and the 
staff had confirmed that he had not consumed any alcohol during that evening, the rest of Schnee' s 
evidence was geared towards supporting the temporary madness theory. 34 
Barossa had served in the police troop for three years before he had become Bennigsen's 
domestic servant. Several of his former comrades had confirmed that he had been "karankf' (= 
cranky) before. Indeed Schnee himself had seen Barossa in such a state, namely during the 
Anapapar expedition. When the Anapapar had attacked the police troop in a long line and Schnee 
had ordered it to hold fire until the warriors were in easy shooting range, Barossa had run towards 
them, shouting that he was going to kill the kanaka all by himself. He had stopped only after 
repeated orders, howling with fury and foaming at the mouth, but had returned to normal soon 
31 For good measure the colonial department pointed out that Bennigsen had probably not considered what was going 
to happen to their widows and children if they were killed during a military operation. 
32 The two were father Dicks, whom we have already met, and father Eberlein, who became particularly active in 
publicising his version of what was happening in German New Guinea in the metropolitan press (see below: 582 ff.). 
33 Not surprisingly the wisdom of this order was questioned by the naval authorities. 
34 Schnee' s evidence does not suggest that the liquor ban for natives was rigorously enforced even in government house. 
His colourful published account of this incident (1 904: 247 ff.) further elaborates his theory. 
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afterwards. Since several people had told him later of the "fighting frenzy" of the Buka, Schnee 
had given this incident no further thought, although he had never seen another Buka in a similar 
state (RKA 2988). 
Whether or not the killing of Below was a case of mistaken identity and whether or not 
Bennigsen had good reason to believe that he had been the intended victim, the incident was a 
shock to his system which would explain why he was no longer keen to pay premiums to police 
women for producing a bunch of little Barossas and why he found the idea of surrounding himself 
with a guard of 50 less excitable askari highly attractive.35 
Had the shock worn off when Bennigsen gave up pushing for this scheme a few months later? 
Perhaps, but there are certainly other aspects of Bennigsen'  s role in the history of the police 
force-at least one of which should be examined. 
In a report of 15  January 1 900 to the colonial department Bennigsen recommended taking a 
wait-and-see attitude to Hahl' s request for strengthening the police force in Ponape with additional 
Malays or Melanesians. Bennigsen had just made an experiment by recruiting a few reliable 
policemen in Amboina, rather than Makassar, the outcome of which should be considered before 
making any decisions. If the Samoa Treaty had given the government the right to recruit in the 
British Solomons, an attempt should also be made to recruit policemen in Malaita, which was said 
to offer better "human material" than the other islands in the group. Bennigsen had also made 
arrangements with Hernsheim & Co. to recruit 50 Buka to strengthen the local police force. It was 
possible that a few suitable men for Ponape could be found among them. On the other hand, 
Bennigsen believed that Melanesians should not be employed in Ponape at all, where they were 
despised as cannibals. If no suitable men could be recruited on Ponape itself, good people could 
probably be had in the Truk Islands. 
The colonial department found Bennigsen's  attitude "not undisturbing" (nicht unbedenklich). 
It instructed him on 25 April to send as many policemen as Hahl regarded necessary to Ponape 
at the next opportunity. In view of the infrequent shipping connections there should be sufficient 
time for him to select the most suitable "human material" for this purpose. 
A day later Bennigsen replied to a decree of the colonial department of 22 February on the 
same matter. He noted that he had sent a copy of his January report to Hahl, so that the latter knew 
that his request for additional men would not be granted without further consideration. He 
reiterated his concerns about the use of Melanesian policemen in Ponape; indeed he feared that 
posting them there might even cause unrest, since Ponapeans had told him that most of what the 
Germans had done was good, but that the black men from New Pomerania had to be sent back. 36 
His own police force had shrunk to 38 men,37 so that he had to keep the men he might be able to 
recruit locally for his own purposes. Although he would take action with these few men whenever 
required he could not guarantee that the results would always tum out as well as up to now. 
Assessor Boether had not yet reported about the performance of the Amboinese in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland. Since Hahl had "so far not been fully satisfied" with his Malays, it was probably 
best to postpone further recruitments for the time being. It was, at any rate, inadvisable to recruit 
as many as 50 men for Ponape in Amboina or Makassar all at once, as such a large number was 
bound to include much unsuitable material. Nor had any funds to recruit or pay them been 
provided in the budget. However, he had requested the German consul in Makassar to select 12 
good men for Ponape, preferably "old Dutch soldiers", and to  send them with their families to 
35 I did indeed read somewhere, without paying much attention to it at the time, of a rumour that it had been Bennigsen 
rather than Below who had seduced Barossa's wife. 
36 According to a marginal note this tied in with a comment by Hahl in a private letter that "his black people" wanted 
to leave him because they found the behaviour of the Ponapeans o&nsive, who looked down on them as "niggers". 
Bennigsen had written to Hahl that he should make these men do some real work before returning them so that they did 
not get the idea that they could make a long holiday cruise at the expense of the government. 
37 The figure is difficult to read. It could also be 30. 
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Herbertshohe. In view of the cautious approach Hahl would no doubt pursue, military 
complications in Ponape were not to be expected, and the promised frequent visits of a German 
warship to Ponape would make quite sure that everything remained calm. 
Bennigsen ended with a plea that the course of action he had adopted after careful 
consideration of all relevant circumstances should not be taken as a refusal to carry out an order 
given to him. A marginal note to the effect that it at least looked very much like a refusal shows 
that Bennigsen had rightly assumed that he was in trouble. Whereas he was merely informed that 
the order still stood, the decree of the director of the colonial department to Hahl is more telling: 
"Since I cannot accept the responsibility for the partial refusal of your request, the Governor has 
been instructed to carry it out fully (RKA 267 1)". 
Although this organic cluster of anecdotes is more satisfying than the systematic and 
chronological clusters previously displayed it is by itself not a satisfactory body of information. 
The fragment of the web of history it represents can be extended in different directions.  The most 
promising move would be to use the fragments as a starting point for a study of Bennigsen' s  
relations with the colonial department, a s  they tell u s  more about the internal workings o f  the 
German colonial bureaucracy than about the history of German New Guinea' s  native police force. 
However, this is not the direction in which I wish to move. I therefore merely want to add a 
cautionary note relating to Bennigsen' s claim that Hahl had "so far not been fully satisfied" with 
the performance of the Malay policemen on Ponape. 38 
On 1 5  August 1900 Hahl reported to Bennigsen that the police unit in Ponape consisted of 1 8  
men. O f  the 20 Malays remaining of those originally recruited i n  Makassar only seven could be 
used as soldiers. But Hahl had recruited 1 1  men in Truk whose performance was more or less 
adequate. Recruiting attempts on Ngatik and Pingelap, near Ponape, had been a failure and 
Ponapeans could only be hired as casual labourers for short periods. On the other hand, district 
commissioner Fritz had written from the Marianas that he did not need the Malays allocated to him 
and he had asked Fritz to send them to Ponape. Hahl insisted that he needed a small well-trained 
troop of at least 40 men, not to fight the natives but in order to secure the safety of the 
administrative headquarters and to help with the building of roads. He therefore asked, for the time 
being, for 1 2  additional Malays, whom he too strongly preferred over Melanesians in Ponape. 
Should Fritz be unable to send additional men he would ask for further reinforcements (AA G 111 , 
Item 157) .39 
With the same mail on 26 September Bennigsen received a report from Fritz. It informed him 
that his 12  Malays had from the start been unhappy, unwilling and ineffective workers who had 
repeatedly asked to be returned to Makassar. When an opportunity had arisen to send them to 
Ponape, the five worst ones had eagerly volunteered. Some of them still had to work off their 
debts to the government before being sent back to Makassar (ibid.). 40 It is thus unlikely that Hahl 
was satisfied with this temporary addition to his manpower. But then he probably had no high 
expectations-as Bennigsen well knew from a "protocol" of 20 October 1 899, which Hahl had 
sent him (see ibid.).  
38 These episodes taught me a salutary lesson. When I had read their reflection in the annual reports I had assumed that 
the push for askari represented the Bennigsen position whereas that taken in the following report already represented that 
of Hahl, rather than a change of heart on the part of the "old African" Bennigsen. I was therefore also no longer surprised 
when I learned later that, instead of being the driving force behind the Melanesianisation of the native police force in the 
Island Territory, as I had expected, Hahl had not been in favour of replacing the Marshallese police force in Jaluit by 
Melanesians. 
39 Bennigsen did, in fact, wait until the receipt of this report from Hahl in September before malcing the request to the 
German consul in Makassar for the recruitment of the "12 good men" for Ponape he had announced in his report to Berlin 
in April. 
40 According to the annual report for 1 900 a total of nine of these 1 2  Malay policemen were sent back to Ponape by Fritz. 
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Two of the Malays had already started to cause serious trouble on the steamer which brought 
them to Ponape. They had thrown pieces of coal at the Chinese crew and threatened them with 
their daggers, which had to be confiscated. They had also stolen and partly consumed a large tin 
of sugar. In Ponape their behaviour had not improved. One had attempted to rape a native woman, 
the other had been repeatedly drunk and had threatened to run amok a few days earlier, so that he 
had to be locked up. In the view of police sergeant Braun, whose evidence Hahl recorded, the man 
was so dangerous that it was necessary to keep him behind bars when sending him back to 
Makassar. 
Although the behaviour of these two particular Malay policemen was hardly typical of the 
behaviour of the 50 or so who initially made up the police force of the Island Territory, to state 
in the face of this evidence that Hahl had "so far not been fully satisfied" with his men at least 
looks very much like phantom history, rather than a mere understatement. But whereas a historian 
stating that Hahl had "so far not been fully satisfied" with the performance of his Malay 
policemen would indeed be merely writing phantom history, Bennigsen' s phantom statement to 
this effect is itself a historical fact, so that a historian reporting it as a statement of Bennigsen is 
writing factual history, even though one could hardly be satisfied with the performance of a 
historian who did not attempt to also read the surrounding historical record critically and report 
the results of this examination. 
On the other hand, it is impractical, and often impossible, to check every statement of a 
historical actor against other sources. Under these circumstances historiographers have little 
choice but to make it plain that they are only reporting what a critical reading of the historical 
record reveals-and in this case a critical reading of Bennigsen' s reports to the colonial 
department shows that all his statements of fact have to be treated with caution. Nonetheless it is 
possible to give a factually accurate account of the history of Bennigsen' s  child endowment 
ordinance, or of his proposal to import East African aska.ri. The case of the killing of the naval 
purser Below is more difficult but also more instructive. There is little doubt that the report of first 
lieutenant Madelung summarised above is factually accurate as far as it goes, whereas Schnee's 
temporary madness theory is unconvincing: Barossa certainly did not behave like a man running 
amok. 
While it is unlikely that we can ever be sure whom Barossa wanted to kill and why, it is 
possible to honour the commitment to factuality by indicating the different scenarios suggested 
by the historical record. Moreover, it makes no difference historically whether Bennigsen or 
Below, or both or neither, had seduced Barossa' s wife, although it is of some historical interest 
whether Bennigsen led a celibate life during his posting in German New Guinea, whether he had 
a German "housekeeper", or a native "washerwoman", or whether different native girls were 
brought to his bed every night-and, more importantly, whether his sexual behaviour, whatever 
it was, was typical of German officials serving in German New Guinea. 
Little can be extracted from this episode for a history of the sexual behaviour of German 
colonial officials, but in the present context the historical significance of this episode is different 
and more indirect. It is relevant for the history of the native police force because it probably had 
some influence on Bennigsen' s proposal to import aska.ris. To be sure, in view of the opposition 
by the colonial department, it was unlikely to get off the ground, even if Bennigsen had continued 
to push it. But this opposition was also partly a reflection of how the relations between Bennigsen 
and the colonial department had developed. It might have been received differently had it come 
from Hahl and had it concerned the police force on Ponape, although it is unlikely that Hahl would 
have made such a proposal. 
But these are just speculations. Historically the main value of this cluster of anecdotes is that 
it shows history as a three-dimensional process. Yet these anecdotes are merely trickles of 
information seeping through an enormous ball of cottonwool. They give us some inkling of what 
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actually went on, but there is no point in adding to the flow until the entire ball is saturated, since 
this would only turn history from a featureless white fluff into a mat of felted black fibres. We 
have to find another, selective way of coming to grips with the history of the native police force 
in German New Guinea. Hence my next experiment: an inspection of the file dealing with the 
instructions concerning the native police force sent to the local administration in northern New 
Ireland (AA63/83,  Box 215). 
VI 
It took until 1908 before the government station in K.aewieng opened a separate file for these 
instructions. The trigger was a circular decree asking for comments as to whether guard duty 
regulations which had been issued by the district officer in Eitape would also be suitable for other 
administrative districts in German New Guinea.41 
District officer Radatz ran a highly militarised establishment.42 He had guards under a native 
corporal posted for 24 hours at the main station building, the store and, if required, the prison. 43 
Each post consisted of three armed men supplied with five live cartridges each. The guards were 
changed every four hours. They had to be inspected once during the day and once during the night 
by the German official on duty. They had to report anything suspicious to the nearest official, 
especially the approach of ships, boats and larger numbers of natives . Lack of attention, sitting 
down, let alone falling asleep while on duty attracted severe disciplinary punishments. Without 
specific orders by a German official, the guards were allowed to shoot only in cases of immediate 
danger. 
Boluminski found this elaborate system inappropriate. Since the establishment of his station 
eight years earlier he had only posted two men at the prison at night and had rarely found it 
necessary to post more guards even during expeditions. It is unlikely that Hahl insisted on 
Boluminski changing his ways.44 But it is also unlikely that he received Boluminski' s  response 
to a decree concerning the recruitment of policemen four years later with the same equanimity. 
On 17 July 1912  Hahl urgently requested Boluminski to recruit 40 suitable men for the 
expeditionary troop. Although the recruitment of married men, together with their wives, was 
desirable, even boys of about 14 were acceptable, provided they were strongly built and 
intelligent. All told, 200 new policemen were required. The expeditionary troop consisted of only 
32 soldiers, 1 1  recruits and 12 labourers, who were unfit for military duties. Instead of being able 
to supply the local administrations with trained policemen as had been intended, the expeditionary 
troop therefore required large reinforcements . 
Boluminski reported after two months that he had only been able to recruit 13  men so far and 
would try to send others as soon as possible. But he pointed out that his district had itself 
"absorbed" many young men as labourers. Recruitment for the police in Rabaul had lost much of 
its appeal as recruits knew that they would probably be posted elsewhere. The requirement of the 
central government had to be met, but he wanted to make clear that he had always recruited his 
own soldiers and had no intention of requesting trained men from Rabaul. In his view all district 
commissioners and district officers had the duty to establish contacts which allowed them to 
replenish their units locally. This left only recruitment for the expeditionary troop, which would 
41  I do not know where Boluminski filed Hahl's 1 905 order concerning the wages of Tomutu. Perhaps the 1 908 decree 
was the first of its kind, because it required Boluminski to comment generally and in writing rather than to take a specific 
action, but it is also possible that he had recently been told to improve his haphazard filing system. 
42 Like many of his colleagues Rodatz was an officer of the reserve. 
43 This presumably meant that guards were posted at the prison only when it actually housed prisoners and that this was 
still often not the case in Eitape in 1 908. 
44 Nor is it likely that any of the other local administrations was eager to follow the example of Rodatz. 
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also be better off keeping its men instead of training them for local administrations. Officers and 
men would then come to know each other thoroughly, so that the troop could perform more 
effectively the difficult tasks it would no doubt soon be facing.45 For new government stations 
Boluminski suggested that the governor follow the example of the Prussian army and establish 
new units by ordering existing ones to contribute eight to ten men each, or at least enough to give 
it a solid core. 
Boluminski, it was implied, would be happy to oblige, provided the governor would let him 
otherwise look after his police troop as he always had and encourage other districts to do the 
same.46 But Boluminski was true to his word. In November 1 9 1 2  he sent not 27 but 34 men, plus 
two women, for the expeditionary troop, whom he had recruited at the cost of 360 Marks and 25 
kilograms of tobacco, and these men were more important to Hahl than Boluminski' s grumblings. 
Indeed they were part of the reason why Hahl could inform Boluminski two months later that 
further recruitments were still desirable but that quality was now more important than quantity. 
By the time Hahl announced in January 1914 that 1 55 new recruits were required, Boluminski 
had died on the job.47 His successor, Stuebel, took a different approach. In April 1914 he 
requested that five policemen be sent from Rabaul, preferably from the Solomons or Wariai, in 
southern New Britain, in order to increase the number of "foreign elements" in the local police 
unit which consisted predominantly of people from the district. 
Attached to Stuebel' s  report was a list of the native policemen serving on 1 April 19 14. It 
includes 53 names, but the last three were those of replacements for three men about to complete 
their contracts and unwilling to stay on, so that the actual strength conformed to the budgetary 
allocation of 50 men. The list shows that only about half the men were locals and that locals were 
rare among the ten men who were serving at least their second contract. The most senior among 
them was the Tolai Towairoko who had been serving since 1 903 .48 Seven other members of this 
old guard were also Tolai and only one came from northern New Ireland. 
Stuebe! was satisfied with the quality of his troop. He regarded it as "especially desirable" if 
five, three of them from the old guard, would renew their contracts and was only happy to see six 
leave: three Tolai and three locals. The rest were "desirable", although five of the men had only 
just joined the troop.49 
A decree of 1 7  April 1 9 14 informed Stuebel that it was at present impossible to send him five 
policemen and that he would have to send at least the same number of recruits when such an 
allocation became possible. It was, however, desirable if he could send a much larger number of 
recruits as soon as possible. 
In July 19 14  Stuebel reported that he had recruited 29 men, and the wife of one of them, 
although three of the men required medical treatment before they could be sent on. All recruits 
were identified by their name and a "recruitment number". Those who would be sent to the district 
office in Rabaul had been given a woollen blanket and mess kit but as yet no wages or wage book. 
Since it was not clear if they were acceptable to the expeditionary troop, they had all been 
45 Boluminski must have known by then that the Kagam Expedition was already under way . 
46 This, of course, also meant giving the officials in charge time to settle down, instead of transferring them constantly 
from one post to the next as Boluminski implied was happening. In 1912  Boluminski was the longest serving "local 
administrator", and indeed the only official in the history of German New Guinea who had headed the same district for 
more than ten years. But the officials in charge of the other local administrations had so far also not changed frequently, 
with the exception of the district office in HerbertsMhe/Rabaul which, due to its close links with the governor's office, 
was a special case. But Boluminski bad some reason to fear that this was beginning to change. 
47 This request was clearly linked with a large punitive expedition of the expeditionary troop to southern New Ireland. 
48 Tomutu was no longer on the payroll. 
49 It is surprising that not a single "Buka" served in the police troop in Kaewieng in 1914, whereas five came from Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland and three from the Admiralty Islands. I do not know how many of the native policemen serving in other 
parts of the colony in 19 14  were "Buka", but the days when they dominated the force, if they ever did, were certainly over. 
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recruited as labourers, at a monthly wage of 5 Marks for the men and 4 Marks for the women. 
Twenty-four kilograms of tobacco had been handed out during the recruitment drive.50 
Stuebel also wrote to the district office in Rabaul, advising it that two of the men still required 
treatment for gonorrhoea and requested that the commander of the expeditionary troop be 
informed accordingly. Another copy of this letter was given to the captain of the Sumatra with the 
instruction to deliver it to the police sergeant (= harbourmaster?) in Rabaul, presumably as a 
separate public health requirement. Finally, Stuebe! instructed his office staff to prepare passage 
certificates for each of the recruits sent and to present the file to him again in two weeks, so that 
he could check the progress of the three sick ones. In short, everything was processed in 
accordance with a well-established bureaucratic routine. 
But some things had not changed. A circular decree of 14 May 1914  concerning a fundamental 
reorganisation of the native police force still stressed the importance of retaining policemen 
permanently in the force because of the dangers of large numbers of people trained in the use of 
arms living "outside" it. However, the main aim was a centralisation of the training of all native 
policemen in German New Guinea. The target was a situation where the local administrations sent 
all their recruits to the expeditionary troop which would allocate trained men twice a year in line 
with local requirements as soon as the shortage of recruits had been overcome by the enactment 
of Hahl' s conscription ordinance. But the plan also addressed other matters concerning the native 
police force, in particular the use of native policemen for non-military duties. To prepare the 
ground for this exercise, local administrations were asked to answer a series of questions: 
1 .  Do you have basic reservations concerning the proposed scheme for the training and 
replacement of native policemen? 
2. How is the training of native policemen currently handled? 
3 .  Who is in charge of the training? 
4. What non-military duties do policemen have to perform? 
5 .  How much time is spent per day on military training? 
6. How are the policemen housed? 
7. By how many men can the local police unit be temporarily reduced, without endangering the 
safety of the district, in order to instruct them thoroughly in the care of their arms? 
The district office in Kaewieng answered promptly in a report of 24 May 1 914. Stuebel had no 
problems with the proposed scheme, although he emphasised that it would be necessary "for 
reasons of native policy" to incorporate some locally recruited men directly into the local police 
unit and essential that it always included a number of local natives who were familiar with the 
terrain and its inhabitants. 
In response to the specific questions Stuebel reported that recruits formed a separate section 
of the police unit; that their military training of two hours per day was the responsibility of the 
district commissioner, but that the police sergeant carried out the immediate supervision; that 
policemen were primarily used for expeditions and police duties, which included supervision of 
public works, summoning natives and retrieving deserted labourers . However, due to the lack of 
other native personnel, policemen also had to guard native prisoners and to carry out labouring 
tasks, especially the maintenance of government buildings and facilities . Stuebel renewed an 
apparently common plea for more government labourers, since the performance oflabouring tasks 
by native policemen interfered with their primary duties and even their military training. Stuebe} 
made a special plea for ten native prison warders since the prison in Kaewieng always housed 70 
to 80 prisoners, mostly serious criminals from other parts of the colony, who worked in several 
gangs on the government plantation. The police barracks had been built in 1 900. They had a 
50 These wages are surprisingly low. It is also remarkable that no cash payments were made to the recruits or their 
relatives. This suggests that the recruits came from a remote area. Perhaps Stuebe! had even "conscripted" them, since 
he was one of the pioneers of this method of rep lenishing the native police force. 
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concrete floor, a corrugated iron roof and walls made of split areca palm. Their southern section 
consisted of a large room for unmarried policemen, the northern section was divided into seven 
small rooms for married men.51 
Stuebel was in favour of the expeditionary troop giving native policemen from local units 
special training which enabled them to take better care of their arms , provided that no more than 
five men were seconded for this purpose at any one time. 
It would have made life much easier for historiographers if the comprehensive decree 
concerning the organisation of the native police force had been completed before the end of 
German colonial rule. As far as I can see, this did not happen and we have to take the historical 
record as we find it. Neither does it include, to my knowledge, the responses of any of the other 
local administrations to this questionnaire. 52 Indeed it is generally most unlikely that the surviving 
historical record will permit even the most persistent researcher to paint a satisfactory overall 
picture of the history of the native police force. But this is only one side of the problem as it is also 
doubtful whether the historical record enables historians to give a satisfactory account of any of 
the events in which the native police force was involved-and this is the question I want to 
address in the following chapter by taking a closer look at a key event in this history, the Kagam 
Expedition. 
51 According to the annual reports the police barracks in Kaewieng were completed more than a year later. More 
importantly, the budgetary strength of the local police unit at that time had been 24 rather than 50 as in 1914. Unless the 
barracks were substantially extended, the standard of accommodation had therefore been halved. 
52 In a way this was a blessing in disguise because it is likely that the other responses would have displayed a significant 
range of variations, both in the views expressed and in the facts reported and because all this information would have had 
to be dealt with-a much more difficult, if not impossible, task whereas this single report was easily summarised and could 
be savoured as a lucky discovery. 
Chapter 7: Problems With Close Ups 
I 
On 9 May 1 9 1 3  captain Prey submitted a belated report on the Kagam Expedition to governor Hahl. It begins with a general report of 26 pages, although about two thirds consists of copies 
of documents relating to the prehistory of the expedition. Then follow edited copies of Prey's 
progress reports which, including some more copied documents, account for 49 pages. 1  The 
penultimate, 1 8  page section of the report comprises copies of documents concerning a related 
incident which occurred after the end of the expedition. The finale is a concluding report of four 
pages-which brings the total to about a hundred typewritten pages of information.2 
Is the information sufficient to write an account of this historical episode which is, on the one 
hand, brief enough to be fitted into an overall history of the native police force but, on the other 
hand, both narratively satisfying and factual? The first step towards answering these questions is 
a summary giving an abbreviated but still reasonably comprehensive picture of the content of the 
report and its appendices. 
II 
On 4 July 1912  district commissioner Scholz reported to Hahl from Friedrich Wilhelmshafen that 
he was planning a punitive expedition against the Kagam people who had killed several native 
bird-of-paradise hunters employed by the planter Gramms and captured their guns.3 A week later 
he supplied further details. Not only had four of Gramms ' s hunters been killed but also two of his 
Chinese traders . Moreover, a native in Siven had in the meantime been shot with one of the 
captured guns. It was suspected that the coastal villages of Borroi and Burbur and the inland 
villages around Kagam were responsible. In addition a head-hunting raid of the villages of Borroi, 
Kajan and Buschun was said to have wiped out the entire population of Geneui, a village a day's 
journey up the Ramu.4 According to Gramms, all villages along and inland of Hansa Bay were 
involved in the killing of the Chinese traders and the hunting boys. 
On 24 July 19 12  Scholz reported on his expedition. He had reached Hansa Bay on 17  July with 
secretary Fabian, police sergeant Beyer, the "ranger" (Waldlaufer)5 Beiersdorf and 25 police­
soldiers. According to witnesses questioned in A war, three Chinese and 1 1  Melanesians had been 
killed. Although Scholz was not convinced that all this information was reliable, he was satisfied 
that the killings had been planned and executed by the villages of Kagam, Ringen and Korak. 
The expedition left A war on 19  July, reinforced by Gramms, the ranger Ulm, about 30 hunting 
boys and an unspecified number of A war natives. A day later it was joined by natives from Minun 
1 The last progress report was prepared after Prey' s return to the Gazelle Peninsula. The others were written at night in 
his camp so that they had included a number of errors and unclear formulations which Prey corrected. He also omitted 
some marginal information, in particular concerning supplies. Otherwise, Prey. stressed, he reproduced the original text. 
2 Appended to the report was a large scale ( 1 :50 000) map of the field of operation and Prey's cartographical notes. 
Unfortunately they were not filed with the copy of the report sent by Hahl to Berlin (RKA 2995) and are probably lost. 
3 Scholz suggested that Hahl should prohibit the hunting of birds-of-paradise further than 16 hours march inland because 
killings like these were bound to recur and because the killing of the hunter Peterson even deeper in the interior had 
demonstrated that punitive measures involved a large, and largely wasted, investment of time and effort. This suggestion 
fell on deaf ears, as far as Hahl was concerned, as did a more radical proposal subsequently made by Prey (see below). 
4 The spelling of proper names used in these documents varies considerably. Since the uncertainty this reflects is itself 
historically significant, I have made no attempt to create an artificial uniformity. 
5 Scholz presumably used the term "Waldltiufer' to designate professional European bird-of-paradise hunters for whom 
hunting was not a sideline to developing a coconut plantation at the coast but their main occupation. 
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and Giri. The Kagam fled when this massive force approached. It camped in their deserted village 
where belongings of one of the Chinese were found. Since it was estimated that the enemy had 
captured about ten guns and 1 ,000 cartridges, Scholz posted a strong guard during the night-not 
in vain as it turned out, because several shots were heard and one of Gramms' s  hunting boys 
received a shotgun blast in his chest and face. The next morning the village was burnt. 
The force marched on, finding the land well prepared for war. More shots were fired at it. 
When the rear returned to the Kagam village, after two Minun people had been wounded, it had 
been reoccupied. A gun was fired over Beyer' s head. Another gun was aimed at Gramms but the 
attacker fled when Gramms raised his rifle. The vanguard under Scholz also fired at the enemy, 
capturing a large number of spears and one gun. When the enemy was next encountered rapid fire 
was ordered and traces of blood showed that it had had some effect. Another gun was found in 
the deserted villages of Korak and Ringen, which were also burnt down. The expedition camped 
a second night near the Ramu and reached A war during the following night after a forced march 
of 17 hours. 
According to Scholz, the leader of "the murderers" was the hunting boy Boram, who hailed 
from Kajan but now lived in Borroi. Scholz was not sure how far the Borroi were involved but 
believed that they had started the rumour that some of their people had also been killed in order 
to confuse the situation. Since he was not sure how far the expedition had "intimidated" the 
natives and since it was possible that the unrest would spread to the coast, he requested Hahl to 
station the expeditionary troop for a longer period in the area "at the next opportunity". In the 
meantime he left his own troop under the command of Beyer as a protection in Awar. 
Hahl acted promptly. On 30 July he ordered Prey to proceed with the expeditionary troop on 
the next postal steamer to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen and then as soon as possible to Hansa Bay. 
Prey was given the task of punishing the murderers of the bird-of-paradise hunters, as well as of 
incorporating the villages in the hinterland of Hansa Bay, and along the coast up to the mouth of 
the Ramu, into the administrative organisation. As for the first task, Prey was ordered to set a time 
by which the murderers and the captured guns and ammunition had to be surrendered. If these 
demands were met the state of war which Hahl had declared for the duration of hostilities would 
not come into effect. If, however, the police under Beyer had been involved in continuing fights 
military action would have to be taken immediately, although this would make the more important 
second task more difficult. For as long as the expeditionary troop remained, the area between the 
Tsukula River, on the eastern side of Hansa Bay, and the Ramu was given the status of a separate 
administrative district and placed under Prey, with the exception of the plantations Awar and 
Nubia. Hahl authorised Prey to execute death sentences he imposed on natives in exercise of his 
criminal jurisdiction without the normally required approval of the governor. Otherwise Prey was 
bound by the provisions of the 1 888 Native Penal Ordinance as amended. Police sergeant Beyer 
and his troop were to return to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen after Prey' s  arrival, and Prey was to 
inform Hahl before his departure about the current strength and composition of the expeditionary 
troop. 
Prey reported a strength of one captain, two police sergeants and 1 14 men. Of these, however, 
only 32 were sufficiently trained and fit for bush warfare; another 32 were untrained and only 
suitable for light carrying duties, the rest rated somewhere in between.6 
The next document presents evidence Scholz had taken from father Vormann on 17  July in 
Potsdamhafen before setting out on his punitive expedition. Vormann had made inquiries of his 
own because he doubted that the "so-called Kagam people" had been responsible for the killing 
6 His later reports show that Prey had still been too optimistic: only 25 men were capable of carrying out military duties. 
On the other hand, Hahl had given the strength of the expeditionary troop Jess than a month earlier as "32 soldiers, 1 1  new 
recruits and 12 labourers".  This would have meant that Prey had managed to double the total strength of his troop in this 
short period, unless Hahl had strategically understated the figures. 
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of the Chinese and the hunting boys. His investigations had been prompted by an invitation from 
a village Gramms had burned down during a private punitive expedition in June. According to 
Vormann, the village in question consisted of three adjacent hamlets and was not called Kagam, 
rather each hamlet had its own name. One was called Bagurraman, the second Dawarran and the 
third was called something like Sivin by the Nubia people. It was in this third hamlet that he had 
found the burned corpses of the people who had been killed during Gramms ' s  expedition. 
Vormann did not identify the number of the corpses but reported having seen two men with 
shotgun wounds, a woman with four knife wounds to her head and a spear wound in her thigh. He 
was also told that a child had been killed during the attack which had surprised the villagers in the 
middle of building a new house. According to Vormann the Sivin had been falsely accused of 
being involved in the killings by their old enemies, the Nubia, because they had refused to supply 
the Nubia with victims for their head-hunting activities although the Nubia had given the Sivin 
two baskets with bush knives, bracelets and chest ornaments as a bribe. The Nubia had sent similar 
bribes to the village of Iku. They also had in their village the heads of two Sivin people who had 
been killed during Gramms's punitive expedition. 
Now follow copies of two reports submitted by Beyer after his return to Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen. The first begins with evidence taken from a coastal tultul, Zanake, who had 
accompanied Vormann to Iku and "Igoron", which, according to Zanake, was another name for 
"Siven". But Zanake also stated that Siven/lgoron was "identical" with Kagam. Indeed it had been 
the main village of the Kagam tribe until it had split up and one section had moved further inland. 
On the other hand, Zanake confirmed that the Igoron had told Vormann that Gramms had fought 
them without reason. Moreover, he reported the lgoron had claimed that the allegedly murdered 
Chinese were still alive and unharmed. 
On 30 July Beyer had marched to lgoron, accompanied by Gramms, who had supplied him 
with carriers because the people in A war village had been too frightened to go. In Igoron four men 
appeared to give evidence but ran away as soon as their questioning was over. It was impossible 
to establish whether Igoron had taken part in the killings, but it was clear that it maintained regular 
contacts with the Kagam villages further inland and belonged to the same tribe. 
The Nubia had provided a different explanation for the baskets with valuables given to Siven. 
It was customary for childless couples from the coast to buy children from the bush to bring them 
up as their own children. Two boys bought in that manner were alive in Nubia and A war, whereas 
Zassi from A war, who had died in the meantime, had sent tradegoods to Iku to buy a child several 
years ago, but neither had a child been brought nor were the tradegoods returned. 
Beyer's second report concentrated on his own activities. It explained that the questioning of 
the lgoron men remained inconclusive because translations between three different languages were 
necessary. His attempts to make contact with the inland Kagam failed. The village burnt down by 
Scholz was still deserted. The only native encountered the following day ran away screaming. 
Beyer' s hope of tracking down the Kagam with the help of their neighbours to the east, a different 
tribe which occupied at least 15  to 20 large villages, was also disappointed, because no Kagam 
could be found anywhere. 
Beyer was unable to contact the head-hunters at the Ramu because everybody maintained that 
there were no tracks from Kajan to their villages. According to the Kajan the village of Guneni 
had started the last round of head-hunting raids. Seven villages, including Kajan, had combined 
and made a counter-attack on Guneni, returning with 21 heads , four of which had been the share 
of Kajan. The Kajan readily gave the names of 1 5  of their men who had participated in the raid, 
since they regarded head-hunting as a perfectly legitimate activity.7 
7 In addition, the Kajan had reported that four named men from Boroi had killed a deserting labourer and that the head 
of Abatt, who had run away from the Catholic mission, was also kept in Boroi. 
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Under these circumstances Beyer decided that punishing such raids would only cause general 
unrest. It was better to demand the surrender of the head-hunting trophies and a few hostages from 
each of the villages, to ensure their good behaviour in the future. He therefore ordered the chief 
of Kajan to produce the heads kept in Kajan, Borroi and Gamai, and handed the matter over to 
captain Prey with his recommendations.8 
This was the state of affairs when Prey arrived in Awar on 8 August 1912  on board SMS 
Cormoran with police sergeants Jahn and Lange and over 100 men. 
ill 
Prey's  general report had two functions: to explain his approach to the expedition and to give an 
overview of its field of operations which had hitherto been largely unknown, so that its mapping 
had been a major part of the exercise. 
Prey' s  starting point was that the killing of the hunting boys and the Chinese, and even more 
so the head-hunting raids, had been in line with local custom. On the other hand, a continuation 
of this kind of behaviour could not be tolerated by the government, which also had an obligation 
to retrieve the captured guns and ammunition. The head-hunters were therefore ordered to hand 
over all their trophies, and the Kagam people all firearms and ammunition. Both were warned that 
they would be severely punished if such incidents occurred again. In addition, the villages 
involved were ordered to supply hostages who were to be sent to Rabaul for some months to 
familiarise themselves with the ways of their white masters and learn the "language of 
communication". 
Had the natives fulfilled these demands no military action would have been taken against them. 
But as they persistently ignored them and refused to enter into negotiations, force had to be used. 
Since it was met with armed resistance, the unqualified superiority of the troop had to be 
demonstrated until resistance ceased completely. Because it was important to keep the loss of 
human lives at a minimum, operations were carried out cautiously, especially as it was difficult 
to determine whether the unwillingness of the natives to cooperate was the result of fear rather 
than defiance. Prey' s solution was to take as many prisoners as possible, treat them well at his 
camp and release them in small groups with messages, after they had seen the strict discipline of 
the colonial forces with their own eyes. Prey refused to use friendly natives as auxiliaries, because, 
he claimed, such auxiliaries always behaved like hordes of murderers and arsonists. 
The territory of the Kagam consisted of narrow ridges, 100 to 250 metres high, separated by 
more or less extensive plains. The latter were dotted with sago swamps which turned into open 
lagoons closer to the Ramu and the coast. The Kagam lived in chains of hamlets along these 
ridges. The largest complex visited by Prey was Gareb. It consisted of about 27 hamlets with a 
total population of probably over 2,000 people. The gardens were correspondingly large, up to 30 
to 40 hectares, mainly planted with taro and yam. While these crops did not do particularly well, 
the stands of coconut palms surrounding the hamlets bore nuts larger than those on the Gazelle 
Peninsula. There was little primary forest left, but the secondary bush was so dense that it was 
difficult to gain the overview essential for determining the best routes for the tracks which Prey 
had started to clear. He therefore invested much time and effort in mapping the area from cleared 
hilltops. Only the sudden departure of the troop had prevented him from fully utilising the results . 
Indeed, it did not even permit him to complete his immediate tasks. 
8 Beyer used his stay to collect the head tax and to improve the census lists of the organised villages. In addition he dealt 
with the estates of the "murdered" Chinese, who had been based in Borroi and Kajan. No information is provided about 
the part they played in these events: did they trade for Gramms (what produce were they trying to obtain in the interior?), 
or had they in fact been put in charge of a group of hunting boys-an arrangement which was best not examined too 
closely? 
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Prey' s  first progress report was written in a camp four kilometres south west of Siven, on 4 
September 19 12.9 He spent the first few days visiting the coastal villages, trying to persuade them 
to hand over their head-hunting trophies. Not only was this unsuccessful but it also had the effect 
that the villages refused to supply him with carriers when he decided to move inland. Although 
he offered payment, he had to threaten the use of force before he could obtain the carriers 
required. 
As Prey had already formed the view that it would be good if the expeditionary troop could 
stay longer in the area than the four months allocated for its tasks, these carrier difficulties 
prompted him to ask Hahl for ten to 12 mules. He also asked for new recruits whom he could 
train, in exchange for men who were suitable for station duties but unable to withstand the 
hardship of prolonged military activity. Prey's  main problem, however, was interpreters, since 
everybody denied any knowledge of the languages in question. When repeated attempts to find 
volunteers failed, he was compelled to use force to secure the services of at least two interpreters . 
When the messages sent to the Kagam people were left unanswered, he launched an attack in the 
early morning of 26 August in an attempt to take prisoners whom he could use to start 
negotiations. One man who fought with two guns was shot dead, two other men escaped with 
serious injuries, but it had been impossible to capture any adults. When two girls were captured 
he had therefore terminated the attack to avoid further bloodshed. 
He spent a week exploring the area and clearing a track, six kilometres long, from Siven in the 
direction of Kagam, as a demonstration that he had no intention of leaving, before releasing the 
girls with presents and further messages. He intended to wait for three more days before making 
another attempt to take prisoners. In his opinion it had been a mistake to bum the villages, because 
arrests were more difficult since the people now lived in small huts scattered in the bush. It was 
better to leave their large houses intact so that they could return; only their weapons and signal 
drums should be destroyed as a punishment. 
The health of the Europeans was good but, in addition to some serious cases of malaria, over 
50 per cent of his men suffered from minor wounds and infections due to constant exertions. Their 
general state of health also suffered, despite the ample rations provided. 
Prey' s  two next reports were exclusively concerned with the insubordination of police sergeant 
Lange. The cause of the storm in the teacup was the ex-policeman Sua who had returned home 
with the expeditionary troop on SMS Cormoran from Friedrich Wilhelrnshafen to A war. During 
the trip he had begged Prey to let him take part in the expedition. Because he had the unusual asset 
of speaking German, Prey signed him up. But when police sergeant Jahn, under whom Sua had 
served during the Ponape Rebellion, expressed a low opinion of his military qualities, Prey only 
used him for camp duties. He was therefore surprised to see one morning that police sergeant 
Lange had placed Sua in charge of the men under his command. When Prey voiced his 
objections-"without the least harshness and softly so that Sua could not hear them"-Lange 
retorted: "I don't understand this, he can do the job just as well as someone else". Although Prey 
continued to act as a model of patience, the situation escalated to a point where Lange insisted that 
Prey could not order him to do anything because he had only been seconded to the expeditionary 
troop and not been placed under the captain's  military command-whereupon Prey sent Lange 
back to Rabaul. 
The trouble with police sergeant Lange had only been one of Prey's problems. The coastal 
villages between Hansa Bay and the Ramu openly refused to supply him with carriers, with the 
exception of Awar and its neighbour, Sissi-Mangu. His attempts to recruit carriers further east 
were opposed by the manager of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in Nubia and the Catholic mission 
9 The date given in the copy I used reads "4.8. 1 2" rather than "4. 9 . 1 2" .  However, the month has to be September as Prey 
only arrived in Hansa Bay on 8 August. Or was the month right but the day wrong? But even 24 August does not make 
sense since the report covers events until the end of the month. 
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in Potsdamhafen. The fitness of police sergeant Feinaugle, who had been sent as a replacement 
for Lange, left much to be desired, and, to top it all off, the Kagam placed a "declaration of war" 
on the track leading to his camp. 
When Prey set out again to capture some male prisoners-a difficult undertaking because his 
policemen were physically inferior to the Kagam warriors who would rather die than 
surrender-he almost succeeded in surprising a still occupied camp. After that he only located and 
burnt some deserted huts. Prey was confident that he would have done better had the expeditionary 
troop been equipped with a few good tracker dogs-another item on his wish-list. Without tracker 
dogs he gave up trying to locate the Kagam and moved against the Ringen people further inland 
with 14 of his best men. In one of the hamlets they met with fierce resistance. Four males were 
shot dead but only two children were captured and a rifle and various items belonging to the 
missing Chinese were found. The price for this small success was high because Prey hurt his knee 
so badly on the march back to the camp that he was out of action for two weeks. 
One of the patrols sent out during this period discovered some newly built houses which were 
vigorously defended. Three men were wounded, but they escaped and again only a young woman 
was taken prisoner. A road gang was attacked a few hundred metres from the camp and another 
Kagam man was shot dead. But the bulk of the Kagam people had vanished. It was clear by now 
that they maintained closer contacts with other groups than had previously been assumed. Prey 
believed that the Kagam were convinced that he would give up if they stayed in hiding long 
enough. Since he had also been informed that the head-hunting villages near the coast had made 
preparations to vacate them should the expeditionary troop try to punish them, it was crucial, in 
his view, that he was permitted to stay on until he had accomplished his tasks. Otherwise 
everything would have to be started all over again under more difficult conditions . .  
As Prey saw it, the main problem was an atmosphere of deep suspicion, which was probably 
the product of a mixture of a bad conscience and bad experiences. None of the natives believed 
a word he was saying. Even the friendly relations he now maintained with several villages had 
been initiated by force. He first had to capture people and tie them up, so that he could give them 
presents and send them back. There was no other way to obtain the information he urgently 
required-and the natives responded by trying to bribe him with traditional valuables as well as 
money. In order to break through this vicious circle Prey advocated that all parts of German New 
Guinea which had not been fully brought under government control be closed to private 
individuals. Even the coast along Hansa Bay and Potsdamhafen was "organised" in name only, 
as his experiences amply demonstrated. It was regrettable that such a closure would make life 
difficult for new plantation enterprises which depended for the first few years on earnings from 
hunting birds-of-paradise-although the fact that the expeditionary troop had not seen a single 
male bird in an area where they had once been plentiful gave cause for concern. But these negative 
effects were far less serious than the confusion created among the natives by all these private 
incursions before they had learned to trust the government. It was intolerable if a missionary went 
to excited villages with which he had had no previous contact to carry out private investigations, 
as father Vormann had done in this case. 10 
On 27 October Prey sent 1 8  male prisoners to Rabaul-together with Sua and another sacked 
policeman. He had banished 1 6  of the prisoners for three years and sentenced two, Iwar and 
Tepori, to five years imprisonment with hard labour. 1 1  The case of I war was straightforward: he 
had been captured armed with a rifle, after Prey had sent messages three times through released 
prisoners that there would be peace as soon as all guns, ammunition and Boram, the suspected 
I 0 Prey did not complain about the private punitive expedition of the planter Gramms. 
1 1  I war was banished for a further five years after he had served his prison sentence. The legality of this verdict is 
doubtful as Prey had no means of knowing whether I war would still constitute a public danger if he was allowed to return 
home after five years. 
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ringleader, had been surrendered, but that dire consequences would follow if these demands were 
not met. The case of Tepori was more involved. He had come to Prey' s camp with one of the 
released prisoners and two little pigs to assure Prey that he and his people were willing to 
cooperate, but that they were frightened of the police. Prey had promised Tepori that his 
people-who were not Kagam--would not be shot if they remained calm when approached, 
instead of running away, and had sent him back with a large axe as a present. A few days later 
police had followed the tracks of some Kagam people to Tepori' s  place. Tepori had stood guard 
on a hill in the middle of the gardens and had ordered the people to run away. 12 He and another 
man, who was later identified as Goram from Kagam, were captured. Unfortunately Goram bled 
to death because the policeman who had overwhelmed him, instead of immediately tying off the 
limb, had carried him to running water to wash out an arm wound he had received in the struggle. 
The transport of prisoners comprised the bulk of the 33 captured adult males .  13 Only four 
remained in the camp. Ten had been released and Goram had died. But 1 1  of the 19 captured 
women, and 27 of the 3 3  captured children were still in Prey's  camp. He intended to take them 
back to Rabaul, where he planned to marry the women, and later the girls, to his soldiers, and train 
the boys for his force when they were old enough. 
The expeditionary troop had suffered no military casualties, whereas 20 natives had been killed 
and about ten wounded. Five guns and about 50 cartridges had been captured. Prey had recovered 
from his knee injury, but Jahn suffered from malaria and general exhaustion and Feinaugle had 
collapsed during a patrol, probably as a result of a heatstroke, so that he had to be sent back to 
Rabaul. By contrast the health of the soldiers had improved, although the prisoners were in a poor 
condition, despite ample food from their own gardens. 
Prey used the time when the three Europeans were out of action to interrogate all prisoners 
with the help of two pairs of interpreters working in shifts. This was a frustrating experience 
because the witnesses, as well as the interpreters, were outdoing each other in telling lies, until 
Prey, so he claimed, had become sufficiently familiar with the vernacular to be able to judge 
whether questions and answers were transmitted correctly. Then he took everybody severely to 
task and started again. But he did not achieve the desired result until he had demonstrated 
repeatedly and tangibly to all interpreters the immediate consequences of further 
disobedience-which presumably meant that he had them beaten. 
His interrogations convinced Prey that many more villages had been involved in the killings 
than had previously been assumed, occupying between them at least an area of about the same 
size as that affected by the Ponape Rebellion. 14 The punitive expedition of district commissioner 
Scholz had only burnt two of them, of which Kagam was, in fact, the smallest. Now the people 
were scattered over the entire area with sentries watching every movement of his men, issuing 
silent warnings if they came close. Prey was proud of the discipline among his men. There had not 
been a single case of disobedience. No women or children had been hurt, and not once had an 
attempt been made to interfere with the women sexually. 
When Prey escorted the prisoners and the sick police sergeant Feinaugle to Potsdamhafen, 
arriving there on 3 1  October, a decree from Hahl, dated 27 September, was awaiting him. It 
ordered the return of the expeditionary troop to Rabaul with the mail steamer leaving 
Potsdamhafen on 1 November. Since it was impossible to move his men, the prisoners and the 
gear to the coast in a day, Prey asked for further instructions. 
12 Prey believed that Tepori was using the Kagam refugees as "slave labourers". 
13 The reports do not show how these men, apart from Tepori and Goram,were captured. Nor is it clear how many of them 
were Kagam. It is likely that many of them were not. Some of them may even have been hostages from the coastal villages 
about whom the report has nothing further to say. 
14 For Prey too the Ponape Rebellion was the military yardstick in the history of German New Guinea against which all 
other operations were measured. 
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It would be most regrettable if the aim of the expedition, which is now within reach, would not be fully 
achieved. 
The Borroi people also still have to be punished. 
The successes of the troop have made a strong impression on the natives who did not believe that it could 
succeed. Mbuit has sent 120 people to visit me in the camp. 
This was the first of many such visits. During Prey's  absence two similar delegations-one 
from as far away as Manam Island-visited his camp to assure him that they were "very good 
people". After his return such visits occurred almost every day, and they began to include women 
and children. Even the Kagam people were sending messengers, telling him of their willingness 
to surrender all guns and ammunition as soon as they could find where they had been buried. They 
could no longer surrender Boram as they had killed him because of the misfortune he had brought 
upon them, but they submitted proof of his death in the form of his thigh and arm bones, his cap 
and his large dogs' teeth ornament, which Gramms identified as belonging to his former hunting 
boy. 
Prey ordered the Kagam to leave their hiding places in the swamps and to rebuild their villages 
before the beginning of the rainy season, promising to assist them with axes and knives and in 
every other way. Gareb and Gurun had already made a start when Prey, on 1 6  November, received 
Hahl's new orders to leave Hansa Bay on SMS Condor, which was due to depart from Yap on 1 8  
November and would collect the troop and its remaining prisoners en route to Rabaul. 
For the troop . . .  this sudden departure was highly regrettable. A completion of all its tasks, including a 
good organisation [of the natives] was impossible to achieve during such a short period. All 
preconditions had . .  . largely been created. Only a little more time and the expedition could have been 
concluded with very different results. 
As it was, Prey packed up his camp, sent Jahn with the equipment, the prisoners and the bulk 
of the troop to Hansa Bay and set out with 20 policemen to punish the Borroi, who had boasted 
that they would feed him to the crocodiles if he tried to follow them to the islands in the Ramu 
onto which they would withdraw. 
Prey planned to reach Borroi overland rather than by boat, following the lagoons from the 
coast. Although everybody had insisted that this was impossible, a route was located. However, 
weakened by stomach problems, Prey had a malaria attack which put him out of action for two 
hours, so that it was dark before the first hamlets were reached. Two were surrounded, but a fight 
ensued, during which five Borroi men were killed. Two men, five women and three children were 
captured. Patrols the next morning established that all other Borroi hamlets had been vacated 
during the night. According to the prisoners that had been part of a carefully prepared plan. Prey 
had been expected, but he had been expected to come from the coast. The hamlets closest to the 
coast had therefore already taken all their valuables across the Ramu and were ready to take off 
as soon as they received warning signals from their coastal allies. The inland hamlets had felt 
comparatively safe, so that all their canoes were still present. 
Prey used two canoes to send the women and children prisoners with three policemen as a 
guard to A war. The other canoes were destroyed as a punishment, apart from a few smaller ones. 
They were carried through the swamp to the Ramu for which Prey set out in the evening with the 
remaining policemen and, presumably, the male prisoners. The canoes were reassembled when 
the river was reached early the next morning and paddled upstream to the village of Bossogun, 
where some of the Borroi had sought refuge. Bossogun was reached around midday. The 
appearance of the canoes caused great fear. The people ran off into the bush but sent a delegation 
with a large pig to assure Prey that they were "very good people", willing to do anything he 
demanded. Prey was relieved by this turn of events because he had realised that it was doubtful 
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whether he and his men could have passed the narrow channel between Bossogun and the Ramu 
alive if they had been attacked from its high banks. Instead of taking action Prey therefore merely 
made a speech. Now that they had seen that he could reach them anywhere the Borroi should 
return to their villages and obey the government' s  orders in future, otherwise he would get even 
more angry with them than he was feeling at present and would punish them severely. 
Prey ended his last progress report by stressing that he had been lucky to conclude the 
expedition so successfully, since a small mishap could have turned the punishment of the Borroi 
into a failure which would have made further measures essential. He used the opportunity to 
emphasise the need to equip the expeditionary troop with at least two motor launches. Had they 
been available, he argued, he could have operated in a much more efficient manner by taking his 
men up the Ramu and approaching the Kagam villages from the interior rather than the coast. 
IV 
On 8 January 1913  the "Vicariatus Apostolicus Novae Pomeraniae" wrote to the "Kaiserliches 
Gouvemement" that father Dicks had wanted to visit a patient in the native hospital in 
Herbertshohe the previous day, unaware that the hospital had been turned into barracks for the 
expeditionary troop. He had seen "the prisoners from New Guinea", apparently only the women 
and children. The latter had looked decidedly poorly. It was to be feared that they would 
deteriorate further and that some of them would die. Indeed, there was talk among the local settlers 
that several had already died. It was therefore necessary that the children be given better food 
without delay. Dicks had also found the presence of the female prisoners in the police compound 
morally "somewhat alarming". The mission was prepared to look after the children who no longer 
needed their mothers and to take responsibility for their education. 
The letter was sent to Prey for comment, who perceived it as a grave attack on his personal 
honour, as well as that of his white and black subordinates . 15 He saw the first attack in the claim 
that the prisoners urgently needed better food, since this implied that it had hitherto been 
insufficient, although no attempt had been made to find out what food the prisoners were given. 
Prey was especially offended because he had insisted that nothing was too good to cater for their 
needs, and that he would, if necessary, pay for special requirements out of his own pocket. He had 
even used his own milk supplies to feed the weaker children until an alternative supply could be 
arranged, with which they were now fed twice daily by two reliable policemen and his houseboy. 
Although the prisoners had been under the medical care of the government doctor from the time 
of their arrival, two babies had died in December-but children, especially babies, occasionally 
also died in Germany, despite the best care and medical assistance. 
Prey regarded Dicks ' s moral misgivings as even more offensive. From the outset his men had 
been under strict instructions not to loot, or to hurt women or children, and never to touch any 
woman sexually. Apart from a young soldier who had picked up a few dogs ' teeth and had been 
punished for this trivial offence, these orders had been followed by all his men. Unfortunately he 
was now in a position to prove scientifically that none of the women prisoners ever had sexual 
intercourse with any of them. When he had learned that the male prisoners sent to Rabaul had all 
been hospitalised with suspected gonorrhoea, he had arranged to have the women medically 
examined. Their examination had shown 14 out of 1 6  to be infected, whereas an examination of 
his men had revealed not a single case of gonorrhoea. Ergo the women had already been infected 
before their capture and could not have had any sexual intercourse with any of his men, even 
during the several weeks some of them had guarded female prisoners in A war without European 
15 Prey was also annoyed that Dicks had entered the guarded compound of the prisoners which was, in fact, some 30 
paces away from the former native hospital, without asking permission. Dicks apparently walked straight past the guards 
who did not stop him because they took him for a government official. 
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supervision, since they would otherwise have also become infected. His men therefore deserved 
better than to be regarded as "black pigs". They had earned the respect of the white community 
and had to be energetically defended against any disparagement. Prey therefore requested a 
judicial investigation of the accusations made. 
Instead of acceding to this request, Hahl wrote a diplomatic letter to the mission, informing 
it that the women and children prisoners would be sent home after it had become possible to 
"communicate verbally" with them. Until then they had to remain in the care of the administration, 
since many suffered from contagious diseases and required a special diet and medical supervision. 
Hahl presented the women and children prisoners generally as a miserable lot who had been 
captured only because they had been too weak to run away with the rest. But he placed special 
emphasis on their hookworm infection which was sapping away the strength of the children. 
Prey took credit for the discovery of the hookworm infection as well, because he had asked 
that the digestive tract of a child, who had remained in a poor state despite all care given, be 
thoroughly examined. Immediately afterwards he reported to Hahl that the presence of hookworm 
had ')ust" been established. When subsequently all prisoners, including the males, were examined, 
hookworm was found in almost all of them, whereas again none of Prey' s men had shown signs 
of an infection. 16 
This led Prey to add the request for one medical doctor for each company of the expeditionary 
troop to his list of wishes in his concluding report. 
Money spent for this purpose will earn high interest, just as any money spent on the creation of a first 
class troop, of which an ample quota of doctors is an organic part . . .  Had the two companies applied for 
at least been approved in this [budget] year, six months would have been sufficient to make a start with 
a large-scale opening up [of the interior of Kaiser Wilhelmsland] which could in the main be completed 
within two to three years with a proper troop under the firm command of a military superior. 
v 
After this summary we can return to the two questions raised at the beginning of this chapter: 
firstly, is the information included in the Prey Report and its appendices sufficient for writing a 
satisfactory account of the Kagam Expedition as a unique historical event; and, secondly, can this 
information be summarised more succinctly than I have done, without distorting what it has to say, 
so that such an account can be fitted more comfortably into a history of the native police force? 
Since the second question is easier to handle and will also help in answering the first, I shall start 
addressing it by examining a few attempts to capture the Kagam Expedition in a nutshell. 
The natives inland from Hansa Bay, particularly the so-called Kagam tribes, had made repeated attacks 
on native bird-hunters. The establishment of lasting peaceful conditions appeared indicated if only to 
ensure the security of the plantations and mission settlements in that area. The expeditionary troop under 
its commander was therefore stationed for five months in the plain at the mouth of the Ramu inland from 
Hansa Bay. This extensive terrain was recorded and mapped by route surveys and the local tribes, who 
were the victims of savage head-hunting practices, were pacified (Sack & Clark, 1978: 354). 
How did the annual reports manage to present an account of the Kagam Expedition in less than 
a hundred words? By taking a categorisation approach. After locating this episode in geographical 
space-the plain at the mouth of the Ramu inland from Hansa Bay-and astronomical time-five 
months during the 19 12  budget year-and identifying the expeditionary troop as its leading 
corporate actor, this account characterises the Kagam Expedition in terms of its reasons, its 
16 Hookworm was widespread in German New Guinea. For example, according to the 1 9 1 1 annual report, 95 per cent 
of the population in Saipan was infected with it. 
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purposes and its results. It presents an outer shell without revealing its content, apart from 
mentioning the apparently peripheral mapping exercise. Moreover, by sidestepping the issue of 
how the result-"pacification"-was achieved the way is cleared for answering the questions 
which are addressed in a similarly categorical manner. 
The main reason given for the expedition is repeated attacks by the "so-called Kagam tribes" 
on native bird-hunters, although the savage head-hunting practices of the local tribes are thrown 
in for good measure. The purpose is indicated in the form of a definition of the term "pacification" 
(Befriedung), namely "lasting peaceful conditions", primarily in the interest of the colonial 
enclaves in the area. While this definition appears to be remarkably vague-and it was certainly 
too early to say, when the annual report was drafted, that "the peaceful conditions" established 
were lasting-the term had acquired a reasonably precise technical meaning. It was considered 
to be completed with the "administrative organisation" of the area in question. Hence the same 
annual report also claimed that Kaiser Wilhelmsland had been administratively organised "without 
a break along the coast from the British border as far as the mouth of the Kaiserin Augusta River 
[Sepik]" (ibid. :  356), that is to say including Hansa Bay. 
While the condensation powers of this categorisation approach are impressive, it cannot help 
but blot out historical episodes to which it is applied as unique events by fitting them into a more 
or less sophisticated typology. It is thus ideally suited as a stepping stone towards a comparative 
and ultimately quantitative analysis but incapable of telling how "it has really been". Moreover, 
in this instance its application is seriously defective. It is by no means clear that there had been 
more than one attack by "the so-called Kagam tribes" on native bird-hunters, whereas it is certain 
that the expeditionary troop had been stationed for less than four months, rather than five months, 
and that at least "the so-called Kagam tribes" had not been "administratively organised" when the 
expeditionary troop had left. 17 
In the middle of 1 9 1 2  the inhabitants of the . . .  district of Kagam had killed and eaten ten labourers 
employed by a planter on Hansa Bay. It was therefore necessary not only to punish the Kagam people 
but to impose and guarantee lasting peace in the still unoccupied sections of the coast of Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland. By now the field company was sufficiently advanced in training to be sent into action. It 
was despatched to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen by the mail steamer at the beginning of August, and 
transported from there by SMS Cormoran commanded by Captain Ebert. First Lieutenant Prey succeeded 
in fulfilling his assignment after five months of unremitting labour (Hahl, 1980: 141) .  
This version, given by Hahl in his memoirs, adopts the same categorisation approach, but it  
is  more specific, although it  omits some information included in the annual report: for example 
a reference to the savage head-hunting practices or to the mapping activities of the expeditionary 
troop. Hahl is more precise as regards the time-frame, although he gives the 
same-wrong--duration for the KagamExpedition as the annual report. 18 He is even vaguer about 
the space dimension, speaking of the "still unoccupied [unbesetzten] sections of the coast of 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland". By contrast, he is most precise in identifying the reasons for the 
expedition: the Kagam had killed and eaten ten labourers employed by a planter on Hansa Bay. 
This does not tie in with the information in the Prey Report, but enabled Hahl to avoid any 
reference to the links between the killings and the hunting of birds-of-paradise. 19 On the other 
hand, Hahl clearly identifies the dual purpose of the expedition: the punishment of the 
17 This does not invalidate the claim that the coast of Kaiser Wilhelmsland had been organised without a break between 
the British border and the mouth of the Sepik by the end of the 19 12  budget year. 
1 8  Hahl probably relied blindly on the annual report. Otherwise he would have remembered that the expeditionary troop 
did not return as late as the beginning of January 1 9 1 3 .  
1 9  Th e  impression created i s  rather that the "ten labourers" were attacked while working in the plantation. 
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cannibalistic killers and the imposition of lasting peace in the whole area. But then he is highly 
categorical about the result. The assignment had been "fulfilled". How? By "unremitting labour". 
The main difference between the two accounts is the attention given by Hahl to the 
expeditionary troop. He even identifies the name of its commander, albeit with an incorrect rank, 
even though he too says nothing about its strength. This also makes sense as in Hahl' s  view the 
Kagam Expedition was significant, not on account of its magnitude, but because it was the first 
of its kind: the expeditionary troop was only now "sufficiently advanced in training to be sent into 
action". It is less clear why Hahl also chose to highlight the fact that the troop had been 
transported from Friedrich Wilhelmshafen to Hansa Bay by SMS Cormoran and that the ship was 
commanded by Captain Ebert. 20 
In the Hansa Bay interior tribes had repeatedly attacked bird-of-paradise hunters and killed two Chinese 
and 1 1  native hunters. The district officer undertook an expedition against these inland people but it was 
felt that "it appeared expedient to establish permanent settled conditions if only to ensure security for the 
plantations and the mission establishments". An expeditionary force under Captain Prey was sent to the 
area with its main base at the mouth of the Ramu River. It was by no means clear which villages had 
committed the killings, several seemed to be involved, one accusing the other. It seemed that the coastal 
villages, which had officially been pacified, might have been connected with the murders as well. It was 
regarded as undesirable to get the whole area up in arms by punishing villages. Instead it was demanded 
that all heads acquired through head-hunting had to be handed over and every village was asked to supply 
five to ten people. Prey made it his policy to take prisoners and hostages, let them experience camp life, 
participate in reconnaissance trips, and attacks on opposing villages, and then to set them loose so that 
they could tell their fellow villagers what they had experienced. Prey hoped to impress on them that the 
white man was able to find his way in the bush without guides, that prisoners were treated justly, and that 
nothing harmful was done to captured wives and children. 
However, even villages which had been included in the "organisation" refused to supply carriers for 
Prey and he noted general defiance and mistrust. He was uncertain whether this was caused by a bad 
conscience or bad experiences in the past, but he was certain that the defiant villagers were not conscious 
of having done anything wrong and were proud of their acts. 
In an interim report in October, three weeks before the expedition ended abruptly, Prey renumerated 
[sic] the enemy's losses to date: 33  male prisoners, 18  sent to Rabaul, four in camp, 10 sent back to their 
villages with messages, one died. 1 9  women prisoners, 1 1  in camp, eight sent back; 33 captive children, 
27 in camp, six sent back. He would have liked to marry the women to the police soldiers and educate 
the children with the troops as they would be good "soldier material". The enemy, Prey counted, had lost 
20 men dead, four seriously injured people had got away and were presumably dead, 406 lightly injured 
men were noticed while they themselves had no casualties. Prey claimed that the people were starting to 
gain confidence and come to the camp voluntarily, some with wives and children. Delegates even of 
villages which had been deserted came, led by discharged prisoners, and promised to return the rifles 
taken from the bird-of-paradise hunters. 
Prey had punished the opposing villages severely and had impressed the people with the power and 
force of the government. But he realised that the area was not yet pacified, as Hahl had reported in the 
Annual Report for 19 12- 13 ,  for it needed more concentration of military power to open up the area 
(Moses, 1978: 100- 1 02). 
Apart from some details, all the information used by Ingrid Moses is contained in the Prey 
Report.21 But it is hardly a satisfactory summary of this information, because the facts presented 
are apparently selected at random rather than according to any plan. But the most important 
20 A plausible explanation is that this arrangement too was "a first", after which the fact that the troop had been 
transported back to Rabaul by SMS Condor no longer warranted a special mention, and that it had been captain Ebert who 
had been prepared to create this precedent. To be sure, the navy had transported large bodies of native police on previous 
occasions, for example when SMS Cormoran had taken 100 Melanesian policemen to Ponape in 1908, but these had been 
emergencies during which the navy had played some military role, whereas it had here merely provided transport. 
21 The first quotation comes from the annual reports. 
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difference between this account and the two previously discussed is positive: Moses rightly 
stressed that Prey, in contrast to the annual report and Hahl' s  memoirs, pointedly denied that he 
had completed his "assignment".22 
The most obvious difference between the account of Moses and my summary of the Prey 
Report is that it has nothing to say about the incident concerning the medical and moral condition 
of the prisoners to which Prey devotes so much space. I have no difficulty with this omission, 
since this incident was not a part of the Kagam Expedition. I find it more difficult to accept that 
Moses disregarded all information concerning the state of health of the members of the 
expeditionary troop and the clash between Prey and police sergeant Lange. More doubtful still I 
find her decision to say nothing about Prey' s  activities in relation to the "head-hunting" tribes near 
the coast. Yet hard decisions have to be made in the condensation game and to focus exclusively 
on the actions against the Kagam villages may have been a sensible way to go. 
Was it also justified to make no reference to Prey' s mapping or road building activities? But 
then Moses says nothing specific about any of Prey' s  actions. Instead we are given the score of 
casualties and prisoners as set out in his progress report in October, "three weeks before the 
expedition ended abruptly", although we are neither told when it began, nor why it ended 
"abruptly", or, for that matter, what the strength of the expeditionary troop had been. 23 Instead we 
are told that 1 8  male prisoners were sent to Rabaul, although not for what reason. To top it all off, 
we are told that "the enemy" suffered 406 "observed" light casualties . 
This whale-sized red herring probably started life as an innocent typing error-Prey had listed 
"4-6" light casualties, but it survived all subsequent readings of the text, by the author as well as 
her supervisors and examiners, just as her statement that Prey's  base camp was situated "at the 
mouth of the Ramu"-which makes no more sense in the context. But the accuracy of all these 
details does not matter since the entire expedition is not treated as an actual event, so that no 
attempt is made to ascertain the factuality of any of the information used. Let us see what happens 
if we examine one of these details, namely the statement that "two Chinese and eleven native­
hunters" had been killed by the "interior tribes". 
Moses refers to a report by district commissioner Scholz of 4 July 1912  and a letter by 
Gramms to Scholz enclosed in it as her sources (ibid. :  100, Fn. 61) .  Since this report is one of the 
enclosures in the Prey Report-although minus its enclosure-it was easy to check the 
information used. The problem was that the report referred to "at least eight" victims. Yet, a later 
report by Scholz, dated 24 July 1912, also enclosed in the Prey Report, gave the figures as 
three-rather than two-Chinese and 1 1  natives killed. But then Scholz pointed out in this report 
that the information on which it was based was not fully reliable. I therefore tried to track down 
the letter of Gramms to Scholz, as well as an enclosure to Scholz's report of 24 July which had 
also not been appended to the copy of the Prey Report Hahl sent to the colonial office. I did not 
have to look far since the file (RKA 2995) to which this copy was added included an earlier report 
by Hahl of 1 August 1912 that enclosed both reports by Scholz with their respective enclosures. 
Without looking at the enclosures it was clear where Moses had got her figures from, namely 
from the covering report by Hahl. It confirmed a telegram to Berlin where the figure had indeed 
been given as two--rather than three-Chinese and 1 1  natives killed. But the stories emerging 
from the enclosures were far more interesting than this wrong reference to a document including 
phantom information. 
According to the attachment to the report by Scholz of 24 July 19 12, there had been two 
attacks by "the Kagam": one in Ringen and the other in Korak. During the Korak attack one 
22 Prey's report of "25 . 1 1 . 1 2", to which Moses refers in this context, apparently does not exist, but the information is 
contained in Prey's concluding report. 
23 Moses misses the point by describing the expeditionary troop as an expeditional force, since this suggests that this 
and other expeditionary forces were formed for particular purposes out of men drawn from other standing units. 
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Chinese and four Melanesians were killed and five Melanesians were wounded. During the 
Ringen attack two Chinese, two named Melanesians-including "Baram from Boroi [sic]"-and 
five unnamed Melanesians "from Kajan and Borroi [sic]" were said to have been killed. This 
indeed adds up to three Chinese and 1 1  natives killed. However, if the attachment is read together 
with the report, the picture changes. While Scholz was satisfied that the Korak attack had taken 
place, he thought that the Ringen attack had been invented, or at least exaggerated, by the coastal 
people whose evidence he had taken in Boroi. He even regarded B aram, one of its supposed 
victims, as the ringleader behind the killings in Korak-and the Prey Report bears out this 
conclusion. In other words, the number of victims was quite uncertain when Hahl sent his cable 
to Berlin and, as far as I know, no attempts were made to investigate the matter further. We 
therefore simply do not know how many people were killed or how many attacks had taken place, 
and it is unlikely that any of the figures given in the primary sources are accurate. 
What is historically significant is that this uncertainty did not bother the officials in German 
New Guinea. In order to determine their course of action they found it sufficient to know that 
"several" natives employed by Europeans had been killed, although Hahl thought it was 
advantageous to report a precise and probably inflated figure. The historiographical consequence 
of presenting any of these figures as factual is that an important historical fact is swept under the 
carpet. 
Gramms ' s first letter to Scholz confuses the issue further because it stated that not only four 
of his own hunting boys had been killed by the Kagam, but also a boy of "Herr Blesse" and a 
native from A war, who had acted as an interpreter. Moreover, two deserters, one from Herr Hahn 
and the other from the Catholic mission, had been killed by the Kajan. 24 But Gramms' s letter does 
at least shed some light on his punitive expedition. 
As soon as two of his boys who had escaped the massacre alive had arrived at his plantation, 
he and "Herr Blesse" had set out for "Kagam" to see whether they could still rescue some of the 
others . They met two wounded boys of "Herr Blesse" on the way but had to camp when it got 
dark. The next morning they had reached "Kagam", which was situated on a steep hill. He and 
Blesse were unable to stop their boys from storming the village, killing three natives and putting 
it to the torch. Despite this victory the boys were unwilling to accompany Gramms to the five 
larger Kagam villages said to be situated behind each other further inland. 25 
Soon afterwards came news that villagers of Kagam, Gorak and Aringer in the lower Ramu River region 
had killed more bird-of-paradise hunters, three Chinese and 1 1  New Guineans in all. Boroi and Kaian, 
places close to the mouth of the Ramu, also seemed implicated and Hahl decided that the Ramu would 
be a good testing ground for the new and untried expeditionary troop. Formed in 1 9 1 1 as a mobile force 
of trained police to open up the country, the troop numbered 1 14 in August 1 9 1 2  at the start of its four­
month patrol inland from Hansa Bay to punish the murderers and bring the region under government 
influence. Hahl declared a state of war in the lower Ramu 'for the duration of military operations' and 
authorized the German captain in charge to sentence New Guineans to death without the usual governor's  
approval required by the native criminal code. By November 1912 the expeditionary troops had killed 
at least twenty people. Scores of men, women and children were taken prisoner and kept at the German 
camp at Kagam until released or transferred to Kokopo. Captain Prey sentenced sixteen people to three 
years' exile from their homes, recommending that they be given 'strict training and work' , and a further 
two to five years' hard labour. A man called Isar was to serve an additional five years for ignoring a 
German order to surrender arms . 'It is very remarkable how unbelievably suspicious all natives here are' ,  
wrote Prey: 
24 This adds up to the figure of"at least eight native victims" initially given by Scholz. According to Gramms's shooting 
boys, the Kajan had also killed several other deserters, although Gramms had no other evidence that this bad been the case. 
25 This story goes some way towards explaining why no government action was taken against Gramms for an 
unauthorised punitive expedition, but makes it more puzzling why it had apparently been directed at the wrong target. Had 
"the boys" treated the Siven as part of the Kagam tribe and simply attacked its nearest village? 
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Not one word from me do they trust. I now have friendly communication with six places. But I have 
been able to force this situation only by seizing people, handcuffing them, taking them with me and 
sending them back with gifts. I had to resort to this means because I needed information at all costs. 
Even on the coast, supposedly under control, the Germans' influence was limited. Villagers between 
Awar and the mouth of the Ramu, said to be head-hunters, refused to provide carriers and Prey vowed 
to punish and replace their luluais and tultuls. A few kilometres inland, in the sago swamps and lagoons 
on the eastern side of the Ramu, the Boroi people issued a challenge to Prey, warning him that if the 
police tried to reach the river islands they would be speared and thrown to the crocodiles. Prey and the 
police, expected to approach Boroi along the coast, took the overland route instead, killed five people 
and arrested others but were unable to find the rest of the Boroi population, who had fled deep into the 
swamps beyond the government' s  reach. 
Prey depicted the Ramu expedition as a success which confirmed the reports of bird-of-paradise 
hunters that the inland of Kaiser Wilhelmsland was densely populated and demonstrated its potential as 
a source of the plantation labourers 'so urgently needed' .  With enough police, he thought, the 
government could begin to open up the New Guinea mainland within six months and complete the main 
part of the job within two or three years. Prey spoke from ignorance. He had gone no further than forty 
kilometres from the coast and knew nothing about the interior. But he expressed the hope of Governor 
Hahl that the Ramu and Markham River valleys would be the gateways by which the Germans would 
enter a populous hinterland and replenish the labour supply. Before Hahl left New Guinea in April 1914 
plans existed for government stations on the upper Markham and middle Ramu, and a police post was 
established at Lae shortly before the outbreak of World War I (Firth, 1 982: 99-102). 
This is a well structured account which neatly integrates the Kagam Expedition into the big 
picture, yet contains enough detail to make it visible as a unique historical event. 26 However, the 
picture differs significantly from that presented in the sources on which it is based, again primarily 
the Prey Report. Moreover, it is not merely defective in numerous details but its streamlined 
coherence is a product of an accumulation of these defects. 
Taken individually, many of them would not be worth mentioning. For example, it is 
defensible to translate "unbedingt" in the quote from Prey's report as "at all costs" (um jeden 
Preis) rather than as "urgently" or to translate ''fesseln" as "handcuffing" rather than as "tying up". 
By itself it also makes little difference that Prey presented the confirmation of the dense 
population in the interior as an "Ergebnis " (result) rather than as a "success" (Erfolg), but taken 
together with the fact that Firth omitted to tell his readers that Prey's recall had prevented him, in 
his own view, from completing his tasks these loaded translations help to produce a major 
distortion. 
Omissions can also perform a strategic role if they are linked with perfectly acceptable 
quotations . Hahl did declare a state of war "for the duration of military operations", as Firth 
claims, but this declaration takes on a different meaning if we are not also told that this did not 
apply to the entire duration of the Kagam Expedition but only for as long as the expeditionary 
troop was engaged in military operations which, Hahl hoped, would not be necessary at all. This 
is why Hahl had authorised Prey to exercise normal governmental powers within the temporary 
administrative district he had defined. They included the judicial jurisdiction over natives, which, 
26 It also gives the correct information concerning its duration and even does not fall for the misquoted fatality figure 
in Hahl's initial telegram. This is not necessarily a merit, however, because that figure is just as unlikely to be accurate. 
But Frrth wants to demonstrate that he "knows" instead of admitting that neither he nor anyone else does; for what would 
he do then? His treatment of the names and locations of the villages involved creates the same illusion of a comforting 
certainty. To stick to "Kagam", "Gorak" and "Aringer" as responsible for the killings and to "Boroi" and "Kaian" as 
implicated certainly made life easier for him and his readers, but the uncertainty about the names and locations of the 
numerous villages involved was an important factor at the time-so that sweeping it too under the carpet also is no 
improvement. Besides, it is likely that the village "Aringer'' shown on modem maps is a different constellation of hamlets 
in a different location from that called "Ringen" in 1 9 1 2. On the other hand, the modem maps I inspected no longer show 
either "Kagam" or "Gorak". This suggests that the descendants of the people living in those places in 1912  now live in 
places with different names. Perhaps "the Kagam people" were even then indeed only "so-called"? 
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contrary to Firth, contained the power to sentence natives to death, but not to execute them without 
the governor's approval. 
Is it acceptable to condense the sentence imposed by Prey on "Isar"-or Iwar-into the 
statement that he had to serve "an additional five years [of what?] for ignoring a German order 
to surrender arms", when Prey had sentenced the man to five years imprisonment with hard labour 
because he had been captured, armed with a gun, after Prey had sent three prisoners with the 
message that the non-surrender of guns would henceforth have dire consequences?27 Is it 
acceptable to quote Prey as having recommended that the banished men be given "strict training 
and work" without adding that it had been the purpose of the exercise to enable them to acquire 
knowledge they could usefully employ later on? 
To turn to the bigger picture, is it acceptable to state that the expeditionary troop consisted of 
1 14 men, without adding that, according to Prey, only 25 of these men were fit for military 
service? Was the expeditionary troop formed in 191 1 ?  Did Hahl decide that the Ramu would be 
a good first testing ground for it?28 Was Prey's knowledge of the interior of Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
limited to what he had observed during the Kagam Expedition? Can that expedition be described 
as "a four months patrol"?29 Does Firth capture the situation described in the sources by telling 
his readers that the villagers between Awar and the mouth of the Ramu were "said to be 
headhunters" when they had boasted to police sergeant Beyer that they had recently killed 21  
people during a single raid-that is  to say about the same number as  the expeditionary troop 
during all its military operations, according to Firth? But the most blatant single distortion is 
Firth's  claim that Prey had been "unable to find the rest of the Boroi population who had fled deep 
into the swamps beyond the government's  reach": what about his dash to Bossogun, which tells 
a very different story?30 
VI 
To be sure, all the individual defects identified in the four versions of the Kagam Expedition just 
discussed can be remedied, but the information necessary to do so cannot possibly be fitted into 
a brief summary. On the other hand, what is there left to say about this expedition if all the 
27 There is no evidence that Prey ordered any executions. It is not even certain that he exercised his judicial powers under 
the Native Penal Ordinance at all. He probably banished the 1 6  men shown in his October list administratively, and it is 
plain that he did not take the women and children prisoners with him because they had committed any criminal offence. 
Did Prey at least base the prison sentences he imposed on Iwar and Tepori on the Native Penal Ordinance, or did he act 
as a court martial? Once more these uncertainties are of considerable historical interest. 
28 Firth probably relied for this portion of his account on Hahl's memoirs rather than on the Prey Report. A superficial 
reading of Hahl' s memoirs indeed suggests that the expeditionary troop was a new institution Hahl decided to try out in 
Hansa Bay. But the real story is not so simple. Other sources show that a special mobile unit had existed since at least 
1 902 and that all native policemen in German New Guinea received some military training since the arrival of lieutenant 
Steinhliuser in the 1 880s. Even in 1 9 1 2  the expeditionary troop was not an elite unit specially trained in jungle warfare. 
Similarly, while Hahl gave the order for the expeditionary troop to proceed to Hansa Bay, he did so in response to a request 
by district commissioner Scholz, who may well have felt that it was Hahl's responsibility to deal with the killings of bird­
of-paradise hunters in the interior, if he was not prepared to restrict their activities, rather than that of his understaffed 
district office. 
29 The context suggests that Prey had only the Ramu/Markham basin in mind when he referred to the opening-up of"the 
interior". Opening up of the area east of the mouth of the Markham was the task of the government station in Morobe and 
the Sepik basin in the west was being explored by a large scientific expedition. To be sure, neither Prey nor any other 
European at the time knew anything about the densely populated valleys in the central ranges south of the Ramu and 
Markham, but this is, historically speaking, neither here nor there. 
30 It is, of course, possible that this dash never took place. But it is unlikely that Frrth discovered infonnation which 
showed it to be an invention without bothering to tell his readers that this was so. On the other hand it is worth mentioning 
that Prey's visit had no lasting effect. According to the draft annual report the village of "Bodsknun" was again 
visited-and warned-after a head-hunting raid on "Mgiri" (Scholz's "Giri"?) during which six people were killed (see 
Sack & Clark, 1 980: 82-83). 
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uncertainties and complexities these defects reflect are avoided? To be safe such a summary would 
have to read like an earlier attempt of Moses . 
Hansa Bay was to be pacified in 1 9 1 2, and an expeditionary force was stationed there for a few months 
to punish several murderers and establish contact and eventually peaceful relations with the headhunting 
and warfaring tribes (1976: 306). 
While there is nothing factually wrong with this sentence, it is so non-committal that it says almost 
nothing. Not surprisingly, Moses did not leave it at this single splash of misty grey, but added dots 
of colour, primarily by telling her readers that Prey had perceived the Kagam Expedition as a 
"cultural task": 
He said that meaningless demonstrations of superior means of power and the winning of cheap war­
laurels were not the purposes and aims of the troops. Rather the advantages of a higher civilization and 
the benefit of peaceful conditions were to be brought home clearly to the savage tribes (ibid. : 307). 
Although this sounds impressive, it is empty rhetoric, for who would want to engage in 
meaningless demonstrations or to win cheap war laurels? This is not to say that Prey's intentions 
were historically irrelevant but their restatement cannot replace an account of his actions, even if 
it accurately reports what Prey had said-and Moses ' s source, the memoirs of captain Ebert of 
SMS Cormoran, did not inspire me with confidence when I thought of the fantastic account 
Ebert's comrade Spiegel had given of the Ponape Rebellion in his memoirs. 
In this case, however, checking the source produced a pleasant surprise. Moses had given a 
fair summary of Ebert's recollection of a conversation with Prey when taking the expeditionary 
troop from Friedrich Wilhelmshafen to Hansa Bay, and Ebert's memoirs struck me generally as 
being more factual than those of Spiegel. Indeed Ebert' s recollection of a conversation with police 
sergeant Beyer on the journey back from Hansa Bay to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen rang a bell in my 
own memory. 
According to Ebert, Beyer had had no difficulty in establishing the facts of the matter when 
he investigated how "three Chinese [ !] and ten [ ! ] natives" had been murdered and partly 
consumed (1924: 1 87). When he had asked members of "the so-called Kagam tribes" about their 
acts of cannibalism they had readily admitted everything, adding that it had "at long last been 
again a truly beautiful feast" (ibid. :  1 89). Although Beyer's reports to Scholz indicate that he had 
referred to the head-hunting raid involving Kajan, I could appreciate that Ebert, when writing his 
memoirs a dozen years later, could still hear how Beyer had said with relish "at long last again a 
truly beautiful feast", since I could still see how the face of old brother Nyssenus had lit up when 
he retold me another of Beyer' s stories in 1 967-which, as I realised when checking my field 
notes, also related to the Kagam Expedition. 3 1  
Beyer, so brother Nyssenus said, had told him that he had been ordered by "Madang"-which 
stands for the district office in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen-to keep an eye on an army captain sent 
out from Berlin to conduct a large punitive expedition with 200 police boys near the mission 
station at Potsdamhafen. When the captain and Beyer had been invited by the missionary for a cup 
of coffee, Beyer had made a point of sitting down at the same table with the captain, placing both 
elbows on it, as was the custom in "boorish" German New Guinea. This had annoyed the captain 
and Beyer had provoked him further by warning him not to venture too far into the bush because 
people who did this often returned without their heads-adding, after a pause: but this would not 
be tragic in the case of the Herr Hauptmann because his head could easily be distinguished from 
all the others by his "silver tongue" (goldene Schnauze). 
3 1  Brother Nyssenus arrived in German New Guinea in 1 9 1 0. The sun helmet he wore in 1 967 looked as if it was part 
of his original outfit. 
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I do not know whether Beyer made these cheeky remarks or whether he would merely have 
liked to have done so, but I am certain he had told brother Nyssenus he had-and in precisely 
these terms; just as I am certain that Beyer had used the expression "concentrate backwards" 
(ruckwarts konzentrieren) when telling Nyssenus how the Herr Hauptmann had reacted when 
he had come face to face with the tough Buschkanaken. This term was as firmly and vividly 
embedded in the memory of Nyssenus as the phrase "at long last a truly beautiful feast" (endlich 
mal wieder ein wirklich schones Fest) had engraved itself in the memory of captain Ebert, so that 
I could see it, glittering like a freshly minted coin when Nyssenus had retrieved these old 
memories in my presence. 
Of course it would make the writing and reading of history more enjoyable if the Kagam 
Expedition could be summed up as a punitive expedition which ended in the hasty retreat of a big­
mouthed captain from Berlin and his 200 police boys. But neither this nor any other historical 
episode can be condensed so neatly without seriously distorting "the facts". To be sure, the 
summaries of Firth and Moses, or of Hahl and the annual report, are more realistic, but they are 
also more misleading because they are meant to be taken seriously as factual history whereas 
police sergeant Beyer told his stories because he wanted to enhance his reputation as a local wit. 
What makes the Kagam Expedition instructive is that it poses an exceptionally simple 
historiographical challenge, because the reports by Prey are, as far as I know, the only eyewitness 
account still available. 32 The main difficulty in dealing with the information does not arise because 
Prey's  account is incomplete, or unreliable, but because it contains too much information. 33 Prey 
would have done historians a favour if he had only submitted a polished final report, as it could 
then have been easily condensed further because it had already made the crucial break with factual 
history. 
On the other hand, it is precisely the loose ends in the report that make it a valuable historical 
source, since they reflect how the Kagam Expedition actually took place. The problem is that this 
taking place can neither be described in a coherent narrative nor be adequately translated into sets 
of categories. The Kagam Expedition is a conglomerate of many different stories which are part 
of many different histories : the history of Prey and Tepori, the history of "the Kagam people" and 
the expeditionary troop, the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea and of modern 
western imperialism in the Pacific. For each of these histories different aspects of the Kagam 
Expedition are relevant and more or less significant. It does not matter for the history of "the 
Kagam people" that the expeditionary troop was transported to Hansa Bay by SMS Cormoran, 
or that police sergeant Lange refused to follow Prey's orders. just as it is immaterial for the history 
of Lange' s life what happened to the New Guinea prisoners who were sent to Rabaul. Conversely, 
Ebert' s decision to transport the expeditionary troop to Hansa Bay may well have been a key event 
in the history of the imperial navy whereas nothing the troop did after it had been landed is of 
consequence in this context. 
Prey's  account is naturally heavily biased in favour of a history of the expeditionary troop. 
Indeed, his reports were more concerned with the future of this troop than with the course of 
events during this expedition-and his insistence that it had not fully accomplished its objectives 
must be seen against this background. 34 Hence it is in the context of a history of the expeditionary 
troop that Prey' s reports are most rewarding and can be most profitably linked with information 
preserved elsewhere in the historical record-in particular the annual report of the expeditionary 
32 I do not know whether, and in what form, this episode figures in the oral traditions of the "Kagam people" and their 
neighbours. 
33 Prey's reports are probably factually accurate as far as they go. It hardly needs saying that they are vastly incomplete. 
But this is not a serious problem, since there is no indication that Prey omitted information which would have substantially 
altered the general picture he painted. 
34 Prey wanted to show what a proper expeditionary troop, consisting of two companies supplied with motor launches, 
mules, tracker dogs and medical staff, could have achieved and would be able to achieve in the future. 
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troop for 1912, a copy of which Hahl sent to the colonial office on 26 September 1 9 1 3  (RKA 
2669) . 
VII 
According to this report, on 1 April 1 9 1 2  the troop had consisted of Prey-then still a first 
lieutenant who was promoted to captain soon after-police sergeants Jahn and Lange and 57 men, 
because 120 "good people" had been seconded to a large scientific expedition to the Sepik.35 In 
addition 12 of these 57 men were unsuitable for military service. By 3 1 March 1 9 1 3  the number 
of men with a more or less adequate military training had only grown to 86. Prey attributed this 
mainly to the fact that police sergeant Lange had insufficient military training to take on the 
training of native recruits . As we now learn, Lange had served as a purser on SMS Planet before 
joining the colonial service. He had also conducted the ship' s  band, a task for which he was well 
qualified because he had served as an army musician before transferring to the navy. Since 
Lange's replacement, Feinaugle, had only lasted a few weeks with the expeditionary troop, Prey 
said nothing about his background, but the three police sergeants subsequently allocated to the 
troop were also hardly ideally suited as "troop-sergeants". One had been trained as a medical 
assistant, the second as a sailor and the third had served in a telecommunications battalion and 
then with the artillery, after a spell with the embassy guard in Peking. The military training of the 
native policemen had therefore fallen on the shoulders of Prey and police sergeant Jahn-an 
experienced infantry-man, but due to go on home-leave a few months later. Moreover, Prey also 
had to deal with all other military matters concerning the government and Jahn had been the only 
person who could help him with the paperwork. By the end of July 1913 ,  when Prey finally got 
around to writing his overdue annual report, the expeditionary troop was thus still far from being 
an impressive war machine. 
Prey' s  annual report also shows that the Kagam Expedition had not been the expeditionary 
troop's  first operation in the field. In May 1 9 1 2  it had moved to a training camp near Bitapaka, 
the site of a planned telecommunications tower. This camp was to be used as a base for opening 
up the southern part of the Gazelle Peninsula. In June 1 9 1 2  Hahl had declared the area between 
the Warangoi River and Wide Bay to be a "military district" placed under the administrative 
control of Prey.36 His first task, however, was a thorough exploration of the Warangoi/Kerewat 
basin. He was to map the area, to assess its agricultural potential and to establish friendly relations 
with its native inhabitants. In so far as his field of operation was outside the declared military 
district, Prey had no general administrative authority, but, in addition to instructing the district 
office in Rabaul to support the expeditionary troop in every way, Hahl empowered Prey 
specifically to call upon the "native organs of the administration, the chiefs and tultuf' to assist 
the troop, in particular by supplying it with carriers and messengers. Hahl also made clear that, 
apart from the military training of the troop in the field, the primary goal was to prepare the 
ground for an extension of the organisation of the native population. In short, the general modus 
operandi of the expeditionary troop had been worked out before it was ordered to proceed to 
Hansa Bay in July 1912  in a hybrid role as an agent of retribution as well as law and order. 
Since the first operation after its return, contrary to the annual reports (see above: 409), 
appears to have been no more than an old-style punitive expedition to the northwestem Gazelle 
35 This figure-more than the total strength of the expeditionary troop at the beginning of the Kagam Expedition-would 
seem to be far too large as a police escort but may have included carriers and various other kinds of servants. Even more 
remarkable than the number of "good men" allocated to the Sepik Expedition is the fact that this expedition was given 
a higher priority in terms of its manpower requirements than the expeditionary troop-which Prey probably found hard 
to swallow. 
36 A short coastal strip between the Warangoi and Riigenhafen, where the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was commercially 
active, had been excluded-like the two coastal plantations in the case of the Kagam Expedition. 
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Peninsula37, a comparison between the Kagam Expedition and the last operation of the 
expeditionary troop in southern New Ireland becomes crucial. 
The first relevant document is a cable Hahl sent to the colonial office on 23 December 1913  
(RKA 2996). It used the attack on the Deininger Expedition (see ibid.) as a reason for making 
another urgent request for an increase in the size of the expeditionary troop. 38 Hahl sought 
permission for a doubling of its strength-the second company for which he had once more 
unsuccessfully applied in his 1914 budget proposal. He also asked for two first lieutenants, four 
police sergeants and an armourer to be sent out immediately from Germany. 
In a report of 26 December Hahl explained the situation. He had sent the expeditionary troop 
under Prey, with 85 men, two police sergeants and a medical assistant, to southern New Ireland 
on 1 8  December and placed the district officer in Namatanai for the duration of its operations 
under the military command of Prey.39 
The operations were expected to last for several months, so that it was essential to form a 
second mobile police unit without delay in order to be able to guarantee public order in the other 
parts of the colony. Since Hahl's  requests represented an expenditure of over 80,000 Marks 
outside the budget, the colonial office was unsympathetic. It authorised Hahl by cable to go ahead 
with the recruitment of the 50 additional policemen which had been included in its 1914 budget 
proposal,40 advising him that first lieutenant von Klewitz was on his way,41 that two police 
sergeants would be sent out forthwith, but that his additional requests required a more detailed 
justification-which Hahl produced on 19  January 1 9 14. 
He painted a gloomy picture. Not only was the whole of southern New Ireland on fire, but the 
north was also beginning to smoulder, so that he had had to send a police sergeant and 12  men as 
reinforcement. The expeditionary troop had in the meantime "visited" over 20 rebellious villages 
in the mountains, coming face to face with the enemy several times. Frequent rain and low 
temperatures were creating appalling conditions, but the troop had to remain until order had been 
established "once and for all". Not counting the sick, the troop had a strength of around 90 men, 
but a substantial number were needed to guard the prisoners, 42 who were part of the baggage train. 
It was under the command of the medical assistant. One police sergeant was out of action because 
of a severe attack of malaria so that only the other police sergeant had been active at the front. 
Despite also suffering from malaria Prey had continued in command. It was only due to his energy 
and "ruthlessness" (RUcksichtslosigkeit), coupled with the excellent training and strict discipline 
of the men, that such a small fighting force had been able to operate successfully so far. It was 
intolerable, however, that a single event of this kind, which could also occur in several other parts 
of German New Guinea at any time, could strip the rest of the colony of all military protection. 
In addition to an expeditionary troop of 125 men, Hahl was therefore asking for a "training 
company" of 1 80 men. But this was not all. Apart from an armourer and a medical assistant for 
37 Prey's report was published in DKB, 1913 :  7 15-16 .  
38 It  also served as a justification for a delay in the return of Prey to Germany which had apparently been ordered in a 
cable from Berlin. 
39 This was probably a manifestation of the lessons learned from Lange' s insubordination during the Kagam Expedition. 
40 As Hahl pointed out these 50 men had been earmarked for the new government station at the mouth of the Markham 
River, so that no lasting increase in the expeditionary troop would result. This was precisely the point: the colonial office 
was prepared to approve temporary emergency measures whereas Hahl was concerned with a permanent strengthening 
of the troop. 
41 Klewitz had apparently been sent out to replace Prey, or to deputise for him while he went on leave. It had been 
intended, however, that Klewitz would visit the Dutch East Indies on the way to study its military arrangements, whereas 
he was now ordered to proceed directly to German New Guinea. 
42 The number of prisoners is not identified. Nor are casualty figures given. But Hahl mentioned in passing the 
"execution" (Hinrichtung) of chief Jimi. This suggests that Prey had again been authorised to execute death sentences on 
the spot and that he had exercised this power at least once on that occasion. 
476 THE EMPEROR' S  NEW CLOTHES 
the troop, each of the two companies needed six police sergeants, one lieutenant and one first 
lieutenant, all under the general command of a captain. 
Hahl' s  extravagant bid was surprisingly successful. On 30 April 1914 the colonial office 
informed the ministry for finance that two first lieutenants, four police sergeants and an armourer 
had been sent out from Germany and that it was still too early to predict the total cost of putting 
down the rebellion in southern New Ireland.43 
Since Prey had by that time left German New Guinea, it is quite possible that he never 
submitted a written report on the operations of the expeditionary troop in New Ireland. If he did, 
no copy was sent to the colonial office in Berlin, nor did the original survive among the records 
of the government in Rabaul. It is unlikely therefore that we will ever be as well informed about 
these operations as about the Kagam Expedition. 
Judging by Hahl ' s  comments in his January report they were of a far more aggressive kind. 
Although Hahl had good reasons for exaggerating the seriousness of the situation and the 
"ruthlessness" of the response-to support his case for an immediate strengthening of the 
expeditionary troop--the operations were probably also in fact very different on these two 
occasions. An attack on a government expedition and its police escort was a much graver matter 
than attacks on native hunting boys, let alone head-hunting raids on "unpacified" villages. 
In these respects the operations of the expeditionary troop in southern New Ireland had more 
in common with Schnee' s 1899 Anapapar Expedition (see above: 441 ) . However, such historical 
comparisons are always dangerous, even across such a small distance in terms of geographical 
space and astronomical time, because the historical stage on which these events occurred had 
altered significantly. Indeed, by December 1913 ,  the expeditionary troop could operate in a 
manner which would still have been impossible in August 1912. 
Does that mean that Prey would have approached the Kagam Expedition as a military rather 
than a "cultural task", if it had taken place a year later? Did the orders he had received from Hahl 
in December 19 13  differ fundamentally from those he had been given in July 1912? What were 
the plans for the mountainous interior of southern New Ireland after the rebellion had been 
crushed? Were the people involved to be banished en masse, as after the Ponape Rebellion? Was 
part of their land to be confiscated, as after the V arzin Murders? Did the expeditionary troop 
continue to operate after Prey's  departure? Or was it withdrawn and replaced by a temporary 
police post, like the one which had been established after the Varzin Murders? Was it planned to 
use the rough terrain as a base for the new training company? 
vm 
Compared with these uncertamtles the dearth of information about the operations of the 
expeditionary troop in New Ireland is a minor worry. It makes little difference to the history of 
colonial rule in German New Guinea what particular actions were performed to crush the rebellion 
"once and for all", unless these actions reflected structural changes, rather than merely responding 
to a particular set of circumstances. Since the historical record does not indicate such general 
shifts, it would only be a mild disappointment if the operations of the expeditionary troop in 
southern New Ireland remained a blank spot on the historical map of German New Guinea. 
But such blank spots demonstrate that a purely structural account of history is also 
unsatisfactory. Historical structures do not exist by and for themselves ; they not only shape human 
actions but are also shaped by them. To describe them in the abstract can only show a more or less 
elaborate skeleton, just as an account of human actions can only present narratively more or less 
43 Hahl's  two reports and this letter to the ministry of finance were all filed in RKA 2996. The cost of putting down the 
rebellion was probably to be financed as expenditure outside the 1 9 1 3  budget which was at the time close to running its 
course. 
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attractive lumps of meat which are by themselves historically meaningless. It is only if we accept 
that history has no narrative meaning and see it as a three-dimensional tapestry of human actions 
which derive their historical meaning from their interaction with various kinds of general 
structures that we can begin to see history for what it was when it took place. 
To be sure, such an interactional approach makes the writing and reading of history more 
complex and ideologically less satisfying, but this is the price we have to pay for historical 
realism: accounts of history must reflect the complexities of life instead of being permitted or even 
expected to simplify them away. Besides, such an approach offers historiographers an achievable 
goal. It does not ask them to perform miracles but only to do what a critical assessment of the 
available historical record enables them to do. 
What is historiographically possible therefore depends on the texture of the historical record 
relating to the particular slice of history examined. It determines how far historiographers can go 
and which approaches they can most profitably follow. Different kinds of historical records 
contain different kinds of information which cannot be measured with the same yardstick. Oral 
traditions, government reports, private letters, statutes, budgets, price-lists and personal memories 
send different signals. They can all make a valuable contribution to an account of history, but only 
if they are each understood in their own terms instead of being artificially homogenised. A 
realistic account of the history of the native police force in German New Guinea has to look like 
a rough collage rather than a glazed oil-painting, because this is what the historical record looks 
like. The question is whether such a collage can nonetheless be presented in a more consumer­
friendly form than these three chapters have done. 
The historical record shows that it is impossible to write a narrative history of "the police", or 
even the native police force, because the former was not sufficiently organised to perform as a 
distinct corporate actor whereas the latter was not sufficiently centralised to perform as a single 
corporate actor. Although the expeditionary troop became a distinct corporate actor towards the 
end of German colonial rule, its history hardly offers a rewarding topic because its life was too 
short to make more than a marginal contribution to the exercise of this rule. Indeed, it may well 
be that the Kagam Expedition was the only singular contribution made. Instead of "concentrating 
backwards", as captain Prey did during this expedition according to police sergeant Beyer, we thus 
have to spread out forward, if we want to arrive at a realistic picture of the exercise of German 
colonial rule. We need to take a holistic approach and consider the entire historical record relevant 
for its exercise-and that means, in principle, taking into account every official action performed 
by an official in the exercise of governmental powers in relation to the geographical area which 
became German New Guinea. 
Yet the historiographical treatment of each of these episodes is problematic, since any 
sequence of human actions, taken by itself, is historically meaningless. It can become historically 
significant only if it is seen as part of the history of something else. Human actions are not 
historically significant because they are unique but because they are, despite their uniqueness, also 
representative. On the other hand, human actions also become historically insignificant if they are 
merely typical, if they merely act out well-established practices in a particular instance. In 
addition, it appears that as soon as the historical record tells us enough about a sequence of human 
actions to form a three-dimensional picture that reveals some of its unique as well as its 
representative features, it can be neither categorised nor narrated because categories have to 
disregard the unique and narrative can only present the typical as if it was unique. Still, it is 
precisely a closer inspection of the question of the historical significance of human actions that 
can help us to sort out the problem of having to deal with the exercise of colonial rule as a myriad 
of human actions-and the Kagam Expedition is again instructive. 
Let us accept that the actions performed by the troop during this expedition are as such 
historically indifferent and become historically significant only as part of the history of something 
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else, in particular the history of the expeditionary troop and, more broadly, the history of German 
colonial rule. What makes the Kagam Expedition significant in this context is that it shows the 
modus operandi of the expeditionary troop in operation. Although not specifically created for this 
occasion, it was for the first time acted out in a situation where a range of different governmental 
concerns had to be combined. If the troop had done no more than carry out Hahl' s orders to the 
letter, its actions would be historically immaterial because their description could add nothing to 
an account of these orders. It would then indeed be sufficient to state, as Hahl did in his memoirs, 
that Prey had "accomplished his task". 
As soon and as long as governmental powers are exercised in accordance with a general 
normative framework or established administrative practices, the actions of the organs of 
government exercising them are historically no more significant than the movements of cog­
wheels in a well-oiled machine. It is possible and sufficient to give an account of such routinised 
exercises of governmental powers by describing these routines as structures and by representing 
their actual performance in the form of categorised and quantified tables. Conversely, a narrative 
account of any of the many performances of such a routine, even if factually accurate, is 
historically meaningless because it can neither come to grips with the underlying structures nor 
with the relative quantitative weight of the performance of this type of action in the scheme of 
government. 
By themselves governmental actions can be historically significant only if they involve some 
freedom of action or, more precisely, some administrative discretion. On the other hand, totally 
arbitrary actions can hardly be regarded as historically significant exercises of governmental 
powers either. But then it is plain that human actions are never totally arbitrary, just as no 
governments exist whose operations are totally routinised. Theoretically the crucial question is 
therefore how to handle the non-routinised exercise of German colonial rule historiographically.44 
A structural approach is of no direct help, because the discretionary exercise of governmental 
powers does not follow an established practice. Yet governmental activities are also never totally 
discretionary, much less ideologically arbitrary. Quite apart from the specific legislative 
limitations imposed on him by the Protectorates Act, even the emperor could not govern the 
German colonies as he saw fit. But while the reproduction of the text of, say, the Native 
Disciplinary Ordinance makes it historically superfluous to describe any of the thousands of 
disciplinary punishments carried out in its application,45 an account of the general structures 
shaping the exercise of discretionary powers cannot replace a description of the particular actions 
performed in their exercise. It gets us, historically, nowhere to state that Captain Prey conducted 
the Kagam Expedition in accordance with his duties as the commander of the expeditionary troop. 
Nor is it historically helpful to try to categorise these duties because this cannot replace a 
description of their performance by Prey in this particular case. 
Once a description of the structures shaping human actions is no longer sufficient to capture 
their historical significance, it becomes necessary to deal with their unique features. This does not 
44 In theory the historiographical treatment of routinised actions is unproblematic. It should consist of a combined 
structural and quantitative approach. In practice the question is whether the historical record permits an application of this 
method. If it does not, we are in trouble as there is no choice but to adopt another approach, in the knowledge that it cannot 
possibly achieve satisfactory results. But that is life or, rather, history. 
45 Disciplinary punishments administered in contravention of this ordinance are another matter. But the treatment of such 
cases was, in principle, also straightforward because they constituted criminal offences of one kind or another which the 
colonial courts had the duty to investigate, prosecute and punish. Whether that always happened is yet another question. 
Seen as actions performed by individual human beings, these illegal punishments are also of doubtful historical 
significance, although they become significant if they are treated in bulk as repetitive acts. How did X generally treat his 
native labourers? How were plantation labourers or domestic servants generally treated during the period of German 
colonial rule? How frequent or brutal were these illegal punishments? All these questions call for some kind of 
quantification whereas a detailed description of a particular instance contributes little, unless it is presented as typical, in 
which case its unique features become historically irrelevant. 
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mean, however, that non-routine exercises of governmental powers, like the Kagam Expedition, 
should be treated as historical episodes in their own right, an account of which can be determined 
by narrative considerations. Their historical significance still depends on their representativeness . 
The Kagam Expedition would historically also be far less significant ifHahl had left it entirely 
up to Prey how he would deal with the situation. His orders are therefore an essential part of this 
historical episode. Moreover, Hahl too was not free to decide what orders he gave to Prey, but 
limited by various structures. He did not place the area between the Ramu and the Tsukula River 
under Prey' s  administrative control because he thought this was a good idea but because it was 
necessary, if he wanted Prey to exercise administrative powers, to determine the respective 
competences of Prey and the district commissioner in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. Similarly, Hahl 
did not exclude the two European plantations from this area because he felt like it but because it 
was impractical to make Prey responsible for carrying out administrative routine tasks in relation 
to them, for example, the supervision of the treatment of the native labourers they employed. If 
he wanted Prey to exercise the criminal jurisdiction over the native inhabitants of this area he had 
no choice but to give him special authority to do so, whereas this jurisdiction was part of the 
powers attached to the office of district commissioner. Moreover, once Hahl decided to authorise 
Prey, he had to do so in accordance with the Native Penal Ordinance. He would have acted 
illegally had he given Prey discretion in this regard, while he could authorise Prey or, for that 
matter, a district commissioner, to execute death sentences on the spot without his prior approval. 
But even in this regard conventions had already begun to develop which Hahl merely followed 
in this case because there were no special reasons to depart from them, so that the authorisation 
of Prey to carry out executions on the spot was itself historically insignificant. Nor was it 
historically significant that Prey had ordered his men not to shoot women and children because 
he merely followed a long accepted principle in doing so. By contrast it was Prey's  personal 
decision not to use friendly natives as auxiliaries, as Scholz and Beyer had done during their 
earlier expeditions . No firm principles had developed in this regard, although Scholz as well as 
Beyer would probably have also preferred to do without them if they had regarded the police unit 
under their command as sufficiently strong to deal with the situation. Nor was Prey the first 
German official to use native prisoners as messengers, to banish natives administratively or to use 
threats or physical force to obtain carriers or interpreters. Even his plan to marry his female 
prisoners to his policemen was not without precedent; it had happened before. This is not 
surprising because most of what people do is not unheard of, unless they find themselves 
confronted by an unheard of set of circumstances and that was not the situation of Prey in Hansa 
Bay in August 19 12. 
Nothing happened in the course of the Kagam Expedition that was radical! y new or different. 
Rather, it was a combination of a large number of factors that makes this episode unique and it 
is the fact that this combination was to a considerable extent planned rather than coincidental that 
makes it significant for the exercise of German colonial rule. Nor is it coincidence that we are 
comparatively well informed about it. Prey wrote his report for a purpose. He did not describe the 
Kagam Expedition as an isolated sequence of human actions. He wanted to present it as an event 
which had been shaped by experiences in the past and contained lessons for the future. Prey did 
not enclose copies of the reports of Scholz and Beyer for good measure but because he wanted 
to contrast their actions with his own, and he dealt with the matters raised in father Dicks' s letter 
as part of his report because they had given previously unreported details retrospectively an 
unexpected but not unwelcome significance. 
To be sure, historians are not obliged to accept the structure Prey gave his version of the 
Kagam Expedition-and it would, for example, be inappropriate if it was seen as part of a history 
of "the Kagam people". But they depart from it at their own peril. After all, Prey did not write his 
report as a historian, or even as a participant in a series of events, but as the commander of the 
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expeditionary troop who officially reported to his superior about the manner in which he had 
translated his general orders into specific actions and about the ways in which his experiences 
were shaping his views about the future organisation, operations and equipment of his troop. The 
structure of Prey' s  reports is therefore intertwined with the structure of the exercise of German 
colonial rule. 
This does not only apply to this report but to the historical record in general, in so far as it was 
produced by officials acting in an official capacity. Governmental records are not just sources of 
bits of information about what "the government" did in relation to its subjects, they also record 
the process by which a government shapes itself, by which it modifies and controls its capacity 
to act. Fortunately, this applies the more so, the less the exercise of governmental action has been 
routinised. The routinised exercise of governmental powers also produces routinised historical 
records, whereas a record of an exercise of discretionary powers makes administrative sense only 
if the actions performed are described in some concrete detail. It would have been pointless if Prey 
had merely reported to Hahl that the Kagam Expedition had accomplished its mission even if he 
had believed that it had. By contrast a registrar of births and deaths would waste everybody's  time 
by reporting more than the number of births and deaths recorded during the period in question. 
On the other hand, such a registrar can report the necessary information quickly and it can be 
quickly assessed by his superiors, whereas reporting on discretionary activities is a much more 
demanding task which can only produce much less conclusive results. 
There are thus good reasons for aiming for an increasing routinisation of governmental actions 
and for reporting about the exercise of discretionary powers only on special occasions or for 
special purposes. The positive side of this is that it produces an unevenly structured historical 
record which creates its own historical milestones by producing denser records relating to them. 
To be sure, this is a highly selective structure but it makes sense in its own terms because it 
reflects where the attention of the government was focused at the time. It is therefore unlikely that 
events which were of major significance for the exercise of governmental powers manage to avoid 
being recorded because governments feed on the information they record about their own 
activities. 
This also offers a practical solution for the problem of dealing with a history of the non­
routinised aspects of governmental activities. We remain dependent on the historical record but 
we can utilise its inherent structures to our own advantage. We have to tap it like a physician taps 
the chest of a patient and listen to the sounds it produces because they echo the changing texture 
of the history recorded. Even if large chunks of the historical record are missing a holistic 
approach can at least identify some of the milestones and indicate some of the patterns defined by 
their configuration. 
Although particular facts may be unable to speak for themselves, the historical record of 
colonial rule in German New Guinea makes its own music. We can hear the basso continuo of 
routine activities getting louder, and we can hear, among the twittering of anecdotal chords, some 
recurring themes and variations which keep the whole piece moving with different speeds in 
different directions but overall along a predictable course. It led towards a greater routinisation, 
specialisation and normalisation of government, making the government capable of, as well as 
more dependent on, recording more information, which became more categorisable and narratively 
less attractive. The history of German colonial rule gets increasingly boring as the size of the 
collage got bigger and its texture tighter. There are fewer milestones and they stand out less from 
the surrounding terrain. Discretion moved towards the margins and higher up the hierarchy. 
Fundamentally new situations to which responses still had to be worked out became rare. 
Can we describe the course which this process took, instead of merely stating its general 
direction in a manner which tells us nothing about what made the history of colonial rule in 
German New Guinea unique? Unfortunately we cannot, any more than we can describe the entire 
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historical record of the exercise of this rule systematically. But we can illustrate this process with 
a strategic selection of clusters of information which show it at work at different times during the 
history of German colonial rule. We can do that because the official historical records were 
themselves part of this process,  whereas they were unconcerned with reflecting other histories, 
for example that of "the Kagam people". 
But the historical record does more than to suggest promising starting points. It indicates the 
natural shape of a cluster of information. It shows, for example, that the Kagam Expedition can 
only be appreciated as an exercise of governmental powers if the Prey Report is read together with 
Prey' s  annual report and even Hahl's  reports concerning the attack on the Deininger Expedition 
and the measures taken by him in response to it. We miss the significance of the Kagam 
Expedition for the history of colonial rule in German New Guinea if we ignore parts of the 
historical record which are organically linked with it. It is only by adopting a holistic approach that 
we can discover these linkages and, having become aware of their importance, learn to watch out 
for them and to interpret the signals the shape of the historical records is sending. 
It is not by chance that Hahl sent a copy of Prey' s  report on the Kagam Expedition to the 
colonial office whereas no copies of reports on the punitive measures by the expeditionary troop 
following the attack on the Deininger Expedition were transmitted. Nor is it a coincidence that no 
reports concerning the Kagam Expedition were published in the Amtsblatt of German New 
Guinea, whereas it published in January 1914 an anonymous government report on the "unrest" 
in southern New Ireland (ibid. :  23-24) and in May 1914 what is described as a "report of the 
expeditionary troop" (ibid. : 1 8 1-83). 
These reports served different purposes, were addressed to different audiences and responded 
to different factual situations. There are a number of possible reasons why no report about the 
Kagam Expedition was published in the Amtsblatt; and we can only speculate which of them 
actually played a part. The "unofficial" (nichtamtlicher) section of the Amtsblatt was addressed 
to the non-native public in German New Guinea. It provided this audience with information of 
"general interest" and, more precisely, with information the government found it necessary or 
desirable to present to this public. In other words, the government was sending signals rather than 
reporting facts. In the case of the Kagam Expedition the Prey Report did not send signals the 
government was interested in sharing with the public, quite apart from the fact that it would have 
had to be completely rewritten to produce an account which was suitable for publication. In the 
view of the government, the killing of a few hunting boys and perhaps a couple of Chinese in the 
remote Hansa Bay hinterland was not an event which concerned the general public. There was no 
need to assure it that the government was in control and that it had nothing to worry about. 
Moreover, the results of the Kagam Expedition were unlikely to impress the public, although their 
very inconclusiveness and the reasons for it were useful for Hahl' s  attempts to convince the 
colonial office that a major strengthening of the expeditionary troop was needed to enable it to 
carry out its tasks successfully. 
The situation after the attack on the Deininger Expedition was different. The Amtsblatt 
published as soon as possible, namely in its first issue for 1914, two reports on the attack which 
Deininger and Forstassessor Kempf had prepared (ibid. :  6-9). This was followed by the two 
reports on the activities of the expeditionary troop already referred to. The purpose of the first 
report was clearly stated in its final sentences. 
An immediate danger hardly exists any longer. However it will take several months before the resistance 
of the rebels, who are on the run, has been completely broken and the kanakas have again been settled 
in permanent residences. In the meantime reinforcements have been sent to the rebellious area (ibid. : 24 ) . 
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No reference to the attack on the Deininger Expedition is made and the most likely reason for the 
rebellion, apart from "sheer wantonness", was seen in the natives ' resistance against their 
incorporation into the administrative organisation (ibid. :  23).46 
The final report, published in May, was presented as a complete success story. It listed a string 
of military measures during which the expedtionary force suffered five casualties, two of them 
serious, whereas about 30 of the rebels, probably including the main ringleader, were shot dead 
and many more were wounded or taken prisoner. Apart from those who had taken part in the 
attack and who were sentenced to long prison terms, all prisoners were released. The military 
operations were regarded as completed when the rebels no longer offered resistance and on 24 
March, a week after Prey had left for Germany, the troop was transported back to Rabaul by the 
government steamer Komet. No further punitive measures, such as banishments or the 
expropriation of land, were intended. Although it was not certain that their leader, Kaiphat, had 
been killed, the rebellious mountain tribes had received a severe punishment which would serve 
them as a salutory lesson (ibid. : 1 8 1-83). 
While all of this must have sounded pleasing in the ears of German New Guinea's non-native 
population, the details of this successful but hardly extra-ordinary military operation were of little 
interest to the colonial office. They certainly would not have helped Hahl' s  campaign for a 
massive increase in the size of the native police force, who by then probably felt that it was 
approaching a victorious conclusion, which additional information would only have put at risk. 
It is also worth mentioning that the attack on the Deininger Expedition may have been another 
case of mistaken identity. District officer Bruckner claimed in a private letter more than a dozen 
years later that he, rather than Deininger, had been the intended target of the attack by these "very 
difficult people" who had made it "as hard as possible" for him "to open up their country" (see 
Sapper, 1929). This is a very different tune from the one he played in his annual report as a 
backdrop against which the excessive response of the expeditionary troop was supposed to be seen 
(see above: 409).  But then such discrepancies in the historical record are to be expected, and to 
display them is historically more illuminating than to gloss over them for the sake of narrative 
coherence. 
It cannot be repeated too often that the manageable middle level of historical generality which 
narrative history tries to capture does not exist. The historical record consists to a large extent of 
information which is either too general or too particular for a satisfactory narrative treatment. 
History is the product of the interaction between the general structures and the particular actions 
this information represents. The problem is that the history of this interaction cannot be spelt out. 
We can only learn to appreciate it through a process of osmosis, through a patient absorption of 
bits of information. An understanding of history is something students of history must gain for 
themselves. The belief that historiographers could and should accomplish this task for their 
readers is misplaced. All they can communicate in a predigested narrative form is phantom history 
which may create the illusion of historical understanding, but in fact prevents readers from 
beginning to see history through their own eyes . History is not like the panoramic view from a 
mountain summit on a clear morning which can be captured in a photograph taken by somebody 
else. Historical understanding is earned by climbing up the slopes and by discovering that the view 
from the top is blocked by mist and that the glimpses of the view caught on the way up are all one 
is going to see. 
Yet these glimpses add up to a more realistic overview than any phantom narrative, because 
the historical record identifies the spots where the recorded information is likely to be more 
illuminating that at other points, and it is the task of academic historiographers to listen to the 
46 No reference is made in this published report to the fact that the rebellion was spreading into northern New Ireland, 
which Hahl stressed in his report to the colonial office. 
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historical record rather than to select some chords from it which can be strung together into a neat 
phantom ballad. 
The historical record of colonial rule in German New Guinea identifies a large number of such 
strategic spots: points where the history of German colonial rule passed some kind of junction; 
points where this history changed direction, or where an attempt to change direction failed; points 
at which someone worked the switches, with or without success .  
The Kagam Expedition was one of these points. But our examination has also shown that it 
is not this expedition as a unique event that matters historically. Like a buoy it is bobbing visibly 
on the surface of history but reveals its historical significance only when it is lifted up and some 
of the complex web is exposed that is hidden beneath and that links everything with everything 
else. For example, we can now begin to see how it fits into Hahl' s development plans and why 
Hahl seized the opportunity offered by the attack on the Deininger Expedition to overcome the 
opposition to these plans by the colonial office. But we see also that this was merely one strand 
of an ever changing web which is as such beyond description. 
To be sure, it is possible to paint a bland factual overview of the history of German New 
Guinea, consisting of a list of dates, places, names and fundamental changes in the form of 
government. But if we want to move beyond such a mundane and surprisingly laborious exercise 
the best we can expect, unless we are prepared to settle for phantom history, is an examination of 
a handful of these strategic points which tries to capture different aspects of this elusive web of 
history at different times and in different places-and this is the aim of the final part of this study. 
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An Archipelago of Episodes 
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MAP VII: The Marshall Islands 
Chapter 8: Diplomatic and Naval Preludes 
I 
German military and diplomatic presence in the Pacific pre-dates the founding of the German Reich. A Prussian naval squadron visited East Asia in 1 860, installing an ambassador in 
Japan and concluding a friendship treaty with Siam. Ten years later the navy of the North German 
Federation maintained a permanent East Asian naval station. In 1872 SMS Nymphe paid the first 
imperial naval visit to Fiji and Samoa. From 1 875 to 1 876 SMS Gazelle under captain von 
Schleinitz-who later became the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s  first administrator-carried out a 
scientific expedition in the Pacific. In 1 878-79 SMS Ariadne, with the German consul in Samoa, 
Theodor Weber, 1 on board, made an extensive diplomatic tour of the islands, concluding inter alia 
a friendship treaty in the Marshall Islands and purchasing two harbours for the Reich in the Dulce 
of York group. 
This visit was the beginning of a permanent "Australian" naval station, the responsibilities of 
which extended at least to the islands in the southwestem Pacific, including New Zealand. 2 In 
1 879 Otto Zembsch, a former naval officer, was appointed as a full-time consul-general, based 
in Samoa, to whom the Hemsheim brothers, Eduard and Franz, who between them acted as 
honorary German consul for Micronesia and Melanesia, were apparently subordinated. 3 Between 
May and October 1 88 1  Zembsch visited the western section of his consular district on SMS 
Habicht under captain Franz Kuhn. During this visit the imperial navy took military action for the 
first time in the area which later became German New Guinea.4 
1 Weber was also the manager of the Godeffroy firm, the largest German commercial enterprise in the Pacific Islands at 
the time. This was not an unusual arrangement but followed standard practice. Section 10  of an 1 867 act concerning the 
consulates of the North German Federation, which was subsequently adopted by the Reich, provided that "merchants" who 
were citizens of the federation be given preference when ''honorary consuls" were appointed. This was a natural move as 
the promotion and protection of German commercial interests was one of the functions of German consuls. Problems arose 
only if a German honorary consul promoted his own personal commercial interests over those of other German enterprises. 
The position changed, of course, when the Reich acquired colonial territories, because the German officials on the spot 
now had to balance the duty to promote and protect German commercial interests with other government responsibilities. 
But the former remained. It was thus perfectly normal to instruct an imperial commissioner posted to a German colony 
to give the commercial interests of German firms a high priority in the exercise of his governmental powers. German 
colonial officials were Ge.rman officials, they were not supposed to govern German colonies as if they were independent 
states, although the temptation to do so increased when the capacity to engage in a territorial form of government 
improved. 
2 I did not examine the reasons for the name of this new naval station. It is obvious that Australia was the most important 
location in its area of responsibility and likely that Sydney, the seat of a German consul-general, was the most convenient 
point of contact with the naval authorities in Germany which also offered adequate facilities for servicing naval vessels. 
3 I have been unable to locate a history of the imperial navy written by a professional historian, so that I had to rely for 
general background information on an account by a retired vice-admiral (von Mantey, 1 926). After this unsuccessful 
attempt I assumed that no professional historian had been tempted to tackle the task of writing a history of the imperial 
colonial service. When I looked instead at the sixth edition of Konig's Handbuch des Konsularwesens I realised that it 
would require a much greater effort than I was prepared to make if I wanted to understand how this service was organised 
and operated. I therefore decided to leave its mysteries well alone and to gloss over any points I found puzzling-and there 
were many: for example the arrangements made with the Hemsheim brothers and, generally, the relations between consuls­
general and ordinary (professional or honorary) consuls. 
4 Suchan-Galow refers to "punitive expeditions" by SMS Ariadne in 1 878 which were directed against Port Hunter( !) 
and Ratuana( !) and "quickly carried out" ( 1940: 1 1 6)-but this is just another instance of phantom history. The Ariadne 
did take action in Port Weber (Weberhafen) and Ruluana (Raluana) but no military force was used (see the chatty account 
of captain B. von Werner, 1 890: 434ff}. 
488 THE EMPEROR' S NEW CLOTHES 
II 
Zembsch had been informed by the consulate in Jaluit about two incidents in Melanesia which, 
in its view, required action. The first was the killing of an agent of the Hernsheim firm in New 
Ireland. 
The agent, Studzinka, a Hungarian, had been killed by one of his Solomon Islands labourers, 
called Tom. Tom had left the station in Putput after the killing and now lived in Tubtub. 5 Zembsch 
was determined "to show the natives that a German warship would not leave the murder of an 
agent of a German firm unpunished". But instead of trying to punish Tom himself, he demanded 
that the Tubtub people surrender him to the chief of Putput for punishment. When they refused 
to surrender Tom, who was a valuable asset on account of the guns and ammunition he had 
brought with him-and his ability to use them-Zembsch requisitioned captain Kuhn to enforce 
this demand and, if this proved impossible, to "punish" the Tubtub instead. 
Since the Tubtub fled as soon as the marines landed, their village was burnt and later shelled 
from the sea to show them that a warship, according to Zembsch the first they had seen, could also 
inflict long distance punishment. Zembsch believed that these actions had greatly frightened the 
natives . He informed the villages on either side of Tubtub that they had nothing to fear but that 
they should warn the Tubtub that they would be punished again by the next warship, if Tom was 
not surrendered to the chief of Putput. 
This episode is historically significant not because of the punitive actions SMS Habicht 
performed but because it illustrates the curiously twisted legal framework within which Zembsch 
saw himself operating. The operation started with a report by the consulate for Micronesia and 
Melanesia to the consulate-general in Samoa, where Zembsch decided to take action-and he did 
so not because someone had been killed or because this someone had been a European but because 
this European, although himself not a German, had been an agent of a German firm. It was this 
fact which made the killing his business . 
Zembsch' s response was primarily shaped by the fact that the killing had taken place in an area 
without an internationally recognised government which the German government could have 
approached with a request for punishment of the killer. A second factor was that this killer was 
a native, rather than a subject of a civilised state, so that it was also impossible to approach his 
government with a request to punish his crime by sending out a warship to have him arrested and 
brought to trial. Under these circumstances Zembsch's task was not just to bring about the 
punishment of a particular criminal, but the prestige of the Reich was also at stake. The Reich had 
a duty to protect German firms and citizens and its standing in the international community was 
going to suffer if it showed itself incapable of carrying out this duty, quite apart from the fact that 
inaction exposed German firms and citizens to increased dangers if "the natives" saw that they 
could harm them with impunity. 
This was the basis of Zembsch' s view that it was necessary "to show the natives that a German 
warship would not leave the murder of an agent of a German firm unpunished". However, it was 
not the commander of the warship but the consul-general who decided what form this 
"punishment" was going to take. Here the first consideration was that Zembsch had no judicial 
jurisdiction over Tom. He could not try Tom himself, nor could Tom be tried by a German 
metropolitan court. The situation was complicated by other factors. Firstly, Tom was not a member 
of one of the local tribes but hailed from the Solomons ;  secondly, he was not a villager but had 
been a labourer employed by his victim (or the latter's  firm); and, thirdly, Tom had moved away 
from the village where he had committed his crime. 
5 Once again I am reproducing the proper names as they appear in the sources used, instead of trying to create a fictitious 
contemporary uniformity or to modernise the names given. 
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Zembsch responded to all these factors by postulating that the chief of Putput, where the 
killing had taken place, had the authority to punish any crimes which had occurred in his district. 
On the other hand, he acknowledged that this chief did not have the means of power to secure the 
surrender of Tom by the chief of the district in which he now lived. As Zembsch saw it, he was 
therefore called upon to secure the surrender of Tom to the chief of Putput. There was no 
justification for punishing the Putput for a crime which they had not committed. Nor was there 
justification for punishing the Tubtub for harbouring a criminal who had committed a crime 
outside their jurisdiction. But the use of force against them became justified when the Tubtub 
refused to surrender Tom, because it was reasonable to expect them to extradite a criminal living 
in their midst for punishment by the proper authority. 
Now Zembsch handed over the matter to captain Kuhn, requisitioning him to use the military 
might of SMS Habicht to enforce his request to surrender Tom. The burning of the village and the 
shelling of the hinterland were part of this enforcement process. It was not aimed at punishing the 
Tubtub for a wrong they had done but rather a means of forcing them to do something they 
wrongly refused to do. This is the reason why they were threatened with a repeat of the 
punishment, if they continued to withhold Tom. 
Hence, we miss the historical point of this episode if we see it as a punitive expedition carried 
out by the navy in response to the killing of Studzinka. It was not. Rather, it was a police action 
concerned with the termination of an unlawful state of affairs which had been brought about by 
the refusal of the Tubtub to surrender his killer. It was an exercise of extra-territorial police 
powers which Zembsch claimed as an agent of the Reich in an extension of his normal consular 
powers in areas of his consular district where civilised governments did not exist. But these 
extraordinary powers were, in this instance, surprisingly limited. Firstly, it appears that they could 
only be exercised in order to protect the interests of German subjects or firms . Secondly, Zembsch 
claimed no j udicial and indeed no penal powers. He only claimed the power to bring about a state 
of affairs which allowed the appropriate local authority to exercise its penal powers by forcing 
another local authority to behave in accordance with the normal behaviour between members of 
the international community. Although acting as a German consul, Zembsch approached this case 
as someone who was applying global standards of civilisation which, if necessary, had to be 
enforced by military means. 
The second case raised a different set of issues. It concerned the killing in the Dulce of Yorks 
of Theodor Kleinschmidt, who collected for the Godeffroy museum in Hamburg. Kleinschmidt 
had quarrelled with natives of Utuan Island who had agreed to serve as crew on his boat but had 
refused to come when they had heard that Kleinschmidt had planned a trip of several weeks. 
Together with his two armed white assistants Kleinschmidt had smashed canoes and burnt houses 
at the beach, before pursuing the natives to a village further inland. He had threatened to destroy 
this village as well unless the Utuan came out of hiding. When he had fired shots into the bush, 
they had responded with spears and had followed him when he withdrew to his boat. After 
Kleinschmidt had fired another shot between the trees they had attacked in large numbers, killing 
him and his assistants. 
Encouraged by their success the Utuan bad then conspired to attack the station of the Deutsche 
Handels-und Plantagengesellschaft on neighbouring Mioko. Its manager, Thomas Farrell, had 
called on all whites and friendly natives for help and had invaded Utuan with a strong force. 
During several days of fighting, five or six Utuan were shot, including the one who had killed 
Kleinschmidt. Since the Mioko chief who had been involved in the plan to attack the station there 
had also died, after blowing off his hand when fishing with a dynamite cartridge stolen from 
Kleinschmidt's estate, Zembsch decided that no further punishment was necessary, especially as 
the Utuan had been "not insignificantly provoked" by Kleinschmidt6 and had already started to 
6 Zembsch' s report does not address the question of whether Studzinka had also been killed in response to a provocation 
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trade again peacefully with the whites . Still, he felt that a gesture was called for. The boats of 
SMS Habicht were therefore demonstratively positioned around Utuan to stop any canoes from 
leaving before Zembsch landed to talk to its inhabitants. He impressed upon them that all whites 
were protected by the warships, that the warships were capable of punishing anyone who harmed 
a white person and that Farrell ' s  action had to be regarded as justified under the circumstances.7 
In his report to the foreign office (RKA 2786) Zembsch stressed that he had told the natives 
repeatedly and firmly that a chief in whose area a white man lived was responsible for his safety 
and would be called to account for any harm he suffered. The natives had agreed with him that 
they should use no violence if they had a dispute with a white man but present their case to 
another white man, who would then decide the matter impartially, together with a native chief 
from another area, or raise their complaints with the next visiting warship. 
But Zembsch also stressed that it was always most difficult to investigate disputes between 
whites and natives in Melanesia, because there were no adequate interpreters; because the natives 
ran away in fear as soon as a warship arrived, even if they had a clear conscience; because there 
were no chiefs whose authority extended beyond their family, village or tribe; and because 
neighbouring tribes were constantly feuding with each other so that it was virtually impossible to 
find neutral intermediaries . In other words, Zembsch knew that the agreement he had reached with 
the chiefs was a charade and that nothing would change, at least not immediately and 
fundamentally. But some wholesome Rule of Law rhetoric could do no harm and might help 
prepare the ground for better things to come. 
Historically speaking, it is unfortunate that Zembsch decided against further punishment of 
those who had killed Kleinschmidt and his assistants, because this meant that he did not have to 
face the same kind of questions he had considered in the Studzinka Case. There is no doubt, 
however, that he would have had no choice but to approach this case differently because entire 
tribes of local natives were involved. There is also no question that Zembsch would have taken 
direct punitive action if Farrell ' s punitive expedition had not taken place-and it is highly unlikely 
that he would have discussed the appropriate punitive measures with chiefs from other districts 
before making a decision. This does not mean that Zembsch merely played games in his subtle, 
legalistic approach to the Studzinka Case, as the factual position in these two cases was in most 
important respects quite different. On the contrary, it is the fact that Zembsch did treat these cases 
differently that is historically significant: a naval bombardment of an area in which a European 
had been killed by natives was not an automatic response. Zembsch did distinguish and, judging 
by these two cases, tried to respond, legally speaking, as normally as possible. 
However, conditions in New Ireland and the Duke of Yorks in 1 8 8 1  were far from normal. 
This applied to the behaviour and the responses of everybody, including Zembsch. A good 
example is the importance he attached in his response in the Kleinschmidt Case to the fact that the 
Utuan had already started to trade again peacefully with the whites. Under normal circumstances 
this should have been irrelevant for a consideration as to whether they had been adequately 
punished for the killing of three people. But the whites were in the area primarily to trade and they 
all knew that some of them would be killed by natives in the process. This expectation was a part 
of their lives. For them "trade must go on" was a more appropriate motto than "fiat justicia pereat 
mundus". The natives apparently took the same attitude. They tolerated, if not welcomed, the 
presence of whites for the trading opportunities it offered and resumed trade not long after five 
or six of them had been shot dead by "the whites". It was therefore also normal for a consular 
on his part. 
7 As to be expected there are significantly different versions of this episode (see Wichmann, 1910: 293 ; and for a more 
recent and fuller discussion based on a different set of sources Schiitte, 1989: 1 32- 149). For my purposes these differences 
are immaterial. It is sufficient to summarise what Zembsch believed had happened or what he wanted the foreign office 
to believe he believed had happened. I am not concerned with the facts of Kleinschmidt' s killing but with Zembsch's 
version of his response to the resulting situation. 
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official to avoid taking measures which interlered unduly with the trade between whites and 
natives . Hence Zembsch did not hesitate to justify his restrained response in both cases by 
pointing out that tougher action would have intimidated the natives out of all proportion and 
seriously interlered with their trade with all white men. 
Seen from Berlin the situation looked different. Less than a year after receiving Zembsch's  
report, Bismarck called personally for tougher action in Melanesia, bypassing Zembsch in the 
process.  
III 
On 24 July 1882 the foreign office informed the admiralty that Bismarck intended to request the 
emperor to send one and, if necessary, two warships with a sufficiently large landing force to the 
Hermit Islands to "speedily and effectively" punish the natives who had attacked the steamer 
Freya of the Hernsheim firm, killing her captain and seriously wounding one of its crew. The 
natives of this small group of islands had fired shots at the steamer Pacific, belonging to the same 
firm, a few weeks earlier. The trading station maintained by the firm had been burnt down and the 
agent and his native labourers presumably murdered (RM 1/2894).8 
The admiralty showed little enthusiasm. Since the islands were part of Zembsch' s  consular 
district and since the station cruiser Carola was strong enough to carry out the punishment, it 
assumed that matters had already been set in motion locally. To send out warships from Germany 
would give the matter an exaggerated importance-thus went a marginal note, probably by its 
chief, admiral von Stosch. 
The admiralty responded to the foreign office accordingly,9 although it now favoured a 
postponement of the punishment until SMS Hyane had arrived at the Australian station to which 
it had been posted as a second vessel. It also instructed captain Karcher of SMS Carola to discuss 
the appropriate arrangements with consul-general Zembsch. Bismarck was satisfied but expressed 
the wish that the punishment be carried out in "the most forceful manner" (in schiiifster 
Weise)-which the admiralty translated into a supplementary order to Karcher. 
When SMS Carola, and SMS Hyane under lieutenant-commander Wilhelm Geiseler, reached 
the waters surrounding the Hermit Islands on Christmas Eve 1 882, Karcher had not yet worked 
out precise plans as to how he was going to give "a warning example" to its native inhabitants for 
the "outrageous cruelties" they had committed. 10 But he had gathered additional information. In 
particular he had established that the seven native labourers employed by the station had been 
killed before the sick agent, Southwell, had been buried alive and the station had been looted and 
burnt. 
The two warships peacefully celebrated Christmas outside the lagoon, Karcher checking his 
information with five natives from the neighbouring Anchorite Islands who had been taken on 
board there as interpreters and scouts because they had previously lived on the Hermits for some 
considerable time. However, communication with them was difficult, since no-one spoke their 
8 The letter by the foreign office included a copy of a report by consul Hernsheim with its enclosures, in particular a report 
of the Hernsheim employee Michelsen, who had travelled on the Freya. It suggested that captain Homeyer had behaved 
in a rather foolhardy manner. The consular report did not ask for drastic punitive measures but merely proposed that the 
matter be investigated during the next visit of a German warship to Matupi which consul-general Zembsch had already 
foreshadowed. 
9 Its response also indicates that the admiralty believed the Hermits to be part of the Marshall Islands. 
1 0  Contrary to Wichmann (1910 :  303, Fn. 2) a detailed report on the punitive actions by the two vessels was published 
at the time-but in the Marine Verordnungsblatt ( 1 883: 7-25) and not in the Annalen der Hydrographie as he had 
expected. Judging by Dempwolff ( 1 904-see below in the text), who was given access to the naval files, the published 
version is reasonably complete (although it omitted at least one significant detail-see below, Fn. 1 3) .  As far as I can see, 
the original reports are not among the naval files kept by the Militiirarchiv in Freiburg. 
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language1 1  and they spoke only a few words of English. Nonetheless, Karcher found out that the 
total population of the Hermit Group was only around 100, less than the landing forces of the two 
warships. Even this small number did not form a single tribe, under one or two chiefs, as he had 
been told, but was divided into numerous family groups. Since the heads of most of these groups 
had been involved in the murder of Southwell and the subsequent attacks on visiting vessels, 
Karcher believed there was little chance that the guilty parties would be surrendered. But he did 
not expect open resistance either. The most likely outcome was that the natives would run away 
into the interior, so that punitive measures would have to be limited to the destruction of 
property-as in the case of the Tubtub expedition by SMS "Habicht"-although he hoped that 
he could at least impose a fine on them in the form of copra which would compensate the 
Hernsheim firm for some of its losses. As surprise was out of the question the first step was a 
systematic destruction of canoes to prevent the natives from leaving their group. Even that 
required considerable caution since they had a large number of firearms and plenty of ammunition. 
When the two warships sailed into the lagoon on 26 December the inhabitants of the main village 
on the main island, Luf, were sitting unarmed on the beach, showing no sign of fear or hostility. 
But they disappeared into the bush when they were approached by one of the cutters of SMS 
Carola. It was followed by the steam pinnace and the second cutter. All canoes found on the 
beach were destroyed and the three boats returned to SMS Carola. She had cast anchor near the 
village, whereas SMS Hyane had sailed to the other side of the island. As it was already too late 
to land, the rest of the afternoon was spent destroying more canoes : a total of 13 .  
For the next morning a landing o f  the marines from both ships was planned. Some natives were 
visible near the main village but again disappeared when the boats approached. The landing was 
preceded by a bombardment of the village and the surrounding bush with five 15  cm shells, two 
8.7 cm shells and 1 3  shots from the revolving cannons. The landing detachment of SMS Carola 
had orders to destroy the main village, as well as a second village situated some distance inland, 
to fire at armed natives, to take unarmed natives prisoner and to spare women and children. Both 
villages were destroyed and eight further canoes, mostly sea-going ones more than 50 feet long. 
Fifteen rifles and large quantities of ammunition were found and tradegoods were scattered 
everywhere. 
As SMS Hydne had difficulty landing in the north of Luf, it was ordered to join SMS Carola 
in the little bay near the main village. In the afternoon Karcher sent the five Anchorites to request 
the chiefs to come to his ship. They were to be told if they appeared before noon the following day 
nothing would happen to them, otherwise everything on the island would be destroyed. The 
emissaries returned the next morning, reporting that all natives had withdrawn to the mountains, 
that the chiefs were too frightened to come, apart from Pissigo--a staunch friend of the 
whites-who wanted to come but was held back by the others . The Anchorites were again sent 
out to persuade at least Pissigo to come to the warship, but without success. 
On 29 December the campaign of destruction was continued on the northern side of Luf. The 
landing detachment of SMS Carola went ashore at the western point, and that of SMS Hyane at 
its eastern end. They were expected to catch the natives between them, since the northern slope 
of the mountains seemed so steep that it was expected to prevent them from escaping inland. 12 The 
ships were to lend artillery support in case serious resistance were to be offered. 
1 1  This included the Hemsheim agent in the Anchorites who had been taken on board because the five men selected by 
Karcher as interpreters and scouts had refused to come, out of fear that they would not be returned, until the agent had 
offered to accompany them. As we have already seen such communication problems continued to play an important part 
throughout the history of German colonial rule in the Pacific. Insufficient attention to its impact has made a major 
contribution to the phantomisation of this history. 
1 2  Luf is some ten kilometres long and, on average, less than two kilometres wide, with a hilly interior rising to less than 
200 metres. 
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Eleven large canoes and seven houses were destroyed in the course of the day, another five 
rifles and large amounts of ammunition were picked up, but no natives were seen. Instead it was 
found that the mountains were criss-crossed by tracks . Karcher therefore decided to send one half 
of the landing detachments into the interior the next day. The Carola contingent under lieutenant 
W ahrendorff spotted a native observing its movements and, failing to capture him, shot him dead. 
Over an hour later it came across a group of about 40 natives on a ridge. They were warned by a 
premature shot so that they could not be surrounded. Instead they scattered in all directions. Fire 
was opened "successfully" but not returned. Shortly afterwards three women were captured. After 
an "unsuccessful interrogation" two of them were released. The third was retained as a guide. 
Subsequently two girls who were hiding with a large amount of food on a densely wooded hilltop 
were taken prisoner. Further questioning of the three prisoners yielded no useful information. 
They were unmoved by everything and happy to come on board SMS Hyane to get food and 
tobacco. 
Keen to press the advantage gained, Karcher wanted to send the Anchorites out once more to 
demand a surrender but they were too tired and frightened to approach the Hermits in the dark. 
He had to wait until the next morning when three of them set out, accompanied by the Hermit 
women. They all returned in the evening, together with two additional women. They had only met 
Pissigo who told them that the others had decided to kill themselves rather than surrender and 
were considering an escape from the group as an alternative. He, Pissigo, had no fear of the whites 
and would come in due course. 
When Luf, as well as some smaller islands, were searched on 1 January, deserted camp sites 
were located, with more ammunition and tradegoods, but only one man and a few women were 
seen from the distance. The marines had been ordered to shoot only in an emergency. While the 
search went on, Pissigo appeared with yet another woman. But he had nothing new to say, 
because, as he claimed, he had not been in contact with the other natives for some days. 
The 2nd of January was a day of rest for the marines, while the nautical staff carried out some 
survey work. Karcher decided to conduct another search the following day to establish whether 
the natives were still around or whether they had fled on canoes which had escaped destruction. 
In the meantime he interrogated Pissigo again, who had settled down with the women on SMS 
Carola and appeared to feel quite comfortable. It gradually emerged that two particularly large 
canoes had been carefully hidden. If they were still there the natives were hiding somewhere if 
they had gone the plan to sail to Uwe, an island about 30 nautical miles away, had been carried 
out. 
When the boats were about to set off in search of the two canoes the next morning with Pissigo 
as a guide, he unexpectedly pronounced that both they and all the natives were gone. Indeed only 
an empty boat shed and some tackle were found. A search of the small islands on the outer reef 
established that they too were deserted and had not been visited for a long time. 
On the morning of 5 January Pissigo and the women were returned to the shore with 
instructions for the future. This time only two men had been killed as a punishment for their 
attacks on whites. From now on they should be peaceful and cooperative, otherwise everybody 
would be killed. For good measure Pissigo, who insisted that he had always advised the others to 
keep the peace but that they had not listened to him, was made personally responsible for the 
return of the refugees. 
SMSS Carola and Hyane certainly did not find them on Uwe, where three visiting Ninigo 
natives assured them that they had not turned up in their group either. Karcher assumed that the 
stormy weather during the last days had driven them off course. What had happened only time 
could tell, for the present his mission was completed. 
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The result of the ten day stay in the Hermit Islands can be briefly summarised as follows: the property 
of their inhabitants, consisting of about 67 houses, 54 canoes and smaller items, especially arms and 
ammunition (a total of24 rifles) were destroyed, together with all gardens; two men were killed and many 
of the inhabitants were driven off the island. 
During a peaceful visit the following year SMS Carola made contact with about 30 men and 
a dozen women. Wherever the Hermits had been, at least some had resurfaced. But their 
experience had hardly boosted their confidence in the future. When Dr Dempwolff medically 
examined the population of the Hermit Group in 1902, he counted 74 persons, but among them 
was not a single child under the age of four and not a single pregnant woman. Although the loss 
of lives during the punitive expedition had been small, 13 Dempwolff tended to believe that the 
native inhabitants of the Hermit Islands had decided to die out as a response and that they were 
well on their way to achieving their goal. 
Whether the population decline continued is not part of our story, but it is unlikely that its 
onset can be attributed to the actions of the imperial navy here summarised. If the bulk of the 
population of the group fitted into two large sea-going canoes at the end of 1 882, what had the 
people been doing with the 54 canoes the marines had destroyed, many of which had been of a 
similar size? Their number would seem to indicate that the population had until recently been 
much larger, even larger than the 300 to 400 estimated by Hemsheim in his 1882 consular report. 
What had happened to them, since they could not have left the group with their canoes which had 
now been destroyed? Had a population decline started with punitive measures taken after the 
killing of a captain Bird by HMS Alacrity in 1874 when a population of between 400--500 souls 
had been counted (see Wichmann, 1910:  194)? Had a natural catastrophe-such as the 1 875 flood 
referred to by Wichmann (see ibid. :  227Hecimated the population and broken its spirit? Had 
the attacks on the Hemsheim trading station and its two steamers been manifestations of a death 
wish? But if this was so, one would have expected the Hermits, instead of refusing to surrender 
but offering no resistance to the warships, to have challenged them to a battle in which all Hermits 
would have perished? 
On the other hand, the behaviour of Pissigo and the women who were happily smoking on 
board while the marines were combing the island for their relatives also appears decidedly odd. 
But was it more remarkable than captain Karcher's interpretation of Bismarck's wish to see the 
punishment carried out "in the most forceful manner"? Did he believe that he was acting in 
accordance with his orders when he assured the chiefs that nothing would happen to them if they 
surrendered peacefully and subsequently ordered the marines only to shoot in an emergency? Or 
did he consider that the circumstances in the Hermit Islands were so different from how they had 
appeared in Berlin that his superiors would agree that a more severe punishment would have been 
inappropriate? 
Four years later Bismarck had also changed his tune. He rather echoed the 1882 sentiments of 
the admiralty that it would be a mistake to give minor punitive actions of the navy in remote parts 
of the globe an exaggerated importance (see above: 102). However, by then the political and legal 
situation had also changed fundamentally. Calling for a one-off demonstration of naval power in 
a political no-man's-land to show the world that the Reich was serious in its commitment to 
protect German trade was one thing; the employment of the imperial navy as a police force within 
a German colony, for whose government the chancellor of the Reich was politically responsible, 
quite another. 
1 3  According to Dempwolff ( 1 904) a woman had also been shot dead, a fact which had been omitted from the published 
reports. 
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IV 
In February 1 884 the foreign office informed the admiralty that it was planned to send an official 
from the German consulate-general in Samoa as an imperial commissioner to Melanesia for the 
next "recruiting season" to ensure, with the support of the navy, that German vessels complied 
with the regulations which had been issued for the recruitment of natives as labourers. The 
imperial commissioner also had the task of protecting German commercial interests from being 
violated or disadvantaged. However, in doing so he had to prevent the development of tensions 
between Germans and members of "other nations" or, at least, to reduce them to a level which 
precluded diplomatic complications . 
Since the British government had already posted a deputy high commissioner to the area, it had 
been informed about the intended move. The foreign office hoped that the combined efforts of 
these two officials would strengthen the feeling of all concerned that their rights would be 
protected. 14 The honorary German consul, Herr Hemsheim in J aluit, had been informed that he 
had, for the time being, been subordinated to the imperial commissioner in the exercise of his 
consular powers (RM 1/2894). 
These were presumably also the instructions issued to consular secretary Gustav von Oertzen 
when he was given this post. A few months later they were overtaken by events. 
14 The term "Rechtssicherheit", used by the foreign office, is difficult to translate. It stands for a state where the rights 
of individuals are safe-hardly a realistic goal in Melanesia in 1 884. 
Chapter 9: The Dawn of Colonial Rule 
I 
S oon after Oertzen had arrived in what was then called the New Britain Archipelago in June 1 884 he was drawn into the events leading up to the annexation of colonial territory by 
Germany. The crucial step in this process was the granting of an imperial charter to the embrionic 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie in May 1 885. Although this charter left the government of the colony in 
principle to the company, it took until June 1 886 before its first administrator arrived in the 
designated capital, Finschhafen, in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and until November of this year before 
an imperial judge was installed in what was now called the Bismarck Archipelago. The company's  
first "station director", who was to be  in  charge of  the archipelago' s  local administration, did not 
take up office until after Oertzen had left in January 1 887 to return to the consulate-general in 
Samoa. I want to take up the story when the question arose as to what extent the emperor's powers 
of government were to be exercised by Oertzen as imperial commissioner. 1 
The day before the charter was issued, Oertzen was instructed by cable to protect one of its 
central provisions: the land acquisition monopoly granted to the company (NKWL 1 885, I :5). He 
was therefore ready to notify the public locally on 22 May that new land acquisitions without the 
approval of the German authorities were invalid. Subsequently Oertzen was instructed to publish 
an expanded version of this notice in the Australian press. It also dealt with the recruitment of 
native labour and the supply of arms , ammunition, explosives and liquor to natives (NKWL 1 886: 
59). 
While the "authorities" and "officials" referred to were those of the Reich, rather than 
representatives of the company, and thus, in practice, primarily Oertzen himself, these public 
notices gave him no penal powers. Nor did they expressly expand in other ways his consular 
powers, which were restricted to German nationals and protected persons. They merely confirmed 
his role as the controller of the German involvement in the labour trade, although they probably 
authorised him implicitly to call on the navy to prevent foreign vessels from engaging in now 
illegal forms of labour recruiting. On the other hand, these notices foreshadowed the setting up 
of some kind of mechanism to deal with land claims of non-natives, presumably also under the 
control of imperial officials. It was indeed Oertzen who issued a public notice in February 1 886 
requesting all those who claimed to have acquired land before 22 May 1 885 in the Bismarck 
Archipelago-but not in Kaiser Wilhelmslaned-to submit their titles to him before 1 May 1886 
for examination and possible registration.2 
A month later Oertzen categorically prohibited the recruitment and removal of natives as 
labourers from northern New Ireland-now renamed Neu Mecklenburg. This prohibition 
remained in force until it was repealed by the chancellor of the Reich in September 1 887 because 
it clashed with the new legal regime administrator Schleinitz had begun to introduce by means of 
an ordinance of 13  January 1 887, based on an authority given to him by the chancellor of the 
Reich on 24 June 1 886. 
On the same day the chancellor informed Oertzen that Schleinitz had been authorised to 
exercise the judicial jurisdiction under the Protectorates Act and that Oertzen's  consular 
1 For a detailed discussion of the annexation process see Sack, 1987. 
2 The confinement of the preliminary registration process to the Bismarck Archipelago was primarily due to the fact that, 
apart from the unusual land claims of the Russian Mikloucho-Maclay-which had, in any case, to be dealt with at a high 
diplomatic level (see Germer, 1961 )-only the Neu Guinea Kompagnie claimed land in Kaiser Wilhelms land. But it also 
suggested that while Kaiser Wilhelmsland was generally recognised as a preserve of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie this did 
not apply to the Bismarck Archipelago with its established cosmopolitan settler population. 
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jurisdiction would come to an end when Schleinitz began to exercise his jurisdiction (RKA 4780). 
In addition, Oertzen was instructed to get in touch with Schleinitz immediately about the treatment 
of the existing land claims. 
Oertzen reported on 15 November 1 886 that he had contacted Schleinitz at the first opportunity 
and that Schleinitz had arrived in Matupi two days previously, bringing with him the imperial 
judge, Georg Schmiele, who had taken up duties on the same day. He, Oertzen, would hand over 
his provisional land register to Schmiele as soon as the latter had familiarised himself with the 
local conditions (RKA 5344).  
This suggests a smooth transfer of powers. But a letter from the Neu Guinea Kompagnie to the 
chancellor, dated 5 July 1 887, raises doubts that this had in fact been the case because it requested 
the return of files Oertzen had taken with him to the consulate in Samoa. It is therefore necessary 
to inspect the relations between Oertzen and Schleinitz more closely. 
II 
In 1884 Oertzen had been instructed to support the land acquisitions Otto Finsch was supposed 
to make, in particular in northeastem New Guinea, to give Germany's territorial ambitions a fmner 
base. After the annexation had been completed, Oertzen was ordered to keep an eye on the stations 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was beginning to establish in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Its first station, 
Finschhafen, was opened in November 1 885, but Oertzen had no opportunity for a visit until the 
cruiser squadron under rear-admiral Eduard Knorr arrived from the Marshall Islands on 15 June 
1 886 with Oertzen's consular colleague, Wilhelm Knappe, as a passenger. Oertzen requested 
Knorr to assist him in carrying out a tour of inspection (RM I/2626). Knorr accepted and on 25 
June 1 886 his flagship, SMS Bismarck, entered Finschhafen to find that administrator Schleinitz 
had been in residence for about two weeks. 
Since Knorr was a personal friend of Schleinitz, a retired vice-admiral (see Schellong 1934: 
75), the visit was cordial and Knorr sent a favourable report about conditions in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland to the admiralty (RM I/2732). The report said nothing about any discussions 
between Schleinitz and Oertzen. Nor is Oertzen' s presence during the visit of the cruiser squadron 
mentioned in the diaries of Otto Schellong, the company's medical doctor in Finschhafen, 
although he praised Knappe as a welcome addition to its social life, perhaps because Knappe, in 
contrast to Oertzen, had remained in Kaiser Wilhelmsland for some weeks, waiting for a ship to 
take him to Australia, in the meanwhile entertaining the locals with stories about the pleasures of 
living in Samoa (Schellong, ibid.).3 
When and how did things go wrong? It appears that the situation deteriorated quite suddenly 
and that a climax was reached during a Christmas visit by SMS Adler to Finschhafen, with 
Oertzen again on board. Finschhafen had been looking forward to this visit. Schellong entered in 
his diary on 21 December 1 886: "The long awaited Adler has arrived, just in time for Christmas; 
we are overjoyed; it is as if the homeland is going to embrace us" (ibid. :  1 04). Schleinitz had 
issued orders about the protocol to be observed. The boats had been freshly painted. Their black 
crews had been dressed in white and given special lessons in oarsmanship. The Adler's band had 
played when her anchor was cast and Finschhafen's  station manager, Richard Mentzel, had paid 
an initial visit to the cruiser and her commander, Friedrich von Wietersheim. Then the speed of 
events went into slow motion. It took hours before Wietersheim' s adjutant arrived with an official 
letter for the administrator. Wietersheim followed after another long interval, just before sunset. 
Schleinitz's return visit was delayed until the next afternoon. Moreover, he wore civilian dress, 
no salute was fired in his honour, and he only stayed for quarter of an hour. Still, contacts at a 
3 Knappe' s report to the foreign office about his stay in Kaiser Wilhelmsland is much more critical than that of Knorr 
to the admiralty (see RKA 2977). 
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lower level could now begin, including visits between Schellong and his medical counterpart on 
SMS Adler. They revealed that the position was so serious that the joint Christmas celebrations 
had been cancelled. 
[T]he question is: is Vice-Admiral von Schleinitz in his current capacity as Administrator for the naval 
commander an official personage, like a consul, whom the latter has to pay an official visit, or is he, as 
a person in charge of a private company, albeit one exercising rights of sovereignty, to be treated as a 
private individual by the Navy? Even though we cannot quite see the importance of this disputed question 
we must back our Administrator . . .  but we do so with mixed feelings (ibid. :  1 05). 
Although the company' s  employees, as well as the Adler' s crew, regarded a difference of 
opinion about Schleinitz' s  status as an adequate explanation for the spoiling of their Christmas 
celebrations, it will not come as a surprise to learn that local gossip had only identified the tip of 
an iceberg. To appreciate what had happened, we must go back to Schleinitz' s  visit to the 
Bismarck Archipelago in November. 
When Schleinitz arrived, SMS Adler had been present for more than a week, resting from the 
effort of placing the northern Solomons under imperial protection. Wietersheimhad been received 
by Oertzen with numerous requisitions, including one for another tour of inspection by him of the 
stations of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, which could all be knitted 
together into a single round-trip. Neither Schleinitz' s visit, nor Schmiele' s installation as imperial 
judge in the Bismarck Archipelago, had made a difference to these arrangements. Indeed, when 
Schmiele j oined the trip, he did so on the basis of another requisition by Oertzen, and only in order 
to carry out a particular judicial investigation which Oertzen had meant to undertake but had 
passed on to Schmiele since it now came under his jurisdiction (RKA 2720). 
The investigation concerned the alleged maltreatment of three Chinese in northern New Ireland 
by their boss, the agent of the Hernsheim firm, Friedrich Schulle. Its results convinced Schmiele 
that he should ask Wietersheim to take the three Chinese in question immediately on board to 
separate them from their brutal employer. Wietersheim agreed, but only on the understanding that 
the costs of their transportation would be refunded by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie to the Adler's 
home base, the Baltic naval station, because such "court expenses" were the company's  
responsibility under its charter.4 
There is no record of Schmiele' s  report to Schleinitz, which he probably made orally shortly 
after the arrival of SMS Adler in Finschhafen.5 But we do know the content of the letter 
Wietersheim's adjutant took to Schleinitz during the afternoon of 21  December 1 886. In it 
Wietersheim complained bitterly about having been unable to obtain fresh food for his crew 
during his visit to the company's  stations in Hatzfeldhafen and Constantinhafen. Since these 
settlements would in future be visited regularly by naval vessels there was an urgent need to have 
such supplies readily available. Moreover, it was in the company's interests that they were "able 
to stay at any time at a station to carry out those requisitions which are regarded as necessary" 
(RM I/2427) .  
Schleinitz's  written reply, made the following day, was of ironic politeness .  He sincerely 
regretted Wietersheim' s disappointment, all the more so as it would have been a pleasure for him 
to arrange for provisions, if he had been officially informed about the intended visit. "However, 
to this hour I have neither been officially notified by the authorities at home nor by Your Honour 
about the presence and the orders of SM Cruiser Adler in the Protectorate which has been placed 
under me" (ibid.). In other words, it was power, not mere protocol, which was at issue. True, 
Schleinitz was worried about his status, especially its recognition by his former naval comrades, 
4 In the meantime the three Chinese were occupied on board as carpenter, stoker and cook "in accordance with their 
respective abilities" (RM 1/2720). 
5 I assume that Schmiele took the first opportunity to disembark and to report to the administrator. 
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but when he insisted that he was entitled to a 21 gun salute as much as an imperial governor, or 
that Wietersheim could have only paid him a private visit when he turned up in his tropical 
uniform rather than his dress uniform, he was concerned about who was ruling German New 
Guinea-:-and his rival in this regard was Oertzen, not Wietersheim. Thus it was the former who 
received, four days later, Schleinitz's carefully worded reproach. 
It has come to my knowledge that Your Honour has, through requisitions made to SM Cruiser Adler and 
by other means, performed acts of the internal administration within . . .  the Protectorate which has been 
placed under the Neu Guinea Kompagnie after I had actually taken over the administration of this area. 
Moreover, you have done so without officially notifying me of the measures you have taken so that I am 
in fact even now not informed about the details of important events which have taken place in territories 
which have been placed under me. 
As Your Honour knows, the rights of local sovereignty have been transferred to the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie by His Majesty the Emperor through the Charter of Protection of 17 May 1 885. . . .  [T]he 
Imperial Government has only reserved for itself, the organisation of the administration of justice, the 
regulation of the relations between the Protectorate and foreign governments and the ultimate 
supervision. 
In the meantime a Decree of the Chancellor of the Reich has also transferred the exercise of the 
judicial jurisdiction in the Protectorate to me and I have, by virtue of the authority given to me, appointed 
the Royal Prussian Court Assessor Schmiele, . . .  to exercise the jurisdiction in the Bismarck Archipelago. 
It is therefore beyond doubt that the entire field of internal administration falls within the exclusive 
competence of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie which can only be exercised by me as its highest 
representative . . . .  
As Your Honour knows, the right to carry out the internal administration i s  inseparable from the 
territorial sovereignty so that Your Honour would even then not be entitled to interfere with it if You had 
been specifically authorised to exercise the ultimate supervision which the Reich has reserved for 
itself-although this is, to my knowledge, not the case. 
I therefore most respectfully beg Your Honour kindly to refrain in future from any interference with 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s  rights of sovereignty or, respectively, with the internal administration of 
the Protectorate . . . .  
I have informed the Commander of  SM Cruiser Adler of  this letter since he  has lent a hand in  the acts 
of interference with the sovereign and administrative rights of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie which have 
occurred. 
Oertzen's  first written statement in the matter, sent to Schleinitz on the evening of 26 
December, responded to oral representations which Schleinitz had apparently made during his visit 
on board SMS Adler. In it Oertzen took cover behind the instructions issued by the navy. He 
pleaded for cooperation between the imperial officials and officers and the staff of the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie, but insisted that any action on the part of the navy presupposed an official requisition 
which could only be made by him, as representative of the imperial government, although he was 
happy to consider at any time requests Schleinitz might care to make (RKA 2657). 
The reply to Schleinitz' s written accusation of illegal interference in his governmental powers, 
delivered as a parting shot just before the Adler's departure on 27 December, called for greater 
firmness. "However estimable Your Excellency's views may be, they cannot cause me to neglect 
my duties to protect the interests of the . . .  settlers in the Protectorate", Oertzen wrote. This duty 
required him, in particular, to requisition the help of naval vessels when crimes had been 
committed by natives against the person or property of whites and to carry, as the imperial 
representative, the political responsibility for the navy' s ensuing military actions. It was out of the 
question that he would relinquish his post-as Schleinitz must have verbally suggested-without 
being expressly ordered to do so by the chancellor of the Reich, especially since Schleinitz's 
judicial authority did not extend to the native population. Besides, the Neu GuineaKompagnie had 
so far failed to create any institutions of government which could protect the settlers, or even its 
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own stations, so that it had, in practice, still to rely on the protection offered by the imperial 
government. Under these circumstances, Oertzen concluded, it would be unwise to push 
premature! y for an extension of the company' s  rights at the expense of the imperial government's 
supreme sovereignty. At any rate, Schleinitz would have to await further instructions by the 
chancellor of the Reich in implementation of the company' s  charter before he could assume 
responsibility in this area (ibid.). 
Wietersheim had an easier task because Schleinitz had only accused him of being ignorant of 
the constitutional position. He could therefore limit himself to refuting this suggestion and to 
expressing his regret if his behaviour, which had been guided by general naval instructions and 
his specific sailing orders, had brought him into conflict with the authority given to S chleinitz. 
But Wietersheim could not resist the temptation to score a point: was not the fact that a copy of 
his sailing orders had only been sent to Oertzen proof that Oertzen, and Oertzen alone, was still 
to be regarded as the sole representative of imperial authority? Wietersheim' s conclusion was the 
same as Oertzen's :  whether Schleinitz liked it or not, he had no standing in relation to the navy, 
and this state of affairs could only be altered by unequivocal instructions from Berlin to all 
concerned. 
While the admiralty strongly backed the stand Wietersheim had taken (RM 1/2427), Oertzen 
was embarrassed when he found in the mail waiting for him in the Bismarck Archipelago an order 
by the foreign office recalling him from his post. Yet he not merely defended himself by claiming 
that the entire conflict had been Schleinitz's fault, as he and Wietersheim had treated him 
throughout with exquisite politeness, but also insisted that even if Schleinitz was given the 
authority to requisition the navy, the settlers in the Bismarck Archipelago, for whose interests the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie had so far shown no concern, could not reasonably be expected to send 
their complaints about native crimes to Finschhafen if they had imperial officials and officers able 
to protect them in their midst. Now that he had been recalled, there was no alternative but for the 
commander of the warship stationed in the Bismarck Archipelago to also assume the political 
responsibility for taking prompt military action (RKA 2657). 
Oertzen should have known, and probably did know, that such a total surrender of 
governmental powers to the navy would be unacceptable, not least to the navy itself. The solution 
adopted in Berlin amounted to a belated victory for Schleinitz. It took the form of two instructions 
issued a few months later.6 The first was directed by the emperor to his naval commanders and 
the second by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie to its administrator, who was given a limited right to 
request naval assistance. 
The reports Schleinitz must have submitted to the company in this matter are no longer 
available. Yet, there is some circumstantial evidence suggesting that even more than honour and 
power had been at stake. Commenting ten years later on a major colonial scandal in Germany' s 
African colonies, Schleinitz added in a footnote that he would never forget a conversation with 
a high naval officer who had warmly supported a system of raging against the natives with cane, 
rope, powder and lead, claiming that it was attributable to his determined rejection of such 
unbridled principles that this way of thinking had not gained ground in German New Guinea 
( 1 896: 67). If this was a veiled reference to his confrontation with Wietersheim and Oertzen on 
the eve of Christmas 1 886 the largest bone of contention may have been an excessively aggressive 
native policy which Oertzen and Wietersheim had pursued. Before examining this question, 
however, it may be useful to approach Oertzen's activities from another angle, namely from the 
perspective of the settlers in the Bismarck Archipelago whose protection was so dear to his heart. 
6 These instructions are part of another story. 
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III 
This small group, around 30 persons when Oertzen arrived in 1884, consisted mainly of traders 
and missionaries living in the northeastem Gazelle Peninsula, the Duke of Yorks and northern 
New Ireland. As regards the missionaries, the activities of the Catholics had almost ground to a 
halt, so that the Methodists were the only spiritual force to be reckoned with. Commercially the 
scene was dominated by three firms: the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft, which 
concentrated more and more on recruiting Melanesian labourers for its plantations in Samoa; the 
Hernsheim firm, a trading enterprise with a strong interest in northern New Ireland; and Farrell 
who operated the first plantation in German New Guinea and specialised in large scale land 
acquisitions. 7 The three firms employed a fluctuating number of more or less dependent traders, 
including several survivors of the disastrous colonisation scheme of the Marquis de Rays, chief 
among them J.M. Mouton and his son Octave, who later became one of the leading businessmen 
in the colony.8 
On 1 8  March 1 886 Mouton senior wrote to the family of his former employer in Belgium: 
think I told you that I bought a lot of land . . .  Up till now only German subjects have been allowed to 
have the titles of their properties registered. A few days ago I was specially informed that I could register 
mine with the Imperial Commissioner in Mioko . . . [but] everything has to be translated into German so 
that it is still not such an easy business . . .  
We have signed another contract for two years . . .  [with the Hemsheim firm on more favourable 
terms]. Before we had only two stations . . .  now we have five and will have more if necessary. One would 
already have been put up but Farrell opposed it under the pretext that he had bought all the land in the 
area . . . I already have a bone to pick with him for various matters like that and I will have even more. 
But when a Commission arrives to investigate these claims they will be reduced by a lot. In the meantime 
no-one here has the power to deal with these matters . . .  
In his son's memoirs Oertzen also mainly figures in connection with land matters. When he 
gave instructions that all "self-made titles" should be presented to him, the Moutons did so, as 
did their partner, Dupre, another former Marquis de Rays colonist. Whereas the latter had no 
difficulties, the Mouton claims were not accepted because, as Oertzen told them, the land they 
claimed had previously been bought by Farrell. "It was now clear to father", Octave wrote, "that 
Farrell again was behind the scene and with his Samoan girls and champagne he bribed the poor 
fool Von Oertzen" (Biskup, 1974:83). Mouton senior raised this accusation in letters to Oertzen 
as well as to Hernsheim, who refused to support him. Understandably Oertzen was "quite wild 
with father"; he even "went so far as to cause trouble with our trading", by instructing a German 
warship to destroy a hut Mouton had built for his native traders on the land which both he and 
Farrell were claiming. 
In order to protect his land claims, Mouton senior wrote to the Belgian consul in Sydney, 
paying a merchant sailor handsomely to post the letter abroad. 
It is quite clear that if father had not used this stratagem to circumvent Farrell, any ordinary way to send 
a letter to the Consul and even to other address would never have reached their destination, for the 
simple reason that Von Oertzen knew that he was doing wrong, and Hemsheim would take the part of 
Von Oertzen, and as there was a kind of a mailbag made for any ship available for postage for the public 
and the Government, any letter from father would certainly have been censored (ibid. : 84). 
7 Farrell was the partner of the future "Queen Emma". She does not figure in these early sources although this changed 
once she had bought Farrell's estate, paying his creditors, according to Eduard Hemsheim, a fraction of his debts. 
8 See Biskup, 1 974. J. M. Mouton's  letter, a translation of which from the French original is quoted below, is privately 
held. 
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Almost a year later, Octave Mouton recalled, his father received a message from Oertzen to send 
all his land titles for registration, followed by a reply letter from the Belgian consul in Sydney 
who had set the diplomatic wheels in Brussels and Berlin in motion. Mouton senior was 
convinced that Oertzen had withheld the consular letter until then because "he was not too sure 
of himself'. Oertzen, Octave Mouton claimed, even begged his father not to mention anything of 
what had happened. According to his son, Mouton senior had been a generous victor, assuring 
the imperial commissioner that he knew that Farrell had been the true culprit and that Oertzen' s  
blame was only that h e  was a weak man (ibid.). 
From Eduard Hernsheim' s perspective the most important event connected with Oertzen was 
his arrival in June 1 8 84. What effect would this have on his own consular position? A letter from 
consul-general Stuebel, introducing Oertzen, reassured him. As Hernsheim understood the 
position, Oertzen was to exercise the official powers of a consul general "without however 
impinging on my rights and duties as Consul".9 The situation was rendered even more harmless 
because "Oertzen was to take up residence in Mioko for the purpose of supervising labour 
recruitment" (1 983 : 87). Hemsheim had a low opinion of Oertzen' s performance in this regard, 
since he 
was at pains to promote the interests of the Samoa Company as far as possible, and to refute the 
allegations against the captains of the firm's recruiting ships, which were based mainly on statements 
made by the British missionaries. Nevertheless we maintained good relations and were frequently in very 
close contact when we were both cabin passengers on the Hyii.ne at the same time (ibid.). 
There are only two further passing references to Oertzen in Hemsheim' s memoirs : the first 
that Oertzen had been instructed at the time of the flag hoistings in November 1 884 to encourage 
the purchase of land by Germans so that he, Hemsheim, had to permit his traders and agents, 
including the Moutons, to join the dance (ibid. :  91) ;  the second that he had reported the brutal 
behaviour of his agent Schulle to "Commissioner von Oertzen who was as yet the only competent 
authority here" and that a copy of this letter, due to an indiscretion of his clerk, had come into 
Schulle' s  possession (ibid. :  97). 
Hemsheim' s diaries 10 tell a story which corresponds closely to the Mouton version. It begins 
in April 1 885 when Hemsheim learned that Farrell was planning to expand his trading network 
to New Ireland. Hernsheim assumed that Farrell intended to start a trade war in what had been his 
preserve in order to force him to buy Farrell' s entire enterprise, so as to eliminate this competition. 
But he had not expected that Farrell would pursue his goals, whatever they were, with as much 
determination as he did. When Hemsheim complained to Oertzen that Farrell' s  new trading 
stations in New Ireland were situated on land bought by his firm, Farrell not only denied this in 
a letter to Oertzen, and accused Hemsheim of occupying land he, Farrell, had bought in New 
Britain, but also heaped "abuse on the German Consulates, so that on my advice Oertzen sent the 
scrawl back with a note to the effect that he could only acknowledge the reply [by Farrell to the 
charges that he had acted illegally in New Ireland] if these abusive passages were omitted". 
By mid-June the position had changed. Hemsheim received a letter from Oertzen "with very 
stupid [that is to say positive] comments on Farrell, who was in Mioko with the whole family and 
told Oertzen lies and got around him". In November Hernsheim decided that he should improve 
his relations with Oertzen by "making up to him", but he thought that the whole business was 
beginning to get boring. His move was successful, for by the beginning of 1 886 Oertzen was 
again "flirting" with Hernsheim, implying that the German government planned to strengthen the 
position of the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft and the Hernsheim firm in the 
9 Whether this interpretation was accurate is another matter. 
1 0  What survives of them is held by the Staatsarchiv in Hamburg. Excerpts are included in Hemsheim, 1983.  
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Bismarck Archipelago at the expense of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie-"possibly New Ireland for 
us [and] Kinigunan and Birara [that is to say the eastern coast of the Gazelle Peninsula] for [the] 
Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft. . . Veremos [we shall see]". No wonder that in response to 
this uplifting news, which would have amounted to an economic monopoly for Hemsheim in New 
Ireland-under exclusion ofFarrell as well as the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft 
and the Neu Guinea Kompagnie-Hemsheim wrote a very friendly private letter to Oertzen (ibid. : 
75-79). 1 1  
The Methodist missionaries were concerned with yet another aspect o f  Oertzen' s  role and 
showed a shrewd appreciation of his changing legal position. Not long after Oertzen' s  arrival, on 
26 July 1 884, Isaac Rooney, who had been approached by the commander of a British naval 
vessel on behalf of Oertzen, assured the latter that he would be happy to render him any assistance 
in his power to investigate the death of Sione, a Samoan trader in New Ireland. These 
investigations revealed that the matter had gone further than had first been believed. Rooney 
therefore wrote again to Oertzen a few days later. 
I wish to lodge with you as the representative of the Imp. German Government in these seas a complaint 
against the sons of the Kuras Chief for firing on one of our Teachers who is a British Subject. 
The Kuras boys having a quarrel with the Matakana people over some trading transaction ran away 
with the trader' s  boat leaving Sione ill at Matakana. As Sione grew worse Josaia [the teacher] went in 
a canoe to Kuras in order to fetch the boat for Sione either to take him to Kuras or bring him over here 
for medical aid. As soon as the Kuras boys saw the canoe they armed themselves, got in the trader' s boat 
and pursued the canoe, firing at the teacher, who was obliged to return to Matakana without the boat. As 
he was at the time endeavouring to do a service to the trader employed by the German firm at Mioko and 
as the offence was committed on board a boat belonging to the said firm I appeal to you for redress in 
the matter. 12 
Rooney was not convinced, however, that Oertzen would see fit to intervene and thus informed 
the representative of the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft that he would be obliged 
to bring his complaint before the next British naval commander if the imperial commissioner 
could not deal with it. 
When Benjamin Danks asked Oertzen in an undated letter, about a year later, to investigate 
the conduct of another Samoan trader, Faifaiesa, who had seriously injured a native in the Gazelle 
Peninsula, he sounded a different note. 
Since the annexation of these islands by Germany I have endeavoured to make the natives understand 
that the laws of Germany would protect them as well as the whites. I have in my school explained to the 
Scholars the nature of the act of annexation and that the Emperor of Germany is now their great chief. 
This native boy told his assailant that he would appeal to the laws of Germany for redress, and he does 
so now through me. Should you decide on investigating his case I gladly place my services as interpreter 
at your disposal and such accommodation as I can afford you are very welcome to. 
Another year later Danks had learned to doubt Oertzen' s ability to uphold "the laws of Germany". 
When Totabu had burned down a church in Ratavul, Danks wrote to Oertzen, on 24 May 1 886, 
that he thought it right to lay the matter before him before taking steps to obtain redress himself. 
"If you think fit to deal with the case please do so, if you prefer to leave the matter with me, 
please let me know. The bearer of this will await your answer." 
1 1  In retrospect it seems most unlikely that the German government had considered amending the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie' s charter so drastically. On the other hand, it is clear that the Bismarck Archipelago and Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
were initially treated quite differently. 
12 The letters by Rooney and Danks (see below) are part of the archives of the Methodist Overseas Mission kept in the 
Mitchell Library in Sydney. 
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But Danks was more concerned with the unsuccessful attempts by the German navy to arrest 
"chief Toviringi" in the hinterland of his Kabakada station. He would do his best, he wrote to 
Oertzen on 28 June 1 886, to persuade Toviringi to pay some shell money as a token of his 
submission, taking care to let the natives know that he was acting on his own and not at Oertzen's  
request. On the other hand, he urged Oertzen to place the people who had served as guides for the 
navy under his protection and to announce that any harm done to them by Toviringi and his allies 
would be severely punished. In conclusion Danks pressed upon Oertzen' s  notice: "the inutility 
and positive danger to all the whites here of any further attempts to capture or punish any of the 
bush people unless the men-of-war can spare sufficient time to accomplish their purpose". 
Oertzen shared Danks' s concern and was, generally speaking, under no illusion about the 
weakness of his position. Consequently he tended to play down, in his own reports , the potential 
of German New Guinea and to stress the difficulties he was facing. This can already be seen in 
his Trade and Shipping Report for 1 885, his first full year in office (RKA 6521) .  
The high hopes which had existed at the beginning of 1 885 had not been fulfilled: copra 
exports had declined from 1 ,800 to less than 1 ,400 tonnes, mainly as a result of a drought, 
although the prohibition of the sale of firearms to natives could also have been a contributing 
factor. The major event had been the dramatic rise of Thomas Farrell whose contribution to the 
copra trade had increased from 120 to over 600 tonnes. 
While he was believed to be near bankruptcy, he returned from Sydney at the beginning of the year with 
a steamer under American flag and numerous personnel . . . and embarked on restless and ruthless 
activities. Wherever there was only the slightest chance of obtaining some copra in the Archipelago, he 
installed a trader, be it on his own land or, under some pretence, on land belonging to others. Even at 
the most remote and dangerous spots he simply put them ashore with provisions for a few weeks . . .  The 
economic success of this approach is undeniable. Of course, half a dozen people have lost their lives in 
the process . . .  Of the ten to twelve traders he stationed at the northcoast of New Ireland all but three have 
been chased away by the natives and most of the stations have been burnt down . . .  He himself has gone 
again to Sydney to supply himself with new people and goods-or, if at all possible, to sell all his 
possessions here because, as he told me, and as his appearance confirmed, his health is completely 
ruined. If this is the real reason for his desire to sell-out or if he, after all, did not succeed in balancing 
his income and expenditure, or if his chauvinist creditors [in Australia] have lost the inclination to 
support and use him further, is difficult to say. 13 
Oertzen hoped that copra exports would again rise to about 2,000 tonnes in 1 886. But he did 
not expect this trend to continue. Even after all available "copra fields" (Koprahfelder) had been 
opened up, the Archipelago could produce no more than around 3 ,000 tonnes annually. Only 
plantations promised a substantial economic upswing. This, however, presupposed the actual 
creation of the institutions of government which the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had to provide under 
its charter. 
The lack of a judiciary and an executive is noticeable even under present circumstances; it will be even 
more pronounced when plantations are established because of the land disputes and the conflicts with 
the natives which will then presumably arise. 
So far the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had totally neglected the Bismarck Archipelago. While its two 
steamers sailed continuously between Finschhafen and Cooktown, there had only been a single 
visit to the Bismarck Archipelago in 1 885, although it took just two to three days to steam across. 
He, Oertzen, was doing his best to calm the growing annoyance of the settlers with promises of 
speedy improvements. 
13 Farrell died not long afterwards of tuberculosis (?) in Australia (see Robson, 1 965 : 1 43). 
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In the course of 1 886 shipping connections did improve-a company vessel now called at 
Matupi and Mioko once a month-but this was the only good news contained in Oertzen' s report 
for that year (ibid.). Copra exports had slumped to less than 900 tonnes. Oertzen attributed this 
primarily to the continuing drought but also admitted that in those districts "in which SM ships 
had had occasion to intervene", trade had temporarily come to a halt and could only gradually be 
restored. 
Oertzen's  report adds little to the Farrell story beyond stating that while he, like Hemsheim, 
had probably earned nothing, he had done considerably better than the Deutsche Handels- und 
Plantagen-Gesellschaft and a new competitor-an agent for the American firm of Crawford & 
Co.-both of whom were facing substantial losses. Oertzen' s final message, pronounced on the 
eve of his departure from German New Guinea, was one of total gloom The prospects for the 
coming year were dim. The effects of the drought would continue to make themselves felt. Even 
under ideal conditions the market was too small for four competing firms. Plantations were the 
only possible hope, provided Farrell 's  experiment proved successful. Commercial shipping had 
declined, the regular visits by company steamers notwithstanding. They would have declined even 
further, but for the visits of several ships from Queensland and Fiji which had returned labourers 
who had completed their contracts. 14 
Taken together, this information suggests that Oertzen' s  original main task-the supervision 
of the labour trade-was the least of his worries ; that the implementation of the prohibition to 
supply natives with arms, ammunition, explosives and liquor also gave him little concern. Without 
the trouble-maker Farrell even the registration of the old land claims would have been plain 
sailing. Indeed, it would seem that it had in general been the activities of Farrell which had kept 
Oertzen on his toes and the German navy busy during much of 1 885 and 1 886- and it is the 
navy's activities in response to Oertzen's  requisitions on which I now want to focus. 
IV 
When SMS Hyiine brought Oertzen to the Bismarck Archipelago in June 1884 it had been under 
the command of lieutenant-commander Wilhelm Geiseler whose reluctance to get involved in 
military actions during a visit by consul-general Stuebe! in February of that year provided the 
accompanying Hemsheim with much amusement (1983:  83ff. and 160 ff.) . 15 During his first 
round trip with Oertzen, Geiseler avoided any military action against the people of Metelek, in 
southern New Ireland, who were accused of having captured the German schooner Mioko at the 
beginning of 1884, killing its entire crew. On 29 July, Oertzen sent Geiseler a formal requisition 
to repeat attempts to punish the Metelek people. 
In view of the seriousness of their deed those involved should - if appropriate - be punished at life and 
limb. I ask you to bring persons who are captured alive to Mioko since I have been instructed to send 
them to the Imperial Consulate in Apia (RM I/2425). 16 
Now Geiseler had to make at least a token effort. Hemsheim offered him his schooner 
Montiara which Geiseler planned to use as a bait, hiding one of his officers with 1 5  men on 
board, who were instructed to kill the Metelek natives when they tried to capture it like the Mioko 
14 Oertzen said nothing about the export of labourers to Samoa, probably because there had been none since the Niufoou 
had gone missing after leaving Apia in March 1 886. However, 170 new recruits had been assembled and inspected by 
Wietersheim on 29 December in response to what must have been Oertzen's  final requisition. Moreover, the Niufoou 's 
replacement, the Neptune, was already standing by to take them to Samoa early in the new year (see RM 1/2720). 
15 This reluctance may well have had its root in Geiseler's earlier experience in the Hermit Islands (see above, chapter 
8). 
16 This banishment option continued to play an important role in Oertzen's approach. 
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a few months earlier. The scheme failed, and bad weather, according to Geiseler, prevented the 
Hyane from putting a landing party ashore. Reporting his lack of success to Oertzen, Geiseler 
promised to approach Metelek once more on his trip to Sydney, although he refused to guarantee 
that he would be able to mete out a punishment which fitted the crime, since the Metelek people 
would without fail withdraw into the mountains (ibid.) .  In fact, Geiseler did not bother to make 
the test, sailing straight to Sydney where he completed his tour of duty. 
When SMS Hyane returned to the Bismarck Archipelago in October 1 884, under lieutenant­
commander Anton Langemak, Oertzen had gone on annexation business to New Guinea. But he 
had left a message for Langemak, indicating that he would approach him with several requisitions 
after his return, and asking him to deal with the punishment of the Metelek in the meantime. 
Your Honour will be informed about the details of the matter and about the hitherto unfortunately 
unsuccessful attempts to punish the guilty parties. In order to preserve our prestige and the fear which 
the natives have to have of our might, if the lives and property of German subjects are to be secure in 
these lands, it would be most highly desirable, to achieve a decisive success (ibid. : fol.68). 
Langemak also preferred to approach the task cautiously. He gladly accepted an offer of the 
Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft to send out a scouting party under the Solomon 
Island trader Sago. Sago returned from New Ireland with a prisoner, but only a few hours before 
Oertzen returned from New Guinea. As he told Langemak about the land acquisitions Finsch had 
made in preparation for Germany's annexation moves, Langemak thought that the time had come 
to go ahead with his more glamorous flag hoisting instructions, but Oertzen saw no need to rush 
matters . This left Langemak no choice but to steam to New Ireland, after another, more urgent 
requisition by Oertzen. He was saved by the bell . On the morning of 1 November, when the 
Hyane was about to reach Wallis Island, where the Metelek were now supposed to live, SMS 
Elisabeth appeared over the horizon. Langemak immediately placed himself under the command 
of her captain, Rudolph Schering, who had been ordered to start hoisting the German flag 
immediately. The flag raising ceremonies keptLangemak busy until the Hyane was needed to look 
after SMS Marie which had been badly damaged on a reef off northern New Ireland. Oertzen 
managed to catch the Hyane briefly in January 1 885 when she came to obtain spare parts for the 
Marie in Matupi. The occasion for Oertzen' s  new requisition was not even murder but theft. But 
since the affair involved natives in Kinigunan, only a short distance from Matupi, Langemak 
could hardly refuse. 
On 15 January at 4 a.m. SMS Hyane left Matupi with Oertzen, the two complaining traders, 
Mouton and Brandt, as guides and Hernsheim's personal servant, Topange, as an interpreter. At 
dawn the two cutters were put ashore. By 7 o'clock the landing parties had returned with two 
prisoners, Tomatari and Togulum-no shots having been fired. This had been the intention, since 
Oertzen had decided that a fine of, respectively, 1 60 and 40 fathoms of shell money would be an 
adequate punishment.17 Langemak had accepted Oertzen' s wish to avoid bloodshed and instructed 
the officers in charge of the landing parties accordingly. Guided by Mouton, sub-lieutenant 
Krtiger had captured Togulum in his sleep. Tomatari had also offered no resistance to lieutenant 
Meyer. Instead he had tried to buy himself free by offering some shell money. It had been taken 
but Tomatari was nonetheless marched to the beach. Together with Togulum, he was tied to posts 
at Mouton's  house; a guard with a loaded rifle being placed next to them. After this had been 
accomplished, Langemak appeared with Oertzen in his gig and took over. With the help of 
Topange the two prisoners were interrogated. They confessed their crime and were sentenced to 
the predetermined fines, to be paid within three hours . But little was added to Tomatari' s  
unsuccessful bribe. Since Langemak was not prepared to wait, he  marched with some men to 
17  These fines represented a considerable cash value, since one fathom was worth about 2.50 Marks at the time. 
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Tornatari' s  village to inform its inhabitants, who were hiding in the surrounding bush, that he 
would start to destroy their canoes and houses. Within minutes the full amount was produced and 
the prisoners were released with the warning that they would be punished more severely in future. 
While this brought this particular affair to a satisfactory conclusion, it was too little for Oertzen 
who wrote a frustrated report to Bismarck on 12  November 1885 (RM I/2896) : "I am faced with 
a large number of disputes with natives, in particular attacks by them on the property of the 
German firms, which can only be . . .  punished with the help of a German warship, since a police 
force is lacking". However, SMS Albatross, which bunkered coal in Matupi in early September, 
was unable to accept any requisitions because she had to continue her journey without delay to 
annex the Carolines. She had no time to spare again when passing through in October 1 885, and 
during the first half of 1 885 all warships had been preoccupied by the mishap of SMS Marie. 
Having seen warships repeatedly without being punished, the natives "now think we are unable 
to harm them and have become more provocative and dangerous as a result". "It is high time for 
energetic action", Oertzen concluded, "and I hope that SMS Albatross will return as soon as 
possible". 
Help was on its way. As requested by the foreign office the admiralty had cabled SMS 
Albatross in Brisbane to speed up repairs and to sail under its new commander, Friedrich Count 
von Baudissin, to the Bismarck Archipelago at the earliest opportunity. It was 12  February 1886 
before she cast anchor in Mioko, but two days later Baudissin started to work his way through 
Oertzen's  list of requisitions (RM I/2625). 
The first requisition related to a comparatively minor affair: some bags of copra had been 
stolen from a trader of the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft in the Birar district in 
the southeastem Gazelle Peninsula and subsequently a shed, containing 40 tonnes of copra, had 
been burnt down, allegedly at the instigation of one of Farrell 's  traders, a man named Ned 
Kerakoose. Oertzen' s requisition suggested the usual shell money fine of between 100 and 200 
fathoms for the native chiefs but was vague about the treatment Ned Kerakoose was to receive. 
Things again went smoothly. Kerakoose was arrested by lieutenant Sass shortly after SMS 
Albatross had cast anchor in the evening of 14 February. Sago once more proved his worth by 
tricking the main native suspects into coming to his boat and delivering them to the warship in the 
course of the night. Since Kerakoose was bailed out by Farrell the next morning for $500 and 
since Oertzen was happy to take two hostages with him until a reduced fine of 50 fathoms of shell 
money had been paid, Baudissin was ready to leave by 1 p.m . .  
The situation in  northern New Ireland, where he arrived on 21  March, was more serious. One 
of Farrell's  traders, Carr, had been killed in December 1 885. His stations in Lessoa, Matinsula 
and Tenisoa had been burnt down or looted. Two ofHemsheim' s traders in Kableman and Butbut 
had also been attacked. While they had escaped, their native labourers had been killed and two 
of them had been eaten in front of the traders ' very eyes. Oertzen insisted on energetic action. The 
New Irelanders, or Neu Mecklenburgians, had repeatedly escaped punishment and were becoming 
so aggressive that they constituted a serious danger for all traders-and Lowery, the Hemsheim 
trader in Kableman, had indeed been killed during a second attack by the time Baudissin had 
issued his orders to his two landing parties. 
Baudissin's  orders stressed that the might of the emperor had to be demonstrated with all 
available means. The immediate goal, however, was the arrest of those personally responsible for 
the various crimes. Women, children and property were under the protection of the landing 
parties, whereas all weapons, in particular firearms, were to be confiscated. The plan was to march 
inland, cutting off the natives ' escape route to the interior, to surround the villages and to arrest 
the culprits, or hostages to secure their subsequent surrender. The landing parties were 
comparatively small-21 and 32 men-each with a European guide and a few native interpreters. 
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Although it was to be essentially a police action the marines were issued with 40 cartridges each 
and special care was taken to guard the boats at all times. 
After a strenuous march through mangrove swamp, the larger landing party under lieutenant 
Sass reached Bulgai and took five prisoners, one of whom was later shot by "the interpreters" 
when he tried to escape. Lieutenant Randewig' s  expedition was more eventful. The village of 
Majuro was fortified with strong pallisades on two sides. Approaching the southern one, 
Randewig's men were received with rifle fire, but from the bush rather than from the village, 
which proved to be deserted when the pallisade was stormed, after the guns in the bush had been 
silenced with a salvo. 
What made the march on Majuro "interesting" (Baudissin's term) was that the person 
murdered by its inhabitants had not been a European trader but a chief from the neighbouring 
village of Kableman, whose subjects had followed the landing party, despite orders to the 
contrary, decked with war paint and howling fiercely. As soon as the marines had entered Majuro, 
the Kableman rushed after them and burnt the village to the ground. In Baudissin' s  view, 
Randewig could not have prevented this, but he, Baudissin, would take action against such 
interference in the future. Nonetheless, he counted the burning of Majuro as a success.  He was 
doubly pleased when the escapee shot in Bulgai turned out to be one of those mainly responsible 
for the murder of Lowery. 18 In addition Sass had confiscated 178 spears-and all that at the cost 
of only two lightly wounded marines. 19 
Next on the list was the island of Kabotheron, whose chief had been behind the murder of 
Carr. Baudissin' s  inquiries revealed that Kabotheron had been evacuated. The bulk of the 
population had moved to the island of Namanne, whereas "the criminals and warriors" had fled 
to a group of small islands on the outer reef. Baudissin decided to concentrate on the latter, 
intending to surround the islands during the night with his boats, a trap from which he believed 
not a mouse could escape. It turned into a fiasco. The steam pinnace broke down and had to be 
towed by the cutter, since it carried the "indispensable" revolving cannon. The chimney of the 
cutter's overworked steam-engine had blazed like a signal torch in the dark, so that the islands 
were deserted when they were finally reached at dawn. The fleeing canoes were still visible, but 
could not be pursued because the water proved to be unexpectedly shallow. In desperation the 
revolving cannon was brought into action but without registering a single hit, because the distance 
of some 3 ,000 metres was already too large. 
During the following rest day 22 less troublesome chiefs were rounded up, among them the 
"notorious" Metango of Nusa, who, Geiseler had claimed, had been shot dead during an earlier 
encounter with SMS Hyane. Oertzen and Baudissin explained to the assembled chiefs that they 
would from now on be held personally liable for any unrest in their districts, whether or not their 
own tribe was responsible for it. A picture of the emperor was displayed, together with a few large 
cannon shells-a combination which, Baudissin thought, did not fail to make an impression. 
After a day of heavy rain Baudissin went to Kabotheron Island where, he had been told, a few 
old people remained. He wanted to tell them that he would continue to fight their tribe until it 
surrendered Carr' s murderers. The people, however, had sensibly hidden in the mangrove swamp 
in the centre of the island where there was no hope of finding them. Thus SMS Albatross moved 
on to Kapsu. 
For Kapsu Baudissin had been given a mixed bag of requisitions . Its inhabitants had cut down 
hundreds of coconut palms Hernsheim had planted on part of a large area of land he claimed to 
have acquired. In addition, Hernsheim had complained that Farrell had stationed several traders 
1 8  Two of the four other prisoners were released as not having been directly involved. 
19 Both of them were hit by spears rather than bullets. This caused Baudissin to comment on the underestimated 
dangerousness of this weapon which was capable of penetrating five centimetres into a tree, a target a warrior would rarely 
miss at 50 paces. 
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on his land, even taking over some unoccupied buildings. "I have to investigate this matter 
thoroughly on the spot", Oertzen had written, "to satisfy myself that the claims made by 
Hernsheim & Co. are in fact correct". Should this prove to be the case, Baudissin was requested 
to remove the traders by force. Since all of Farrell ' s  traders had in the meantime been chased 
away and the Kapsu chiefs behaved in a gratifyingly submissive manner, Oertzen determined that 
a severe reprimand was sufficient so that Baudissin could concentrate on the next lot of misdeeds, 
including the murder of another Farrell trader, Campbell, which could all be traced back to a 
cluster of three villages : Mankai, Libidor and Lasua. 
Able to muster between them at least 600 warriors, these villages were said to terrorise the 
entire region, hiring out their services as mercenaries to the highest bidder if they were not 
fighting on their own account. Baudissin therefore expected tough opposition. Indeed, he wished 
it, since he saw little point in shelling empty villages. If open resistance was offered, on the other 
hand, he could crush the prestige of these villages, "once and for all". Nonetheless, the reinforced 
landing party under lieutenant Randewig was ordered to arrest in the first instance the individual 
"criminals" who were known to his guides. Only if the arrests were resisted was he to fight, but 
then as hard as he could. To be more precise, Randewig was to proceed in this manner first in 
relation to the central village, Libidor, and, on his way back, deal similarly with Mankai which 
he was to bypass earlier. 
Once more the description of the terrain Baudissin had been given bore little resemblance to 
reality. Randewig barely reached Mankai at sunrise, seeing its last inhabitants flee into the bush. 
After setting fire to the village, he continued his march towards Libidor where he believed the 
Mankai people had sought refuge. But he was attacked from both sides and the rear, five of his 
men receiving minor injuries during the first hail of spears. A pitched battle ensued. The Mankai 
were finally driven away, leaving nine dead behind. Randewig's  men had suffered no further 
casualties . They were received in Kapsu by its delighted inhabitants with an offering of drinking 
nuts, dirty and exhausted and many without their boots which had disintegrated during eight hours 
of marching across coral rocks and swamp. 
Despite this victory Baudissin felt that Libidor and Lasua also deserved a lesson. High surf 
prevented a landing in Libidor and Baudissin found Lasua deserted, after having fired his cannons 
at some of its inhabitants who were gleefully watching the unsuccessful first attempts of the 
landing party to make its way through the narrow passage in the reef. After burning down two 
thirds ofLasua-leaving the rest intact to encourage the inhabitants to return in the hope of better 
times when they would again produce copra for the traders-SMS Albatross continued to 
Lamerotte where Nanqui, the suspected murderer of Campbell, was said to be hiding. 
In this case Baudissin's  preparatory work paid off. Campbell' s  neighbour, Tross, had 
persuaded some of Nanqui ' s  relatives to come with him to Kapsu. Once on board they soon 
wailed so loudly that Baudissin put them "under arrest" because it was feared that they would 
jump into the sea if they were not restrained. However, the unpleasant experience of being 
"restrained"-presumably chained-for a few hours was worth it. By questioning them Oertzen 
established that Nanqui had been the black sheep of Lamerotte but that he had spent most of his 
time elsewhere, especially in Libidor, where he had become involved in the Campbell murder. 
Since they were innocent, Baudissin put the prisoners ashore in Lamerotte, appropriately 
frightened, and steamed back to Nusa, after a detachment had conducted a symbolic search for 
Nanqui, but without waiting for the pig he had been promised by his grateful ex-prisoners. 
While Oertzen was using the steam cutter to deal "with some land matters", SMS Albatross 
proceeded to Kabien to carry out the last New Ireland requisition, concerned with yet another 
attack on a trader. When the landing party found Kabien deserted, lieutenant Sass put the village 
to the torch and ordered a breakfast break before the return march. The marines had barely settled 
down when they were attacked. Hand to hand fighting developed costing two Kabien lives. No 
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marines were wounded. The total number of Kabien casualties remained in the dark. Even the two 
corpses had vanished when Sass came back from pursuing the enemy-not retrieved by their 
relatives, but, as Sass discovered, thrown in the flames by his guides who, according to Baudissin, 
were disgusted "with our perverted tastes" when they were prevented from enjoying their meal. 
This cannibal episode provided Baudissin with a welcome excuse for treating Germany's 
colonial subjects as military enemies, but he believed that he had done all he could for their 
education for the time being. Leaving a detachment of six men under a sergeant behind, which 
was to arrest the Kabotheron chiefs, he turned his attention to New Britain, resolved to return to 
Libidor after things had settled down. 
The immediate reasons for Oertzen' s requisitions concerning the north coast of the Gazelle 
Peninsula were again comparatively minor: several thefts from trading stations, a case of arson 
and the suspected poisoning of a Tolai sub-trader. But behind them stood the towering figure of 
Tovering, 20 the richest chief in the area, who was suspected of being involved in all these affairs. 
The main aim was therefore the subjugation of Tovering. A landing party set out on 8 March, at 
5.00 a.m. , under the command of lieutenants Randewig and Sass. Their guide and interpreter was 
the naturalist Johannes Kubary who, after spending many years in Micronesia, was now employed 
as an agent by the Hemsheim firm.21 
Kubary had advised Baudissin that 30 marines were ample to deal with Tovering. He and his 
people would most probably flee when the troop approached, which could then confiscate his 
shell money treasure and thereby force him to surrender. The landing party returned at 3 . 15  p.m., 
empty-handed and embarrassed. Tovering had received them in his fortified mountain hamlet, 
surrounded by about 30 warriors . Signal drums could be heard throughout the district and more 
warriors had been seen hiding in the densely wooded valley leading up to Tovering's  eyrie. 
Randewig and Sass were not prepared to risk a military confrontation under these circumstances 
and Kubary had flatly refused to mention such dangerous topics as "arrest" or "shell money 
fines" .  After some polite conversation, the landing party quietly made its way back to the coast. 
Baudissin was furious. The following day a second attempt was to be made, this time with the 
trader Lewerentz as guide. The landing party was almost doubled in strength, comprising not only 
48 marines, but also a doctor, a medical assistant and five men to carry the wounded and to 
perform other auxiliary tasks. Baudissin meant business. It had to be made clear beyond any 
shadow of doubt that Tovering had to surrender unconditionally. Although his arrest was still the 
first priority, Baudissin's  final message to his landing party was to use "every opportunity . . .  to 
crush any resistance from Tovering, even at a high price, once and for all". 
Having put the landing party ashore, SMS Albatross proceeded to Kabaira. From there 
lieutenant Schroder was to set out with a small contingent to meet the main party on its way down 
from Tovering's  village. His party came under fire as soon as it landed and suffered two 
casualties, one of them serious. By the time the wounded were safely back on board and Baudissin 
had established that the shots had been fired by "Tovering's  people" and not, as had been first 
suspected, the "Kabakada tribe" which had formally surrendered to Schroder in the morning, the 
main landing party had also returned. Instead of emerging triumphantly from among the trees with 
Tovering as a prisoner, it approached by boat from the direction of Kabakada. It had run into an 
ambush from which it escaped, despite heavy fire, at the cost of only two minor casualties. After 
Lewerentz had led the party in circles for the next hour or so, Randewig had given orders to 
retreat, since open resistance was no longer offered. Although he was of the opinion that he had 
crushed the enemy-a view shared by Baudissin, who believed that nine confirmed dead were 
20 ''Tovering" is, of course, identical with Danks' s  "Toviringi". 
21 Kubary later became the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's station manager in Constantinhafen. 
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sufficient proof of a decisive victory-the landing party had been harassed by snipers until it had 
reached the Methodist mission station in Kabakada. 22 
SMS Albatross spent the next morning shelling the Kabaira coast, causing, according to 
Baudissin, tremendous panic among the inland villages with her far-reaching cannons. Then the 
coastline was again raked with the revolving cannon before a landing party was put ashore to 
destroy the villages and plantations of the people who had fired on lieutenant Schroder's 
detachment. Now Baudissin decided he had done enough, as it  could surely not be his duty "to 
devastate our own Protectorate". In the hope that he had "instilled respect in the natives" he raised 
anchor to return to New Ireland to restore his badly shaken confidence. 
The detachment left behind in Nusa had been unable to capture the Kabotheron chiefs, but it 
had harassed their subjects, who were getting desperately short of food. Since Baudissin claimed 
that he had, from the start, been guided by the wish not only to punish but also to restore peace, 
he allowed the people to return to their gardens, under the condition that they would offer no 
shelter to their ,chiefs. Nanqui too had proved impossible to catch, but Baudissin consoled himself 
with the pious wish that he had been cast out by his own people, so that public peace had also 
been assured in that region. 
Baudissin' s crowning triumph came in Mankai. Its inhabitants had approached the local trader 
to arrange for a formal peace ceremony, an offer Baudissin hastened to interpret as unconditional 
surrender. He went ashore with Oertzen and received the spears the warriors presented to him as 
a symbol of their peaceful intentions. He returned one of them as what he understood to be a 
reciprocal gesture, distributed tobacco, told the warriors that the emperor would reward obedience 
with his protection and, as an added bonus, pronounced that the recruiting oflabourers in northern 
New Ireland had been prohibited by Oertzen. 
Everybody in this area was now ready to surrender. This was not only his opinion but also that 
of Herr von Oertzen. Unfortunately, there was no time to reap the fruits of his labour since he had 
to rush back to New Britain, where his presence was urgently required. Upon his arrival he was 
informed that here the whole country was filled with fear. Yet no formal peace offerings had been 
made. He stipulated a collective fine of 900 fathoms of shell money-or 600 fathoms and the 
surrender of the by now almost forgotten arsonist-to be paid within 48 hours. When no payments 
were made, Baudissin embarked on a campaign of destruction. With the hired help of 32 natives 
from Mioko the landing party spent three days criss-crossing the hinterland of Kabakada, burning 
villages and destroying gardens, causing damage far in excess of the stipulated fine. The Mioko, 
much afraid at first, quickly became enthusiastic demolition experts. Open resistance was never 
offered, but snipers occasionally fired shots, causing two minor casualties. While, in contrast to 
New Ireland, no formal surrender was achieved, Baudissin believed that he had taught the natives 
a lesson they would not like to see repeated. 
SMS Albatross left the Gazelle Peninsula on 26 March for Sydney, carrying out a final, anti­
climactical requisition by Oertzen en route. It consisted of forcefully pulling down a trader's hut 
between Ralum and Kinigunan which Mouton had refused to vacate, despite repeated instructions 
by Oertzen. 
On his way to Sydney, Baudissin composed a supplementary report to the admiralty, because 
he had to justify staying on in the Bismarck Archipelago instead of carrying out his orders to go 
to the Carolines to retrieve the symbols of German sovereignty which remained there after the 
1 885 German flag hoisting ceremonies had been superseded by a Papal arbitration recognising 
the older claims by Spain. But the justification for staying in the Gazelle Peninsula soon became 
a justification for leaving it without achieving a decisive military victory. 
To make his case, Baudissin distinguished between the punishment of natives, their formal 
surrender and their actual subjugation. With the limited means of power at his disposal he had had 
22 Baudissin noted with indignation that the stretchers with the wounded were the snipers' favourite target. 
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to settle for the mere punishment of the natives in the hinterland of Kabakada and Kabaira. Even 
a much larger force-like that of the now expected cruiser squadron-could not be sure to 
subjugate the natives within a short time. Hundreds of marines could march across the country 
for days without sighting a single native, while suffering heavy casualties from snipers. If 
punishment was the goal, one had to hit as hard and quickly as one could and then leave 
immediately. Nothing was more harmful than the prolonged but passive presence of a warship. 
This was why he had left the area as soon as he had carried out his campaign of destruction. To 
be sure, it would have been highly desirable to arrest, try and execute Tovering, but at present no­
one was legally entitled to do so. Besides, Tovering' s  surrender would have achieved little. 
Despite his wealth, which permitted him to hire more than a thousand warriors, many of them 
armed with modem rifles, resistance would not have collapsed with his arrest. Nor would his 
people be prepared to buy his release with the payment of even a hundred fathoms of shell money. 
To subjugate the area each hamlet had to be dealt with individually. This required a strong, land­
based police force of about 20 whites and 50 Solomon Islanders, and it too might take as long as 
a year to complete the task. 
This prepared the ground for Baudissin' s offensive: it was unacceptable that the settlers in the 
Bismarck Archipelago contributed nothing to their own safety but relied on the navy to restore 
order during its brief visits. It was even more regrettable that the imperial commissioner knew so 
little about local conditions. A small gunboat could have easily lost face if it had taken action 
relying on Oertzen' s intelligence. Yet, when Baudissin had entreated Oertzen to keep himself up 
to date about what was happening among the natives for the benefit of subsequent visits of naval 
vessels, he had met with the curt reply: "How can I do this, I have no communications with these 
people". Baudissin regretted having to raise this point, despite his excellent personal relationship 
with Oertzen, since such matters might well be outside the duties of an imperial commissioner. 
But he had felt obliged to think first and foremost of the interests of the navy, and other naval 
commanders had to know where they stood. 
Oertzen's  comments on Baudissin' s  performance in his report to the foreign office of 25 
March 1886 (RKA 2976) were reserved but positive. They focused on the reasons why so many 
crimes had been committed by the natives within the course of a single year, and Farrell 's  trade 
war in northern New Ireland was again given pride of place. Thanks to the energy and 
circumspection of Baudissin, SMS Albatross had executed most of the requisitions successfully, 
although this had required the shedding of more blood than the punishment of the crimes in 
question would have called for. It had only rarely been possible, however, to arrest the culprits, 
or to take hostages. The natives had either run away or had resisted the landing parties as one 
body, because their custom was based on the collective responsibility of the group for the actions 
of one of its members. Hence what had been intended to be police actions had developed, 
frequently and unavoidably, into warfare. Oertzen hoped that the establishment of a permanent 
executive and regular courts would gradually change the natives' behaviour and conceptions. 
Whenever he could, he had tried to explain to them that only guilty individuals were to be 
punished. The rest of the population was to be protected by the German authorities,  in particular 
from wrongs committed by whites. The only collective action required of them was to give up 
cannibalism which would henceforth be severely punished. 
The activities of SMS Albatross in New Ireland had been a complete success :  order had been 
restored and could be maintained, provided the area was visited by a warship every three months 
or so. The same applied to New Britain, 23 with the single exception of the inland districts between 
Kabaira and Kabakada. Their numerous inhabitants had always been hostile to the whites and 
23 In his reports Oertzen took care to employ the new Gennan geographical names, adding in brackets a "germanicised" 
version of the old, British ones-which were still commonly used, even by the German navy-for example "Neu-Pommem 
(Neubritain)". 
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owned hundreds of firearms , including a large number of Snider rifles. More importantly, instead 
of being delighted when their neighbours were punished, as had been the experience in New 
Ireland, the districts had stood together and offered determined resistance. The actions of SMS 
Albatross had demonstrated the superior might of Germany, but victory had been by no means 
decisive, otherwise the mild collective fine of 900 fathoms of shell money would have been 
quickly paid as a sign of submission. The resistance of these natives still needed to be 
broken-the sooner the better for public peace and order in the entire area, since no other natives 
would dare to stand up against German authority once the most powerful and warlike tribes had 
been subjugated. Unfortunately SMS Albatross had lacked the means as well as the time to carry 
out the necessary measures, which would have had to include a total disarmament of the tribes in 
question. 
Although his report stopped short of criticising Baudissin, the personal relationships between 
him and Oertzen had cooled considerably when SMS Albatross returned in May 1 886. By the 
time Baudissin got around to reporting on this second round of activities, on 1 2  August 1 886 (RM 
112626), he was furious with Oertzen. 
When SMS Albatross arrived in Matupi on 3 1 May 1 886, Baudissin was informed about the 
recent developments in the Kabakada/Kabaira area not by Oertzen but by the missionary Danks 
and the trader Cook. They told him that internal fighting had broken out which had caused 
Tovering to move across to the Baining side of Weberhafen. The only incident mentioned by 
Oertzen was the burning down of an almost empty copra shed at the deserted Kabaira station, 
which warranted no punishment. Indeed, he did not want Baudissin to take any action. Not a 
single written requisition was presented. Oertzen merely asked Baudissin orally to check upon the 
few remaining Farrell traders in northern New Ireland on his way to the Carolines. Yes, it was 
true, Oertzen had admitted, when Baudissin had confronted him, that one native had cut another's 
throat not far from Matupi, but it would be going too far if the German authorities interfered in 
such "internal" matters. True also, Danks had asked him to do something about a native who had 
killed his mother near his station in Kabakada, but since the culprit had in the meantime enlisted 
to go as a labourer to Samoa it was sufficient to ask the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen­
Gesellschaft to keep him away a bit longer. The last case presented by Baudissin involved the 
burning down of one of Danks' s churches. According to Oertzen it had only been a bush material 
structure of little monetary value. Besides, the arson had not been directed against the mission but 
had been performed in accordance with native custom to force Danks to demand compensation 
from someone who had wronged the arsonist so that a punishment of the arsonist was 
inappropriate.24 Oertzen' s  general message to Baudissin was unequivocal: leave the Gazelle 
Peninsula as quickly as possible and let me wait for the cruiser squadron which will deal with all 
outstanding matters. 
As Baudissin would have liked to see the Kabaira/Kabakada affair settled before that 
happened, he eagerly accepted the offer of a Nodup chief to capture Tovering in his Baining 
refuge, provided SMS Albatross would leave for a few days so that Tovering could be caught off 
guard. Baudissin duly absented himself to the southeastern corner of the Gazelle Peninsula to 
survey a newly discovered harbour, which he named "Rtigenhafen" after an island in the Baltic 
of whose unusually shaped port it reminded him. However, on his return the dreams of presenting 
Tovering's  head to rear-admiral Knorr on a platter were shattered. Tovering was no longer in 
Baining, and was said to have returned to his home base where neither the Nodup chief nor 
Baudissin could get him. 
Baudissin' s only consolation was that he found everything peaceful in northern New Ireland. 
Schulle assured him that trading had been resumed so that any further punishment of the natives 
24 lbis is a reference to the Tolai custom of kamara (see Sack, 1 972) whereby an injury is passed on to innocent third 
parties at the expense of the original wrongdoer who is obliged to foot, eventually, the entire bill. 
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was undesirable. Since the outstanding complaints against Farrell ' s  traders were also not 
straightforward, Baudissin decided that it was better not to stir things up and merely warned the 
traders that the navy would make just as short work of them as of the natives if they did not 
behave properly. He concluded his report to the admiralty with praise of Schulle whom he saw 
emerging as a kind of white paramount chief, who should be given free rein, naturally within the 
law, even though his immediate aim was simply to enrich himself. 
When the cruiser squadron arrived on 15  June 1 886, Oertzen found admiral Knorr 
unexpectedly reluctant to get involved in the Tovering affair. It was only when, during his oral 
representation, Oertzen claimed that the measures taken by Baudissin in March had damaged the 
prestige of the navy in the eyes of the natives that Knorr was moved to act. 
Two landing parties, one setting out from Kabakada, the other from Kabaira, were to perform 
a pincer movement to cut off Tovering and his main ally, Tolonglong, from the interior, to arrest 
them, to confiscate their shell money and, at the very least, to destroy Tovering' s  hamlet. The 
burning down of the hamlets of Tovering and Tolonglong was all that was achieved. The landing 
parties saw a few natives from the distance, captured just 25 fathoms of shell money, and 
impressed, so it was hoped, the natives by their sheer number. 
Whereas the details of this operation are of little historical interest, the internal processes set 
in train by two letters by Knorr-the first to Baudissin, dated 21  June 1 886, the second to 
Oertzen, dated 1 July 1 886 (RM I/2732)-are significant. Knorr had formed the view that 
Baudissin' s actions had been "insufficiently thought through" and that his subsequent reports had 
been "very unclear" (ibid.) .  He singled out three points on which Oertzen' s  reports differ 
significantly from those of Baudissin-as Knorr read them. 
Firstly, it appeared that, instead of stopping short of ordering Tovering to accompany the 
landing party to SMS Albatross on 8 March when it became apparent that it might be difficult to 
enforce such an order, such an order had, in fact, been issued and expressly rejected by Tovering. 
Secondly, it happened that the landing party had only got one third of the way to Tovering' s  
hamlet o n  9 March when it had been ambushed, s o  that its subsequent "victory" had not been 
achieved against Tovering' s  forces . Thirdly, it appeared that the demolition mission had also 
penetrated nowhere near Tovering' s  hamlet, so that Tovering had, in fact, not been punished at 
all for his insolent refusal to obey naval orders and, hence, the emperor' s  commands. 
Baudissin responded to this dressing down in a report to the admiralty, dated 5 September 
1 886 (RM I/2626), in which he asked his superiors to obtain clarification from the imperial 
commissioner who had obviously misunderstood the situation; for it was Oertzen who was to 
blame for the difficulties his men had so bravely overcome and who was now adding insult to 
injury by claiming otherwise. However, the arguments Baudissin put forward in his 
defence-which centred, predictably, on Oertzen' s  inability to provide the navy with adequate 
logistic support-are less rewarding than the bits of additional information he provided along the 
way. 
The first is revealed because Baudissin failed to appreciate that Knorr had read his March 
report as saying that Tovering had not been ordered to accompany the first landing party on 8 
March back to SMS Albatross, and that this had permitted a strategic withdrawal without a loss 
of face.Of course, Tovering had refused to come, otherwise none of the subsequent actions would 
have been necessary. Puzzled, because Knorr's first criticism made little sense on this basis, 
Baudissin gave a more detailed account of the navy's only face to face encounter with Tovering. 25 
His two lieutenants had been passive witnesses at an occasion during which the appearance 
of a friendly meeting had been carefully preserved. All the talking had been done by Kubary, but 
his command of the local language had been so limited that he had to use his servant as an 
25 This criticism was based on the view that Baudissin's report had not just been "very unclear", but that it had, in fact, 
misrepresented the actual position. 
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interpreter.26 A s  far as the lieutenants could tell Kubary had instructed his servant to translate to 
Tovering: "The white chief [Baudissin] wants to talk to you. Be so kind as to come with us. I 
would advise you to take a pig with you as a present, then nothing will happen to you." While a 
pig was instantly produced, Tovering had said, according to Kubary' s servant: "I never go on 
board [of naval ships] . I will not go this time either. I don't like it." Kubary's response to this had 
been: "Then we will have to tell him [Baudissin] . He will become very angry and will send 
someone to get you", whereupon Tovering had insisted that he would not come even then. What 
Tovering had actually said to Kubary's servant, and how the latter had actually translated 
Kubary' s messages to Tovering, no-one would ever know. The man had later mentioned to the 
missionary Danks that he had not translated everything Kubary had told him, but if he had been 
dishonest in this manner to his own master there was no reason to believe his subsequent 
statement to the missionary either. 
The second piece of information is part of a comment on Oertzen' s request to Knorr to disarm 
all the natives. When Baudissin had wanted to issue orders to that effect in March, Oertzen had 
insisted that he could not confiscate the property of innocent people. Baudissin had reminded 
Oertzen of this statement when the first two marines had been wounded, and urged him to use at 
least the shell money fines he received to buy back firearms on a voluntary basis.  
The two other pieces of information relate to the final demolition mission, which Baudissin 
had seen as the adoption of a customary strategy. His aim had been to destroy property worth at 
least as much as the unpaid fine of 900 fathoms of shell money he had imposed on Tovering and 
his people. The beauty of the scheme had been that it did not matter, according to local custom, 
if the property destroyed did not belong to Tovering because he would be held responsible for its 
destruction and had to compensate those who had innocently suffered.27 Baudissin also stressed 
that great care had been taken in the execution of this ingenious scheme that no coconut palms 
were damaged so as not to harm the copra trade. 
The admiralty did not bother to ask Oertzen, via the foreign office, for a clarification, probably 
because the question of logistic support for the navy had already been addressed by Knorr in his 
letter to Oertzen of 1 July 1 886. In it Knorr had complained that the navy was facing an 
impossible task when it was requisitioned to arrest particular chiefs or to punish entire villages 
or districts in Melanesia. The way things stood, it could either refuse to carry out all such 
requisitions or continue to accept them, as had been regularly done in the past, with virtually no 
hope of success. Neither of these alternatives was acceptable. However, the situation could be 
improved. Since surprise was the only chance to achieve results, all requisitions from now on had 
to be kept secret. At the same time they had to be more carefully prepared. Both were the 
responsibility of the representative of the imperial government-that is to say, Oertzen-who had 
to acquire to this end a precise knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, including their 
language and their social and political organisation. In particular, he had to arrange that the 
appropriate number of carriers was available28 and to prepare sketch maps of the areas in question, 
which showed all the information relevant for military purposes, such as the location of harbours, 
villages, tracks, rivers and fords. 
This was not what Oertzen had bargained for. Hence he changed tack when responding to 
Knorr' s requests in a letter of 15 July 1 886. It was addressed to "the Imperial Command of the 
26 It is not stated which language Kubarry used to communicate with his servant, but the naval officers were obviously 
able to understand some of it. The phrasing of the Gennan translation given by Baudissin suggests that it ws an early form 
of "Pidgin". 
27 This was, of course, a conveniently legalistic interpretation of kamara. It is unlikely that the Tovering distributed 900 
fathoms of shell money, or indeed any shell money, among those whose houses and gardens were destroyed . 
28 Knorr specified that at least one carrier, but preferably two, were required for each ten members of a landing party so 
that the cruiser squadron would have required up to 1 00 carriers-a target which Oertzen would have had little chance 
of meeting. 
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South Sea Station, here" (RM I/2733) and merely for the record, since Oertzen had not faced up 
to Knorr before the latter departed from Matupi on 3 July 1 886, leaving the navy' s files in 
Oertzen' s  care. Oertzen could therefore quietly add his letter to these files, where it would await 
the arrival of the next warship-which happened to be SMS Adler under Wietersheim.29 
In his response Oertzen acknowledged the rear-admiral's valuable suggestions, which he 
would certainly take to heart, but stressed that the position was really quite different. As the files 
would show most of his requisitions, including those made to SMS Albatross, had been carried 
out with admirable success. The Tovering affair had been a unique exception. Furthermore, 
conflicts with natives occurred in areas where civilisation was penetrating hitherto unexplored 
districts, so that no-one could be expected to provide reliable intelligence about them. As for 
carriers, who obviously had to be supplied by friendly neighbouring tribes, arrangements could 
not be made in advance, because natives were unable to keep secrets so that it would be quite 
impossible to take the enemy by surprise. A sudden dawn attack by a naval landing party put 
ashore immediately after the warship's  arrival offered by far the best chance of success. If this 
did not work, the only alternative was for the landing party to stay on, pursuing the natives 
relentlessly, until they were willing to surrender. The problem had simply been that neither SMS 
Albatross nor the cruiser squadron had had sufficient time to employ this strategy. 
By presenting the situation in this manner, Oertzen avoided having to admit that he had no 
intention of tracking through the bush, preparing sketch maps and learning native languages, much 
less of playing the policeman himself. To write requisitions and to watch from the safety of a 
warship how they were carried out was more his style-and was that not all that could be fairly 
expected from a consular official?30 
Oertzen's  approach paid off, if only because he found a sympathetic audience in captain von 
Wietersheim. But it took more than three months before his tactic was tested-and I propose to 
use this interval to catch up with the developments in the Marshall Islands.3 1  
v 
When the Marshall Islands were placed under imperial protection by SMS Nautilus under captain 
Rottger in October 1 885,32 the German government expected that the two German firms active in 
the group would form a counterpart to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie which would be issued with 
a similar charter and assume full administrative responsibility. Indeed, the sailing orders for the 
Nautilus had barely been issued, when the chancellor of the Reich reminded these firms that they 
could not count on the permanent presence of an imperial commissioner, backed by a warship, 
because the Reichstag would refuse to approve the necessary funds (RKA 2954). The two firms, 
the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen Gesellschaft and the Hemsheim firm, which had ranged 
themselves more or less reluctantly and sincerely with the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in Melanesia, 
were not at all keen to accept a charter in Micronesia, especially when it became clear that neither 
29 Knorr was even Jess impressed by Oertzen than Baudissin. He reported to the admiralty that the difficult role of the 
imperial commissioner required a great deal more attention, effort and initiative than Oertzen was able to muster (RM 
I/2732). 
30 This is, of course, my interpretation. But Baudissin did complain bitterly that while Oertzen had always avoided 
accompanying the landing forces inland, he had specifically requested that they should camp at Tovering' s  hamlet-a 
request which Baudissin had declined because he was not prepared to expose his men to the notorious danger of 
contracting fever during a night in the open. 
3 1  This is what the historical record tells us about the "series of punitive raids" which, according to Hempenstall, had 
demonstrated "the inadequacy of the navy as a police force" and had been so bloody that Bismarck had suppressed the 
publication of reports "for fear of political repercussions" (see above: I 02). As facts can speak for themselves, no 
interpretation is required. 
32 The Nautilus belonged to the Hong Kong based East Asian station. It had to come to the assistance of its Sydney-based 
Pacific counterpart, since the latter could not cope with all the flag hoistings which had to be performed at the time. 
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the Carolines nor the Gilbert Islands, which would have linked the colony, respectively, with 
China and Samoa, would become German. 
By the end of January 1 886 it had been agreed that the Hamburg firms should make proposals 
for the most suitable arrangements for administrating the Marshall Islands and that an official 
from the consulate-general in Apia should visit the area to provide the German government with 
up to date information. On 5 February consul-general Stuebe! was given the the option of 
entrusting the mission to his offsider, Knappe, if he felt he could not leave Samoa for an extended 
period. Stuebe! decided against going himself, but it took until May before Knappe set out from 
Apia. When he did, however, he did so in style, not on board a tiny gunboat, like Oertzen two 
years earlier, but with Knorr's cruiser squadron, arriving in Jaluit on 28 May. 
Although Knappe had not been given any special powers, as he was not meant to start 
governing the Marshall Islands but merely to report on how this might best be done, he showed 
a great deal more initiative than Oertzen. The day after his arrival he held a meeting with 
representatives of the commercial interests present on J aluit, including the non-German ones. The 
meeting quickly reached agreement that the administration had to be placed in the hands of a 
resident imperial official, but that the costs for the required minimal administration could easily 
be borne by "the Islands", so that no subsidy from the Reich would be required. The main source 
of local revenue was to be a tax to be paid by the Marshallese in the form of copra which could 
be large enough to cover the estimated running costs of government of just over $5,000 per 
annum. The various fees and taxes to be paid by Europeans, which were only expected to raise 
about half as much, could therefore be used to pay off the initial capital outlay, which the two 
German firms were to provide in the form of a loan on standard commercial terms, and to cover 
any possible shortfalls. 
On the strength of this agreement Knappe not only made far-reaching proposals to the foreign 
office but also took a series of immediate measures. The central one was to install the Hemsheim 
manager, Grosser, as a temporary "Representative of the Imperial Government". For the future 
Knappe envisaged a kind of quasi-consular regime, based on the voluntary submission of the non­
German foreign residents rather than on an exercise of territorial German sovereignty. It was to 
be placed under the German consulate-general in Apia which would be represented by a consular 
secretary, who would also hold a kind of semi-consular court. In fact, such a court started 
operating forthwith, because Knappe also enacted two ordinances which made it an offence if 
non-German merchant vessels failed to report their arrivals and departures to the "Representative 
of the Imperial Government"33 and pronounced the familiar prohibition to supply natives with 
firearms, ammunition, explosives and liquor. 
Since Knappe proposed that a junior official would be posted to Jaluit, it is unlikely that he 
had ambitions in this regard. Yet it was he who was selected to return there as imperial 
commissioner, although the measures he had taken had probably exceeded his authority and 
although the foreign office accepted none of his proposals. On the other hand, Knappe had at least 
done something in a situation in which something needed to be done-and he could not possibly 
have known about the scheme adopted by the Protectorates Act two weeks before his departure 
from Apia. 34 
The instructions issued to Knappe on 1 1  September 1 886 for his role as imperial commissioner 
(RKA 2954) show that the foreign office had every intention of handing over the governmental 
responsibilities for the Marshall Islands to a chartered company as quickly as possible. 
33 German vessels already had to report to the German consul under existing metropolitan legislation. 
34 It is also likely that Knappe assumed that the German government had approved the 1 885 "treaty of protection" which 
would indeed have called for a quasi-consular regime restricted to foreigners. Indeed taken by themselves his subsequent 
instructions as imperial commissioner (see below in the text) could still be interpreted in this sense. 
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In view of the provisional character of your mission it cannot be your task to take responsibility for the 
financial requirements of the future administration of the colony. You will therefore refrain from the 
introduction of new fees and taxes. Only in cases of urgent need, for example for the construction of a 
prison and the employment of a few policemen, should you secure the necessary funds by levying the 
resident foreign firms in accordance with arrangements to be made with them and only insofar as the 
costs cannot be covered by fees which you are paid . . .  for the performance of consular acts. 
To introduce a tax for natives on the basis of their copra production was not at all advisable for 
the time being. In general, Knappe was only to intervene in native affairs if the public order was 
endangered or if his intervention was specifically sought by those involved. As far as the proposed 
ordinance concerning the control of non-German vessels was concerned-to the enactment of 
which Knappe had apparently not confessed-there were no objections, provided the non-German 
firms were happy with it. In addition, Knappe received a blanket instruction to be careful not to 
interfere with the rights of citizens of other nations in order to avoid complaints by foreign 
governments. On the other hand, he was expected to get foreigners, as well as natives, used to the 
new order by being firm but just, thereby ensuring that "the handing over of the administration 
to a colonial company under the supervision of the Reich can be effected without difficulty". 
Knappe left Apia in his new role as imperial commissioner on 1 3  December 1 886 on board 
SMS Albatross, whose command captain von Frantzius had taken over from Baudissin (see RM 
I/2626). He arrived in J aluit on Christmas Eve. The unexpectedly large European community-as 
many as four merchant vessels were also riding at anchor-feasted merrily together in stark 
contrast to the tense segregation in Finschafen. To be sure, Frantzius was displeased when the 
coaling of SMS Albatross by the Hemsheim firm dragged on and one lighter load had to be 
rejected altogether because it was soaking wet. Nor was he amused when the pilot with whom he 
had been supplied collapsed next to him on the bridge with an epileptic fit before his ship had 
started to move. But the pilot was soon replaced, and the rest of the round trip through the 
Marshall Islands-with Knappe on board-went smoothly. 
Knappe made speeches to the assembled chiefs, assuring them of the goodwill of the German 
government, but also impressing upon them that law and order was to rule from now on, so that 
they were no longer permitted to disturb the latter by taking the former into their own hands. All 
of this, Frantzius reported to the admiralty, the chiefs understood perfectly well and approved of 
wholeheartedly. 
SMS Albatross left Jaluit on 7 January 1 887 and anchored a week later in Matupi, alongside 
SMS Adler which was getting ready to take imperial commissioner von Oertzen back to Apia. 
Knappe only stayed on until the middle of the year, since his valuable services were more urgently 
required in Samoa. He was replaced by vice-consul Sonnenschein as acting imperial 
commissioner. 
A critical point during the dawn of German colonial rule in the Marshall Islands was reached 
when the cruiser squadron visited the group in May/June 1 886 because it confronted its 
commander, rear-admiral Knorr, with a whole range of delicate issues. One of them arose because 
the chief of the atoll of Namorik, Lebomari, had let it be known that he did not regard his atoll as 
being under German protection, since he had not been a party to the agreement signed by Kabua 
and other chiefs in 1 885. The German firms suggested that Knorr should now also hoist the 
German flag on Namorik and persuade Lebomari to join the agreement, since he merely felt 
slighted because his signature had been regarded as superfluous. Knorr refused to re-open the 
merry-go-round of flag hoistings, but he was willing to console Lebomari by erecting a sign 
officially proclaiming that Namorik too was under German protection. 
Instead of responding to Knorr' s generosity, Lebomari, "an adherent of the Boston Mission", 
refused to appear before Knorr, declaring that he would prefer to place himself under American 
protection. Only after Knorr's  adjutant had threatened to get him by force if he did not tum up 
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within half an hour did he give in. He came with his entourage, including some native 
missionaries, to be addressed by the adjutant and Knappe about the advantages of German 
protection. This led to an animated private discussion betweenLebomari and the missionaries and 
to a sudden change of heart. His lack of cooperation, he now proclaimed, had merely been due 
to the bad influence of the Boston Mission ! He was not only eager to have the fact of German 
protection documented by a sign in front of his house, but also asked to be taken by the flagship 
to Jaluit where he wanted to confer with Kabua. 
Knorr's next stop was Majuro. The incident requiring his intervention went back to 1 885, 
when the paramount chief, Jiberric, had allegedly promised captain Rottger to pay certain fines 
within a certain period-none of which had been recorded in the naval files. This greatly annoyed 
Knorr, since he therefore had to rely on the version given to him by the traders, who were not only 
the original complainants but also had to act as his interpreters in his dealings with the 
Marshallese, and whom he regarded as not at all trustworthy. This created a situation, Knorr 
complained, where the exercise of his "naval jurisdiction" could easily be seen as being totally 
arbitrary or even intentionally unjust. 
After Jiberric, who had difficulty walking due to a sickness, had finally arrived at the 
Hernsheim station, Knorr made his appearance ashore. He began proceedings by asking the 
assembled Marshallese whether they had any complaints against the traders. Only when this was 
denied did Knorr tum to complaints against Marshallese. The first had been lodged by a Majuro 
chief whose coconuts had been repeatedly and forcefully removed by Jiberric's  main lieutenant. 
Knorr responded with an earnest warning to all chiefs to maintain peace and order, since 
troublemakers would from now on be banished from their islands by the German authorities.35 
The next case involved the theft of allegedly $100 from the German trader Schmidt. This was 
the case already heard by captain Rottger who was said to have decided that Jiberric, who had 
paid $30 on behalf of the thief at the time, claiming this to be the amount actually stolen, should 
pay an extra $70. Knorr had several reasons to be unhappy about this case. Firstly, he tended to 
believe Jiberric rather than Schmidt, as far aS the stolen amount was concerned, so that he 
disapproved of Rottger' s decision, although he felt he had to uphold it. Second! y, he was told that 
the case, which had been the reason for his insistence on Jiberric' s personal appearance despite 
his sickness, the painful effects of which were now vividly demonstrated, had in fact collapsed 
this very morning when Jiberric had paid the outstanding $70 to another trader, which Schmidt 
had not bothered to tell Knorr, although he had been informed about it. Since Knorr nevertheless 
felt that he had to do something, he decided to fine the thief, whom he had brought before him, 
another $30 (the figure is significant), only to see it promptly paid by Jiberric. 
The next case gave Knorr the opportunity to make amends. It concerned a small "spirit hut" 
in front of another trader' s  house, the removal of which Jiberric had promised to ROttger. Knorr 
established that the hut was not only older than the house but that Jiberric owned the land on 
which both structures had been erected. He therefore confirmed that Jiberric had to remove the 
hut, as promised, but that the trader had to pay him the stiff price of $60 in cash for the small plot 
of land.36 
It was the final case which was the real crux. A Marshallese had recently assaulted the trader 
Schmidt, whom Knorr found particularly obnoxious. Although he thought that it was Schmidt's 
fault if a native dared to lay hands on him, Knappe and all but one of the traders, whose advice 
he had sought, insisted that a fine would not do and that a corporal punishment was needed. Knorr 
reluctantly agreed, and 25 strokes were administered to the culprit in front of a large crowd of 
35 Knorr did not indicate what form these banishments were supposed to take. 
36 I do not know whether Knorr considered whether this decision was in accordance with the land acquisition prohibition 
which Rottger had proclaimed the previous year. 
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people who were visibly impressed by this novel spectacle. 37 Knorr took pains to explain to the 
chiefs, whom he had also consulted and who had argued in favour of a fine, that the punishment 
had to fit the crime. However, he was personally far from convinced that this had indeed been the 
case and washed his hands of the whole matter. Because of the short duration of his stay on 
Majuro he was unable to say what further, positive or negative, results his judgements had 
produced. He had tried his best to be fair. If he had, in fact, been unjust, the traders themselves 
would have to suffer the consequences. He had told them that much and had warned them, in their 
own interest, to be reasonable in their relations with the natives . 
Knorr was more concerned to improve the navy's image in the eyes of the assembled 
Marshallese. Hence he embarked upon a long speech to counteract the effects of these 
"unpleasant proceedings". He admonished the chiefs to be peaceful. All these disputes had to 
come to an end since they could only undermine the prosperity and the enjoyment of life among 
such a small population. The fines the Marshallese had paid would not be given to the traders, nor 
would they be kept by the judges, rather they would be paid into a special fund to be used for the 
Marshallese' exclusive benefit. Then he sang the praise of German rule which had their well­
being very much at heart and saw their punishment as a necessary but most painful duty. 
After his return to Jaluit Knorr had to face his most unpleasant task, that of dealing with the 
murder of an English trader, who had been attacked by two Philippino sailors when he had tried 
to prevent a brawl and had been fatally stabbed by one of them. According to Knappe's  
requisition to Knorr (RM 112732), the whites in  Jaluit had met after the trader's death, about a 
month earlier, to decide what to do with his killer. To hand him over to the natives, who would 
have quietly done away with him, as had been the practice in similar cases in the past, had been 
regarded as illegal, now that the Marshall Islands had been placed under German protection. 
Instead the culprit had been locked in a cellar to await his punishment by the cruiser squadron. 
Because the emergency prison had to be constantly guarded, the matter was urgent. As the civil 
administration of justice had not yet been regulated by law he, Knappe, could not dispose of the 
case, so that it was up to the admiral to deal with it by way of court martial, since it would damage 
the prestige of the German government if the people thought that it was incapable of handling 
cases of such a serious nature. 
Knorr rose to the occasion, although he pointed out that he had been unable to constitute a 
court martial because neither were the Marshall Islands in a state of war nor was the accused a 
member of the armed forces. Nevertheless he had felt obliged to deal with the matter in order to 
preserve the prestige of the imperial government. Since it had been proven that the merchant sailor 
Birnabe Castillo had murdered the trader Fred Ackland, it had been necessary, taking into account 
section 21 1 of the German Criminal Code and the need to strengthen and maintain the German 
authority in the protectorate, to sentence him to death. As it was impractical to carry out this 
sentence by decapitation-the official metropolitan German form of execution--Castillo was to 
be hanged. Morever, the execution was to be carried out by "natives of the land", although in the 
presence of a detachment of 40 marines.38 
Instead of describing the gory details of the execution I want to turn to the general comments 
to which this case inspired Knorr. The admiral accepted that under the extraordinary 
circumstances prevailing in a German colony without laws, courts or government a dictatorial 
exercise of power was the only way of maintaining some kind of law and order. He did not know 
if and when a proper administration of justice would be established and this question was 
certainly no business of his. Yet, he had to draw attention to the enormous responsibility the 
person had to carry who exercised this dictatorial jurisdiction. While it was not his place to 
express an opinion as to whether or not naval commanders should be expected to play this role, 
37 Knappe apparently later remembered this corporal punishment rather differently (see above: 62). 
38 It is interesting to compare this early case with the proceedings after the Ponape Rebellion more than 20 years later. 
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it was absolutely necessary to create a clear legal position in this regard, since they might 
otherwise become criminals in the eyes of the law, simply by shouldering this responsibility in 
the course of their military duties . It had to be urgently detennined by law where and when naval 
commanders had to exercise such a jurisdiction and, more broadly, under what circumstances 
naval commanders had to accept requisitions by German consuls or other representatives of the 
imperial government to take any punitive measures. 
Knorr' s concerns were conveyed by the admiralty to the foreign office. It responded on 9 
September 1 886 (RM I/2626). Until other arrangements for the administration of tbe Marshall 
Islands could be made an imperial commissioner would be stationed there who was also to be 
empowered to exercise judicial jurisdiction. Knappe had been provisionally appointed to this 
position. He would be ready as from the middle of November to proceed from Apia to the 
Marshall Islands. Since regular shipping connections were non-existent and it was, in any case, 
preferable if he could take up his post with some ceremony, it was desirable for him to be 
conveyed to J aluit by a warship which could stay with him for a few weeks, SMS Albatross being 
suggested for the purpose. 
We know already that Knappe was indeed taken by SMS Albatross to J aluit, under her new 
commander, Frantzius, in December 1 886. What we do not yet know is that the ship had already 
paid a brief visit to the Marshall Islands under Baudissin in July, en route from the Carolines to 
Sydney. Baudissin had only planned to bunker coal and to carry out some target practice, but he 
got involved in other matters, probably not quite as reluctantly as he made out in his report of 1 2  
August 1 886 (RM I/2626) . 
Upon his arrival in J aluit, SMS Albatross was visited by Grosser who was asked by Baudissin 
why the German flag was flying in front of his house. Grosser explained that he had been installed 
by Knappe as the "Representative of the hnperial Government" and presented Baudissin in this 
capacity with a requisition to visit Mille and Amo where some of the chiefs still refused to accept 
that they stood under German protection. Baudissin was inclined to reject this requisition because 
he believed that Knorr would have dealt with it, or would have left instructions for the next 
warship to do so, if he had felt that action in such cases was required, but he changed his mind 
when a letter arrived from Majuro the next day. In it the Hemsheim trader Muller complained that 
Jiberric had placed him under a "tabu" because it had been at his station that Schmidt's assailant 
had been given the controversial corporal punishment by Knorr. Since then Millier had been 
unable to buy a single pound of copra, so that he was now asking to be given another station 
immediately, unless Jiberric was forced to remove the tabu. 
This was Baudissin' s chance; for if Knorr' s actions had been effective Muller' s authority and 
prestige should have increased-as had happened elsewhere, for example in the case of Schulle 
in northern New Ireland as a result of Baudissin's  punitive expeditions in May. Instead Jiberric 
had punished him merely because he had loyally placed his station at Knorr' s disposal. If it was 
already intolerable that a chief thought he could punish someone who was not his subject, to do 
so as a protest against a sentence pronounced by the navy was outrageous. Something had to be 
done to put an end to this policy of intimidation. Otherwise there would be no end to naval 
interventions. Moreover, since Muller had been the victim of an act of revenge directed against 
a punishment pronounced by Knorr, the navy had a moral obligation to see to it that he was 
compensated. Hence Baudissin had felt compelled to go to Majuro and, this being the case, had 
also visited Mille and Amo on the way.39 
In Mille Baudissin told the assembled chiefs that it made no difference whether or not they 
had been present when the German flag had first been hoisted. This was readily accepted but 
Baudissin was otherwise not favourably impressed by what he saw. True, the houses were well-
39 Naturally, Baudissin was less forthright, but there is no doubt that he was responding, obliquely but with plain 
satisfaction, to Knorr' s criticism of his performance in the Gazelle Peninsula. 
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built and clean; the people were all decently dressed; the missionary Jeremias, an Ebon native 
educated by the Boston Mission, conducted a successful school, and everybody only had good 
things to say about his restraint in non-religious matters . Nonetheless something was seriously 
wrong: a counterbalance to the influence by the mission was lacking. Because they no longer had 
to worry about food and had abandoned their former warlike ways, the people had become lazy, 
soft and effeminate, to the extent that it was now fashionable for men to wander around in ladies '  
skirts ! 
Baudissin' s stay on Amo proved equally uneventful. He informed the assembled chiefs about 
Knappe's  prohibition to supply natives with firearms and liquor-as he had also done in 
Mille-and told them that they had no right to place a tabu on foreigners but should take 
complaints against them to the proper authorities. There were no such complaints but the traders 
raised several tricky questions: did Knappe' s prohibition also apply to natives or halfcastes 
employed as traders? Would the government buy back the now useless supplies of arms and 
ammunition from the traders? Could he, Baudissin, issue land titles to them? Baudissin found 
conditions on Amo much better than on Mille. The people were still more "natural", although they 
had probably "degenerated" sufficiently so as not to cause serious trouble. Only their impressive 
sea-going canoes presented a problem for an orderly administration since one could never be sure 
on which island, or even in which atoll, one would find the people because they were always on 
the move. 
Now to Majuro. Here Baudissin had, so he claimed, intended to banish Jiberric.40 But he let 
himself be persuaded by the local traders, who had to know best what was good for them, that a 
fine was sufficient. He therefore imposed a "disciplinary" fine of $ 1 50 on Jiberric which was paid 
on the spot, although Jiberric claimed that the tabu on Muller had been placed by his sub-chiefs 
without his knowledge-a claim which Baudissin dismissed as being as implausible as it was 
immaterial. Baudissin had the fine demonstratively carried to his boat, only to hand two thirds of 
it subsequently over to Muller as compensation because the losses he had suffered were to be 
regarded as a direct result of a service he had rendered to rear-admiral Knorr.41 Baudissin also 
instructed Jiberric that he was free to trade with whomever he liked, but that his behaviour in this 
instance had been an act of revolt against the "Herr Admiral" and that he could not expect to get 
off so lightly in another instance of this kind. "After some talk he pledged to remove the tabu and 
to mend his ways, and we reinforced the pledge with a handshake." 
Baudissin was pleased with his improvised round trip. Short as it was, it promised positive 
results, in particular because of the surprise the appearance of a warship so soon after the visit of 
the cruiser squadron had caused everywhere. He therefore not only reported to the admiralty but 
also "informed Herr Grosser by letter of the achievements. I have left a copy of this letter [with 
Grosser] for the next of SM Ships arriving here, and I intend to direct another copy to the 
Consulate in Apia"-so that the world would know what a model naval commander he was, no 
matter what Knorr and Oertzen were saying. 
VI 
We left Oertzen in the Bismarck Archipelago in mid July 1 886, guarding the naval files to which 
he had added his reply to Knorr's request for improved logistic support for the navy. In October 
he started to compile a new list of requisitions as if nothing had happened, nothing, that is, which 
40 I rather doubt that he had seriously contemplated making this dangerous move. 
4 1  This may well have been a calculated challenge to Knorr's public announcement that fines would not go as 
compensation to the traders in response to whose complaints they had been pronounced. Knorr himself, however, had 
approved Knappe' s  suggestion that the fines collected during the visit of the cruiser squadron were to be used for the 
erection of a proper prison-as if this was the most natural way of serving the interests of the Marshallese, the purpose 
to which these fines were devoted. 
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would have affected his relationship with the navy or, for that matter, with the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie; for this October list already included the requisition for his ill-fated Christmas visit 
to Finschhafen. But in the Bismarck Archipelago too things had been rather quiet, apart from the 
killing of just one more trader in northern New Ireland. 
The arrival of SMS Adler in Matupi on 2 November encouraged Oertzen to add another item 
to his list. A negro trader named Jimmy had threatened to shoot the keeper of Hernsheim' s inn. 
Since Jimmy was prone to commit outrages of this kind it was imperative to take him out of 
circulation until formal court proceedings could be taken against him-a sign that Oertzen already 
knew about the imminent arrival of a judge in the archipelago, who appeared a fortnight later in 
the person of Schmiele. 
During the first three weeks of her presence SMS Adler underwent a thorough cleaning, so 
that only short-distance jobs could be undertaken. The first concerned an assault on Hernsheim' s 
manager on Matupi by two natives who had only paid part of the shell money fine Oertzen had 
imposed on them. After positioning boats around the island to intercept fleeing canoes, a landing 
party marched to the hamlet of Tolok, the main culprit, at 4.30 a.m. on 4 November, only to find 
that Tolok had departed, together with all his shell money, as soon as SMS Adler had cast anchor. 
Tolok's relatives were asked to pay up on his behalf within the hour. When only 20 fathoms and 
two pigs were produced, the landing party shot another three pigs, said to belong to Tolok, to 
make up the rest of the fine. 
The next day, at a more civilised hour, Jimmy's time had come, when sub-lieutenant Huss 
went with the cutter across to his trading station. Jimmy allowed himself to be arrested peacefully 
but was put in chains for the next ten days, as no suitable lock-up was available. Then he was 
released at Oertzen's instructions because his unidentified employer, presumably Farrell, had 
bailed him out and because Schmiele had just taken up his judicial office so that it was now up 
to him to deal with the matter because, as a US citizen, Jimmy was under his jurisdiction, despite 
the colour of his skin, which had probably not been immaterial in the treatment he was given up 
to this point. 
Schleinitz' s visit to the Bismarck Archipelago in November made no difference to Oertzen' s 
arrangements with Wietersheim, apart from a requisition to permit Schmiele to join SMS Adler's 
round trip so that he could investigate the complaints against Hernsheim's agent Schulle in 
northern New Ireland. Oertzen was happy to surrender this responsibility to Schmiele, as he had 
learned to appreciate Schulle' s assistance during the operations of SMS Albatross in May. Indeed, 
so useful had Schulle become to Oertzen and the navy that even Schmiele's  finding that the 
complaints about his brutality towards his Chinese servants were amply justified was not seen as 
a reason for dispensing with his services. On the contrary, although Oertzen's  investigations 
revealed that the killing of the Hernsheim trader Herrmann and the burning of his station had been 
an act of revenge by the Kapsu chief Angate, whose hamlet had been burnt down by Schulle after 
Herrmann had accused Angate of stealing a large quantity of tradegoods, Oertzen not only insisted 
that those responsible for Herrmann' s death be severely punished, but also approved of 
Wietersheim's plan to put Schulle in charge of an auxiliary force of 93 warriors under the 
"notorious" Nusa chief, Metango. 
In his requisition to Wietersheim Oertzen stressed that courts competent to deal with native 
crimes did not yet exist, since natives were excluded from the jurisdiction of Schmiele and 
Schleinitz, but that he had received instructions that guilty individuals captured alive by the navy 
would probably be banished.42 Now it was up to Wietersheim to issue his orders for the military 
42 No details are given. My guess is that Oertzen and his superiors had banishment to Samoa in mind where these people 
would carry out compulsory labour on the plantations of the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft under the 
supervision of the German consulate. 
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campaign which lasted, with some interruptions, for over two weeks, from 27 November to 1 1  
December 1 886. 
Wietersheim' s first move was to attack Kapsu from behind, after crossing the narrow northern 
tip of New Ireland. The attack was to be carried out by a landing party consisting of two officers, 
the ship' s  doctor and 56 men, supported by Schulle' s auxiliary corps, which was to indicate to the 
landing party what villages counted as friendly or hostile, and was to be rewarded with the canoes 
captured in the latter. While the main aim was the arrest of Angate and his accomplices, 
Wietersheim's orders acknowledged the difficulty of capturing them individually and therefore 
approved the punishment of their entire tribes. Women and children were to be spared, but 
resisting or fleeing men were to be shot. Firearms and gardens were to be destroyed-but not the 
houses so that the people could return to their villages and resume trading as soon as possible. 
Although neither Angate nor anybody else was arrested during the three day expedition and 
only some long distance shots were fired with uncertain results, Wietersheim claimed it as a 
success. Nonetheless, he decided that some additional shelling from the sea was called for. The 
bombardment was carried out on 3 December when over a period of 55 minutes a total of 49 
grenades were fired into the bush behind Kapsu. Wietersheimhad expected that it would convince 
the hostile tribes that further resistance was fruitless, so that a small landing party could now, with 
the help of some friendly natives, arrest Angate in his hideout. This proved difficult to arrange 
because the friendly natives had also left their villages.  Finally chief Mosjelechat of Tubtub was 
brought on board and agreed to capture Angate, dead or alive, after he had been promised a 
substantial monetary reward and the entire land belonging to Kapsu for future use by his people. 43 
The chief asked for a few days to carry out his part of the bargain, was put ashore, and sensibly 
kept at a safe distance thereafter. 
Meanwhile a small landing detachment managed to arrest the native Wobau from A velus, who 
had been found lurking near Butbut and whom three witnesses identified as having taken part in 
the killing of Herrmann. The prisoner and the three witnesses were sent on board SMS Adler 
where Oertzen carried out further investigations. They confirmed Wobau's  involvement in the 
killing. But there existed no court which could have sentenced him to death for this crime and 
such a dramatic warning example was highly desirable, because the operations of the landing 
party during the next few days produced no other tangible results. Wietersheim therefore took it 
upon himself to exercise his military jurisdiction and send Wobau to the gallows-not as a 
murderer but as a spy who had been paid by his people to report on the movements of the navy. 
Wobau' s execution, the first of a native in German New Guinea, took place on 1 1 · December 
1 886 in Kapsu. It was not exactly a public event because Wietersheim had again shelled the 
village, so that it was deserted when Dr Eckstein confirmed Wobau's death at 1 1 .50 a.m. 
Afterwards the landing party had another look around to see whether it could, by some miracle, 
arrest Angate. Instead it stumbled across a cache containing 150 spears in a swamp, into which 
it fired the last 14 rifle shots of the campaign because there had been suspicious movements 
among the foliage. 
All in all, Wietersheim was nevertheless content with his efforts. But then his goal had been 
more modest than that of Baudissin a few months earlier. He had not expected unconditional 
surrender, followed by everlasting peace, but was satisfied that Schulle believed that he did not 
have to fear for his life for a while and that trade, even with Kapsu, would resume shortly. 
Wietersheim did not feel that it was necessary to justify his actions to his superiors or to explain 
his views to them. He took it for granted that every sensible person knew that there was no choice 
43 This extraordinary promise gives a good indication of Wietersheim's megalomania. He did not just feel entitled to 
confiscate the subsistence base of an entire group, but believed that the Kapsu would accept his decision instead of 
throwing the Tubtubs off their land as soon as he had turned his back. 
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but to show the natives, as forcefully as possible, who was master, and to repeat this lesson again 
and again, until they finally accepted the inevitable. 
The same applied to his views about the relations between the navy and the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie. He did not have to express them because it went without saying that an officer of the 
imperial navy could never be placed in a position where he had to accept requisitions from a 
commercial company. Schellong had beenright when he thought that the clash between Schleinitz 
and Wietersheim was primarily concerned with honour-but the honour which was threatened 
was not the personal honour of Schleinitz but the corporate honour of the imperial navy, and it 
was threatened not so much by Schleinitz' s  demands to have his status as company administrator 
publicly recognised by Wietersheim but by Bismarck's  peculiar idea to let colonies of the Reich 
be governed by commercial companies, an idea which, in turn, was not motivated by a desire to 
save the German taxpayer money but by Bismarck's reluctance to plead with the Reichstag for 
colonial funds. Everybody's honour was at stake and everybody's honour was tied up with that 
of everybody else. Even Schellong, although he felt that the clash between Schleinitz and 
Wietersheim was pretty ridiculous, nevertheless accepted that he and his fellow company 
employees had to give loyal support to their chief-because not to do so would have been 
dishonourable. 
Since honour apparently played such an important part in the manner in which "the Germans" 
conducted their affairs at the time, it is worth considering another strand of events where 
questions of honour and status arose, seemingly unconnected with issues of power or policy, and 
in which the Neu Guinea Kompagnie did not figure at all, the leading actors being rear-admiral 
Knorr and vice-consul Knappe. 
VII 
Knorr had been worried about protocol from the moment the cruiser squadron approached Jaluit, 
where the German consulate was being looked after by a junior Hemsheim employee, named 
Naht, whom Knorr was reluctant to grant the usual consular gun salute should he pay the flagship 
an official visit. Knorr solved this particular dilemma by reasoning that while Naht, as acting 
consul, might be entitled to a naval gun salute in other parts of his consular district, it was 
certainly not due to him in the Marshall Islands after they had been placed under imperial 
protection so that they were no longer foreign soil. But what was he to do should Naht travel on 
his flagship in his official capacity, whatever that was? Should he invite him to join his own mess, 
since consuls, including acting consuls, were treated as equivalents of naval commanders and 
were as such entitled to this treatment, no matter what rank they held? Knorr was inclined to do 
so, until he was approached by Knappe who, as a vice-consul, had so far travelled in the officers' 
mess44 but who insisted that the arrangements made for him had to be upgraded in this case, 
because he represented consul-general Stuebe! so that he was, in this capacity, Naht's superior 
as acting consul. Knorr was annoyed because he regarded Knappe, at barely 30, as far too young 
for the honour of sharing his table and because he expected that his own junior officers, Knappe' s 
age-mates, would resent the latter's elevation. Knorr was therefore relieved when no official trip 
by Naht eventuated, so that he did not have to implement his contingency plan of admitting 
Knappe to his own mess, but as his personal guest and hence at his personal expense, rather than 
as of right. 
Knappe, however, continued to make life difficult for Knorr by installing the Hernsheim 
manager Grosser as "the Representative of the Imperial Government", a new-fangled creature of 
dubious legitimacy who did not appear in any naval instructions. These instructions did not even 
register the species "imperial commissioner" which Knorr encountered shortly afterwards in the 
44 Lebomari, on his trip from Namorik to Jaluit, had been allocated to the deck-officers' mess, one level further down. 
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person of Oertzen in the Bismarck Archipelago. To be consistent Knorr also denied Oertzen a 
consular gun salute, as the archipelago too was under imperial protection. Moreover, he took care 
to make confidential inquiries, through his adj utant, about the treatment Oertzen had received 
when travelling in the past on naval ships as imperial commissioner. Not only had he always 
joined the commander's mess, Oertzen assured the adjutant, but, more conclusive still, the 
expense accounts he had submitted on this basis had always been approved by the foreign office. 
Since Oertzen, at 50, was also in a respectable age group, Knorr invited him to join his mess for 
the trip to Kaiser Wilhelmsland, although he cautiously pointed out that he only did so on the 
basis of the precedents in Oertzen' s case, since general instructions defining the proper treatment 
of imperial commissioners had not been issued so far. 
But Knorr had not reckoned with Knappe' s  persistence. As soon as he heard about the 
treatment Oertzen was to receive, he approached Knorr, demanding again his own upgrading 
because Oertzen held the same consular service rank as he did, namely that of vice-consul. Knorr, 
who had not been aware that Oertzen was a mere vice-consul when he was not an imperial 
commissioner, invited Knappe as a personal guest to his mess for the two day voyage. This was 
also appropriate on account of the fact that Knappe did not travel in an official capacity but was 
merely hitching a ride. However, Knorr was by now thoroughly fed up with the entire situation: 
with Knappe' s  repeated self-assertions; with Oertzen' s  criticism of Baudissin and inability to 
provide the navy with adequate logistic support; with the awkward position in which the navy 
generally found itself in the new German colonies; and, most of all, with the deplorable lack of 
clear headquarters instructions. 45 While he himself had sufficient authority and experience to deal 
with the resulting uncertainties, it was intolerable to expose young naval commanders to them. 
They should not be expected to make difficult political decisions but permitted to concentrate on 
performing their military duties. It was high time for the authorities in Berlin to wield a broad 
regulatory sword and to protect the navy from pushy young diplomats, like Knappe, who were too 
big for their boots , as well as from tired, elderly incompetents, like Oertzen, who did not have the 
energy to fill theirs, and who were both likely to get the navy, sooner or later, into serious 
trouble.46 
For Knorr the visit to his friend Schleinitz in Finschhhafen was a welcome escape from a 
madhouse, and he was not going to let it be spoilt by questions of protocol. It was an informal 
meeting between old comrades who probably held similar views about what the new German 
colonies needed, which were dominated by notions like order and caution and in which military 
bravura had no more room than spectacular commercial profits. 
Oertzen sensibly stayed in the background during the squadron' s  visit to Finschhafen. He 
knew that he had incurred Knorr's displeasure so that this was not the time to assert himself in 
relation to Schleinitz as company administrator. This could wait until the next opportunity; for he 
had no reason to believe, in June 1 886, that his position as imperial commissioner was threatened. 
But neither did he know that the foreign office had recently informed the admiralty that it would 
appreciate Oertzen being given special treatment by the navy. This had happened in response to 
an inquiry by the admiralty, which had been caused by a report from Baudissin, who had faced 
the same kind of questions of protocol which so worried Knorr, some months earlier. 
45 Knorr had been given extensive general instructions by the admiralty in January 1 886 when he was placed in charge 
of the newly formed cruiser squadron (see RM I/2732). Although they identified regular visits to overseas territories which 
had been placed under imperial protection as the main purpose of the squadron's creation, and specifically referred to the 
carrying out ofrequisitions which exceeded the "means of power" at the disposal of the small warships manning the navy's 
permanent overseas stations, they showed no appreciation of the consequences Germany's joining of the ranks of colonial 
powers were bound to have for the navy. Thus, the instructions assumed that all requisitions would continue to be issued 
by the "diplomatic representatives" of the Reich. 
46 It hardly needs saying that these are not Knorr' s own words, but what I take to be a fair articulation of his sentiments 
as they shine through between the lines of his reports. 
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In January 1 886 Baudissin had been ordered to take vice-consul Knappe on SMS Albatross 
on an official mission from Apia to Tonga. How was he supposed to treat him during this trip, he 
had asked Knappe's superior, consul-general Stuebe!? As Knappe was to operate independently 
during his mission, Stuebe! replied, he should, if at all possible, be made a member of the 
commander's mess. This applied even more strongly to Oertzen, Stuebe! had added, since he was 
as imperial commissioner "the highest civil authority in the new New Guinea Protectorate" (RM 
112625). Baudissin had not been altogether satisfied with this advice, which was, in any case, not 
binding for him, because Stuebe! was not his military superior. He had therefore composed a 
special report to the admiralty. It showed that Baudissin had been especially concerned with the 
protocol to be observed if Oertzen, as imperial commissioner, wanted to pay an official visit to 
a foreign warship while on board one of SM ships. But Baudissin had also inquired about the 
ranking order between imperial commissioner and vice-consul Oertzen and the honorary consul 
Hemsheim who had let it be known that he outranked Oertzen and that he would like to see this 
fact acknowledged by the navy (see ibid.). 
When the admiralty approached the foreign office, it was told that consul Hemsheim had been 
placed under Oertzen as imperial commissioner, but only for the "westernly section" of his 
consular district-that is to say only in Melanesia but not Micronesia; that Oertzen had so far not 
been given a definite rank in his capacity as imperial commissioner; but that it would be 
appreciated if he, as "the Permanent Representative of the Imperial Power of Protection" in the 
Bismarck Archipelago, were shown "special attention and consideration" while on board one of 
SM ships (ibid.) .  Although it sounds straightforward, this response raised more questions than it 
answered. What did "special attention and consideration" amount to in concrete terms? Did 
Hemsheim outrank Oertzen when they met in the "easternly section" of the former's  consular 
district? Was Oertzen's  authority as imperial commissioner restricted to the Bismarck 
Archipelago, so that naval commanders should henceforth reject his requisitions in so far as they 
related to Kaiser Wilhelmsland? Conversely, had administrator Schleinitz, who was by then on 
his way to German New Guinea, also been placed under Oertzen? Was Schleinitz's authority 
restricted to Kaiser Wilhelmsland? Was he at least there to be accepted as a representative of 
imperial authority by the navy? 
The foreign office could have removed some of these uncertainties by accepting Hemsheim 's 
offer to relinquish his consular commission, which he claimed to have made during a visit to 
Berlin in June 1 886. Instead, according to Hemsheim (1983 : 102), Friedrich Krauel, the most 
senior official dealing with colonial matters, had persuaded him to stay on, because Oertzen 
would soon be sent from the Bismarck Archipelago to the Marshall Islands to repeat his 
performance as a provisional governmental authority. 47 By the time Hemsheim met Krauel again 
in September the foreign office's  plans had changed. Knappe had now been designated to go to 
the Marshall Islands whereas Oertzen was to return to Germany, and no replacement for him 
would be sent to the Bismarck Archipelago. 
Seen from the metropolitan perspective, the main reason for the continued presence of an 
imperial commissioner in German New Guinea after the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had appointed 
its administrator had been the pre-annexation land claims, the treatment of which, the foreign 
office believed at the time, could not be left to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. It had expressed this 
view in a letter to the company of 25 May 1 886 (RKA 4 780). It referred specifically to the Anglo­
German Declaration of 10 April 1 886, according to which disputed claims of this kind had to be 
dealt with diplomatically if the claimant was a British subject. But this declaration had marked 
the end of the phase of international diplomacy surrounding the establishment of Germany's first 
4 7 Krauel later became the first head of the colonial department in the foreign office. He had previously served as consul­
general in Sydney and had played an important part in the diplomatic negotiations concerning Germany's colonial interests 
in the Pacific. 
528 THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES 
Pacific colonies, rather than the beginning of close international cooperation in their ad­
ministration. Besides, the foreign office had already learned that the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, the 
only German colonial company committed to doing the job the government expected them to do, 
at considerable expense to its shareholders, did not take at all kindly to interference with the 
running of its colony. It was therefore advisable to withdraw the imperial commissioner from 
German New Guinea as soon as this could decently be done. Hence, while the foreign office had 
still indicated in May that the treatment of the pre-annexation land claims would be exempted 
from the jurisdiction of the company's officials, this exemption was no longer expressly stated 
when Schleinitz was authorised a few weeks later to exercise the judicial jurisdiction under the 
Protectorates Act, which included land registration matters. Furthermore, Oertzen was, at the same 
time, not only informed that his judicial jurisdiction would come to an end when Schleinitz started 
to exercise his, but also specifically instructed to hand over his preliminary land register and 
related documents to Schleinitz-unless there were local objections to this course of action of 
which the foreign office had no knowledge (RKA 4780).48 
It was probably because of this final reservation that the Neu Guinea Kompagnie was not yet 
told that there had been a shift in policy. It had to wait until 4 September before it learned that 
Oertzen would also place the files relating to "the land question" at the disposal of its officials. 
On the other hand, the foreign office was now ready to go the whole way by also informing the 
company that Oertzen had been ordered to leave the Bismarck Archipelago as soon as the 
company's  station director had taken up his duties (ibid.) .  In other words, the right to supervise 
the company' s  governmental activities, which the emperor had retained under its charter, would 
now be exercised in Berlin, rather than by an imperial official on the spot. 
Naturally the foreign office stopped short of disclosing to the company that this signalled the 
end of Oertzen' s career in the Pacific, although this too had been decided. However, in response 
to inquiries flowing from Knorr's reports about the visit of the cruiser squadron to the Marshall 
Islands, it informed the admiralty that Knappe rather than Oertzen had been appointed to go there 
as imperial commissioner to set up an orderly administration of justice. Because of the provisional 
nature of his appointment the emperor had not given him a special rank, but for the duration of 
his posting he was entitled, not just to "special consideration", but to the honours due to a full 
consul (RM 112626). As we can see, the foreign office could be precise when it was pushed hard 
enough and when it had nothing to lose by calling a spade a spade. 
In the light of these communications it appears likely that the reversal of Oertzen's  and 
Knappe' s  fortunes was not unconnected with Knorr's reports.49 Oertzen' s  Christmas clash with 
Schleinitz had merely confirmed that his lack of political judgement in handling the Tovering 
affair had been no accident. To let himself be provoked by Knorr's reluctance to act into 
suggesting that Baudissin had damaged the prestige of the imperial navy had been even more 
foolish than letting himself be drawn into Wietersheim's  pointless confrontation with Schleinitz. 
By contrast Knappe had shown just the right mixture of initiative and caution. He had handled 
Knorr beautifully. That he had irritated the ponderous admiral in the process was an added bonus. 
Instead of being overwhelmed by him, Knappe had successfully stood up for the entire diplomatic 
service. Knappe had a bright future, while it was obviously time for poor old Oertzen to be sent 
to pasture as a consul in some remote provincial centre in Europe where nothing of importance 
was ever going to happen. 
When Hernsheim returned from Germany to the Bismarck Archipelago, Oertzen had already 
left. Instead he found Schmiele camped in the billiard annexe of his establishment, barely on 
48 My guess is that the foreign office believed, but was not quite sure, that there would be no disputed land claims by 
British subjects so that no need for diplomatic treatment under the joint declaration would arise. 
49 Copies of reports by naval commanders on military and political matters were sent routinely by the admiralty to the 
foreign office. 
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speaking terms with captain Frantzius of SMS Albatross, who was delighted, according to 
Hernsheim ( 1 983:  105), that he could now conduct his business with Schmiele through Hernsheim 
as the German consul since he refused to recognise Schmiele as anything but an employee of the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie. 
Frantzius reported a somewhat different version to the admiralty on 1 April 1 887 (RM J/2427) . 
Since he had been officially notified by Hernsheim of the latter's resumption of his duties as 
consul, he, according to Frantzius, had had no alternative but to accept Hernsheim as the 
"Imperial Representative" within the meaning of the naval instructions. When Schleinitz had 
asked him for naval support in the arrest of some native murderers in the Kabaira/Kabakada 
area,50 he had therefore felt obliged first to consult with Hemsheim and to inform Schleinitz 
accordingly. 
As was to be expected, Schleinitz took offence and wrote to Hemsheim, as well as to 
Frantzius, reiterating that he alone represented the rightful government in German New Guinea. 
While the continued tensions between Schleinitz and the navy51 are not part of our story, it should 
be mentioned that Frantzius did not simply echo Wietersheim but expressed the view that too 
many shots had already been fired and that education had to take the place of further bloodshed, 
even though it would probably take decades before the natives would accept a civilised attitude 
towards law and order.52 However, the exit of Hemsheim, as the last representative of pre­
colonial, consular powers deserves closer attention. 
Rather than reluctantly "gauging Hemsheim' s feelings" (sein Sentiment einholen), as Frantzius 
put it after he had learned that Hernsheim' s commission had been tenninated by the foreign office, 
he had formally asked Hemsheim in writing, on 9 March 1887, whether he, in his capacity as 
imperial consul, intended to make a requisition in the matter raised in the attached 
correspondence. Hernsheim had responded equally formally the following day that although he 
was entitled to exercise all his consular functions as long as he had not been expressly instructed 
by the foreign office to the contrary, he believed that it would best reflect the spirit of his 
commission if he declined to mediate between the navy and the administrator in the matter of 
requisitions until he had received clear orders, or was specifically asked by the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie' s  officials to intervene.53 
Hemsheim had no intention of becoming the meat in the sandwich and no illusions about the 
foreign office's willingness to support him against either the Neu Guinea Kompagnie or the navy. 
Moreover, he suspected that the foreign office would be compelled to back the company against 
the navy, if it did not want to risk the company handing back its charter. Most painfully from his 
personal point of view, he also had to accept that the company was in the Bismarck Archipelago 
to stay and that he had to bury his dreams of running his own little kingdom in New Ireland, 
which Oertzen had still encouraged hardly a year earlier. 
The official tennination of his commission as consul merely confirmed his fears. He had lost 
and the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had achieved a total victory, at least for the time being. All he 
could do was to keep the lines of communication with the foreign office open and to feed it with 
information which would strengthen his hand in his struggle for his economic survival in the 
Bismarck Archipelago. He therefore wrote, on 27 March 1 887, a private letter to Krauel (RKA 
50 The details of this case no longer concern us, although it should be mentioned that everybody was careful not to 
mention any possible connection with the Tovering affair. 
51  They reached an absurd climax when Schleinitz complained that SMS Albatross had canied out target practice in the 
territorial waters of German New Guinea without informing the civil authorities in advance so that agreement about a 
suitable location could be reached (see RM I/2427, report of 5 May 1 887). 
52 Frantzius also accused Schleinitz of trying to involve the navy in pointless military activities; for if the arrest of the 
native murderers was as easy as Schleinitz made it appear on paper, why did the Neu Guinea Kompagnie not carry it out 
itself (see the report of 1 April 1 887, ibid.)? 
53 Copies of both letters are appended to Frantzius' report. 
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2977) . It began diplomatically enough. Instead of complaining that he had first been encouraged 
to stay on as consul, only to be dropped as soon as this became inconvenient, he reminded Krauel, 
as if all this had not happened, that he had been kind enough to permit Hernsheim, during their 
last meeting in Berlin, to continue to express his views, wishes and hopes relating to the 
promotion of German interests in the Pacific.54 But then his frustration got the better of him. He 
started by stating calmly that the conflict between Schleinitz and the naval commanders would 
probably have been settled before Krauel received his letter, although he expected that it would 
continue to hamper cooperation between the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and the navy long after the 
legal position had been clarified, but he then expressed the view that this conflict had largely been 
the product of the uncertainty about the respective roles of the various officials which had 
persisted "out here" for so long-a state of affairs "which could only be described as deplorable". 
It is unlikely that this comment earned Hernsheim Brownie points, 55 precisely because he put 
his finger on the crux of the matter. Throughout the annexation period the officials on the spot 
had frequently been left in the dark. True, this had to some extent been unavoidable, and the long 
delays in communication between the Pacific and Germany had been a major contributing factor. 
But the main reason for these troublesome uncertainties had been the absence of definite plans 
in the foreign office, which was trying to keep its options open as long as possible. Even after 
Germany' s  colonial acquisitions had been internationally secured, it continued to play a game of, 
now internalised, diplomatic manoeuvring, changing, or half-changing, its only half-committed 
mind, quite happy to leave everybody else guessing-and to see them pay the price for guessing 
wrongly. 
To annex colonies was one thing, to govern them quite another. When it proved, for a variety 
of reasons, to be more difficult than expected to hand them over to chartered companies as foster 
parents, the foreign office played for time and acted only when this became unavoidable. But this 
period of colonial dawn could not be prolonged forever. The sun had to rise-and the consular 
and naval nursemaids on the spot, who had at first quite enjoyed their freedom, began to call in 
unison for a firm legal framework which would relieve them of their individual responsibility, 
when they realised that their freedom consisted largely of the opportunity of bumping painfully 
into each other. It would not take long before their successors complained about the stifling 
effects of bureaucratic restrictions on their activity and before the central colonial bureaucracy 
in Berlin began to savour the powers of government by remote control-but by then the nature 
of the entire game had irrevocably altered. Indeed during this extended dawn period the game was 
in some respects more complex than it was later on because almost everything still had to be 
worked out and because the few existing, rudimentary normative and organisational structures 
were not designed to deal with the circumstances under which they now had to operate. As these 
structures were adjusted and developed, the history of German colonial rule became more 
routinised. What individual officials did in particular instances became historically less 
significant. Even their personality moved into the background at the grass roots level, although 
it remained crucial in the context of structure-building. 
Hence we need less concrete detail for an account of the history of the exercise of German rule 
after things had settled down than is required to appreciate the initial working-out process . On the 
other hand an account of this history as a collage of unique human actions rather than general 
structures has to become more selective and fragmented. It is futile to try to give an action-centred 
account of the exercise of German colonial rule as an overall picture even during the brief reign 
of Schleinitz. There were already too many actors, too many actions and too many places of 
54 On the other hand, Hemsheim' s  wording suggests that he had already been told during this final meeting that his 
commission would soon be terminated. 
55 As far as I can see his Jetter was promptly filed away without any kind of response. 
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continuous activity. Instead of following the movements of a few leading actors, the next chapter 
will therefore focus on one of these places .56 
56 Some readers may be interested in finding out what happened subsequently to our consular and naval stars, and I am 
happy to oblige. After a short spell in the foreign office, Oertzen was indeed posted as a consul to a remote provincial 
centre-namely, of all places, to Sarajevo, although he was long gone and dead before he would have had to deal with the 
assassination of the archduke of Austria in 1 9 1 4. Oertzen retired as consul-general from a posting in Le Havre in 1 907 
and died, aged 70, in 1 9 1 1 .  
Knappe returned to the consulate in Apia from the Marshall Islands and was placed in charge in 1 888. But he soon stuck 
his neck out too far and was temporarily banished from the consular service (see Kennedy, 1 974: 84-85). He rejoined it 
after working as a banker in South Africa for three years. He retired as consul-general from his last posting in Shanghai 
in 1 906 and died, a year before Oertzen, when he was only 55. 
Wietersheim had an unspectacular naval career. He was pensioned off with the rank of rear-admiral in 1 900 and died in 
1 906 at the age of 57. 
Graf Baudissin was by far the most successful, reaching the rank of admiral in 1 908, leading the naval staff for two years 
and retiring as chief of the North Sea naval station, aged 60, four years later. He died in 1 92 1 .  
Let me add for good measure that Geiseler died in 1 89 1 , just 43, but that he had by then reached the most senior captain's  
rank-a more rapid rise than one might have expected in the light of his performance as lieutenant-commander between 
1 882 and 1 884. But then Knorr's criticism of Baudissin had not augured well for his career either, whereas everything 
seemed to point to a glorious future for Knappe-all of which only goes to show that history at the individual level is full 
of surprises, although it usually makes sense, once it is viewed in retrospect in the light of adequate information. (Most 
of the biographical information concerning Oertzen and Knappe comes from the archives of the Auswartiges Arnt in Bonn 
and for Wietersheim, Baudissin and Geiseler from Hildebrandt and Herriot, 1988-90.) 
Chapter 1 0: A Short And Brutal Life 
I 
Hatzfeldhafen was the most westerly of the three stations the Neu Guinea Kompagnie had initially projected for Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Although it had a greater economic potential than 
either Constantinhafen or Finschhafen, it was closed six years later because frequent trouble with 
its Melanesian neighbours made it unprofitable to maintain. Since this is the only time in the 
history of German New Guinea that native resistance forced the abandonment of a major colonial 
establishment, and since their resistance earned the local population a reprieve of more than a 
dozen years from colonial rule, it is worth examining this episode more closely. 
II 
The station started on a small uninhabited island in the harbour which gave it its name. Its closest 
neighbours were two coastal villages on the far sides of the points by which the harbour is formed: 
Dugumor in the west and Tombenam in the east. When the first party, consisting of the station' s  
manager, Fritz Grabowsky, an assistant, a carpenter, a Malay overseer, nine Malay labourers and 
five Malay women and children arrived on the company steamer Samoa during the afternoon of 
19  December 1 885, the ship was soon surrounded by about 30 canoes filled with curious natives 
who wanted to try the cigars the foreigners were smoking, had a decidedly thieving nature, were 
far from shy and rather smelly. They were happy to trade food of the most inferior quality for flat 
iron which they could use as blades for their adzes but not at all interested in providing labour. 1 
Natives came from far and wide to visit the station to watch demonstrations of mirrors, 
concertinas and other magical items. The Germans were on edge, fearing that a nightly fishing 
expedition was about to attack their island or counting with apprehension that a crowd of natives 
visiting the island to barter, after a second supply visit by the Samoa, included as many as 96 
armed warriors. The main problem was to keep the visitors under control, a task which was made 
considerably easier when Carl Hunstein, an old New Guinea hand, arrived as a temporary 
reinforcement with a ferocious Newfoundland dog which attacked any black person on sight and 
had to be tied up before native visitors could land in safety.2 
Once the necessary buildings had been completed and an experimental vegetable garden 
planted, Grabowsky began to explore the mainland. He reached a small mountain village, 
Tambero, in February, after crossing a substantial kunai plain with apparently excellent soil. The 
most encouraging sign was that the villages grew substantial quantities of high quality tobacco 
which, if planted commercially, promised to supply a valuable product for the European market 
(NKWL 1 886: 63). The Tambero people paid a return visit to the station and by April 1 886 
visitors had come from as far afield as Bilau in the west and Malala in the east. Only relations with 
Dugumor had cooled, due to more thefts, warnings and threats. 
Now preparations began for an experimental plantation on the mainland. By June the station 
island had been turned into a veritable park and an exploration of the wider environment by the 
Scientific Expedition was under way. The agricultural experiments were mostly successful and 
in June 1 887 tobacco was planted on a substantial scale, Grabowsky having returned with 60 
additional Malays and four Chinese from a recruiting trip to Java (Schellong 1 934: 1 14). But on 
1 See Grabowsky 1 8 89/1 890 for a detailed account. 
2 Large dogs, regarded as being as superior to the indigenous breed as their masters, are another theme which runs 
through colonial history, not only in German New Guinea, although it is again only illustrated by sporadic, anecdotal 
information. 
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23 July 1 887 a group of 12  Malay labourers was attacked and half of them were seriously 
wounded, one fatally, although the attackers fled when a German overseer armed with a rifle 
appeared on the scene and fired a single shot. Grabowsky believed that both Dugumor and 
Tombenam, together with a second mountain village, Tschiriar, had been responsible. He decided 
that the forces at his disposal were too weak to punish the culprits and sent for reinforcements. 
They arrived on 27 August from Finschhafen with the company steamer Ottilie. 
On 29 August a punitive expedition was undertaken against Dugumor. It was deserted and was 
burnt to the ground. The only casualties were a Finschhafen native, who was fatally shot by a 
sailor who mistook him for an enemy, and the sailor himself who was speared by a real enemy, 
but not fatally, during the march back to the station. The following day Tombenam, also deserted, 
was destroyed as well, whereas friendly relations with other villages were confirmed (NKWL 
1 887: 1 92-94) . 
By September the tobacco plantation had been replanted closer to the station and the relations 
with the natives had improved. Dugumor had paid three pigs as compensation and accepted the 
condition of only visiting the station henceforth unarmed. Tombenam, on the other hand, had not 
yet renewed contact (NKWL 1888:  19) .  After the resignaton of Grabowsky a major effort under 
the new station manager Schollenbruch was made. It involved the construction of a road from 
Dugumor via Hatzfeldhafen to Tombenam and further east, the direction in which the most 
promising plantation land was to be found. 
The 1 888 tobacco harvest was completed in May and the first cigars were manufactured from 
it, with satisfying results (NKWL 1 888: 150 and 179). Ten hectares were under cultivation and 
about 600 hectares for new tobacco fields had been bought from the natives. The labour force had 
increased to 95 and was comparatively healthy. The contacts with Tombenam were lively, whereas 
Dugumor and Tschiriar were reserved (NKWL 1 888:  1 8 1 -82). 
In 1 889 relations with Dugumor also improved and those with Tombenam and villages further 
east became so intimate that they and the Hatzfeldhafen labourers from the Bismarck Archipelago 
exchanged formal visits during which they performed their respective dances (NKWL 1 889: 26). 
The 1 888 tobacco harvest had sold well, achieving a price of 1 .5 1  Marks per half kilogram, 
compared with two parcels of Sumatra tobacco which sold for as much as 2.26 Marks and as little 
as 74 Pfennigs on the same occasion (NKWL 1 889: 33). 
In 1 889 the tobacco seedlings were badly affected by pests but 26 hectares were prepared for 
planting. The labour force under the new manager Wilhelm von Puttkamer-Schollenbruch having 
also resigned-had grown to 163. But there was another attack, this time by the mountain village 
Tambero. It was directed against three Malay labourers who were cutting palm fronds as roofing 
material, and wounded one of them fatally. "A specific reason for the hostility of the natives could 
not be established", just as in the case of the 1 887 attack. Still, relations with the coastal villages 
remained friendly (NKWL 1890: 14- 16). Moreover, Puttkamer's  explorations showed that there 
was enough good tobacco land behind Tombenam to maintain a large plantation which could plant 
100 hectares annually in rotation (NKWL 1 890: 21-27). 
In February 1 890 imperial commissioner Fritz Rose requested SMS Sophie to visit 
Hatzfeldhafen to show the flag because he thought this might impress the natives, some of whom 
were still hostile (NKWL 1 890: 65). By that time the station was managed by an ex-Sumatra 
tobacco planter, Schoevers-Puttkamer being groomed for greater things.  The 1 890 harvest 
produced nearly 8,000 kg of tobacco and 60 hectares of land were prepared for the next season. 
Relations with the coastal villages improved. The station was visited by canoes offering coconuts 
for sale from as far away as Franklin Bay nearly every day. Schoevers visited Franklin Bay in an 
attempt to locate a group of 32 runaway labourers from near Cape King William and found the 
area particularly attractive and fertile with a strong and well-nourished population living in 
remarkably clean houses (NKWL 1 890: 73-74). 
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The mass desertion of the labourers was understandable. They not only suffered from inalaria 
but had got caught in the tail end of a dysentery epidemic which was followed by an influenza 
epidemic (NKWL 1 890: 88). They got away just in time since a shipment of Chinese coolies 
brought cholera to Hatzfeldhafen which killed 28 of those remaining.3 
The main shock came in May 1 891  when the people in Franklin Bay killed two Rhenish 
missionaries, Wilhelm Scheidt and Christian Boesch, who were in the process of opening a station 
in their midst, together with an employee of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie and 14  labourers. 
When he learned about the murders, the imperial commissioner used the police troop . . .  to carry out a 
punitive expedition . . . .  However, neither the reasons for the attack nor the culprits could be identified. 
It appears that rapacity was the motive since items stolen from the missionaries were found in several 
villages. The settlement of the Rhenish Mission on Dampier Island has not been threatened so far. By 
contrast a telegraphic report has been received that a white overseer stationed in Hatzfeldhafen was killed 
in August. Because of its remoteness from the seat of the Central Administration the station could only 
be given adequate protection by being itself staffed at a level the cost of which would be quite out of 
proportion with the profits which can be achieved. Since experience so far has shown that the quality of 
the tobacco grown is inferior to that grown in Astrolabe Bay, the station will be closed (NKWL 1891 -93: 
14). 
How does the Neu Guinea Kornpagnie' s  official version of the history of Hatzfeldhafen 
summarised above compare with the reports from Rhenish missionaries? 
m 
Hatzfeldhafen had been their first choice for a station. The Methodist and Sacred Heart Missions 
were already active in the Bismarck Archipelago, the Neuendettelsau Mission had started in 
Finschafen and the native population in Astrolabe Bay was much sparser than around 
Hatzfeldhafen. Hatzfeldhafen also had the advantage that Grabowsky was a proven friend of the 
mission, which he had earlier supported in Borneo, whereas his colleague Johann Kubary in 
Constantinhafen took a very different attitude. 
After the favourable results of a first inspection of the Hatzfeldhafen area Wilhelm Thomas 
and Friedrich Eich had the opportunity to accompany the Scientific Expedition in June 1 887 on 
its journey up the Sepik and were impressed by its potential as a road into the interior. However, 
after their return they found that tensions between the station and the natives around 
Hatzfeldhafen, which they had already noticed in May, had increased so much "that it came to 
hostilities and to the destruction of a few villages . . .  ". Under these circumstances any thought of 
establishing a mission station near Hatzfeldhafen "naturally" had to be abandoned (Berichte 1 887: 
356-60). 
Eich visited Hatzfeldhafen again in September 1 887 and found "the gentlemen well but in an 
uncomfortable position", since friendly relations with the natives had not yet been re-established. 
The two villages which had been punished had been informed that they had to pay a number of pigs if 
they wanted to restore peace. But the people did not seem to be anxious to do so. They brought no pigs 
but quietly rebuilt their villages so that one of them, Tombenom [sic] , had already been completed. The 
other village, Dugumor, had apparently one night made a kind of sacrifice near the station (or was it a 
declaration of war?), consisting of an old spear, an old [net] bag, a few shards and three tiny green 
coconuts (Berichte 1 888 :  54). 
3 The willingness of these deserters to walk home across hundreds of kilometres of hostile country is not only a sign of 
their desperation but also an indication that European perceptions of traditional Melanesian inter-group relations were not 
necessarily shared by Melanesians. 
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In his history of the Rhenish Mission, Kriele (1927) adds further details from letters by Thomas 
and Eich not published at the time. 
Even before their Sepik journey the missionaries had seen evidence of the tensions between 
the station and its neighbours. Natives from Dugumor had burnt a stack of timber belonging to the 
station. It had retaliated by taking a Dugumor man hostage during his next visit, demanding three 
pigs as compensation before he would be released. The pigs were brought, albeit reluctantly, 
because the hostage was an important man . The latter, who had been bound, was released, given 
some presents, after his swollen wrists had been treated, and taken triumphantly back to the 
village. On their return from the Sepik, Eich and Thomas had been assured that everything was 
now fine and that they could safely visit Dugumor. However, they were suspicious because native 
men had only rarely visited the station after the incident although women continued to barter. Then 
came the attack and only afterwards did one of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie employees mention 
that his life had been threatened during a recent visit to Dugumor from which he had withdrawn, 
walking slowly backwards, covering the villagers with his rifle (ibid. :  3 1 -32). 
It took five weeks, until 27 August 1887, for reinforcements and instructions to arrive from 
Finschhafen. Administrator Schleinitz had given orders to destroy the three villages implicated, 
to take hostages but to avoid bloodshed. As we already know, the only casualties were suffered 
by members of the punitive expedition: a sailor fatally shooting a Finschhafen native by mistake 
only to be speared in the back during the hasty retreat to the station. Nor did the missionaries 
regard the punitive expeditions as a success. 
After that all contact with the villagers naturally ceased. Days of constant worry followed. It was 
necessary to be on guard for 24 hours. Again and again suspicious native movements could be observed 
(ibid. : 32). 
When the mission was getting ready to establish a station in the Hatzfeldhafen area in 1 889 
another bloody attack-presumably that by Tambero--had occurred (ibid. :  56). But the mission 
remained undeterred. Scheidt made a new tour of inspection in August 1 890 which led to the 
decision to establish a station in Franklin Bay the following year (ibid. :  72). 
Scheidt visited the villages between Hatzfeldhafen and Malala for about two weeks on foot, 
finding no sign of hostility, not even in those villages which had been repeatedly punished by the 
station. The reception was most friendly in the little cluster of villages around Malala (Berichte 
1 89 1 :  39-401)  to which Scheidt returned with Boesch in May 1891 . They travelled to 
Hatzfeldhafen and from there, accompanied by Schoevers, to Franklin Bay. A site near Malala 
was selected. Boesch remained to start clearing the plot for the station with the help of the friendly 
natives, whereas Scheidt went back to Hatzfeldhafen with Schoevers to get roofing iron and other 
building materials. When Scheidt returned with Schoevers's  assistant, Bodo von Moisy, on 27 
May, the boat was met by natives who had waded into the surf, to help to bring it to the beach, as 
its crew thought. But they attacked and killed everybody, apart from two of the Melanesian 
labourers who managed to make their way back to Hatzfeldhafen despite their wounds. 
A report missionary Peter Arff wrote on 23 July to his superiors in Barmen continues the story. 
Immediately an expedition was sent out, but it found nothing which gave a clue as to what had happened 
to the whites or blacks, with the exception of one grave in which two blacks rested. The subsequent large 
expedition under the command of the imperial commissioner, consisting of 14  whites and over 100 
labourers, armed partly with guns and partly with spears, brought no further news. Here and there items 
of clothing were found in the houses ; otherwise nothing. We assume that Brother Boesch, who had stayed 
behind with five boys, was murdered together with them between 22 and 26 May, and that the natives 
immediately attacked the boat when it arrived on the 27th to cover up their first deed. Apart from our two 
Brethren and Herr von Moisy, 14 blacks were killed (including the boy Amugu from our boarding school 
whom I had lent the Brethren for this voyage since there was a shortage of oarsmen). It is impossible to 
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say anything definite about the first murder . . .  We can only speculate. Brother Bergmann connects it with 
an eclipse of the moon which took place on 23 May. But I find this unlikely. In my view rapacity was 
probably the direct motive. The people had seen the trade goods, like iron, knives and axes, and what is 
more natural than an attempt to bring them into their possession. But something else needs to be 
considered. Almost as long as Hatzfeldhafen Station has existed, there have been disputes with the 
natives in this area. As far as I can remember, Brother Eich already experienced them during this first 
visit, and when I arrived eighteen months ago, another clash had just occurred. The natives do not forget 
such events easily and they cannot distinguish between the Company' s officials and missionaries because 
they do not yet know the latter (Berichte 1 89 1 :  325-26). 
In this case Kriele has little to add, although he mentions that 1 8  natives were !killed during 
Rose' s  punitive expedition which the missionaries had neither initiated nor approved. On the other 
hand, they believed that they had no right to prevent this exercise of criminal justice as an 
expression of the power of the state, in particular since not only members of the mission had been 
killed. Even the natives appreciated the need for punishment. Thus the Karkar people, who had 
informed missionary Kunze about the killings two weeks before the news reached the imperial 
commissioner in Astrolabe Bay, had also commented: "The Malala are really bad people. Now 
the big ship must come and fight them" (quoted ibid. :  76). 
IV 
The next step is a consideration of the unpublished government records. The problem here is that 
apparently all records the Neu Guinea Kompagnie kept in its headquarters in Berlin were 
destroyed during World War II and only small fragments of those kept in German New Guinea 
during the period of "company rule" have survived. We are therefore largely limited to the records 
of the central colonial administration in Berlin and the navy, which both had a higher survival rate. 
Short as the history of Hatzfeldhafen station was it fell into two distinctly different periods in 
the history of German New Guinea. During the first it was governed by an administrator who 
reported to the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s board of directors; during the second by an imperial 
commissioner who reported to the German government. This means that the records kept by the 
central colonial administration differ significantly between these two periods.  They only include 
reports prepared by the local authorities during the former if the company chose to pass them on 
as attachments in its correspondence with the German government. 
In this particular case we are lucky because attached to a letter by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie 
to the chancellor of the Reich, dated 1 8  November 1 887, is a copy of the report by Grabowsky to 
the administrator concerning the first attack on the Malay labourers in July 1 887, as well as an 
excerpt from the report he made on the punitive actions taken in August (see RKA 2978). The 
details of the attack, given in the first report, are not helpful but its conclusion is worth quoting: 
There is no doubt that the natives of Dugumor and Tombenam, and probably also those from Tschiriar, 
are the culprits and that the station is not in a position to punish them as energetically as they deserve. 
To stop them from becoming increasingly cheeky, I request Your Excellency to arrange that these villages 
be strictly disciplined by a warship. We shall try in the meantime to capture some natives as hostages. 
The company' s  letter did not enclose a copy of the administrator' s  report but indicated that he had 
felt he had to choose between closing the station and an energetic punishment which would 
demonstrate to the natives the superior strength of the colonial government, and that he had settled 
in favour of the second alternative. Since he could not count on the help of a naval vessel, as none 
had visited the colony for months and the date of the next visit was uncertain, he decided to 
reinforce the strength of the station for a punitive expedition the course of which is described in 
the excerpt from Grabowsky' s  second report. 
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It recounted that the Samoa, on its way to the Sepik, had brought the news on 12  August that 
no warship but reinforcements could be expected. It also mentioned that people from the friendly 
mountain village Tambero had in the meantime confirmed that the villages of Tombenam, 
Dugumor and Tschiriar had indeed been responsible. The account of the two punitive expeditions 
corresponds largely with the published version, stressing, in addition, that the sailors had in 
general proved useless for military purposes . So accident-prone, in fact, had they been, that it was 
out of the question to proceed with the forces available against the mountain village Tschiriar. On 
the other hand, the news of the punitive action against the coastal village had spread quickly. Only 
two hours after the destruction of Tombenam people from Tambero had turned up at the station, 
assuring it not only that they were friends but also that they fully approved of the action because 
they themselves had repeatedly suffered from the aggression of the stronger coastal villages. They 
received presents and were promised a large reward for any man from Tombenam and Dugumor 
whom they managed to capture. The station also visited the villages of Bilau and Dalua to assure 
them that they had nothing to fear. 
The Neu Guinea Kompagnie regarded these measures at best as a partial success, not only 
because it had been impossible to identify the individuals who had been responsible for the attack 
and to punish them personally, but also because no action whatever had been taken against 
Tschiriar. 
The danger of renewed attacks has therefore not been removed. On the contrary, they are to be expected, 
if months pass by without an energetic punishment and the natives begin to believe that the whites are 
incapable of administering it so that there was no reason to fear them. 
Now comes the crunch: 
If the protection which the Imperial Charter has promised the Company is to be effective, it will be 
necessary to station at least one warship permanently in the colony which can be called upon to help in 
emergencies without loss of time. We therefore respectfully beg your Serene Highness that such an order 
be issued. 
The foreign office was able to assure the company, on 27 November, that it had already been 
decided that one of the two ships allocated to the Australian station would be posted in German 
New Guinea and that only the tense situation in Samoa had delayed this measure. On the other 
hand, it pointedly referred to the company's plans to create its own police force which should 
prove to be more effective than the action of warships since the pursuit of natives by marines into 
the interior was impractical. 
This was not the end of the matter. On the other side of the globe administrator Schleinitz sent 
a formal requisition to the navy in September, asking, inter alia, for military action against 
Tschiriar which was to consist primarily of the capturing of hostages to be handed over to the local 
authorities . It was commodore Heusner of the cruiser squadron who had to deal with this 
requisition when he arrived with three ships in Matupi on 10 December 1 887. His task was made 
simpler because Schleinitz had in the meantime withdrawn a requisition concerning the murder 
of a trader in the Gazelle Peninsula. However, Heusner had difficulty with the Hatzfeldhafen 
request and decided to go to Finschhafen to discuss it with Schleinitz. He was unsuccessful 
because Schleinitz was absent on an exploratory trip along the coasts of New Britain. What he 
found out about the situation in Hatzfeldhafen confirmed his view that he should reject the 
requisition. He formulated his reasons in a report to the admiralty (RM 112734) but did not 
disclose them to Schleinitz because he did not want to create the impression that the navy was in 
any way accountable to the company' s  administrator. 
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It appears that the foreign office, which had been sent Heusner's report (see RM I/2448), did 
not inform the Neu Guinea Kompagnie about its content either. At any rate, the company raised 
the question of naval punishment of Tschiriar again in August 1 888. The foreign office responded 
on 1 6  August (RKA 2978) and approached the admiralty nine days later (RM I/2428). 
The foreign office reminded the admiralty that Heusner's rejection of Schleinitz' s  requisition 
had been based on the view that after the reinforcement of Hatzfeldhafen no further trouble was 
to be expected but 
[a ]s the Board of Directors of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie reports the natives of Tschiriar have repeated 
their raids in the meantime. In particular they have made another attack in May of this year, and, 
according to the latest news the attitude of Tschiriar and other mountain villages has become so hostile 
that a serious encounter with them appears imminent. 
Under these circumstances it supported the company' s  request to send a warship to 
Hatzfeldhafen as soon as possible. Even if punishment of the natives proved impossible, the 
company believed that a prolonged presence of the warship in the waters of Hatzfeldhafen would 
by itself achieve the desired effect, especially if it carried out some target practice. The admiralty 
declined the request, primarily because the two ships on the Australian station were for the time 
being occupied in Samoa and the Marshall Islands, but it also reiterated the doubts as to the 
military practicality of punishment of Tschiriar by the navy already expressed by Heusner. 
Heusner had been reluctant to involve the navy in any punitive activities in German New 
Guinea. He was therefore pleased to be able to point out that Schleinitz had withdrawn his 
requisition for an intervention on the Gazelle Peninsula because new evidence had suggested that 
the natives the navy was supposed to have punished were, in fact, not responsible for the killing. 
Perfectly innocent people would have suffered and the confidence that naval vessels were 
delivering only just punishment would have been destroyed. Since it was the naval commanders 
and not the civil authorities who carried the responsibility for such punitive actions, great caution 
in accepting any of their requisitions was called for. As regards the Hatzfeldhafen requisition, 
Heusner had rejected it mainly for military reasons. He thought that it was most unlikely that a 
naval detachment would be able to capture natives in the mountains, and that a long distance 
bombardment would be useless.  In his view the reinforced station was quite capable of looking 
after itself and was in no serious danger. But he was more interested in the reasons for the July 
attack and in stressing the company' s  own governmental responsibilities.  
Heusner suspected that the natives around Hatzfeldhafen had become hostile because they 
feared that the whites were trying to push them off their land-a fear which was especially 
understandable as the company had simply occupied the land first used for its station as ownerless. 
When the experimental plantation had been started the natives had naturally become worried. But 
they constituted no major threat since they fled from the scene of their attack as soon as it was 
approached by a lone European with a rifle. 
Heusner was particularly annoyed by Schleinitz' s request to capture hostages and to hand them 
over to the local authorities. The imperial navy was not a police force to be used by the Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie. Although the imperial charter had ordered the officers of His Majesty to 
protect the company, this protection was obviously limited to cases where it was unable to protect 
itself. As long as the company failed to establish its own police force which could protect the life 
and the property of Europeans as part of the institutions of government it had to maintain under 
its charter, it only had a "very conditional" claim to naval protection. 
The foreign office had already dealt with Heusner's main point when returning his report to 
the admiralty in February by pointing out that the company' s  annual report had announced the 
formation of an armed native police force. But it still had to deal with the company's complaint 
about a lack of support by the navy. It largely limited itself to summarising Heusner's military 
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reasons for the rejection of the only requisition which, as far as it knew, Schleinitz had made. It 
also stressed that in the other German colonies, too, military intervention by the navy was avoided 
as far as possible, although it assured the company that it would do its best to arrange for more 
frequent naval visits to German New Guinea to show the flag. 
The next request for naval intervention in Hatzfeldhafen was made by imperial commissioner 
Rose in response to the attack by the Tambero people in November 1 889, as he informed the 
chancellor in January 1890 (RKA 2948). Although Puttkamer' s punitive expedition had achieved 
some success, in Rose's view only punishment by the navy would be understood by the natives 
as "an act of state", demonstrating that the station was indeed under powerful protection. He had 
therefore, in line with section 2 of the "Instructions for the Administrator" of 7 June 1 887, 
requisitioned the navy to show the imperial flag in Hatzfeldhafen and to intimidate the natives by 
a bombardment of Tambero, since this was the only way of assuring the peaceful economic 
development of the station. 
Again the situation was complicated by delays in communication. The foreign office responded 
to Rose• s January report in May. It left the question of the appropriateness of Rose• s requisition 
open, since it was impossible to appreciate the local circumstances in Berlin, but instructed Rose 
to requisition naval assistance as sparingly as possible and only if it involved no more than "a 
simple landing". Any punitive activities away from the coast had to be carried out by the local 
police force. If it was not yet sufficiently strong such measures had to be postponed until that 
strength had been reached. Rose was also reminded that, as an imperial official, his relations with 
the navy were not governed by the instructions issued by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie to its 
administrator but rather by the general imperial instructions concerning the relations between 
consular officials and naval commanders which had been issued in 1 872, the main content of 
which was summarised in section 65 of Konig ' s Manual for Consuls-a work Rose was obviously 
expected to keep on his bedside table. 
Long before this response was drafted in Berlin, Rose reported, in February 1890, on the 
arrival of SMS Sophie under captain Herbing. He reported again in May about the fate of his 
requisition. Captain Herbing had rejected military intervention in Hatzfeldhafen-without giving 
reasons-although he was happy to show the flag. Moreover, there had been serious tensions 
between Herbing and the imperial chancellor Schmiele in the Bismarck Archipelago which Rose 
largely attributed to Herbing' s unreasonable behaviour. Rose therefore asked for a clear definition 
of the respective powers and responsibilities of the imperial chancellor and the naval commanders 
in the archipelago as well as for a prolonged presence of naval vessels in the colony so that 
extended discussions between the commanders and the local administration could bring about a 
better cooperation and a more effective use of naval assistance. Rose claimed that he had been 
aware that his relations with the navy were no longer governed by the 1 887 instructions after his 
acting position had become regular on 1 April 1 890.4 He therefore asked for several copies of the 
now relevant 1 872 imperial instructions. 
The foreign office responded to Rose' s  May report in September. It supported Rose's  
complaints about Herbing's  behaviour in the Bismarck Archipelago, whose justification had 
already been recognised "in principle" by the admiralty, but backed Herbing's  rejection of the 
Hatzfeldhafen requisition, since it had been based on military considerations which had been the 
captain' s  sole responsibility. It also pointed out that Rose' s  second request had been taken care 
of by the extended visit of SMS Alexandrine and promised regular visits of this kind in the years 
to come. Finally it referred Rose, in connection with his last point, to its May letter with its 
reference to the Konig manual as an adequate source of fo.formation. 5 
4 It is not clear whether this was supposed to mean that, in Rose's view, his position before then had been more like that 
of an acting company administrator than that of an acting imperial commissioner. 
5 My guess is that the foreign office did not have a full copy of these voluminous naval instructions either but also relied 
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The relevant file shows that the foreign office had seen Herbing' s March report to the 
admiralty about the February visit of SMS Sophie to Hatzfeldhafen before writing to Rose in 
May-or, rather, before sending off the letter drafted in April under a revised date but without 
amendments. The most interesting part of this report is again its conclusion. Herbing, who had 
read the earlier naval reports, copies of which were kept among the records of the Australian 
station, essentially repeated the by now familiar argument that punitive expeditions by the navy 
were ineffective and that the Neu Guinea Kompagnie should establish its own armed police force. 
But he went further by stressing that the burning down of villages and the destruction of gardens 
was a dishonourable task the navy should not be asked to perform. On the other hand, he 
suggested that the company' s  police force had to be equipped with a steamer so that it could hit 
the same target again and again, until the natives had been worn down to a point where they would 
hand over those among them who were personally responsible for past misdeeds and henceforth 
keep the peace.6 
In September 18 90 Rose informed the chancellor of the Reich that conditions in Hatzfeldhafen 
had improved greatly and that he had decided to requisition the navy, apart from emergencies, only 
if he was able to accompany the vessel himself so as to avoid in future the kind of discord which 
had developed during the visit of SMS Sophie. Because of a recent visit by SMS Alexandrine 
there had been no reason to seek assistance from the cruiser squadron during its subsequent visit. 
The report by Rose informing the chancellor of the Malala Massacre was written on 27 July 
1 891  in his new capital Stephensort-Finschhafen having been abandoned after an epidemic had 
killed half its white population earlier that year (RKA 2980). There had also been serious native 
unrest in Astrolabe Bay. While this was going on Rose had been informed by Schoevers about the 
May events . He had immediately assembled as large a force as possible, so that it could be divided 
into several groups which between them could cover a large area in the course of the few days 
Rose could afford to be absent from Stephansort. Consisting of 1 2  whites , the native police force 
and about 100 labourers, it had left Stephansort on 27 June 1 89 1  in the company steamer Ysabel. 
The Stephensort contingent, enlarged by Schoevers, overseer Miiller and about 30 labourers, 
had arrived in Malala at 6.30 a.m. on 29 June. Malala had been deserted but the neighbouring 
villages were still occupied. One of them, Moro, had been attacked but its inhabitants had fled 
before the police force was in shooting range. Now four parties fanned out to track down natives 
in their hiding places. For two days anything which moved had been shot on sight. There had been 
16 confirmed deaths and several probable additional casualties. Since "countless villages had been 
destroyed, hundreds of coconut palms have been cut down7 and countless canoes have been 
smashed", Rose believed that the punishment had been sufficient. 
As arranged, the Ysabel had collected the expedition on 1 July 1 89 1  and taken it back to 
Hatzfeldhafen. Since then the area had remained quiet. Only one of the labourer' s houses had been 
burnt down by natives who had all withdrawn into the hills. Tambero and another mountain village 
had been burnt down as a reprisal and five more natives had been shot dead. 
Once more Rose's  resume is of particular interest. He did not regard the situation in Astrolabe 
Bay as serious but the abandonment of Hatzfeldhafen as administratively desirable. The 
concentration of all efforts within Kaiser Wilhelmsland on the economically most promising 
Astrolabe B ay would enable him to embark on a more constructive policy by convincing the 
natives that the administration , would not only punish their misdeeds but also protect their 
interests. Naturally this required time-which he did not have as long as he also had to act as the 
on the excerpts in the manual which was standard consular equipment. 
6 The allocation of a steamer to the colonial executive in German New Guinea had already been suggested by the navy 
in 1 889, but the foreign office had informed the admiralty that such a move was, for the time being, impractical. 
7 In contrast to the Bismarck Archipelago the purchase of coconuts from natives for the production of copra in Kaiser 
Wilhelrnsland was not sufficiently important to call for the preservation of palms during punitive expeditions. 
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Neu Guinea Kompagnie's commercial manager.8 However, he did not doubt that he would be 
successful once he could concentrate on tackling this task. 
About the Malala Massacre Rose had this to say. He too believed Scheidt and Moisy had been 
killed as a consequence of the preceding killing of Boesch, but he attributed the success of the 
attack mainly to the fact that Moisy had lost his nerve instead of facing his attackers. Why Boesch 
had been killed was less clear. The most common cause of trouble was the stealing of food from 
native gardens by Melanesian labourers, but such thefts would only explain an attack on them and 
not why Boesch had been killed as the first European in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Hence Rose opted 
for the rapacity theory, which was strongly supported by the fact that in almost all villages items 
from Boesch' s stores had been found. This gave Rose the opportunity of blaming Boesch for his 
own fate, because he should have been more careful in hiding his treasures from the eyes of the 
natives . 
Although Rose felt that the situation around Hatzfeldhafen was now under control, he asked 
for an extended visit by a warship, stressing that he did not expect it to become active on land, 
since there only the native police troop could operate successfully. However, the awesome power 
of the naval vessels still had to be demonstrated to the hostile tribes-and this required more than 
the casual sailing past which SMSS Sophie and Alexandrine had performed. 
Rose also referred to unrest and misdeeds in northern New Ireland, where yet another trader 
had been killed. There was little he could do with the means at his disposal to punish such 
misdeeds, but Schmiele' s investigations had established that there too the white traders there were 
largely themselves to blame so that they hardly deserved government protection. 
In a report written in September Rose analysed the position more carefully as a basis for a 
series of concrete proposals . He expressed no concern about the situation on the Gazelle 
Peninsula. Since he also had little doubt that Hatzfeldhafen would be abandoned-which had been 
guarded by most of his police force since mid-August-his assessment and plans focused on 
Astrolabe Bay and northern New Ireland. 
In Astrolabe Bay Rose saw the main problem in the extension of the plantations which were 
moving from an experimental stage to commercial production. This required large areas of land. 
Although the native population was small and peaceful, problems were unavoidable because it was 
so scattered that each plantation of a commercially viable size affected a number of hamlets 
hidden in dense bush. Not only were the claims of some of them bound to be overlooked, despite 
the greatest care when the land was acquired, it was also difficult to control the relations between 
the plantation labourers and this multitude of native neighbours. The theft of root crops from 
native gardens by the labourers, who could only get used with difficulty to the rice diet offered 
to them, was a constant source of irritation, so much so that the first question asked by natives 
approached to sell land was how many black labourers the whites would bring. Although this was 
regrettable, large scale commercial activity would almost certainly create trouble with the native 
population. 
The situation in northern New Ireland was different. Here the main problem was the white 
traders, many of whom belonged to the scum of the earth. However, the area not only produced 
a third of the entire copra exported, but was also by far the most important recruiting district. 9 
Since, unlike Hatzfeldhafen, it could thus not be abandoned, a small administrative station had to 
be established there to control the behaviour of blacks and whites. 
This was the first of Rose' s  concrete proposals. The second was a regular commercial shipping 
connection linking northern New Ireland with the Gazelle Peninsula and Astrolabe Bay. It 
replaced an application for a government vessel, which he had made some months earlier, since 
8 The company' s  general manager had been one of the victims of the "malaria epidemic" in Finschhafen. 
9 Of the 1 ,273 labourers recruited in the islands in 1 890 over I ,OOO came from New Ireland and New Hanover compared 
with under 1 00 from the northern Solomons (NKWL, 1 891-93: 1 6). 
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Rose had accepted that this application had no chance of being approved by the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie. 
His third proposal, an increase in the size of the police troop to 50 men, was also linked with 
the first, since a portion of this enlarged force was to be stationed in northern New Ireland. Rose 
estimated the combined costs of his first and third proposal to be around 8,000 Marks per annum 
and asked for support for a corresponding increase in his budget. 
The foreign office sent this report to the company for comments . The response was almost 
totally negative, as the decision to close down Hatzfeldhafen, while in agreement with Rose' s  
views, could hardly be  called a positive measure. To begin with, the company was unhappy with 
Rose' s  punitive expeditions. Although it praised Rose' s  "energy and personal devotion" it doubted 
that they had been "the only, or the most appropriate means of securing peace". Moreover, while 
wishing Rose well in his efforts to establish closer, friendly relations with the natives in Astrolabe 
Bay, and promising to instruct its employees to support them as much as possible, it rejected all 
his concrete proposals, using them instead as a basis for making much larger counter-claims 
against the Reich. 
Firstly, it had no intention of spending any money on protecting "the scum of the earth" in 
northern New Ireland, since it could not control which persons were sent there and where they 
were stationed. Secondly, it could not be expected to spend any more on shipping since it was 
already paying dearly for connecting German New Guinea with the regular German shipping lines 
whereas in all other German colonies these connections were heavily subsidised by the Reich. 
Thirdly, the same applied in relation to native attacks on colonial enterprises: in all other German 
colonies military measures were financed by the Reich, whereas the company was expected to 
carry the full burden, although its charter and the negotiations preceding it left no doubt that it was 
entitled to expect imperial protection not only from foreign aggression but also in cases of internal 
unrest. 
As regards the proposed increase in the size of the police force, the company expressed its 
surprise that the imperial commissioner and its general manager had apparently worked out a deal 
which departed from its agreement with the German gove:-nment by replacing the 3 6  part-time 
policemen for which it provided with 24 full-timers .  Nonetheless it was not only prepared to 
sanction this departure but also to approve an expenditure of up to 15,000 Marks for the police 
force. Indeed, this amount had already been allowed for in the current budget. On the basis of the 
imperial commissioner's own calculations, according to which a native policeman cost 200 Marks 
per year, this would permit Rose to increase his force not just to 50 but even to 75 men. But even 
if one was more realistic and doubled these figures a substantial increase beyond the current 
strength of 24 men was possible, which was ample, if the establishment of a police post in 
northern New Ireland, which was neither justified nor practical, was not proceeded with. 
The foreign office sent a copy of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie' s response to Rose, instructing 
him to maintain order with the means at his disposal, since the company was unwilling, and the 
German government unable, to allocate more funds. All that could be promised was more frequent 
visits by naval vessels as the Australian station was now permanently manned with two ships. 
The date of this communication was 29 December 1 89 1 .  A month earlier Rose had reported 
that Hatzfeldhafen had been closed down, not sounding too pleased because the police troop had 
recently achieved substantial successes against the natives, more than a dozen of whom had been 
killed. In April 1892 Rose visited the area on board SMS Bussard to continue the punishment (see 
DKB 1 892: 373). Since the natives promptly fled, it was once more impossible "to capture 
hostages". However, a rifle belonging to Moisy was found and, to the great relief of Rose, was 
in a state which showed that the natives around Hatzfeldhafen were still unable to use any firearms 
they might capture. 
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The report also mentioned that the gun of "the murdered overseer Muller", Rose' s  local expert 
during the June 1 89 1  punitive expeditions, had been found. In other words not everything had 
remained peaceful and quiet around Hatzfeldhafen after the departure of Rose and his police troop 
in early July, so that we had better examine more closely what happened there between then and 
the closure of the station in November. This period is not covered by any of the sources so far 
discussed. But there is another, unexpected and surprisingly informative, source. 
v 
Rose had returned to Hatzfeldhafen in August 1 891  to investigate the killing of Muller. According 
to his first witness, Walter Grundmann, Ludwig Muller had left the station early on 14 August 
with five labourers to search for an ox which had gone missing. When he did not return for lunch, 
station manager Schoevers took about 25 labourers to look for him, accompanied by Grundmann 
and the medical assistant Reiter. When crossing a little river close to Tombenam they were 
attacked by 15  to 20 natives. Schoevers was speared in the right arm, and his rifle became 
inoperative when he fell in the sand. Reiter' s  rifle also failed after the first shot-as did most of 
the guns with which the labourers had been armed. Grundmann fired five or six shots which all 
found their mark. The last shot brought down an unusually powerful native who was finished off 
by the labourers when he tried to crawl into the bush-whereupon all other natives fled. The 
whole fight lasted only a few minutes,  leaving at least three natives dead and Schoevers and 
several labourers wounded. Schoevers and his party then withdrew to the station. Muller's corpse 
and his gun were found in Tombenam village three days later. He had been killed, presumably 
together with his labourers, without firing a single shot. 
As Grundmann had arrived in Hatzfeldhafen barely two weeks earlier, Rose questioned Phillip 
Leiby, who had been stationed there since 1 888, about the reasons which might explain the recent 
hostility of the natives. Leiby claimed that relations with the neighbouring natives were not bad 
until the arrival of Schoevers at the end of 1 889, although the Tambero people, who still visited 
the station when Leiby first arrived, stayed away later. Relations deteriorated dramatically after 
an incident in March 1 89 1 .  A Malay disappeared from the station, returning a few days later with 
a minor spear wound. Schoevers and Milller set out to investigate and came back with a hostage, 
three canoes and some ethnographic items from Bilau village. The hostage was released when 
three pigs were paid but Schoevers kept the canoes. When Leiby and the then medical assistant, 
Boschat, subsequently visited Bilau they were shown the grave of a native who had been shot 
during Schoevers ' s  earlier visit by his personal servant, Tobotako-"whether on Schoevers ' 
orders, I am unable to tell". The Bilau also complained that Schoevers had not returned their 
canoes although they had paid the pigs partly for that purpose. Since then no Bilau had visited the 
station. On the other hand, on the day before Scheidt and Moisy left Malala in May, two 
influential chiefs, lrobam of Tobenam and Nabok of Muschi, had come to the station and had 
therefore learned about the impending departure of the boat. 
Leiby left it to Rose to draw his conclusions-which he did, sending the recorded evidence 
to Schmiele in the Bismarck Archipelago with the request to hear Boschat, who was now stationed 
in HerbertshOhe, about the development of the relations with the natives around Hatzfeldhafen 
since Schoevers had taken over. Whereas Schoevers claimed in his reports that relations were 
steadily improving, Rose had gained the impression that Schoevers, as well as Milller, had not 
been "exactly scrupulous" in their treatment of the natives. After drawing attention to the fact that 
the official report by Schoevers on the Bilau incident did not mention the firing of any shots, Rose 
turned to the treatment of the labourers in Hatzfeldhafen which also did not appear to have been 
the best. This was strongly suggested by the massive desertion rate. To be sure, the unnamed 
official in HerbertshOhe responsible for the control of the employment of labourers recruited in 
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the Bismarck Archipelago had never mentioned Hatzfeldhafen, although he had passionately 
attacked their treatment in Astrolabe Bay, but, for obvious reasons, little weight could be attached 
to this fact-a veiled reference to the fact that both Schoevers and Richard Parkinson, the official 
in question, had married into the clan of Queen Emma, by then German New Guinea's leading 
business woman. 
Rose was probably disappointed when he received the evidence of Franz Carl Boschat taken 
by Schmiele. Boschat had first been sent to Hatzfeldhafen in mid 1 888 with the police troop under 
lieutenant Steinhauser, which was supposed to protect the station from further attacks by the 
Tombero people. No punitive expeditions were carried out because it had been the main aim to 
re-establish friendly relations. But little progress was made on that score, since the police troop 
failed to make any contacts . When Boschat was posted to Hatzfeldhafen in August 1 889 the 
station had been under the management of Puttkamer. There were contacts with neighbouring 
villages but they were strictly regimented. Instead of permitting natives to wander around the 
station, they had to gather in one particular spot where Puttkamer would trade with them. With the 
arrival of Schoevers relations became more relaxed, especially after Schoevers had been joined 
by his wife who had visited the coastal villages in her canoe, with the result that, for the first time, 
native women also came to the station. 10 
Boschat admitted that things changed after the Bilau incident but his version showed 
Schoevers in a more positive light. When he and Leiby questioned the labourers who had 
accompanied Schoevers, they told them that he had strictly instructed them not to shoot at natives. 
Schoevers' s servant had made sure that he had been on the other side of the village when he shot 
the Bilau so that Schoevers could, at most, have heard the shot. Besides, relations with Bilau had 
al ways been difficult because this village had tried to monopolise trade with the station, repeatedly 
fighting other villages who had visited it to barter-without being punished for this aggression. 
As far as the treatment of labourers was concerned, Schoevers never beat them or, rather, only as 
a formal punishment for thefts . By contrast, Mi.iller, who supervised the labourers in the fields, 
had been an excitable man. He treated them well during slack periods but beat them frequently 
during times of pressure, so hard that they carried visible welts. The greatest shortcoming was the 
quality of the food-but that was also not Schoevers's fault but rather the result of inadequate 
funds . 
Since Boschat also told Schmiele that there had been tensions between Leiby and Schoevers 
because they had different views about tobacco cultivation, probably no further action would have 
been taken if new accusations had not been raised against Schoevers. This time Rose took a 
different attitude. He assumed the rumours that Schoevers had systematically enriched himself at 
the expense of the company, as well as of his Malay and Chinese employees, would probably 
dissolve under closer scrutiny, but he asked Assessor Geissler, who deputised for Schmiele while 
the latter was on leave, to investigate because it was in Schoevers' s  interest to establish officially 
that these persistent rumours were groundless .  It is only because Rose attached the earlier 
evidence to this request that the information just summarised survived. Whereas most of Rose's  
files have disappeared, i t  was incorporated in a file of the imperial court in HerbertshOhe-the 
Untersuchungssache Schoevers-which, though incomplete, is still available (see CA AA63/83,  
B43). 
The additional evidence on this file sheds no new light on the relations between the 
Hatzfeldhafen station and its native neighbours, but it suggests that its closure had been inevitable 
because it had already started to fall to bits after the 1 891 tobacco harvest. Instead of preparing 
for the new season, productive work was reduced in June and came to a complete standstill after 
the killing of Mi.iller in August. Apart from an occasional foray by the police guard under police 
1 0  By contrast the Rhenish missionaries claimed that it was the men who stopped visiting in times of trouble whereas 
the women continued to come. 
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sergeant Piering the station had engaged in some occupational therapy and waited for the axe to 
fall. 
VI 
Generally speaking the information presented in the preceding sections merely confirms that the 
closure of the station in Hatzfeldhafen was due to a combination of circumstances. But the details 
that can be extracted from the historical record enable us to look behind the bland balance sheet 
presented by the Neu Guinea Kompagnie at the time. For example, while the inferior quality of 
the Hatzfeldhafen tobacco, compared with that produced in Astrolabe Bay, was a factor in the 
cost-benefit analysis, a closer examination shows that its significance was inflated at the time, 
perhaps because it made the closure of the station appear more like an ordinary business decision. 
It is unlikely that the company would have continued operating the station, even if its tobacco had 
been superior to the Astrolabe Bay product, just as it is unlikely that it would have been closed 
simply because its tobacco did not meet expectations . Without "the hostility of the natives" 
Hatzfeldhafen would have lived on as long as it produced tobacco of a marketable quality in 
sufficient quantity to make a profit-and it had performed rather well on this score: its 1 891  
harvest had been larger than that in  Stephansort or Erima in  Astrolabe Bay ( 1 20 as compared with 
1 15 and 75 bales), and although the Erima tobacco was regarded as the most promising, the 
Hatzfeldhafen product was good enough to be combined with the Astrolabe Bay harvest and 
offered as a single lot for auction in Bremen (NKWL, 1892: 28). 
On the other hand, it was economic factors of a more general nature, rather than the hostility 
of the natives, that were ultimately decisive for the closure of Hatzfeldhafen. It is improbable that 
the Neu Guinea Kompagnie would have considered abandoning the stations in Astrolabe Bay if 
its native inhabitants had shown the same degree of hostility, concentrating its operations in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland around Hatzfeldhafen. Even if there had never been trouble with the natives, 
Hatzfeldhafen could, at best, have maintained a single tobacco plantation of a substantial size. It 
was not a suitable location for a large plantation centre. It was only a small fish which did not have 
to struggle too hard to be released from the colonial net. This release was greatly assisted by the 
fact that it was in any case advantageous to concentrate all colonial efforts in Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
in Astrolabe Bay, the area with the largest economic potential and the best harbour. It is quite 
possible that, after the closure of Finschhafen-whlch was also not merely the result of the 
"malaria epidemic" in early 1 891-Hatzfeldhafen would also have been given up, even without 
the Malala Massacre, because a strategic withdrawal to Astrolabe Bay made economic as well as 
administrative sense. 
Nonetheless, the hostility of the natives was an important factor in the history of Hatzfeldhafen 
and the Malala Massacre was a key event. But it is perhaps more significant that the contemporary 
reports show that their authors did not know what had actually happened, and constructed instead 
imaginary scenarios, using stereotypes which suited their various ideological purposes. Thus, 
imperial commissioner Rose took it for granted that the economic colonisation of German New 
Guinea was bound to create serious tensions with its native population, but he believed that these 
tensions could be successfully managed if the colonial government established itself as an 
independent arbiter who was seen by the natives as a higher authority which protected their 
interests, as well as punishing their misdeeds. This is why he insisted on the continued 
involvement of the navy: it symbolised for him the difference between the government as a 
political institution and the Neu Guinea Kompagnie as a representative of commercial interests, 
quite apart from demonstrating the awesome powers of the Reich which made all opposition on 
the part of the natives futile. It is also crucial for this scenario that "the natives" were essentially 
rational beings who would accept their place in the new order as in their best interests, once they 
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had understood that the government protected these interests . The other side of the coin is Rose's 
readiness to blame individual Europeans for instances where these tensions exploded. For him 
resorting to the rapacity of the natives, or their warlike character and so on, was the last resort. 
Primarily such instances had to be the fault of particular individuals who had failed, one way or 
the other, to manage the unavoidable tensions successfully. It could be done, and it had to be done 
in order to establish colonial rule as a reasonable enterprise, against which no natives would 
thinkingly revolt. General unrest there could be, but no general rebellion. If clashes occurred, they 
had to have specific reasons which had nothing to do with colonial rule as such. 
The problem for Rose, in the case of Hatzfeldhafen at least, was that his attempts to establish 
individual blame were no mor:e successful, but his attempts performed a valuable historical service 
because they opened a small window through which we can catch some glimpses of what 
conditions in Hatzfeldhafen actually looked like. 
What we see reflected in Grundmann' s, Leiby' s and Boschat' s evidence is a remarkable scene. 
Barely two weeks after Rose's two day campaign of destruction around Malala, Millier wandered 
off with five labourers to search for an ox, apparently entering Tobenam village, whose chief at 
least Leiby believed to be implicated in the Malala Massacre, in such a careless manner that his 
party was wiped out without firing a single shot. Although worried by his prolonged absence, 
Schoevers follows with a larger search party without bothering to check that the rifles were in 
working order, and without keeping his party together11 because no-one expected that there was 
danger of an attack so close to the station. 
Even after the Malala Massacre neither the Europeans nor their labourers regarded their native 
neighbours as a serious threat. Although work was stopped on the plantation to avoid attacks on 
small groups of labourers and a few guards were posted, life otherwise went on as usual. But it 
had always been characterised by a sporadic use of violence by all sides. The Bilau incident is a 
good illustration. The Malay who returned with a spear wound was a 12  year old boy, the personal 
servant of Moisy. He had fled the station in one of Schoevers 's  private canoes because he was 
afraid of being beaten for some small thefts, and was speared when caught stealing food from 
native gardens. Rather than returning the canoe and complaining to the station the Bilau people 
had done nothing. Instead Schoevers and Millier, accompanied by a number of armed labourers, 
had set out to investigate. Their return with a hostage, several canoes and other loot clearly did not 
come as a surprise to Boschat; and the imposition of a fine in the form of pigs was also routine. 
Nor did it stop Boschat and Leiby from visiting Bilau afterwards. They apparently did not even 
fear for their lives when they discovered that a native had been shot. Although Boschat was 
satisfied that Schoevers had nothing to do with the shooting, he found it natural to investigate the 
matter, together with Leiby, and to do so by questioning the labourers instead of confronting 
Schoevers, let alone taking steps to have Tobotako punished for his action, which no-one, 
including Rose, it seems, regarded as particularly outrageous. 
The amount of violence used by all concerned is astonishing-and it was expected right from 
the start. It was natural for Grabowsky to fear that the flotilla of canoes approaching the embrionic 
station during a nightly fishing expedition was about to attack. It was natural for Hunstein to keep 
a large dog who attacked blacks on sight. It was natural to take hostages and tie them up. But it 
was also natural for the Europeans to pay social visits to villages they had recently set fire to, or 
for the natives to come to trade a few weeks after some of their relatives had been shot by the 
station. 
Violence was a natural part of life. But it was violence between equals and violence which did 
not escalate. There were no attempts to drive the whites and their labourers into the sea or to drive 
the natives into the hills. What happened had little to do with either the establishment of colonial 
1 1  According to Grundmann some of the labourers were about 1 00 metres ahead of the three Europeans. 
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rule or with resistance to it. It was neither colonial conquest nor anti-colonial rebellion. It was a 
bloody, proto-colonial mess; a jumble of actions without a script. Was such a script written and, 
more importantly, was it acted out when company rule came to an end in German New Guinea and 
the colony came under direct imperial control? 
Chapter 1 1 :  Tribulations of a New Broom 
I 
The two years Rudolph von Bennigsen spent as imperial governor in German New Guinea are sandwiched between the period of company rule ( 1 886 to 1 899) and the Hahl era ( 190 1  to 
1914). Moreover, Albert Hahl had been identified with German New Guinea since 1 896, first as 
imperial judge in the Bismarck Archipelago and then as vice-governor in the Island Territory, 
before taking over from Bennigsen as acting governor in July 1 90 1 .  It is therefore tempting to 
dismiss the brief reign of Bennigsen as a historically insignificant interlude. This temptation grows 
stronger when one reads contemporary assessments of the man, like that of lieutenant-commander 
Seiferling, who described him as a "bon vivant" who was "obviously in no way up to his task", 
or that of the historian Peter Hempenstall, according to whom Bennigsen' s  "formula for the 
control of the protectorate" was not only "brutally direct and simple"-namely "expansion by 
pacification", involving "several bloody campaigns against recalcitrant New Guineans"-but also 
a complete failure (see above: 95 and 122) . However, while it can be quickly shown that both 
these assessments offer phantom history, it takes rather longer to give a more realistic idea of the 
shapes Bennigsen's reign actually took. 
II 
On 3 1  May 1 899 Ernst Schmidt-Dargitz, a senior official in the colonial department, wrote in a 
private letter to Wilhelm Solf, who had recently been appointed president of the "Municipality" 
in Samoa: 1 
today Bennigsen starts his journey from Naples. If I compare him with you, you have in my opinion 
chosen the better part since the title [governor] is all that makes his office attractive (BA, Nachlass Solf, 
NL53, No. 130). 
Bennigsen probably viewed the situation differently, although he might have got worried had he 
known how Schmidt-Dargitz perceived the part he was supposed to play in German New Guinea. 
For Bennigsen his posting was a promotion-he had previously been "treasurer" (Finanzdirektor) 
in German East Africa2-and an attractive challenge. Not only did he have to make a fresh start 
in Melanesia, where government activities had largely ground to a halt, it was also likely that the 
Island Territory in Micronesia would soon become part of his domain and possible that the 
Marshall Islands and even other German colonial acquisitions in the Pacific, including S olf s 
Municipality in Samoa, would eventually be incorporated. 
In Melanesia it was his most important task to pave the way for an expansion of the stagnant 
colonial economy by promoting new commercial enterprises and encouraging the established ones 
1 According to Fabricius ( 1992: 144) Schmidt-Dargitz knew what he was talking about having himself served as president 
of the municipality from 1 894 to 1 897 and before as imperial commissioner in the Marshall Islands from 1 893 to 1 894. 
I recently noticed, however, that Fabricius also reported a different version, according to which it had instead been a "Dr. 
Wilhelm Schmidt" (ibid.: 85) who had served in the Marshall Islands. I shall spare readers an account of the extended 
foray into Wonderland this surprise brought about. 
2 Bennigsen was acting governor of German East Africa when Solfhad arrived there in April 1 898 on his first colonial 
posting. To his disappointment Bennigsen put him in charge of the district court. It is unlikely that the two men became 
better friends when governor Eduard von Liebert returned and chose Solf as his personal assistant, inter alia to counteract 
Bennigsen who, according to Solf, tried to make it as difficult as possible for Liebert to govern (see Vietsch, 1 961 : 36). 
That Solf was sent to Samoa only a year later, at a time when it was clear that great things were about to happen, gives 
a good indication that his talents had also been recognised in Berlin. 
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to extend their field of activities to new geographical areas-which then had to be "pacified". The 
first step in this direction was the establishment of a government station in northern New Ireland, 
the only significant centre of commercial activity in the Bismarck Archipelago outside the Gazelle 
Peninsula, for which funds were already set aside in the 1 899 budget. The second most promising 
target was the Admiralty Islands with their potentially rich marine resources. As regards Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland the speeding up of economic development was to a large extent in the hands of the 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie on the basis of the 1 898 agreement, under which it could acquire an 
additional 50,000 hectares of land there within three years and would receive ten annual payments 
of 400,000 Marks by the Reich which it had to invest in its economic activities in the colony. 
However, these concerns were soon overshadowed by the tasks awaiting Bennigsen in the Island 
Territory which was indeed placed under him and for the government of which he was given much 
wider powers than he enjoyed in Melanesia. 
In this chapter I want to look at two of the strands of Bennigsen' s reign: his attempts to pacify 
the Admiralty Islands and the ideas about the future of German New Guinea which he developed 
as part of his plans for the Island Territory. 
m 
Shortly after his arrival in HerbertshOhe Bennigsen was informed by the commander of SMS 
Moewe, captain Dunbar, that the survey vessel had to sail to Sydney for repairs but that he was 
willing to deal with urgent requisitions before her departure. After discussions with his deputy, 
Heinrich Schnee, Bennigsen decided that, apart from some punitive action in northern New 
Ireland, at least a visit to the Admiralty Islands was required, since large-scale pearl fishing was 
about to start in this restless group where several traders had been killed in the past. 3 
Captain Dunbar accepted the requisition, and on 29 July 1 899 SMS Moewe left Herbertshohe 
with Bennigsen, Schnee and 20 native policemen on board-plus a representative of each of the 
two most interested German commercial firms, the Hemsheim firm and the Deutsche Handels­
und Plantagen-Gesellschaft, and two native labourers, who had lived for several years as prisoners 
of the local natives in the Admiralty Islands, as interpreters . 
Since Bennigsen was unable to communicate with the native policemen, it was left to Schnee 
to instruct them repeatedly during the two day journey to the group that the purpose of the visit 
was not to fight but to enter into peaceful negotiations ; that they were therefore not to shoot 
without specific orders, unless they had to defend themselves; and that they were on no account 
to fire at women or children. 
As the Moewe approached the group it was met by the Hernsheim trader Maetzke who was 
taken on board before the vessel cast anchor off Mok Mandrian (Big Mok), an island engaged in 
constant feuding with the neighbouring islands of Mok Lin (Little Mok) and Baluan which 
seriously disturbed trade. When canoes from Mok Mandrian came alongside to find out what was 
going on, they were assured by the interpreters that the Moewe had peaceful intentions. 
Nonetheless the inhabitants of the first "marine village"4 ran away when it was visited by the 
ship's  boats. But the adult males were persuaded to return and were soon engaged in a lively 
barter trade with their visitors. After a drill demonstration by the police, Bennigsen, Schulz from 
the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellschaft, the Hernsheim trader Maetzke and a few 
policemen were escorted by a "trust-inspiring chief' across the island to another marine village, 
a strenuous march of 30 minutes. 
3 According to Dunbar's report of 12 August 1 899 (RM 3/3 1 1 4  ), Bennigsen had arrived with the mail steamer on 24 July. 
If this is accurate he would have had "virtually" no first-hand experience of local conditions when he sailed for the 
Admiralty Islands and would have had to rely almost totally on Schnee's advice. 
4 A number of the coastal villages in the group were built on piles over the sea (see below in the text). 
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Since Mok Lin was only a short distance away, Bennigsen sent a message to Schnee to follow 
with the boats and the rest of the policemen. In the meantime Maetzke, who was known by name 
and well-respected, explained to the villagers, who were eager to join the expedition to Mok Lin, 
that they were not allowed to fight. There was indeed no fighting on Mok Lin when the boats 
landed after a crossing of less than 15 minutes, although the warriors at the beach at first shook 
their obsidian-tipped spears menacingly. Instead Bennigsen preached peace. But he also promised 
strong action by the government against anyone who dared to breach it. 
There was no time to visit Baluan about a mile away where a large number of warriors had 
gathered along the shores. The Moewe sailed straight to the small island of Komuli on which the 
trading station of Maetzke and his partner Molde was situated. Trade was going well for them. 
They had bought about 30,000 Marks worth of produce, mainly copra and trepang, during the 1 8  
months of their presence, and a large portion of the 20,000 Marks worth of tradegoods with which 
Hernsheim & Co. had supplied them was still in store. 
Bennigsen too was satisfied with his visit so far. 
There is no doubt that this round trip of a German warship, the landings of the police troop and the 
peaceful contacts made have had a positive effect on the natives which will significantly promote trade 
with them and prevent further outrages on their part. 
However things did not go to plan when an attempt was made during the return voyage to retrieve 
two rifles which were still in the hands of the natives of Pak island who had killed the traders 
Moller and Andersen in 1 893.  Because of the length of time that had elapsed and because Pak had 
already been shelled by SMS Bussard in 1 898, Bennigsen intended no punitive action. Rather, 
he put the two interpreters ashore, who had been held captive on this very island. They made 
contact with the natives and returned with the welcome news that the Pak were ready to surrender 
the rifles. Thereupon Bennigsen landed with the entire police troop. One rifle and some 
ammunition were produced, and the people who had met the troop happily escorted it to a village 
about ten minutes inland. There a revolver and more ammunition was handed over, but Bennigsen 
refused to believe that the second rifle had been given as a present to another island, as was 
claimed, and ordered a search of the houses . As a result the natives ran away. One of the 
interpreters was sent after them. He failed to return. The next village visited by the troop was 
deserted and two spears had been pushed in the ground at its entrance. This was interpreted as a 
declaration of war, but Bennigsen was prepared to give the Pak the benefit of the doubt. He 
ordered a return to the beach and a lunch break. When the interpreter had still not returned at its 
end, it was assumed that he had been killed and eaten. 
Bennigsen decided that the time for energetic action had come. SMS Moewe steamed to the 
other side of the island to cut off any canoes attempting to escape. Bennigsen ordered the 
destruction of the seven canoes which lay beached where the police force had landed. Next the 
two villages already visited were burnt down, after all valuable items had been removed and all 
pigs had been shot as a welcome supply of fresh meat. 
Eventually all five villages on the island had gone up in flames and the Moewe had 
demonstrated the awesome powers of the "manowar" by blowing all visible canoes to pieces with 
its canons. Not a single native had been sighted. Still Bennigsen was well pleased with the result. 
The destruction of the carefully built houses, some roofed with corrugated iron looted from the 
trading station, and the removal of all valuable weapons, utensils and food, had hit the natives 
very hard, Bennigsen reported to the colonial department, teaching them a lasting lesson which 
would prepare the ground for peaceful relations. 
Bennigsen was generally optimistic. As soon as the government had its own steamer, instead 
of having to rely on the navy, the future of the colony was assured. Outrages by the natives could 
be speedily punished, and they would gradually learn that they were no longer able to attack the 
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lives or the property of their fellow men with impunity. To be sure, such control could initially 
only be exercised along the coast, but the government stations which would be established by and 
by in the various parts of the colony would be able to extend it also into the interior. 
The report just summarised (RKA 2982) was dated 8 August 1 899. On 24 September 
Bennigsen had to report that the trader Maetzke and two of his labourers had been killed by a Mok 
Mandrian chief and his sons only two weeks after the governor' s  visit. Although SMS Jaguar was 
in HerbertshOhe when the news arrived, Bennigsen did not requisition her commander to carry 
out speedy punishment because he was about to leave on higher orders with the warship for 
Micronesia for the formal handing over of the Island Territory by the Spanish authorities. Instead 
he supplied Maetzke's partner Molde with a guard of six native policemen and placed a price on 
the head of the murderers. 
In his second report (ibid.), Bennigsen again stressed the urgent need for a government 
steamer. Without it he was powerless .  He had also received calls for military interventions in 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland. If he was unable to respond for lack of a suitable vessel, the imperial 
government would soon become the target of the same kind of complaints about its inaction as 
had been previously directed against the Neu Guinea Kompagnie.5 
Bennigsen returned from the Island Territory on 1 January 1 900. He left for a major punitive 
expedition to the Admiralty Islands after little more than two weeks, spurred on by further "native 
outrages" on which Schnee had reported to the colonial department in November (ibid.). In 
October the schooner Nukumanu of Queen Emma' s  Forsayth firm had been attacked and taken 
by the natives of Papitalai and Pitilu in the north of the group. The captain and mate and all but 
four members of its native crew had been killed. Three of the survivors had been taken captive 
whereas the last managed to escape despite his wounds. He was found by Molde who towed the 
looted Nukumanu to his station on Komuli. The three prisoners were freed by another Forsayth 
vessel, the Nugurea. She had come to inspect land the firm had recently purchased on Manus. In 
the course of this inspection her boat discovered one of the Nukumanu' s boats on a small river. 
On it the three prisoners were guarded by a number of native women who fled, after some 
warning shots had been fired. The two boats were then fired at from the wooded banks, one 
European receiving a shot through both thighs. 
Schnee had taken evidence from a Papitalai prisoner whom Molde had sent to Herbertshohe. 
According to him the whole sequence of violence turned around firearms. The Mok Mandrian 
people had got hold of 20 rifles and five revolvers when they had looted Komuli after the killing 
of Maetzke and were using them to attack their traditional enemies. They, in turn, had planned to 
attack a pearl lugger to capture its firearms when the Nukumanu unexpectedly turned up. The 
seizure of that vessel had yielded them six rifles, three revolvers and plenty of ammunition. 
Schnee stressed once more the need for a government steamer. The repetition of such 
murderous deeds could only be prevented if they could be punished immediately (emphasis in the 
report). If it was not possible to send out a government steamer soon, it was necessary to station 
a warship in the archipelago until that could be done. SMS Moewe was expected to return in 
December, but if she was delayed, Schnee planned to use the Nugurea for a punitive expedition. 
Unless something was done quickly, the Admiralty Group would again be lost to European trade. 
Since he also had no vessel for the recruitment of additional policemen, he had arranged with the 
Hernsheim and Forsayth firms to put some suitable labourers at his disposal so that they could 
received at least some rudimentary military training before the expedition. 
On 28 January Bennigsen sent a preliminary report to Berlin on the punitive expedition he had 
in the meantime carried out to the Admiralty Islands with the help of SMS Seeadler (ibid.). As 
Schnee was still busy punishing the natives in northern New Ireland yet again, Bennigsen 
5 Now, however, the shoe was on the other foot, because it was primarily the Neu Guinea Kompagnie which was calling 
for a stronger military presence in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. 
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postponed a detailed report until after Schnee's return. But he indicated that the expedition to the 
Admiralty Islands had been a success. Not counting the unknown number of wounded, 50 native 
warriors had been killed. In addition one man, three women and six children had been taken 
prisoner. The women and children had been handed over to the Catholic mission, whereas the 
male prisoner was to be tried for his involvement in the murder of Maetzke. The police troop had 
only suffered one major and two minor casualties. 
Bennigsen's  full report (ibid.) explained that Schnee had temporarily increased the police 
troop to 70 men with labourers whom the two firms had supplied free of charge. Since SMS 
Moewe was too small to transport a troop of that size he had chartered Hernsheim' s Mascotte at 
an all inclusive rate of 140 Marks per day, which the firm had reduced by 40 Marks in 
consideration of the special interest it had in the expedition. It was to start and finish in northern 
New Ireland because the chance to operate there with the enlarged police troop was too good to 
be missed. 
Schnee had left with the police troop for New Ireland on 10 January. He was to meet 
Bennigsen on Alim Island at the southern periphery of the Admiralty Group. Originally the 
governor was to sail there on SMS Moewe but captain Dunbar passed on the requisition to captain 
Schack, the commander of the station cruiser SMS Seeadler, after her arrival in HerbertshOhe. 
Having left HerbertshOhe on 1 8  January, SMS Seeadler cast anchor next to the Mascotte off Alim 
Island two days later. 
Schnee and the Mascotte had reached Komuli on 1 6  January. He was again accompanied by 
several private persons, including Molde, who was returning to his station in Komuli which he 
had left in the care of two assistants, Schlehan and Rebstock. Schnee also took both of them on 
board, as well as the policemen who had protected the station and a number of armed labourers. 
In addition 12 natives from the Fedarb Islands and Mok Lin were taken as guides, so that his total 
force now numbered around 100. 
After the Mascotte anchored off Alim on 17 January, Schnee went pigeon shooting on the 
uninhabited island with a few of his policemen. To his surprise they discovered two canoes from 
Mok Mandrian which carried about ten men. The policemen shot one of them. The rest 
disappeared into the dense bush. Schnee ordered the landing of his entire force. It formed a chain 
across the narrow island and drove the Mok Mandrian who found themselves north of the line into 
the mangroves at its end. They defended themselves with occasional rifle shots and swam out to 
sea when that did not stop the police from pursuing them-and another one was shot. As it was 
getting dark Schnee ordered the ship' s  boat and the two captured canoes to circle the island during 
the night to prevent the Mok Mandrian from escaping by raft. 
Schnee' s troops spent the next two days until the arrival of SMS Seeadler searching the island. 
Two more Mok Mandrian were shot when they defended themselves with their spears. One, who 
had hidden in the reef, was taken prisoner, as was a boy who had hidden in the top of a coconut 
palm. One Mauser rifle and some ammunition were found. According to the prisoners this had 
been the only firearm the crew of seven had carried, so that two persons were still unaccounted 
for. 
After the arrival of Bennigsen another search was made-without success, although Bennigsen 
satisfied himself that Schnee's orders to his native "auxiliaries" to refrain from the customary 
removal of the heads of their dead enemies had been followed. 
Now the punishment of the Mok Mandrian could begin in earnest. They had been expecting 
it and had moved to the larger Baluan island where it was easier to hide in the interior.6 At five 
o'clock in the morning the pinnace of the warship landed the police troop and its native guides. 
After a 20-minute march the first village was reached. The approach had been noticed and the war 
6 The enmity between Mok Mandrian and Baluan was obviously not as enduring as had been assumed, if it existed at 
all. 
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drums were beaten, so that the police troop attacked immediately. It was met with a hail of stones 
and spears. The temporary policemen were reluctant to expose themselves but gathered courage 
when the enemy withdrew. Three smaller settlements in this part of the island were captured in 
rapid succession and the regular force pursued the enemy in small groups. The valuables were 
removed from the houses, including many items looted from Maetzke' s station, the pigs were shot 
and taken to the ships and the villages burnt. Twenty-one men were killed and a pregnant woman 
was taken prisoner. A spear wound received by one of the policemen was the only serious casualty 
suffered by the government forces. It was treated by Bennigsen-who took this opportunity to 
stress in his report that the government still did not have a single medical assistant, let alone a 
doctor, in its employ. 
A second large marine village was shelled by SMS Seeadler to demonstrate the range of her 
cannons. Then the bush behind it and the beach around it were raked with the revolving cannon 
before the troop was landed. As was to be expected it found the village and a smaller bush village 
deserted. Some of the veteran policemen pushed further into the interior and exchanged sporadic 
rifle fire with the hidden enemy, but time was running out. Hence the two villages were set alight 
after they had been looted by a crowd of Fedarb Islanders who had appeared in large numbers of 
canoes to watch the spectacle. 
The next step was the punishment of Pitilu and Papitalai for the taking of the Nukumanu. The 
Pitilu did not notice the approaching ships and were still on their offshore island. Under the 
command of a naval officer the Mascotte was sent to patrol its north coast, whereas SMS Seeadler 
shelled its southern coast. Bennigsen covered the east coast with the pinnace, towing a boat with 
12  policemen. The revolving cannon was once more employed, and the policemen landed at 
several points to destroy native villages and canoes. The Pitilu resisted. Three of them were shot 
dead and one was wounded. The main police contingent under Schnee was landed at the western 
coast. It killed 1 8  warriors and took four women and five children prisoner. 7 It suffered one minor 
casualty because a policeman stepped into one of the spear traps which had been scattered over 
the island. 
The following morning SMS Seeadler crossed a large bay to reach Papitalai. Bennigsen had 
no great hopes for the effectiveness of the punishment he would be able to inflict, since the 
Papitalai were aware of the presence of the ships and since their village was situated on what he 
thought was part of the main island so that they could easily move out of reach. Thus the 
revolving cannon was once more used as a demonstrative weapon. The bush around the main 
village was raked, and a few salvos were fired 1 ,000-2,000 metres inland, before it was burnt. 
There was some further shooting when the SMS Seeadler began to survey the bay. But the hidden 
warriors were silenced by the revolving cannon from the pinnace. Later six grenades were fired 
by the large cannons of SMS Seeadler from 5,000 metres at Papitalai with a "50 per cent success 
rate". 
The next target were the Porn Mandrian people who, in contrast to those of Porn Lin, had been 
involved in the looting of Komuli station. In view of the small size of its population which was 
extremely vulnerable on its tiny island, Bennigsen planned no military action. Indeed, after he had 
learned from the Porn Lin that none of the stolen rifles were on Porn Mandrian, he decided against 
a landing when its inhabitants refused to come out of hiding. Instead he inspected the obsidian 
quarry on Porn Lin which supplied much of the traditional weaponry for the entire group. 
The final step was the return of the Fedarb guides to their island. They were getting worried 
that they would be attacked by the Mok Mandrian as soon as Bennigsen had left. The governor 
could do no more than promise a speedy return of a warship. He was eager to leave so as to reach 
his capital in time for the celebrations of the emperor' s  birthday on 27 January. He just made it, 
SMS Seeadler casting anchor in HerbertshOhe shortly before midnight, 26 January. 
7 Another woman, who was captured with her small baby, was released by Bennigsen "with some friendly words". 
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In his full report Bennigsen was still optimistic about the results of his first major punitive 
expedition: the energetic punishment of the main culprits would have a lasting effect and open the 
promising group, first for trade and then for plantations. Nor was the punishment meted out too 
harsh, since the tribes punished consisted essentially of murderers, robbers and cannibals who 
would soon wipe each other out with their stolen firearms if they were not stopped. It was 
essential to keep a close watch on the group and to punish outrages promptly, until the 
natives-who were among the most intelligent in the colony-had learned that only the 
government was entitled to wage war. 8 
The colonial department was not unduly shocked that Bennigsen'  s expedition to the group had 
cost at least 50 lives. Instead attention in Berlin was captured by a marginal measure. Bennigsen 
had confiscated Alim Island, which was claimed by the Mok Mandrian, and had granted it to 
Molde so that the copra it could produce would compensate him for the loss he had suffered when 
his station had been looted after the killing of Maetzke. The question was raised as to whether 
Molde should be instructed to pay some monetary compensation to the heirs of his partner. Rose, 
who was directly responsible for this matter, did not favour the suggestion and proposed to await 
the response of Maetzke's  heirs to the published version of Bennigsen' s  report which had been 
sent to them for their information. When they did not respond at all, Rose recommended that 
nothing be done officially. Although the traders in the Bismarck Archipelago were a rough bunch, 
they had a noble streak in money matters and hated nothing more than government interference 
in their private affairs . Molde would probably get in touch with his partner's heirs on his own 
initiative should he make a profit out of the coconut palms on Alim, and it should be left to him 
to do so. Rose's  superiors agreed and the matter was closed on 3 1 May 1900. 
Molde's  generosity was not tested. A few months later he disappeared with his crew during 
a stormy trip to the Gazelle Peninsula. 9 But Molde was soon replaced on Komuli. One of this new 
lot of traders, Carlbourn, was attacked during the first half of 1 901 on Buke Island. His cutter was 
taken and he and his crew of seven, including two native policemen, were killed. 
It was left to acting governor Hahl to report on this new outrage on 26 July 1 901  (see RKA 
2988), a few weeks after Bennigsen had left the colony. Hahl did not advocate punitive action 
because he attributed the attack to Carlbourn's lack of caution-just as Bennigsen had attributed 
the attack on the Mencke Expedition on St Matthias to the recklessness of Mencke and Caro. But 
Hahl also pointed out that it would be prudent to assess the success of the pearl luggers, which 
had just sailed for the Admiralty Islands, before making plans for the group. If it was substantial, 
the group's  economic value justified the expense of its pacification by a permanent government 
station, manned by two good Europeans and 50 native policemen, who could disarm the natives 
within three years and establish public peace. If, on the other hand, trepang and copra remained 
the only products available in commercial quantities, it would be up to the Hemsheim firm to 
supply its station on Komuli with sufficient means of power to protect itself. Hahl was not in 
favour of providing "dubious white elements" with a police guard. But he stopped short of 
requesting the abandonment of the station on Komuli, whereas he had insisted that the firm close 
its station in the St Matthias Group. 
It was a pointedly cautious document. Instead of going into details, Hahl enclosed a long 
report by Wilhelm Wostrack, the official whomBennigsen had temporarily stationed with a police 
8 Bennigsen was proud that no women or children had been killed by the police troop-in contrast to an earlier expedition 
on SMS Moewe to New Ireland when two women had been shot dead, allegedly by mistake. The constant admonishments 
and the threat of imprisonment, even if women or children were accidentally harmed, had finally succeeded in instilling, 
at least in that regard, European standards of behaviour in the police troop. 
9 According to the "land register'' (Grundbuch) Alim Island was sold by auction in 1 908 to Rudolf Wahlen. The proceeds 
were presumably paid to Molde' s heirs. I do not know whether they did share them with Maetzke' s heirs, or were officially 
encouraged to do so. 
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guard on Komuli 10 after another punitive expedition carried out with the help of SMS Moewe in 
August 1900. 1 1  A note by Rose shows that at least he was ready to draw the conclusions for which 
Hahl had prepared the ground. 
It appears that developments in the Admiralty Islands are taking the same course as those in New Ireland, 
where the naval expeditions also had no lasting success and a permanent improvement only became 
possible as a result of a continuing influence of the Administration through the establishment of a station 
(RKA 2989-emphasis in the original) .  
Rose ordered that a copy of Wostrack's  report be made and kept on file because it  painted a 
terrifying picture of the chaotic conditions in the group which would be useful when it came to 
justifying the expense of establishing a station there. Some funds for this purpose were indeed set 
aside in the 1903 budget but they did not meet Hahl' s expectations, since they were only sufficient 
to fund a station which would be "as simple as possible", rather than being manned with "the two 
good Europeans and 50 native policemen" whom Hahl regarded as necessary to tackle the 
pacification of the group with a realistic chance of success. Besides, the pearl luggers had not 
been as successful as had been hoped. Nor had the Sacred Heart mission gone ahead with its plans 
to open a station in the group. It made good administrative sense under these circumstances to 
employ the government' s scarce resources elsewhere and to let the regrettable chaos in the 
Admiralty Islands continue until the reasons for a determined intervention had become more 
compelling and adequate resources were available. 
Although it was by now clear to everybody that the use of military force during brief visits 
would have no lasting effects, the policy of periodic punitive responses to native outrages in the 
group continued for the rest of the decade. It had not been invented by Bennigsen. He had merely 
followed a well established practice reaching back to the punitive expedition in response to the 
Malala Massacre by Rose in 1 891 .  The latter had been a far more determined exercise of 
systematic destruction carried out by an even larger force, although the native casualties had then 
been lower, probably on account of the lesser efficiency of the inexperienced police force. They 
had been lower still during the punitive expeditions carried out by the navy before the 
establishment of a native police force. On the other hand, if one is prepared to accept any of the 
official casualty figures given as at least approximately correct, they had been considerably higher 
during the punitive expedition by SMS Cormoran together with the native police force in the St 
Matthias Group shortly afterwards which had been carried out against Bennigsen' s  wishes. 
More importantly, it appears that Schnee played an influential part in shaping Bennigsen's 
initial attitude towards punitive expeditions . Schnee had been frustrated by the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie's  reluctance to support energetic responses to "native outrages" and believed that the 
lack of determined action had made the situation considerably worse than it would otherwise have 
been. In his view it was the duty of the imperial government to intervene with all the means of 
power available and certain that the natives would change their behaviour if it was demonstrated 
to them that the imperial government was willing and able to punish breaches of the public peace 
speedily and severely. 
Whereas the killing of Maetzke and the taking of the Nukumanu could still be put down to the 
fact that the powers of the imperial government had not been demonstrated sufficiently clearly 
1 0  Wostrack may have been the medical assistant for whom Bennigsen had been waiting in January. He was subsequently 
posted as a police sergeant cum medical assistant to the government station in northern New Ireland and later placed in 
charge of the government station established in southern New Ireland in 1 904. He remained in charge of that station until 
1912. Wostrack retained a strong interest in medical matters and pioneered the training ofnative medical assistants-the 
Heiltultul-in his district (see Davies, 1 992: 129). 
1 1  In view of the number of punitive expeditions in which SMS Moewe participated in 1 899 and 1900 it is not surprising 
that the naval office became concerned with the effects of these distractions on her survey work (see above: 1 32). 
556 THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES 
during the visit in August 1 899, the killing of Carlbourn after the large punitive expedition in 
January 1 900 showed that this view had been mistaken, especially when information was received 
that this killing had been instigated by the Fedarb chief Kewenu who had been the leader of 
Bennigsen' s  guides during that expedition. But after receiving Wostrack' s  report in December 
1 900 Ben:migsen hardly needed this demonstration. It is an astonishing document which deserves 
close attention-but it must be seen in connection with yet another punitive expedition. 
On 14 August Bennigsen requisitioned captain Dunbar to punish "the Mock people" who had 
withdrawn to Green Island, off the south coast of Manus, and were terrorising all natives whom 
they regarded as friends of the Germans .  Quite recently they had attacked Palavan Island, killing 
almost 100 people and taking over 100 young women and children prisoner in order to abuse them 
sexually or eat them during their orgies.  Immediate action was imperative to prevent even worse 
massacres (see RKA 2650). Dunbar accepted the requisition, and on 16  August SMS Moewe left 
Herbertshohe with Bennigsen, police sergeant Soelle, Wostrack and 26 native policemen. After 
collecting another 15  native policemen in Kaewieng and another 1 1  policemen, plus eight Fedarb 
guides, on Komuli, the Moewe anchored during the night of 1 9  August near Green Island. 
Although Bennigsen had asked to accompany the expedition, he left all decisions to the navy. 
Dunbar ordered lieutenant-captain Hering to punish "the Mock people", who were now said to 
have settled on the main island, with a landing force of 120 men. It was to be divided into two 
companies of 20 marines and 25 native policemen each and a strong guard for the seven boats 
transporting it ashore. Hering was to land before daybreak and surround the village, so as to 
prevent its inhabitants from escaping into the interior, before attacking it. The men were to be 
arrested and only to be "overwhelmed" (wehrlos machen) if they defended themselves. Women 
and children were to be spared and the houses burnt. Fleeing canoes were to be pursued with the 
steam pinnace which had been armed with a revolving cannon. 
This was the usual strategy and as usual it failed to work. The trip to the village took much 
. longer than expected, since it was situated an hour further east than had been assumed and the 
boats kept on running into reefs in the dark. It was therefore only approached after sunrise. As it 
was clear that the flotilla had been seen, Hering ordered an immediate attack from the sea. Fire 
from the revolving cannon was opened at a distance of 500 metres. It was answered with gunshots 
from the natives who had climbed high up into trees. Rifle fire from the boats was then added and 
when the natives had been silenced the landing force went ashore at 6.30 a.m. 
The village consisted of 16 "huts" built on piles in the sea next to the mouth of a river fringed 
with mangroves. 12 Towards the sea it was enclosed by a palisade with three entrances and the land 
behind it rose steeply, thus affording additional protection. The village was deserted and the 
natives offered no resistance when they were pursued. The marines did not get far in the difficult 
terrain, in contrast to the native policemen, whom Hering had allowed to advance on their own, 
since he knew that he could not have stopped them in any case. As the marines were trying to find 
their way through the mangroves, the shots fired by the policemen became more and more distant. 
Since there was no chance of catching up with the enemy, Hering ordered the marines to return 
to the village, where they had all reassembled by 8.30. When the first policemen returned shortly 
afterwards, the marines started to board the boats. The boats waited until the last policeman came 
back at 9.30. The policemen reported that they had killed six natives, and Hering could see from 
the boats that they had set fire to four bush villages. The marine village was also ablaze, including 
the canoes . One policeman had been speared through the arm and a marine had suffered a minor 
accidental injury. 
12 It is not clear whether Hering regarded all native dwellings as "huts" (Hutten) or whether this term indicated that the 
structures were not up to the general Manus standard, perhaps implying that the village had been recently built as a 
temporary shelter for "the Mock people". 
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By 1 1  a.m. the landing forces were back on the Moewe, having fired the revolving cannon at 
some empty huts on Green Island which, according to the Fedarb guides, was no longer inhabited. 
After this operation Bennigsen decided that a further employment of naval landing forces was 
pointless but that it was worth testing what a prolonged presence of a substantial native police 
force in the group could achieve. Hence Wostrack and 21 native policemen were left behind on 
Komuli on a pacification mission. 
On Komuli Molde presented Wostrack with his labourer Maggeo, whom he had put in irons 
a week before. Maggeo had not only refused to carry out a task but had first thrown an oar and 
then a heavy stone at Molde, before hitting him on the chest with his fist, shouting that Molde 
should be on guard because he, Maggeo, was "a Kapsu man"-the name of his home village in 
New Ireland. It emerged that this had not been Maggeo' s first act of violence. He had previously 
attacked Molde' s assistants Schlehan and Rebstock as well as his partner Maetzke. More seriously 
still, he had tried to persuade the other labourers to join him in killing Maetzke while Molde was 
away. The plan was to load Maetzke' s  boat with the loot, in particular the firearms, and sail it to 
Kapsu where Maggeo promised to give his co-conspirators women and many presents. The plan 
had failed because the labourers from the Solomons had refused to participate. Instead their 
leader, Roko, a former policeman, had announced that he would guard Maetzke day and night to 
prevent the murder. 
Since Wostrack shared Molde' s view that it would make a bad impression on the local natives 
if they saw that the whites had serious problems with their own labourers, he released Maggeo 
after a promise that he would be a good boy from now on-and it worked. Maggeo became a 
model labourer, so much so that Molde selected him, together with Roko, to accompany him on 
a trip to the Gazelle Peninsula to get provisions. 
It was during this trip that Molde' s boat disappeared. Those on board also included Oren, 
another New Irelander, whom Molde was taking as a prisoner to HerbertshOhe. Oren was the 
interpreter who had been sent to persuade the Pak people to return after they had run away into 
the bush during Bennigsen's  1 899 expedition. Rather than having been killed and eaten by the 
Pak, as had been assumed at the time, Oren had joined forces with them and, on account of his 
experience with guns, had played a prominent role in the raids following the looting of Komuli 
station and of the Nukumanu. 
W ostrack had seen the capture of Oren as his most urgent task. He tackled it by offering the 
Pak a wealth of tradegoods if they surrendered Oren. They refused and boasted that they were not 
afraid of the whites whose warships could only destroy a few old houses and canoes at the beach 
and that Oren would shoot any white man who was foolish enough to come within his range. 
A few weeks later Wostrack set out with Molde and a combined force of over 30 policemen 
and labourers. The plan to surprise a large coastal village on Pak before daybreak failed because 
the trip took longer than expected. The village was deserted when the force arrived in full 
daylight. The policemen and labourers searched the island in small groups, returning in the 
evening with three female prisoners and the report that three warriors had been killed. The 
campaign was continued the following day. Eight villages and their canoes were burnt, 1 1  men 
were killed and 17  prisoners were taken. One of the dead was said to be part of a group of 
followers of chief Kamau who had visited Pak to take part in a singsing. 
Since the prisoners claimed that Oren had fled Pak during the previous night, Wostrack and 
Molde returned to Komuli to consider their next move. When the prisoners were questioned again, 
it emerged that Oren had not fled but was still on Pak. Wostrack demanded his immediate 
surrender because he feared that Oren would join his "good friend" Kamau on Manus, where it 
would be much more difficult to capture him. 
Although the Pak sent what they claimed to be Oren's  gun and some ammunition, they still 
refused to surrender the man. However, some days later people from Mok Lin brought in Oren 
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and were rewarded with tradegoods worth 200 Marks. The story of an old Pak chief who had 
come with the Mok Lin explained this change of mind. After the first day of Wostrack' s campaign 
a large number of people had fled Pak by swimming under the cover of darkness to a 
neighbouring island. About 20 of them had drowned, among them a daughter of Kamau who had 
recently married a chief on Pak. Kamau had visited Pak soon after Wostrack had left. When he 
had heard about his daughter' s  death he had become very angry and had started to fire his rifle 
among the people, killing one man . The old man was now seeking Wostrack's protection from 
Kamau' s wrath and offered the resumption of trade with Molde. Wostrack was pleased, released 
seven of the Pak prisoners and promised the release of the other ten as soon as the Pak 
surrendered the ammunition still in their possession. When 1 1  cartridges were brought in, as well 
as copra and other produce for Molde, the remaining ten prisoners were set free. 
A few weeks later an alliance of natives under Kamau, including the Rubal from the south and 
the Papitalai from the north, raided Pak. According to Wostrack Kamau had resolved to drive the 
whites altogether out of the group by making trade impossible for them. He had first announced 
this during a raid on Lornau, on the north coast of Manus, in August, when he had promised that 
all places trading with Molde would suffer the same fate. Kamau had also boasted that he would 
attack Molde at the next opportunity and that he was not frightened of warships, having shot at 
them without being punished. 
When Ponam, an island off the north coast of Manus, had refused to comply a raiding party 
under Kamau and Oren had attacked. The Ponam chief Bokohan, whom Molde brought back to 
Komuli, claimed that 150 of his people, including all his siblings and his father, had been killed, 
that many women and children had been captured and sold as slaves. If Wostrack did not come 
and help, he, Bokohan would not cut his hair and beard until Kamau had been killed, even if they 
reached down to the ground before this happened. 
Wostrack promised to do all he could. He began by requesting the release of the Ponam slaves, 
offering presents for their return. Fedarb obliged but chief Wussolak of Lou, another "great 
friend" of Kamau, refused. He felt safe in his mountain village in the centre of his comparatively 
large island and sent a message that W ostrack had to come and take the slaves himself if he 
wanted them. 
Wostrack set out, again with over 30 men, five days later and managed to surprise Wussolak 
in his village at sunrise. Wostrack had hoped to arrest Wussolak and had ordered his men only to 
shoot if they were attacked. But Wussolak defended himself with his spears and was shot down 
by one of the policemen. The other natives then fled and Wostrack withdrew without burning the 
village, although goods looted in Komuli as well as from the Nukumanu were found in the houses. 
Two days later the Lou brought in three Ponam slaves to Komuli, whom Molde took back to 
Ponam, together with another nine who had been surrendered earlier. Kamau too paid another visit 
to Ponam. Instead of fighting the people, he proclaimed that he was their king and that he was 
stronger than the whites whose guns he had taken. To show the Ponam that he was not a bad man 
he even paid them for the women he had taken earlier. 
It was time to move against Kamau. According to Bokohan he had only 30 warriors under his 
command. But it would nonetheless be difficult to capture him because he lived on a river, 
navigable by canoe, which dissected Manus and which "the Rubal etc. people" used to reach the 
north coast quickly from their places in the south. Kamau maintained 24 hour guards at both ends 
of the river and had built a special house to store the loot from the Nukumanu. The Ponam offered 
to act as guides but got cold feet because they feared that Kamau would take bloody revenge if 
Wostrack did not succeed in capturing him. 
"But without reliable guides we can do nothing", Wostrack added, and directed his energy 
from then on against other targets. While this is understandable, it is curious that Karnau no longer 
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figures at all in the second part of W ostrack' s report, although it continues to talk about raids and 
attempts to secure the surrender of guns and the release of slaves in various parts of the group. 
Who was this mysterious Kamau, living next to a bifurcating river in the centre of Manus? 
Was he one of "the Rubal etc. people" from the south, who were using this river as a shortcut to 
the north coast? -and who turn out to be identical with "the Mock people" whose marine village 
at the mouth of a river on the south coast had been the target of the punitive expedition of the 
Moewe in August 1900? Had Kamau obtained the guns he was using in his raids due to his links 
with the Mok Mandrian after the looting of Komuli station? Or was he a Papitalai-or a 
Pitilu?-from the north who had been behind the attack on the Nukumanu and had managed to 
control most of the loot, storing it safely in a special house in the interior of Manus? In either 
case, how had he managed to bring about an alliance which included the Mok Mandrian as well 
as the Papitalai although the latter were said to have attacked the Nukumanu so as to be able to 
defend themselves against the former after they had obtained guns from the looting of Komuli 
station? 
How do we deal with such a jumble of information? One possibility is to see it as depicting 
a horrifying chaos, as Rose did, and leave it at that. Another possibility is to replace the chaos by 
a reassuring phantom order. 
What the Germans faced in Manus was not just aimless savagery or conservative resistance to change. 
It was rather a contact situation common to many parts of New Guinea. Patterns of hostility and alliance 
which had prevailed in the past among the various groups of Admiralty Islanders were now being 
influenced by the intervention of inopportune, white newcomers, who claimed the authority to order the 
lives of all villagers and possessed technological marvels capable of changing forever the old way oflife 
(Hempenstall, 1978: 154-55). 
These vague generalisations sound plausible enough, but are they historically illuminating? Do 
we not rather have to ask what distinguished "the contact situation" in the Admiralty Islands in 
1 899/1 900 from that in other parts of German New Guinea and indeed from the contact situation 
in the Admiralty Islands, say, six years earlier or six years later? How did the part played by Oren 
in the Admiralty Islands in 1 899/1900 compare with that played by the Solomon Islander Tom in 
northern New Ireland after the killing of the trader Studzinka in 188 1  (see above: 488)? Why did 
the people around Hatzfeldhafen not get hold of one of the many deserters from that station to 
teach them how to use the guns they had captured (see above: 542)? Did the killing of the traders 
Moller and Andersen by the Pak people in 1 893 lead to the same kind of chain-reaction of bloody 
raids and counter-raids as the killing of Maetzke in 1899? Had the subsequent killing of the trader 
Dow on Rambutyo been a counterpart of the attack on the Nukumanu in 1 899 carried out with the 
aim of obtaining guns as a defence against raids from Pak? 13 Why did the part played by Oren in 
1 899/1900 apparently differ so markedly from that he played in 1 893? Why did Oren leave the 
Pak people after the opening of Komuli station in 1 898? Why did he rejoin them in 1 899? Why 
did the Pak people refuse to surrender Oren after they had seen that he was incapable of protecting 
them? 
Neither Oren nor Kamau figure in Hempenstall' s account and there is no reference to 
Wostrack' s  report, although it appears that Hempenstall made selective use of it. Instead we are 
offered more phantom history. 
In the early days Hahl [!]  tried the expedient of stationing troops in the group temporarily, but without 
success. War-like villagers scattered by the police only became wandering raiders, and the Mouk­
Mandrian, Rubal and Pak people, in the east of the islands, simply turned from marauding the centres 
13 For a convenient summary of the contact history of the Admiralty Islands see Nevermann, 1 934. 
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of European trade to terrorising friendly islanders in the vicinity; a hundred people were reportedly killed 
in a single raid on Ponam Island, north of Manus ( 1978:  1 54). 14 
Hempenstall also offers an elaborated phantom version of the "patterns of hostility and alliance 
which had prevailed in the past among the various groups of Admiralty Islanders". According to 
it: 
The Germans found three major social groups in the Admiralties. The Usiai were subsistence 
agriculturalists scattered in small groups in the interior and were considered by the others to be a 
dependent and inferior lot. On the coasts lived the Matankor, who combined agriculture with fishing. The 
third group were the Manus, a truly maritime people who lived in lavishly-constructed pile settlements 
built over the waters of swamps and bays. The Manus were-and still are-great sailors, in the old days 
taking their giant outriggers into the west and as far south as the Gazelle Peninsula; only for sago, taro, 
beans and timber were they dependent on land dwellers. The three groups together were estimated by the 
Germans to number some 13 ,000 (ibid. : 153) .  
He subsequently tells us more about the Manus 
who relied on canoes for fishing, transport and fighting; who obtained meat from the sea, from hunting, 
from breeding pigs and dogs, and from cannibalism; and who traded frequently with other Manus 
communities in coconut oil, dogs' teeth and clay pots (ibid. : 1 55) .  
But the Manus did not only trade with each other, they were also engaged "in a series of payback 
murders" (ibid. :  1 53).  However the main problem was the "continual blood feuds between the 
Manus and the land dwellers" which "endangered the security of most European passers-by" 
(ibid.) .  
Leaving aside the many specific improbabilities this account contains, 15 does it say anything 
about the traditionally prevailing patterns of hostility and alliance beyond stating that the Manus 
fought and traded with each other and also fought-and presumably traded-with the Usiai and 
Matankor? 
As far as "the Germans" are concerned Hempenstall also introduces a confusing anachronistic 
element. Bennigsen and Schnee did not find three major "social groups" but rather believed that 
they had found a simple, dualistic scenario which consisted of the Manus, who lived in marine 
villages, and the Usiai who did not, and who could therefore be easily distinguished, although they 
were in all other respects very similar. 16 
14 Hempenstall refers to a report by Bennigsen of 28 August 1900, which I have not consulted. I therefore do not know 
whether Bennigsen had learned by then that the name of the island, to the raid on which he had referred in his requisition 
of 14 August, was "Ponam" rather than "Palavan" or whether this is Hempenstall's  interpretation and there had, in fact, 
been two raids. Nor do I know whether Bennigsen in his report no longer referred to the capturing of over 1 00 young 
women and children as sex slaves and cannibal roasts during this raid-or one of these raids-or whether Hempenstall, 
"for reasons of his own", omitted this information. I have also no idea why Hempenstall claimed that the Pak people had 
terrorised friendly islanders-presumably after they had been scattered by Wostrack's policemen-or why the name of 
the "Mouk Mandrian" but not that of the "Rubal" (who are probably Nevermann's  "Ndruwal") is modernised, or why his 
map ( 1978:  1 5 1 )  does not identify the location of "Rubal", omits the "Mouk" Islands and does not cover the geographical 
area where Pak is situated. 
15 I find it hard to believe, for example, that beans or dogs' meat were an important part of Manus traditional diet, or that 
the Manus traded amongst each other in any of the products named. 
16 Hempenstall does not consider how the subsequent discovery of the "Matankor" impacted on this scenario. It seems 
that "the Germans" at the time treated these "coastal dwellers" as part of the Usiai, whereas Hempenstall gives the 
impression that they were more like the Manus. How does one interpret the German reports in the light of this different 
scenario? Did the Matankor also live in constant fear of the Manus? Did the Manus raid the scattered small groups of the 
"true" Usiai in the interior or did they mainly raid the Matankor? How permanent were the divisions between these three 
"social groups"? Did the Usiai become Matankor if they moved to the coast and the Matankor Manus when they built 
TRIBUIATIONS OF A NEW BROOM 561  
According to Schnee ( 1904: 208) there were less than 2 0  Manus communities i n  the group 
which were concentrated in the southeast: eight along the south coast of the main island, plus the 
Fedarb Islands, Mok Mandrian and Mok Lin, Baluan, Buke and Rubal. Papitalai was the only 
Manus outpost in the north, but there was also one marine village, Balamok, on Rambutyo, a large 
island on the eastern periphery of the group. Most of the Manus villages were small, some of them 
could only muster about 50 warriors, although the Mok Mandrian were more numerous. The 
largest Manus settlement was said to be Buke, which Schnee had not visited. None of the marine 
villages he had seen had consisted of more than 20 to 30 houses, although additional "home­
steads" (GehOfte) were scattered on the land behind them The Usiai-and that means the rest of 
the population, including for example the Pak people and those on the Porn islands-were more 
numerous. The population of Pitilu alone was estimated to be about 2,000. Nonetheless the Manus 
occupied a dominant position in the group. It appeared that the Usiai in many places were under 
some kind of obligation to pay tribute to them. Where such a "friendly relationship" did not exist, 
the Usiai lived in constant fear of the Manus who continuously raided the coasts within their 
reach, killing the men and enslaving the women. On the other hand it had been reported that the 
Usiai had recently attacked the Manus village Lotja, killing all but five of the adult males. 
The liberal use of terms like "apparently", "allegedly" and "reportedly" in his account 
indicates that Schnee was by no means certain that the information he presented was reliable, and 
he had good reason to be cautious since any verbal communication with the local people was very 
limited. Schnee found it most difficult to obtain clear answers from them about the objects they 
used and almost impossible to ascertain anything about their customs, since only few of them 
knew a little "Pidginenglisch" and "our former interpreters from New Ireland" also could only 
make themselves very poorly understood in that language (ibid. :  2 1 1 ). 17 Schnee hardly fared better 
when he relied on Molde's knowledge of the vernacular. His attempts to learn something about 
the techniques used in the manufacture of obsidian blades on Porn Lin had largely consisted of 
gestures because Molde's vocabulary "had to be called rather poor" (ibid. :  204). 
How could "the white newcomers" hope, under these circumstances, to gather reliable 
information on complex matters like the patterns of hostility and alliance? How did Wostrack 
"piece together" the information he presented in his report which did not consist of his own 
observations-for example Bokohan' s story of the raid by Kamau and Oren on Ponam? Had 
Bokohan lifted both hands into the air 15 times to indicate the number of the victims while 
Wostrack was counting, or did Molde know the word for 150 in the local language? Did Bokohan 
use sign language to indicate that he would no longer cut his hair and beard? Had W ostrack been 
told that the raid on Pak had been carried out by "the Mook/Rubal/Perri/Pittesee and Papitalai 
people with Kamau", or had he just written down a string of names? Did he appreciate the 
significance of the inclusion of the Papitalai? Had he tried to find out how Kamau fitted into the 
picture? Did he know and just not bother to report that Kamau was, say, a Rubal, or a Papitalai, 
because that was common knowledge? 
Did it matter to Wostrack how many people had been killed during the Ponam raid? Did it 
matter to Bennigsen? Did it matter to him whether there had been one or two big raids--one on 
Palavan, the other on Ponam, whether "the Mock people" had been involved, who "the Mock 
people" were, or whether any of the people who had actually participated in the(se) raid(s), or in 
the killing of Maetzke, lived in the village which was punished by SMS Moewe on 20 August 
1 900? 
themselves a marine village? 
17 By this Schnee presumably meant that they only knew a few words of English they could use to communicate with 
him. Had "Pidginenglisch" already become a distinct language with a grammar and a vocabulary of its own the 
"interpreters" had not mastered? Was Schnee an accomplished speaker of this language, or did he simply string English 
words together when talking to his policemen, for example, most of which meant nothing to them? 
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I suggest none of it did. It was sufficient for Bennigsen to know that the situation in the 
Admiralty Islands was horrifying and chaotic. His job as a governor was to do what he could to 
bring this chaos to an end, not to establish what patterns of hostility and alliance might be 
reflected by it. Uncertainties on that score were immaterial for the exercise of German colonial 
rule. On the other hand, the fact that these uncertainties existed but were ignored is highly 
significant, so that it would be pointless and even counter-productive for a historian of this rule 
to establish what the patterns of hostility and alliance among the people in the Admiralty Islands 
had actually been at the time. 18 But, as we shall now see, there were other kinds of uncertainties 
which mattered a great deal to Bennigsen. 
IV 
When the Island Territory was acquired from Spain it was placed under the governor of German 
New Guinea, instead of being established as a separate colony or combined with the Marshall 
Islands. A small group of officials was appointed and sent out from Germany to meet with 
Bennigsen to whom the Island Territory was to be officially handed over by the Spanish 
authorities . 19 
Instructions for Bennigsen were sent to vice-governor Hahl in Genoa from where he was to 
sail with his colleagues on 25 July 1 899. He was given copies of the two relevant imperial 
ordinances-which had been approved by the ministry of justice but not yet signed by the 
emperor-together with the chancellor' s implementation decree and a more specific decree not 
intended for publication. These decrees empowered Bennigsen to regulate temporarily those 
matters which, as from 1 January 190 1 ,  were to be governed by the Consular Jurisdiction Act. But 
Bennigsen was also instructed to work out proposals for the permanent arrangements . It was left 
to his "circumspection" (Umsicht) to come up with temporary solutions which would allow for 
a smooth transition. Bennigsen was only told to pay special attention to the land question and to 
consider making all land transactions subject to approval by the local authorities . As regards the 
temporary regulation of the administration of justice, it was recommended that Bennigsen should 
model it on the law applying in the Old Protectorate. On the other hand, it was stressed that the 
decision to make the Island Territory for the time being a part of German New Guinea did not 
mean that the laws enacted for that colony applied automatically to the Island Territory. In so far 
as such an application was considered to be expedient, the relevant pieces of legislation had to be 
formally introduced. By contrast it was necessary to exclude the Island Territory expressly from 
any legislation Bennigsen enacted from now on for German New Guinea, if it was not also to 
apply there. In short, it looked as if Bennigsen was given by and large a free hand. 
On 21 October 1 899 Bennigsen sent a fundamental ordinance of 26 September and his 
implementation instructions to the colonial department, together with two shipping ordinances he 
had enacted for the Island Territory and a labour ordinance for the whole of German New Guinea, 
including the Island Territory, which he intended to proclaim after his return to Herbertshohe. His 
covering report was based on the view that he was "entitled to assume" (wie ich anzunehmen zu 
duifen glaube) that the Island Territory and the Old Protectorate would soon become one large 
1 8  The task of a historian of the Pacific Islanders under German colonial rule is different. For such a historian it is crucial 
to establish the traditional patterns of hostility and .alliance and the influence of the "white newcomers" on these patterns. 
In this context it is also necessary to sort out how far the contemporary reports-for example that of Wostrack-<:an be 
treated as factual. This is probably a task only a narrative historian would be brave enough to tackle; but then narrative 
historians do not need to engage in demanding exercises of this kind. 
19 The following account is based on documents contained in RKA 2998 to 300 1 ,  supplemented by information the 
colonial department filed in RKA 2966 and 4786 and Items 4, 9, 27, 1 02 and 1 2 1  of the G 1 series of files of the imperial 
government in the Australian Archives. 
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colony under a unified administration. This was the basis of his uniform labour ordinance and of 
his plan to submit in the near future uniform taxation and customs ordinances. 
Bennigsen' s  report arrived in Berlin on 7 January 1900. The first response was an ordinance 
of the chancellor of 20 January which prohibited for the time being the acquisition of any land 
from natives in the Island Territory. It repealed any previous enactments to the contrary. This 
meant section 12  of Bennigsen' s  ordinance which had established a land acquisition monopoly 
of the government. The next step was a decree to the vice-governor in Ponape and the district 
commissioners in Yap and Saipan, dated 24 January. Firstly, it pointed out that section 5 of 
Bennigsen' s  September ordinance was not in accordance with the 1870 Personal Status Act so 
that matters dealt with under the ordinance had to be re-enacted in compliance with this act to 
become legally valid. Secondly, it instructed the local authorities not to apply Bennigsen's labour 
ordinance in the Island Territory. Thirdly, it requested the local authorities to exercise their 
legislative powers only "in really urgent cases" (in wirklich dringlichen Fallen).  
According to the decree a repeal of section 12  of Bennigsen' s ordinance had been necessary 
because no decision about the most appropriate economic utilisation of the Island Territory had 
as yet been made. It was clear, however, that such a decision had to take the neighbouring 
Marshall Islands and the "distinctive" (eigenartige) arrangements for their economic utilisation 
into account. Before transferring any land in the Island Territory to commercial interests it also 
had to be ascertained how much land suitable for plantations and other economic enterprises was 
available and how much of this "hardly particularly large area" could be acquired from the natives 
or taken into possession as ownerless.20 The need to protect forestry and other resources had to 
be considered as well, and it still had to be worked out whether the land should be sold outright 
or only leased to private interests. 
The colonial department invited the local authorities to report on all these issues. They were 
especially instructed to report what land in their districts had already been transferred on the basis 
of the September ordinance and reminded that from the receipt of this decree they were no longer 
empowered to initiate or complete the transfer of any land. 
A response to Bennigsen was sent more than a month later. It stated first of all that the full 
incorporation of the Island Territory into German New Guinea Bennigsen envisaged was at 
present out of the question. The Island Territory was economically linked to the Marshall Islands 
rather than the Old Protectorate, and it was impossible to unite all three areas administratively as 
long as the German government was bound by its 1 888 agreement with the Jaluit Gesellschaft for 
the Marshall Islands. Since it was uncertain whether a way could be found to terminate this 
agreement without harming the legitimate interests of the company, it was also premature to 
consider the enactment of uniform tax and customs legislation for the Old Protectorate and the 
Island Territory. As Bennigsen's  September ordinance would automatically become ineffective 
on 1 January 190 1 ,  there was no point in critically examining its individual provisions. However, 
in view of the negotiations with the Jaluit Gesellschaft it had been necessary to repeal section 12, 
which was also irreconcilable with the telegraphic instruction to Bennigsen that no land 
acquisitions from natives in the Eastern Carolines were permitted. Because of the urgency of the 
matter, and the lack of direct shipping connections between the Island Territory and Herbertshohe, 
the repealing ordinance had been sent directly to the local administrations. The covering decree, 
a copy of which was enclosed for Bennigsen' s  information, set out "the additional reasons" for 
its enactment. No decision in principle about the transfer of native land could be made until the 
negotiations with the Jaluit Gesellschaft had been completed and the detailed report requested 
from the vice-governor had been received. On the other hand, the colonial department was looking 
forward to Bennigsen' s proposals concerning the permanent legal framework for the Island 
20 The colonial department doubted that there was any ownerless land in the Island Territory. 
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Territory. They had to arrive in Berlin at the latest by early October so that the required imperial 
ordinance could be made public in the Island Territory before 1 January 190 1 .  
The colonial deparunent also had difficulty with Bennigsen' s special ordinances. Because the 
Island Territory, the Marshall Islands and the Old Protectorate were separate administrations, 
vessels based in the Marshall Islands and the Old Protectorate, contrary to Bennigsen' s ordinance, 
had to be treated as "foreign ships" in the Island Territory. In addition, the fees Bennigsen had 
set for foreign ships were far too low compared with those in the Marshall Islands. And so it went 
on. Bennigsen was instructed to repeal his labour ordinance for the Island Territory; his currency 
regulations were criticised; and fault was even found with the ordinance concerning the supply 
of arms and liquor to natives because it contained no penal provisions. 
On 20 March 1900, well before this depressing decree arrived in Herbertshohe, Bennigsen had 
submitted his "permanent" proposals to the colonial deparunent. As was to be expected they were 
drafted on the assumption that the German colonial territories in the Pacific would form a single 
administration-with the exception of Samoa which, Bennigsen accepted, on account of its 
remoteness and its peculiar recent history, required a separate government. Once the planned 
shipping connections were operating it would soon become apparent how much the interests of 
these other three territories would profit from a single administration and a umform law which 
would first include the Old Protectorate and the Island Territory and into which the Marshall 
Islands could later be incorporated as another district. 
Apart from unified taxation and customs legislation, in Bennigsen's  view only two general 
ordinances, one by the emperor and one by the chancellor, were required. His draft for an imperial 
ordinance was divided into two parts. The first was concerned with the organisation of the local 
administration, the second with the administration of justice. Bennigsen planned a division of 
German New Guinea into five administrative "districts" and an unspecified number of "sub­
districts" (Oberbezirke and Unterbezirke) . They were respectively to be placed under "district 
commissioners" (Bezirksamtmiinner) and "district officers" (Stationschefs) .  The district 
commissioner for the Bismarck Archipelago would serve at the same time as the deputy of the 
governor with the title vice-governor. He, as well as his colleague in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and 
the governor as chief justice, had to be fully qualified lawyers, whereas this was not necessary in 
the case of the district commissioners in the Eastern Carolines, the Western Carolines and 
Marianas, much less in the case of the district officers, who were apparently to be placed directly 
under the governor rather than under one of the district commissioners.21 The establishment and 
the abolishment of new districts and the excision of sub-districts from existing districts required 
the approval of the chancellor whereas the governor was entitled to make minor alterations on his 
own responsibility. 
The draft also covered the native police force. Its strength was to be determined annually in 
the budget. It was to be placed under the command of the governor. Its main body was to be 
stationed at the seat of the governor in Herbertshohe but smaller sections were to be allocated to 
the district offices and stations. They were to be under the command of the officials in charge, 
although their training and direct supervision was to be the responsibility of German police 
sergeants. 
For the administration of justice Bennigsen envisaged a continuation of the arrangements made 
for the Old Protectorate in 1 886 and 1 888 with minor, technical adjustments .  By contrast he 
proposed major modifications of the existing land and mining law. The 1888 imperial land 
ordinance was to be supplemented by the 1 895 imperial crown-land ordinance for German East 
Africa and amended accordingly. The 1 897 mining ordinance of the Neu Guinea Kornpagnie was 
21 I should point out that it was common at the time for people joining the upper stream of the metropolitan or colonial 
public service to be fully qualified lawyers. 
TRIBULATIONS OF A NEW BROOM 565 
to be replaced altogether by an amended version of the 1 898 imperial mining ordinance for 
German East Africa. 
In addition to minor adjustments in the field of the personal status law, the proposed 
chancellor ordinance dealt, firstly, with the implementation of the new land and mining law, as 
modified by the importation of the East African crown land and mining ordinances and, secondly, 
with the administration of criminal justice in relation to natives. In the latter context Bennigsen 
once more proposed an African import. The Neu Guinea Kompagnie's 1 888 Native Penal 
Ordinance was to be replaced by the 1 896 decree of the chancellor concerning the exercise of the 
criminal jurisdiction and the disciplinary powers over natives in East Africa, the Cameroons and 
Togo, with some minor amendments. 
The most detailed proposals related to the implementation of the crown land ordinance. They 
boil down to the following principles : 
1 .  a land acquisition monopoly for the government, with the exception of leases of native land 
for less than three years; 
2. an obligation on the government when acquiring native or ownerless land to ensure that 
adjacent natives retained enough land for their existence, namely a minimum of five times the 
area currently in use by them; 
3 .  a discretionary power of the governor: (a) to determine in which forms (lease or full 
ownership) land acquired by the government was transferred to private interests; and (b) to 
impose improvement and forestry protection conditions; and 
4. an authority for the governor to issue further implementation regulations. 
In a covering report Bennigsen provided additional explanations. They demonstrate, in 
particular, that he did not appreciate the relationship between the Native Penal Ordinance and the 
Disciplinary Ordinance in the Old Protectorate and was unaware that an introduction of corporal 
punishments as judicial punishments in the Pacific would meet with strong opposition in Berlin. 
While Bennigsen commented no further on the native police force, he did justify the posting of 
the vice-governor to Herbertshohe, rather than to the peripheral Ponape. His arguments were 
compelling, if it was to be the role of the vice-governor to also act as deputy for the governor in 
the Old Protectorate, rather than functioning only as a kind of primus inter pares in the Island 
Territory who was given a direct line to the colonial department, which made him a junior 
colleague rather than a subordinate of the governor of German New Guinea but gave him no 
powers to act as his deputy in the Old Protectorate. 
A key factor in Bennigsen' s considerations was the large distances and the poor commun­
ications between the various local administrations. He intended to deal with this difficulty by 
spending much of his time travelling the length and breadth of his colony on his government 
steamer, visiting the various local administrations while the vice-governor was holding the fort 
in Herbertshohe. 22 
What Bennigsen had to say about the relations between the district commissioners and the 
district officers gives the clearest clue as to what he had in mind. On the one hand it was necessary 
to allow the latter to operate largely independently; on the other hand, it was unwise to entrust 
them with the exercise of the judicial jurisdiction over non-natives, or of legislative powers, so 
that these powers had to remain with the district commissioners to whom the district officers 
therefore had to be "in a certain way" (in gewisser Weise) subordinated. Bennigsen was still 
undecided as to how this relationship was best sorted out. He therefore asked for permission to 
come up with a solution when he established the first government station in northern New Ireland 
"in about July" .23 
22 It is likely that Bennigsen thought that Schnee was just the right man for the job. 
23 Bennigsen asked politely for special instructions on that score, but he knew very well that they could not arrive before 
the station had been established, if it was indeed established "in about July". Bennigsen also foreshadowed the 
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The colonial department again spent no time on a detailed analysis of Bennigsen' s proposals, 
since they did not fit into its plans and were regarded as generally misguided.24 Yet it took until 
4 August before it responded to this report by sending the draft of an imperial ordinance 
concerning the permanent regulation of the "legal conditions" (Rechtsverhiiltnisse) in the Island 
Territory. Although the covering decree stated that it had "utilised" (verwerten) Bennigsen's 
proposals, it had nothing in common with them Apart from a few predictable provisions for the 
administration of justice in relation to non-natives, it only addressed the question of the land and 
mining law in the Island Territory. But its answer was pointedly non-committal. It stipulated that 
the laws introduced by the Consular Jurisdiction Act did not apply in this field. Instead it 
authorised the chancellor, and with his approval the governor, to regulate these matters for the 
time being in so far as this was required. 
By that time the colonial department had already received a second report by Bennigsen, dated 
26 April, which responded to its March decree. It indicated that Bennigsen was ready to throw in 
the towel but only under protest. In his view it was "absolutely necessary" to unite Germany's 
colonial territories in the Pacific, apart from Samoa, into a single administration with uniform 
laws. This necessity surely constituted a "political reason" for which the 1 888 agreement with the 
J aluit Gesellschaft could be terminated under its clause 4. Should this be impractical, the interests 
of the Pacific colonies demanded that the company be offered monetary compensation for its 
agreement to a consensual termination. It had shown no interest in the economic development of 
the Carolines in the past, and the conditions in the Marshall Islands were so deplorable that the 
commander of SMS Seeadler was about to lodge a formal complaint with the naval office. 
Bennigsen stuck his neck out even further by declaring that he could take no responsibility for 
an approach to the government of the Pacific colonies which failed to create a unified 
administration of the three territories as this would delay their development perhaps by decades. 
He therefore left it to the colonial department to change his proposals as it saw fit, since he was 
unable to propose workable alternatives . Finally, he stressed that nothing in his instructions had 
indicated that the colonial department was against such a unification. It was therefore at least 
necessary to create clarity in this regard because any measure taken without a certain knowledge 
of the department' s plans for the future could only harm the development of these territories. 
Bennigsen was especially offended by the chancellor' s  ordinance of 20 January 1900. In his 
view it corresponded to section 12 of his 1899 ordinance with the only exception that it also 
prevented the government from acquiring land in the Island Territory. The aim of precluding 
foreigners from acquiring land for the time being could therefore have been achieved by 
instructing the local administrations "internally and confidentially" not to sell any of the land they 
acquired. Although he would also have regarded such an instruction, in agreement with the local 
officials, as a serious setback, it would at least have avoided the unfortunate consequences of the 
current situation where the government could not even acquire native land for public purposes. 
Bennigsen also defended his other legislative measures against the colonial department' s  
criticisms. I n  particular, h e  stated that while he had carried out the order to repeal his labour 
ordinance for the Island Territory he could take no responsibility for the consequences this was 
going to have. 
establishment of three additional government stations in the next budget year. Two of them were to be situated in the 
Island Territory, in the Palau and Truk Groups, thus considerably reducing the responsibilities of the district offices in Yap 
and Ponape. The third station was to be located at the mouth of the Ramu, in connection with the plans of the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie to use this river to gain access to the interior of Kaiser Wilhelms land. 
24 One of the few marginal comments on Bennigsen's report related to his proposal to reserve major organisational 
decisions for the chancellor because it could easily come to ill-considered moves if this authority were given to the 
changing occupants of the governor's position. In the view of the commentator this was a rare manifestation of 
"Selbsterkennmis" (a realisation of his own limitations) on the part of Bennigsen. 
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Now our story is heading for an anticlimax. The ordinance "concerning the legal conditions 
in the Island Territory" Bennigsen had been sent in August was never enacted. It was superseded 
by a general implementation ordinance of the revised Protectorates Act for all German colonies 
proclaimed in October. In November Bennigsen and the local administrations in the Island 
Territory were sent a list of the few sections of Bennigsen' s 1 899 ordinance that would survive 
after 1 January 190 1 .  On 24 December 1900 Bennigsen was instructed to repeal the administrative 
instructions he had issued in its implementation. In addition, he was told that experienced 
administrators like Hahl, Senfft and Fritz hardly required new instructions of this kind, at least 
not before the "concession question" had been settled. 
But Bennigsen had the last word. When reporting on 1 1 April 1901 that he had carried out the 
order to repeal his 1 899 implementation instructions, he again stressed that his original 
instructions concerning the administration of the Island Territory had been far from clear. In this 
difficult situation, after discussions with Hahl, Senfft and Fritz, he had taken those measures 
which, to the best of his knowledge and belief, had been required to meet the existing situation. 
If these measures had not in all points corresponded with the intentions of the colonial 
department, this had been due to the fact that his instructions had not sufficiently familiarised him 
with these intentions . 
What had these intentions been? A memorandum prepared in the colonial department in 
January 1900 suggests that it too had regarded a speedy unification of the Island Territory, the Old 
Protectorate and the Marshall Islands as desirable. The problem had been the 1 888 agreement with 
the Jaluit Gesellschaft which, as long as the company fulfilled its contractual obligations, the 
German government could only terminate if this was required for "political reasons". The colonial 
department interpreted this expression to mean reasons of "higher politics" ( hochpolitisch) at the 
international level, which did not exist at the time. It also believed that the Island Territory was 
economically firmly linked with the Marshall Islands, so that it should not be united with the Old 
Protectorate without the latter. The original plan had therefore been to offer the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
an exclusive economic concession for the Eastern Carolines in exchange for relinquishing its 
political rights in the Marshall Islands under the 1888 agreement. Since such a concession would 
probably have involved some kind of land acquisition monopoly for the company, the colonial 
department had been anxious to prevent any land acquisition by other parties. But instead of 
informing Bennigsen of these plans it had merely invited him, in his July instructions, to consider 
whether he should make all land transfers initially subject to approval by the local authorities. It 
would perhaps have been better, the memorandum conceded, if the intentions of the government 
at that time not to permit the transfer of any land had been expressed more clearly. However, this 
intention had been expressed succinctly in the August cable to Bennigsen which prohibited all 
alienation of native land to foreigners, apart from emergencies. Unfortunately the governor had 
not complied with this instruction, or had misinterpreted it by assuming that it was only concerned 
with acquisition of native land by foreigners without the approval of the local authorities. The 
memorandum took the view that section 1 2  of Bennigsen' s ordinance had at least objectively been 
a breach of these instructions and therefore recommended its immediate repeal. It added that it 
was necessary, in view of Bennigsen's apparent opposition to any form of a "protectionistic 
system", to inform him that the colonial department intended to adopt such a system. 
However, the recommendation to clarify the situation forthwith was not taken up so that 
Bennigsen and the officials in the Island Territory continued to be left in the dark; and it was the 
lack of clear directions, rather than differences of opinion about the policies to be pursued, that 
convinced Bennigsen that it was time to give up. This does not mean that he did not personally 
feel strongly about the need for a speedy administrative unification of the Island Territory and the 
Marshall Islands with the Old Protectorate, but as a good public servant he would not have 
refused to go along with fundamental policy decisions approved by the emperor, had he been 
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informed about them. What frustrated Bennigsen was that he was given wide discretionary powers 
only to be told that what he had done in their exercise was unacceptable and had to be undone.25 
v 
The previous discussion has only followed the central strand of these frustrating exchanges. 
Another important strand is the "land and concession question". It was brought into the open in 
a decree to Bennigsen of 21 June 1900 (AA Gl,  Item 204). It enclosed correspondence with the 
Jaluit Gesellschaft reaching back a full year. In June 1 899 the Jaluit Gesellschaft had offered to 
tackle the economic development of the Island Territory in cooperation with the Deutsche Bank. 
It had sought a land acquisition monopoly for ten years, with an upper limit of 30,000 hectares, 
and a tax exemption for the same period. In exchange it offered a ten per cent share of its entire 
profits, that is to say including those of its operations in the Marshall Islands which, as it proudly 
pointed out, had yielded a dividend of ten per cent for the previous year.26 
The colonial department expressed interest but indicated that it expected in exchange for such 
a concession an arrangement obliging the company to cover the entire costs of administering the 
Island Territory. It also informed the company that it was engaged in similar negotiations for the 
western section of the Island Territory with a syndicate led by Count von Hutten-Czapski which 
was about to send out an expedition under Professor Volkens to examine the groups in question 
and was willing to do so without demanding any provisional undertakings by the colonial 
department as the Jaluit Gesellschaft had done. 
The company's  counter-offer suggested postponing a decision about the financial obligation 
it had to accept in exchange for a land acquisition monopoly. It dealt exclusively with the 
expedition it would send out as a counterpart of that under Professor Volkens.  As the company 
had learned, he would accompany Bennigsen on his trip to take over the Island Territory from the 
Spanish authorities so that the costs would be minimal. Its expedition, on the other hand, would 
be of a very different kind. Whereas it was the aim of the Volkens expedition to acquire some 
general knowledge of these islands, for which visits of a few days were sufficient, the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft had been familiar with them for many years. Its aim was to establish whether 
particular areas of land were suitable for the particular crops it had in mind and whether they 
could be acquired by it. In order to accomplish this task its expedition had to consist not just of 
a botanist but had to be led by a businessman already acquainted with the area, who was assisted 
by various other people and given a sea-going vessel for his own use, since the required detailed 
examination of each of the larger islands could take weeks if not months. 
Before embarking on such an expensive enterprise the company had to know whether a 
division of the Island Territory along 148° eastern longitude was acceptable; whether Volkens had 
been informed that he was not permitted to acquire land east of this line; and whether the company 
would be given exclusive permission to do so with the assured support of the local officials. This 
exclusive permission could be limited to the duration of its expedition and extend, at any rate, no 
further than the end of 1900. If the colonial department was prepared to give the officials and 
25 Bennigsen probably did not appreciate that the colonial department was dithering rather than being devious. But this 
mattered little, since it could have at least clarified that it was considering a range of options, and that it was essential not 
to make any firm commitments for the time being. It is not unlikely that the decision to postpone the introduction of the 
Protectorates Act until I January 1 901 was also influenced by these uncertainties. All that was meant to happen until then 
was to be of a provisional character which allowed the colonial department to keep its options open. Bennigsen was not 
expected to prepare the ground for a particular permanent solution but for a smooth transition to whatever solution was 
adopted. In other words, Bennigsen was expected to do essentially nothing new, without being told that this was the case. 
It is worth remembering that the instructions to Knappe on his appointment as imperial commissioner in the Marshall 
Islands had been of a similar nature (see above: 5 1 8) .  
26 It  also offered to maintain a regular shipping line, although it asked for an annual subsidy of 90,000 Marks for doing 
so. 
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Volkens corresponding telegraphic instructions before they left Singapore, the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
would immediately get its expedition ready. 
The colonial department was not impressed by this counter-offer which would have enabled 
the company to acquire all the land it wanted without committing itself to anything. However it 
was prepared to permit the company to acquire up to 5,000, rather than 30,000, hectares, so that 
its expedition-which would certainly not cost more than 50,000 Marks-would add a mere 10 
Marks to the cost of each hectare of land it  acquired. 
The June decree of the colonial department to Bennigsen did not indicate whether the 
negotiations with the J aluit Gesellschaft, or the Hutten-Czapski syndicate, had progressed further, 
but it implied that at least they had not reacheq a conclusion. Bennigsen was asked to report on 
the question, in particular for the Eastern Carolines. If his views did not favour the proposals of 
the Jaluit Gesellschaft, he was to develop plans as to how else the islands could be utilised in a 
manner which benefited German interests and excluded English, Japanese and other foreign 
competition as far as possible. The vice-governor in Ponape had been sent a copy of the decree 
and asked to report as well. 
Bennigsen responded in a long report written on board SMS Moewe on 20 August 
1900-while her marines and Bennigsen's native policemen were punishing "the Mock-people" 
in the Admiralty Islands. It reiterated the view that the planned land concessions for the Eastern 
Carolines and the Western Carolines and Marianas would hinder rather than help the economic 
development of the Island Territory. After expressing again his distinctly unfavourable opinion 
of the Jaluit Gesellschaft and urging a termination of the 1 888 Marshall Islands agreement, he 
summarised his views in three theses: 
l .  the state should grant no tax exemptions; 
2. the state should grant no large land concessions; 
3. the state should control the allocation of all uncultivated land in the colony.27 
On 28 September Bennigsen sent a report by Hahl, dated 6 September, to the colonial 
department without comments, apart from stating that all other officials shared his views about 
large concessions, namely that they held back the development of the colony and reduced the 
revenue of the state. 
Hahl was indeed against granting the Jaluit Gesellschaft the land concession it had sought. If 
the company acquired 30,000 hectares not a single hectare of useful land would be left for third 
parties.28 The company would also acquire a de facto trading monopoly, because only traders 
prepared to become totally dependent on it could hope to survive under these circumstances. In 
Hahl's view a concession had at least to be cut to 10,000 hectares. But he preferred the granting 
of only 1 ,000 to 2,000 hectares to the company, and then only in the form of a 99 year lease, the 
speedy cultivation of which would make a most welcome contribution to the development of the 
colony. Since the granting of a large concession would effectively mean that the colony would be 
governed in the interests of the company, it had to be expected to make a payment which was 
sufficient to cover the entire costs of its administration, and Hahl thought that a payment of 
100,000 Marks a year would be appropriate.29 
As an alternative Hahl proposed (1)  to open the Island Territory to all trade, since it was 
impractical to keep out foreign interests and to insist on the import of only German goods; (2) to 
27 It is significant that Bennigsen used the term "state" (Staat) and not "government" or "administration" in this context 
because this suggests that he saw his colony as a "state" and not as a territory which he was governing on behalf of the 
Reich. 
28 This gives a good indication of how the agricultural potential of the Island Territory was seen at the time: there were 
just 300 square kilometres ofland available for commercial agriculture, less than two thirds of the grant to the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie in Kaiser Wilhelmsland in the 1 898 agreement. 
29 Hahl was in favour of a subsidised shipping line run by the Jaluit Gesellschaft, but believed that the company would 
be prepared to do so whether or not it was given a land concession. 
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encourage one or more middle-sized plantation enterprises in the high islands; and (3) to compel 
the natives in the low atolls to plant up the suitable unused land so as to produce an increasing 
volume of cash crops for export. Such a planting programme had to be supervised by government 
officials during regular visits . While no additional staff was required for this purpose only 
experience could show whether one government steamer would be capable of carrying out this 
task in addition to all the other tasks it was expected to perform. 
On 20 November the history of the land and concession question entered into a new phase 
with a cable by the colonial department to Hahl: "Concession Jaluit Gesellschaft for coral atolls 
Eastern Carolines to 148° similar to Marshall Islands recommended by colonial council. No-one 
to be admitted to these atolls, including Ant." In addition the governor and all three district offices 
in the Island Territory were informed by cable that the chancellor ordinance of 20 January had 
been supplemented by a declaration which made clear that the leasing of land and the occupation 
of ownerless land was also prohibited: "strict compliance expected" (see RKA 2285). This was 
followed by an explanatory decree to Hahl of 27 November, a copy of which was sent to 
Bennigsen, without further comments or instructions (AA Gl ,  Item 204). It stated that due to 
various misunderstandings, the reasons for which it did not wish to discuss,  the land and 
concession question had not been treated in a manner which corresponded with the colonial 
department's intentions and instructions. Although a cable in August 1 899 had prohibited the 
transfer of any land by natives to foreigners, apart from emergencies, Bennigsen' s  September 
ordinance had permitted the acquisition of land by the government, although the government was 
clearly a foreigner in the sense of not being a native.30 The chancellor ordinance of 20 January 
1 900, which prohibited for the time being the acquisition of any land from natives in the Island 
Territory, had also been misunderstood as, according to reports by the Jaluit Gesellschaft, leases 
of native land of up to 99 years had been approved. On 24 November the chancellor had therefore 
issued a decree which expressed the intention to freeze for the time being any dealings concerning 
land or land rights not already in the possession of non-natives . A certified copy of this decree 
was enclosed, and Hahl was instructed to proclaim it forthwith in "the customary manner". The 
colonial department firmly expected that these regulations would from now on be strictly applied 
in accordance with their spirit as well as their letter. Should doubts about their meaning still arise, 
Hahl was to report immediately to the colonial department and to send a copy of his report to the 
governor (emphasis in the original text). 
In the meantime the land and concession question had been further clarified during the last 
meeting of the colonial council, in so far as that had been possible in view of the incomplete 
information available. The colonial department enclosed a revised memorandum from the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft. It advocated the granting of three separate concessions: for the Eastern Carolines, 
for the Western Carolines and Palau and for the Marianas. The colonial department also enclosed 
excerpts from the minutes of the colonial council meeting. They showed that the council had 
approved the proposal of the J aluit Gesellschaft after an amendment restricting it to the low coral 
atolls had been withdrawn.31 However, the Jaluit Gesellschaft itself had subsequently limited its 
application for a concession to the low coral atolls in the Eastern Carolines . The colonial 
department had not yet decided whether to grant such a concession, partly because it wanted to 
give Hahl the opportunity to express his views, but mainly because it recognised that its granting 
could only achieve positive results if it was supported by all concerned. 
30 There is little doubt that it had not occurred to Bennigsen or any of the local officials that the colonial government 
could also be seen as a "foreigner" and that this quite reasonable view had led to a genuine misunderstanding. On the other 
hand, subsequent moves, in particular the decision to continue the leasing of land after its sale had been prohibited look 
rather less innocent, although the reports of the Jaluit Gesellschaft on this matter may well have been exaggerated. 
3 1  The minutes show that the approval had been given after the chairman had also disclosed Bennigsen' s  opposition to 
the granting of any concessions. 
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Since the colonial department enclosed the draft of a concession, which had already been 
given a preliminary blessing by the ministry of finance, as well as drafts of the ordinances Hahl 
would have to enact if it was granted, he was clearly expected to come to the party and to drop any 
objections to the now proposed arrangements. They were indeed only a shadow of what the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft, or the colonial department, had hoped for. Apart from the geographical restrictions 
of the concession to 12 named atolls, it no longer involved the acquisition of any land by the 
company,32 nor any tax exemptions. Instead the company was given a limited trading monopoly 
for 30 years for which it had to pay a modest fee of 5,000 Marks per annum for the first ten years, 
but which was to rise subsequently if its copra exports from the Eastern Carolines exceeded 600 
tonnes per annum-the equivalent of a yield of a single mature plantation of 600 hectares. 
Hahl responded on 15 February 190 1 .  He supported the now proposed concession as it took 
into account most of the criticisms he had made of the original proposal.  But he gave his support 
mainly because he believed that such a concession was necessary to enable a German company 
to survive the competition of foreign interests. He therefore stressed that the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
had to earn this protection by undertaking to establish permanent stations manned by reliable 
German-speaking agents; not to employ dubious white elements as traders or planters; and to 
upgrade its main station on Ponape, in particular by providing proper facilities for the loading and 
unloading of the mail steamer and coal supply ships. 
Hahl also insisted that Ant had to be exempted because Henry Nanpei had been granted title 
to these islands by the Spanish governor in 1 896. He further indicated that it would be desirable 
to exclude Pakin as well. It already earned the leading chief of the Jokaj ,  who had conquered the 
islands in pre-colonial times, an annual income of 3,000 Marks from copra he sold to the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft, whereas Nanpei, as far as Ant was concerned, refused to deal with the company 
because he claimed that he had been duped by it in the past. 
Bennigsen fully agreed with Hahl in a report dated 1 8  February 190 1 ,  stressing that dire 
consequences would follow for public peace on Ponape if Ant or Pakin were not excluded from 
the concession. Even a reduction of the fee payable by the Jaluit Gesellschaft by as much as one 
third would be acceptable as a price for their exclusion. In the concession approved by the 
chancellor on 2 July 1901 ,  the Jaluit Gesellschaft was instead compensated for the exclusion of 
Ant and Pakin by the inclusion of the Truk Group in the concession-a generous alternative as 
this group was the most populous in the entire Island Territory. But then the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
had also made additional concessions. They were included in a secret supplement because the 
arrangements made were not suitable for publication. The first consisted of an amendment of the 
termination clause in the published document. It authorised the chancellor to cancel the 
concession at any time without compensation to the company if the relations between the Reich 
and another state, or the maintenance of public order in the Island Territory, required this. 33 The 
second prepared the ground for an administrative unification of the Marshall Islands with the 
Island Territory. The company undertook to raise no objections against such a move, whereas the 
colonial department implicitly recognised that the privileges the company had been granted in the 
1 888 agreement would survive it, although alternative arrangements concerning the costs of the 
administration could be made. 
In general Bennigsen could be pleased with this final outcome. In a way he had won the war 
without achieving any concrete victory. But he had ruined his own career in the colonial service 
in the process. Indeed, it was already Hahl as acting governor who received the colonial 
32 Instead the company was to assist the natives in planting up their hitherto unused suitable land. In return the natives 
had to sell the copra from such new groves to the company. 
33 This made clear that, as in the 1 888 agreement, only "hochpolitische" reasons of external politics would count. On 
the other hand, the recognition that a continued operation of the concession might endanger public peace suggests that 
German rule was also regarded as being by no means internally secure. 
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department' s decree in September 190 1 .  Whether the economic development of the Island 
Territory profited from this largely negative answer to "the land and concession question", or 
whether the Jaluit Gesellschaft profited economically from the minimalist concession it obtained, 
is another matter. But the course of these developments had little to do with either Bennigsen' s 
or the colonial department' s  intentions. Still, it is clear that a great deal of time and energy could 
have been used more constructively had the colonial department been more forthcoming and had 
it not given Bennigsen unrealistic expectations concerning the role he was meant to play.34 
But this is enough of the big picture for the time being. It is time to focus again on what was 
happening at the grass-roots level. 
34 The implications of this evidence for Hempenstall' s  claim (see above: 95}-that Bennigsen resigned in a fit of 
pique-are plain. 
Chapter 12: the Aftermath 
I 
On 20 May 1 902, Assessor Wolff reported to the colonial department that a military post of 20 policemen was in the process of being established between Paparatawa and Tamanairiki on 
the Gazelle Peninsula to secure public peace in the area after the military operations in response 
to the V arzin Murders had been completed. He assured his superiors that this post would cause 
no additional expenditure. The cost of running it would be covered by selling the copra produced 
from the rich stands of coconut palms growing on the land to be confiscated as a punishment from 
the tribes responsible for the murders. In addition to the 20 policemen, 20 labourers would 
therefore be allocated to this new post. An ideally suited European had already been appointed to 
take charge: the former Catholic missionary Costantini, who was well acquainted with and liked 
by the natives in the area and who had rendered valuable services during the military operations 
(see RKA 2989). 
The post started to operate soon afterwards and was used as the base for the celebrations of 
the official end of the hostilities. They were arranged to coincide with the birthday of the empress 
on 22 October. A big sing sing was staged. About 2,000 ( ! ) natives participated and 25 Europeans, 
including several ladies, who were guarded by 40 armed native policemen (see RKA 2989). 
Costantini did not last long because his appointment was vigorously opposed by the Catholic 
mission, 1 but the police post in Toma remained in place until 1908, when it was closed down 
because the natives in the area were now completely peaceful (see RKA 5803). 
The annual report for 1902 shows that concern with the maintenance of public peace had not 
been the only reason for its establishment. 
The establishment of a Police Station in Toma (Paparatawa) will ensure peaceful conditions both for the 
expanding plantations and also among the belligerent natives themselves. The overthrow of the tribes 
around V arzin and in particular the inclusion ofTamanairiki in the area under orderly administration, has 
brought the entire northern section of the Gazelle Peninsula, which constitutes a single linguistic area, 
under the influence of the Government. The Taulil, who live between V arzin and the Baining Mountains, 
had in the past been subjected to severe attacks from two sides. The establishment of public peace was 
of particular benefit to these people. Ever since contact was made with them they have in fact proved 
reliable supporters of the Government; in particular they immediately commenced work on the 
construction of roads, as they recognised that a rapid and convenient communication route was in their 
interest (Sack & Clark, 1 979: 236). 
According to the 1903 annual report the construction of a road between Toma and Taulil and 
another one between Toma and Kabaira (ibid. : 247) indeed became a major task. It continued into 
1 904 (ibid. :  253) but apparently came to an end during that year-at least no reference to it is 
made in subsequent reports. 
The 1 903 report also stated that the government plantation which had been started in Toma 
was not to be extended beyond the 100 hectares already planted with coconut palms.2 The rest of 
the 478 hectares confiscated was "to be given over to pasture", and the breeding of buffaloes, 
sheep and goats had already started experimentally (ibid. :  248). The following year experiments 
with rubber and chinchona trees were conducted, but the latter failed completely and the former 
1 Assunto Costantini had left his order on account of persistent problems with his vows of celibacy. A number of court 
cases involving him and the mission followed. For a phantom version of an encounter with Costantini see Jacques, 1 922: 
32-38.  
2 It  would appear that this was the area in which the coconut palms of the previous native owners were concentrated. 
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were only partly successful. Otherwise the commercial performance of the post was not 
sufficiently memorable to rate a mention. Nor was it a success as a base for the mobile police unit 
for which it was used in 1 903 (ibid. :  244 ), since the base was apparently moved to Herbertshohe 
soon afterwards. The next and last reference to Toma in the annual report for 1 909 describes it 
as a "convalescent home" (ibid. :  304) which, at a height of around 400 metres, had also become 
a popular destination for weekend outings from Herbertshohe (see Wendland, 1 939 :  1 60). 
However, it is possible to fill in some of the empty spaces in this picture, because a "diary" of 
the police post in Toma, covering the period from 8 June 1 903 to 3 1  December 1904, has survived 
(AA63/83,  Item B73). 
II 
The first entry lists the presence of a workforce of 62 natives. Of these 29 are classified as 
"soldiers", eight as "labourers", six as "women" and 1 9  as "Kanakas". Twenty-five of the soldiers 
were engaged in building two houses on that day, one of them for "Samoans".3 Two soldiers 
carried out "continuing tasks", one supervised 1 1  labourers and Kanakas who were collecting 
coconuts, and the last supervised five women who were planting grass.  Three labourers also 
carried out continuing tasks. Three persons were sick and four were sent to Herbertshohe. The 
entry was signed by Klinger. 
The entries continued in this format for about four weeks, when Klinger was replaced by 
Pitsch. During this time the workforce increased from 62 to 72. On 1 2  June five Kanakas were 
added. A day later the soldier Tompi was sent to HerbertshOhe and the soldier Man and the 
labourer Sobul arrived from there. On 27 June the number of Kanakas increased to 28.  One new 
labourer was added, one woman left, but the number of soldiers still stood at 29. 
What did this workforce do during the four weeks or so under the command of Klinger? It 
gradually emerges that the most important continuing task of the soldiers consisted of guard 
duties, to which between two and four soldiers were allocated every morning.4 None of the 
continuing tasks of the labourers are identified. 
During the 25 working days covered-Sunday was a day of rest and Klinger made no 
entries-between one and six persons were sent to Herbertshohe on 15 days. The reason is only 
identified once: on 24 June two people were sent for medical treatment; they were still listed as 
absent the following day. 
The number of sick people varied between nil and four. Apparently only two cases were 
sufficiently serious to require professional medical attention. The diary does not indicate whether 
the same person remained sick for several days or whether different people were out of action for 
only a day or two. It is worth mentioning, however, that during the last five working days, when 
Klinger was trying to finish some projects, not a single case of sickness is recorded. I should add 
that the diary suggests throughout that the native workforce in Toma during the 1 8  months 
covered was reasonably healthy, and that not a single death is recorded. 
One person is listed as being "on leave" for a week and one person as having "deserted" .5 This 
desertion was the most dramatic event recorded during Klinger's command. The deserter was 
probably the target of the five people he sent out on 22 June "to catch" ( einfangen) natives. At any 
rate the two people sent out the following day are shown as having been sent out "to catch a 
deserted labourer". For three more days one person is listed as having "run away". 
3 It was probably intended as accommodation for a group of banished Samoans. 
4 There is no indication as to how long these guard duties lasted or whether guards were also posted at night. 
5 Desertions were not regarded as a problem. Only one other case is listed. In that instance Hahl noted calmly during a 
visit that the deserter "should stay away". 
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Only two other unusual events are referred to. On 19 June Toma was visited by district 
commissioner Wolff who noted that he had examined the diary, and on 26 June Klinger gave most 
of his workforce the afternoon off to attend a sing sing in a neighbouring village. Only a guard of 
12 men remained at the station. 
The work program was interrupted twice by heavy rain. During the second storm the rooves 
of the houses for the labourers leaked badly. In the next week over 150 man-days were devoted 
to fixing the problem-an indication that the houses, which were probably less than a year old, 
had either been shoddily constructed or that Klinger' s workforce was highly inefficient, or both. 
The most striking feature of the diary during this period is the lack of military activity. It took 
until 30 June before the 29 soldiers had their first drill session. This may have been due to the fact 
that the necessary facilities still did not exist. On 1 0  June Klinger allocated 13  people to building 
a rifle-range and targets. Until the end of the month more than 300 man-days were devoted to this 
project. As from 30 June military training sessions became a regular feature of station life in 
Toma. 
During the last days of Klinger' s command efforts were concentrated on building a fence "for 
the animals". Other agricultural activities took place in bursts. Between 8 and 12 June 650 man­
days were spent on collecting coconuts. This should have produced quite a heap if each man had 
picked up an average of, say, 300 nuts per day.6 There is no indication as to what happened to 
these nuts, or to those subsequently collected. The yield of the first few days covered should have 
been ample to plant up systematically the entire 100 hectares earmarked for this crop.7 Between 
23 and 26 June the harvest of maize occupied 60 man-days. The collection of coconuts was 
resumed on 25 June. A smaller number of people harvested bananas and betel and galip nuts. A 
hive of activity, but not a single man-day was spent on building roads and the 29 soldiers also 
apparently never left the station for any kind of patrols .  
With the arrival of Fitsch the format of the diary changed. The size of the workforce is  no 
longer shown, nor is the number of persons who were out of action due to sickness or other 
reasons. The entry for Fitsch's  first working day on the job illustrates the new style: 
Until 8 am police soldiers drill. From 8 to 9 cleaning rifles. Afterwards maize harvest. Policesoldier 
Passingatrongar to Herbertshohe. Labourers maize harvest. 
For a brief period Fitsch continued to include precise information about changes in his workforce. 
On 7 July he hired To Kelio and on 9 July To Komil as casual labourers for three months. On 10 
July the soldiers To Matava and Pina were posted to  Herbertshohe. On 16 July the labourer Tapim 
deserted and the soldier To Nomu and the woman Boden were sent to HerbertshOhe. From then 
on it becomes impossible to put a figure to the changes. The entry for 20 July recorded that "the 
relieved police soldiers [were sent] to Herbertshohe in the afternoon", but it neither indicated their 
number nor whether all or only some of them were replaced. Similarly the entry for 25 July shows 
that "people", presumably Kanakas, were paid off with pipes and tobacco but does not say how 
many people were involved. It appears, however, that casual labourers were gradually phased out. 
It took until 5 September before the arrival of ten new permanent labourers from Herbertshohe 
was recorded. On the same day 1 1  soldiers and five labourers were sent to "the roadworks in 
Kabaira", although eight of the soldiers returned within three days. On 10 October Fitsch went 
with another six soldiers and six labourers to Kabaira. He returned the following day, but we are 
6 There is nothing magic about this figure. But it seemed not unreasonable to assume that a labourer could pick up a nut 
every two minutes during a ten hour working day. 
7 There is no indication in the diary that copra was produced in Toma. While the newly planted palms would not have 
started bearing by the time the police post was closed down in 1 908,  the confiscated stands should have produced a 
substantial harvest, although Wolff was probably overly optimistic when he predicted that it would make the post 
financially self-sufficient. 
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not told whether he brought the soldiers or labourers back with him. Three days later 17 labourers 
completed their contracts . In November two soldiers and two labourers were sent to HerbertshOhe 
to be paid off. Only one casual labourer, To Pinie from Vunadidir, is shown as having been hired 
after July. 
Between 3 1  December and 2 January 1904 a total of 30 police soldiers and three women were 
sent from Herbertshohe. This meant a net gain of 26 soldiers, because four soldiers were sent to 
HerbertshOhe the following day. On 17 January followed a major reduction. Fifteen soldiers were 
"sent to the French [Witu] Islands"-to carry out punitive measures following the attack on a 
trading station. On 14  March as many as 50 soldiers were recorded as having been posted to 
Herbertshohe. 8 
This would appear to be more than the total number of soldiers present at the time. Yet an 
innovation by Pitsch demonstrates that this was not the case. Pitsch had started to list the names 
of the eight soldiers who were given guard duties on Sundays, and the entries for the next few 
Sundays after the loss of the 50 men include the names of over 30 different soldiers. In other 
words, probably as many as 100 police soldiers had been stationed in Toma in early January.9 
From then on the number of soldiers and labourers appears to have continued to shrink. On 
23 May district commissioner Kommayertook five soldiers to Kabaira. The following day another 
seven soldiers and four labourers were sent to HerbertshOhe and roadworks at Ratavul. 10 At the 
end of the year yet another five soldiers, one woman and two labourers were sent to HerbertshOhe 
because they had completed their contracts. 
All told, the workforce in Toma at the end of 1904 was considerably smaller than it had been 
1 8  months earlier. This is not surprising as the entries in the diary had been deadly dull for some 
months .  Apart from the early morning drill for the soldiers, the entire labour service for them. the 
labourers and the women had consisted of maintaining the station and the pasture: cleaning the 
station, cleaning the fences, mowing grass, pulling grass. 
Although life on the station had never been exciting, earlier it had been less repetitive. Pitsch' s 
first main task had been the completion of "the animal fence". But this was apparently not 
followed by the arrival of large numbers of animals. The first reference to their presence is an 
entry in August according to which a sick goat was taken to HerbertshOhe. It took until early 
September before four soldiers ( ! ) were allocated "permanently" to looking after "the buffaloes". 
From then on, the menagerie, or at least the facilities for housing it, grew impressively. First a 
pigsty was constructed. This was followed by a cowhouse, for which the women wove mats for 
many days. Later they also made mats for a sheep-pen. 
The diary does not show how many buffaloes, sheep, goats, pigs-or chickens and 
horses-were kept on the station. Nor does it show what happened to them. There is no reference 
to any of them being slaughtered for local consumption or to provide fresh meat for Herbertshohe. 
This ties in with the information in the annual reports that animal husbandry was still in an 
experimental stage, so that numbers had to be built up. The diary also confirms that the focus of 
agriculture moved during the second half of 1904 to the preparation of pasture. By contrast much 
of the previous 1 2  months had been devoted to planting, tending and harvesting crops. Initially 
maize and coconuts figured most prominently, but they were later supplemented by tapioca, sweet 
potatoes, taro and millet. Even kapok trees were planted and the periodic collection of betel and 
galip nuts continued. The station produced substantial surpluses of food crops which were sent 
to HerbertshOhe. On 1 6  July, 20 labourers were sent with taro and maize. They returned with two 
8 This move may well have implemented a decision to transfer the base of the mobile unit to HerbertshOhe. 
9 The entry for 29 April shows that on that date their number was still at least 40, because this number is given for those 
who performed shooting practice on that morning. 
10 Ratavul was a critical point in the developing system of roads in the Gazelle Peninsula. It was there where the road 
crossed the caldera forming Blanche Bay at its narrowest point and led to "the Northcoast". 
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ox carts which were presumably used to transport more produce. On 8 August 22 soldiers and 
labourers were sent with taro and betel nuts. On 23 December 1 903 a special effort was made: the 
entire workforce collected galip, betel and coconuts for HerbertshOhe as a Christmas treat. 
A climax of productivity was reached a few weeks later. On 26 February 443 kilograms of taro 
were sent, on 3 March 523 kilograms, and on 5 and 7 March a total of over 2,000 kilograms 
followed, not to mention the departure of an ox cart on each of 9 and 1 0  March with an 
unspecified load. But then there is a gap until the end of May, when 870 kilograms of taro were 
sent, followed by two ox cart loads in early June. However this is the last transport listed. It 
appears that even the Christmas present of various nuts for HerbertshOhe was not repeated in 
1 904. 1 1  
The building activities on the station had largely been completed when Pitsch took over in July 
1 903. The houses for the mysterious Samoans, who never materialised, were demolished in 
September instead of being put to other uses. Yet Pitsch recorded on 10 July the arrival of a 
carpenter who brought a load of 60 (cubic?) feet of (milled?) timber with him. In October a "new 
house" was constructed for which trees were cut in the bush, which also supplied balbal (coral 
trees) for the construction of the various animal fences. 
Road building played a significant part in the station' s  activities for just a few months. The 
only project for which the station was directly responsible was apparently the road to Tomavatur. 
It occupied the policemen after their early morning drill session for much of the time between 
September and December 1 903 . From then on they too were increasingly allocated to work "in 
the plantation". Even for the work on the Tomavatur road the policemen were not formed into 
gangs which camped along the road as the distance from the station increased; at least they were 
apparently all present at the station for their military training during weekday mornings. This does 
not mean that no such gangs were formed, but if they operated, they were detached from the 
station and operated under a different command so that the diary does not account for their 
activities .  
Judging by the diary only a single European had initially been posted to  Toma: first Klinger 
and then Pitsch. But it was not its purpose to account for the movements of non-native personnel. 
On the contrary, Pitsch crossed out an entry on 3 1 July 1903 which had recorded that "the police 
sergeant" had gone to Herbertshohe. Pitsch apparently went again a week later to seek medical 
attention, but this only emerges indirectly. The entry for 8 August shows that the shooting practice 
had been cancelled because Pitsch could not stand "on my sick leg". It 3.Iso recorded that in the 
afternoon as many as 22 soldiers and labourers were sent to Herbertshohe with produce. But it 
went on to state that only "the guard" and corporal Towarlie, as well as two invalids, had 
remained on the station. Moreover, this particular entry was signed by Pitsch, a practice which he 
had generally abandoned, as a further indication that Pitsch too had gone and had left Towarlie 
in charge. 
On 3 September Pitsch was relieved by Pieper. Pieper had come to Toma the previous day 
with district commissioner Kornmayer who initialled the diary. Pieper only stayed for two weeks, 
when he was taken back to HerbertshOhe by Kornmayer who again initialled the relevant entry. 
Pieper was lax as regards the military training of the policemen. No shooting practice took place 
and infantry drill was only carried out on five days. On three days the construction of the pigsty 
was given priority and on two days the cleaning of the road to Vunadidir. 
After his return Pitsch got stuck into the construction of the road to Tomavatur with his 
policemen, so much so that he too cancelled the shooting practice for a while and for some days 
did not carry out any infantry drill either. On 1 0  October he went with six policemen and six 
labourers to Kabaira and stayed away overnight. Since it is unlikely that a native corporal was left 
1 1  It is quite possible that at least not all of the taro had been grown by the station but that it was bought from natives 
who came to the market which was apparently held regµlarly at the post. 
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in charge of the station for 24 hours, Fitsch probably had by then acquired a European offsider, 
although he continued to keep the diary until 23 November when he was again relieved by Pieper. 
This time Pieper stayed until 2 1  December. But he returned six weeks later. Moreover, he was 
then replaced by Adelmann, who held the fort until 1 3  March 1904, when Pieper returned. Pieper 
was again replaced by Adelmann on 22 April, and Adelmann remained in charge until 1 8  October, 
when Fitsch returned and settled down to his military training and pasture maintenance routine. 
However, Adelmann may well have stayed on, since Fitsch recorded on 19  December that 
Adelmann had gone with ten soldiers to Taulil. On the other hand, while the diary recorded the 
return of the ten policemen three days later, it did not record the return of Adelmann-but then 
it was not its task to do so. 
The diary displays several puzzling features.  Was it a coincidence that most of the recorded 
transports of taro to Herbertshohe took place during the periods the diary was kept by Adelmann? 
Did it so happen that the taro was then ready to be harvested, or did Fitsch and Pieper not bother 
to record routine transports of produce? Similarly, was it a coincidence that during the four 
periods when the diary was kept by Pieper only the sending of a single member of his workforce 
to the hospital in Herbertshohe was recorded, although the other three keepers of the diary 
routinely recorded such hospital visits? Did Pieper regard such events as not worth recording? Or 
was he not prepared to approve such visits? Does the fact that the diary records the punishment 
of natives with compulsory labour on three occasions mean that the station imposed no other such 
punishments during the period covered? Can we draw the same kind of conclusion from the fact 
that the arrest of a native, who was sent to Herbertshohe, and the sending of three prisoners from 
Herbertshohe to the prison in Toma were only recorded once?12 
Despite these unc.ertainties a fairly clear overall picture emerges. It appears that the 
establishment phase was largely completed before Fitsch' s  arrival, that roadworks in the area 
became his main responsibility and that his shorter or longer absences from the station between 
September 1903 and October 1904 were also linked with this task. As regards the commercial 
aspect, the move from crops to animal husbandry is plainly visible. But although it is obvious that 
it was going to take time before the coconut plantation became fully productive and stock numbers 
had increased sufficiently to start selling or slaughtering large quantities, it is striking how little 
progress was apparently made. 
The diary is especially disappointing as a source of information about the part the station 
played as a base of the mobile police unit. There are indications that it was used in late 1903 and 
early 1 904 as a kind of holding paddock for surplus policemen, but with the departure of the 50 
policemen in March this role appears to have come to an end. 
The most unexpected result is that the station played no active role in the maintenance of 
public peace in the area. From the start the atmosphere was remarkably relaxed. The diary shows 
no concern for the security of the station. Klinger obviously had no fear that there might be 
trouble when he gave the bulk of his workforce permission to attend a singsing in one of the 
neighbouring villages, although his workforce presumably included at least some policemen who 
had taken part in the punitive actions following the V arzin Murders just over a year ago. The only 
occasion when the police performed any kind of demonstrative action was an "exercise march" 
( Obungsmarsch) to Paparatawa on 29 August 1903, a week or so after what appears to have been 
the highlight in the life of the station in 1903/04: a visit by governor Hahl on 20 August. 
By and large the station kept to itself. Apart from the to-and-fro between Toma and 
Herbertshohe, and occasional movements of policemen and labourers connected with road 
building, only a handful of excursions are recorded. On 18 August 1903 Fitsch sent three soldiers 
to Taulil. On 1 September soldiers were sent to Rapitoko and Malakuna to summon natives. On 
1 2  On the other hand it would seem that none of these events should have been recorded in a diary which had the purpose 
of recording how the workforce was employed at the post. 
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5 November Fitsch went with five soldiers to Rebar. On 9 September 1904 ten soldiers were sent 
to Wairiki and on 19 December Adelmann went with ten soldiers to Taulil . No details are given, 
but it is significant that the Taulil and their closest Tolai neighbours were the destination in most 
cases. This is not unexpected, as the annual reports indicate that the station had a special 
responsibility in relation to the Taulil. Fortunately there is no need to speculate, as a special task 
Fitsch was called upon to perform in this context is documented in a separate file of the district 
office in Herbertshohe which survived because it was sent to the colonial department. Before 
examining this file, however, it is worth considering the only surviving file of the station in Toma. 
According to its cover it deals with the "administration of native justice" in its district between 
1903 and 1907 (AA G254, Item Box 4). But this is misleading because the station was given no 
formal judicial jurisdiction, rather, its administrative district remained within the jurisdiction of 
the station court in HerbertshOhe, so that the file can only deal with related administrative matters. 
ill 
The first document on this file consists of instructions sent to Pitsch by the district office on 1 3  
August 1 903. Pitsch was to send Towarlie-presumably his native corporal-and the Kanaka 
Tomuar to Taulil to arrange for To Babeke and three other named Taulil to come to Toma on 1 9  
August where the governor wanted to meet them It was important, according to the instruction, 
that the Tolai in Wairiki, especially To Maidang, did not learn about the meeting because they 
might try to prevent it. The topic the governor wished to discuss was the repatriation of "Taulil 
slaves" kept by theTolai. Two days later Pitsch was instructed to postpone the meeting by one 
day. 
As we know from the diary Pitsch sent three soldiers to Taulil on 1 8  August and Hahl came 
to Toma on 20 August to hold "court". The file contains no information as to what happened 
during the meeting. On the other hand, it does show that the Tolai in the area were well informed 
about what was going on. 
On 18 August To Neia from Paparatawa came to the station, accompanied by father Stehlin 
as an interpreter, to complain that the government chief To Belagia had ordered To Neia to pay 
60 fathoms of shell money to To Kirara. The case revolved around the brothers To Kilang and 
Talim. To Kilang had been the Paparatawa chief who, together with To Vagira of Tamanairiki, 
had been behind the V arzin Murders and who had been shot dead during the following punitive 
measures. Talim was also dead, but he had been killed during a traditional fight with Rebar about 
ten years earlier. Because To Kirara was held responsible for that fight he had paid To Kilang 
compensation of 50 fathoms of shell money as compensation for the death of his brother Talim. 
Now To Kirara demanded their repayment from To Kilang' s  nephew To Neia, plus ten fathoms 
as interest. To Kirara had persuaded To Belagia to hold court in this matter. To Neia had not been 
told about the court and refused to accept the decision. To Neia now asked that the matter be 
judged by a European because it could not be settled by the chiefs. 
Summoned by Fitsch, To Belagia confirmed that To Kirara had demanded 60 fathoms from 
To Neia. A court had been arranged for 14 August but not held because To Neia had not turned 
up. Instead the others had a festive meal during which they decided to take the matter to Pitsch 
on the market day in Toma on 17 August, but this time To Kirara had not come. To Belagia also 
wanted the matter to be judged by a European. 
On 19  August Stehlin wrote to Fitsch about new developments in the matter, which To Neia 
had told him about. To Kirara had announced that Ja Kumu, a large roll of 300 fathoms of shell 
money, was to be distributed during the court Hahl was going to hold in Toma as compensation 
to the relatives of those killed during the punitive measures following the Varzin Murders. 13 Ja 
13 The naming of large rolls of shell money was a common practice. 
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Kumu had belonged to To Kilang and was now owned by To Neia and To Birao who was much 
afraid of losing it. To Kirara had also warned To Neia to settle the Talim matter before the court 
was held. To Neia, Stehlin wrote, was too ill to come to Toma and Stehlin suffered from an attack 
of fever, so that Fitsch had to come to Paparatawa should he want to pursue the matter. 
Again the file does not show whether that happened or whether Ja Kumu was distributed. But 
Hahl did deal with the Talim matter, because he noted in the file that To Neia had paid 60 
fathoms, presumably to To Kirara. No reasons for the decision are given. There is also no 
indication as to what Hahl thought of the planned distribution of Ja Kumu, which treated the 
government's  punitive measures after the Varzin Murders as if they had been a traditional war 
among Tolai for which To Kilang was held responsible. 14 It would seem that Hahl took the view 
that To Kilang had extorted the bloodmoney for his brother Talim from To Kirara, and that his 
heirs should return this ill-gotten gain to To Kirara who had become an influential supporter of 
the government. It is, of course, possible that To Kirara had only threatened to demand the 
distribution of Ja Kumu to make To N eia repay the bloodmoney for Talim, and, in particular, that 
he had hoped that To Birao would use his powers of persuasion to this end, so that he and To Neia 
would not also lose the treasured Ja Kumu-but as usual the historical record only offers 
intriguing glimpses. 
Another such glimpse, and another case involving the estate of one of the people killed after 
the V arzin Murders, came before Fitsch in December 1905 . To Kabenge of Tamanairiki had fled 
after the murders and had been killed by the Taulil. To Kukuai, who was now tultul in Gunanur, 
had come to Tamanairiki afterwards and had taken 140 fathoms of shell money which had 
belonged to To Kabenge. To Pipili and Taure from Tamanairiki demanded the return of the 
money. They claimed that they, as well as To Kukuai and To Wongatal of Gunanur, were the 
matuana (matrilineal nephews) of To Kabenge, but that To Kukuai claimed all of To Kabenge's  
shell money for himself. When "the Gunanur" did not turn up to several meetings Fitsch arranged 
to mediate the matter; he summoned To Kukuai and chief To Birao. They came, bringing along 
the tultul To Urangut as their "spokesman"-which presumably meant that he translated for the 
others into Pidgin, since Fitsch did not speak Tolai. 
To Urungat explained that the Gunanur had not come to the meetings because they had hoped 
to settle the matter with the Tamanairiki themselves, but that their efforts had first been delayed 
by a sing sing which had preoccupied the Tamanairiki and then by a sickness of To Kukuai. To 
Kukuai insisted that he and his two brothers were the only true matuana of To Kabenge, because 
his wife Ja Tomai had been the sister of their mother Ja Lagorai-an affinal relationship which 
would appear to have nothing to do with the normal matuana blood relationship. But when Fitsch 
subsequently questioned To Pipili and Taure, their matuana relationship with To Kabenge turned 
out to be just as tenuous . According to them, To Kabenge had come to Tamanairiki from Gunanur 
as a little boy and had since then lived with them in the same gunan (hamlet). He had accumulated 
all his shell money wealth while living in Tamanairiki. This is why they now claimed his shell 
money and why they were his true matuana. 
Fitsch decided that he was unable to sort out the relationships between the parties because he 
did not speak the vernacular and referred the matter to the district office in Herbertshohe. The new 
district commissioner Karlowa noted on file that he had dealt with it during a visit to Toma in 
April 1 906 without indicating what the outcome had been, let alone whether Fitsch had 
misunderstood the facts in his attempt to take evidence in Pidgin. 
It is possible, for example, that To Kabenge had moved from Gunanur to Tamanairiki to live 
with his mother' s brother and that To Pipile and Taure lived in the same gunan because they were 
14  It is worth recalling that the Tatama stories I recorded 70 years later adopted the same approach (see above: 265). 
What these cases say about the ways in which the Tolai responded to their colonial history at the time would be of central 
importance for a history of Melanesians under German colonial rule. 
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the children o f  the daughter o f  another sister o f  this man ,  or, for that matter, that J a  Tamai was 
not the wife but the sister of To Kabenge and perhaps even the mother of To Pipile and Taure. It 
is unlikely that district commissioner Karlowa made a serious attempt to sort out the relationships 
between the parties or to establish "the customary rules" of Tolai inheritance as a basis for his 
decision. He probably aimed instead for a political compromise which was acceptable to the 
parties, as well as being in the interests of the government-and such an approach would have 
been in line with the traditional Tolai way of handling disputes. 
Pitsch also exercised some kind of quasi-judicial powers. On 27 March 1905 he sentenced To 
Laur from Wairiki to four weeks hard labour, signing his decision as "native warden". In the 
morning of that day Pitsch had sent four policemen to chief Tulul in Rapui, who was supposed 
to tell them where the sorcerer Tapalia had taken his shell money treasure, which was to be 
confiscated. 15 To Laur had been at Tulul' s gunan when the policemen arrived. He had heard Tulul 
telling them that Tapalia's  shell money was at the gunan of To Rakaur in Wairiki. Using a 
shortcut To Laur had warned To Rakaur who had disappeared with the shell money by the time 
the policemen arrived. During their return march to Toma the policemen had come across "the 
traitor" To Laur, who admitted that he had warned To Rakaur. They took him to Pitsch who 
questioned him with the help of the policeman Willy as interpreter. Pitsch sent To Laur to the 
district office in Herbertshohe to serve his sentence because there was no prison in Toma in which 
he could have been locked up during the night. 16 Instead of being kept in Herbertshohe To Laur 
was sent to work on the road at Ratavul, where he died after serving three weeks of his sentence. 
Pitsch was instructed to inform his relatives through a suitable messenger of what had happened, 
although he was given no details, for example the cause of To Laur's death. 
A frequent visitor to the police post in Toma was the Taulil chief To Babeke. One of these 
visits occurred in September 1904 while Adelmann was in charge. To Babeke brought the Baining 
Upka with him, because he had received orders from Hahl to hand over all Baining who had been 
involved in the Baining Massacre, when several members of the Catholic mission had been killed 
earlier that year. To Babeke insisted that neither Upka nor any other of the Baining who were 
staying in Taulil had taken part in the killings. He had only brought Upka so that the governor 
could satisfy himself that this was so. But Adelmann was suspicious because Upka had an almost 
new bush knife in his possession and because he did not believe Upka' s explanation that he had 
received it as a gift from father Rascher when the latter had visited Baining together with the 
governor a year earlier. He therefore sent Upka on to Hahl. Hahl believed the story and informed 
Adelmann that Upka was free to return to Taulil with To Babeke. Adelmann was also told that 
To Babeke had been ordered to arrest any Baining still on the run after the massacre. To Babeke 
and the person making the actual arrest were each to be given an axe as a reward. 
In March 1905 To Babeke was back with a complaint about his tultul Marima. Marima had 
gone to Hahl and falsely accused the Taulil Tamar of some misdeed because he wanted Tamar to 
be sent to prison so that he, Marima, could take Tamar' s  wife, Ja Mori. Pitsch sent To Babeke to 
Hahl who ordered that Marima pay ten fathoms of shell money each to To Babeke and the station 
in Toma and hand back his tultul cap. 17 
These visits by To B abeke were only minor episodes in the relations between the colonial 
government and the Taulil. The main event was an attempt to return "the Taulil slaves" to their 
home, which is covered in the district office file already mentioned (RKA 2990). 
1 5  Tapalia was a notorious iniet sorcerer who still figures prominently in Tolai oral traditions. 
16 It is not clear what had happened to the prison in Toma to which the district office had earlier sent prisoners from 
HerbertshOhe. 
17 The file does not indicate whether Hahl also ordered the release of Tamar from prison and the payment of some 
compensation to him by Marima. 
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IV 
In June 1903 father Dicks sent a manuscript by father Eberlein, a vociferous critic of the 
government, to governor Hahl for his information. Intended for publication in the Kolnische 
Volkszeitung, it described the precarious situation of the Taulil, a tribe which lived between the 
Tolai and Baining and was subject to attacks from both sides. As a result the tribe had dwindled 
to about 300 members. Its extinction was imminent. Their neighbours, the Butam, had already 
been wiped out. But there was perhaps a chance to save the Taulil by returning over 1 00 slaves 
who had been captured by the Tolai and now lived mainly in Malakuna and Rapitoko. To achieve 
this would be a noble task for the government. 
Hahl reacted favourably, especially since an adoption of Eberlein' s  suggestion offered an 
opportunity to improve the strained relations which had developed with the Catholic mission 
while Hahl had been away on sick leave in Germany. He decided that a return of those Taulil 
slaves who could still speak their language and had memories of their home was to be 
recommended and referred the matter on 1 July to the imperial district judge Wolff for comments. 
Wolff' s response was pointedly cautious. In his view all male slaves had been captured as small 
children and were fully integrated into the Tolai communities in which they lived, so that it was 
likely that force would have to be used to "liberate" them. The position of the female slaves was 
different. In accordance with native custom, women of all ages had been captured. Some of those 
captured as adults would perhaps gladly volunteer to return, and the return of these women was 
of special importance because very few women were left in Taulil. During his repeated visits 
Wolff had only seen a single woman and three children. 
Wolff proposed to go with a few influential Taulil to Malakuna, which was under full control 
of the government, to arrange the return of these women. If this move was successful an attempt 
could be made in remote Rapitoko, where armed resistance was certainly to be expected. But 
Wolff was ready to do what he could, although it was quite possible that the attempt would lead 
to open hostilities even in Malakuna. 
Finally Wolff warned that, despite what he had written, father Eberlein was unlikely to support 
these measures since they were bound to tum his Tolai flock against him Hahl therefore opted 
for ascertaining Eberlein' s  views first of all, drawing his attention to the risk involved in the 
project and to the limited means of power the government had at its disposal. 
Eberlein was all for energetic action and confident that it would succeed. Indeed, he 
recommended starting not near his mission station in Malakuna but in Rapitoko, as well as in 
Anapapar, Tamanairiki, Wairiki and Viviren. The slaves in Malakuna had all long lost their 
connections with Taulil. Moreover, they were all Christians and could easily be moved back to 
Taulil when the mission had established a station there and could look after them. The position 
in the other places, along the border with Taulil, was different. Here the slaves still spoke Taulil 
and maintained contacts with their relatives. During Eberlein' s last visit to Taulil To Babeke had 
staged a big feast which had been attended by many of these slaves who would have gladly 
remained, had they not feared the revenge of their Tolai masters if they had done so. Moreover, 
as shown by the incomplete list of Taulil slaves Eberlein attached, at least in Rapitoko they 
included several married Taulil couples whose return was unproblematic because it did not 
involve the breaking up of families-which Hahl had declared to be unacceptable. 1 8  
Eberlein saw no point in negotiating with Tolai chiefs like To Maidang in Wairiki about the 
return of the slaves in their areas. The arrest of one or two of these chiefs, or the seizure of their 
1 8  Eberlein gave an illustration of the "ruthlessness" of the Tolai chiefs in relation to the Taulil. When the Taulil had 
approached Rapitoko with the proposal to buy back female slaves as wives with shell money, they had met with a "scornful 
rebuff ". 
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shell money as a pledge for the release of the slaves, would not fail to have the desired effect. 19 
However, Eberlein agreed with Hahl that the first step was to arrange a meeting with To Babeke 
and other influential Taulil to ascertain their views about the project. 
On 3 1  July Hahl instructed the "native warden" in HerbertshOhe, von Seckendorff, to arrange 
such a meeting in Toma in cooperation with Eberlein. Hahl himself wanted to be present. He also 
asked specifically that To Maidang be invited, who would cause no problems. 20 The meeting took 
place in Toma on 20 August. Afterwards Seckendorff prepared a brief record for the file. To 
Babeke and his people had welcomed the planned return of the slaves. The Tolai chiefs To Peleia, 
To Neia and To Kirara, who had been present, were therefore instructed to bring the Taulil slaves 
in their districts to Toma within the next ten days, otherwise the police would come and get them 
and they would be punished. 
Things turned out differently. On 22 August the Taulil woman Ja Lilime from Wairiki 
appeared in Hahl's  office in HerbertshOhe, together with her husband To Maidang, offering the 
governor 20 Marks for permission to stay with To Maidang. Hahl agreed, gave the woman back 
her 20 Marks and informed Fitsch and Seckendorff accordingly. On 3 1  August Fitsch reported 
from Toma that To Larnue from Anapapar and Ja Wungi from Ratavul had also approached him 
with the wish not to return to Taulil. They had both been captured as small children, no longer 
spoke Taulil and Ja Wungi had married the Tolai To Panie with whom she had one child. The 
wish was granted on 14 September, and Fitsch was instructed accordingly. 
On the other hand, the native missionary Tomas complained to Fitsch on 3 1  August that To 
Babeke had come with his people to Rapitoko and removed by force two Taulil women, Ja Tauri 
and Ja Lura, both of whom were married to Tolai men. To Babeke had beaten a Tolai woman, Ja 
Tatare, with his luluai staff when she had tried to free the women. A Tolai man, To Marn, who 
had come to her aid, had also been beaten and taken away by the Taulil who, Tomas believed, had 
later killed him. 
Fitsch summoned To Babeke. To Babeke admitted that he had taken the two women from the 
garden of Urapila. But he insisted that he had told Urapila beforehand that Hahl had ordered the 
return of all Taulil slaves. To Babeke denied having beaten the Tolai woman but admitted that his 
people had beaten To Marn "a bit", after he had threatened them with an axe, when they had taken 
his wife Ja Tauri. To Marn was still in Taulil where he now wanted to stay with his wife. 
When Fitsch asked To Babeke why he had gone to Rapitoko on his own, instead of asking the 
station for help, he had stated that the Taulil had understood Hahl to have said at the Toma 
meeting that they should go themselves to get their people back. But To Babeke had now ordered 
his people not to act on their own. Fitsch confirmed that such independent moves were indeed 
unacceptable but gave permission for these two particular women to stay in Taulil until Hahl had 
made a decision. However he warned To Babeke that Hahl would not protect the Taulil if they 
tried to get their people back by themselves again. 
On 4 September another Taulil woman, Ja Malur, asked Fitsch for permission to stay with her 
Tolai husband and their children. It was granted by district commissioner Kommayer, who 
subsequently gave this permission in several other cases. But Kommayer also instructed Fitsch 
to make a concerted effort to promote the return of the other Taulil slaves. On the other hand, 
Fitsch was admonished to proceed cautiously and to avoid hostilities .  Married women with 
children were not to be returned, although exceptions could be made for polygamous marriages, 
if the Taulil wife had no dependent children. 
19 Eberlein's  list included only about 50 rather than over a hundred names. 
20 Seckendorff obviously misunderstood this instruction, as he asked Fitsch instead to make sure that To Maidang did 
not learn about the meeting because he was likely to cause trouble (see above: 579). Although he probably did learn about 
the meeting, To Maidang apparently did not attend. I do not know whether Hahl inquired why he had not turned up. 
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Fitsch obliged, but got into trouble when he bluntly asked Mrs Parkinson to return forthwith 
the Taulil woman Ja V aira who was her domestic servant. A week later he reported that his efforts 
had resulted in the return of only five Taulil slaves, four from Malakuna and one from Rebar. He 
therefore asked to be relieved of this thankless task which prevented him from making progress 
with the road to Tamanairiki and Tomavatur. 
Hahl agreed. It was now clear, he noted, that Eberlein' s proposal was impractical. There were 
no recently enslaved Taulil and those who had been taken in the past had long become part of the 
Tolai tribe.21 All that remained to be done was to ensure that they were treated well, and, as far 
as he knew, no complaints had been lodged on that score. But Hahl left it to Kornmayer to 
terminate the project formally and to inform Eberlein that this had happened. 
Subsequently the reasons for termination became still more compelling. On 28 September 
chief To Vuvul from Malakuna came to Hahl and asked for the return of his wife, Ja Kavaone, 
whom Fitsch had taken to Taulil the previous day, because she had been married to him for a long 
time, bearing him four children, one of whom, a grown man , was still alive. Hahl referred this case 
to Kornmayer, instead of deciding it himself. Kornmayer checked with Fitsch, who claimed that 
To Vuvul was telling lies. But Fitsch also reported that the Taulil were no longer interested in the 
return of any male slaves .22 
Father Eberlein saw the situation differently, as he reported on 10 November to Bishop 
Couppe, who promptly sent the report on to Hahl. He had not objected, Eberlein wrote, when the 
return of the Taulil slaves had started in Malakuna rather than in the districts around Mount 
Varzin as he had suggested. Nor had he complained when the project had been halted after only 
a few weeks. But it was too much that all but one of the slaves had in the meantime been retrieved 
by their former masters, and that it had been claimed this had happened in accordance with 
instructions which governor Hahl and he, Eberlein, had issued. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. His name had been misused by the Tolai and he was now standing as a liar before the Taulil 
whom he had always told of his wish to see their tribe reunited. 
Eberlein had learned about these recent developments during a visit by To Babeke to his 
mission station in Takabur. To Babeke had brought To Mativon with him, the only returned slave 
who remained in Taulil. To Mativon had told Eberlein that chief To Vuvul of Malakuna had sent 
To Mikele to Taulil to bring back not only To Vuvul' s "concubine", Ja Kavaone, but also all other 
Taulil slaves on the orders of Eberlein and Hahl. Although the slaves had been treated well in 
Taulil and had felt at home there, they had all returned with To Mikele, with the exception of To 
Mativon, who had assured Eberlein that he would not for anything return to Malakuna.23 
Hahl instructed Fitsch to investigate whether the returned slaves had indeed been brought back 
from Taulil by the Tolai. He had given no instructions to this effect and had generally kept out 
of this matter, apart from permitting To Maidang' s  Taulil wife to stay in Wairiki. After looking 
at the file Hahl realised that he had forgotten about the visit to him by To Vuvul. However, he had 
made no decision but referred the matter to Kommayer. Although Hahl again stopped short of 
deciding the case, he instructed Fitsch to investigate what had happened but to take action only 
in accordance with Kommayer' s orders. 
Fitsch questioned To Vuvul who admitted that he had brought his wife back from Taulil 
because he had believed that Hahl had given him permission to do so. Consequently, he had told 
To Babeke that he was acting with Hahl' s permission. Fitsch also questioned To Babeke who told 
him that only Ja Kavaone had been collected by the Tolai, but that three male Taulil slaves had 
21 Hahl used the term "Livuan". 
22 The Taulil had good reasons for changing their attitude. Shortly afterwards To Kowai, one of the three males Fitsch 
had taken to Taulil, also ran away and was granted permission by Kornmayer to stay in Tingenavudu. 
23 Did this also include the two women To Babeke had brought back from Rapitoko? 
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run away from Taulil. Fitsch had instructed To Babeke to do nothing until the imperial judge had 
made a decision. 
Fitsch' s  report was dated 21 November. Three days later Ja Kavaone turned up in Hahl' s  
office in  Herbertshohe, telling him that she had been married to To Vuvul for a long time and had 
borne him one child. She wanted to stay with To Vuvul and his other three wives. Neither she nor 
To Vuvul were baptised, and they had no intention of becoming Christians, either Catholic or 
Methodist. She had been taken back to Taulil by Pitsch but she did not want to stay there although 
she knew her relatives there. When Hahl inquired whether her husband would allow her to visit 
her relatives in Taulil, she had stated that she had no wish to visit them. Thereupon Hahl gave Ja 
Kavaone permission to stay with To Vuvul, informed the station in Toma and referred the matter 
for further action to Kommayer. Kommayer added it to the "Travel Folder Toma". Apparently 
no further action was taken. On the contrary, Kommayer decided to bring the whole project to an 
end two months later. He informed Eberlein of this decision and ordered that the file be closed. 
Instead of gathering dust,. or mould, the file was sent to the colonial department which passed it 
on to a prominent anthropologist, Dr Thilenius, together with a copy of Eberlein' s article which 
had been published in the Kolnische Volkszeitung on 1 0  January 1 904, although it was by then 
clear that the project had been a fiasco and that much of Eberlein' s  account was questionable. 
This did not stop Thilenius from parading his expertise in the form of a series of general 
comments which he sent to the colonial department when he returned the file. 
Thilenius pointed out that while the return of about 50 slaves would significantly increase the 
Taulil population "in the present generation", even the return of 20 women of child-bearing age 
could not secure its survival. If the survival of the Taulil as a tribe was politically desirable other 
measures had to be taken. For example, the government could provide Taulil males with shell 
money to enable them to buy wives, encourage marriages outside the traditional "connubial 
system", and pay premiums to Taulil families with large numbers of adolescent children.24 
Thilenius doubted that "the Mission" was right in attributing the population decline to a recent 
spate of raids aimed at obtaining women. In his view it was more likely due either to a sudden 
deterioration in the "hygienic conditions" or to a gradual drop in fertility as a result of 
intermarriages among relatives, a common occurrence among many "Oceanic peoples". 
Thilenius ignored most of the specific information on file. He certainly did not subject it to 
a critical analysis. Rather he accepted its veracity without taking it seriously. For example, he 
wrote first of a tribe of between 200 and 300 people, including perhaps as few as three women 
and three children, but later halved the likely number of adult Taulil males by referring to the 
return of more than 20 reproductive females to an adult male population of more than four times 
that size-that is to say around 100, rather than at least 200. Moreover, although Thilenius was 
concerned about the consequences of this hypothetical 1 :4 ratio, he gave no thought to the far 
more puzzling question as to how the Taulil tribe currently managed to function, if the ratio had 
for some time been somewhere between 1 :50 and 1 : 100. Had the men taken over the gardening 
and cooking? Did they guard the three women and three children in a fortified compound to which 
three lucky males were admitted every night? Or is the entire file filled with phantom information, 
demonstrating that everybody was moving in the dark, playing games and quite enjoying it? 
Why did no one bother to collect reliable information about the "free" Taulil ?25 Did To Babeke 
keep dozens of women and children hidden away from foreign eyes? Had the number of adult 
Taulil males also shrunk to, say, 20 or 30? Was To Babeke the leading Taulil chief, or was he an 
24 Thilenius did not believe in the utility of paying premiums for new-boms, presumably in view of high infant mortality. 
25 The official list ofTaulil slaves drawn up by Kommayer was still largely the same as the provisional list compiled by 
Eberlein. It is clear that it was far from complete but unclear how many Taulil slaves had not been included. Indeed, it 
appears that no effort was made to asce1'11ain whether Taulil slaves were living in a much larger area than Eberlein believed 
although there were indications that this was so. 
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upstart who used his contacts with the whites to increase his influence, whereas the main 
traditional Taulil leaders remained in the background? 
The closer one looks at this information the less plausible it becomes. This applies in particular 
to the information reported by Eberlein, who stuck his neck out further than anybody else. What 
had the relations between the Taulil and the Tolai been like, if it was possible for To Babeke to 
stage a feast which had been attended by a large number of Taulil slaves, and Eberlein, as guests? 
What had given Eberlein the idea that it was only the fear of the revenge of their Tolai masters 
which prevented these slaves from remaining with their Taulil relatives-an idea which turned 
out to be spectacularly mistaken? Had someone told him that this was the situation, or had 
Eberlein used his imagination to come up with a story which suited his purposes? Had To Babeke 
told Eberlein that To Vuvul had demanded the return not only of his wife but of all slaves? Did 
To Mativon assure Eberlein that he would not go back to Malakuna for anything, or had Eberlein 
heard words to this effect in his head because they fitted into the picture he wanted to see? Was 
Eberlein generally as conceited as the part he played in this episode suggests? Was what he wrote 
about the Varzin Murders, or any other event in the history of German New Guinea, just as 
dubious as what he had to say about the Taulil and the Taulil slaves? 
More importantly, was what the information presented here tells us about the situation at the 
colonial frontier in the northeastern Gazelle Peninsula in 1903/04 typical of what happened at 
colonial frontiers in other parts of German New Guinea throughout the period of German colonial 
rule? What did this situation have in common with that, say, in the Admiralty Islands at the time? 
How similar or different were the relations between the Tolai and the Taulil from those between 
the Tolai and the Baining or, for that matter, the relations between the Baining and their other 
neighbours? 
Of course it would be historically valuable to learn more about these traditional "patterns of 
hostility and alliance", but would this enable us to "generalise'', or give us a better understanding 
of the patterns of German colonial rule? Does this file again demonstrate that the more we learn 
about past events the less representative they become and that historical patterns have to do with 
underlying structures which shape human actions rather than with common elements shared by 
a smaller or larger number of such actions? 
In my view, we are indeed chasing the end of the rainbow if we search for such common 
elements in the hope that we can generalise from them and that we can somehow tum these 
generalisations into an action-centred, narrative account of history. It simply cannot be done 
without replacing historical facts with quasi-narrative phantoms. What makes this episode 
historically illuminating as a bundle of human actions is precisely their uniqueness, not any 
abstractable common elements .  It is the particulars that offer glimpses of general historical 
significance and uncertainties about their factuality no longer matter in this context. It is 
immaterial that we do not know whether the people in Rapitoko would have offered armed 
resistance if Wolff had tried to liberate their Taulil slaves. Nor does it matter whether the 
Rapitoko let To Babeke take away two Taulil women without attacking him in force because he 
had announced he was acting in accordance with Hahl's  orders, or whether To Babeke had, in 
fact, misunderstood what Hahl had said. What counts historically is that Hahl's  wishes were an 
important consideration for the Taulil as well as the Tolai, and that it was for them Hahl as a 
person, rather than "the colonial government", that counted. It is also historically significant that 
Hahl was beginning to feel uneasy about this personal focus and that he made a not very 
determined effort to stay in the background and let a sequence of district commissioners handle 
the matter. 
There is no question that these glimpses are crucial because it is their cumulative effect that 
conveys a feeling of "how it has really been". The problem is that while a historiographer can 
present the information offering these glimpses and occasionally draw attention to them, they have 
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to be experienced first-hand to deliver their messages : they lose their nutritional value if they are 
baked into a narrative omelette. Worse still, a diet of such omelettes gradually reduces the 
awareness of the importance of these glimpses, instead of increasing the capacity of students of 
history to read for themselves between the lines of a narrative, where history becomes most 
telling. 
This applies not just to these glimpses but also to the big picture. What can one say directly 
and generally about the place of the police post in Toma in the history of colonial rule in German 
New Guinea? An assessment of the "typicalness" of its performance certainly does not help us 
further. It is once more an accumulation of concrete details that counts, and it is once more 
essential to expose readers to these mundane details to enable them to form their own picture. 
My own experience is that this picture moved further away from what I had expected the more 
specific information I considered. I had no clear preconceived ideas about the activities of a police 
post established after the Varzin Murders. But I did have some surprisingly strong expectations, 
of which I had been unaware. They only manifested themselves in my responses to the details I 
saw. I do not know what I had expected but it was plainly different from what I saw. I was also 
surprised at myself when I realised how little I was disturbed by the uncertainty and 
inconclusiveness of what I saw. I had come to accept that this was what history looked like and 
that a historiographer who took the historical record seriously could ultimately do no more than 
show that this is the way it is, and that this was also the way it had been when the historical actors 
performed their actions. For them the events to which they responded with their actions were 
already far from certain. They too did not know, and had no means of knowing, how it had really 
been when what we regard as the past was what they saw as their present. 
Since it would be inappropriate to end this journey on such a resigned note, I want to present 
another cluster of episodes that takes us chronologically to the end of German colonial rule. It is 
fitting that this journey will transport us geographically to the north western periphery of German 
New Guinea where the last specks of land dissolve in a vast sheet of open water and history as 
an account of the actions of particular human beings is replaced by patterns of waves and currents. 
Chapter 13: Do Times Change ? 
I 
The annual report for 191 1 announced the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Island Territory. The Ponape Rebellion made the changes more visible than would otherwise have 
been the case, but they were primarily due to discussions in Germany during governor Hahl's  
1910 home leave, where the new colonial secretary, Lindequist, was more sympathetic to Hahl's  
plans than his predecessor Demburg, who had a remarkably low opinion of the economic and 
political value of Germany's Pacific colonies. Since the commercial potential of the Island 
Territory, apart from its already tapped phosphate riches, was small, Hahl 's  plans focused on the 
Old Protectorate, especially on Kaiser Wilhelmsland, but the less ambitious plans for the Island 
Territory would have had an even greater immediate impact on its indigenous population. 
The annual report used the expropriation of the "tribal territory" of the Dschokadsch after the 
Ponape Rebellion as a stepping stone for a presentation of these plans, since the land was to be 
allocated to native settlers from other parts of the Carolines . The administration had tried for many 
years to concentrate their scattered population on the few high islands. This was for mainly 
humanitarian reasons because the inhabitants of the low atolls were exposed to cyclones from 
which they suffered terribly. But their resettlement also had economic advantages because the land 
which would thus become available could be leased to colonial enterprises with the necessary 
capital to tum it into intensively cultivated plantations . 
In the Marshall Islands, where much of the land was lying idle because the population was too 
small to utilise it, the surplus land was, if possible, to be used in a similar manner. For the 
Marianas a German enterprise with a strong capital base was also required to manage effectively 
the export and import trade which was currently in the hands of small and purely extractive 
Japanese firms. 
These plans translated into negotiations for the establishment of four companies: one for the 
Marianas, one for the Western Carolines, one for the Eastern Carolines and one for the Marshall 
Islands. Of these only the West-Karolinen Gesellschaft, formed by merging the interests of the 
Jaluit Gesellschaft and the local O'Keefe firm, got off the ground. The Jaluit Gesellschaft was 
expected to play the leading role in the Ost-Karolinen Gesellschaft as well, whereas Hahl was 
negotiating with Rudolph Wahlen, who had recently bought the Forsayth firm in the Old 
Protectorate with the help of allied Hanseatic capital, to persuade his allies also to invest in a Neue 
Marianen Gesellschaft. The main focus of this chapter is the history of the fourth enterprise, the 
Marshall Islands Plantation Syndicate, which was to include the Jaluit Gesellschaft, Hemsheim 
& Co. and a Hamburg firm, Scharff & Kayser. 1 
II 
The local representative of the syndicate was Emil Timm, the manager of Hemsheim & Co. in 
Rabaul. A letter from the Jaluit Gesellschaft of 6 September 191 1 invited Hahl to discuss 
proposals concerning the leasing of the "disposable" land in the Marshall Islands, 2 although a need 
to communicate directly with the syndicate in Hamburg was foreshadowed, since it was unclear 
1 It is important to appreciate that it was Hahl, rather than the capitalists, who was advocating the establishment of these 
companies, since this chase of reluctant investors put the government throughout in a weak bargaining position. It should 
also be noted that it was Hahl, rather than the colonial office, who took the initiative. 
2 Unless otherwise indicated the documents discussed in this chapter are included in AA G2/l ,  Item Y 40. 
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how much unplanted or vacated planted land would be available and how much its acquisition 
from the natives, or lease payments to them, were going to cost. 
On 24 October 1 9 1 1 Hahl had his first meeting with Timm, who proposed an agreement which 
was similar to that already signed with the West Carolines company . However, it was not limited 
to an area of land of a certain size to be acquired as soon as possible. Rather it was to extend to 
all land which could be acquired from the natives in the Marshall Islands in the future. 
On 15 November Hahl met again with Timm and Herr Janssen of the Jaluit Gesellschaft. 
Agreement in principle was reached, but everything hinged on how much land would be available. 
Hahl therefore instructed the government station in J aluit to buy as quickly as possible planted and 
unplanted land within its entire district from the natives, or to take it into possession as ownerless. 
Hahl assumed that it would be possible to buy land for around 20 Marks per hectare, but 
authorised higher payments for particularly valuable blocks. 
Since the government steamer Komet was booked until March 1 91 2, Hahl wrote to district 
commissionar Kersting in Ponape, asking him to place the smaller government vessel Delphin at 
the station's  disposal. Hahl's  letter to Kersting was diplomatic. He assumed that Kersting would 
soon travel with the Jaluit Gesellschaft's Germania fromPonape to the Western Carolines, where 
he would have the use of the Komet, so that it should be possible to send the Delphin to J aluit. He 
did not want to interfere, however, with any arrangements Kersting wanted to make for the use 
of that vessel. 
Kersting indeed had other plans and greater visions.3 He used the Delphin to visit for the first 
time the easternmost part of his domain arriving in the Marshall Islands in January 1912, before 
sending a report to Hahl in which he sketched his views about a reorganisation of the 
administration of the whole territory and his objections to the establishment of "monopolistic 
companies" (AA G 1 2/l ,  ltem Z14). 
Because of what he had to say about the role of the J aluit Gesellschaft in this context, Kersting 
specifically asked that his report be treated confidentially. He knew that the company was unlikely 
to find his plans appealing. Hence it was best if it heard nothing about them until they were put 
into action. Kersting assumed that they would be approved by Hahl, with whom he had discussed 
the future of the Island Territory during the governor's  recent tour of inspection and who had 
asked Kersting to develop detailed proposals . 
As regards its administration, Kersting saw himself in agreement with Hahl on two 
fundamental issues : firstly, the government' s  main responsibilities lay in the fields of public health 
and education and, secondly, it was unrealistic to expect that the Reich would subsidise these 
efforts. Kersting therefore proposed to replace the expensive land-based administration of two 
district offices and six government stations with a much reduced, mobile administration. It was 
to consist of two senior officials, the "Chief of the Island Territory" and his deputy, who would 
tour the islands regularly on a new, modern steamer, together with a small support staff. The 
savings which would be made in this manner were to be used to fund a substantial expansion of 
land-based health and education services. 
The Jaluit Gesellschaft was the snake in this potential paradise, and the part it wanted to play 
in its future was likely to ruin everything. 
3 Kersting was at the time effectively in charge of the entire local administration of the Island Territory. In 1 909 he was 
appointed district commissioner of the Wester Carolines district, which included Palau and the northern Marianas. After 
the Ponape Rebellion he was in addition appointed district commissioner of the Eastern Carolines district, which now also 
included the Marshall Islands and Nauru. This state of affairs was probably linked with Hahl's plans to downgrade the 
district office in Yap; otherwise he would have pushed for the appointment of another district commissioner for the 
Western Carolines. It is unlikely that Hahl ever intended to turn Kersting into a "Chief of the Island Territory'', just as he 
did not support Berghausen' s  ambitions to become the "Chief' of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, about which I read somewhere, 
probably in one of the naval reports. 
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The monopoly of the Jaluit Gesellschaft which everybody experiences as increasingly oppressive will 
then be complete. If the people, as I propose, will be educated, they will soon need what little land they 
have and use it efficiently . . .  With the land in the low islands we hand over resources to the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft which we will urgently need to carry out our colonising tasks. We embitter the natives 
against the government by taking land from them against their will, often for a price representing less 
than one annual harvest. . .  I am unable to believe that the Jaluit Gesellschaft will contribute much to the 
education and civilisation of the people. With little effort it will pocket valuable assets the government 
could utilise much better to advance the economic and cultural development of the Micronesians . . .  
Kersting promised that he would try to acquire enough land in the Marshall Islands to ensure the 
establishment of one large plantation company, although he hoped that it was not too late to stop 
this also from happening; that Hahl would agree with his views; and that Hahl would at least 
forgive him for expressing them openly, which he had not been able to do earlier because he had 
only now acquired the necessary local knowledge. 
Kersting developed his grand vision in a long report in May which Hahl sent with detailed 
comments to the colonial office (AA G2/l , Item Z 14). Although Hahl and Kersting were indeed 
in agreement about the fundamental aims of German colonial administration in the Island 
Territory, their ideas about their achievement differed just as fundamentally or, rather, in the light 
of his experiences since 1 899, Hahl regarded Kersting' s proposals as naively idealistic and hence 
impractical. This applied, in particular, to two factors : the need for a land-based local admin­
istration and the need for at least some enterprises with a large capital base which were necessary 
to manage the import and export trade even in an economy which consisted otherwise of a large 
number of small native and European producers . Hahl agreed with Kersting that an effective, 
single chain of administrative command had to be established and that a reliable sea-going vessel 
was essential for this purpose. However, instead of taking the politically retrogressive step of 
turning the Island Territory into an economically non-viable, semi-independent colony under a 
"Chief of the Island Territory" it was to be administered by a Rabaul-based senior official in close 
cooperation with the governor with the help of the government streamer Komet, which had only 
to spend a little time in the Old Protectorate, once the district offices and government stations 
there had all been equipped with smaller sea-going vessels.4 
Hahl envisaged a speedy implementation of his plans for the Island Territory, beginning with 
a downgrading of the district office in Yap to the status of a government station in the 1 9 1 3  
budget. Kersting was shocked when he was informed about these plans and considered resigning 
from the colonial service and setting himself up as a planter in the Island Territory to prove the 
merit of his views,5 but the colonial office was at least not prepared to move as fast as Hahl had 
hoped, so that the status quo continued until the end of German colonial rule. 
III 
In his May report Kersting also had more to say about his bete noir, the Jaluit Gesellschaft: 
[It] dictates the natives the lowest possible prices for their copra and other products and sets the prices 
for imported goods so high . . .  that the disproportionality between their efforts and their rewards is a 
constant source of discontent . . . . This attitude is reinforced by virtually all whites, and especially the 
missions, since they suffer equally under the pressure of these monopolies . . .  
I do not believe that these monopolies are a necessary evil here and that all smaller enterprises . . .  are 
doomed to failure. They could well flourish . . .  provided that shipping lines operate which serve the 
interests of everybody equally. This is what has been lacking so far . . .  The Carolines and Marianas are 
4 The similarities between Hahl' s  views and Bennigsen's  proposals ten years earlier are obvious. 
5 I have been unable to relocate the document in which Kersting threatened his resignation and inquired about the 
possibility of acquiring land in the Island Territory, but I am confident that I did not just see it in my dreams. 
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only served by the steamer Germania of the J aluit Gesellschaft and its schooners. In the Marshall Islands 
the Burns Philp Line also operates, but it works hand in hand with the Jaluit Gesellschaft. It knows very 
well that the J aluit Gesellschaft. has the government on its side and that it will fare much better if it shares 
the loot with the company under its conditions . . .  
I see no reason why we should . . .  be in such a hurry to bind ourselves for generations with contracts 
which will close off . . .  the many opportunities which may soon offer themselves. We will create a 
powerful cartel of capitalists as a state within the state . . .  which will make it difficult for the government 
to protect and foster public interests and, in particular, those of the natives. 
As I have reported . . .  [earlier] the representatives of the Jaluit Gesellschaft have applied to me to 
resettle the same natives as . . .  labourers on the land [in the Western Carolines] on which they had hitherto 
lived as . . .  owners and which, as I can prove, was bought from them against their will and for a fraction 
of its value. Such arrangements certainly do not fit into our times ! . . .  
The economic and cultural level of the natives in the Marshall Islands is backward to an extent which 
is difficult to find elsewhere in our colonies. Yet the Marshallese are most gifted and capable of 
development. But the current state of affairs suits the monopoly trade: even though its volume does not 
grow it offers rich and easy profits . . .  In the interests of the future of the Island Territory I therefore must 
speak out against these new companies. 
Kersting did not use his stay in the Marshall Islands to buy land for the syndicate. Instead he 
complained about insufficient information. Hahl responded on 21 January 1912  that he had sent 
all available documents, apart from a recent letter from the Jaluit Gesellschaft, a copy of which 
he now enclosed. The colonial office had so far not been involved in the negotiations. By choosing 
Timm as its spokesman the syndicate had moved the centre of the negotiations from the Marshall 
Islands to Rabaul, although the colonial office would have to approve the final contract. Whether 
such a contract 9ould be concluded depended on whether or not it was possible to buy enough land 
at a price that promised a viable enterprise (RKA 2501) .  
On 11  April Hahl dispatched new instructions to Kersting who had sent another discouraging 
report in March.6 According to Hahl there were about 2,500 hectares of land in the Marshall 
Islands which, due to the decrease of the indigenous population, had to be regarded as ownerless. 
In addition to buying as much land from the natives as possible, Hahl now expressly requested that 
these ownerless areas be ascertained and taken into possession for the Fiskus, irrespective of how 
they would be subsequently utilised. The Marshallese could not possibly make them productive. 
Since it was unlikely that the government would be given the funds to accomplish this task in 
cooperation with them, and equally unlikely that small European settlers would stream to the 
Marshall Islands to take up the vacant land, leasing it to larger enterprises was the only practical 
alternative. This would also enable the government to make other arrangements for the by then 
productive land in 60 years time . 
Hahl further stressed that while the general rules excluded the acquisition of land used or 
required by its native owners if the land was to be transferred to private interests, this restriction 
did not apply if the land was acquired for the Fiskus, for example as a native reserve. Hence it was 
possible to acquire the entire Eniwetok Atoll-to which Kersting had apparently referred in his 
report-for the Fiskus but to lease to the syndicate only those sections which were not required 
by the natives. 
Since Kersting was fully occupied with the land reforms on Ponape, according to Hahl, the 
land acquisitions in the Marshall Islands had to be carried out by the district officer in Jaluit who 
was therefore sent a copy of Hahl' s instructions to Kersting. Hahl also informed Timm that it was 
planned to acquire the land required for the syndicate in April and May; that it was hoped that the 
total area would be about 1 ,200 hectares; and that the purchase price would be around 20 Marks, 
and certainly no more than 50 Marks, per hectare. Hahl' s main concern was an assurance from the 
6 I have not seen this report, as it was not included in the files I consulted. But Hahl's response indicates its content in 
so far as it related to the matter under discussion. 
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syndicate that it would refund the purchase price of probably around 25,000 Marks immediately 
since the budget made no provision for an expenditure of this magnitude by the government. 
When Hahl wrote to Timm and Kersting he had received a preliminary report from district 
officer Merz according to which Kersting would send the Delphin to Jaluit for three months. 
"During this period the land acquisitions will be carried out. Following the instructions by Herr 
Dr Kersting only an area of 1 ,000 to 1 ,200 hectares is to be acquired." This was the basis of 
Hahl' s  view that at least 1 ,200 hectares were available and also of his counter-instruction to 
acquire as much land as possible, at least for the Fiskus. On the other hand, Timm now suggested 
that the agreement be concluded in J aluit with "Herr Regierungsrat Kersting as the representative 
of the Fiskus". Hahl promptly informed Kersting of this suggestion but also instructed the district 
officer in Jaluit to enter into direct negotiations with the representatives of the syndicate. 
District officer Merz reported in May. He had visited the sparsely populated northern Ratak 
and Ralik chains, accompanied by their paramount chiefs, Labareo and Leit. After a detailed 
investigation of ten atolls, he had identified a total of 1 , 1 68 hectares as being available for 
acquisition, for which he had offered a total of 27, 150 Marks-without success,  since Labareo 
had demanded 80,000 Marks for 150 hectares in the Wotje Atoll, for which Merz had offered 
3 ,750 Marks, and Leit 40,000 Marks for 292 hectares in the Bikini Atoll, for which Merz had 
offered 7 ,300 Marks. 
Labareo had justified his demand with a reference to a block of land of less than four hectares 
on Jaluit which Burns Philp had recently bought from the Catholic mission for 13 ,000 Marks. Leit 
had acted under the influence of Labareo, who in turn had been influenced by the Burns Philp 
representative, Hayes, and perhaps also by an offer which Domnick, who ran the pub on Jaluit, 
had made him for Bikini. 
The [small] population of the northern Rataks . . .  and Ralilcs is . . .  unable to utilise fully the currently 
unused areas within the foreseeable future. Since it is also unlikely that Labareo and Leit will reduce their 
demands significantly, I am requesting Your Excellency' s  authorisation to take the identified unused 
areas . .  . into possession. The amounts offered by me would constitute an ample compensation . . .  
The . . .  Jaluit Gesellschaft emphasised that it was important for the Marshall Islands Plantation 
Syndicate to obtain atolls without native reserves . . .  In my view Rongerik, Rongelab and Bikini would 
be suitable . . .  since Leit could, with some goodwill, find a place for the . . .  few inhabitants on Wotho, 
Quadjelin, Ujai and Namu. 
In the interests of the development of the Marshall Islands and of the prestige of the Administration, 
I regard it as imperative that the largely unused lands are taken . .  . into possession. I have already warned 
the two chiefs that they should expect such a move on the part of the Government, although without any 
noticeable effects. 
Hahl responded in June in a long decree addressed to Mertz. The fact that it had been 
stencilled shows that it was given a wider circulation. Kersting was merely one of the intended 
recipients. He had been sidelined to the extent that Hahl ha<;l unilaterally allocated the Delphin to 
Merz until the end of August. The decree spelled out Hahl' s long-term plans for the Marshall 
Islands. They envisaged a temporary division of the group into a northern and southern section. 
The Marshallese were to be temporarily concentrated in the south. This involved in his estimate 
the removal of some 600 people. Hahl regarded this as basically unproblematic because the two 
paramount chiefs had moved their subjects up and down the two chains of islands at will since 
time immemorial; because the chiefs were in principle willing to sell the northern atolls,  although 
they were asking an exorbitant price; and because there was still more land in the southern atolls 
than the shrinking population could utilise during the next few decades, even if its decline, from 
about 15 ,000 at the beginning of German colonial rule to about 9,500, could be reversed. 
Such a reversal was the cornerstone of Hahl' s  plans. The aim was not so much to clear the 
northern Marshall islands for colonial development as to strengthen the Marshallese by 
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concentrating the population in the south. The goal was to create a healthy, self-assured and 
growing population which would be ready in 60 years time, when the leases to the Marshall 
Islands Plantation Syndicate had run out, to take over the developed land in the north and manage 
it as affluent and contented taxpayers . 
Reaching this goal required a gradual but fundamental reform of the traditional Marshallese 
sociopolitical organisation, as well as a thorough modem education. The obsolete and 
unproductive feudal arrangements had to be replaced by a modem system in which the eagerness 
of individual natives to acquire possessions, and to earn so as to be able to participate in what 
civilisation had to offer, served as the mainspring. Hahl was hopeful that the tireless efforts of the 
administration would succeed in convincing at least the more gifted natives that this was where 
their own best interests lay. 
The main problem with the development of the northern atolls was that the pampered 
Marshallese, who were demanding daily wages of between 2 and 4 Marks, had priced themselves 
out of the market. While it was possible for the enterprises in the Carolines to develop the land 
set aside for them with a local workforce at a cost of around 30 Marks per month per head, this 
approach was impractical in the Marshall Islands. It was therefore necessary to work with 
imported labourers and that required a reasonably compact plantation area of at least 1 ,000 
hectares. 
Unfortunately further considerations had shown that taking the required land into possession 
as ownerless met with legal difficulties, inter alia, because the right of the two paramount chiefs 
to dispose of unused land had been recognised, most recently by the offer of Merz to buy such 
land from them. The alternative of using the Expropriation Ordinance to confiscate the land was 
also problematic if it was to be transferred to private interests for ordinary commercial purposes. 
For the time being it was thus necessary to continue negotiations with the two chiefs in order to 
persuade them to sell the required land at a reasonable price. 
Since director Millier af the Jaluit Gesellschaft was expected in Rabaul in September, 
according to a supplementary decree, the decision about the feasibility of the project would be 
made there, so that all contracts concluded with the two chiefs had to be made subject to the 
approval of the governor. Hahl stressed that the outlines of the government' s  plans should be 
explained to them. They would focus on the economic development of the north of the group 
whereas its southern part was to be reserved for "the people", whose traditional sociopolitical 
organisation and land tenure would be reformed, but only gradually. It was to be left open whether 
some land in the south would eventually also be set aside for educational purposes, or for 
economic enterprises which would produce an income for the community or "the state". If the 
issue was raised, it was to be made clear that such moves were likely. Hahl hoped that the chiefs 
had sufficient insight to appreciate that they could not oppose the publicly proclaimed policies of 
the government indefinitely and that they would therefore agree to part with the northern islands 
at a reasonable price. 
Merz reported in August. His efforts had again been almost totally unsuccessful. Leit had 
demanded 160,000 Marks for Bikini, Rongelab, Rongerik, Ailinginai and Wotho. After consulting 
with the Jaluit Gesellschaft, Merz had made a counter offer of 60,000 Marks. Following 
discussions with members of his family, Leit had not only rejected this offer but also stated that 
he would not sell any land to the Fiskus.1 Labareo had accepted that he could not resist the 
government but, in the interest of his subjects, he had refused to part voluntarily with any land. 
Merz had gained the impression that it was mainly the fear of the reactions of their subjects that 
prevented the paramount chiefs from selling the land at the best possible price-whereas, was the 
implication, they could not be held responsible if the land was expropriated. 
7 According to Merz, this refusal was "indubitably" due to the influence of his wives, who had previously "belonged" 
to the now deceased iroj, Kabua. 
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The only positive news came from the remote and apparently independent Eniwetok Atoll. Its 
two chiefs, Piter and Jitiam, had agreed to sell all islands, apart from Eniwetok and Engibi, which 
they had already planted with coconuts under a contract with the Jaluit Gesellschaft-a total area 
of about 320 hectares for 3 ,000 Marks.8 
Merz recommended that the atolls Bikini, Rongelab, Rongerik, Wotho, Ailinginai, Taka, 
Erikub, Temo and all "dispensable" islands in Wotje be expropriated and their inhabitants be 
resettled. 
Once the resettlement has taken place, the planned reorganisation can begin. As long as the current iroj 
elablab [paramount chiefs] are alive, the atoll chiefs (iroj in kien) will remain their representatives and 
will, together with them, be the executive organs of the government. The land will be transferred into the 
ownership of the kajurs (commoners). They have to pay a monetary levy to the iroj elablab set by the 
government and collected by the iroj in kien. The headtax will continue to be paid in the form of copra, 
because this is regarded as less painful by the people, as well as being financially advantageous for the 
government. I shall submit a detailed report on this matter as soon as I have fully assessed the collected 
data. 
Should Your Excellency decide in favour of an expropriation of the suggested islands, I would 
propose that the 300 [sic] hectares in Eniwetok and the atolls Bikini, Rongelab, Rongerik, Wotho and 
Ailinginai be given to the Marshall Islands Plantation Syndicate whereas Taka, Erikub, Temo and the 
expropriated islands in Wotje be reserved for other ventures. 
After discussions with Timm and representatives of the Jaluit Gesellschaft in Rabaul, Hahl 
decided against an expropriation. Instead he would personally try to buy the required land, perhaps 
by February 19 13 .  But this was largely a symbolic gesture. The plans for the Marshall Islands 
were put into the too hard basket and Hahl turned his attention elsewhere. This is shown by his 
instructions to Merz concerning Eniwetok, which were clearly written without Hahl having taken 
the time to re-read Merz's report. As a result Merz was ordered to purchase the entire group for 
the Fiskus, but to set aside native reserves which were to be excluded from a future lease 
agreement with the Jaluit Gesellschaft. Merz was also instructed to negotiate a replacement of the 
existing "planting and loans agreement" between the natives and the J aluit Gesellschaft with what 
Hahl called a "purchase, supply and repayment contract", in which the purchase price payable to 
the natives for their land was to be deducted from their debts to the Jaluit Gesellschaft under the 
previous agreement. 
Merz reported to Hahl in December. Although he had had no opportunity to visit Eniwetok, 
he had settled everything with the representatives of the J aluit Gesellschaft in a manner which, he 
trusted, would find Hahl ' s  approval. He and the representatives of the Jaluit Gesellschaft had 
agreed that a purchase price for the entire group of 15,000 Marks was appropriate and that the 
interests of the natives would be sufficiently protected by setting aside Eniwetok and Engibi as 
native reserves . However, the Jaluit Gesellschaft now felt entitled to be compensated for the 
purchase price for the islands which were not to be leased to it. This was to be achieved by 
concluding a 30 year "supply agreement" which could be extended by another 30 years. It obliged 
the Eniwetok to sell their copra for 4 Pfennigs less per kilogram than the usual price. In addition 
2 Pfennigs per kilogram were to be deducted to pay off the debt to the Jaluit Gesellschaft under 
the previous agreement. The J aluit Gesellschaft was also to be given the right to send its labourers 
to Eniwetok and Engibi to collect ripe coconuts which the natives did not require for their 
sustenance and were unable to turn into copra themselves. According to the company, this was 
bound to happen when the 1 75 hectares of coconuts planted on the two islands had fully matured. 
8 Merz also ascertained the "dispensable" land in the atolls not covered in his previous report. The star performer was 
Mejit, whose 492 inhabitants were keeping their fully planted 250 hectare island, including themselves, their dwellings 
and their paths in excellent order. 
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For the copra so produced the Jaluit Gesellschaft had to pay a special price of 6.5 Pfennigs per 
kilogram to the natives of which 2 Pfennigs were to be deducted to pay the outstanding debts. 
This complicated agreement did not find Hahl ' s  approval.9 However, the instructions issued 
to Merz in January 1 9 1 3  did not address the crucial question that the Eniwetok had never agreed 
to selling the two main islands, which Hahl' s staff had raised. Perhaps Hahl thought that this new 
agreement would reduce their debt with the Jaluit Gesellschaft by another 1 2,000 Marks and that 
they lost little if the two islands were bought by the Fiskus but declared a native reserve. In any 
case, Hahl' s instructions dealt exclusively with changes to the proposed supply agreement. Firstly, 
the debt to the Jaluit Gesellschaft had to be repaid as quickly as possible; secondly, the company 
had to pay the Eni wetok the going price for their copra and was not permitted to increase the price 
of the goods with which it supplied them in lieu of an interest payment on the outstanding loan; 
thirdly, the duration of the supply agreement was to be limited to five years in the first instance, 
after which it could be terminated by both parties, as well as the government, by giving notice of 
one year; and fourthly, the company had to obtain the approval of the inhabitants each time before 
its labourers came to Eniwetok or Engibi to collect surplus nuts. 
The government station in Jaluit was instructed to negotiate an agreement with the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft which met these requirements. It was also asked to submit a copy of the current 
planting and loans agreement and to clarify how much the natives owed; whether the agreement 
continued to operate; whether the debts of the natives were increasing as a result; and how an 
alternative supply of essentials to them could be ensured if the agreement was terminated. 
When four months later a progress report had still not been received, Hahl sent a reminder to 
Jaluit. Acting district officer SchOnleber replied that Hahl's  January decree could not be found. 
District officer Merz had probably taken it with him by mistake when he had gone on leave. 
Schonleber had already reported the report missing when Kersting had stopped in Jaluit on his 
way to Rabaul. Schonleber had also given Kersting a written report, together with a copy of "the 
old Eniwetok contract" and a statement by the Jaluit Gesellschaft that it could not respond to the 
points raised by Hahl as it did not know what they were. 
Since Kersting had only spoken with Hahl about the Eniwetok matter in Rabaul but handed 
over no documents, Hahl had no choice but to send SchOnleber a copy of his January instructions 
and ask him to take action now. Schlonleber reported in August that as soon as the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft had seen these instructions it had declared that it was unable to conclude an 
agreement on this basis . Schlonleber enclosed a copy of the existing agreement, together with a 
summary of the Jaluit Gesellschaft's bills and receipts. 
The old Eniwetok contract had been concluded in 1 898 and approved by the then 
administrator. The company' s  letter seeking this approval painted Eniwetok as a wretched place. 
Apart from some wild arrowroot and pandanus, and a few thriving coconuts the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
had planted earlier, there was no food on the islands, unless one counted the large number of rats. 
The people had no tools for working the ground and their canoes were so flimsy that they could 
not go fishing during the monsoon season. The Jaluit Gesellschaft had therefore discussed with 
them how they could improve their lot by gradually planting up their islands with coconuts. The 
Eniwetok were persuaded and concluded an agreement with the company that enabled them to do 
so. Indeed, the company had already made a start by planting about 1 ,700 coconuts and 50 
breadfruit trees and by giving the natives a small flock of breeding chickens and some cats to get 
rid of the rats. The Jaluit Gesellschaft supplied planting nuts, tools, food and goods at the usual 
price plus freight. The Eniwetok committed themselves to selling all their produce exclusively to 
9 It would certainly have been advantageous for the company. Saving 4 Pfennigs per kilogram of copra increased its profit 
by 40 Marks per tonne. With an estimated annual production of 175 tonnes this translated into 7,000 Marks. In other 
words, the new agreement would have compensated the company in less than two years for the larger purchase price it 
would have had to pay. For its entire duration the agreement promised an additional profit of over 100,000 Marks. The 
company certainly knew how to feather its nest. 
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the company which would pay the same price it paid natives in the other islands. The amounts due 
would be subtracted from the amounts owing, but even after all debts had been repaid the 
Eniwetok remained obliged to sell their produce exclusively to the Jaluit Gesellschaft for another 
20 years. 
During the 15 years until 1913  the Eniwetok had accumulated debts of almost 30,000 Marks. 
Until 1 9 1 1 ,  when planting had been completed, their only income had been 1 50 Marks for shark 
fins. In 19 12  the first copra was produced, but the price the Eniwetok received for their copra in 
January and June 1913  matched to the last Pfennig the price they had been charged for the goods 
supplied to them, so that their debts had in fact increased, since they had also been charged the 
agreed freight of 500 Marks per trip. 
As the company paid the Eniwetok 120 Marks per tonne of copra their debts represented the 
equivalent of about 250 tonnes. They had produced 20 tonnes during the 1 2  months to June 1913 ,  
but production could now be expected to rise rapidly. According to the company the 1 75 hectares 
planted on the two main islands promised a yield of about 175 tonnes annually once they had 
come into full production. This was a sufficiently large quantity to make Eniwetok attractive to 
its competitors. The Jaluit Gesellschaft therefore had good reason to cling to this contract which 
bound the Eniwetok to it for another 25 years, assuming that they managed to pay off their debts 
during the next five years. 
Although the company's  profit margin accounted for a substantial portion of the accumulated 
debts , the profit from the sale of imported goods was insignificant compared with the potential 
profit of exporting 175 tonnes of copra annually from the atoll, especially as long as each tonne 
fetched about four times as much in Europe as the company paid for it to the Eniwetok. No 
wonder therefore that the company had generously indicated that it would stop charging freight 
over and above its usual mark-up for the goods it took to the atoll as soon as the increased copra 
production made the trips to Eniwetok profitable overall. 
This gesture made little impact in Rabaul, at least on Hahl' s subordinates who first examined 
Schonleber's report and its enclosures. One of them wrote in the margin next to the company's  
refusal to replace the old Eniwetok contract with an agreement which met the demands made by 
Hahl: "There are ways and means to terminate this contract !" Subsequent comments show that it 
was regarded as morally so defective that the threat of making this embarrassing document public 
should persuade the company to agree to its voluntary termination. But Hahl had more important 
things to do before his departure from German New Guinea than to deal with this matter. It was 
therefore left to his designated successor, acting governor Haber, to take the next step during his 
first visit to Jaluit in May 1914. 
Eduard Haber' s notes on his discussions with the Jaluit Gesellschaft show that not only a 
compromise for Eniwetok was being worked out but that the plans for a plantation syndicate were 
also still on the table. In relation to the former, Haber had argued that the 1 898 agreement had 
automatically come to an end when its purpose, the planting up of Eniwetok and Engibi, had been 
achieved. The company had accepted this but had pointed out that its special relations with the 
Eniwetok had to continue until they had paid off their debts . However, it had agreed that they 
would not be bound to it afterwards and that it would treat these debts until then as an interest free 
loan. 
As far as the purchase of land was concerned the negotiations were conducted on the basis of 
the original proposal by Merz, who had in the meantime returned from leave. That is to say Hahl' s 
plan to purchase the entire atoll for the Fiskus had been quietly abandoned. Only about 300 
hectares of unused land were to be purchased and the company had agreed to deduct the purchase 
price-presumably the 3,000 Marks Merz had previously offered-from the debts of theEniwetok 
if the land was transferred to the plantation syndicate. 
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Whether this would have happened, whether the plantation syndicate would have got off the 
ground and whether Hahl ' s  plans for the development of the Marshall Islands would have been 
proceeded with is impossible to say, since events at the global level brought all negotiations to an 
end a few months later. They gave Haber generally no chance to leave his mark on the exercise 
of colonial rule in German New Guinea. Nonetheless it is instructive to consider the views he was 
beginning to form, in particular about the government of the Island Territory, to which he made 
his first extended tour of inspection. 
IV 
Haber would have preferred to postpone this tour, which Hahl had arranged for him. but he also 
wanted to meet district commissioner Kersting who was due to go on leave shortly. So he went, 
and his meeting with Kersting created a highly favourable impression of the man on Haber. 
Although his report of 2 June 1914 (RKA 2996) did not comment on the differences of 
opinion between Hahl and Kersting, his own views were clearly influenced by them. The position 
Haber was inclined to take was somewhere between those of Hahl and Kersting, but his 
sympathies were leaning distinctly in Kersting's direction, although he naturally sought to 
demonstrate that he was his own man. 
The political situation in no section of the Island Territory gives currently cause for concern. Yet the 
question as to whether the natives are satisfied that they are better off under German colonial rule than 
under another colonial power requires constant attention. If they do not have this feeling political 
complications between Germany and other colonial powers could lead to undesirable consequences in 
parts of the Island Territory which is far too large to be kept under close control. The district 
commissioner in Ponape has misgivings in this regard in connection with the establishment of the various 
large leasehold companies. As is well known they are only prepared to begin operations if, in addition 
to undeveloped land, they are given enough land already stocked with coconut palms to cover at least 
most of their operating costs forthwith. Planted land naturally has to be acquired from the natives by 
exercising more or less pressure, and the price offered by the leasehold companies is rather low. In 
addition, the chiefs who dispose of the tribal lands keep most of the proceeds themselves . . .  Nonetheless, 
I share the misgivings of the district commissioner only to a small extent. The inhabitants of the atolls 
in the area of the Western Carolines Company which I visited expressed no dissatisfaction. I am also 
confident that secretary Baumert, who is negotiating the purchase contracts in the area of the Eastern 
Carolines Company, is sufficiently objective and considerate to protect the interests of the natives 
adequately . . . 10 In the Marshall Islands the capable district officer Merz will probably soon be able to 
settle the preliminary question concerning the availability of land already stocked with coconut palms 
which the syndicate desires. Once the leasehold companies have become fully operative, they will 
naturally also be able to monopolise the copra trade. This will create the political duty for the 
administration to introduce effective controls on the prices they pay to the natives . . . 1 1  
In Haber' s view the experiences in  Ponape suggested proceeding cautiously with a reform of the 
traditional sociopolitical organisation because German New Guinea could not afford to replicate 
the costly military "means of power" cup-ently available in Ponape in other parts of the Island 
Territory. But his most urgent concern was communication and shipping. His long-term goal was 
the establishment of a commercial shipping company with its own docking facilities and coal 
depots-and the government as a major shareholder. 
10 I am disregarding Haber' s comments concerning the Marianas which raise different issues. 
1 1  According to Haber the prices paid to natives for copra ranged from less than 1 00 Marks per tonne in the Western 
Carolines, to at least 1 20 Marks in the Eastern Carolines, to 140 to 1 60 Marks in the Marshall Islands and 200 Marks 
offered by the Japanese traders in the Marianas. 
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Haber was especially concerned that the downgrading of the two district offices, proposed by 
Hahl, would mean that the local administration in the Island Territory would be entirely in the 
hands of lower and middle ranking officials. As a consequence the two district courts, which 
university trained senior officials could run as a sideline to their administrative functions, would 
also have to be closed down. Even more importantly, the Island Territory would be lost as a 
training ground for inexperienced senior officials who could subsequently utilise the practical 
lessons they had learned when they were posted to the government in Rabaul or to the colonial 
office. 12 In view of his "extraordinary personal gifts", Haber would nonetheless be pleased if some 
temporary arrangement could be found which would allow Kersting to remain in charge of the 
local administration of the whole Island Territory, provided that such an arrangement did not 
become a permanent feature of the colony' s  administrative organisation. 
In addition Haber advocated a series of measures which would have given Kersting' s base in 
Ponape a preeminent position for a long time by concentrating all major educational institutions 
in the Island Territory on that island which Haber saw-for reasons of his own-as its centre of 
intelligence and commercial drive. He proposed that the existing school for interpreters be moved 
from Saipan to Ponape; that one trade school be opened in Ponape, rather than one each in Saipan 
and Truk; that the planned agricultural school also be located on Ponape; and that a "school of 
navigation" be added, which Kersting had proposed and which was to train Micronesians to 
replace the expensive Chinese and Malays as machinists, stokers, cooks, stewards, boatswains and 
quartermasters (see RKA 2752) . 
In short, Kersting would probably have found a distinctly favourable climate on his return from 
leave. But it was early days yet and Haber may well have changed his views on a number of 
subjects after a closer acquaintance with "land and people" (Land und Leute) . For example, he 
might have become concerned about the likely impact of the growing tensions between Kersting 
and the Capuchin mission on his administration of the Island Territory, which had probably 
already started to worry Hahl, who knew from his experience with Kersting' s  predecessor Fritz 
how disruptive they could be. However, all this is speculation. "[l]n view of the outbreak of war 
and the lack of any postal connections" the colonial office never responded to the views expressed 
by Haber in his report-and in 1914  as in 1 899 and 1884 the major policy decisions concerning 
the exercise of German colonial rule in the Pacific were made in Berlin. 
v 
It is tempting to conclude this tour of inspection of a handful of the thousands of episodes which 
make up the history of German colonial rule by comparing what they have told us about the 
position at its dawn, at the beginning of direct imperial administration and at the end of the Hahl 
era. But although there are striking similarities and differences, there are also far too many 
variables and uncertainties for a systematic and conclusive analysis. 
The colonial section of the foreign office when Schleinitz became the Neu Guinea 
Kompagnie' s first administrator was not the same institution as the colonial department during the 
brief reign of Bennigsen, or the colonial office at the eve of Hahl's  departure from German New 
Guinea. To begin with their respective heads, Krauel, Buchka and Solf, were different people, 
with different backgrounds, experiences and personalities . The same applies to Schleinitz, 
Bennigsen and Hahl, as well as to the staff of these leading actors. But the situation had also 
12 The German colonial service, like the metropolitan civil service, consisted of three distinct streams into which 
applicants entered on the basis of their (primary, secondary and tertiary) educational qualifications. A senior official had 
not worked his way up through the ranks but entered the upper stream, whereas it was, in principle, impossible for a 
member of the middle or lower stream to be promoted to the one above. Nonetheless it did happen, for example in the 
cases of Senfft and Boluminski, but such promotions became increasingly unlikely. 
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changed in every other respect. By 1914 German New Guinea, as well as metropolitan Germany, 
had become different places, even physically, although of course not totally so. 
We can be intrigued, for example, by the parallels between the situations in which Oertzen and 
Bennigsen found themselves, or amused by the change of Hahl' s  views about the role of 
"monopolistic companies" in German New Guinea between 1899 and 1912  and the similarities 
between the stance he had taken in 1898 and that taken by Kersting a dozen years later. But there 
is no point in dissecting these scenarios and juxtaposing their various elements. 
How much had Hahl altered as a person during the 1 8  years he was involved in the 
administration of German New Guinea? Had he changed his views about the merits of 
monopolistic companies, or had he merely learned to accept them as necessary evils? Would 
Kersting in time also have modified his views?13 Is it the task of a historian of German colonial 
rule to identify such changes and perhaps even to evaluate them? Should historians judge the slice 
of history they study? If this is part of their job, are they entitled to simplify matters for everybody 
by selecting the information presented so as to support the judgement they have arrived at? 
For example, would it be legitimate to transform the final act of the history of the monopolistic 
companies in the Island Territory into a theatrical play in which Kersting features as the white 
knight whereas Hahl is cast in the unfamiliar part of the villain, ipe Jaluit Gesellschaft looming 
as a totally despicable, greedy and heartless monster in the background? 
To be sure, if we take the information provided by Kersting at its face value, it readily lends 
itself to such a treatment. But can we trust his words any more than those of any other historical 
actor? Can we, for example, treat his claim that he could prove that land in the Western Carolines 
had been bought from natives against their will and for a fraction of its value as a statement of 
fact? Is this claim more trustworthy than Kersting' s  claim that it was difficult to find people 
"elsewhere in our colonies" who were economically and culturally as backward as the 
Marshallese? Did Kersting believe this absurd claim to be true or was it just strategic rhetoric? 
Would Kersting have been able to prove what he said about the land purchases in the Western 
Carolines or could he only show, as Haber put it, that more or less pressure had been exercised 
and that the price paid had been rather low. Moreover, if the case had been as clear cut as Kersting 
made it out to be, why had he not taken action to have these contracts declared invalid? After all 
he was as district commissioner in charge of the Western Carolines and presided over their district 
court and their land register in which the titles based on these dubious purchases had to be 
recorded. 
Is it relevant in this context that Haber stated that the people in the low atolls which he had 
visited in this district-and which clearly included some where land for the Western Carolines 
Company had been bought-had expressed no dissatisfaction? Had the people been too frightened 
to express their dissatisfaction? Is it relevant that Haber had expressed his confidence that 
secretary Baumert was sufficiently objective and considerate to protect the interests of the natives 
when buying land in the Eastern Carolines? Did Haber really believe that this was so, or did he 
only express this view because it was administratively convenient to make this assumption? 
And so it goes on and on. Most of the statements presented in this account could be questioned 
in this manner. To raise these questions is not a nit-picking exercise. Rather, it demonstrates how 
much of the ground of history consists of shifting sand, and not just a layer of shifting sand 
covering solid bedrock which we can uncover if we try hard enough. This shifting sand is part of 
history and it contains the impressions of other parts of history which we would otherwise be 
unable to see at all. This is what makes an account of these episodes historically illuminating. 
They reflect what cannot be directly described. But we have to be careful; for if we try to nail 
down these reflections we destroy them instead of giving them firmer features. It is the unique 
13 It is worth noting that Kersting was five years older than Hahl instead of belonging to the next generation of colonial 
officials as one might have expected. 
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strength of a narrative approach to history that it is capable of capturing these subtle reflections 
alive and the ultimate weakness of narrative phantom history that it prevents historical narratives 
from fulfilling their potential. The irony is that narrative too can only live up to its 
historiographical potential if we accept that history is concerned with structures rather than 
actions, because only then can we appreciate that the historical significance of particular human 
actions lies in what they tell us, directly or indirectly, about the general structures shaping human 
behaviour. This frees us from the burden of having to give the actions described an ahistorical, 
narrative meaning. It also places the issue of factuality in a different context. What matters 
historically is no longer the factuality of the actions described in the historical record but the 
factuality of the structures about which they inform us. Where this information is indirect and 
reflective, and this is where narrative plays a crucial role, historiography becomes like a game of 
squash: the target is the field in which the players move but they have to hit the ball against the 
wall in order to reach it. 
The land purchases in the Western Carolines provide a good illustration of how this works. 
What matters historically-or, rather, for a history of German colonial rule in the Island 
Territory-is not so much what actually happened on the ground but how senior government 
officials responded to these purchases, which everybody knew were legally problematic, not 
because of the particular circumstances but because all land acquisitions from natives were legally 
more or less questionable, and not just because they often involved some pressure or deception. 
Kersting's  approach to this dilemma was shaped by his views about the political desirability of 
these purchases and his antagonism towards the Jaluit Gesellschaft. He used the legal questions 
raised by them as ammunition in his campaign against the "monopolistic companies".  He was not 
concerned with the legal validity of these acquisitions, which he apparently accepted as afait 
accompli, he presented them as legally defective because this showed the company in a 
particularly negative light: first it had used illegal means to acquire the land and then it had the 
cheek to ask him for permission to resettle the former owners on the land as serfs-as if we were 
still living in the Dark Ages ! By contrast, Haber sought refuge in the belief that B aumert would 
make sure that the interests, if not the rights, of the natives would be adequately protected during 
other land acquisitions of this kind. 
On the other hand, it may well have been the J aluit Gesellschaft which persuaded Hahl not to 
confiscate the northern atolls in the Marshall Islands. But if it did, it did not do so out of concern 
with the welfare of its inhabitants but because it feared the impact such a bold move would have 
on its commercial operations .  It was better not to use a legal sledge-hammer but to continue the 
political game of negotiating a "voluntary" sale, in which all players brought all kinds of pressures 
to bear upon each other. That much is clear. But this does not mean that Merz was right in 
suggesting that Leit and Labareo were trying to force the government into confiscating the 
northern atolls, so that they could pocket the compensation without having to justify the loss of 
the land to their subjects. Nor is it clear that Merz was right in attributing Labareo ' s  reluctance to 
sell-or to sell cheaply?-to the influence of the Bums Philp agent. What could he hope to gain 
by making life difficult for the government and the Jaluit Gesellschaft-especially if Kersting was 
right in claiming that Bums Philp had settled for sharing the profits to be made in the Marshall 
Islands under the company' s conditions? But was Kersting justified in making this claim? Was 
Kersting-or Merz, or any of the other historical actors-seriously concerned about the factuality 
of any, let alone all, of the statements they made? 
Yet they all operated by asserting the existence of specific facts instead of sending the 
messages they wanted to convey in clear text. Like subsequent narrative historians, the historical 
actors exercising German colonial rule in the Pacific were moving in a kind of Wonderland. This 
applied not only where they exercised discretionary powers, and were thus unable to operate 
behind a shield of legal rules, the entire machinery of government and its operation, in particular 
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where it became routinised and bureaucratised, was assuming a phantom quality. Facts were 
replaced by information about purported facts, government became increasingly concerned with 
the management of information, and that called for the production of manageable rather than 
factual information. This is how phantom history and the Rule of Law link up and how they 
contribute to the global colonisation of humankind. They both replace facts with manageable 
phantoms which are treated as facts, although their factuality is in fact immaterial. 
But the functions of the phantomisation of history and the bureaucratisation of law in the 
global colonisation process are different. The bureaucratisation of government under the Rule of 
Law transforms phantoms into facts which, in the realm of government, are more real than the 
facts they purport to represent. By contrast, it is the political function of narrative phantom history 
to hide this transformation process. As a result neither narrative historians nor normative lawyers 
know what they are doing, namely digging the graves for their respective professions. But life will 
go on and even the colonial state is not immortal. However, it is unlikely to be swept aside like 
German colonial rule in the Pacific. Instead it will transform itself into something different, 
something even more powerful and less human. Yet its emergence will still be greeted by the 
narrative historians with their old battle-cry "look he is naked !"-because this is all they have 
learned to say about history and all we have learned to hear. 
This is where my story of a small chapter behind this supposedly never-ending story must end, 
although it too could, narratively speaking, go on for ever and ever. What is its message? That a 
willingness to face "the facts" is not a significant factor in the making or writing of human history 
and that there are no rewards for intellectual honesty, because it seems to make it more rather than 
less difficult to manage the world? Or that "manageability"-or is it the "virtual" manageability 
of actual reality or, more frighteningly still, the actual management of"virtual" reality?- appears 
to have become the central aim of all human endeavour, including the academic study of law and 
history? 
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Index 
Preface 
The preparation of an index for a text of this size forces the compiler to confront questions which can usually be ignored. As my answers have shaped this index decisively but invisibly it is necessary to 
discuss how I arrived at them. 
Although I had been involved in compiling a number of indexes in the past, I had no clear recollection of 
how the task had been handled on these occasions. All I could remember was that it had been a tedious but 
straightforward exercise. On each occasion, so it looked to me in retrospect, we had adopted the conventional 
approach of settling primarily for a "proper name" approach, supplementing it, in so far as this was desirable, 
with a "subject heading" approach. Somehow this must have achieved a result which we regarded as 
satisfactory. 
Since I saw no reason why this conventional approach should not also work with the text now in front 
of me, I gave it a go, starting with a provisional list of the "proper names" referred to in it. It certainly 
worked. In fact, it worked too well, as I ended up with a list of hundreds of names which, I felt, had to be 
drastically culled. But what criteria could I use to determine whether a particular proper name should or 
should not be included? 
My provisional list was also remarkably uneven. The "propername" approach seemed to work reasonably 
well for the narrative parts of the text but let me down when the text became more analytical or systematic. 
This was not the result of the text not naming names in these sections. On the contrary, the number of proper 
names referred to could be particularly excessive. 1 Did I have to abandon a "proper name" approach for the 
indexing of the non-narrative parts of the text and switch to a "subject heading" approach? But to do so meant 
jumping from the frying pan into the fire: I did not even have a firm starting point, because a subject heading 
approach could not limit itself to subjects expressly referred to in the text, whereas an indexer had to consider 
only proper names which actually occurred in the text. Hence it was impossible to compile mechanically a 
provisional list of "subject headings" which was perhaps uncomfortably long but at least finite-quite apart 
from the problem of selecting from such a list the subject headings to be included in the final index. 
Moreover, the problem of what to do with the "proper names" referred to in the non-narrative parts of the 
text remained, since I could hardly disregard them altogether. And a parallel problem arose for the narrative 
parts, as they referred to subject matters, as well as to people and places, which also needed to be taken into 
account. 
How did other indexers handle these difficulties? Since I did not think it would be a good idea to examine 
one of the indexes in which I had myself been previously involved or one of the indexes in the works of the 
phantom historians I had criticized in the text, I settled for that in "Germany in the Pacific and Far East" 
(Moses & Kennedy, 1 977) to which I and three of them had contributed. 2 
The Moses & Kennedy index comprises about 250 "first order" headings. The large majority refers to 
"persons", natural and otherwise, as commercial firms, mission societies and even several newspapers are 
listed. Some of these "personal" headings include, in addition to a surname, one or more first names of the 
person in question, others his office and/or title instead and still others the lot3-presumably reflecting the 
different ways in which this person was identified in the text.4 A need to subdivide these "personal" headings 
with the help of "second (or third) order" headings had apparently only arisen in a few cases, since a large 
1 I only had to think of the dozens of names listed in Tables Il and ill (see above: 143 and 1 57). 
2 I should admit that it did not occur to me at the time to look instead for a "manual" for indexers. However, judging by 
the following examination of concrete examples, this would have been a bad move, since it demonstrated that such 
manuals, which probably do exist, either do not provide theoretically sound advice or their advice is ignored in practice. 
3 Royalty was treated differently. While the listing of the German emperor under "Wilhelm IT' made good sense, I found 
the heading "Heinrich, Rear-Admiral Prince" distinctly odd-but then a listing under "Prussia, Prince Henry of', as he 
is also referred to in the text, would hardly have been an improvement. 
4 I subsequently discovered that the position was less clear. For example, I had identified the person listed bluntly as 
"Schmiele, Judge" in the index in the text as "the imperial judge G. [ !] Schmiele". 
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number of them listed only a single page reference and since the mechanical device of indicating a range of 
pages had been sufficient to keep most of the others "comfortably" short. 5 
The entry under "Bismarck, Otto von" may illustrate how the few remaining "personal" headings are 
subdivided. After a dozen or so page references follow seven subheadings: "and Caroline Islands", "and 
Fijian land question" and so on. I found this simple "linking" method attractive but began to wonder how 
seriously it had been taken, when I noticed that the page reference to the last-mentioned subheading is "69-
70", whereas the reference under the corresponding first order heading "Fiji, Land question in" is "68-69", 6 
and that no corresponding first order heading "Caroline Islands" is listed. 
But then generally very few place names are included -and most of them are treated as if they too refer 
to persons rather than localities. This applies in particular to "Britain" and "Germany", where the entries 
identify these metropolitan countries with their respective governments. "Colonial" territories, like "New 
Guinea" (not German New Guinea!) or "Samoan Islands", are treated differently, but even they are not seen 
as places, rather their names serve as convenient geographical focal points for a casual collection of second 
order subject headings. Thus the heading "New Guinea" is subdivided into: "early settlement in", "German 
annexation of', "labour recruitment in", "missions in" and "Queensland, intervention in", although it is hard 
to believe that these subheadings represent the only, or, at least, the most significant references to "New 
Guinea" in the text. 7 
The treatment of the central heading "Germany" shows the strategic manipulation of these headings. 
There is, strictly speaking, no first order heading "Germany''. Instead three second order headings are given: 
"Germany and Japan", followed by "and Spain" and "and the USA". Yet there are no headings under 
"Japan", and "Spain", and under the heading "United States" no corresponding second order heading "and 
Germany" is given. On the other hand, headings like "Britain" function partly as an extension of the entries 
under the invisible first order heading "Germany''. Thus we find under the heading "Britain" not just a sub­
heading "and Germany" but three more specific headings which distinguish "relations", "negotiations" and 
"rivalry" between the two countries. This spreading of entries, which would have been more naturally listed 
under "Germany", gives the index a balanced appearance, but it is unlikely to assist readers of a text which 
focuses primarily on Germany. 
The omission of a heading "Japan" is still more peculiar, considering that an entire chapter is devoted 
to "German Cultural and Political Influence on Japan, 1 870- 1914". The entry under "Germany and Japan" 
is also puzzling. It does not read "156 [the first page of the relevant chapter] passim", as one would expect, 
rather several specific page references are given, suggesting that the subject "Germany and Japan" is not 
discussed on the other pages of that chapter-a suggestion which is not in accord with the text. 
The omission of a heading "Japan" is just one of many puzzling omissions. There is also no heading for 
"Kaiser Wilhelmsland", even though another chapter deals with the extension of colonial rule in this part of 
German New Guinea. 8 Does the inclusion of so few place names, compared with the number of personal 
names, reflect a considered decision on the part of the indexer, or did it just so happen?9 Did he also have 
sound reasons for including such a small-and again distinctly strange--collection of first order subject 
headings (from "Anti-Comintern Pact" to "Steamship subsidy"), and for excluding headings which one would 
have thought to be more obvious, such as "Land" or "Labour"? Perhaps he had, but it is certainly not 
apparent to users of his index what they were. 
How did he treat the "personal" names which were clearly much dearer to his heart? Was it an accident 
that "Malietoa" and "Mata"afa" are listed-the only Pacific Islanders featured-whereas the name ofLauaki, 
who plays an even more important part in Peter Hempenstall ' s  chapter, is not? Why were the names of the 
5 The magic "passim" formula, which indicates that a proper name (or subject) is referred to "on and off' over a range 
of pages, is also used, but only rarely-and then in a peculiarly abbreviated form, indicating only the first page of what 
turns out to be the relevant chapter. 
6 While a discussion of Bismarck's involvement in the Fiji land question-according to the index-only starts on p.69, 
the continuation of that discussion on p. 70 must still be concerned with that question. 
7 It will come as no surprise that there are no corresponding first order headings for "labour recruitment", "Queensland" 
and so on. 
8 As we have already seen there is also no subheading "extension of German colonial rule in" under the heading "New 
Guinea". Nor is there a subheading "German administration in" under this heading, although it is, for example, included 
under "Ponape". 
9 I found the reluctance to use historical events as headings also curious. Although, for example, the "Sino-Japanese War" 
is listed, the "Ponape Rebellion" is only referred to indirectly under "Ponape, punitive action in", and the "Madang 
Conspiracies", which also figure in the text, are not referred to at all in the index. 
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Ponapean counterparts of these Samoan stars-those of Nanpei and Jomatau, which are given by 
Hempenstall-also excluded? 
Why does the index include the name "von Kotze" (without first name or initial), although the man had 
not, by any stretch of the imagination, played a significant part in the history of German New Guinea, but 
exclude those ofFinsch, Neuhauss and Prey, who all did and who are also referred to by Ingrid Moses?10 Did 
von Kotze catch the compilers' attention because he is presented as a nephew of Bismarck or because he had 
provided Moses with one of these deliciously quotable quotes: "We decided to make a punitive expedition, 
partly to kill the hostile kanakas, partly to kill time"? 
However, this had become a rhetorical question, since it was by now plain that it was futile to search for 
any rhyme or reason behind this index. There was none. What I had before me looked like the hurried 
fulfillment of an inescapable duty. Or had the eagerness to adopt a "she"ll do mate !" attitude been brought 
about by the "nature" of the text, which was not the comprehensive treatment of a single topic by a single 
author but a collection of papers by a multitude of authors who dealt in different ways with various aspects 
of Germany's involvement in the history of the Pacific and the Far East, presenting a few fragments of a large 
mosaic? Had this put the indexer in a position where no more than a token effort was practical? 
Since I remembered how impressed I had been by the elaborate index in Roger Joyce' s biography of Sir 
William MacGregor (197 1 )  when I had consulted it in search of information on the financial position of 
British New Guinea, I decided to take another look to see if it provided me with a model I could happily 
follow. Alas, it did not but it demonstrated that unrealistic ambitions in the field of indexing are just as 
dangerous as a lack of enthusiasm. 
How did the indexer deal with the references to Sir William MacGregor, who presumably featured 
throughout the book, as he could hardly choose the easy way out by settling for a one-line "passim" entry? 
He had produced a long and variously subdivided entry under "MacGregor, William" which covered, by the 
looks of it, most pages of the text and many pages more than once. 1 1  
However, this entry i s  only the start, since it refers readers to the entries under "the names of  his 
[MacGregor' s] colonies" which are again variously subdivided. 12 In addition two subject headings, namely 
"Honours" and "Languages'', are referred to. Unexpectedly the first covers only the honours which 
. MacGregor had personally received, or had been instrumental in having bestowed on others, and the second 
is devoted, at least primarily, to his admirable linguistic achievements, so that they too serve, in fact, as 
further extensions of the entries under the "MacGregor, William" heading. 
But we still have not reached the end of the road. The "Languages" heading includes a further reference 
to "Literary references" which, in tum, refer the reader to "Historical references"-and I was no longer 
surprised to find that these headings related exclusively to such references made by Sir William MacGregor. 
A reference among the "Literary references" to "Schiller" aroused my curiosity. When I followed it up, I 
found that MacGregor had a copy of Schiller's "Geschichte " (sic) with him on a patrol in British New 
Guinea, reading it on alternate nights with the Iliad. Although I was once more awed by MacGregor' s  
erudition, 13 I found i t  hard to believe that this reference to Schiller, hidden away under "Literary references", 
could be of practical assistance to any user of the index. 14 On the other hand, it certainly did no harm, and 
the entire MacGregor-centric part of the index looked to me more and more like an extravagant but 
inconsequential overkill. 
How did the rest of the index perform? There were first of all a large number of proper name 
entries-again many with a single page reference. Their treatment was unremarkable, although the "title 
question" was handled with amusing unevenness15 and the interest shown in the suburbs of Brisbane and 
1 0  The reference to imperial commissioner Rose in this chapter is included but the indexer got himself unnecessarily into 
trouble because he identified Rose, on the strength of his subsequent appointment to Samoa, referred to in earlier chapters, 
as "consul". 
1 1  Pages 1 to 5, for example, are referred to under eight different subheadings. 
1 2  The "colony" headings refer back to "the subject headings MacGregor, William, colonial career", indicating the 
relevant range of pages-"pp. 95-21 8" in the case of British New Guinea-thus introducing a further, geographical 
subdivision for the entries under these headings. There are other back references of this kind (see, for example, the 
peculiarly designed heading "Education"). 
1 3  I was disappointed, however, that Joyce' s text did not tell me which of the several works by Schiller including the word 
"Geschichte" in their title had been an "old favourite" of MacGregor. 
14 In contrast to Dante, but in company of Homer and other authors, Schiller is not given his own first order heading in 
the index. 
15 For example, the Chancellor of the Reich, Prince Bismarck, is listed as a simple "Otto" whereas William Humble 
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particular schools in Queensland was more intense than the text warranted. By contrast, I was intrigued by 
what appeared to be attempts to group specific entries "systematically" together under general subject 
headings. 
The first of these headings to attract my attention was "Churches, Christian" because it contained yet 
another "see also" reference to MacGregor-this time to his "Christian belief'-followed by a string of page 
numbers. 16 While I was getting used to finding references to MacGregor in unexpected places, I was surprised 
that most of the subheadings did not refer to Christian churches but to the activities of Christian missionaries, 
which, I would have thought, was not the same thing. Moreover, I was again struck by an unevenness of 
treatment. Whereas the London Missionary Society is listed under its name under the subheading "New 
Guinea", the other references under that subheading are to "Anglican", "Methodist" and "Roman Catholic" 
missionaries. In addition, and in contrast to the Anglican and Methodist missionaries (who are called 
Wesleyan missionaries under the subheading "Fiji"), the London Missionary Society scored its own heading, 
although not a discrete first order heading but a subheading "Missionary Society" under the "geographical" 
first order heading "London". The Roman Catholic missionaries received yet another form of treatment. They 
are also listed under the first order heading "Sacred Heart Society"-which does not exist-with a 
cumbersome reference to "Churches, Christian, New Guinea, Roman Catholic missionaries", whereas in the 
case of the London Missionary Society a reference to "Churches, Christian" was regarded as sufficiently 
specific. 
But the box of surprises only began to open fully when I looked at the entries under the heading 
"Products, agricultural". The first surprise was that the entry listed "timber" as an agricultural product; the 
second that it nonetheless included not only aheading "Forest"-although not a heading "Products, forestry", 
as one might have expected-but that this heading referred to a heading "Timber" which, in turn, referred 
to a heading "Products"-albeit in this context without the qualification "agricultural". 
There was also no heading "Products, marine". Instead there was a heading "Fishing" which treated, via 
a cross-reference, "sealing" as form of fishing. Nor was there a heading "Products, mineral"-or a heading 
"Mining" as a counterpart of "Fishing". Instead there was a heading "Minerals", which included the dubious 
subheading "coal". There was also neither a first order heading "Products, industrial" nor a heading 
"Industry", or, for that matter, a heading "Animal husbandry" or separate entries for the most obvious 
domesticated animals, like pigs, sheep or cattle. But there was an additional heading "Agriculture", which 
I had not expected. It included a three page reference to "Agriculture, Queensland". Surprise, surprise, these 
pages did not deal with agriculture in Queensland but rather used primary industry examples to illustrate that 
"Impending old age had done nothing to dull MacGregor' s  inquiring mind". Furthermore, the inquiring mind 
of MacGregor had operated in a highly selective fashion, focusing inter alia on prickly pears, angora goats, 
ostriches, blowflies, and the scientific backwardness of Queensland. 17 
On the other hand, MacGregor may have been indirectly responsible for the broad interpretation of 
"agriculture" in the index because the Faculty of Agriculture in Queensland, for the establishment of which 
he was arguing, was, according to MacGregor, supposed to cover "the Pastoral, the Horticultural and the 
farming [sic] industries". But MacGregor can hardly be blamed for the entire intellectual mess which the 
indexer created. I rather got the feeling that it was the product of a growing sense of frustration on the part 
of a well-meaning indexer who had realised too late that he had bitten off more than he could chew and 
wanted to finish his job as quickly as possible by throwing his chosen headings higgledy-piggledy into the 
next best general subject heading box, without considering whether their mixed content made any sense. 
Ward, the z•d Earl of Dudley, scored two entries under "Ward" and "Dudley'' .  Yet he is only referred to in a footnote, 
where he is featured neither as "Ward", nor as ''the Earl of Dudley" but as "Lord Dudley, Governor-General [of Australia] 
1 908- 1 1 ". The text does not refer to "Otto Bismarck" either. Instead the name "Bismarck" occurs in this plain form in two 
quotes from MacGregor which refer, equally plainly, to "Granville'', who is not listed as "Granville, George" in the index 
but as "Granville" with a reference to "Leveson-Gower, Granville George (91h Earl Granville)". 
16 I should mention in passing that the first of these references is to a blank page and the last to an improbable span of 
well over 1 00 pages. Whereas these two particular blunders are probably the result of trivial errors which we all make 
(should the second reference read "305, 433" rather than "305-433"?), their frequency suggests that the indexer generally 
lacked the patience to keep up with his ambitions. 
17 While "Prickly pear", "Goats, Angora" and "Ostriches"-but not blowflies-are listed under these specific headings, 
MacGregor's views about the scientific backwardness of Queensland are politely submerged under the heading 
"Queensland economy, agricultural policy". 
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How else could I account for the fact that references to the Australian Labor Party and "Kanakas in 
Queensland" both appeared under the heading "Labour", 1 8  or that American and Indian Indians were grouped 
together under the heading "Indians"? How could the indexer justify the combination of references to the 
Ladies League in Lagos, "adultery" and "Queensland Aboriginals" (and a host of various other subheadings) 
under the heading "Women"-without including the corresponding heading "Men"-or the combination of 
references to the First World War with references to "military" activities in British New Guinea (without 
distinguishing between intertribal warfare and punitive actions by the colonial government) under the heading 
"War", and to include under that heading even a mysterious subheading "U.S.A Crisis"-which turns out 
to be a reference to a remote threat of war between Britain and the United States over fishing in the waters 
of Newfoundland. 
He plainly could not, but then it dawned on me that I had been wrong in assuming that the indexer had 
felt a need for a rational justification for what he was doing. The explanation for all the oddities my 
examination had identified (and I have mentioned only a few of them) was quite different and simple: I was 
back in Wonderland. The indexers, whose work I had inspected, had not been engaged in a bungled rational 
enterprise but in the performance of an academic ritual, consisting of a small repertory of conventional 
movements, the meaning of which had long been forgotten. 
The indexes of historiographical texts, so it appeared, were a continuation of phantom history by other 
means. Indexers were supposed to treat their texts in the same manner as narrative historians treated the 
historical record. Indexers had even developed their own version of a narrative language in which words did 
not mean what they said and for which the logical implications of what was being said were immaterial. Thus 
"Products, agricultural" did not, or, rather, did not necessarily, refer to a particular species of the genus 
"product", it could also be another way of saying "agriculture"-a word which, in turn, could cover other 
forms of primary industry. Indeed, words could be emptied of any concrete meaning and become mere 
cyphers. Moreover, all this happened by itself, as it were, and required no purposive action on the part of the 
indexer. An indexer did not have to transform "London" from the name of a place into a particular 
combination of letters when listing the London Missionary Society under "London", nor did he have to 
convince himself that "adultery" was a specifically female activity, this amazing flexibility was an inherent 
quality of the phantom language he was using. 
Under these circumstances the indexer of MacGregor' s  biography had no cause to become frustrated. On 
the contrary, he could look with pride at his work as an unusually ornate performance of a time-honoured 
ritual. The possibility that his index could nonetheless be an intellectual shambles did not enter his 
consciousness-and why should it? Indexes are not meant to be critically analysed. They are practical tools. 
With that I agreed, but could it excuse shoddy workmanship in the forging of such a tool which, I 
thought, was also bound to affect its usefulness? This brought me finally to the simple but crucial question: 
what is an index? I had so far not addressed it because I had assumed that the answer was obvious: an index 
is supposed to give people who use it a better (or quicker, or easier?) access to the text to which it 
relates-but I was now beginning to suspect that the question was not as simple as this glib answer suggested. 
What then, was an index? 
According to the Shoner Oxford an index is: "A list of things in (usu. alphabetical) order; esp. a list usu. at 
the end of a book, giving names, topics etc .  mentioned in a book and the places [in the book !]  where they 
occur. Formerly also a table of contents. "  
This boiled down definition was surprisingly "liberal" but i t  gave little away. Still, i t  contained some 
helpful clues. The first was the suggestion that an index was a specialised table of contents 19, which I found 
difficult to reconcile with the statement that an index listed "names, topics etc." mentioned in a book. To be 
sure, anything mentioned in a book is contained in it, but to me a table of contents was more narrowly 
focused. Hence I was pleased that the Shoner Oxford confirmed this feeling, since it defined a "table of 
contents" as a "summary of the subject-matter [ ! ]  of a book" and, "content" as "the sum of the constituent[ ! ]  
elements of  something". Could the distinction between the constituent elements of  a text and "names, topics 
etc.", which were merely mentioned provide the selection criterion I was looking for? Was an index supposed 
to index only what a text was about and to disregard what was peripheral? I was confident that I was on to 
something, but decided to follow a second clue first. 
18 The actual entry is constructed as follows: "Labour, Australian, Party" . 
1 9  It reminded me of the tables of content in baroque novels in which each chapter heading gives a short description of 
what is happening in it. 
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I had been puzzled by the initial definition of an "index" in the Shorter Oxford as a list of "things'', 
especially when I compared it with the subsequent reference to "names, topics etc."-which apparently 
coincided with the conventional distinction between "proper names" and "subject headings". Were indexes 
lists of things? Were names and topics things? A closer look at this conventional distinction was called for, 
since there was something quite peculiar going on. 
Just how peculiar it was, was brought home to me when I compared the conventional English terms with their 
most common German counterparts, which distinguish between a "Personenverzeichnis" and a 
"Sachverzeichnis", that is to say, between an index of "persons", and index of"things". Under this distinction 
the proper names of places, since they are not persons, are fitted into the "Sachverzeichnis", the counterpart 
of a subject index. However, places are not things either. But then the meaning of the term Sache in German 
is ambiguous. A Sachgebiet-a field of study-covers the study of abstractions as much as the study of 
physical objects-and the same ambiguity exists in English, where the counterpart of Sachgebiet is "subject 
matter", since "matter", like Sache, can, according to the Shorter Oxford, refer to the stuff of which physical 
objects consist as well as to that which belongs to a subject of study-whatever that may be. Besides, there 
is a perfectly acceptable alternative to a "Personenverzeichnis" in German, namely a "Namensverzeichnis", 
which can not only include the names of persons but also the names of places and indeed the names of 
anything ( ! ) else, since a Sachverzeichnis also lists the names of things, rather than the things themselves. 
This led me to what appeared to be the historical root of the distinction between proper name and subject 
indexes; the distinction by the grammarians of classical antiquity between a "nomen proprium" and a "nomen 
commune", that is to say a name which refers to something unique and a name which refers to something 
typical. We follow the wrong track, if instead of distinguishing between different kinds of names, we try to 
make distinctions in accordance with differences in the nature of that which is being named. Proper name 
indexes, subject indexes, Personen- and Sachverzeichnisse are, contrary to the Shorter Oxford, all not lists 
of "things" but lists of "names" or words-a state of affairs neatly reflected in the "generic" German term 
"Stichwortverzeichnis" a list of "key words". Certain words are used as headings in indexes not because they 
name persons, or places, or objects, or subject matters, but because they, in contrast to most other words used 
in a text, have a special "string". (Stich), because they provide a "key" which opens up the text. 
Not all key words, however, are of the same kind; they can name whatever they name differently, namely 
as something which is unique or as something which is typical. A text can, for example, refer to a ship as a 
"ship", or as "naval vessel", or as "German naval vessel", thereby identifying the genus, species or subspecies 
of the category of thing to which the ship belongs, or it can identify its proper name, say Mowe-which, of 
course, does not turn the ship into a person. Similarly a text can refer to the same man by his proper proper 
name, say Otto von Bismarck, or identify him in accordance with his office-the chancellor of the Reich-or 
some other typical "attribute" and specify this typical designation to such an extent that it becomes as 
"unique" as a proper name (for example, the first chancellor of the second German Reich). 
The conventional distinction between proper names and subject headings is therefore confusing rather 
than helpful. This does not mean, however, that the compilation of a "proper name index" and that of a 
"subject index" are not different enterprises-if it is understood that the "real" distinction is between two 
different kinds of names, that a "subject index" should be treated as an index of common names and that 
common names have a different relationship with each other than proper names.20 
Whereas each proper name stands on its own feet, in splendid isolation, each common name is part of 
an abstract logical order. This does not preclude the linking of proper names in an index-for example, 
"Bismarck and the Caroline islands"-but these links must actually exist, they must themselves be unique, 
while subject headings have a given systematic relationship with other subject headings. An indexer enters 
a different world when he moves from a proper name to a subject heading approach. A proper name index 
can be compiled mechanically and it can be comprehensive, whereas a subject index is ideally systematic and 
has to be selective. Indeed, thanks to the wonders of modern technology, the compilation of a proper name 
index can be fully mechanised. An indexer does not even have to read the text he is indexing. He only has 
to know the subject matter it is dealing with and how to find a few existing lists of proper names in this field. 
I could have fed the names of all the German colonial officials in the Hubatsch Lists and the place names 
in the index of a contemporary German colonial atlas into a computer and let it search for these names in the 
text. I could even have adopted a mechanical solution for the problem of too many proper names or too many 
references to particular proper names, by instructing the computer to exclude all proper names, which were 
20 In order not to complicate matters further, I shall stick to the conventional distinction for the rest of this preface. 
INDEX 6 1 3  
only referred to once in the text and to choose randomly no more than ten page references fo r  each proper 
name. 
For a subject index such a mechanical approach could not work. But it would also have been futile to sit 
down and work out, systematically and in the abstract, an ideal subject index for a text dealing with the 
history of German New Guinea. The compiler of a subject index is just as firmly tied to his text as the 
compiler of a proper name index-but in different ways. In contrast to the latter, who is limited to the proper 
names actually referred to in the text, the former can make up his own subject headings-for example the 
heading "Products, agricultural"-but he can be no more systematic than his text, and texts about history are 
rarely consistently systematic. On the other hand, while historiographical texts seldom treat any subject 
systematically, they often mention a variety of subject matters just in passing, just as they mention a whole 
host of proper names just in passing. 
This took me back to the problem of selecting which proper names and subject headings should be 
included in an index. Was the Shaner Oxford right in suggesting that an index should list all names and 
topics mentioned in the text, or should it, for example, only include the names of persons who were featured 
as historical actors in the text and only the names of places which appeared in it as the scenes of historical 
events? Such an approach appeared to make sense, especially for narrative histories. Yet it was plainly not 
the approach adopted in the indexes of Moses & Kennedy and Joyce. 
What concerned me at this point was not the haphazardness of the selection process but the fact that both 
indexes included a large number of headings which provided no key to anything discussed in the text. 
Eventually I hit on a likely answer to that puzzle. It had to do with the audience for which an index is 
designed. The crucial question was whether an index is exclusively addressed to people who had read, or 
were going to read, the entire text because they were interested in what it had to say or whether it had to 
consider the needs of people who were treating the text as a potential source of bits of information on 
"people, topics etc." in which they were themselves interested. Put differently, was an index an elaborated 
table of contents which was trying to make a text more readily accessible as a text or was it a kind of mail 
order catalogue which potential customers could compare with their personal shopping lists? 
There was nothing wrong with the second possibility. The problem was rather that an indexer who is 
trying to provide an inventory of all the information mentioned in a text faces intellectually a hopeless task, 
because anything a text says, however peripheral, is of conceivable interest to someone. Nor can he possibly 
come up with a structure of the index which is helpful to everybody. If he is aware of this predicament, he 
cannot go beyond a mechanical application of a proper name approach, since anything he does to improve 
on it is bound to have a random-or idiosyncratic-quality. He can put together an infinite number oflonger 
or shorter and differently ordered indexes, without being able to justify rationally why he has chosen one 
version in preference to another. 
On the other hand, an indexer who is prepared to consider only genuine readers of a text can work out 
rational criteria for the selection of proper names and subject headings to be included in the index and he can 
utilise the structure of the text to structure his index, provided he has the courage of his convictions and 
realistic expectations of what he can achieve. 
On the other hand, he is in for a double disappointment, because the fruits of his labour will look 
superficially like any other conventional index and because the trimming of the excess fat will disappoint 
those of his audience who were looking for just such tasty morsels. But then the wonders of modem 
technology make indexes as mechanical information inventories entirely obsolete, since anyone up to date 
with them can feed a text into his computer, naturally without having to bother to read it, and let it find out 
which bits of information on items on his personal shopping list it contains. 
This, however, was not the kind of Wonderland I had entered. The indexers of Moses & Kennedy and 
Joyce had not decided to provide a comprehensive inventory of all the information contained in their texts. 
Nor had they got into trouble because they had tried to kill two birds with one stone. Instead they had done 
what was expected from them; they had performed a well established ritual. Both indexes were part of the 
same cultural milieu in which narrative phantom history flourishes. Indeed, it appeared that these indexes 
were primarily designed to make it easier for other narrative historians to take notes as a basis for 
constructing their own narratives. 
Was the compilation of an index a rational enterprise? Could it be approached as such? Was it an art 
rather than a science-or, perhaps a trade? Did the alleged mysteriousness of the Past extend beyond 
historiographical texts to their indexes? Did the irrational practices which I had detected, instead of poisoning 
the indexes th.ey produced, make them more fertile? Should we not congratulate Paul M. Kennedy, for 
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example, for including additional bits of information in the index of his "Samoan Tangle" ( 1 97 4 ), rather than 
questioning whether they serve a rational purpose? Is it not reassuring to read that "White, Henry" was 
"secretary at the U.S. Embassy in London" or that "Townsend, Mary" was a "historian", although there are 
good reasons to doubt that a person looking up these names in the index is given any practical assistance by 
these additions? Should we not be pleased that the index lists the names of so many newspapers, instead of 
accusing the indexer of excessive zeal because 20 of them are referred to on two pages? Is it pedantic to point 
out the inconsistency of identifying "Wilhelm II'', as "German kaiser" (without a capital "K" or italics), 
"Buchka, Dr Gerhard" (without a "von") as "Kolonialdirektor" and "Graf [not count] Herbert von Bismarck" 
as "secretary of state for foreign affairs"? Does it make sense to list a page reference "25-122" (without 
passim) under "Germany, policy towards Samoa" and references to "26-7, 82, 86-7, 1 09,  1 20, 1 22-33" under 
the peculiar heading of "Germany, internal politics, and relationship to Samoa", not to mention dozens of 
other references under a multitude of other (non-German) headings? 
Do any of these oddities matter? They do if the compilation of an index is seen as an academic activity. 
But is it? Or is it not treated as a menial task which someone has to do and which authors or editors only 
perform themselves if they can find no one else to carry it out for them? Conversely, is the compilation of 
an index a task which is quite distinct from the writing or editing of a text-a task that requires a specialised 
expertise which few authors possess but which enables indexers to index any text, without having to know 
anything about its subject matter? Considering that the "authors" of indexes are rarely identified, although 
everybody knows that by no means all authors of texts could claim that the index of their text was entirely 
their own work, it would seem that the compilation of an index is not regarded as ail intellectual achievement 
one could be proud of. 
There are good reasons for taking this view. Compiling an index is hardly a creative task. But it is 
nonetheless demanding. There is an awful lot that can go wrong when compiling an index. While an indexer 
does not need any specialised expertise, he requires a quality which one connects with accountants ratherthan 
historians: meticulousness-and this means, first of all, taking a text seriously, including its warts and 
limitations, since it is the nature of a particular text which determines what is possible and appropriate as far 
as indexing is concerned. 
There are texts which rule out a proper name or a subject heading approach-and perhaps both, 21 there 
are texts which require a combination of both approaches and there are texts which give an indexer a range 
of choices, each of which can have important consequences. Thus an indexer who decides that a proper name 
approach is suitable and by itself sufficient can choose between a comprehensive and a selective index. By 
opting for the second alternative he commits himself not only to a search for rational selection criteria, he 
also limits automatically the informativeness of his index, because the user of a selective index can no longer 
draw negative conclusions from its content. He cannot assume, for example, that a person not listed is also 
not referred to in the text, or that a single page reference means that this is the only page on which the person 
in question is referred to. 
Does an indexer have a choice as to the selection criteria he is going to adopt? I suggest he has not. As 
far as I can see a distinction between "insignificant" and "significant" references provides the only rational 
basis for deciding on the inclusion and exclusion of proper names as well as subject headings. Yet, as we 
have already seen, an indexer enters a different world when he switches to a subject heading approach, so 
that he may be well advised to postpone such a move as long as possible-and the technique of linking two 
proper names can take him a considerable distance. But even here the question of consistency arises, since 
an indexer who chooses, for example, to link Bismarck with the Carolines is logically committed to list this 
link under "Carolines" as well as under "Bismarck", because his index is logically incomplete ifhe only lists 
it as a subheading under the second heading.22 
21 An indexer may then have to consider alternatives to an index-and there are many, some of which may also provide 
useful supplements to an index. 
22 Could he justify the omission of a heading "Carolines" on the basis that his text is "about" Bismarck but not "about" 
the Carolines? This too is doubtful because it already draws the choice of "Carolines" as a subheading under "Bismarck" 
into question; for, ifthe Carolines are not significant as the geographical location of the "events" discussed, he should have 
chosen another key word. 
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However, the choice o f  subject headings raises this and other logical issues more clearly. 23 For example, 
the indexer of Kennedy' s  Samoan Tangle obviously made a mistake when adding "see also General Board" 
to the subheading "Naval Department" under "United States of America" without listing an entry under 
"General Board". But if this listing had been made, the use of "see also" could still be logically questionable, 
if this term is given a precise meaning. Put differently, is it logically unacceptable to use this device as a trick 
to give an index a more balanced appearance by splitting off a sub-group of references which could just as 
well have been listed under that heading? or should "see also'', strictly speaking, only refer to references 
which do not fit directly under a heading, although they are related to it? 
Is an indexer logically obliged to include cross-references? Are there different types of cross-references 
which have to be treated differently-for example "parallel" and "hierarchical" cross-references? Does it 
matter whether an indexer has taken the headings in question from the text or whether he has made them up 
himself? Is it, for example, necessary to include a cross-reference, if a text refers to the same person in one 
context as "William Humble Ward" and in another context as "the 2nd Earl of Dudley"? What is an indexer 
to do if the man is sometimes referred to in the text as "Lord Dudley" and sometimes as "the Governor­
General of Australia"? Can he simply list the references to "the Governor-General of Australia" under "Lord 
Dudley", or does he also have to include a heading "Governor General of Australia" with a cross-reference 
to "Lord Dudley" (and vice versa), or does he have to exclude references to the "Governor-General of 
Australia" because this designation neither qualifies as a proper name nor as a subject heading? 
What about "Products, agricultural'.'?  If the text only refers to particular agricultural products it would 
seem that an indexer does not have to include such a general heading. He can stick to specific headings for 
particular products, so that the question of cross-references does not arise24• An indexer provides a 
"voluntary" service ifhe introduces such a general heading as a stepping stone which leads users of the index 
to specific entries. The situation is different if the text includes a significant general discussion of agricultural 
products. A conscientious indexer has then no choice but to include this general heading. He also has no 
choice but to include headings for particular products, ifthe references to themin the text are significant. Nor 
can he choose not to include any cross-references, or to do so only if he feels like it. 
How far does an indexer have to go in following his text? Does he have to reflect a distinction it makes 
between "agriculture" and "horticulture"? Is he entitled to choose his own heading "Products, agricultural" 
in preference to the tenn "crops" used in the text which makes a distinction between "agriculture" and 
"horticulture" superfluous? 
But let me return to "the Governor-General of Australia" and the general questions which references of 
this "type" raise? What is a conscientious indexer supposed to do, if a text refers to a person only by his 
office (etc.)  and never identifies his name? Is he supposed to look for this name in other sources? But if he 
does so successfully and lists the relevant page references under that name, he only confuses users of the 
index as this name does not appear on the pages in question. Is he supposed to go a step further and 
supplement his index by a list of all the governors-general of Australia. Does he have to consider whether 
the relevant references in the text can instead be adequately covered by a subject heading? Is he entitled to 
put such references without further ado in the "too hard" basket, to declare even entire texts to be non­
indexable, or to instruct authors to rewrite their texts in accordance with the requirements of a "rational" 
index? 
While this would be going too far, there is ample scope for turning the compilation of indexes into a more 
rational enterprise. Here like in most other fields the devil lurks among the details. But we should not let 
ourselves be overwhelmed by the prospect and lose sight of the big picture. 
There is only one basic decision to be made, and the rest follows from it, whether we like it or not: is the 
index to be compiled to be an index of a text or, as a text is it to be an index of all the information contained 
in it? Only if we opt for the first alternative can the compilation of an index be treated as a rational enterprise. 
If we choose the first option and want to proceed rationally we need first of all rational criteria for the 
selection of the propernames and subject matters referred to in the text which we want to include; for without 
such criteria we do not have to worry about anything else since then everything goes and whatever we do 
turns into a more or less pretentious charade. 
23 Ingenious as the linking of proper names looks, it becomes generally suspect when it is inspected more closely. It 
would appear, to stay with the previous example, that the text did not link Bismarck with the Carolines but rather with 
the "Carolines question" as a subject matter which was primarily handled in Europe and which should have been listed 
under that heading, if it played a significant part in the text. 
24 It makes no sense to add, for example, a cross-reference "see also potatoes" to entries under a heading "sugar cane". 
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As far as I can see, the only available rational selection criterion requires the indexer to decide whether 
the "names, topics etc." mentioned play a significant part in the text. If they do, they are in, if they do not, 
they are out. Now it is plain that significance is a matter of degree, that significance shades gradually into 
insignificance. I was surprised, however, how many of the "persons, places, topics etc." referred to in my text 
clearly either played a significant or, far more often, an insignificant part in it. In fact, so many names started 
to fall by the wayside, once I applied this test, that I began to worry if there would be anything left, or rather, 
whether the result would still look academically respectable. I therefore had to remind myself energetically 
that this was an irrelevant consideration and that it was instead my task to provide an index which reflected 
"the constituent elements" of the text adequately but as economically as possible. 
Seen in this light, my extensive preparatory had been worthwhile. What had started as a daunting task 
could now be reduced to comfortably manageable proportions. Instead of having to produce an index which 
was even larger and more complicated than that in Joyce, I ended up with an index which was shorter and 
simpler than that in Moses & Kennedy-and yet, in my view more rational and more helpful to my intended 
audience than an imitation of either of them would have been. 
Academic factuality test: 5 
Accounting magic: 2 18, 382, 389 
Administration of justice: native: 73-86 (passim), 
308-9, 334, 354-79 ; non-native: 306-8, 349; 
see also: Dual system of justice, Mixed 
jurisdiction 
Administrative discretion: 365-7 
Administrative Organisation and Native Law 
Ordinance ( 1 908): 335, 360- 1 
Administrative punishments: 143-52 (passim), 
356-358 
Admiralty Islands, punitive expeditions :  75, 549-
62 
African policemen: 75, 407, 446-8, 
Ah Tam: 146, 1 5 1  
Alsace-Lorraine: 28 1 
Anapapar, punitive expedition: 441 
Annexations: 277-80 
Anti-semitism: 196 
Arms, liquor etc., prohibition to supply natives: 
289-90, 339-40, 342-3 
Baining Massacre: 153- 1 54, 582-6 (passim) 
Barossa: 448-5 1 
Bascom, W.R. : 1 09- 14 (passim) 
Baudissin, Friedrich von: 507-3 1 (passim) 
Baumert, colonial official: 597-600 (passim) 
Below, naval purser: 448-5 1 
Bennigsen, Rudolf von: 95-6, 122, 258-60, 280, 
326-8, 336-7, 354, 406, 446-52, 548-72 
(passim) 
Berg, Victor: 93, 332-3 
Berghausen, Ernst: 53-5, 56-61 ,  84, 228-44 
(passim) 
Beyer, police sergeant: 457-73 (passim) 
Biermann, Max: 3 13-15  
Birds of paradise: 168, 178,  228-32, 295-6 
Bismarck, Otto von: 102-3 , 28 1 -4, 299, 49 1 ,  494 
Blanche Bay Uprising: 7 1 ,  73-4, 98-9 
Boeder, Gustav: 94-95, 105- 1 1 9  (passim), 395-6 
Boether, Paul: 1 85-6, 1 89-9 1 
Boluminski, Franz: 259-60, 438,  452-3 
Boram (Baram): 457-69 (passim) 
Born, Dr: 1 27- 1 28 
Brandeis, Eugen: 61-8, 123, 125-6, 1 83 ,  3 1 7  
British New Guinea, financial position: 2 1 1 - 1 2  
Bruckner, colonial official: 409, 482 
Brutalisation of colonial society: 1 72 
Buin Expedition: 83 
Btilow, Bernhard von: 248-9 
Burski, captain von: 123-30, 138  
Index 
Carr, E.H. :  38-42 
Castillo, Bimabe: 520 
Chinese: 132-6; 143-52 (passim) 166, 337, 339, 
363-4, 369-70, 445 (Fn. 23) 
Christmann, Helmut, Peter Hempenstall and Dirk 
Ballendorf: 1 12-20 (passim) 
Coercive and Penal Powers Ordinance ( 1 905) :  
335 ,  357, 414- 1 8  
Colonial Budgets Act: 2 12, 3 1 8, 324, 380-2 
Colonial Memorial Medal: 69-7 1 ,  254-58 
Colonial state, growth of: 22 1-7 
Commercial law: 287-9, 296-7, 338-9, 402 
Congo Conference, General Act: 28 1 
Conscription ofnatives :  as labourers: 229-30; for 
police service: 420- 1 
Consular Jurisdiction Act: 305-6, 333-4 
Corporal punishments: 64-7, 172, 176, 194-5, 
202-4, 359 
Corvt�e labour: 78-86 (passim), 90-2, 237, 238 
Costantini, Assunto: 573 
Criminal investigations and prosecutions :  1 55-6 
Customs (duties) law: 308, 339, 341-2 
Danks, Benjamin: 503-4, 5 1 3  
Daumagu: 439-40 
Decentralisation of governmental powers: 347-53 
de Costa, Leunard Weinand: 190- 1  
Dempwolff, Otto: 494 
Deportation: 373 
Dernburg, Bernhard: 54-6, 66-7, 1 1 9, 249-5 1 ,  
588 
Development plans (19 1 1 - 1 9 14) : 399-401 
Dicks, father: 437-8, 464 
Disciplinary law/proceedings/punishments : 
colonial officials: 55,  62-8 (passim), 130-8, 
244, 246-58; natives : 133-6, 202-4, 294-5, 
298-9, 309, 341 , 360, 369-70 
District courts, decisions by: 161 -81  (passim) 
Drinking licences:  142-52 (passim) 
Dual system of justice: 15 ,  35, 333 
Dunbar, captain: 549, 556-7 
Eberlein, father: 582-6 
Ebert, Paul: 472 
Eckart, Wolfgang: 120- 1 
Ehrlich, P.M.: 1 10- 14 (passim) 
Epstein, Klaus: 61-2, 67, 248, 250 
Eniwetok, planting agreement: 594-6 
Erzberger, Matthias : 6 1 -7 ,  1 59-60, 248 , 365 
Eschke, consul-general: 1 33-6 
Expeditionary troop: 80-82, 407-9, 457, 459-76, 
578 
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Farrell, Thomas: 489-90, 501-14 (passim) 
Financial controls: parliamentary: 224, 381 -93 ; 
administrative: 382, 392-402 (passim) 
Financial history: 205-27, 380-402; Budget 
proposal 19 14- 15 :  213-17 ;  Island Territory: 
2 1 2- 1 3 ,  393-9; Marshall Islands: 222-3 ; Neu 
Guinea Kompagnie: 205-12 
Finschhafen, relations with natives: 198-202 
Firth, Stewart: 20-3 1 ,  56-6 1 ,  196-204 (passim), 
469-7 1 
Fishing with dynamite: 340 
Fiskus: 212 ,  224 
Fitsch, colonial official: 575-85 
Flierl, Johannes: 197-9, 239-43 (passim) 
Frantzius, captain: 5 1 8, 529 
Fritz, Georg: 94, 1 1 8-19,  128,  329-30, 332, 450 
Gasai: 199 
Geiseler, Wilhelm: 505-6, 508,  531 
Gibbon(s) : 1 27-8, 410, 423 
Girschner, Dr: 107-20, 410, 423 
Government chiefs: 76-86 (passim), 100- 1 ,  144-
56 (passim), 304, 355, 371  
Gowa, police corporal: 437-8 
Grabowsky, Fritz: 532-3 , 536-7 
Gramms, planter: 456-69 (passim) 
Grapow, Max: 258-60 
Grattan, C.H. :  30- 1  
Haber, Eduard: 596-600 
Hatzfeldhafen, company station: 532-47 
Hahl, Albert: 93- 101  (passim), 133-6, 145-60 
(passim), 176, 1 85-6, 2 1 8-19 ,  264-5, 322, 
328-50 (passim), 354-77 (passim), 397-40 1 ,  
420-21 ,  437-53 (passim), 456-83 (passim), 
554-72 (passim), 579-86, 588-99 (passim), 
Hambruch, Paul: 106-20 (passim) 
Hansemann, Adolph von: 299, 303-5 
Head tax, native: 79-86 (passim), 90-2, 214; see 
also: Taxation law 
Heiltultul: 371 -2 
Hempenstall, Peter: 86-104, 109-20 (passim), 
159-60, 1 97-204 (passim), 217  (Fn. 32), 559-
60 
Herbertshohe, police post: 350 
Herbing, captain: 539-40 
Hermit Islands, punitive expedition: 49 1-4 
Hernsheim, Eduard: 502-3 1 (passim) 
Heusner, commodore: 537-9 
Hiery, Hermann: 106-20 (passim) 
Hildebrandt, Arthur: 194 
Historical key events: see: Baining Massacre, 
Blanche Bay Uprising; Buin Expedition; 
Kagam Expedition; Madang Conspiracies; 
Malala Massacre; Ponape Rebellion; 
Southern New Ireland Rebellion; Varzin 
Murders 
Historical records, structure of: 32-7, 270- 1 ,  430-
4 (financial records), 477-83 
Hollrung, Max: 200 
Hubatsch Lists: 53-4, 62, 1 20- 1 ,  1 9 1  (Fn. 16) 
Ideology, colonial: 227-45 (passim) 
Irmer, Georg: 3 13 ,  3 1 5  
Jahn, police sergeant: 459-74 (passim) 
Jaluit Gesellschaft: agreement with the Reich 
( 1 888):  3 1 8- 19, 563 ,  566-7 1 ;  Eastern 
Carolines concession ( 1901) :  3 3 1 -2, 563 , 
568-7 1 
Japanese, legal status of: 369 
Jiberric: 5 1 5-22 
Jimmy, Negro trader: 523 
Jomatau, see Somadau en Sokehs 
Judges, imperial: 1 82-92 
Kabua: 279, 5 1 8- 1 9  
Kagam Expedition: 7 1 ,  8 1 -2, 429, 456-74 
Kamau: 557-62 
Kamio, police corporal: 443 
Karcher, captain: 49 1 -4 
Karlowa, Rudolf: 580-1 
Kersting, Hermann: 94 (Fn. 1 3) ,  1 06- 1 3  
(passim), 589-600 (passim) 
Keysser, Christian: 236-8,  240- 1 ,  242 (Fn. 19) 
Kiem, colonial official: 63-5 
Kleinschmidt, Theodor: 489-90 
Knake, acting governor: 1 29-36 
Knappe, Wilhelm: 3 12, 3 1 3, 3 1 5, 5 1 4-3 1 
(passim) 
Knorr, Eduard: 5 14-3 1 (passim) 
Komine, Isokide: 130-2 
Kommeyer, district commissioner: 576, 577, 
583-5 
Kraetke, Reinhold: 309 
Krauss, Emil: 341 ,  375 (Fn. 42), 439-40 
Krieger, Maximilian: 1 84 
Kubarry, Johannes:  5 1 0, 5 14- 1 5  
Labareo: 592-600 (passim) 
Labour law: 290- 1 ,  294-5, 299, 307, 361 -2, 370-
3 
Labour recruitment: 56-60, 1 72, 193 ,  1 98-9, 239, 
241-2: see also: Conscription of natives; 
Corvee labour 
Land law: 291-3, 307, 334 
Lange, police sergeant: 459-60, 474 
Langemak, Anton: 506-7 
Lebomari: 5 1 8- 1 9  
Legislative history: 303-53;  Eastern Carolines: 
328, 330-3 ;  Island Territory: 326-8;  
Marianas: 329-30; Marshall Islands: 3 1 1-17 ;  
Neu Guinea Kompagnie: 303-1 1 ,  3 1 8-25 ; 
Western Carolines: 328-9 
Leit: 592-600 (passim) 
Licences: 145-52 (passim) 
Licencing approach: 287-97 
Lindequist, Friedrich von: 588 
Lobell, German official: 248-5 1 
Luelen, Bernart: 106- 14 (passim) 
Luluai: see: Government chiefs 
Madang Conspiracies: 7 1 ,  8 1  
Maetzke, trader: 549-55 1  
Makiri: 199-200 
Malala Massacre: 7 1 ,  8 1 ,  534-6, 540 
Malay policemen: 4 1 1 - 12, 449-5 1 
Marriage Ordinance, Native ( 1904): 337-8 
Marshall Islands, development plans: 588-97 
Melanesians and Micronesians: their history 
under German colonial rule: 7-8; their 
responses to this rule: 1 8  
Merz, colonial official: 395-6, 592-600 (passim) 
Metropolitan law, importation of: 15  
Mining law: 293-4, 334 
Mixed jurisdiction: 15, 360- 1 
Mixed marriages and mixed-race persons: 368, 
374-8 
Mobile police unit: see Expeditionary troop 
Molde, trader: 550-62 (passim) 
Moses, Ingrid: 467-72 
Mouton, J. M. : 501-2 
Mouton, Octave: 501-2 
Mi.iller, Ludwig: 543-6 
Nanpei, Henry: 88, 126, 264, 57 1 
Narrative history: 2-7, 30- 1 ,  88-9 
Narrative language: 27-8, 217 (Fn. 32) 
Native police force: 72, 405-55, 542; see also: 
African policemen, Expeditionary troop; 
Malay policemen 
Native reserves: 304; see also: Land law 
Natives, complaints to colonial authorities by: 
159 ;  legal position of: 306, 367-9 ; mal­
treatment of: 169-8 1 (passim) 
Navy, role in colonial government: 72-5 (passim), 
83 
Neuhauss, Richard: 230-43 (passim) 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie: agreement with the 
Reich ( 1 889): 3 19-20; agreements with the 
Reich (1 896/98): 323 ; articles of association 
(1886): 305; imperial charter (1 885): 303 ; 
instructions to the administrator ( 1 885): 303-
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5 ;  instructions to  general manager ( 1 889): 
320- 1 
New Guinea, Territory of, financial position: 226 
Northern New Ireland, punitive expeditions : 102-
3, 507- 1 0, 5 1 l , 523-5 
Nyssenus, brother: 472-3 
Oertzen, Gustav von: 435, 496-53 1 (passim) 
Oral traditions: 8-12, 265-70 
Oren: 557-62 
Osswald, Arthur: 1 15 ,  239-40, 396-7 
Papua, financial position: 221 -2 
Penal Ordinance, Native ( 1 888) :  1 89, 309, 344 
Personal status law: 285, 306-7 
Phantom history: 2-7, 1 2, 30- 1 ,  269-7 1 ,  600- 1 
Pissigo: 492-4 
Poeplau, Oskar: 249-53 
Police: see: Native police force 
Police powers: 413-19 
Pominis: 88, 1 59-60 
Ponape Rebellion: 69, 7 1 ,  80, 94-5, 105-22 
(passim), 237, 258, 397, 428-9, 588 
Prey, Hermann: 456-83 (passim) 
Protectorates Act: 282-7, 305-6, 333-4, 567 
Punitive Expeditions: 1 6-17,  3 6-7, 69-86 
(passim), 229, 23 1 ,  233, 261 -4; see also: 
Admiralty Islands, Anapapar, Finschhafen, 
Hermit Islands, Northern New Ireland; St 
Matthias and Historical key events 
Puttkamer, Jesco von: 248-54 
Puttkamer, Wilhelm von: 190- 1 ,  533 
Quantitative history: 14- 16, 46-7, 84-5 
Racism: 2, 173, 179 
Reich, constitution of: 224, 28 1 ,  283-4 
Reichstag: see: Financial controls, parliamentary 
Rhenish Mission: 534-6 
Roads: 76-86 (passim), 90-2, 143-52 (passim), 
577 
Roettger, captain: 278,  5 1 9  
Rooney, Isaac: 503 
Rose, Fritz: 54-6, 62-6, 97-8, 132-6, 1 83 ,  193-
204 (passim), 249, 261 (Fn. 22), 321-2, 365, 
376-7, 439-40, 535-546 (passim), 5 54-5 
Riidiger, Hugo: 1 84-5 
Rule of Law: 2-3, 12, 14- 1 6, 59, 7 1 ,  1 37,  173, 
243-4, 287, 297-9, 364-7, 379, 402, 421 ,  
600- 1 
Sacred Heart Mission, complaints by and about 
missionaries: 157-8 
Sago, Solomon Islands trader: 145, 1 49,  1 5 1 ,  
158 , 506, 507 
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Salisbury, Richard: 99- 1 0 1  
Sattelberg, community organisation: 236-7 ,  241 
Schack, Friedrich: 275-6 
Schellong, Otto: 200- 1 ,  497-8 
Schleinitz, Georg von: 287-8, 305-8, 496-53 1  
(passim), 535, 537-9 
Schmidt, imperial commissioner: 3 12, 3 1 5  
Schmidt, trader: 5 1 9  
Schmiele, Georg: 1 82-4, 1 88-9, 194-5, 307, 369, 
497-53 1 (passim) 
Schnee, Heinrich: 54-6, 97-8, 441-, 448-5 1 ,  549-
562 (passim) 
Schoevers, planter: 533-46 
Scholz, Benno: 240, 242-3, 456-69 (passim) 
Schrader, Carl: 200- 1 
Schulle, Friedrich: 498,  5 1 3 , 523-4 
Schutzgebiet: 23, 275-7 
Schutzgebietsangehorigkeit: 378-9 
Schutzgewalt: 23, 275-7 
Seiferling, lieutenant-commander: 121-2, 130-2 
Senfft, Arno: 121 ,  328-9, 376 
Shipping subsidies: 205, 2 1 0, Fn. 14 
Shooting boys (native) :  145-52 (passim) 
Sinade: 436-7 
Singapore, British authorities in: 133-6 
Skopnik, Hugo: 322 
Soelle, police sergeant: 443-5 
Solf, Wilhelm: 124, 25 1 -2, 256-7, 376 (Fn. 44), 
548 
Somadau en Sokehs: 88,  1 07-1 7  (passim) 
Sonnenschein, Franz: 3 12, 3 1 6  
Southern New Ireland Rebellion: 83, 409, 475-6, 
48 1 -2 
Spidle, J.W. : 54-6 
Spiegel, E. von: 1 06- 1 8  (passim) 
Sprachschiiler, 58, 83-4 
St. Matthias, punitive expedition: 128, 258- 1 
Steinhauser, police commander: 405, 435, 544 
Steusloff, colonial official: 406, 442 
Stimson, missionary: 126-7 
Stuckhardt, Wilhelm: 6 1 ,  93,  101 ,  185-6, 259, 
350, 439-40 
Stuebel, district commissioner: 453-5 
Stuebe!, Oscar: 1 23-5, 1 29-30 
Sub-traders (native) : 145-52 (passim) 
Supreme court, decisions by: 161-81  
Tapalia: 581  
Tatama: 265-6 
Taulil, return of slaves: 581-6 
Tavalai: 98-9 
Taxation law: 308, 345-7 see also: Head tax, 
native 
Thilenius, Georg: 585 
Thurnwald, Richard: 56-61 ,  84 
Tideck, 442 
Tigat, Nason: 265-6 
Tirpitz, Alfred von: 1 23-5, 130, 256 
To Babeke: 579-86 
To Bobo: 88, 98- 101 ,  144, 148 
Tom, Solomon Islands labourer: 488-9 
Toma, police post: 573-87 
To Maidang: 579, 582-3 
To Mataria (To Materia, Tornatari): 1 00 (Fn. 25), 
442, 506, 507 
Tomotu, police corporal: 438 
To Rarnit: 144 
Toreren: 442-3 
Towering (Toviringi) : 1 54, 504, 5 10- 16  
Tultul: see: Government chiefs 
Unification of colonial law: 341-7 
Varzin Murders: 7 1 ,  77, 96-8, 1 3 1 ,  134, 148-9, 
265-8, 443-4, 578, 579-80 
"Virtual" history: 198 
Vormann, father: 439-40, 457-8 
Wietersheim, Friedrich von: 279, 497-53 1  
(passim) 
Winter, Julius: 193-204 
Wobau: 524 
Wolff, Emil: 96-8, 1 32-6, 147, 149, 1 86, 443-5, 
573 , 582 
Wostrack, Wilhelm: 554-62 (passim) 
Zembsch, Otto: 487-9 1 
Zipol, policemen: 440 
PHANTOM HISTORY 
THE RULE OF LAW 
AND THE COLONIAL STATE 
The Case of German New Guinea 
Peter Sack 
This book uses the history o f  German New Guinea t o  examine the role of law in colonial government. It argues: that it was crucial; that the 'colonial state ' ,  rather 
than disappearing, has become a global phenomenon; and that the conventional narrative 
approach to history is incapable of giving a realistic account of the history of colonial rule, 
offering 'phantom history' instead. 
On the other hand this book argues that it is possible to adopt alternative approaches 
to colonial law, because it is historically an instrument for organising state powers which 
creates historical records that reveal the structures of this organisation and provide 
quantitative information about its operation. 
What makes the case of German New Guinea particularly interesting is that such a 
structural and quantitative approach can take us only part of the way since its colonial law 
had to be developed from scratch, so that it could only gradually grow into a bureaucratic 
form of government which lawyers l ike to call 'The Rule of Law' .  
While it is comparatively easy to describe the legal framework within which its  government 
operated, it is imposs ible to deal with its operation adequately in quantitative terms, 
because much of the relevant information was not systematically recorded and because a 
large portion of the records made has not survived. 
There was thus no choice but to adopt a narrative approach, despite its shortcomings, but 
to try to avoid the pitfalls of 'phantom history' as far as possible . In short, this book is as 
much about the challenges of writing a realistic history of colonial rule as it is about the 
history of colonial law in German New Guinea. 
